THE

WORKS

OF THE FAMOUS

Nicholas Machiavel,

CITIZEN and SECRETARY

OF

FLORENCE.

WRITTEN

Originally in ITALIAN, *and from thence newly and faithfully Tranſlated into* ENGLISH.

The THIRD EDITION, carefully Corrected.

LONDON:

Printed by *T. W.* for A. CHURCHILL, R. BONWICK, T. GOODWIN, J. WALTHOE, M. WOTTON, S. MANSHIP, B. TOOKE, R. WILKIN, R. SMITH, R. ROBINSON, and T. WARD.

MDCCXX.

MDCCXX.
R. WILKIN, R. SMITH, R. ROBINSON, and T. WARD.
WIN. LEWTHORP, M. WOTTON, S. MANSHIP, B. TOOKE.
PRINTED FOR A. CHURCHILL, R. BONWICK, T. GOOD-
LONDON:

LICENSED Feb. 2. 1674.

The THIRD EDITION, carefully Corrected.

Originally in ITALIAN, and from thence Translated into ENGLISH.

MUSEUM BRITANNICUM

ELOQUENCE

OF THE

CITIZEN and SECRETARY

Nicholas Machiavel

OF THE FAMOUS

WORKS

THE

THE SEVERAL

TREATISES

Contained in this

BOOK.

1. THE History of *Florence.*
2. The *Prince.*
3. The Original of the *Guelf* and *Ghibiline* Factions.
4. The Life of *Caſtruccio Caſtracani.*
5. The Murther of *Vitelli, &c.* by Duke *Valentino.*
6. The State of *France.*
7. The State of *Germany.*
8. The Diſcourſes on *Titus Livius.*
9. The Art of *War.*
10. The Marriage of *Belphegor,* a Novel.
11. *Nicholas Machiavel's* Letter in Vindication of himſelf and his Writings.

THE

11. Nicholas Machiavel's Letter in Vindication of him-
self and his Writings.

10. The Marriage of Belphegor, a Novel.

9. The Art of War.

8. The Discourses on Titus Livius.

7. The State of Germany.

6. The State of France.

5. The Prince.

4. The Life of Castruccio Castracani.

3. The Original of the Civil and Capitline Regions.

2. The Murther of Vitelli, &c. by Duke Valentino.

1. The History of Florence.

BOOK

Contained in this

TREATISES

THE SEVERAL

THE

HISTORY

OF

FLORENCE,

CONTAINING

An Account of the Heroic ENTERPRIZES,

Publick and Private Tranſactions;

With the Civil Diſſentions, Changes and Alterations in that

GOVERNMENT.

Alſo an ACCOUNT of the

AFFAIRS of *ITALY,*

And the ACTIONS, DESIGNS and CONTRIVANCES of moſt of the PRINCES and STATES therein.

In Eight BOOKS.

By *NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL.*

LONDON:

Printed for *A. Churchill, R. Bonwick, T. Goodwin, J. Walthoe, M. Wotton, S. Manſhip, B. Tooke, R. Wilkin, R. Smith, R. Robinſon,* and *T. Ward* 1720.

Printed for A. Chalmers, R. Faulder, T. Longman, J. Walpoe,
M. Walton, S. Macuplo, B. Tooke, R. Wilkin, R. Smith, R. Ro-
pinson, and T. Ward 1790.

LONDON:

BY NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL.

In Eight BOOKS.

Of most of the PRINCES and STATES in Europe.
And the ACTIONS, DESIGNS and CONTRIVANCES
Of their MINISTERS of STATE:
Also an ACCOUNT of the
GOVERNMENT
With the Civil Dissentions, Changes and Alterations in that
Republick and Private Transactions:
An Account of the FACTIONS, INTERPRIZES
CONTAINING
THE ELOQUENCE
OF
HISTORY.
THE

THE EPISTLE TO CLEMENT VII.

BEing commanded by your Holineſs (whilſt in a private condition) to write the Hiſtory of FLORENCE; I addreſſed my ſelf to it with all the art and diligence wherewith Nature and Experience had endued me. Having deduced it to the times, in which, upon the death of *Magnifico Lorenzo de Medici*, the whole Form and Model of *Italy* was altered; and being to deſcribe the height and importance of what followed, in a loftier and more vigorous ſtile, I judged it beſt to reduce what I had written till thoſe times into one Volume, and preſent it to your Holineſs, that you might at leaſt have a taſte of the Fruit you had ſown your ſelf, and of my Labour and Cultivation. In the peruſal of this Work, your Holineſs will ſee firſt, to what ruine and convulſions our Country was expoſed for many ages by the variations of Governments, after the declenſion of the Roman Empire in the Weſt. You will ſee how your Predeceſſors, the *Venetians*, the Kingdom of *Naples*, and the Dukedom of *Milan* took their turns of Empire and Sovereignty in

this

this Province. You will ſee your own Country refuſing obedience to the Emperors, by reaſon of the diviſions, and thoſe diviſions continuing till under the protection of your Family, it began to ſettle into a Government. And becauſe it was your Holineſs particular command, that in my character of your Anceſtors, I ſhould avoid all kind of flattery, true praiſe not being more pleaſing to you, than counterfeit is ungrateful; fearing in my deſcription of the bounty of *Giovanni*, the wiſdom of *Coſimo*, the courteſie of *Piero*, the magnificence and ſolidity of *Lorenzo*, I may ſeem to have tranſgreſſed your Holineſs direction, I do moſt humbly excuſe my ſelf, both in that, and whatever elſe in my deſcriptions may appear unfaithful to your Holineſs diſſatisfaction; for finding the Memoirs and Relations of thoſe who in ſundry ages made any mention of them, full of their commendations, I muſt either preſent them as I found them, or paſs them by as if I envied them. And if (as ſome write) under their great and egregious exploits there was always ſome latent and ambitious deſign, contrary to the intereſt and liberty of the publick. I know nothing of it, and am not bound to relate it: for in all my Narrations I never deſired to cloak or palliate a diſhonourable action with an honourable preſence; nor to traduce a good action, though to a contrary end. But how far I am from flattery, is to be ſeen in the whole courſe of my Hiſtory, eſpecially in my Speeches and private Diſcourſes, which do plainly, and without reſervation, deſcribe with the ſentences and order of their language, the dignity and humour of the perſons. I avoid likewiſe in all places ſuch words as are impertinent to the verity, or reputation of Hiſtory; ſo that no man who conſiders my Writings impartially, can charge me with adulation; eſpecially if he obſerves how little or nothing I have ſaid of your Holineſs own Father, whoſe life was too ſhort to diſcover him to the world,

and

and I too downright to expatiate upon it. Nevertheleſs had he done nothing more but given your Holineſs to the world, that very thing outweighs all the actions of his Anceſtors, and ſhall leave more ages of honour to his family, than his malevolent fortune took years from his life. I have endeavoured (moſt holy Sir) as far as might be done without blemiſh to the truth, to pleaſe all people, and it may ſo fall out I have pleaſed no body. If it ſhould, I ſhould not wonder, ſeeing, in my judgment, it is impoſſible to write any thing of our own times, without offence to ſeveral. Yet I come forth cheerfully into the field, hoping that as I am honoured and employed by your Holineſs Goodneſs, I ſhall be defended by your Holineſs Judgment; and then with the ſame confidence and courage as I have writ now, I ſhall purſue my engagements if my life laſts, and your Holineſs continues amongſt us.

THE
Author's Introduction.

WHEN I first took upon me to write the History of *Florence*, and its Transactions both at home and abroad, I thought to have begun at the year 1434, at which time the Family of the *Medici* (exalted by the merits of *Cosimo*, and his Father *Giovanni*) was in greater authority than any other in that City; believing that Mess. *Leonardo d' Arezzo*, and Mess. *Poggio*, two excellent Historians, had given particular description of all the passages before. But upon diligent perusal of their Writings to inform my self of their Orders and Methods, that thereby my own might have better approbation, I found that in their Narratives of the Florentine Wars, and Foreign Negotiations, they had been accurate enough; but in their Civil Dissentions, their Intrinsic Animosities, and in the Effects which followed them, they were either totally silent, or where any thing was mentioned, it was with such brevity and abruptness as could yield neither profit nor recreation to the Reader: Which I conceive they did, either out of an opinion that they were inconsiderable, and unworthy to be transmitted to Posterity; or else they apprehended a necessity of reflecting upon some Great persons, whose Family would be disobliged thereby; both which arguments (if I may speak it without offence) are beneath the grandeur and magnanimity of a Great person. For if any thing in History be delightful or profitable, it is those particular descriptions; if any thing be useful to such Citizens as have the Government in their hands, it is such as represents the feuds and dissentions in the Cities, that thereby they may be enabled to maintain their own unity at other peoples expence; if the example of any Commonwealth moves a man, certainly that which is written of ones own, makes a much stronger impression; and if the Factions of any State were ever considerable, the Factions in *Florence* were not to be pretermitted: the greatest part of other States have not had above one, which sometimes has advanced, and sometimes ruined the Government; but *Florence* has had many divisions. Every body knows how in *Rome* after the expulsion of their King, there arose division betwixt the Nobles and the People, which continued till one of them was oppressed. So it was in *Athens*, and all

the

the Commonwealths which flouriſhed in thoſe times; but in *Florence* the firſt diſſention was betwixt the Nobles; the next betwixt the Nobles and Citizens; and then betwixt the Citizens and the Plebs: In all which, one was no ſooner ſuperior, but it divided again; and the effects of thoſe diviſions were Murders and Baniſhments, and Diſperſion of Families, ſuch as never occurr'd in any City, that can be remembred. And truly in my judgment, nothing demonſtrates the power of our City ſo much as the conſequences of thoſe diviſions, which were enough to have ſubverted and deſtroyed any other in the world. But ours grew ſtill greater thereby; ſo remarkable was the courage of the Citizens, and ſo efficacious their induſtry for the advancement of their Country, that thoſe few which ſurvived the miſeries of their Predeceſſors, did more by their conſtancy and courage towards the advancement of their intereſt, than the malignity of thoſe accidents could do to depreſs it. And doubtleſs had *Florence* been ſo happy after it had freed it ſelf from the Empire, to have aſſumed ſuch a form of Government as would have preſerved it in unity, I know not any Commonwealth, either ancient or modern, that would have exceeded it, or have been comparable to it, either in Riches or Power. For it is obſervable, after the *Ghibilines* were driven out of the Town in ſuch numbers as all *Tuſcany* and *Lombardy* were full of thoſe Exiles, the *Guelfs*, and ſuch as were left behind in the expedition againſt *Arezzo* (which was the year before the battel of *Campeldino*) were able to draw out of their own Citizens 1200 Horſe, and 12000 Foot. And afterwards in the War againſt *Philippo Viſconti* Duke of *Milan*, being to try their fortune rather with their Riches than their Arms (which at that time were very much weakened) in five years ſpace (which was the length of that War) the *Florentines* expended five millions and five hundred thouſand Florins; and when that War was compoſed, to oſtentate and publiſh the power of that Commonwealth, they marched out with an Army, and beſieged *Lucca*. I do not ſee therefore, for what reaſon theſe diviſions ſhould not be worthy of relation; and if thoſe Noble Authors were reſtrained by fear of offending the memory of ſuch as they were to ſpeak of, they were mightily out, and ſeem not to have underſtood the ambition of mankind, and their deſire to have the names of themſelves and anceſtors tranſmitted to poſterity; nor did they remember that many people, not having opportunity to make themſelves eminent by good and laudable acts, have endeavoured to compaſs it by any way, how ſcandalous and ignominious ſoever. Neither did they conſider that the actions which carry greatneſs along with them, as thoſe of Governments and States, what ends ſoever they have, and which way ſoever they are deſcribed, do ſtill leave more honour than infamy to their

Family;

Family; the conſideration of which things prevailed with me to alter my deſign, and to begin my Hiſtory from the very foundation of the City: And becauſe it is not my intention to tranſcribe what has been done before by other people, I ſhall relate ſuch things only as occurr'd within the City to the year 1434, mentioning the accidents abroad only ſo far as will be neceſſary for the intelligence of the other; after which year I ſhall give a particular deſcription both of the one and the other. Beſides, for the better and more laſting underſtanding of this Hiſtory, before I treat of *Florence*, I ſhall diſcourſe of the means by which *Italy* fell under the dominion of thoſe Potentates which governed it at that time: all which ſhall be comprehended in my Four firſt Books. The firſt ſhall give a ſhort recital of all tranſactions in *Italy*, from the diſſolution of the Roman Empire to the year 1434. The ſecond ſhall give an account of all affairs from the foundation of the City of *Florence*, to the end of the war againſt the Pope, which commenced upon the expulſion of the Duke of *Athens*. The third ſhall conclude with the death of *Ladiſlaus* King of *Naples*. And in the fourth we ſhall end with the year 1434, from whence afterwards to our preſent times, we ſhall give a particular Narrative of all proceedings both within the City and without.

THE

THE TABLE OF THE Florentine Hiſtory.

Book I.

The Northern Nations healthful and prolifick pag. 1
Their Method of evacuation upon their exceſſive encreaſe ibid.
Their exceſſive encreaſe, the ruine of the Roman *Empire* ib.
The Weſtern Gothes the firſt invaders of that Empire ib.
Rome *ſack'd by them under the command of* Alaricus 2
Boniface *Governour of* Africk *for the Emperor* ib.
Gallia *over-run by the Franks, and from them called* France ib.
The Hanni *conquer and denominate* Hungaria ib.
Britain *called* Anglia *from the* Angli ib.
The Hanni *invade* Italy *under* Attila ib.
Attila *beſieges and takes* Aquilegia ib.
He advances to Rome, *but retires at the requeſt of the Pope* 3
The Hanni *driven back over thee* Danube, *return home* ib.
The firſt reſidence of the Roman *Emperors at* Ravenna ib.
New Emperors elected by the Romans *upon the non-reſidence of their old* ib.
The Lombards invade Italy ib.
Odoacres *call'd King of* Rome, *and the firſt of the Barbarians which thought of fixing in* Italy ib.
The old Empire divided into Cantons ib.
Theodorick *invades* Italy, *ſlays* Odoacres, *calls himſelf King of* Rome, *and held his reſidence at* Ravenna ib.
Theodorick *dies* 4
Ballaſarius *General for* Juſtinian *the Emperor* ib.
Totila *takes, ſacks, and burns* Rome ib.
Narſetes *a new General for* Juſtinian ib.
Longinus *alters the Government in* Italy ib.
Alboins *kill'd by the conſpiracy of his Wife* ib.
The authority of the Biſhops of Rome *began to encreaſe* ib.
Biſhops of Rome *employed as Miniſters by the Emperors and Kings, and ſometimes executed by them* 7
The Eaſtern Empire deſtroyed in the times of Heracleus *the Emperor* ib.
The King of France *exempts the Pope from all humane juriſdiction* 8
Paſcal *created Pope* ib.
The original of Cardinals ib.
Eugenius *the ſecond Pope* ib.
Oſpurcus *made Pope, changes his name* ib.
The original of Piſa ib.
The Government of Italy, anno 931 ib.
Agabito *Pope* 9
Gregory *the fifth Pope, expelled and reſtored, diveſts the* Romans *of their power of creating Emperors, and confers it upon ſix Princes of* Germany ib.
Clement *the ſecond Pope* ib.
Nicholas *the ſecond Pope, excludes the* Romans, *and renounces the Papal Elections to the ſuffrage of Cardinals only* ib.
Schiſm and anti-Popes in the Church ib.
The difference between Henricus *and the Pope, the ground of the Guelf and Ghibilin factions* ib.
The original of the Kingdom of Sicily ib.
Urbin *the ſecond Pope* ib.
The firſt Croiſſade ib.
Paſcal *the ſecond Pope* 11
Alexander *the third Pope* ib.
A new anti-Pope ib.
The Pope's penance to King Henry *of* England, *upon the complaints about* Thomas Becket ib.
Celeſtin *the third Pope* 12
Honorius *the third Pope* ib.
The Orders of St. Dominick *and St.* Francis *inſtituted*, 1218 ib.
The Titles of King of Naples *and* Jeruſalem *annexed* ib.
The houſe of the Eſti *made Lords of* Ferrara 13

The TABLE.

The Guelfs side with the Church, the Ghibilins with the Emperor ib.
Innocent *the fourth Pope* ib.
Clement *the fifth Pope* ib.
Adrian *the fifth Pope* ib.
Nicholas *the third of the house of* Ursin 14
The first introduction of Popes Nephews. ib.
Martin *the tenth Pope* ib.
Pope Celestine *resigns to* Boniface *the eighth* ib.
The first Jubilees ordained by Boniface *every* 100 *years* 15
Benedictus *chosen, dies, and is succeeded by* Clement *the fifth, who removed his residence into* France, 1036. ib.
John *the* 22*th Pope* ib.
The Visconti *a great Family in* Milan, *made Princes of that City by the extirpation of the* Torri ib.
The first Duke of Milan ib.
The Dukedom of Milan *falls to the* Flora's 16
The original of the Venetians ib.
Candia *given to the Venetians by the French* 17
Benedict *the twelfth Pope* ib.
Clement *the sixth Pope* ib.
The Jubilee reduced to 50 *years* 18
Avignon *given to the Pope by the Queen of* Naples ib.
Innocent *the sixth Pope* ib.
Urban *the fifth Pope* ib.
Gregory *the twelfth Pope* ib.
The Pope returns to Rome *after* 71 *years residence in* France ib.
Urban *the sixth Pope* ib.
Clement *the seventh Anti-Pope* ib.
Guns first used between the Genoeses and Venetians ib.
Urban *and* Clement *succeeded by* Boniface *the* 9*th and* Benedict *the* 13*th* ib.
Boniface *dies,* Innocent *succeeds him; and* Gregory *the* 12*th* Innocent 19
Alexander *the fifth elected, and succeeded by* John *the* 23*d* ib.
Three Popes at once ib.
Martin *the fifth* ib.
The Queen of Naples *calls in the King of* Arragon *to her assistance, adopts him, and makes* Braccio de Montone *her General* 20
The state of Italy ib.

Book II.

The convenience of Colonies 22
The Original of Florence 23
The denomination of Florence ib.
The first division of Florence 24
The Guelf and Ghibilin Faction in Florence ib.
The Union and Government of the City of Florence 25
The Antiani ib.
The Captain of the People and Podesta ib.
Their Militia ib.
A generous Custom ib.
Manfredi *King of* Naples, *a great Patron of the Ghibilins* ib.
Carlo d' Angio *call'd into* Italy *by the Pope* 26
A new model of Government in Florence ib.
New commotions in Florence ib.
A second model by the Guelfs 27
Gregory *the tenth Pope* ib.
Florence *under excommunication* ib.
Innocence *the* 5*th* ib.
The jealousie of the Pope ib.
Nicholas *the third Pope* ib.
The Ghibilins return ib.
Martinus *Pope* 28
The Government of Florence *reformed by the Citizens* ib.
The three Priors to govern two months, to be chosen out of the City indifferently ib.
The Signori ib.
Discord between the Nobility and People ib.
The Priory *and* Gonfalonier ib.
Persuasions to the Nobility to be quiet 29
The same to the People ib.
New reformation in Florence, 1298, 30
The difference in the Family of the Cancellieri, *the occasion and consequence* ib.
The Bianchi *and* Neri ib.
Charles *of* Valois *made Governour of* Florence 31
New troubles occasioned by Corso Donati 32
The Medici *and* Giugni 33
Florence *burned,* 13[illegible], ib.
Corso Donati *condemned* 34
His Death ib.
New divisions in Florence 35
Castruccio Castracani 36
The Council of the Signori *to sit forty months, whereas before it was occasional* 37
Election of Magistrates by Imborsation. ib.
Ramondo da Cardona *General of the Florentines* ib.
The Duke of Athens *Governour of* Florence ib.
Lodowic *the Emperor called into* Italy 38
The death of Castruccio *and the Duke of* Calabria ib.
New reformation in Florence ib.
The Florentines quiet at home ib.
Their Buildings ib.
A Captain of the Guards 36
Maffeo da Marradi ib.
Lucca *sold to the Florentines* 40
Taken from them by the Pisans ib.
The Duke of Athens ib.
The Speech of one of the Senators to the Duke of Athens 41
The Duke's Answer 42

The TABLE.

The Duke of Athens *chosen Prince by the People* ib.
His practices in Florence ib.
Three conspiracies against the Duke at one time 43
Commotion in France 44
The Duke expell'd 45
His character ib.
New reformation 46
The Nobility deposed ib.
The Nobility attempt to recover their authority 47
The people arm against them ib.
The Nobility utterly depressed 48

Book III.

EMulation *betwixt the middle and the meaner sort of people* 50
The Citizens Oration to the Senate 51
New reformation 53
Gregory *the* 11*th holds his residence at* Avignon ib.
New Commission for the management of the War ib.
A conspiracy of the Guelfs 54
The conspiracy defeated ib.
The Speech of Salvestro de Medici 55
The Balia ib.
Reformation again 56
Luigi Guicciardini's *Oration* ib.
New troubles 57
The Speech of a Plebeian 58
The people rise again 59
The demands of the people 60
Michaele di Lando, *a Carder of wool* ib.
Michael *overcomes the multitude* 62
The popular faction distinguished from the Plebeian ib.
Another reformation 64
The Commons expelled from the Government 65
Michael Lando *imprisoned* ib.
Benedetto's *Speech to his friends upon his going into banishment* ib.
He dies at Rhodes 66
Veri de Medici's *Speech to the Senate* 67
Donati Acciaivoli *confin'd* 68
A new conspiracy defeated ib.
The Duke of Milan *practises against the City of* Florence 69
Several Families banished ib.
The King of Naples *dies* ib.

Book IV.

PEace *betwixt* Florence *and* Milan 72
Imola *taken by the Duke* Philip 73
The Florentines overthrown ib.
Rinaldo Albizi's *exhortation to be quiet* 74
Giovanni de Medici's *reply to* Rinaldo 75
The factions of Urano *and the* Medici 76
The great courage of Biagio del Milano ib.
The cowardize of Zenobi del Pino ib.
Piccinino *revolts* 77
Carmignuola *General of the League* ib.
Peace betwixt the League and the Duke 78
Giovanni de Medici's *Speech to his Sons in his death* ib.
Cosimo *heir to his Father* 79
Volterra *revolts* ib.
Recovered again by the Florentines ib.
Rinaldo *perswades to war with* Lucca 80
Urano *opposes it* ib.
The cruelty of Astorre 81
Rinaldo *accus'd* 82
His Speech to the ten 83
Pagolo *Lord of* Lucca *deposed* 84
The Florentines defeated ib.
Peace between the Florentines and the Lucchesi ib.
Florence *in confusion* 85
Cosimo Medici *deposed and imprisoned* 87
Federigo's *Speech to* Cosimo *his Prisoner* ib.
Cosimo *banished* 88
Rinaldo's *Speech to his friends* ib.
Eugenius *the Pope labours a Peace* 90
Cosimo *recalled* ib.
Rinaldo's *answer to the Pope* ib.

Book V.

THe *Soldiers in* Italy *distinguished into two parties* 93
The Duke of Milan *promises his Daughter to Count* Francis Sforza ib.
The Pope invaded, makes Peace with Sforza ib.
Wars in Romagna ib.
Sforza *General of the Pope's League* 94
Peace betwixt the League and the Duke ib.
New Ordinances in Florence ib.
Alphonso *King of* Arragon *defeated by the Genoeses, and brought Prisoner to Duke* Philip 95
The Duke and his authority in Genoa ib.
Genoa *delivered to the Duke of* Milan 96
How it recovered its liberty again ib.
Rinaldo's *Oration to the Duke of* Milan ib.
The Speech of a Citizen of Lucca *to the People* 98
Controversies between the Greek and Roman Churches 102
Determined at Florence, *by the submission of the Greek* ib.
The Pope deluded, and his Country invaded by Nich. Piccinino 103
The Speech of Neri, *a Citizen of* Florence, *to the Venetian Senate* 104
Nicolo Piccinino *defeated by Count* Sforza 106

He 'ſcapes to Fenna, *and from thence very ſtrangely to his Army* ib.
Verona *ſurpriz'd by* Nicolo 107
Recovered again by the Count ib.
The Duke of Milan *encouraged in his Expedition into* Tuſcany *by* Nicolo *and the Florentine Exiles* 108
The Patriarch of Alexandria *General for the Pope* ib.
The Pope diſcovers intelligence between the Patriarch and Nicolo, *and reſolves to ſecure him* ib.
Is ſecured by Antonio *Governour of the Caſtle at* Rome, *and dies* 109
Commiſſioners from the Venetians to the Count ib.
Nicolo *makes a diverſion into the Territories of* Florence ib.
The Count deſirous to follow him, but is hindred by the Venetians ib.
Of Nicolo's *proceeding after he left* Lombardy 110, 111
Nicolo's *practices to ſurprize* Crotona 112
Breſcia *relieved by the Venetians* ib.
The Duke of Milan's *Fleet defeated by the Venetians* ib.
Nicolo *engages the Florentines at* Anghiari, *and is defeated by them* ib.
The Speech of Count Poppi *to the Florentine Commiſſaries* 114
Neri's *Anſwer* ib.

Book VI.

THe Duke of Milan *propoſeth a Peace to Count* Sforſa, *and offereth his Daughter in marriage to the Count* 116
The ingratitude of the Venetians ib.
Micheletto *General for the League* ib.
Nicolo's *inſolence to the Duke of* Milan 117
Peace between the Duke of Milan *and Count* Sforſa ib.
Naples *taken by the King of* Arragon 118
Florence *reformed* 119
Nicolo Piccinino *dies of grief; a couragious, but unfortunate General* ib.
A new War in Lombardy 121
Count Sforſa *courted by all Parties* ib.
The Duke of Milan *dies* ib.
The Count made General for the Milaneſi 122
The Venetians ambitious of the Dutchy of Milan ib.
Alphonſo *invades the Florentines* ib.
Retreats out of Tuſcany 123
The Venetians fall upon Count Sforſa *in his Trenches at the Siege of* Caravaggio, *and are totally routed by the Count* 124
Peace between the Venetians and the Count, by which the Venetians were obliged to aſſiſt the Count in his obtaining the Dutchy of Milan 125
An Oration made by one of the Milan *Ambaſſadors to the Count* ib.
The Count's Anſwer 126
Coſimo de Medici *a friend to the Count* 127
The Venetians aſſiſt the Milineſi againſt the Count 128
The Milineſi reduced to great ſtraits by Sforza ib.
Milan *delivered to* Sforſa, *and he made Duke thereof, enters into a League with the Florentines* 129
The King of Arragon *and the Venetians enter into a League* ib.
Their Embaſſy to the Florentines ib.
The Florentines anſwer ib.
The Florentines prepare War 130
Federigo *the Emperor comes into* Italy *to be crown'd, and enter* Florence ib.
The King of Arragon *invades* Tuſcany ib.
The ſtrange conceit and undertaking of a Citizen of Rome 131
Peace between the Duke of Milan *and the Venetians* ib.
The King of Arragon *enters into the League* 134
The Pope ſollicits a War againſt the Turk ib.
A prodigious Tempeſt ib.
The Genoeſi invaded by the King of Arragon 135
Genoa *delivered to the French* ib.
The King of Arragon *dies* ib.
Caliſto *the third dies, and* Pius *the ſecond choſen Pope* 136
The Genoeſi revolt from the French ib.
Naples *invaded by* Giovanni d' Angio ib.
The King of Naples *defeated* ib.
He recruits his Army, fights and defeats Giovanni ib.
Giovanni *being defeated, and deſerted of his Soldiers, flies into* France ib.

Book VII.

COſimo de Medici, *and* Neri Capponi, *the two great Citizens in* Florence 138
Coſimo *dies* 139
His Children, Riches, Honours, and Actions deſcribed 139, 140, 141
Giacopo Piccinio *murdered* 142
Franceſco Sforza *Duke of* Milan *dies* 144
The Florentines invaded by the Venetians 148
Peace between the Florentines and Venetians 149
Piero de Medici's *Speech to the Florentines* ib.
His Death 150
Thomaſo Soderini *in great favour with the Florentines* ib.
Lorenzo *and* Guiliano de Medici *made Princes of the City of* Florence ib.

A con-

The TABLE.

A conſpiracy of the Nardi 151
Bernardo *defeated, and taken* 152
The Duke of Milan *in* Florence ib.
Tumults in Volterra ib.
Volterra *ſurrendred and ſack'd* 183
Italy *in two factions* 154
Troubles in Tuſcany ib.
A conſpiracy againſt the Duke of Milan *takes effect, and the Duke ſlain* 155, 156

Book VIII.

Animoſity between the Parri *and the* Medici *in* Florence 158
A conſpiracy to deſtroy Lorenzo *and* Giuliani de Medici ib.
Rinati del Pazzi *diſſwades from the enterprize, but in vain* 159
The conſpiracy miſcarries 161
The Pope and King of Naples *make war upon the* Florentines 162
Lorenza de Medici's *Speech to the* Florentines ib.
The Pope and King invades their Territories 164
Genoa *rebels againſt the State of* Milan ib.
The gratitude of the Florentines 165
The Pope's Army defeated 166
Lodovico Sforza *Governor of* Milan 167
Lorenzo de Medici *arrives at* Naples 168
The Iſle of Rhodes *aſſaulted by the* Turks 169
The Duke of Calabria *defeated* 171
A new League ib.
Caſtello *beſieged by the Army of the Pope* 172
The Coloni *provoke the Pope, and are ruined in* Rome 173
The company of S. Giorgio ib.
Aquila *rebels againſt the King of* Naples 175
Is protected by the Pope ib.
The Genoeſes *overthrown* 176
The Venetians *defeated* 177
Count Girolamo *murdered* ib.
His death revenged by his wife ib.
Galeotto *Lord of* Faenza *murdered by his wife* 188
The character of Lorenzo de Medici ib.
His death 189

TABLE

Of the ſeveral CHAPTERS in the

PRINCE.

Chap. I. *The ſeveral ſorts of Governments, and how they are obtained* 199
Chap. II. *Of hereditary Principalities* ib.
Chap. III. *Of mix'd Principalities* 200
Chap. IV. *Why the Kingdom of* Darius, *uſurp'd by* Alexander, *did not rebel againſt his Succeſſors after* Alexander *was dead* 203
Chap. V. *How ſuch Cities and Principalities are to be governed, who before they were ſubdued, lived under their own Laws and Conſtitutions* 204
Chap. VI. *Of Principalities acquired by ones own proper conduct and arms* 205
Chap. VII. *Of new Principalities acquired by accident and ſupplies from other People* 206
Chap. VIII. *Of ſuch as have arrived at their Dominion by wicked and unjuſtifiable means* 209
Chap. IX. *Of Civil Principalities* 211
Chap. X. *How the ſtrength of all Principalities is to be computed* 212
Chap. XI. *Of Eccleſiaſtical Principalities* 213
Chap. XII. *The ſeveral forms of military Diſcipline, and of thoſe Souldiers which are call'd mercinary* 214
Chap. XIII. *Of Auxiliaries, mix'd Souldiers and Natives* 217
Chap. XIV. *The Duty of a Prince in relation to his Militia* 218
Chap. XV. *Of ſuch things as render men (eſpecially Princes) worthy of blame or approbation* 219

Chap.

The TABLE.

Chap. XVI. *Of Liberality and Parſimony* 220
Chap. XVII. *Of Cruelty and Clemency, and whether it is better for a Prince to be loved, or feared* 221
Chap. XVIII. *How far a Prince is obliged by his promiſe* 222
Chap. XIX. *Princes are to be cautious of making themſelves either odious, or contemptible* 223
Chap. XX. *Whether the building of Citadels, and other things that Princes many times do, be profitable or dangerous* 227
Chap. XXI. *How a Prince is to demean himſelf to gain reputation* 229
Chap. XXII. *Of the Princes Secretaries* 230
Chap. XXIII. *How Flatterers are to be avoided* 231
Chap. XXIV. *How it came to paſs that moſt of the Princes of* Italy *have loſt their Dominions* 232
Chap. XXV. *How far in human affairs fortune may avail, and in what manner ſhe may be reſiſted* 233
Chap. XXVI. *An exhortation for the delivery of* Italy *from the Barbarians* 234
The original of the words Guelf *and* Ghibilin 236
The life of Caſtruccio 239
The relation of the murder committed upon Vitellozzo Vitelli Oliveretto da Fermo, Pogolo, *and the Duke* de Gravina (*all of the houſe of the* Urſini) *by the machination and management of Duke* Valentine 253
The State of France *in an Abridgment* 256
The State of Germany *in an Abridgment* 265

A

TABLE

OF THE

DISCOURSES.

Book I.

Chap. I. *What have been generally the Principles of all Cities, and particularly of* Rome 268
Chap. II. *The ſeveral kinds of Commonwealths; and under which kind the* Roman *is comprehended* 270
Chap. III. *Upon what accidents and tumults in* Rome *the Tribune of the people was created, by which that Commonwealth became more perfect* 272
Chap. IV. *The diſſentions betwixt the Senate and the People of* Rome, *were the occaſion that Commonwealth became ſo powerful and free* 273
Chap. V. *Where the Guardianſhip of liberty may be moſt ſecurely depoſited, whether among the People or Nobility: and which has greater occaſion to tumultuate, he that would acquire more, or he that would defend, and keep what he has* 274
Chap. VI. *Whether in* Rome *ſuch a form of Government could be eſtabliſhed, as ſhould take away the animoſities betwixt the Senate and the People* 275
Chap. VII. *How neceſſary it is for the conſervation of a State, that any Citizen be ſecurely accuſed* 277
Chap. VIII. *Unjuſt calumnies are no leſs pernicious to a Commonwealth, than legal accuſations are profitable and good* 278
Chap. IX. *How much a ſingle perſon is neceſſary for the eſtabliſhment of a new Commonwealth, or the reformation of an old* 279
Chap. X. *As they are to be praiſed who lay the foundations of any Republick or Kingdom, ſo they are to be condemned who ſet up a Tyranny* 281
Chap. XI. *Of the Religion and Ceremonies of the* Romans 282
Chap. XII. *How neceſſary for the preſervation of a State it is, that Religion be in eſteem, and how much* Italy *has ſuffered for want of it, by means of the Church of* Rome 284
Chap. XIII. *How the* Romans *pretended Religion*

The TABLE.

ligion many times to regulate their City, to profecute their Wars, and to pacifie their Tumults 285

Chap. XIV. *The* Romans *were wont to interpret their* Auſpices *with accommodation to their own pleaſures and deſigns; and when at any time they were forced to tranſgreſs, they managed it wiſely, and pretended to be very preciſe; and if any body raſhly deſpiſed them, he was ſure to be puniſhed* 286

Chap. XV. *How the* Samnites *in the extremity of their affairs, as their laſt refuge, had recourſe to Religion* 287

Chap. XVI. *A people accuſtomed to the dominion of a Prince, though by accident they may acquire their liberty, yet it is with great difficulty, if they maintain it* 288

Chap. XVII. *A people wholly corrupted in their manners, may poſſibly recover their liberty; but they will find inſuperable difficulty to maintain it* 289

Chap. XVIII. *A corrupt City having made it ſelf free, how its liberty may be maintained; and not having made itſelf free, how its liberty may be procured* 290

Chap. XIX. *Though a weak Prince ſucceeds an excellent, the Government may ſtand; but if one weak Prince ſucceeds another, 'tis impoſſible* 292

Chap. XX. *Two good Princes, immediately ſucceeding, may do great things; and well-grounded Commonwealths having always a virtuous ſucceſſion, their Conqueſts and Acquiſitions muſt of neceſſity be according* 293

Chap. XXI. *How much that Prince or Commonwealth is to be condemned, which neglects to train up ſoldiers of its own* ib.

Chap. XXII. *What is to be obſerved from the combat betwixt the three* Roman Horatii, *and the three* Alban Curiatii 294

Chap. XXIII. *That our whole fortune is not to be ventured upon part of our force; and that for that reaſon the keeping of paſſes is many times dangerous* ib.

Chap. XXIV. *In well ordered Governments, offence and deſert are never ſet one againſt the other, but he who does well is rewarded, and he who does otherwiſe, is puniſhed* 295

Chap. XXV. *Tho' it is many times convenient to reform the old fundamental Cuſtoms of a free City, yet it is convenient ſtill to retain ſome ſhadow and appearance of their ancient ways* 296

Chap. XXVI. *A new Prince in a new Conqueſt, is to make every thing new* ib.

Chap. XXVII. *Men are as ſeldom perfectly bad, as they are perfectly good* 297

Chap. XXVIII. *For what reaſons the* Romans *were leſs ingrateful to their Citizens than the* Athenians ib.

Chap. XXIX. *Whether the Prince, or the People is moſt ſubject to be ingrateful* 298

Chap. XXX. *What Rules are to be obſerved by a Prince or Commonwealth to avoid this vice of ingratitude, and how a General or great Citizen is to demean himſelf to elude it* 299

Chap. XXXI. *That the* Romans *uſed no extraordinary puniſhments towards their great Captains, when they committed an error of ignorance, or malice, provided the Government was not damnified by it* 300

Chap. XXXII. *A Commonwealth or Prince is not to defer his beneficence till the neceſſity of the object requires it* 301

Chap. XXXIII. *If an inconvenience increaſes either within a State, or againſt it; it is better to temporize and comply, than to endeavour to remove it by violence* 302

Chap. XXXIV. *The Dictatorſhip was uſeful, not hurtful to the Commonwealth of* Rome; *and how that power which is uſurped, and illegally aſſumed, is pernicious to a State, not that which is conferred legally by the ſuffrage of the people* 303

Chap. XXXV. *How it came to paſs that the creation of the* Decem-virat *was prejudicial to the liberty of that State, though it was done freely, and by publick ſuffrage* 304

Chap. XXXVI. *Citizens who have executed the greateſt Offices, ought not afterwards to dain or ſcruple the leſs* 305

Chap. XXXVII. *What troubles and offence was created in* Rome *by the* Agrarian *Law; and how dangerous it is to make a new Law oppoſite to an old Cuſtom, with too much retroſpection* ib.

Chap. XXXVIII. *Weak Commonwealths are generally irreſolute, and ill adviſed, as taking their meaſures more from neceſſity than election* 307

Chap. XXXIX. *Divers people have many times the ſame accidents* 308

Chap. XL. *The creation of the* Decem-virat *in* Rome, *what things are moſt remarkable in it; and how far ſuch a Conſtitution may be uſeful or pernicious to a Commonwealth* 309

Chap. XLI. *For a mean man to grow immediately inſolent, or a meek man immediately cruel, without juſt ſteps of gradation, is both imprudent and unprofitable* 311

Chap. XLII. *How eaſily mens manners are corrupted* ib.

Chap. XLIII. *Thoſe Soldiers which fight for their own honour are the beſt, and moſt to be truſted* 312

Chap. XLIV. *A multitude without an Head is altogether unſerviceable; nor is any man to threaten, that has any thing to deſire* ib.

Chap. XLV. *'Tis a thing of ill example to break a new Law, eſpecially for the Maker: and 'tis no leſs dangerous to the Governour*

of

of a State, to multiply injuries, and repeat them every day 313
Chap. XLVI. *How men leap from one paſſion to another; and how they who at firſt aim at nothing but ſelf-preſervation, when ſecured of that, grow Oppreſſors of other people* 314
Chap. XLVII. *Though the people, in things that are diſcuſſed in general, are many times miſtaken; yet when they are reduced to particulars, they are more ſenſible and judicious* 317
Chap. XLVIII. *To prevent the advancement of mean people to the Magiſtracy, it is particularly to be contrived that the competition be betwixt the beſt and moſt noble, and the wickedeſt and moſt abject* 318
Chap. XLIX. *If thoſe Cities which have been free from their foundation (as* Rome*) have found it difficult to contrive ſuch Laws as might maintain them ſo. Thoſe which have been always ſervile, will find it almoſt impoſſible* 319
Chap. L. *No Magiſtrate or Council ought to have power to check or controul the publick Acts of the City* 320
Chap. LI. *A Prince or Commonwealth that is conſtrained to do a thing, is to ſeem to do it frankly, and without any compulſion* ib.
Chap. LII. *The beſt and moſt ſecure way to repreſs the inſolence of an ambitious and powerful State, is to preclude and ſtop up thoſe ways by which he would come to his greatneſs* 321
Chap. LIII. *The people (deceiv'd with a falſe appearance of good) do many times deſire that which turns to their deſtruction: and how great hopes and large promiſes do eaſily debauch them* 322
Chap. LIV. *How great the authority of a grave man is, to aſſwage the tumultuouſneſs of the people* 323
Chap. LV. *How eaſily things are managed in a City where the Commons are incorrupt; how hard it is to erect a Principality where there is not an equality; and where it is not, a Commonwealth is impoſſible* 324
Chap. LVI. *Great accidents, before they happen to any City or Province, are commonly prognoſticated by ſome ſign, or predicted by ſome men* 326
Chap. LVII. *The multitude united, is formidable and ſtrong, but ſeparated, is weak and inconſiderable* ib.
Chap. LVIII. *That the Multitude is wiſer, and more conſtant than a Prince* 327
Chap. LIX. *What Leagues or Confederacies are moſt to be truſted; thoſe which are made with Princes, or thoſe which are made with free States* 329
Chap. LX. *How the Conſulſhip, and other Dignities in* Rome *were conferred without reſpect of age* 330

Book II.

Chap. I. *Whether the virtue or fortune of the* Romans *was the occaſion of the greatneſs of their Empire* 333
Chap. II. *With what Nations the* Romans *contended, and with what obſtinacy thoſe Nations reſiſted* 335
Chap. III. *It contributed much to the grandeur of the City of* Rome, *that they ruined the neighbouring Cities, and admitted ſtrangers to their own dignities and priviledge* 337
Chap. IV. *There are three ways which Commonwealths have taken to enlarge their Territories* 338
Chap. V. *The variation of Religion and Languages, with the accidents of Deluges and Plagues, have been the cauſe that many great things have been forgotten* 340
Chap. VI. *How the* Romans *proceeded in making of War* 341
Chap. VII. *What proportion of Land the* Romans *allowed to every man in their Colonies* 342
Chap. VIII. *What it is that diſpoſes ſome people to leave their native Countries, to diſpoſſeſs other people* ib.
Chap. IX. *What thoſe occaſions are which do moſt commonly create War among Princes* 344
Chap. X. *That, according to the common opinion, money is not the ſinews of War* ib.
Chap. XI. *'Tis not diſcretion to enter into ſtrict amity with a Prince, whoſe reputation is greater than his ſtrength* 346
Chap. XII. *Upon an apprehenſion of being invaded, whether it be better to make war, or expect it* ib.
Chap. XIII. *That from mean to great fortune, people riſe rather by fraud, than by force* 348
Chap. XIV. *Many people are miſtaken, who expect with meekneſs and humility to work upon the proud* 349
Chap. XV. *Weak States are irreſolute and uncertain in their Councils, and ſlow Councils are moſt commonly pernicious* 350
Chap. XVI. *How much the Soldiers of our times do differ from the Diſcipline of the Antients* 351
Chap. XVII. *How the Armies of our times are to judge of Artillery, and whether the general opinion of it be true* 353
Chap. XVIII. *How by the authority of the* Romans, *and the univerſal Diſcipline of the Antients, the Foot are more ſerviceable than the Horſe* 355

The TABLE.

Chap. XIX. *The Conquests of Commonwealths that are ill governed, and contrary to the model of the* Romans, *do conduce more to the ruin than advancement of their affairs* 357

Chap. XX. *No Prince or Commonwealth, without manifest danger, can employ foreign Forces, either Auxiliary, or Mercenary* 359

Chap. XXI. *The first Prætor which the* Romans *ever sent out of their own City, was to* Capua, *and that was* 400 *years after they began first to make war* 360

Chap. XXII. *How uncertain the Judgment of most people are in things of greatest importance* 361

Chap. XXIII. *How the* Romans *upon any accident which necessitated them to give judgment upon their Subjects, avoided always the mid-way* 362

Chap. XXIV. *That in the generality, Castles and Citadels do more mischief than good* 364

Chap. XXV. *To attempt a City full of intestine divisions, and to expect to carry it thereby, is uncertain and dangerous* 367

Chap. XXVI. *He who contemns or reproaches another person, incurs his hatred without any advantage to himself* ib.

Chap. XXVII. *Wise Princes, and well govern'd States, ought to be contented with Victory; for many times whilst they think to push things forward, they lose all* 368

Chap. XXVIII. *How much it is for the interest of all Governments, that all Injury be punished, whether against the publick, or particular persons* 369

Chap. XXIX. *Fortune casts a mist before peoples eyes, when she would not have them oppose her designs* 370

Chap. XXX. *Princes and Republicks that are truly magnificent, do not make their Leagues and Alliances with money, but by their virtue, reputation, and force* 372

Chap. XXXI. *How dangerous it is to believe Exiles too far* 373

Chap. XXXII. *How many several ways the* Romans *used to conquer their Towns* 374

Chap. XXXIII. *How the* Romans *upon any Expedition, gave their Generals general Commissions* 375

Book III.

Chap. I. *That a Sect or Commonwealth be long-liv'd, it is necessary to correct it often, and reduce it towards its first Principles* 377

Chap. II. *'Tis the part of a wise man, sometimes to pretend himself a fool* 379

Chap. III. *The Liberty newly acquired, could not have been preserved, but by the execution of* Brutus *his Sons* 380

Chap. IV. *A Prince is never safe in his new Conquests, whilst they are in being, whom he dispossess'd* 381

Chap. V. *How a King may lose his Kingdom, though he comes to it by inheritance* ib.

Chap. VI. *Of Conspiracies* 382

Chap. VII. *How it comes to pass that in the changes of State, from liberty to servitude, and from servitude to liberty, some are very innocent, and others very bloody* 391

Chap. VIII. *He who would change the form of a Government, is to consider seriously upon what grounds he does it, and the disposition of the Subject* 392

Chap. IX. *How he that would succeed, must accommodate to the times* 393

Chap. X. *A General cannot avoid fighting, when the enemy is resolv'd to engage him upon any terms* 394

Chap. XI. *One person that has many enemies upon his hands, though he be inferior to them, yet if he can sustain their first impression, carries commonly the victory* 396

Chap. XII. *A wise General is to put a necessity of fighting upon his own Army, but to prevent it to his enemies* 397

Chap. XIII. *Whether we are more safe in a good General with a bad Army, or a good Army with a bad General* 398

Chap. XIV. *What strange effects new inventions have sometimes in a battel, and how new noises have the same* 399

Chap. XV. *One General is best for an Army, and that to govern it by Commissioners, is not so good* 400

Chap. XVI. *That in times of difficulty, virtue is in esteem; in times of ease and luxury, men of riches and alliance are in greatest request* 401

Chap. XVII. *A man is not to be disobliged, and employed afterwards in any matter of importance* 402

Chap. XVIII. *Nothing is more honourable in a General, than to foresee the designs of his enemy* 403

Chap. XIX. *Whether for the government of the multitude, obsequiousness and indulgence be more necessary than punishment* 404

Chap. XX. *One instance of humanity wrought more upon the* Falisci *than all the force of the* Romans 405

Chap. XXI. *How it came to pass that* Hannibal, *by methods quite contrary to what were practised by* Scipio, *did the same things in* Italy *that the other did in* Spain ib.

Chap. XXII. *How the austerity of* Manlius Torquatus, *and the humanity of* Valerius Corvinus *gain'd each of them the same honour and reputation* 406

Chap. XXIII. *Upon what occasion* Camillus *was*

was banished from Rome 409
Chap. XXIV. *The prolongation of Commissions brought* Rome *first into servitude* ib.
Chap. XXV. *Of the Poverty of* Cincinnatus, *and several other Citizens of* Rome 410
Chap. XXVI. *Women are many times the destruction of States* 411
Chap. XXVII. *How the civil Discords in a City are to be composed, and of the falsity of that opinion; but the best way to keep a City in subjection, is to keep it divided* ib.
Chap. XXVIII. *A strict eye is to be kept upon the Citizens; for under pretence of officiousness, and piety, there is hid a principle of Tyranny* 413
Chap. XXIX. *That the transgressions of the People do spring commonly from the Prince* ib.
Chap. XXX. *A Citizen who would do any great matter by his own authority, must first extinguish all envy. In what matter things are to be ordered upon the approach of an enemy, and how a City is to be defended* 414
Chap. XXXI. *Powerful States, and excellent Persons, retain the same mind and dignity in all kind of conditions* 416
Chap. XXXII. *The ways which some people have taken to prevent a peace* 417
Chap. XXXIII. *To the obtaining a Victory, it is necessary your army has a confidence not only in one another, but in their General* 418
Chap. XXXIV. *What vogue, fame or opinion disposes the people first to favour some particular Citizen; and whether they, or a Prince, distributes their Offices with most prudence and judgment* 419
Chap. XXXV. *What dangers they incur, who make themselves Authors of any enterprize; and the more extraordinary the design, the greater the danger* 420
Chap. XXXVI. *The reasons why at the first charge the* French *have been, and still are accounted more than men, but afterwards less than women* 422
Chap. XXXVII. *Whether fighting in small parties, or pickeering before a Battel be necessary; and how the Temper of a new enemy is to be found without them* 423
Chap. XXXVIII. *How a General is to be qualified, that his army may rely upon him* 424
Chap. XXXIX. *A General ought to know the Country, and how to take his advantage in the ground* 425
Chap. XL. *How fraud in the management of War is honourable and glorious* 426
Chap. XLI. *That ones Country is to be defended by all means, and whether honourable or dishonourable, it imports not, so 'tis well defended* ib.
Chap. XLII. *That forc'd promises are not binding* 427
Chap. XLIII. *Those who are born in the same Country, retain almost the same Nature thorough all the variety of times* ib.
Chap. XLIV. *Confidence and boldness does many times obtain that which would never be compassed by ordinary means* 428
Chap. XLV. *Whether in a Battel it is best to give or receive the Charge* 429
Chap. XLVI. *How it comes to pass that in a City the same family retains the same Manners and Customs a long time* ib.
Chap. XLVII. *A good Citizen is to forget all private injury, when in competition with his love to his Country* 430
Chap. XLVIII. *When any enemy commits any grand fault, 'tis to be suspected for a fraud* ib.
Chap. XLIX. *A Commonwealth which desires to preserve it self free, has need of new provisions every day; and upon what score* Fabius *was called* Maximus 431

A TABLE of the ART of WAR.

Chap. I. *How the Seigneur* Fabritio Colonna *being refreshing himself one evening with some other Gentlemen in a beautiful Garden, took occasion to enter upon this discourse of War* 435
Chap. II. *A person of Honour and Condition is not to make War his profession* 438
Chap. III. *How a Commonwealth ought not (in prudence) to permit any of its Citizens to make War their profession* 439
Chap. IV. *That a King ought not to permit his Subjects to make Arms their profession, for the mischiefs which do frequently ensue* 440
Chap. V. *In what Countries the best Soldiers are to be raised* 442
Chap. VI. *Whether it be best to choose you men out of the Cities or Country* 443
Chap. VII. *Of the inconvenience, and convenience of Trained-Bands, or a settled Militia* 444
Chap. VIII. *Of what sort of people an Army is to be composed* 445
Chap. IX. *How the* Romans *raised their Legions* 446
Chap. X. *Whether it is best for a Militia to consist of a great number or a small* 447
Chap. XI. *How the Inconveniencies which follow*

The TABLE.

follow great Armies, may be prevented 448

Chap. XII. *Of the Cavalry* 449

Book II.

Chap. I. *What Arms were most used by the Antients in their Wars* 450

Chap. II. *Of the Arms which are used at present, and of the invention of the Pike* 451

Chap. III. *Whether the ancient or modern is the best way of arming* ib.

Chap. IV. *How Foot should be arm'd, and of the force and convenience of Men at Arms* 453

Chap. V. *The difference between Men at Arms and Foot, and upon which we are most to rely* 454

Chap. VI. *How the Soldiers are to be exercised* 455

Chap. VII. *Of what number of men, and of what arms a Battalion is to consist; and of exercising in Companies to make them ready either to give a charge, or receive it* 456

Chap. VIII. *Of three principal ways of drawing up a Company, and putting them into a posture to fight* 458

Chap. IX. *The manner of rallying Soldiers after a rout, and to make them face about a whole Company at a time* 459

Chap. X. *To range a Company in such order, that it may be ready to face the Enemy, on which side soever he comes* 460

Chap. XI. *To draw up a Company with two Horns, or another with a Piazza, or Vacuity in the middle* 461

Chap. XII. *Of the Baggage and Train belonging to a Company: how necessary it is that they have several Officers, and of the usefulness of Drums* 462

Chap. XIII. *A Discourse of the Author about military Virtue; and how it is become so despicable in our days* 463

Chap. XIV. *What number of Horse are to be put into a Battalion, and what proportion is to be observed for their baggage* 465

Book III.

Chap. I. *The Order observ'd by the* Roman *Legions when a Battel was presented* 466

Chap. II. *The Form observ'd in their Battels by the* Macedonian *Phalanx* 467

Chap. III. *How the* Swisses *ordered their Battalions* ib.

Chap. IV. *How the Author would make use of both* Greek *and* Roman *arms for his Battalion, and what was the ordinary Army of the* Romans 468

Chap. V. *The way of drawing up a Battalion, according to the intention of the Author* 469

Chap. VI. *The description of a Battel* 470

Chap. VII. *The Author's reasons for the occurrences in the Battel* 473

Chap. VIII. *The Exercises of an Army in general* 476

Book IV.

Chap. I. *The considerations and subtilties to be used in the drawing up an Army to fight* 478

Chap. II. *The Arts which are to be used during the Fight* 481

Chap. III. *Stratagems after the Fight* 482

Chap. IV. *Two other ways of ranging an Army to fight* ib.

Chap. V. *Of the constraint and advantage a man may have to fight* 483

Chap. VI. *Directions for a General* 484

Chap. VII. *Which way a Battel is to be avoided, though pressed never so earnestly by the Enemy* ib.

Chap. VIII. *How Soldiers are to be encourag'd to fight, and how they are to be cooled and disjunged when their Courage is too high* 485

Chap. IX. *A General ought to be skilful and eloquent to persuade or dissuade as he sees occasion* ib.

Chap. X. *Certain considerations which encourage Soldiers, and make them as virtuous as valiant* 486

Book V.

Chap. I. *How the* Romans *marched in an enemies Country, and in what manner they are to be imitated* 487

Chap. II. *How an Army is to be marshalled to march in an enemies Country* 488

Chap. III. *How to put an Army presently into order, and draw it up, so as if upon a march it should be attack'd, it may defend it self on all sides* 489

Chap. IV. *Of commands derived by word of mouth, by Drums and Trumpets, and of the nature of Pioneers* 491

Chap. V. *Of the Provisions that are necessary for an Army* ib.

Chap. VI. *How the Antients divided the spoil; and of the Pay which they gave to their Soldiers* 492

Chap. VII. *To know the Surprizes which are contriving against you upon your march* 493

Chap. VIII. *One is to know the Country perfectly well thorough which he is to pass, and keep his enterprizes secret* ib.

Chap.

The TABLE

Chap. IX. *Of certain things which are requisite upon a march* 494
Chap. X. *How to avoid fighting near a River, though pressed by an enemy; and in what manner you may pass it* ib.
Chap. XI. *How to make your passage thorow a streight, though you be pressed by an enemy* 495

Book VI.

Chap. I. *What kind of places the* Greeks *and the* Romans *chose out for their Camps, with a short recapitulation of what has been said before* 496
Chap. II. *The form of a Camp* 497
Chap. III. *Of the several Watches and Guards about the Camp* 501
Chap. IV. *To observe who goes and comes to the Camp* ib.
Chap. V. *Of military Justice, and the method used by the Antients in the punishment of Offenders* ib.
Chap. VI. *The Antients had neither women nor gaming in their Armies; and of the manner how they discamp'd* 502
Chap. VII. *The safety and health of a Camp is to be regarded, and it is by no means to be besieged* 503
Chap. VIII. *Directions as to Provisions* ib.
Chap. IX. *How to lodge more or less than four Battalions, and what number of men is sufficient to make head against an enemy, be he as numerous as he may* 504
Chap. X. *Certain Artifices and Advertisements of War* ib.
Chap. XI. *How to rid ones self of an Army that is pressing upon ones heels* 505
Chap. XII. *How a man may make a Prince's Favourite suspected, and divide his forces* 506
Chap. XIII. *In what manner seditions and mutinies in an Army are to be appeased* 507
Chap. XIV. *How the Antients relied much upon their Auguries, and other accidents* ib.
Chap. XV. *That we are not to fight with an enemy reduced to despair; and several arts that may be used to surprize him* 508
Chap. XVI. *How a suspected Town or Country is to be secured; and how the peoples hearts are to be gained* 509
Chap. XVII. *War is not to be continued in the Winter* ib.

Book VII.

Chap. I. *How Towns or Castles are to be fortified* 510
Chap. II. *What order is to be observed by him who shuts himself up in a Town, with resolution to defend it* 513
Chap. III. *Advertisements for such as are distressed for provisions within a Town, and for such as besiege them, and would reduce them to that necessity* 514
Chap. IV. *Other Advertisements both for the Besiegers and the Besieged* ib.
Chap. V. *A man is not to depend upon the countenance of his enemy, but is rather to suspect; what even he sees with his eyes* 515
Chap. VI. *How to disfurnish a Garrison of its men, and to bring a terror upon a Town* ib.
Chap. VII. *To corrupt a Garrison, and take it by treachery* 516
Chap. VIII. *Good guard to be kept in all places and times* ib.
Chap. IX. *Ways to write privately to ones Friends* 517
Chap. X. *How to repair a Breach, and the way to defend it* ib.
Chap. XI. *Of Mines* 518
Chap. XII. *Good Guards are always to be kept, and your Soldiers not to be divided* ib.
Chap. XIII. *That when one sees himself block'd up on every side, it is good to expose ones self now and then; and of the advantages which have ensued* ib.
Chap. XIV. *General Rules to be observed in military Discipline* 519
Chap. XV. *The way to have many Horse in your Country* 520
Chap. XVI. *A General is to invent of himself, and not follow altogether the practices of his Predecessors* 521
Chap. XVII. *The Author returns, and with a short Discourse concludes his Book* ib.

The Marriage of Belphegor 524

THE

THE FIRST BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF *FLORENCE.*

By NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL.

To His Holineſs CLEMENT *the Seventh.*

THE people which live Northward beyond the *Rhine* and the *Danube*, being born in a healthful and prolifick Clime, do many times increaſe to ſuch unſuſtainable numbers, that part of them are conſtrained to abandon their Native, in queſt of new Countries to inhabit. When any of thoſe Provinces are overcharged, and diſpoſed to diſgorge; the Order they obſerve is, to divide into three parts, ſo equally that each of the three conſiſts of a juſt proportion of Noble and Ignoble, Rich and Poor. After which they caſt Lots, and that part to whoſe fortune it falls, marches off to new Quarters where they can be found, while the other two disburden'd of their ſupernumeraries remain behind, and enjoy their own Patrimonies in peace. Theſe inundations and redundancies of people were the deſtruction of the Roman Empire, to which the Emperors themſelves gave great opportunity; for having forſaken *Rome*, the ancient Seat of the Empire, and remov'd their Reſidence to *Conſtantinople*, they left the Weſtern Empire more weak, as being more remote from their inſpection, and by conſequence more obnoxious both to their Governours and Enemies. And indeed, for the deſtruction of an Empire founded upon the bloud of ſo many brave men, there could not be leſs careleſneſs in the Princes, leſs treachery in the Miniſters, nor leſs force and impetuoſity in thoſe who invaded: for one inundation being unable, ſeveral conſpir'd, and at laſt effected its ruine.

The Northern Nations healthful and prolifick.

Their method of evacuation upon their exceſſive increaſe.

Their exceſſive Increaſe the ruine of the Roman Empire.

The firſt from thoſe Northern Countries who invaded that Empire (after the *Cimbri* which were vanquiſh'd by *Marius* a Citizen of *Rome*) were the *Viſi Goti* or Weſtern *Goths*, who after ſome skirmiſhes and conflicts upon the Confines of the Empire, were by conceſſion of the Emperors aſſign'd, and for a long time permitted quietly to poſſeſs a part of the Country along the *Danube*. And although upon ſeveral occaſions, and at ſundry times they invaded the Roman Provinces; yet by the vigilance and power of the Emperors, they were always repell'd. The laſt that overcame them ſo gloriouſly, was *Theodoſius*, who having ſubdu'd them to his obedience, they did not (as formerly) create themſelves a King, but contented themſelves with his Government and Pay, they ſubmitted to both, and ſerv'd him faithfully in his Wars. But *Theodoſius* being dead, and his two Sons *Arcadius* and

The weſtern Goths the firſt Invaders of that Empire.

Honorius succeeding; not inheriting his Virtue and Fortune as well as his Crown, the Empire began to decline, and the times (as their Emperor) to grow worse and worse.

To the three parts of the Empire, *Theodosius* in his life-time had preferred three Governors; *Ruffinus* to the East, *Stilico* to the West, and *Gildo* to the South; who all of them after the death of *Theodosius* despising the Title of Governors, resolv'd to make themselves Kings. *Gildo* and *Ruffinus* miscarried in their first Enterprise and were ruin'd: But *Stilico* being better at Hypocrisie than his Brethren, endeavour'd to insinuate and work himself into a confidence with the Emperors, yet with design so to perplex and disturb their Affairs, that he himself might afterwards with more ease leap up into the Saddle. To incense the *Visigots*, and provoke them to mutiny, he counsel'd the Emperors to abate and retrench their former allowance; and least they should not be sufficient for the molestation of the Empire, he contrived that the *Burgundi*, *Franchi*, *Vandali* and *Alani*, (Northern people like the other, and in motion for new Quarters) should fall likewise upon the Roman Provinces.

The *Visigoti* as soon as they found themselves retrench'd, that they might be in better order to revenge it, created *Alaricus* their King, under whose conduct they assayl'd the Empire; and after several Rencounters and Accidents, they over-ran all *Italy*, and sack'd *Rome*. Not long after, *Alaricus* died, and was succeeded by *Ataulfus*, who marrying *Placidia* the Emperor's Sister, Articled upon the Match, to assist in the Relief of *France* and *Spain*, which Provinces were at that time much infested by the *Vandali*, *Burgundi*, *Alani*, and *Franchi* upon the aforesaid occasion. *Ataulfus* undertook only the *Vandali*, who having possest themselves of that part of *Spain* call'd *Betica*, being press'd hard by the *Visigoti*, and distressed beyond all remedy, they were call'd over by *Boniface* (who at that time Govern'd *Africk* for the Emperors) to come and plant there, for those Provinces being then in rebellion, he was afraid his ill Administration might be discovered. This invitation and their own Exigence concurring, the *Vandals* embrac'd that Enterprize, and performed many memorable and brave things in *Africk*, under *Gensericus* their King.

Rome sack'd by them, under the command of *Alaricus*.

Boniface Governour of *Africk* for the Emperor.

In the mean time *Theodosius* the Son of *Arcadius* succeeded to the Empire, who regarding but little the Affairs of the West, gave those Nations the first thoughts of fixing in their New Conquests. Accordingly the *Vandali* in *Africk*, the *Alani* and *Visigoti* in *Spain*, began to set up for themselves, and lord it over the Natives. The *Franchi*, and the *Burgundi*, not only over-run and possess'd themselves of *France*, but according to the parts they possest, they gave it their Names; one of them being call'd *Franchia*, and the other *Burgundia*. The success of their Camrades inviting new multitudes to the subversion of the Empire, the *Hunni* fell upon *Pannonia* (which is a Province upon the banks of the *Danube*) and giving it their Name, have denominated it *Hungaria* to this very day. Then as an addition to the disorders, the Emperor finding himself attacked in so many places, to contract the number of his Enemies, he began first to treat and capitulate with the *Vandals*, then with the *Franks*, which Treaty increas'd the Authority of the *Barbarians*, and diminish'd his own. Nor was the Island of great *Britain* (call'd *England* at this day) exempt from its troubles: For the *Britains* grown apprehensive of the people which had Conquered *France*, and not discerning which way the Emperor would be able to defend them, call'd in the *Angli* (a Nation in *Germany*) to their assistance. The *Angli*, under the Conduct of *Vortiger* their King, undertook their defence, and at first behav'd themselves faithfully; afterwards their Opportunity increasing with their Power, they drove the Natives out of the Island, possess'd themselves of it, and gave it their Name in commutation for its liberty. Being robb'd of their Country, and made Valiant by Necessity, though they were not able to recover their own, the *Britains* began to think of invading some other, and planting themselves there. In this Resolution they cross'd the Seas with their whole Families, and possess'd themselves of those parts which lie upon the Coasts of *France*, and are call'd *Britain* to this day. The *Hunns* (who as was said before) had over-run *Pannonia*, being streightned and disturb'd in their Quarters by other Nations, *viz.* the *Zepidi*, *Eruli*, *Turingi* and *Ostrogoti* (or Eastern *Goths*) they rose again, and put themselves once more in motion for New Habitations. Not being able to force their way into *France*, which was at that time defended by the *Barbarians*, they fell into *Italy* under *Attila* their King, who not long before (to rid himself of a Partner in the Government) had slain *Bleda* his own Brother, and by that means made himself absolute. *Andaricus* King of the *Zepidi*, and *Velamir* King of the *Ostrogoti* remained as his Subjects. *Attila* having in this manner made his inroad into *Italy*, he besieg'd *Aquilegia*, lay (without interruption) two years before it, wasted the Country round about it, and dispersed the Inhabitants, which (as we shall afterwards declare) was the occasion of building the City of *Venice*. After he had taken, sack'd and demolish'd *Aquilegia*,

Gallia over-run by the *Franks*, and from them call'd *France*.

The *Hunni* Conquer and Denominate *Hungaria*.

Britain call'd *Anglia* from the *Angli*

The *Hunni* invade *Italy* under *Attila*

Attila besieges and takes *Aquilegia*.

Aquilegia, and ſeveral other Towns, he advanc'd towards *Rome*, but forbore the deſtruction of it upon the interceſſion of the Pope, for whom *Attila* had ſo great a Reverence and Veneration, that upon his ſingle perſuaſion, he withdrew out of *Italy* into *Auſtria*, where he died. After *Attila*'s death, *Velamir* King of the *Oſtrogoti*, with the Commanders of other Nations, took up Arms againſt *Tenricus* and *Eurius*, *Attila*'s Sons. One of them thay kill'd, and forc'd the other with the *Hunni* back again over the *Danube* into their own Country: Upon which the *Oſtrogoti*, and *Zepidi* plac'd themſelves in *Pannonia*, and the *Eruli* and *Turingi* remain'd upon the Bank of the *Danube*.

He advances to *Rome*, but retires at the requeſt of the Pope.

The *Hunni* driven back over the *Danube*, return home.

Attila being departed out of *Italy*, *Valentinianus* at that time Emperor of the Weſt, had a deſign to repair that Empire; and for his Capacity of defending it with more eaſe and convenience againſt the irruptions of the *Barbarians*, he quitted *Rome*, and ſettled his Reſidence at *Ravenna*. The Calamities wherewith the Weſtern Empire had been oppreſſed, were the occaſion that the Emperor reſiding at *Conſtantinople*, had many times transfer'd the poſſeſſion of it to other people as a thing of great danger and expence, many times without the Emperor's permiſſion; the *Romans* ſeeing themſelves deſerted, had created new Emperors in order to their defence; and ſometimes other perſons taking advantage of their own Intereſt and Authority, uſurp'd, as it happen'd when *Maximus* a Citizen of *Rome*, got poſſeſſion of it after the death of *Valentinianus*, and forc'd his Widow *Eudoxa* to take him for her Husband; who deſirous of revenge, and diſdaining (being of Imperial extraction) the Embraces of ſo inferior a perſon, ſhe invited privately *Genſericus* King of the *Vandals* into *Italy*, remonſtrating the Eaſineſs and Utility of the Conqueſt; who allured by the Prize, was without much difficulty perſwaded. He entred *Italy* with his Army, march'd up to *Rome*, found it abandon'd, ſack'd it, and continued in it fourteen days; after which he took and plunder'd ſeveral other Towns, and having laden both himſelf and his Army with the Spoil, he return'd into *Africk*. The *Romans* returning (upon his departure) *Maximus* being dead, they made *Avicus* (a *Roman*) Emperor. After many occurrences both within *Italy* and without, and the death of ſeveral Emperors, the Empire of *Conſtantinople* fell into the hands of *Zeno*, and the Empire of *Rome* (by Stratagem and Artifice) to *Oreſtes*, and *Auguſtulus* his Son, who, preparing to defend it by force, were invaded by the *Eruli* and *Turingi* (plac'd as we ſaid before upon the Banks of the *Danube*) Confederate for that Expedition under the Command of *Odoacres* their General. Of ſuch places as they had thought good to baulk and leave empty, the *Lombards* poſſeſſed themſelves, a Northen Nation like the reſt, and Commanded by *Godoglio* their King, which were the laſt People that plagued *Italy*, as ſhall be ſhown in its place. *Odoacres* having made his way into *Italy*, he encountred, vanquiſh'd, and ſlew *Oreſtes* near *Pavia*, but *Auguſtulus* got off. After this Victory, that the Title might change with the Government, *Odoacres* caus'd himſelf to be called King of *Rome*, and was the firſt Chieftain of thoſe Nations (which at that time over-ran the whole World) that thought of fixing in *Italy*; for (either ſuſpecting their abilities to keep it, by reaſon of the eaſineſs and facility wherewith it might be reliev'd by the Emperor of the Eaſt, or for ſome other ſecret cauſe) the reſt had ravag'd and plunder'd it, but they always retir'd, and ſought out other Countreys for their Eſtabliſhment and Plantation.

The firſt Reſidence of the Roman Emperors at *Ravenna*.

New Emperours elected by the *Romans*, upon the non-reſidence of their old.

The *Lombards* invade *Italy*.

Odoacres call'd King of *Rome*, and the firſt of the *Barbarians* which thought of fixing in *Italy*.

In thoſe days, the ancient Empire of *Rome* was reduc'd under theſe Princes. *Zeno* Governing in *Conſtantinople*, Commanded the whole Empire of the Eaſt. The *Oſtrogoti* Commanded *Meſia*: The *Viſigoti*, *Pannonia*: The *Suevi* and *Alani*, *Gaſcoigne* and *Spain*: The *Vandali*, *Africa*: The *Franchi* and *Burgundi*, *France*: The *Eruli* and *Turingi*, *Italy*. The Kingdom of the *Oſtrogoti* was devolv'd upon a Nephew of *Velamir*'s, called *Theodorick*, who retaining an Amity with *Zeno* Emperor of the Eaſt, writ him word, that his *Oſtrogoti* being in valour ſuperior to other Nations, they thought it injuſt and unreaſonable to be inferiour in Territory and Command, and that it would be impoſſible for him to confine them within the Limits of *Pannonia*. That being therefore neceſſitated to comply, and ſuffer them to take up Arms in queſt of New Countreys, he could do no leſs than give him timely advertiſement, that he might provide againſt the worſt, and if he pleas'd aſſign them ſome other Countrey, which by his Grace and Favour they might inhabit with more Latitude and Convenience. Whereupon *Zeno* partly out of fear, and partly deſirous to drive *Odoacres* out of *Italy*, directed *Theodorick* againſt him, and gave him that Countrey for his pains, when it was his fortune to catch it. *Theodorick* accepts the Propoſition, removes from *Pannonia* (where he left the *Zepidi* his Friends) and marching into *Italy*, ſlew *Odoacres* and his *Son*, call'd himſelf King of *Rome* by his Example, and made *Ravenna* his Reſidence, upon the ſame Reaſons as had prevail'd before with *Valentinian*. *Theodorick* was an excellent perſon both in War and Peace: In the firſt he was always Victor, in the laſt a continual Benefactor, as that City and that Nation experimented often.

The Old Empire divided into Cantons.

Theodorick invades *Italy*, ſlays *Odoacres*, calls himſelf King of *Rome*, and held his reſidence at *Ravenna*.

He divided his *Ostrogoti* into several Countreys, appointing Governours over them, that might Command in time of Wars, and Correct in time of Peace. He inlarged *Ravenna*, and repair'd *Rome*, and restor'd all its Priviledges, except its Military Discipline. Without any noise or tumult of War, by his own single Wisdom and Authority, he kept all the *Barbarian Princes* (who had Cantonized the Empire) in their just bounds. He built several Towns and Castles between the *Adriatick-Sea* and the *Alps*, to obstruct any new Incursion by the *Barbarians*; and had not his many Virtues been sullied and eclipsed towards his latter end by some Cruelties he committed upon a jealousie of being depos'd (as the deaths of *Symmachus* and *Boetius*, both of them virtuous men, do sufficienty declare) his Memory would have been this day as honourable, as his Person was then: for by his Virtue and Bounty, not only *Rome* and *Italy*, but all the rest of the Western Empire was freed from the continual Conflicts, which for so many years it indur'd by the frequent irruption of the *Barbarians*, and recuc'd into good Order and Condition: And certainly if any times were ever miserable in *Italy*, and those Provinces which were over-run by the *Barbarians*, they were the times betwixt the Reigns of *Arcadius* and *Honorius*, and his; for if it be consider'd what inconveniences, and damage do generally result to a Common-wealth or Kingdom upon alteration of Prince or Government, especially if effected not by foreign force, but civil dissention: If it be observed, how fatal the least Changes prove to Common-wealth or Kingdom how potent soever, it may easily be imagin'd how much *Italy* and other Provinces of the Roman Empire suffer'd in those days, losing not only their Government, but their Laws, Customs, Conversations, Religions, Language, Habits, and even their Names: The thoughts of any one of which things (without so great an accumulation) would make the stoutest heart to ake, much more the seeing and feeling of them. And as this was the destruction, so it was the foundation and augmentation of many Cities. In the number of those which were ruin'd was *Aquileia*, *Luni*, *Chiusi*, *Popolonia*, *Fiesole*, and many others. Among those which were new built, were *Venice*, *Siena*, *Ferrara*, *l'Aquila*, and several other both Towns and Castles, which for brevity sake I omit. Those which from small beginnings became great and considerable, were *Florence*, *Genoa*, *Pisa*, *Milan*, *Naples*, and *Bolonia*, to which may be added the ruine and reparation of *Rome*, and several other Cities which were demolish'd and rebuilt. Among these devastations and inroads of new people there sprang forth new Languages, as is visible by what is us'd both in *France*, *Spain*, and *Italy*, which being mixt with the Language of their Invaders and the ancient *Roman*, is become new, and clear another thing to what it was before. Besides not only the Provinces lost their Names, but particular places, Rivers, Seas, and Men; *France*, *Italy*, and *Spain*, being full of new Appellatives, quite contrary to what they were of old; as the *Po*, *Garda*, and *Archipelago*, for Rivers and Seas; and for Men, in stead of *Cesar* and *Pompey*, they began to be call'd *Peter*, *John*, *Matthew*, &c. But among all these Variations, the changing of their Religions was of no less importance: for the Custom and Prescription of the ancient Faith being in combat and competition with the Miracles of the New, many tumults and dissentions were created, which had the Christian Church been unanimous and entire, would never have happen'd: But the *Greek*, the *Roman*, the Church at *Ravenna* being in contention, and the Heretick, with the Catholick as furiously zealous, they brought great misery upon the world, as *Africa* can witness, which suffer'd more by their Arrianism (which was the Doctrine of the *Vandals*) than by all their avarice and cruelty. Whilst men liv'd exposed to so many persecutions, the terror and sadness of their hearts was legible in their faces; for besides the multitude of calamities they endured otherwise, great part of them had not power to betake themselves to the protection of God Almighty (who is the surest refuge of all that are in distress) for being uncertain whither their devotions were to be directed, they died miserably without any.

Theodorick therefore deserved no small praise, who was the first which gave them respite from the multitude of their evils, and restored *Italy* to such a degree of grandeur in the thirty eight years which he reigned there, that there was scarce any thing to be seen of its former desolation: But when he died, and the Government devolv'd upon *Atalaricus* the Son of *Amalasciunta* his Sister, in a short time (the malice of their fortune being not exhausted as yet) they relapsed, and fell over head and ears into their old troubles again: For *Atilaricus* dying not long after him, the Kingdom fell into the hands of his Mother, who was betray'd by *Theodate* (a person she had call'd in to assist her in the Government.) She being remov'd, and he made King, to the great dissatisfaction of the *Ostrogoths*, to whom that Usurpation had made him insufferably odious; *Justinian* the Emperor took courage, began to think of driving him out of *Italy*, and deputed *Belisarius* his General for that Expedition, who before had conquer'd *Africa*, driven out the *Vandals*, and

Theodorick dies.

reduc'd it under that Empire again. Having firſt poſſeſs'd himſelf of *Sicily*, and from thence paſſed his Army into *Italy*, *Belliſarius* recovered *Naples* and *Rome*. The *Goths* foreſeeing their deſtruction, kill'd *Theodate* their King, as the occaſion of all, and elected *Vitegetes* in his place, who after ſeveral Skirmiſhes was at length beſieged and taken in *Ravenna* by *Belliſarius*, who (not proſecuting his Victory as was expected) was call'd back by *Juſtinian*, and his Command given to *Johannes* and *Vitalis*, who were much ſhort of him both in virtue and converſation; ſo that the *Goths* took heart, and created *Ildovado* their King, who was at that time Governour of *Verona*: and being kill'd ſhortly after, the Kingſhip fell to *Totila*, who beat the Emperor's forces, recover'd *Tuſcany*, and ſubdued the Governours of all thoſe Provinces which *Belliſarius* had reduc'd. Upon which misfortune *Juſtinianus* thought it neceſſary to ſend him again into *Italy*; but returning with ſmall Force, he rather loſt what he had gain'd before, than acquir'd any new reputation. For *Totila* (whilſt *Belliſarius* lay incamp'd with his Army at *Hoſtia*) beſieged *Rome*, and took it as it were under his Noſe; and then upon conſideration that he could neither well keep nor relinquiſh it, he demoliſh'd the greateſt part of it, forcing away the people, and carrying the Senators as Priſoners along with him, and taking no notice of *Belliſarius*, he advanced with his Army into *Calabria* to encounter and cut off certain ſupplies which were ſent out of *Greece* to reinforce him. *Belliſarius* ſeeing *Rome* abandon'd in this manner, addreſſed himſelf to a very honourable enterpriſe, and entring the City, repair'd the Walls with all poſſible celerity, and re-invited the Inhabitants when he had done. But fortune concurr'd not to the nobleneſs of his deſign: for *Juſtinianus* being at that time invaded by the *Parthi*, *Belliſarius* was call'd back to repel the invaſion. In obedience to his Maſter, he march'd his Army out of *Italy*, and left that Province to the diſcretion of the Enemy, who ſeiz'd again upon *Rome*, but uſed it not ſo barbarouſly as before, being wrought upon by the prayers of St. *Benedict* (a perſon very eminent in thoſe times for his ſanctity) he apply'd himſelf rather to repair than deſtroy it. In the mean time *Juſtinian* had made a Peace with the *Parthi*, and reſolving to ſend new Supplies into *Italy*, he was diverted by a new alarm from the *Sclavi* (another northern people) who had paſs'd the *Danube*, and fallen upon *Illyria* and *Thrace*: So that *Totila* had his full ſwing, and was in a manner in poſſeſſion of all *Italy*. As ſoon as *Juſtinian* had conquer'd the *Sclavi*, and ſettled the Countries which they had invaded, he ſent a new Army into *Italy* under the conduct of *Narſetes* an Eunuch, a brave Captain, and of great experience in the wars. Being arrived in *Italy*, he fought, beat and kill'd *Totila*, after whoſe death the remainder of the *Goths* retir'd into *Pavia*, and made *Teia* their King. On the other ſide, *Narſetes* after his Victory took *Rome*, and then marching againſt *Teia*, he ingag'd him about *Nocera*, defeated his Army, and ſlew him among the reſt: By which diſaſter the very name of the *Goths* was well near extinguiſh'd in *Italy*, where they had reigned from the time of *Theodorick*, to this *Teia*, full ſeventy years. But *Italy* was ſcarce warm in its Liberty, when *Juſtinianus* died, and left his Son *Juſtinus* to ſucceed, who by the counſel of his Wife *Sophia*, recall'd *Narſetes* out of *Italy*, and ſent *Longinus* in his place. *Longinus*, according to the example of his Predeceſſors, kept his Reſidence at *Ravenna*, in other things he digreſs'd, and particularly by introducing a new form of Government in *Italy*, not conſtituting Governours in every Province, as the *Goths* had done before, but deputing a Captain in every City or other Town of importance, with the Title of Duke. Nor in this diſtribution did he ſhow any greater favour to *Rome* than to the reſt; for removing the Conſuls and Senate (names which to that time had been ſacred among them) he conſtituted a Duke, which he ſent every year from *Ravenna*, and his Government was call'd the Dukedom of *Rome*. But he that more immediately repreſented the Emperor at *Ravenna*, and had the univerſal Government of *Italy*, was call'd *Eſarco*. This diviſion not only facilitated the ruin of *Italy*, but haſten'd it exceedingly, by giving the *Lombards* opportunity to poſſeſs it. *Narſetes* was much diſguſted with the Emperor for calling him off from the Command of thoſe Provinces, which by his own virtue, and effuſion of his bloud he had acquir'd: And *Sophia* not thinking it not injury ſufficient to get him recall'd, had given out contumelious words, as if ſhe would make him ſpin among the reſt of the Eunuchs. Whereupon in great diſdain *Narſetes* encourag'd *Alboino* King of the *Lombards* (who at that time govern'd in *Pannonia*) to invade *Italy* and poſſeſs it.

Belliſarius General for *Juſtinian* the Emperor.

Totila takes, ſacks, and burns *Rome*.

Narſetes a new General for *Juſtinian*.

Longinus alters the Government in *Italy*.

As was ſhown before, the *Lombards* were enter'd and had taken poſſeſſion of ſuch places upon the *Danube* as had been deſerted by the *Eruli* and *Turingi*, when *Odoacres* their King conducted them into *Italy*. They had continued there ſome time, till their Kingdom fell to *Alboino*, for a daring and couragious man, under whom paſſing the *Danube*, they encounter'd with *Commodus* King of the *Zepidi* (a people planted in *Pannonia*) and overcame him. Among the reſt *Roſmunda* one of *Commodus* daughters was taken priſoner, whom *Alboinus*

boinus took for his Wife, made himself Lord of her Country, and mov'd by the barbarousness of his nature, he caused a Cup to be made of her Father's Skull, and in memory of that Victory, drank out of it very often. But being call'd into *Italy* by *Narsetes*, with whom he had retain'd a friendship in his wars with the *Goths*; he left *Pannonia* to the *Hunni* (who as we said before, returned into their own Country after the death of *Attila*) march'd into *Italy*, and finding it so strangely cantoniz'd and divided, he possess'd (or rather surpriz'd) *Pavia*, *Milan*, *Verona*, *Vicenza*, all *Tuscany*, and the great part of *Flaminia* (call'd now *Romagnia*): So that presuming from the greatness and suddenness of his Conquests, all *Italy* was his own, he made a solemn feast at *Verona*, where much drinking having exalted his Spirits, and *Commodus* his Skull being full of Wine, he caused it to be presented to *Rosmunda* the Queen, who sat over against him at the Table, declaring (and that so loud she could not but hear) that at a time of such hearty and extraordinary mirth, it was fit she should drink one Cup with her Father. Which expression touching the Lady to the quick, she resolv'd to be reveng'd; and knowing that *Almachilde* a young and valiant *Lombard*, had an intrigue with one of her Maids, she prevail'd that she might personate her one night, and lie with him her self. Accordingly *Almachilde* being introduc'd upon a time into a very dark place, he enjoy'd *Rosamunda* instead of her Maid. The business being done, *Rosamunda* discover'd her self, told him what was pass'd; That now it was at his choice, whether he would kill *Alboino*, and enjoy her and her Kingdom, or be kill'd himself for vitiating his Wife. *Almachilde* had no fancy to be slain, and therefore chose the other proposition of killing his Master; but when they had kill'd him, they found themselves so far from acquiring the Kingdom, that they were afraid of being made away by the *Lombards*, out of the affection they bare to the memory of *Alboino*; for which cause, packing up with all the Jewels and Treasure they could make, they marched off to *Longinus* at *Ravenna*, who received them honourably.

Alboino kill'd by the Conspiracy of his Wife.

During these Troubles, *Justinus* the Emperor died, and *Tiberius* was elected in his place; but being employ'd in his Wars against the *Parthians*, he was not at leasure to send relief into *Italy*. Which *Longinus* looking upon as an opportunity to make himself King of the *Lombards*, and of all *Italy* besides, by the help of *Rosamunda* and her Treasure, he imparted his design to her, and perswaded her to kill *Almachilde*, and take him afterwards for her Husband. She accepted the Motion, and having in order thereunto prepared a Cup of Poison, she gave it with her own hand to *Almachilde* as he came thirsty out of a Bath, who having drank off half, finding it work, and great convulsions within him, concluding what it was, he forc'd her to drink the rest, so that in a few hours both of them died, and *Longinus* lost all hopes of making himself King. In the mean time at a Convention of the *Lombards* at *Pavia* (which they had made their Metropolis) they created *Clefi* their King, who re-edified *Imola*, that had been destroy'd by *Narsetes*. He conquer'd *Rimini*, and in a manner all up as far as *Rome*, but died in the middle of his cariere. This *Clefi* behav'd himself so cruelly, not only to Strangers, but even to the *Lombards* themselves, that the edge of their monarchical inclination being taken off, they would have no more Kings, but constituted Thirty, they call'd Dukes, to govern under them. Which Counsel was the Cause the *Lombards* extended not their Conquests over all *Italy*, nor dilated their Dominion beyond *Benevento*, *Rome*, *Ravenna*, *Cremona*, *Mantua*, *Padua*, *Monselice*, *Parma*, *Bolonia*, *Faenza*, *Furli*, *Cesana*; some of them defended themselves for some time, other never fell at all under their subjection. For having no King, they were first render'd unapt for the Wars; and when afterwards they reassum'd their old Government, and created Kings again, the small relish and taste the people had had of Liberty, render'd them less obedient to their Prince, and more contentious among themselves, and not only put a stop to the cariere of their Victories at first, but was the occasion afterwards, that they were driven out of *Italy*. Things being in this posture with the *Lombards*; the *Romans* and *Longinus* came to terms with them, and it was agreed, that Arms should be laid down on all hands, and each enjoy what was in their proper possession.

The Authority of the Bishops of *Rome* began to increase.

About this time the Bishops of *Rome* began to take upon them, and to exercise greater authority than they had formerly done. At first the Successors of St. *Peter* were venerable and eminent for their Miracles, and the holiness of their Lives; and their examples added daily such numbers to the Christian Church, that too bviate or remove the Confusions which were then in the world, many Princes turn'd Christians, and the Emperor of *Rome* being converted among the rest, and quitting *Rome*, to hold his residence at *Constantinople*; the *Roman* Empire (as we have said before) began to decline, but the Church of *Rome* augmented as fast. Nevertheless, until the coming in of the *Lombards*, all *Italy* being under the dominion either of Emperors or Kings, the Bishops assumed no more power, than what was due to their Doctrine, and Manners; in Civil Affairs, they were

subject

subject to the Civil Power, imployed many times by the Emperors and Kings, as their Ministers; and many times executed for their ill Administration. But *Theodorick* King of the *Gothi*, fixing his Seat at *Ravenna*, was that which advanc'd their interest, and made them more considerable in *Italy*; for there being no other Prince left in *Rome*, the Romans were forc'd for Protection to pay greater Allegiance to the *Pope*. And yet their Authority advanc'd no farther at that time, than to obtain the Preference before the Church of *Ravenna*. But the *Lombards* having invaded, and reduc'd *Italy* into several Cantons; the Pope took the opportunity, and began to hold up his head: For being as it were Governor and Principal at *Rome*, the Emperor of *Constantinople* and the *Lombards* bare him a respect, so that the *Romans* (by mediation of their Pope) began to treat and confederate with *Longinus* and the *Lombards*, not as Subjects, but as Equals and Companions; which said Custom continuing, and the Popes entring into Alliance sometimes with the *Lombards*, and sometimes with the *Greeks*, contracted great reputation to their dignity: But the destruction of the Eastern Empire following so close under the Reign of the Emperor *Heracleus*, in whose time the *Schiavi* (a people we mention'd before) fell again upon *Illyria* and over-ran it, and call'd it *Sclavonia*, from their own Name. The other parts of that Empire being infested first by the *Persians*, afterwards by the *Saracens*, out of *Arabia*, under the Conduct of *Mahomet*, and last of all, by the *Turks*, and having lost several Provinces which were members of it, as *Syria*, *Africa*, and *Egypt*: The Pope lost the convenience of the Emperor's protection in time of Adversity, and the power of the *Lombards* increasing too fast on the other side, he thought it but necessary to address himself to the King of *France* for assistance; so that the Wars which hapned afterwards in *Italy*, were occasioned by the Popes, and the several inundations of *Barbarians*, invited by them; which manner of proceeding having continued to our times, has held, and does still hold *Italy* divided and infirm. But in my description of Occurrences betwixt those times and our own, I shall not inlarge upon the ruine of the Empire, which in truth receiv'd but little assistance from the Popes, or any other Princes of *Italy*, till the days of *Charles* the VIIIth. but discourse rather how the Popes with their Censures, Comminations and Arms, mingled together with their Indulgences, became formidable and reverenced and how having made ill use both of the one and the other, they have lost the one entirely, and remain at the discretion of other people for the other. But to return to our Order. I say that *Gregory* the Third being created Pope, and *Aistolfus* King of the *Lombards*; *Aistolfus* contrary to League and Agreement, seiz'd upon *Ravenna*, and made War upon the Pope: *Gregory* not daring (for the reasons aboveſaid,) to depend upon the weakness of the Empire, or the fidelity of the *Lombards* (whom he had already found false) appli'd himself to *Pepin* the Second, who from Lord of *Austracia* and *Brabantia*, was become King of *France*, not so much by his own Virtue, as by the Chivalry of his Unkle *Pepin*, and *Charles Martel* his Father: For *Charles Martel* being Governor of that Kingdom, gave that memorable defeat to the *Saracens* near *Torsi* upon the River *Totra*, in which above 200000 of them were slain; upon the reputation of which Victory under the discipline of his Father, and his own deportment in it besides, *Pepin* was afterwards made King of that Kingdom; to whom, when Pope *Gregory* appli'd himself for Relief against the *Lombards*, *Pepin* return'd Answer, that he would be ready to assist him, but he desir'd first to have the honour to see him, and pay his personal respects. Upon which Invitation Pope *Gregory* went into *France*, passing thorow the *Lombards* Quarters without any interruption, so great Reverence they bare to Religion in those days. Being arriv'd, and honourably receiv'd in *France*, he was after some time dismiss'd with an Army into *Italy*; which having besieg'd *Pavia*, and reduc'd the *Lombards* to distress, *Aistolfus* was constrain'd to certain terms of Agreement with the *French*, which were obtain'd by the intercession of the Pope, who desir'd not the death of his Enemy, but that he might rather be converted and live. Among the rest of the Articles of that Treaty, it was agreed, That *Aistolfus* should restore all the Lands he had usurped from the Church. But when the French Army was return'd into *France*, *Aistolfus* forgot his Engagement, which put the Pope upon a second Application to King *Pepin*, who re-suppli'd him again, sent a new Army into *Italy*, overcame the *Lombards*, and possessed himself of *Ravenna*, and (contrary to the desire of the Grecian Emperor) gave it to the Pope, with all the Lands under that *Exarchat*, and the Country of *Urbino*, and *la Marca* into the bargain. In the interim *Aistolfus* died, and *Desiderio* a *Lombard*, and Duke of *Tuscany*, taking up Arms to succeed him, begg'd Assistance of the Pope, with promise of perpetual Amity for the future; which the Pope granted, as far as the other Princes would consent. At first *Desiderio* was very punctual, and observed his Articles to a hair, delivering up the Towns as he took them to the Pope, according to his Engagement to King *Pepin*, nor was there any *Exarchus* sent afterwards from *Constantinople* to *Ravenna*,

Bishops of *Rome* imploy'd as Ministers by the Emperors and Kings, and sometimes executed by them.

The Eastern Empire destroy'd in the time of *Heracleus* the Emperor.

Ravenna, but all was Arbitrary, and manag'd according to the pleasure of the Pope. Not long after, *Pepin* died, and *Charles* his Son succeeded in the Government, who was call'd the Great, from the greatness of his Exploits. About the same time *Theodore* the First was advanc'd to the Papacy, and falling out with *Desiderio*, was besieg'd by him in *Rome*. In his exigence the Pope had recourse to the King of *France* (as his Predecessor had done before him) and *Charles* not only suppli'd him with an Army, but marching over the *Alps* at the Head of it himself, he besieg'd *Desiderio*, in *Pavia*, took him and his Son in it, sent them both Prisoners into *France*, and went in person to *Rome*, to visit the Pope, where he adjudg'd and determin'd, *That his Holiness being God's Vicar, could not be subject to the Judgment of Man.*' For which the Pope and People together, declar'd him Emperor, and *Rome* began again to have an Emperor of the West; and whereas formerly the Popes were confirm'd by the Emperors, the Emperor now in his Election was to be beholding to the Pope; by which means, the power and dignity of the Empire declin'd, and the Church began to advance, and by these steps to usurp upon the Authority of Temporal Princes. The *Lombards* had been in *Italy* 222 years, so long as to retain nothing of their original Barbarity but their name. *Charles* being desirous to reform *Italy*, in the time of *Leo* III. was contented they should inhabit and denominate the parts where they were born, which since then, have been call'd *Lombardy*: and because the name of *Rome* was venerable among them; he appointed that part of *Italy* which was adjacent, and under the *Exarchat* of *Ravenna*, should be call'd *Romagnia*. Moreover, he created his Son *Pepin*, King of *Italy*, extending his Jurisdiction as far as *Benevento*; all the rest was continued under the dominion of the Grecian Emperor, with whom *Charles* had made an Alliance. During these Transactions, *Pascal* the First was elected Pope, and the Parish Priests in *Rome*, by reason of their propinquity and readiness at every Election, to adorn their power with a more illustrious Title, began to be call'd Cardinals; arrogating so much to themselves, (especially after they had excluded the Voices of the people) that seldom any Pope was created but by them, out of their own number. *Pascal* being dead, he was succeeded by *Eugenius* the Second, of the Order of *Santa Sabina*. *Italy* being in this manner under the Authority of the *French*, changed its Form and Oeconomy in some measure; for the Pope having incroach'd upon the Temporal Authority, created *Counts* and *Marquisses*, as *Longinus*, *Exarchat* of *Ravenna*, had made Dukes before. After some few, *Ospurcus* a Roman succeeded to the Papacy, who not satisfied with the uncomliness of his Name, call'd himself *Sergius*, and gave the first occasion for the changing their Names, which has since been frequently practis'd at their several Elections. About this time *Charles* the *Emperor* died, and his Son *Lodovic* succeeded, yet not so quietly, but that there arose so many and so great differences betwixt his Sons, that in the days of his Grand-Children, the Empire was wrested from his Family, restor'd to the *Almans*, and the next German Emperor was call'd *Ainolfus*. Nor did *Charles* his Posterity by their dissentions lose only the Empire, but their Sovereignty in *Italy* likewise; for the *Lombards* resuming Courage, fell foul upon the Pope and his *Romans*, who not knowing to whose protection to betake himself, was constrain'd to make *Berengarius* (Duke of *Friuli*) King of *Italy*. Encouraged by these Accidents, the *Hunni* (who at that time were planted in *Pannonia*) took heart, and invaded *Italy*, but coming to a Battel with *Berengarius*, they were overthrown, and forc'd back again into *Pannonia*, or rather into *Hungaria*, it being at that time call'd by their Name. At that time *Romano* was Emperor of *Greece*, who being General of his Army, had usurp'd upon *Constantine*, and forc'd the Government out of his hand; and because during these innovations, *Puglia* and *Calabria* (which as I said before, had subjected themselves to that Empire) were then in Rebellion; inrag'd at their insolence, he permitted the *Saracens* to possess those Countreys, if they could gain them; who invading them thereupon, immediately subdu'd them, and attempted upon *Rome*. But the *Romans*, (*Berengarius* being employ'd against the *Hunni*) made *Alberigo*, Duke of *Tuscany*, their General; by whose Valour their City was preserv'd, and the *Saracens* raising their Siege, retir'd, built a Castle upon the Mountain *Gargano*, and from thence lorded it over *Puglia* and *Calabria*, and infested all that part of *Italy* besides. Thus it was that *Italy* in those times was marvelously afflicted towards the *Alps* by the *Hunni*, towards *Naples* by the *Saracens*; and it continued in that Agony several years, under three *Berengarij* successively; during which time the *Pope* and the Church were under no less perturbation; having no refuge to fly to, by reason of the dissention among the Western Princes, and the impotence of the Eastern. The City of *Genoa*, and all its Territory upon the Rivers, were over-run by the *Saracens*, which, by the resort of multitudes (driven thither out of their own Country) was the foundation of the Grandeur of *Pisa*. These Accidents happen'd in the year DCCCCXXXI. But *Ottone* Son of *Enricus* and *Matilda*, and Duke of *Saxony*, coming

The King of *France* exempts the Pope from all humane Jurisdiction.

Pascal created *Pope*.

The Original of Cardinals.

Eugenius the II. *Pope*.

Ospurcus made *Pope*, changes his Name.

The Original of *Pisa*.

The Government of *Italy*, *Anno* 931.

to the Empire, and being a man of great reputation for his Conduct and Prudence, *Agabito* the *Pope* addreſſed himſelf to him, imploring his Aſſiſtance in *Italy* againſt the Tyranny of the *Berengarij*. The States of *Italy* in thoſe days were Govern'd in this manner. *Lombardy* was under the Juriſdiction of *Berengarius* the Third, and *Albertus* his Son. *Tuſcany* and *Romania* under the Dominion of a Governour deputed by the Emperor of the Weſt. *Puglia* and *Calabria* were part under the *Greek* Empire, and part under the *Saracens*. In *Rome*, two Conſuls were created out of the Nobility every year, according to ancient Cuſtom, to which a Prefect was added to adminiſter Juſtice to the people. They had moreover a Counſel of Twelve, who provided Governours annually for all Towns under their Juriſdiction. The *Pope* had more or leſs power in *Rome*, and in all *Italy*, according as his favour was more or leſs with the Emperor, or other perſons which were more potent than he. *Ottone*, to gratifie his requeſt, came into *Italy* with an Army, fought with the *Berengarij*, drove them out of their Kingdom (which they had enjoy'd 55 years) and reſtor'd the *Pope* to his former dignity. *Ottone* had a Son, and a Grand-Child of his own Name, both which, one after the other, ſucceeded in the Empire, and in the time of *Ottone* the Third, Pope *Gregory* the Fifth was expelled by the *Romans*. *Ottone* undertook a new Expedition into *Italy* in his behalf, and having once again re-eſtabliſh'd him in his Chair, the *Pope* to be reveng'd of the *Romans*, took from them the power of Creating the Emperors, and conferr'd it upon ſix German Princes; Three Biſhops, *Munſter*, *Treves* and *Colen*; and Three temporal Princes, the Duke of *Brandenburg*, the Prince *Palatine* of the *Rhine*, and the Duke of *Saxony*; and this happen'd in the year 1002. After the death of *Ottone* the Third, *Enrico* Duke of *Bavaria* was created Emperor by the ſaid Electors, and was Crown'd twelve years after by *Stephanus* the Eighth. *Enricus* and *Simeonda* his Wife, were eminent for their Piety, having as a Teſtimony of it, built and endow'd ſeveral Churches, and among the reſt that of S. *Miniato*, near the City of *Florence*. In the year 1024, *Enrico* died, was ſucceeded by *Corrado* of *Suevia*, and he by *Enrico* II. who coming to *Rome*, and finding a Schiſm in the Church, and three *Popes* in being at the ſame time, he degraded them all, and cauſing *Clement* II. to be elected, was Crown'd Emperor by him. *Italy* was then govern'd partly by the People, partly by Princes, and partly by the Emperor's Miniſters, the chiefeſt of which (to whom the reſt did in all matters of importance refer) had the Title of Chancellor. Among the Princes, the moſt powerful was *Gottifredus*, Husband to the Counteſs *Matilda*, who was Siſter to *Enricus* II. She and her Husband had the poſſeſſion of *Lucca*, *Parma*, *Reggio*, and *Mantua*, with all that Country which is now call'd the Patrimony of the Church. The *Popes* at that time had no ſmall trouble upon their hands, by reaſon of the ambition of the people of *Rome*; who having at firſt made uſe of the Papal Authority to free themſelves of the Emperors, as ſoon as the *Popes* had taken upon them the Regiment of the City, and reform'd things as they thought good themſelves, of a ſudden they became their Enemies; and they receiv'd more injury from the people, than from any other Chriſtian Prince whatſoever, rebelling and mutining at the ſame time the *Popes* by their Cenſures, made the whole Weſt to tremble; nor was the deſign of either of them leſs than to ſubvert the Authority and Reputation of the one and the other. *Nicolas* II. arriving at the Popedom, as *Gregory* V. had taken from the *Romans* the priviledge of creating the Emperor; ſo he depriv'd them of their concurrence to the Election of the *Pope*, reſtraining it wholly to the ſuffrage of the Cardinals; nor contented with this, by agreement with the Princes which Govern'd at that time in *Puglia* and *Calabria* (for reaſons which ſhall be mentioned hereafter) he forc'd all the Officers ſent thither by the people, to aſſert their Juriſdiction, to pay Allegiance to the *Pope*, and ſome of them he diſplaced. After *Nicolaus* was dead, there happen'd a great Schiſm in the Church: The Clergy of *Lombardy* would not yield obedience to *Alexander* II. who was choſen at *Rome*, but created *Cadalo* of *Parma*, Anti-Pope. *Enrico* deteſting the extravagant dominion of the *Popes*, ſent to *Alexander* to reſign, and to the Cardinals, that they ſhould repair into *Germany*, in order to a new Election: ſo that he was the firſt Prince which was made ſenſible of the effects of their Spiritual Fulminations; for the *Pope* calling together a new Council at *Rome*, depriv'd him both of his Empire, and Kingdom. Some of the *Italians* following the *Pope's*, and ſome of them the Emperor's party, was the foundation of that famous Faction betwixt the *Guelfs* and *Ghibilins*, in ſo much that for want of foreign inundations by the *Barbarians*, they turn'd their Arms upon themſelves, and tore out their own Bowels. *Enrico* being Excommunicated, was forc'd by his own Subjects to come into *Italy*, where bare-footed, and upon his knees he begg'd his Pardon of the *Pope*, in the year MLXXX. Notwithſtanding all this, not long after, there happen'd a new quarrel betwixt *Enrico* and the *Pope*; whereupon, provok'd by a new Excommunication, he ſent his Son *Enrico* with an Army, who by the Aſſiſtance of the

Agabito, Popt.

Gregory the Vth. *Pope*, expell'd and reſtor'd; diveſts the Romans of their power of creating Emperors, and confers it upon ſix Princes of *Germany*.

Clement IId. *Pope*.

Nicolas IId. *Pope*, excludes the Romans, & reduces the Papal Elections to the ſuffrage of Cardinals only.

Schiſm, and *Anti-Popes* in the Church.

The difference betwixt *Henricus* and the *Pope*, the ground of the *Guelfs*, and *Ghibilin* Factions.

the *Romans* (whose hatred the *Pope* had contracted) besieg'd him in his Castle; but *Roberto Guiscardo* coming from *Puglia* to his relief, *Enrico* had not the courage to attend him, but rais'd his Siege and retired into *Germany*. However the *Romans* continued obstinate, and *Robert* was forced to sack the Town, and reduce it to its ancient Ruins, from whence by several *Popes* it had been lately restor'd. And because from this *Roberto*, the Model of Government in the Kingdom of *Naples* did proceed, it will not (in my judgment) be superfluous to give a particular Narrative, both of his Country and Exploits. Upon the differences betwixt *Charlemain's* Heirs (as is said before) a new Northern people call'd *Normans* took occasion to invade *France*, and possess'd themselves of that part of it which is now call'd *Normandy*. Of this people, part went into *Italy*, in the time when it was infested by the *Berengarii*, the *Saracens*, and *Hunns*; settling in *Romania*, and performing very valiantly in all those Wars. Of *Tancred*, one of the Princes of those *Normans*, were born several Sons, among which, *William* call'd *Ferabar*, and *Roberto* call'd *Guiscardo*, were two. *William* arrived to be Prince, and the Tumults in *Italy* were in some measure compos'd: But the *Saracens* having *Sicily* intire, and daily invasions made upon *Italy*, *William* entred into Confederacy with the Princes of *Capua* and *Salerno*, and with *Milorcus* a *Grecian* (who by the Emperor of *Greece* was deputed Governour of *Puglia* and *Calabria*) to invade *Sicily*, and in case of Victory, it was agreed among them, that both Prey and Country should be equally divided. The Enterprize was prosperous; they beat the *Saracens*, drove them out of the Country, and possess'd it when they had done. But *Milorcus* causing more Forces to be transported privately out of *Greece*, seiz'd the Island for the Emperor, and divided only the Spoil. *William* was not a little disgusted, but reserving his indignation for a more convenient time, he departed out of *Sicily* with the Princes of *Capua* and *Salerno*; who having taken their leaves of him to return to their homes, instead of marching to *Romania*, as he pretended to them, he faced about with his Army towards *Puglia*, surpriz'd *Melfi*, and behav'd himself so well against the Forces of the Emperor, that he made himself Master of most part of *Puglia* and *Calabria*, which Provinces at the time of *Nicolas* II. were govern'd by his Brother *Roberto*; and because he had afterward great contention with his Nephews about the inheritance of those States, he made use of the *Pope's* mediation, who readily comply'd, being desirous to oblige *Roberto*, that he might defend him against the *German* Emperor, and the people of *Rome*; and it afterwards happen'd (as we have said before) that at the instance of *Gregory* VII. he forced *Enrico* from *Rome*, and suppress'd the Sedition of the Inhabitants. *Robert* was succeeded by two of his Sons, *Roger* and *William*; to their Inheritance they annexed the City of *Naples*, and all the Country betwixt it and *Rome*; besides that, they subdued *Sicily*, of which *Roger* was made Lord. But *William* going afterwards to *Constantinople*, to marry that Emperor's Daughter, *Roger* took advantage of his absence, seiz'd upon his Country; and elated by so great an acquest, caus'd himself first to be call'd King of *Italy*; but afterwards contenting himself with the Title of King of *Puglia* and *Sicily*, he was the first that gave Name and Laws to that Kingdom, which to this day it retains, tho' many times since, not only the Royal Blood, but the Nation has been changed; for upon failure of the *Norman* Race, that Kingdom devolv'd to the *Germans*; from them to the *French*; from the *French* to the *Spaniards*; and from the *Spaniards* to the *Flemens*, with whom it remains at this present. *Urban* II. tho' very odious in *Rome*, was gotten to be *Pope*; but by reason of the dissentions there, not thinking himself secure in *Italy*, he removed with his whole Clergy into *France*. Having assembled many people together at *Anvers*, he undertook a generous Enterprize, and by a learned Oration against the Infidels, kindled such a fire in their minds, they resolv'd upon an Expedition into *Asia* against the *Saracens*, which Expedition (as all other of the same nature) was call'd afterwards *Crociate*, because all that went along in it carry'd a red Cross upon their Arms, and their Cloaths. The chief Commanders in this Enterprize were *Gottofredi Eustachio*, *Alduino di Buglione* Earl of *Bologna*, and *Peter* the Hermit, a man of singular veneration both for his prudence and piety. Many Princes and Nations assisted with their Purses, and many private men serv'd as Voluntiers at their own charges. So great an influence had Religion in those days upon the Spirits of men, incouraged by the Example of their several Commanders. At first the Enterprize was very successful, all *Asia minor*, *Syria*, and part of *Egypt* fell under the power of the Christians; during which War, the Order of the Knights of *Jerusalem* was instituted, and continued a long time in *Rhodes*, as a Bulwark against the *Turks*. Not long after the Order of the Knights Templers was founded, but it lasted not long, by reason of the dissoluteness of their manners. At sundry times after these things, upon sundry occasions, many accidents fell out, in which several Nations, and particular men signalized themselves. There were ingaged in this Expedition, the Kings of *England* and *France*, the States of

The Original of the Kingdom of *Sicily*.

Urban II. *Pope*.

The first *Croisade*.

Pisa

Pisa, *Venice* and *Genoa*, all behaving themselves with great bravery, and fighting with variety of fortune, till the time of *Saladine* the *Saracen*; but his courage and virtue improv'd by intestine differences among the Christians, robb'd them of the glory they had gain'd at the first, and chased them out of a Country, where for ninety years they had been so honourably, and so happily plac'd. After the death of Pope *Urban*, *Pascal* II. was chosen to succeed him, and *Enrico* IV. made Emperor; who coming to *Rome*, and pretending great friendship to the Pope, took his advantage, clapt both him and his Clergy in prison, and never discharged them till they had impower'd him to dispose of the Churches in *Germany* as he pleas'd himself. About this time *Matilda* the Countess died, and gave her Patrimony to the Church. After the deaths of *Pascal* and *Enric*, many Popes and many Emperors succeeded, till the Papacy fell to *Alexander* III. and the Empire to *Frederick Barbarossa* a *Swede*. The Popes of those days had many controversies with the people of *Rome*, and the Emperors, which till the time of *Barbarossa*, rather increas'd than otherwise. *Frederic* was an excellent Soldier, but so haughty and high, he could not brook to give place to the Pope. Notwithstanding he came to *Rome* to be crown'd, and return'd peaceably into *Germany*. But that humour lasted but little, for he return'd shortly into *Italy*, to reduce some Towns in *Lombardy*, which denied him obedience. In this juncture, Cardinal *di* S. *Clemente* (a *Roman* born) dividing from Pope *Alexander*, was made Pope himself by a Faction in the Conclave. *Frederick* the Emperor being then incamp'd before *Crema*, *Alexander* complain'd to him of the Anti-Pope: *Frederick* reply'd, That they should both of them appear personally before him, and that then, hearing faithfully what each of them could say, he should be better able to determine which was in the right. *Alexander* was not at all satisfied with the answer; but perceiving the Emperor inclining to the Adversary, he excommunicated him, and ran away to King *Philip* of *France*. For all that, *Frederick* prosecuted his Wars in *Lombardy*, took and dismantled *Milan*: which put the Cities of *Verona*, *Padua* and *Venice*, upon a Confederacy for their common defence. In the mean time the Anti-Pope died, and *Frederick* presumed to create *Guido* of *Cremona* in his place. The *Romans* taking advantage of the Pope's absence, and the Emperor's diversion in *Lombardy*, had re-assum'd something of their former authority, and began to require obedience in the neighbouring places which had been anciently their Subjects. And because the *Tuscans* refus'd to submit, they march'd confusedly against them; but they being re-inforc'd by *Frederick*, gave the *Roman* Army such a blow, that since that time *Rome* could never recover its old Condition either for Populousness or Wealth. Upon these Events, Pope *Alexander* was return'd to *Rome*, presuming he might be safe there, by reason of the animosity the *Romans* retain'd against the Emperor; and the employment his Enemies gave him in *Lombardy*. But *Frederick* postponing all other respects, march'd with his Army to besiege *Rome*. *Alexander* thought it not convenient to attend him, but withdrew into *Puglia* to *William*, who upon the death of *Roger* (being next Heir) was made King. *Frederick* being much molested, and weaken'd by a Contagion in his Army, rais'd his siege, and went back into *Germany*. The *Lombards* which were in League against him, to restrain their Excursions, and streighten the Towns of *Pavia* and *Tortona*; caus'd a City to be built (which they intended for the Seat of the War) and call'd it *Alexandria*, in honour to Pope *Alexander*, and defiance to the Emperor. *Guido* the new Anti-Pope died likewise, and *John* (of *Fermo*) was chosen in his room, who by the favour of the Imperial party, was permitted to keep his Residence in *Monte Fiascone*, whilst *Alexander* was gone into *Tuscany*, invited by that people, that by his authority they might be the better defended against the *Romans*. Being there, Ambassadors came to him from *Henry* King of *England*, to clear their Master's innocence in the death of *Thomas Becket*, Archbishop of *Canterbury*, with which he was publickly and most infamously aspersed. To enquire into the truth, the Pope sent two Cardinals into *England*, who (notwithstanding they found not his Majesty in any manifest guilt) yet for the scandal of the fact, and that he had not honour'd the said Archbishop with the respect he deserved, they prescrib'd as a Penance, That he should call all the Barons of his Kingdom together, swear his Innocence before them, send 200 Soldiers to *Jerusalem*, to be paid by him for a twelve-month, and himself follow in person with as great a power as he could raise, before three years were expired; that he should disannul all things passed in his Kingdom in prejudice to the Ecclesiastick liberty, and consent, that any of his Subjects whatever, should appeal to *Rome*, when, and as often, as they thought it convenient: all which Conditions were readily accepted, and that great Prince submitted to a Sentence there is scarce a private person but would scorn at this day. But though his Holiness was so formidable to the Princes abroad, he was not so terrible in *Rome*; the people in that City would not be coaxed, nor perswaded to let him live there, though he protested he would meddle no

Pascal 2d.

Alexander 3d.

A new Anti-Pope.

The Pope's Penance to King *Henry* of *England*, upon the complaints about *Thomas Becket*.

farther than Eccleſiaſtical matters; by which it appears, things at a diſtance are more dreadful than near at hand. In the mean time *Frederick* was return'd into *Italy*, with reſolution to make a new War upon the Pope; but whilſt he was buſie about his preparations, his Barons and Clergy gave him advertiſment, that they would all forſake him, unleſs he reconciled himſelf to the Church; ſo that changing his deſign, he was forc'd to go and make his ſubmiſſion at *Venice*; and pacification being made, the Pope in the Agreement diveſted the Emperor of all the authority he pretended over *Rome*, and named *William* King of *Sicily* and *Puglia*, his Confederate. *Frederick* being an active Prince, and unable to lie ſtill, embarqu'd himſelf in the enterprize into *Aſia*, to ſpend his ambition againſt the *Turk*, which he could not do ſo effectually againſt the Pope. But being got as far as the River *Cidno*, allur'd by the clearneſs and excellence of the Waters, he would needs waſh himſelf in it, and that waſhing gave him his death. Thoſe Waters being more beneficial to the *Turks*, than all Excommunications to the Chriſtians; for whereas theſe only cool'd and aſſwag'd his ambition, they waſh'd it away, and extinguiſh'd it quite.

Frederick being dead, nothing remain'd now to be ſuppreſs'd, but the contumacy of the *Romans*. After much argument and diſpute about the creation of Conſuls, it was concluded, the *Romans*, according to ancient cuſtom, ſhould have liberty to chooſe them; but they ſhould not execute their Office, till they had ſworn fealty to the Church. Upon this accord *John* the Anti-Pope fled to *Monte Albano*, and died preſently after. In the mean time, *William* King of *Naples* died alſo; and having left no Sons but *Tanacred* a Baſtard, the Pope deſign'd to have poſſeſs'd himſelf of his kingdom, but by the oppoſition of the Barons, *Tanacred* was made King. Afterwards *Celeſtin* III. coming to the *Papacy*, and being deſirous to wreſt that kingdom from *Tanacred*, he contriv'd to make *Enrico* (*Frederick*'s Son) King, promiſing him the kingdom of *Naples*, upon condition he would reſtore ſuch Lands as belong'd to the Church; and to facilitate the buſineſs, he took *Coſtanza* (an ancient Maid, daughter to King *William*) out of a Monaſtery, and gave her him for his Wife; by which means the kingdom of *Naples* paſs'd from the *Normans* (who had founded it) and fell under the dominion of the *Germans*. *Henricus* the Emperor having firſt ſettled his affairs in *Germany*, came into *Italy* with his Wife *Coſtanza*, and one of his Sons call'd *Frederick*, about four years of age, and without much difficulty poſſeſs'd himſelf of that kingdom, *Tanacred* being dead, and only one Child remaining of his iſſue, call'd *Roger*. Not long after *Enricus* died in *Sicily*, he was ſucceeded in that kingdom by *Frederick*; and *Otto* Duke of *Saxony*, choſen Emperor by the aſſiſtance of Pope *Innocent* III. But no ſooner had he got the Crown upon his head, but contrary to the opinion of all men, he became Enemy to the Pope; ſeiz'd upon *Romania*, and gave out Orders for the aſſaulting that kingdom: upon which being excommunicated by the Pope, and deſerted by his Friends, *Frederick* King of *Naples* was choſen Emperor in his place. The ſaid *Frederick* coming to *Rome* to be crown'd, the Pope ſcrupled it, being jealous of his power, and endeavour'd to perſuade him out of *Italy*, as he had done *Otto* before; which *Frederick* diſdaining, retir'd into *Germany*, and making war upon *Otto*, overcame him at laſt. In the mean time *Innocent* died, who beſides other magnificent works, built the Hoſpital *di Santo Spirito* at *Rome*. *Honorius* III. ſucceeded him, in whoſe Papacy was inſtituted the Orders of S. *Dominic* and S. *Francis*, in the year MCCXVIII. *Honorius* crown'd *Frederick*, to whom *John*, deſcended from *Baldwin* King of *Jeruſalem* (who commanded the remainder of the Chriſtians in *Aſia*, and retain'd that title) gave one of his daughters in marriage, and the Title of that kingdom in dower with her; and from that time whoever is King of *Naples*, has that Title annex'd. In *Italy* at that time they liv'd in this manner: the *Romans* had no more the creation of Conſuls, but in lieu of it they inveſted ſometimes one, ſometimes more of their Senators with the ſame power. The League continued all the while, into which the Cities of *Lombardy* had entred againſt *Frederick Barbaroſſa*; and the Cities were theſe; *Milan*, *Breſcia*, *Mantua*, with the greater part of the Cities in *Romagna*, beſides *Verona*, *Vicenza*, *Padua*, and *Trevigi*. The Cities on the Emperor's ſide were *Cremona*, *Bergamo*, *Parma*, *Reggio*, *Modena*, and *Trenta*: The reſt of the Cities of *Lombardy*, *Romagna*, and the Marquiſate of *Treviſan*, took part according to their intereſt, ſometimes with this, ſometimes with the other party. In the time of *Otto* III. one *Ezelino* came into *Italy*, of whoſe Loins there remaining a Son, call'd alſo *Ezelino*, being powerful and rich, he join'd himſelf with *Frederick* II. who (as was ſaid before) was become an Enemy to the Pope. By the encouragement and aſſiſtance of this *Ezelino*, *Frederick* came into *Italy*; took *Verona* and *Mantua*, demoliſh'd *Vicenza*, ſeiz'd upon *Padoua*, defeated the united Forces of thoſe parts, and when he had done, advanc'd towards *Toſcany*, whilſt in the mean time *Ezelino* made himſelf maſter of the Marquiſate of *Trevizan*. *Ferrara* they could

Celeſtin 3d. Pope.

Honorius 3d. Pope.

The Orders of S. *Dominic* and S. *Francis* inſtituted 1218.

The Titles of King of *Naples* and *Jeruſalem* annexed.

could not take, being defended by *Azone da Esti*, and some Regiments of the Pope's in *Lombardy*. Whereupon when the Siege was drawn off, his Holiness gave that City in Fee to *Azone da Esti*, from whom those who are Lords of it at this day are descended. *Frederick* stop'd, and fix'd himself at *Pisa*, being desirous to make himself Master of *Tuscany*, and by the distinctions he made betwixt his Friends and his Foes in that Province, rais'd such animosities, as proved afterwards the destruction of all *Italy*: For both *Guelfs* and *Gibilins* increas'd every day, the first siding with the Church, the other with the Emperor, and were call'd first by those Names, in the City of *Pistoia*. *Frederick* being at length remov'd from *Pisa*, made great devastations, and several inroads into the Territories of the Church; in somuch that the Pope having no other remedy, proclaim'd the *Croisada* against him, as his Predecessors had done against the *Saracens*. *Frederick* (lest he should be left in the lurch by his own people, as *Frederick Barbaroffa*, and others of his Ancestors had been before,) entertain'd into his pay great numbers of the *Saracens*; and to oblige them to him, and strengthen his opposition to the Pope, by a party that should not be afraid of his Curses, he gave them *Nocera* in that Kingdom, to the end that having a Retreat in their own hands, they might serve him with more confidence and security. At this time *Innocent* IV. was Pope, who being apprehensive of *Frederick*, remov'd to *Genoa*, and thence into *France*, where he call'd a Counsel at *Lyons*, and *Frederick* design'd to have been there, had he not been retain'd by the Rebellion of *Parma*. Having had ill Fortune in the suppressing of that, he march'd away into *Tuscany*, and from thence into *Sicily*, where he died not long after, leaving his Son *Currado* in *Suevia*, and in *Puglia*, his natural Son *Manfredi*, whom he had made Duke of *Benevento*. *Currado* went to take possession of the Kingdom, died at *Naples*, and left only one little Son behind him in *Germany*, who was call'd *Currado*, by his own Name. By which means, *Manfred* first as Tutor to *Currado*, got into the Government, and afterwards giving out that his Pupil was dead, he made himself King, and forc'd the Pope and *Neapolitans* (who oppos'd it) to consent. Whilst Affairs in that Kingdom were in that posture, many Commotions happen'd in *Lombardy*, betwixt the *Guelfs* and the *Gibilins*. The *Guelfs* were headed by a Legate from the Pope, the *Gibilins* by *Ezelino*, who at that time had in his possession all that part of *Lombardy* on this side the *Poe*. And because while he was entertain'd in this War, the City of *Padoua* rebell'd, he caus'd 12000 of them to be slain, and not long after, before the War was ended, died himself in the thirtieth year of his age. Upon his death, all those Countreys which had been in his hands, became free. *Manfredi* King of *Naples* continued his malevolence to the Church, as his Ancestors had done before him, holding Pope *Urban* IV. in perpetual anxiety, so that at length he was constrain'd to convoke the *Crociata* against him, and to retire into *Perugia*, till he could get his Forces together: but finding them come in slowly and thin, conceiving that to the overcoming of *Manfred*, greater supplies would be necessary, he address'd himself to the King of *France*, making his Brother *Charles* Duke of *Angio*, King of *Sicily* and *Naples*, and excited him to come into *Italy*, and take possession of those Kingdoms. Before *Charles* could get to *Rome*, the Pope died, and *Clement* V. succeeded in his place. In the said *Clement*'s time, *Charles* with 30 Galleys arriv'd at *Ostia*, having ordered the rest of his Forces to meet him by Land. During his residence at *Rome*, as a Complement to him, the *Romans* made him a Senator, and the Pope invested him in that Kingdom, with condition that he should pay 50 thousand Florins yearly to the Church; and published a Decree, that for the future, neither *Charles*, nor any that should succeed him in that Kingdom, should be capable of being Emperors. After which *Charles* advancing against *Manfred*, fought with him, beat him, and kill'd him near *Benevento*, thereby making himself King of *Sicily*, and that Kingdom. *Corradino* (to whom that State devolv'd by his Father's Testament) gathering what Forces together he could in *Germany*, march'd into *Italy* against *Charles*, and ingaging him at *Tagliacozza*, was presently defeated, and (being afterwards discover'd in his flight) taken and slain. *Italy* continued quiet, till the Papacy of *Adrian* V. who not enduring that *Charles* should continue in *Rome*, and govern all (as he did) by vertue of his Senatorship, he remov'd to *Viterbo*, and solicited *Ridolfus* the Emperor to come into *Italy* against him. In this manner, the Popes sometimes for defence of Religion, sometimes out of their own private ambition, call'd in new Men, and by consequence new Wars into *Italy*. And no soonner had they advanc'd any of them, but they repented of what they had done, and sought immediately to remove him; nor would they suffer any Province, (which by reason of their weakness they were unable themselves to subdue) to be injoy'd quietly by any body else. The Princes were all afraid of them, for whether by fighting, or flying, they commonly overcame, unless circumvented by some Stratagem, as *Boniface* VIII. and some others were by the Emperors, under pretence of Friendship and Amity. *Ridolfus* being retain'd by his War with the King of *Bohemia*, was not

The House of the *Esti* made Lords of *Ferrara*.

The *Guelfs* side with the Church, the *Gibilins* with the Emperor.

Innocent 4th Pope.

Clement 5th Pope.

Adrian 5th Pope.

at

Nicolas 3d. of the House of *Ursini*.

at leisure to visit *Italy* before *Adrian* was dead. He which succeeded him was *Nicolas* III. of the House of *Ursini*, a daring, ambitious man: who resolving to take down the Authority of *Charles*, contriv'd that *Ridolfus* the Emperor should complain of *Charles* his Governor in *Tuscany*, of his siding with the *Guelfs*, who after the death of *Manfred*, had been receiv'd and protected in that Province. To comply with the Emperor, *Charles* call'd away his Governor, and the Pope sent his Cardinal Nephew to take possession of it for the Emperor: to recompense that Kindness, the Emperor restor'd *Romania* to the Church, which had been usurp'd by his Predecessors, and the Pope made *Bartaldo Orsino* Duke of *Romagnia*: growing more powerful by degrees, and believing himself strong enough to look *Charles* in the face, he began to expostulate, turn'd him out of his Senatorship, and publish'd a Decree, that no person for the future of Royal extraction should ever be Senator in *Rome*. Not contented with this, he carried his Designs farther, and was in the mind to have droven *Charles* out of *Sicily*; to which end, he held secret intelligence with the King of *Arragon*, who effected it afterwards in the time of his Successor. He design'd likewise to have made two Kings out of his Family, one of *Lombardy*, the other of *Tuscany*, by whose power and assistance the Church might be defended from the incursions of the *Germans* abroad, and the oppression of the *French* at home. But he dying before any thing could be done, was the first Pope that gave so manifest demonstration of Ambition, or that, under pretence of advancing the Church, design'd only to exalt and magnifie his own Family; and though from this time backward no mention is to be found of Nephew, or any other of his Holiness Kindred, yet forward all History is full of them; and as formerly the Popes have endeavour'd to leave them Princes, they would leave them Popes now adays if they could, and make the Papacy hereditary.

The first introduction of Popes Nephews.

Martin 10th. Pope.

But the Principalities they erected, have been hitherto short-liv'd; for the Popes seldom living long, the first gust of wind shakes them, for want of their Authority and Courage to sustain them. This Pope being dead, *Martin* X. succeeded, who being born a *French-man*, was a friend to the *French*, and *Charles* (in the Rebellion of *Romania*) sent an Army to his Assistance, who having besieg'd *Furli*, *Guido Bonatti* an Astrologer being in the Town, appointed the Garrison a certain time to sally upon them; and following his direction, they did it with such success, that the whole *French* Army was either taken or kill'd. About this time, the practices betwixt Pope *Nicolas* and *Peter* King of *Arragon*, were put in execution; the *Sicilians* by that means kill'd all the *French* they found in that Island; and *Peter* made himself Lord of it, upon pretence it belonged to *Constansa*, *Manfred*'s Daughter, whom he had married; but *Charles* in his preparation for its recovery, died; left *Charles* II. his Son, at that time a Prisoner in *Sicily*, who for his enlargement, promis'd to surrender himself again, if in three years time he prevail'd not with the Pope to invest the House of *Arragon* with the Kingdom of *Sicily*. *Ridolfus* the Emperor, in stead of coming into *Italy* himself, to recover the reputation of the Empire, sent an Ambassador thither with full power to enfranchize such Cities as would buy out their Freedom: Upon which, many Cities redeem'd themselves, and chang'd their Laws, with their Liberty. *Adulfus* Duke of *Saxony*, succeeded in the Empire, and in the Popedom, *Piero del Murone*, by the Name of Pope *Celestine*; but having been a Hermit, and exceedingly devout, in six months time he renounced, and *Boniface* VIII. was chosen in his room. The Heavens (foreseeing the time would come *Italy* should be deliver'd both from the *Germans* and *French*, and remain intirely in the hands of its Natives; that the Pope though freed from foreign impediments, might not be able to usurp, and establish himself in the Power which he exercised then) rais'd up two great Families in *Rome*, the *Colonni*, and the *Ursini*, that by their Authority and Alliance they might be able to circumscribe his Holiness, and keep him within his bounds. Pope *Boniface* was sensible of them, and apply'd himself very zealously to have extirpated the *Colonni*, excommunicating them first, and then proclaiming the *Crociata* against them; which, though it might be some prejudice to them, was more to the Church: For those Swords which had been drawn in vindication of the Gospel, and done honourable things; when for private ambition they were unsheath'd against Christians, they lost their first sharpness, and would not cut at all; and so it came to pass, their immoderate desire of satiating their Appetite, by degrees lessened the Popes power, and disarm'd them.

Pope *Celestine* resigns to *Boniface*. 8th.

Two of that House which were Cardinals, he degraded; *Sciarra* (the chief of them) escaping in disguise, being discover'd, was taken by the *Spanish* Privateers, and clap'd to an Oar; but being known at *Marsellis*, he was rescu'd, and sent away to the King of *France*, who by *Boniface* was Excommunicated thereupon, and depriv'd of his Kingdom. *Philip* King of *France*, considering very well that in all open Wars with the Popes, he had either run some eminent danger, or come home by the loss; began to look about for some Artifice,

 and

and at length, pretending great readineſs to comply, and counterfeiting a Treaty, he ſent *Sciarra* privately into *Italy*, who being arriv'd at *Anagnia* (where at that time the *Pope* had his reſidence) gathering his Friends together in the night, he ſeiz'd upon his Holineſs, who (tho' inlarg'd afterwards by the people of the Town) died ſhortly in a Delirium with meer ſenſe and indignation. This *Boniface* was the firſt *Pope* which ordained Jubilees in the year MCCC. and decreed they ſhould be celebrated every hundred years. Theſe times produced many troubles betwixt the *Guelfs* and the *Ghibilins*, and *Italy* being forſaken by the Emperors, many Towns recover'd their liberties, and many were uſurp'd. Pope *Benedict* reſtor'd their Caps to the Cardinals of the Houſe of *Colonni*, abſolv'd King *Philip*, and gave him his bleſſing. *Benedict* was ſucceeded by *Clement* V. who being a *Frenchman*, removed his Court into *France*, *Anno* MCCCVI. During theſe Tranſactions *Charles* II. King of *Naples* died, and left the Succeſſion to *Robert* his Son. The Empire was in the mean time fallen to *Arrigo* of *Luxemburg*, who came to *Rome* to be crown'd, tho' the *Pope* was not there; upon whoſe arrival many commotions followed in *Lombardy*, and all baniſh'd perſons, whether *Guelfs* or *Ghibilins*, being reſtor'd to their former habitations, conſpiring to ſupplant one another, they fill'd the whole Province with the calamities of War, notwithſtanding the Emperor employ'd his utmoſt power to prevent it. *Arrigo* removing out of *Lombardy* by the way of *Genoua*, return'd to *Piſa*, with deſign to have driven King *Robert* out of *Tuſcany*; but not ſucceeding in that, he march'd to *Rome*, but continued there a few days only, for the *Urſini* by the help of King *Robert*, forced him to remove, and he march'd back again to *Piſa*, where, for his more ſecure warring upon *Tuſcany*, and ſupplanting that King, he caus'd it to be aſſaulted on the other ſide by *Frederick* King of *Sicily*. But in the height of his deſigns, when he thought himſelf ſure both of *Tuſcany* and its King, he died, and the ſucceſſion went to *Lodovick* of *Bavaria*. About this time *John* XXII. was created *Pope*, in whoſe Papacy, the Emperor ceaſed not to perſecute the *Guelfs*, and the Church; but King *Robert* and the *Florentines* interpoſing in their defence, great Wars enſued in *Lombardy*, under the conduct of the *Viſconti* againſt the *Guelfs*, and againſt the *Florentines* in *Tuſcany*, by *Caſtruccio di Lucca*. And becauſe the Family of the *Viſconti* were the original of the Dukedom of *Milan*, one of the five Principalities that govern'd all *Italy* afterwards, I think it not amiſs to deduce it a little higher. After the League among the Cities in *Lombardy* (which I have mention'd before) for their mutual defence againſt *Frederick Barbaroſſa*, *Milan* being reſcued from the ruin that impended, to revenge itſelf of the injuries it had receiv'd, enter'd into that Confederacy, which put a ſtop to the Emperor's career, and preſerv'd the Churches intereſt in *Lombardy* for a while. In the proceſs of thoſe Wars, the Family of the *Torri* grew very powerful, increaſing daily more and more, while the Emperor's Authority was ſmall in thoſe parts. But *Frederick* II. arriving in *Italy*, and the *Ghibilin* Faction (by the aſſiſtance of *Ezelino*) prevailing, it began to dilate and ſpread it ſelf in all the City, and particularly in *Milan*, the Family of the *Viſconti* ſiding with that party, drove the Family of the *Torri* out of that Town: But long they were not baniſh'd, for by an accord made betwixt the Emperor and *Pope*, they were reſtor'd. Afterwards when the *Pope* remov'd with his Court into *France*, and *Arrigo* of *Luxemburg* came to *Rome* to be crown'd, he was receiv'd into *Milan* by *Maffeo Viſconti*, the Head of that Houſe, and *Guido della Torre*, the chief of the other. Yet how kindly ſoever they carry'd it outwardly, *Maffeo* had a ſecret deſign, by the Emperor's being there, to drive out the *Torri*, believing the Enterprize the more practicable, becauſe *Guido* was of the Enemies Faction. He took the advantage of the peoples complaints againſt the behaviour of the *Germans*, incouraging them ſlily to take Arms, and reſcue themſelves from their barbarous ſervitude. Having diſpoſed things as he deſired, he cauſed a tumult to be raiſed by one of his Confidents, upon which the whole Town was to be in Arms, and pretendedly againſt the *Germans*. The tumult was no ſooner begun, but *Maffeo*, his Sons, Servants, and Partizans were immediately in Arms, and ran to *Arrigo*, aſſuring him that tumult was raiſed by the *Torri*, who not content with their private condition, took that occaſion to ruin him as an Enemy to the *Guelfs*, and make themſelves Princes of that City. But he deſired him to be ſecure, for they and their party would not fail to defend him, whenever he required it. *Arrigo* believed all to be true, that *Maffeo* had told him, joined his Forces with the *Viſconti*, fell upon the *Torri* (who were diſperſed up and down the City to ſuppreſs the tumult) killed thoſe of them which they met, baniſhed the reſt, and ſeized their Eſtates: So that *Maffeo Viſconti* made himſelf Prince. After him there ſucceeded *Galeazo* and *Aza*, and after them *Luchino* and *John*, who was afterwards Archbiſhop of that City: *Luchino* died before him, and left two Sons, *Barnardo* and *Galeazo*; *Galeazo* dying not long after, left one Son, called *Giovan Galeazo*, *Conti di Vertu*, who after the death of the Archbiſhop, killed his Uncle *Barnardo*, made himſelf Prince, and was the firſt that took upon him the Title of Duke of *Milan*. He left

The firſt *Jubilees* ordained by *Boniface* every 100 years.

Benedict choſen, dies, and is ſucceeded by *Clement* V. who remov'd his reſidence into *France*, 1306.

John XXII. Pope.

The *Viſconti* a great Family in *Milan*, made Princes of that City by the extirpation of the *Torri*.

The firſt Duke of *Milan*.

left two Sons only, *Philip*, and *Giovan Maria Angelo*, who being ſlain by the people of *Milan*, the Government remain'd wholly to *Philip*. He dying without iſſue Male, the Dukedom was tranſlated from the Houſe of the *Viſconti*, to the *Sforza*'s; but of the manner and occaſions of that, hereafter. To return therefore, where I left.

The Dukedom of *Milan* falls to the *Sforza*'s.

Lewis the Emperor, to give reputation to his party, and to be formally Crown'd, came into *Italy*, and being at *Milan*, to drain the City of its Money, he pretended to ſet them at Liberty, and clap'd the *Viſconti* in *Priſon*. Afterwards, by the Mediation of *Caſtruccio da Lucca*, he releas'd them, march'd to *Rome*, and (that he might more eaſily diſturb the tranquility of *Italy*) he made *Piero della Carvaro*, Anti-Pope: by whoſe reputation, and the intereſt of the *Viſconti*, he preſum'd he ſhould be able to keep under both the *Tuſcans*, and *Lombards*. But *Caſtruccio* died in the nick, and his death was the Emperor's ruin, for *Piſa* and *Lucca* rebelled out of hand. The *Piſans* took the Anti-pope, and ſent him Priſoner to the *Pope* into *France*, ſo that the Emperor deſpairing of his Affairs in *Italy*, he left them all as they were, and retired into *Germany*. He was ſcarce gone, before *John* King of *Bohemia* came into *Italy* with an Army (being invited by the *Ghibilins* in *Breſcia*) and poſſeſt himſelf both of that City and *Bergamo*. The *Pope* (however he diſſembled it) was not averſe to his coming; and therefore his Legat at *Bologna* favoured him privately, looking upon him as a good Antidote againſt the Emperor's return. Theſe under-hand practices chang'd the Condition of *Italy*; for the *Florentines* and King *Robert*, perceiving the Legat a favourer of the *Ghibilin* Faction, turn'd Enemies to all people that profeſs'd themſelves their Friends. In ſo much as without reſpect to either *Ghibilins* or *Guelfs*, many Princes aſſociated with them; among the reſt were the Families of the *Viſconti* & *Scala*, *Philippo di Gonſaga* of the Houſe of *Mantua*, the Families of *Carara* and *Eſte*, whereupon the *Pope* Excommunicated them all. The King apprehenſive of their League, return'd home to reinforce himſelf, and coming back with more Force into *Italy*, found his Enterprize very difficult notwithſtanding; ſo that growing weary of the buſineſs (though much to the diſſatisfaction of the *Legat*) he return'd into *Bohemia*, leaving *Garriſons* only in *Modena* and *Reggio*, recommending *Parma* to the Care of *Marſilio*, and *Piero de Roſſi*, who were eminent men in that City. As ſoon as he was departed, *Bologna* enter'd into the Confederacy, and the *Colleagues* divided the four Towns that were remaining to the Church among themſelves, *Parma* to the *Scali*, *Reggio* to the *Gonzagi*, *Modena* to the *Eſti*, and *Lucca* to the *Florentines*. But many differences follow'd upon that diviſion, which for the greateſt part were compos'd afterwards by the *Venetians*. And now I ſpeak of the *Venetians*, it may appear indecorous to ſome people, that among all the occurrences and revolutions in *Italy*, I have deferr'd ſpeaking of them, notwithſtanding their Government and Power places them above any other Republick or Principality in that Country.

That that Exception may be remov'd, and the occaſion appear, it will be neceſſary to look back for ſome time, to make their Original conſpicuous, and the reaſons for which they reſerv'd themſelves ſo long from interpoſing in the Affairs of *Italy*. *Attila* King of the *Hunni* having beſieg'd *Aquilegia*, the Inhabitants after a generous defence, being reduc'd to diſtreſs, and deſpairing of Relief, conveighing their Goods, as well as they could, to certain Rocks in that point of the *Adriatick Sea* which were not inhabited, they eſcap'd after them themſelves. The *Padouans* ſeeing the fire ſo near them, concluding when *Aquilegia* was taken, his next viſit would be to them, ſent away their Goods, Wives, Children, and unſerviceable people to a place in the ſame Sea, call'd *Rivo Alto*, leaving the young men, and ſuch as were able to bear Arms, for the defence of the Town. The Inhabitants of *Monſelice*, and the Hills about it, fearing the ſame deſtiny, remov'd to the ſame Iſlands. *Aquilegia* being taken, and *Padoua*, *Montſelice*, *Vicenſa*, and *Verona* overcome and ſack'd by *Attila*'s Army; thoſe which remain'd of the *Padouans*, and the moſt conſiderable of the reſt, ſettled their habitations in certain Fenns and Marſhes about the aforeſaid *Rivo Alto*: and all the people about that Province, which was anciently call'd *Venetia*, being driven out of their Country by the ſame Calamities, joyn'd themſelves with them; changing (by neceſſity) their pleaſant and plentiful Habitations, for rude and barren places, void of all Commodity and Convenience. But their number being great, and their Quarter but ſmall, in a ſhort time they made it not only habitable, but delightful; framing ſuch Laws and Orders to themſelves, as ſecur'd them againſt miſeries of their Neighbours, and in a ſhort time made them conſiderable, both for reputation and force. So that beſides their firſt inhabitants, many people reſorting to them from the Cities of *Lombardy*, upon occaſion of the Cruelty of *Cleſi* King of the *Lombards*, they multiply'd ſo faſt, that when *Pepin* King of *France* at the ſollicitation of the *Pope*, undertook to drive the *Lombards* out of *Italy*, in the Treaties betwixt him and the Emperor of *Greece*, it was agreed that the Duke of *Benevento* and the *Venetians*, ſhould be ſubject neither to the one nor the other,

The Original of the *Venetians*.

but

but enjoy their Liberty to themselves. Moreover, Necessity having determin'd their Habitations among the Waters, having no Land to supply them, it forc'd them to look about which way they might live; and applying to Navigation, they began to trade about the World, and not only furnish'd themselves with necessary Provisions, but by degrees brought thither such variety of Merchandize, that other people which had need of them, came to them to be supply'd. At first, having no thoughts of Dominion, they were wholly intent upon what might facilitate their Trade, and in order thereunto, they acquir'd several Ports, both in *Greece* and *Syria*, and in their passage into *Asia* the *French* making use of their Ships, they gave them (by way of Recompence) the Island of *Candia*. While they lived at this rate, their Name was grown formidable at Sea, and so venerable at Land, that in most Controversies betwixt their Neighbours they were the only Arbitrators: as it happen'd in the difference betwixt the Confederates upon the division of the Towns, where the cause being referred to them, they awarded *Bergamo* and *Brescia* to the *Visconti*. But having afterwards in process of time conquer'd *Padoua*, *Vicenza*, *Trivegi*, and after them *Verona*, *Bergamo* and *Brescia*, besides several Towns in *Romagna* and elsewhere, their power began to be so considerable, that not only the Princes of *Italy*, but the greatest and most remote Kings were afraid to provoke them. Whereupon, entring into a Conspiracy against them, the *Venetians* lost all in one day, that in so many Years, and with so vast Expence they had been gaining; and tho' in our times they may have recover'd it in part, yet not having regain'd their Reputation and Power, they live at the mercy of other people (as indeed all the Princes of *Italy* do.) *Benedict* XII. being *Pope*, looking upon *Italy* as lost, and fearing that *Lodovic* the Emperor should make himself Master of it, he resolv'd to enter into strict Amity with all those who held any Lands that belong'd formerly to the Empire, presuming their fear to be dispossess'd, would make them faithful in the defence of *Italy*, and zealous to keep him out: accordingly he publish'd a Decree to confirm all the usurp'd Titles in *Lombardy*, and to continue their Possession. But that *Pope* died before his promise could be made good, and *Clement* VI. succeeded him. The Emperor observing with what liberality the *Pope* had dispos'd of the Lands belonging to the Empire, that he might not be behind him in so generous a point, he gave all Lands that had been usurp'd from the Church, to such persons as had usurp'd them, to hold them of the Empire, as the other of the *Pope*. By which Donation *Galeotto Malatesti* and his Brothers became Lords of *Rimini*, *Pesaro*, and *Fano*, *Antonio da Montefeltro* of *la Marca* and *Urbin*, *Gentil da Varano* of *Camerino*, *Giovanni Manfredi* of *Faenza*, *Guido di Polenta* of *Ravenna*, *Sinebaldo Ordelaffi* of *Furli* and *Cesena*, *Lodovico Aledosi* of *Imola*, besides many others in other places: so that of all the Lands which belong'd to the Church, there was scarce any left without an Interloper; by which means, till the time of *Alexander* VI. the Church was very weak, but he recover'd its Authority in our days, with the destruction of most of their Posterity. At the time of this Concession, the Emperor was at *Taranto*, where he gave out, his Design was for *Italy*, which was the occasion of great Wars in *Lombardy*, in which the *Visconti* made themselves Lords of *Parma*. About this time, *Robert* King of *Naples* died, and left two Grand-Children by his Son *Charles*, (who died not long before) leaving his eldest Daughter *Giovanna* Heir to the Crown, with injunction to marry *Andrea*, Son to the King of *Hungary*, who was his Nephew. But they liv'd not long together, before *Andrea* was poison'd by her, and she married again to *Lodovic* Prince of *Taranto*, her near Kinsman. But *Lewis* King of *Hungary*, Brother to *Andrea*, to revenge his death, came into *Italy* with an Army, and drave *Giovanna* and her Husband out of the Kingdom. About these times there happen'd a very memorable passage in *Rome*; one *Nicholas di Lorenzo*, Chancellor in the Capitol, having forc'd the Senate out of *Rome*, under the Title of *Tribune*, made himself Head of that Commonwealth, reducing it into its ancient form, with so much Justice and Virtue, that not only the neighbouring Provinces, but all *Italy* sent Ambassadors to him. The ancient Provinces seeing that City so strangely reviv'd, began to lift up their Heads, and pay it a respect, some out of fear, and some out of hopes. But *Nicholas*, notwithstanding the greatness of his Reputation, not able to comport with so great an Authority, deserted it himself; for being overburthen'd with the weight of it, he left it in the very beginning, and without any constraint, stole privately away to the King of *Bohemia*, who, by the *Pope's* order, in affront to *Lewis* of *Bavaria*, was made Emperor, and to gratifie his Patron, he secur'd *Nicholas*, and clapt him in Prison. Not long after, as it had been in imitation of *Nicholas*, one *Francesco Baroncegli* possest himself of the Tribuneship, and turn'd the Senators out of *Rome*: so that the *Pope*, as the readiest way to suppress him, was glad to discharge *Nicholas* of his Imprisonment, and sent him to *Rome*, to resume his old Office: whereupon *Nicholas* undertook the Government once more, and caus'd *Francesco* to be executed. But the *Colonnesi* becoming his Enemies by degrees, he himself was put to death

Candia given to the *Venetians* by the *French*.

Benidict XII. *Pope*.

Clement VI. *Pope*.

by them, and the Senate restor'd to the exercise of its former Authority. In the mean time the King of *Hungary*, having depos'd Queen *Giovanna*, return'd to his own Kingdom: But the *Pope* desir'd to have the Queen his Neighbour rather than that King, and order'd things so, that the Kingdom was restor'd, upon Condition her Husband *Lewis* renouncing the Title of King, should content himself with that of *Taranto*. The Year MCCCL. being come, his Holiness thought fit that the Jubilee appointed by *Pope Boniface* VIII. to be kept every hundred years, should be reduc'd to fifty; and, having pass'd a Decree to that purpose, in gratitude for so great a Benefit, the *Romans* were contented he should send four Cardinals to *Rome*, to reform their City, and create what Senators he pleas'd. After which the *Pope* declar'd *Lodovic* of *Taranto* King of *Naples* again, and *Giovanna*, highly oblig'd by that favour, gave the Church *Avignon*, which was part of her Patrimony. By this time *Luchino Visconti* being dead, *John* Arch-bishop of *Milan* remain'd sole Lord, and, making several Wars upon *Tuscany* and his Neighbours, became very considerable. After his death, the Government fell to his two Nephews, *Bernardo* and *Galeazzo*, but *Galeazzo* dying a while after, he left his Son *John Galeazzo* to share with his Unkle in the State.

The Jubilee reduc'd to 50 years.

Avignon given to the *Pope* by the Queen of *Naples*.

In these Days, *Charles* King of *Bohemia* was created Emperor, and *Innocent* VI. *Pope*, who having sent Cardinal *Giles* (a *Spaniard*) into *Italy*, by his Virtue, and the excellence of his Conduct, he recover'd the reputation of the Church, not only in *Rome* and *Romagna*, but all *Italy* over. He recover'd *Bologna*, that had been usurp'd by the Arch-bishop of *Milan*. He constrain'd the *Romans* to admit a foreign Senator every year, of the *Pope*'s nomination. He made an honourable Agreement with the *Visconti*. He fought and took Prisoner *John Aguto* an *English-man*, who with four thousand *English* was entertain'd in *Tuscany*, upon the *Ghibilin* account. After these Successes, *Urban* V. being *Pope*, he resolv'd to visit both *Italy* and *Rome*, where *Charles* the Emperor came to meet him; and having continued together several Months, *Charles* return'd into his Kingdom, and the *Pope* to *Avignon*. *Urban* died, and *Gregory* XII. succeeded, and because Cardinal *Egidio* was dead, *Italy* relaps'd into its former distractions, occasion'd by the caballing of the People against the *Visconti*. Whereupon the *Pope* at first sent a *Legat* into *Italy* with six thousand *Britains*, after whom he follow'd in Person, and re-establish'd his Residence at *Rome*, in the year MCCCLXXVI. after it had been kept in *France* LXXI. years.

Innocent VI. *Pope*.

Urban V. *Pope*.

Gregory XII. *Pope*.

The *Pope* returns to *Rome*, after 71 years absence in *France*.

After the death of this *Pope*, *Urban* VI. was created. Not long after at *Fondi*, ten Cardinals quarreling with his Election, and pretending it was not fair, created *Clement* VII. The *Genoueses* in the mean time (who for several years had lived quietly under the Government of the *Visconti*) rebell'd. Betwixt them and the *Venetian*, there happen'd great Wars about the Island of *Tenedos*; in which War by degrees all *Italy* became concern'd, and there it was that great *Guns* were first us'd, they being a *German* invention. Though for a while the *Genoueses* were predominant, and held *Venice* blockt up for several Months together; yet in the conclusion, the *Venetian* had the better, and made an advantagious Peace, by the assistance of the *Pope*. In the year 1381, (as we have said before) there was a Schism in the Church, and *Giovanna* the Queen favour'd the Anti-Pope. Whereupon, Pope *Urban* practis'd against her, and sent *Carlo Durazzo* (who was of the Royal House of *Naples*) with an Army into her Kingdom, who possest himself of her Country, and drove her away into *France*. The King of *France* undertaking her quarrel, sent *Lodovic d'Angio* to repossess the Queen, and force *Urban* out of *Rome*, and set up the Anti-Pope. But *Lodovic* dying in the middle of the Enterprize, his Army broke up, and return'd into *France*. *Urban* thereupon goes over to *Naples*, and claps nine Cardinals in Prison, for having sided with *France* and the Anti-Pope. After that he took it ill of the King, that he refus'd to make one of his Nephews Prince of *Capua*, but concealing his disgust, he desir'd *Nocera* of him for his Habitation, which as soon as he was possess'd of, he fortified, and began to cast about which way to deprive him of his Kingdom. The King taking the Alarm, advanc'd against *Nocera* and besieg'd it, but the *Pope* escap'd to *Genoua*, where he put the Cardinals which were his Prisoners to death. From thence he went to *Rome*, and created 28 new Cardinals. In the mean time *Charles* King of *Naples* went into *Hungary*, was proclaim'd King there, and not long after kill'd. He left the Kingdom of *Naples* to his Wife and two Children he had by her, one call'd *Ladislao*, and the other *Giovanna*.

Urban VI. *Pope*: *Clement* VII. *Anti-Pope*.

Guns first us'd betwixt the *Genoueses* and *Venetians*.

John Galeazzo Visconti in the mean time had kill'd his Unkle *Bernardo*, and possess'd himself of *Milan*; and not content to have made himself Duke of *Milan*, he attempted upon *Tuscany*; but when he was in a fair way to have conquer'd it, and to have made himself King of all *Italy*, he died. *Urban* VI. died also, and was succeeded by *Boniface* IX. *Clement* VII. the Anti-Pope died likewise at *Avignon*, and *Benedict* XIII. was created in his room. *Italy* all this while was full of Soldiers of Fortune, *English*, *Dutch*, and *Britains*, some of them commanded by Princes, which upon several occasions had been invited thither,

Urban and *Clement* succeeded by *Boniface* IX. & *Benedict* XIII.

thither, and ſome of them which had been ſent by the Popes, when their reſidence was at *Avignon*. With this medly of Nations the Princes of *Italy* maintain'd their Wars many times, till at length *Lodovico da Conio Romagnuolo* having train'd up a Party of *Italians*, call'd the Soldiers of *Saint George*, by his Valour and Diſcipline leſſen'd the Reputation of the Forreigners, and made them afterwards more uſeful and conſiderable in the *Italian* Wars. The Pope upon certain differences which aroſe betwixt him and the *Romans*, remov'd to *Sceſi*, where he remain'd till the Jubilee in the year 1400. at which time, to invite him back again for the benefit of their City, the *Romans* condeſcended that he ſhould have the annual nomination of a foreign Senator, and be permitted to fortifie the Caſtle of St. *Angelo*; upon which Conditions being return'd, to inrich the Church, he ordain'd, That in every Vacancy, each Benefice ſhould pay an Annat into the Chamber Eccleſiaſtical. After the death of *John Galeazzo* Duke of *Milan*, though he left two Sons, *Giovan-Mari-Angelo*, and *Philip*, the State was divided into many Factions. In the troubles which followed, *Giovan-Mari-Angelo* was ſlain, and *Philip* for ſome time kept Priſoner in the Caſtle of *Pavia*; but by the Valour and Allegiance of the Governour, he eſcap'd. Among the reſt who had ſeiz'd the Cities which belong'd formerly to *John Galeazzo*, *William della Scala* was one, who having been baniſh'd, and retiring to *Franceſco de Carrara* Lord of *Padua*, by his means he recover'd the State of *Verona*, but he enjoy'd it a ſhort time; for *Franceſco* caus'd him to be poiſon'd, and aſſum'd the Government himſelf. The *Vicentini* hereupon (having till then liv'd quietly under the Protection of the *Viſconti*) growing jealous of the greatneſs of the Lord of *Padua*, ſubmitted themſelves to the *Venetians*, who at their inſtigation made War upon him, and beat him firſt out of *Verona*, and at length out of *Padua*. By this time Pope *Boniface* died, and *Innocent* VII. was elected in his place. The people of *Rome* made a ſolemn Addreſs to him for the Reſtitution of their Liberty and Forts, and being deny'd, they call'd in *Ladiſlaus* King of *Naples* to their Aſſiſtance; but their differences being afterwards compos'd, the Pope return'd to *Rome*, from whence for fear of the people he fled to *Viterbo*, where he had made his Nephew *Lodovic, Conte della Marca*; after which he died, and *Gregory* XII. ſucceeded, upon Condition he ſhould reſign when ever the Anti-Pope ſhould be perſuaded to do the ſame. At the interceſſion of the Cardinals, to try whether it was poſſible to accommodate their differences, and reunite the Church, *Benedict* the Anti-Pope came to *Porto Veneri*, and *Gregory* to *Lucca*, where many Expedients were propos'd, but nothing concluded; whereupon the Cardinals forſook them both, of one ſide and the other, *Benedict* retired into *Spain*, and *Gregory* to *Rimini*. The Cardinals by the favour of *Baldaſſare Coſſa*, Cardinal and Legat of *Bologno*, call'd a Council at *Piſa*, in which they created *Alexander* V. who immediately excommunicated King *Ladiſlaus*, inveſted *Luigi d' Angio* with his Kingdom, and by the aſſiſtance of the *Florentines*, *Genoueſes*, *Venetians* and *Baldaſſare Coſſa* the *Legat*, they aſſaulted *Ladiſlaus*, and drove him out of *Rome*. But in the heat of the War, *Alexander* died, and *Baldaſſare Coſſa* was created Pope, with the name of *John* XXIII. *John* was created at *Bologna*, but remov'd to *Rome*, where he found *Luigi d' Angio* with the Forces of *Provence*; having joyn'd himſelf with him, they march'd out againſt King *Ladiſlaus*, fought with him, and routed his Army; but for want of good Conduct, not purſuing their Victory, King *Ladiſlaus* rally'd, recover'd *Rome*, and forc'd the Pope away to *Bologna*, and *Luigi* to *Provence*. The Pope caſting about with himſelf which way he might reſtrain and leſſen the power of King *Ladiſlaus*, caus'd *Sigiſmund* King of *Hungary* to be choſen Emperor, invited him into *Italy*; to which purpoſe they had a Conference at *Mantua*, where it was concluded, a General Council ſhould be call'd for uniting the Church; upon the accompliſhment of which, it was preſum'd they ſhould be better able to defend themſelves againſt the incroachments of their Enemies.

Boniface dies, *Innocent* VIIth ſucceeds him, and *Gregory* the XIIth, *Innocent*.

Alexander Vth elected, and ſucceeded by *John* the XXIIId.

At this time there were three Popes in being at once; *Gregory*, *Benedict*, and *John*, which kept the Church very low, both in force and reputation. The place appointed for their Convention was *Conſtance*, a City in *Germany*, contrary to the intention of Pope *John*; and though by the death of King *Ladiſlaus*, the great Reaſon was taken away that mov'd the Pope to that propoſition, nevertheleſs, things being gone ſo far, and he under an obligation, he could not handſomly come off, but was forc'd to go to it. Being arriv'd at *Conſtance*, it was not many months before he found his Error, and endeavoured to have eſcap'd; but being diſcovered and taken, he was put in Priſon, and compell'd to renounce. *Gregory*, one of the Anti-Popes, renounced by Proxy, but *Benedict*, the other Anti-Pope, refus'd, and was condemned for a Heretick; at laſt finding himſelf abandon'd by all the Cardinals, he renounc'd likewiſe, and the Council created a new Pope, *Viz. Oddo* of the Houſe of *Colonna*, who took the name of *Martin* V. upon which, the Schiſms were compos'd, and the Church united, after it had been divided forty years, and ſeveral Popes living at one and the ſametime. As we ſaid before, *Philip Viſconti* was at this time in the Caſtle of

Three Popes at once.

Martin Vth.

Pavia. But upon the death of *Fantine Care* (who in the troubles of *Lombardy* had made himself Lord of *Vercelli*, *Alexandria*, *Novara*, and *Tortona*, and contracted great wealth) having no Sons, he bequeath'd his Dominions to his Wife *Beatrix*, injoining his Friends to use their utmost endeavour to marry her to *Philip*; by which Marriage, *Philip* being much strengthen'd, he recover'd *Milan*, and all the whole Province of *Lombardy*: after which, to recompense her great Benefits (according to the example of other Princes) he accus'd his Wife *Beatrix* of Adultery, and put her to death. Being arriv'd at that height both of Power and Grandeur, he began to contrive against *Toscany*, and pursue the designs of his Father *John Galeazzo*. *Ladislaus* King of *Naples* at his death, had left to his Sister *Giovanna* (besides his Kingdom) a formidable Army, commanded by the chief Captains in *Italy*, and among the rest, by *Sforza da Contignuolo*, a person of particular repute for his Valour in those Wars. The Queen (to clear her self of an aspersion of too much intimacy with one *Pandolfello* which she advanc'd) took to her Husband *Giacopa della Marcia*, a *Frenchman*, of Royal Extraction, but upon condition he should content himself to be call'd Prince of *Taranto*, and leave the Title and Government of the Kingdom to her. But the Soldiers as soon as he was arrived in *Naples* called him King, which occasioned great differences betwixt him and the Queen, sometimes one prevailing, and sometimes the other. But at length the Government rested in the Queen, and she became a severe Enemy to the Pope. Whereupon *Sforza* to drive her into a necessity, and force her to his own terms, laid down his Commission, and refused to serve her against him; by which means being (as it were) disarmed in a moment, having no other remedy, she applyed her self to *Alphonso* King of *Arragon* and *Sicily*, adopted him her Son, and to Command her Army, she entertained *Braccio da Montone*, as Eminent a Soldier as *Sforza*, and an Adversary of the Pope's, upon account of certain Towns (as *Perugia* and others) which he had usurped from the Church. After this, a Peace was concluded betwixt her and the Pope; but *Alphonso* suspecting least she should serve him as she had done her Husband, began privately to contrive how he might possess himself of the Forts: But the Queen was cunning, and prevented him by fortifying her self in the Castle of *Naples*. Jealousies increasing in this manner, and no-body interposing, they came to an Engagement, and the Queen by the help of *Sforza* (who was returned to her Service) overcame *Alphonso*, drove him out of *Naples*, abdicated him, and adopted *Lodovic d' Angio* in his place. Hereupon new Wars ensued betwixt *Braccio* (who was of *Alphonso*'s party) and *Sforza* (who was for the Queen.) In the process of the War *Sforza* passing the River *Pescara*, was by accident drowned. His death was a great prejudice to the affairs of the Queen, who thereupon would have run great hazard of being droven out of her Kingdom, had not her loss been supplyed by *Philip Visconti*, Duke of *Milan*, who forced *Alphonso* back again into *Arragon*. But *Braccio*, not at all discouraged at *Alphonso*'s departure, continued War upon the Queen, and besieged *Aquila*. The Pope looking upon *Braccio*'s greatness, as a diminution to the Church, entertained *Francisco* (the Son of *Sforza*) into his pay, who marching with an Army to the relief of *Aquila*, ingaged *Braccio*, routed his Army, and slew him. Of *Braccio*'s party, there remained only *Otho* his Son, from whom the Pope took *Perugia*, but left him the Government of *Montone*. But he also was not long after slain in *Romania*, in the *Florentine* assistance; so that of all those who fought under the Discipline of *Braccio*, *Nicolas Piccinino* was the man now of greatest reputation. Being come thus near with our Narrative to the times we designed, that which remains being considerable in nothing but the Wars which the *Florentines* and the *Venetians* had with *Philip* Duke of *Milan*, (of which, our Relation shall be particular when we come to treat of *Florence*,) we shall forbear to enlarge any farther, and only in short, reduce it to memory, in what state and posture *Italy* then stood with its Princes, and Armies. Among the principal States, Queen *Giovanna* held the Kingdom of *Naples*, *La Marca*, the *Patrimony*, and *Romagna*. Part of their Towns belonged to the Church, part to their particular Governours, or others which had usurped them: as *Ferrara*, *Modena*, *Reggio*, to the Family of the *Esti*, *Faenzi* to the *Manfredi*, *Imola* to the *Alidosi*, *Furli* to the *Ordelaffi*, *Rimini* and *Pesaro* to the *Malatesti*, and *Camerino* to the House *Varana*. *Lombardy* was divided, part under Duke *Philip*, and part under the *Venetian*. All the rest who had had any sovereignty or principality in those parts, being extinct, except only the House of *Gonzagua*, which governed in *Mantua* at that time. Of *Tuscany* the greatest part was under the Dominion of the *Florentine*; *Lucca* only, and *Siena* lived free under their own Laws: *Lucca* under the *Guinigi*, and *Siena* of it self. The *Genoueses*, being free sometimes, sometimes under the Authority of the *French*, and sometimes of the *Visconti*, they lived without any great reputation, and were reckoned among the meaner and most inconsiderable States of that Country. Their principal Potentates were not themselves in Command, but their Armies managed by their Generals. Duke *Philip* confined himself to his Chamber, and

The Queen of *Naples* calls in the K. of *Arragon* to her assistance, adopts him, and makes *Braccio da Montone* her General.

The State of *Italy*.

not

not being to be seen, his Wars were manag'd by Commissioners. The *Venetians* altering their Scene, and making War by Land, they disbarqued that Army which had made them so glorious by Sea; and according to the Custom of their Country, gave the Command of it to other People. The Pope, being a religious Person, and *Giovanna* Queen of *Naples* a Woman, were not so proper to command in Person, and therefore did that by necessity which others did by indiscretion. The *Florentines* were under the same necessity, for their frequent divisions having exhausted their Nobility, and the Government of the City remaining in the hands of such as were bred up to Merchandize; in their Wars they were forc'd to follow the fortune and direction of Strangers: So that the Armies, all *Italy* over, were in the hands of the smaller Princes, or such as had no Sovereignty at all. Those smaller Princes embracing those Commands, not from any impulse or stimulation of Glory, but to live plentifully and safe. The other's Education having been small, not knowing what other course to take, they took up Arms, hoping thereby to gain either Honour or Estate. Among these the most eminent were *Carmignuola*, *Francisco Sforza*, *Nicolo Piccinino*, brought up under *Braccio*, *Agnolo della Pergola*, *Lorenzo*, and *Micheletto Attenduli*, *Il Tartaglia*, *Giaccopaccio*, *Ceccolino* and *da Perugia*, *Nicolo da Tolentino*, *Guido*, *Torello*, *Antonio dal Ponte ad Hera*, and many others. With these may be reckon'd those Princes which I have mention'd before; to which may be added the Barons of *Rome*, the *Orsini*, *Colonnesi*, and other Lords and Gentlemen of the Kingdom of *Lombardy*, who depending upon the Wars, had settled a kind of a League and Intelligence betwixt themselves, model'd it with that artifice, and temporized so exactly, that most commonly whoever were Enemies, both sides were sure to be losers. By this means, the Art of War became so mean and unserviceable, every little Officer that had but the least spark of Experience could have easily corrected it. Of these lazy Princes, and their despicable Officers shall be the Subject of my ensuing Discourse; but before I come to it, it will be necessary (according to my promise at first) to deduce *Florence* from its Original, and give every one a clear prospect what was the State of that City in those times, and by what means it arriv'd at it, thorough the imbroilments of a thousand Years, in which *Italy* was involv'd.

THE

THE SECOND BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF *FLORENCE.*

AMong the great and admirable Orders of former Kingdoms and Common-wealths (though in our times it is diſcontinued and loſt) it was the Cuſtom upon every occaſion to build new Towns and Cities; and indeed nothing is more worthy and becoming an excellent Prince, a well-diſpoſed Common-wealth, nor more for the intereſt and advantage of a Province, than to erect new Towns, where men may cohabit with more convenience, both for Agriculture, and Defence. For beſides the Beauty and Ornament which follow'd upon that Cuſtom, it render'd ſuch Provinces as were conquer'd, more dutiful and ſecure to the Conqueror, planted the void places, and made a commodious diſtribution of the People; upon which, living regularly and in order, they did not only multiply faſter, but were more ready to invade, and more able for defence. But by the negligence and omiſſion of Common-wealths and Principalities, this method being at preſent diſuſed, the Provinces are become weaker, and ſome of them ruin'd. For (as I ſaid before) it is this Order alone that ſecures a Country, and ſupplies it with People. The ſecurity conſiſts in this, that in a new conquer'd Country, a Colony placed by Authority, is a Fortreſs and Guard to keep the Natives in obedience; neither without this can a Province continue inhabited, or preſerve a juſt diſtribution of the people, becauſe all places being not equally fertile or healthful, where it is barren, they deſert; where unwholſome, they die; and unleſs there be ſome way to invite or diſpoſe new Men to the one, as well as the other, that Province muſt fail; the abandoning ſome places, leaving them deſolate and weak, and the thronging to others, making them indigent and poor. And foraſmuch as theſe inconveniences are not to be remedied by Nature, Art and Induſtry is to be apply'd; and we ſee many Countries which are naturally unhealthful, much better'd by the multitude of Inhabitants; the Earth being purify'd by their Tillage, and the Air by their Fires, which Nature alone would never have effected. Of this, *Venice* is an inſtance ſufficient; for tho' ſeated in a ſickly and watriſh place, the concourſe of ſo many people at one time, made it healthful enough. *Piſa* by reaſon of the malignity of the Air, was very ill inhabited, till *Genoa*, and the Inhabitants upon its Rivers, being defeated and diſpoſſeſs'd by the *Saracens*, it follow'd, that being ſupplanted all of them at once, and repairing thither in ſuch Numbers, that Town in a ſhort time became populous and potent. But the Cuſtom of ſending Colonies being laid aſide, new Conqueſts are not ſo eaſily kept, void places not ſo eaſily ſupply'd, nor full and exuberant places ſo eaſily evacuated. Whereupon many places in the world, and particularly in *Italy*, are become deſolate and deſerted in reſpect of what

The Convenience of Colonies.

in

in former ages they have been, which is imputable to nothing, but that Princes do not retain their ancient appetite of true Glory, nor Common-wealths the laudable Customs they were wont.

In old time, by the virtue and courage of these Colonies, new Cities were many times built, and what were new begun inlarg'd. In which number the City of *Florence* may be reckon'd, which was begun by the Inhabitants of *Fiesole*, and augmented by the Colonies. It is a true Story (if *Dante*, and *John Villani* may be believ'd) that the City of *Fiesole*, though plac'd it self on the top of a Mountain, nevertheless, that their Markets might be better frequented, and their Commodities brought to them with greater convenience to the Merchant, they order'd them a place, not on the top of the Hill, but in the Plain, betwixt the bottom of the Mountain, and the River *Arnus*. The Original of *Florence*.

These Merchants (in my judgment) were the first occasion of building in that place, and what was originally but Store-houses for receipt of their Commodities, became afterwards a Town, and place of Habitation.

After the *Romans* had conquer'd the *Carthaginians*, and render'd *Italy* safe against Foreign imbroilments, they multiply'd exceedingly; for men will not incommode themselves, but where they are constrain'd by necessity; and though the terrors of War may force them for shelter to fortify'd places and rocks, yet when the danger is over, their profit and convenience calls them back again to their houses, and they perfer elbow-room and ease before any such restraint. The security which follow'd in *Italy* upon the reputation of the *Roman* Common-wealth, might possibly be the occasion that this place (from the aforesaid beginning increasing so vastly) became afterwards a Town, and was call'd at first *Arnina*.

After this there arose Civil Wars in *Rome*, first betwixt *Marius* and *Silla*, then betwixt *Cæsar* and *Pompey*, and afterwards betwixt them that murder'd *Cæsar*, and those which reveng'd his death. By *Silla* first, and after that by the three *Roman* Citizens (who revenged the Assassination of *Cæsar*, and divided the Empire) Colonies were sent to *Fiesole*; all, or part of which settled in the Plain not far from the Town which was already begun. So that by this occasion, the place was so repleniſh'd with Houses, Men, and all things necessary for Civil Government, that it might be reckon'd among the Cities of *Italy*. But from whence it assum'd the name of *Florence*, is variously conjectur'd. Some would have it call'd *Florence* from *Florino* one of the chief of that Colony. Some say it was not called *Florentia*, but *Fluentia* in the beginning, in respect of its nearness to the River *Arno*; and they produce *Pliny* as a witness, who has this Expression, That *the* Fluentini *are near to the Channel of the River* Arnus. But that (in my opinion) is a mistake, because *Pliny* in his Book design'd to tell where the *Florentines* were seated, not what they were call'd. Nor is it unlikely but that word *Fluentini* might be corrupted, because *Frontinus* and *Tacitus* (who writ, and were near contemporary with *Pliny*) call'd the Town *Florentia*, and the people *Florentini*, forasmuch as they were Govern'd in the time of *Tiberius*, according to the same Laws and Customs with the rest of the Cities in *Italy*: and *Cornelius Tacitus* relates, that Ambassadors were sent from the *Florentines* to the Emperor, to desire that the Waters of the River *Chiane* might not be disimbogued, or diverted upon their Country; neither is it reasonable to think that City could have two names at one time. My opinion therefore is clear, that whatever might be the occasion of its Original or Denomination, it was always call'd *Florentia*; that it was founded under the Empire of the *Romans*, and began to be mention'd in History in the time of the first Emperors; that when that Empire was first afflicted by the *Barbarians*, *Totila*, King of the *Ostrogoti* demolish'd *Florence*; that 250 years after, it was rebuilt by *Carolus Magnus*, from whose time till the year 1215, it follow'd the fortune of the rest of *Italy*, and was subject to those that Commanded; during which it was governed first by the Successors of *Charles*, afterwards by the *Berengarij*, and last of all by the Emperors of *Germany*, as has been shewn in our general discourse. In those days it was not in the power of the *Florentines* to extend their bounds, or to perform any memorable action, by reason of their subjection to Foreign Dominion. Nevertheless in the year 1010, on St. *Romulus*' day (which was a solemn Festival among the *Fiesolani*) they took, and destroy'd *Fiesole*, either by the connivance of the Emperors, or by the opportunity of an *Interregnum* betwixt the death of one Emperor and the Creation of another, at which time all the Cities were free. But afterwards when the *Popes* assum'd more Authority, and the Emperors power began to diminish, all the Towns in that Province began to comport themselves with less regard or reverence to their Princes; so that in the year 1080, in the days of *Arrigo* III. though *Italy* was divided betwixt him and the Church, yet till the year 1215, the *Florentines* by submitting to the Conquerors, and designing no farther than their own preservation, kept themselves quiet and intire. But as in the Body of Man, the later they come, the more dangerous and mortal are the Diseases; so *Florence* the longer it The Denomination of *Florence*.

was

was before it fell into the paroxyſms of faction, the more fatally it was afflicted afterwards when it did. The occaſion of its firſt diviſion is conſiderable, and being mention'd by *Dante* and ſeveral other Writers as remarkable, I ſhall take the liberty to diſcourſe of it briefly.

The firſt Diviſion of *Florence*.

Among other great and powerful Families in *Florence*, there were the *Buondelmonti*, and *Uberti*, and not long after them the *Amidei*, and *Donati*. In the Family of the *Donati*, there was a Lady (a Widow) very rich, who had a great Beauty to her Daughter. The Lady had reſolv'd with her ſelf to marry her Daughter to *Meſſr. Buondelmonte*, a Young Gentleman, the head of that Family. This intention of hers (either by negligence, or preſuming it ſafe enough at any time) ſhe had not imparted to any body, ſo that before ſhe was aware *Meſſr. Buondelmonte* was to be married to a Daughter of the Houſe of *Amidei*. The Lady much diſſatisfy'd with her omiſſion, hoping nevertheleſs her Daughter's Beauty might be able to diſſolve the Contract, ſeeing him paſs one day alone towards her Houſe, ſhe took her Daughter along, and went down to accoſt him, and opening the Gate as he went by, ſhe ſaluted him, and told him, ſhe could not but congratulate his Marriage, though indeed ſhe had kept her Daughter (preſenting her to him) in hopes ſhe ſhould have been the Bride. The young Gentleman beholding the Excellent Beauty of the *Damoiſelle*, contemplating her Extraction, and that her Fortune was not at all inferiour to the perſon he had choſen, fell immediately into ſuch a paſſion and deſire to marry her, that not conſidering the promiſe he had made, the injuſtice he ſhould commit, nor the ill conſequences that might follow, he reply'd, *Seeing (Madam) you have preſerv'd her for me (being not yet too late) it would be ingratitude to refuſe her*; and without more ado, he married her. The notice of his inconſtancy was no ſooner divulg'd, but it was taken in great indignity by the Families of the *Amidei* and *Uberti*, who at that time were nearly ally'd. Having conſulted among themſelves, and ſeveral others of their Relations, it was concluded, the affront was inſupportable, and not to be expiated but by the death of *Meſſr. Buondelmonte*; and tho' ſome remonſtrated the evils which might follow, *Moſcha Lamberti* repli'd, That to conſider every thing, was to reſolve on nothing; ſuper-adding an old Adage, *That a thing once done, is not capable of Remedy*: upon which the Fact being determin'd, the perpetration was committed to the ſaid *Moſcha*, *Stiatta Uberti*, *Lambertuccio Amidei*, and *Oderigo Fifanti*. Upon *Eaſter-day* in the morning, they addreſs'd themſelves to the work, and being privately convey'd to a Houſe belonging to the *Amidei*, between the *Old Bridge* and St. *Stephans*, *Meſſr. Buondelmonte* paſſing the River upon a White Horſe, (as if an injury could as eaſily have been forgotten, as a Marriage have been broken) they ſet upon him at the foot of the Bridge, and ſlew him under a Statue of *Mars*, which was placed thereby. This Murder divided the whole City, part of it ſiding with the *Buondelmonti*, and part with the *Uberti*; and both the Families being powerful in Houſes, Caſtles, and Men, the Quarrel continued many years before either could be ejected; yet tho' the animoſity could not be extinguiſh'd by a firm and ſtable peace, yet things were palliated and compos'd ſometimes for the preſent, by certain Truces and Ceſſations, by which means (according to the variety of accidents) they were ſometimes at quiet, and ſometimes together by the ears. In this Condition *Florence* continued till the Reign of *Frederick* XI. who being King of *Naples*, and deſirous to ſtrengthen himſelf againſt the Church; to corroborate his intereſt in *Tuſcany*, joyn'd himſelf to the *Uberti* and their party, by whoſe aſſiſtance the *Buondelmonti* were driven out of *Florence*, and that City (as all *Italy* had done before) began to divide into the Factions of the *Guelfs* and the *Ghibilins*. Nor will it be amiſs to commemorate how each Family was ingag'd. The Families therefore which ſided with the *Guelfs* were the *Buondelmonti*, *Nerti*, *Roſſi*, *Freſcobaldi*, *Mozzi*, *Baldi*, *Pulchi*, *Gherardini*, *Foraboſchi*, *Bagneſi*, *Guidalotti*, *Sacchetti*, *Manieri*, *Lucardeſi*, *Chiaramonti*, *Compiobbeſi*, *Cavalcanti*, *Giandonati*, *Gianfiliazzi*, *Scali*, *Guallerotti*, *Importuni*, *Boſtichi*, *Tornaquinci*, *Vecchietti*, *Foſinghi*, *Arrigucci*, *Agli*, *Silij*, *Adimari*, *Viſdomini*, *Donati*, *Pazzi*, *della Bella*, *Ardinghi*, *Theobaldi*, *Cherchi*. With the *Ghibilins* there joyned the *Uberti*, *Manelli*, *Ubriachi*, *Fifanti*, *Amidei*, *Infanganti*, *Maleſpini*, *Scolari*, *Guidi*, *Galli*, *Capprardi*, *Lamberti*, *Soldanieri*, *Cipriani*, *Toſchi*, *Amieri*, *Palermini*, *Migliorelli*, *Pigli*, *Barucci*, *Cattani*, *Agolanti*, *Bruneleſchi*, *Caponſachi*, *Eliſei*, *Abbati*, *Fedaldini*, *Guiocchi*, *Galigai*; to which Families of the Nobility, many of the Populacy joyn'd themſelves on each ſide, as their intereſt or affections carried them, ſo that in a manner the whole City was ingag'd either on one ſide or the other. The *Guelfs* being driven out, retir'd into the Vale upon the River *Arnus*, mention'd before, and the greateſt part of their Garriſons being there, they defended them as well as they could againſt the Attacks of their Enemies. But when *Frederick* dyed, thoſe perſons who were Neuters, retaining great intereſt and reputation with the people, thought it more ſerviceable to the City of *Florence* to reconcile their differences and unite them, than by fomenting them, to deſtroy it. Whereupon endeavouring a Compoſure, they prevail'd,

The *Guelfs* and *Ghibilin* Faction in *Florence*.

at

at length that the *Guelfs* ſhould lay aſide their indignation, and return, and the *Ghibilines* renounce their ſuſpicion and receive them. Being united in this manner, it was thought ſeaſonable to provide for their liberty, and to contrive ſome Laws for their defence, before the new Emperor ſhould get the power into his hands. In order thereunto they divided the City into ſix parts; They choſe twelve Citizens (two for each part) which, under the title of *Antiani*, they inveſted with the Government, but chang'd them every year. To prevent any animoſity that might ariſe from the determination of the matters judicial, they conſtituted two Foreign Judges, (one of them call'd the Captain of the people, and the other the *Podeſta*) to decide all Civil and Criminal Cauſes which ſhould occur. And becauſe Laws are but tranſient, and of little duration, where there is no power to defend them, they eſtabliſh'd 20 Colours in the City, and 76 in the Territory, under which all the youth was liſted, and oblig'd to be ready in their Arms under their reſpective Colours, as often and whenever the Captain, or *Antiani*, ſhould require them. Moreover, as their Enſigns were diſtinct, ſo were there Arms; ſome of them conſiſted of Croſs-bows, ſome of them of Halbards. Their Enſigns were chang'd at every *Pentecoſt* with great ſolemnity, and diſpos'd to new Men, and new Captains put over their Companies. Beſides, to add majeſty to their Army, and provide a refuge for ſuch as were wounded, or diſabled in Fight, where they might refreſh, and recruit again, to make head againſt the Enemy, they order'd a large Charriot cover'd with Red, and drawn by two white Oxen, upon which their Standard of White and Red was to be placed. Whenever their Army was to be drawn out, this Charriot was to be drawn into the Market-place, and with great formality conſign'd to the Captains of the people. For the greater magnificence and oſtentation of their Enterprizes, they had moreover, a great Bell (call'd *Martinello*) which rung continually a month before they march'd with their Army, that the Enemy might have ſo much time to provide for his Defence. So much *Gallantry* there was then amongſt men, and with ſo much *Magnanimity* they behav'd themſelves, that whereas now adays it is reputed policy and wiſdom to ſurprize an *Enemy*, and fall upon him while he is unprovided, it was then thought treacherous and ignoble. This Bell when they march'd, was carried along with the Army, and by it the Guards ſet, and relieved, and other Military Orders deriv'd. By this Diſcipline in Civil and Martial affairs, the *Florentines* laid the foundation of their liberty. Nor is it to be imagin'd what ſtrength and authority it acquir'd in a ſhort time, for it came not only to be the chief City in *Tuſcany*, but to be reckon'd among the Principal of all *Italy*; and indeed there was no grandeur to which it might not have arriv'd, had it not been obſtructed by new and frequent diſſentions. Ten years together, the *Florentines* liv'd under this Government; in which time they forc'd the *Piſtoieſi*, *Aretini*, and *Saneſi* to make peace with them, and returning with their Army from *Siena*, they took *Volterra*, demoliſh'd ſeveral Caſtles, and brought the Inhabitants to *Florence*. In theſe Exeditions, the *Guelfs* had the principal Conduct, as being much more popular than the *Ghibilines*, who had carried themſelves imperiouſly during *Frederick*'s Reign, and made themſelves odious; or elſe it was becauſe the Church party had more Friends than the Emperors, as being thought more conſiſtent with their liberty. The *Ghibilines* in the mean time, being diſpleaſed to ſee their Authority ſo ſenſibly decreaſe, could not be ſatisfy'd, but attended all occaſions to repoſſeſs themſelves of the Government. When *Manfredi* the Son of *Frederick* King of *Naples* was inveſted in that Kingdom, and had over-power'd the power of the Church, conceiving it a fair opportunity, they practis'd privately with him, to reaſſume their Government; but they could not manage it ſo cunningly, but their practice was diſcover'd to the *Antiani*, who ſummoning the *Uberti* thereupon; the *Uberti* not only refus'd to appear, but took Arms, and fortify'd themſelves in their houſes; at which the people being incens'd, took Arms likewiſe, and joyning with the *Guelfs*, drove them out of *Florence*, and forc'd the whole *Ghibiline* party to tranſplant to *Siena*. From thence they deſir'd the aſſiſtance of *Manfredi* King of *Naples*, who ſending them ſupplies, by the Conduct and Diligence of *Frinata* (of the Houſe of *Uberti*) the *Guelfs* received ſuch a blow upon the River *Arebia*, that thoſe which eſcaped (ſuppoſing their City loſt) fled directly to *Lucca*, and left *Florence* to ſhift for it ſelf. *Manfredi* had given the Command of the Auxiliaries which he ſent to the *Ghibilines*, to the *Conte Giordano*, a Captain of no ſmall reputation in thoſe times. *Giordano*, after this Victory advanc'd with his *Ghibilines* to *Florence*, reduc'd the City to the obedience of *Manfredi* depos'd the Magiſtrates, and alter'd or abrogated all the Laws, and Cuſtoms that might give them the leaſt figure or commemoration of their liberty: Which injury being done with little *diſcretion*, was receiv'd by the people with ſo much *deteſtation*, that whereas before they were ſcarce Enemies to the *Ghibilines*, they became thereby inveterate and implacable; and that mortal animoſity was in time their utter deſtruction. Being to return to *Naples* upon affairs of great importance to that Kingdom, the *Conte*

The Union and Government of the City of *Florence*.

The *Antiani*.

The Captain of the People, and *Podeſta*

Their Militi

A generous Cuſtom.

Manfredi King of *Naples* a great Patron of the *Ghibilines*.

Giordano left Count *Guido Novello* (Lord of *Casentino*) in *Florence*, as Deputy for the King. This *Guido Novello* call'd a Council of *Ghibilines* at *Empoli*, wherein it was unanimously concluded, that *Florence* should be razed, being (by reason the people were so rigid *Guelfs*) the only City capable to reinforce the declining Party of the Church.

Ferinata Uberti.

Upon so cruel and barbarous a Sentence against so noble a City, there was not one Friend or Citizen oppos'd, besides *Ferinata della Uberti*; who publickly and couragiously undertook its defence: declaring, that he had not run so many dangers, nor expos'd himself to so many difficulties, but to live quietly afterwards in his own Country; nor would he now reject what he contended for so long, nor refuse that which his good fortune had given him; he was resolv'd rather to oppose himself (against whoever should design otherwise) with as much vigour and zeal as he had done against the *Guelfs*; and if jealousie and apprehension should prompt them to endeavour the destruction of their Country, they might attempt if they pleas'd; but he hop'd, with the same virtue which drove out the *Guelfs*, he should be able to defend the City. This *Ferinata* was a man of great courage, excellent conduct, head of the *Ghibilines*, and in no small esteem with *Manfredi* himself. These qualifications, and the consideration of his authority, put an end to that resolution, and they began now to take new measures, and contrive ways of preserving the State. The *Guelfs* who had fled to *Lucca*, being dismiss'd by the *Luccheſi*, upon the Count's commination, they withdrew to *Bologna*, from whence being invited by the *Guelfs* of *Parma*, to go against the *Ghibilines*, they behav'd themselves so well, that by their valour the Adversary was overcome, and their possessions given to them: so that increasing in honour and wealth, and understanding that Pope *Clement* had call'd *Carlo d'Angio* into *Italy*, to depose *Manfredi* (if possibly) they sent Ambassadors to his Holiness to tender their assistance; which the Pope not only accepted, but sent them his own Standard, which the *Guelfs* carried ever after in their Wars, and is used in *Florence* to this very day. After this, *Manfredi* was beaten, despoil'd of his Kingdom, and slain; and the *Guelfs* of *Florence* having perform'd their share in that Action, their Party grew more brisk and courageous, and the *Ghibilines* more timorous and weak. Whereupon those who with Count *Guido Novello* were at the helm in *Florence*, began to cast about how they might, by benefits or otherwise, gain and cajole the people, whom before they had exasperated by all circumstances of injury: But those remedies (which if used in time, before necessity requir'd, might possibly have prevail'd) being apply'd abruptly, and too late, did not only not contribute to their safety, but hasten'd their ruin. To coax and insinuate with the people and their party, they thought it would do much if they restor'd them to a part of that honour and authority which they had lost. To this purpose they chose 36 Citizens from among the people, and adding to them two foreign Gentlemen from *Bologna*, they gave them power to reform the State of the City as they pleas'd. As soon as they met, the first thing they pitcht upon, was to divide the City into several Arts (or *Trades*) over each Art they plac'd a Master, who was to administer Justice to all under his [illegible]; and to every Art a Banner was assign'd, that under that each Company might appear in arms, whenever the safety of the City requir'd it. At first these Arts (or *Companies*) were twelve, seven greater, and five less; the lesser increasing afterwards to fourteen, their whole number advanc'd to XXI. as it remains at this day. The *Reformation* proceeding quietly in this manner, and contriving many things for the common benefit of the people, without interruption; Count *Guido* thinking himself under an equal obligation to provide for his Soldiers, caused a Tax to be laid upon the Citizens, to raise Money for their Pay; but he found such difficulty in the business, he durst never collect it: Whereupon, perceiving all lost, unless something was suddainly done; he combin'd with the chief of the *Ghibilines*, and determined to take that back again by force from the people which so unadvisedly they had given.

Carlo d'Angio call'd into *Italy* by the Pope.

A new Model in *Florence.*

With which design, having assembled the several Companies in their arms (and the 36 *Reformatori* with them) causing a suddain alarm to be brought in, the *Reformatori* being frighted, and retiring to their houses, the Ensigns of the several Faculties were display'd, and several armed men behind them immediately; understanding that Count *Guido* and his Party were at St. *Johns*, they made a stand at St. *Trinita*, and chose *Giovanni Soldanieri* for their Captain. The Count on the other side, hearing where they had posted, advanced against them; and the people, not declining, they met in a place which is now call'd *Loggia dei Tornaquinci*, where the Count was worsted, and most of his Party slain. Being off of his mettle, and fearful the enemy would assault him in the night, and cut his throat, his men being cow'd, and unable to defend him, without considering other remedy, he resolv'd to preserve himself by flying, rather than by fighting; and accordingly (contrary to the perswasion of the Heads of the *Ghibilines*) he retired to *Prato* with what men he had left. When he found himself safe, and his fear over, he became sensible of

New Commotion.

his error, and being desirous to have repair'd it, next morning, at break of day, he drew out his Men, march'd back to *Florence*, designing to recover that honourably, which he had so scandalously lost; but he found himself mistaken, for tho' it might have cost the people hot water to have expell'd him, they found it no hard matter to keep him out when he was gone; insomuch that being repuls'd, he drew off with great sorrow and shame to *Casentino*, and the *Ghibilines* return'd to their houses. The people being Conquerors, out of affection to all such as had a love for their Country, they resolved to reunite the City once more, and call'd home all their Citizens which were abroad, as well *Ghibilines* as *Guelfs*. Hereupon the *Guelfs* return'd, after six years banishment, the *Ghibilines* late attempt was pardoned, and they receiv'd back again; but yet they continued odious both to the people, and *Guelfs*, the last not being able to extinguish the memory of their banishment, nor the first to forget their tyranny and insolence, when the Government was in their hand; so that their animosity was deposited neither on the one side, nor the other.

Whil'st the affairs of *Florence* were in this posture, a report was spread, that *Corradine*, Nephew to *Manfredi*, was coming with Forces out of *Germany*, to conquer the Kingdom of *Naples*; upon which the *Ghibilines* conceiv'd fresh hopes of recovering their Authority, and the *Guelfs* being no less sollicitous for their security, begg'd the assistance of King *Charles*, in case *Corradine* should come. *Charles* having comply'd, and his Forces upon their march, the *Guelfs* became so insolent, and the *Ghibilines* so timorous, that two days before the *French* Army arriv'd, the *Ghibilines* fled out of the City, without staying to be expell'd. The *Ghibilines* departed, the *Florentines* new modell'd their City, choosing Twelve principal Magistrates to continue in Authority only for two Months, not under the title of *Antiani*, but *Buoni Huomini*. Next to them they constituted a Council of 80 Citizens, which they call'd *La Credenza*: after which, 180 were chosen out of the people, which with the *Credenza*, and the 12 *Buoni Huomini*, were call'd the General Council: besides which, they erected another Council, consisting of 120, both Citizens and Nobles, which Council was to consummate and ratifie whatever was debated or resolv'd in the rest. Having settled their Government in this manner, and by new Laws and Election of Magistrates of their own party, fortifi'd themselves against the machinations of the *Ghibilines*, the *Guelfs* confiscated the *Ghibilines* Estates, and having divided them into three parts, one was assign'd to Publick uses, another given to their Magistrates and Captains, and the third distributed among the *Guelfs*, to recompence the damage they had receiv'd. The *Pope*, to preserve *Tuscany* to the Faction of the *Guelfs*, made King *Charles*, *Imperial Vicar* of that Province. By this method, the *Florentines* having maintain'd their honour and reputation abroad by their Arms, and at home by their Laws, they remain'd firm and secure; in the mean time the *Pope* dy'd, and after a two years vacancy, and a tedious dispute, *Gregory* X. was elected, who being at the time of his Election (and a long while before) in *Syria*, and (by consequence) ignorant of the humours of the Factions, he carry'd not himself with that caution towards them, as his Predecessors had done. But in his way to *France*, being arriv'd at *Florence*, he thought it the office of a good Pastor to endeavour to compose their differences, and prevail'd with them to receive Commissioners from the *Ghibilines* to negociate the manner of their return; but tho' their Peace was made, and all particulars concluded, the *Ghibilines* were too jealous to accept them, and refus'd to come back. The *Pope* imputed the fault to the City, and excommunicated it in his passion, under which censure it continued whil'st he lived; but after his death, when *Innocent* V. was created, it was taken off. *Innocent* V. was succeeded by *Nicholas* III. of the house of *Orsini*; and because the *Popes* were always jealous of any great power in *Italy* (tho' rais'd by the favour of the Church) and constantly endeavour'd to depress it, great troubles, and frequent variations ensued; for the fear of a person grown potent to any degree, was the advancement of another less powerful than he; who growing powerful by his preferment, as his Predecessor had done, became formidable like him; and that fear was the occasion of his debasement. This was the cause that Kingdom was taken from *Manfredi*, and given to *Charles*. This was the reason that *Charles* became terrible afterwards, and his ruine was conspir'd: for *Nicholas* III. (mov'd by the Considerations aforesaid) prevail'd so, that *Charles* by the Emperor's means, was remov'd from the Government of *Tuscany*, and *Latino* (the *Pope*'s Legate) sent thither in his place, by Commission from the Emperor. *Florence* at this time was in no very good condition, for the *Guelfish* Nobility being grown insolent, and careless of the Magistrates, several Murders and other Violences were daily committed, the Malefactors passing unpunish'd by the favour and protection of the Nobles. To restrain these insolencies, it was thought good by the Heads of the City, to recal those who were banished, which gave opportunity to the Legate to reunite the City; and to the *Ghibilines* to return: whereupon instead of XII. Governours which they had before, they were

A second Model by the *Guelfs*.

The 12 *Buoni Huomini*. *La Credenza*.

Gregory X.

Florence under Excommunication. *Innocent* V.

The Jealousie of the *Popes*. *Nicholas* III.

The *Ghibilines* return.

were increas'd to XIV. (VII. of each party) their Government to be Annual, and their Election by the *Pope*. Two years *Florence* remain'd under this Form, till *Martino* (a *Frenchman*) was created *Pope*, who reſtor'd to King *Charles* whatever Authority *Pope Nicolas* had taken from him: So that *Florence* being again in Commotion, the Citizens took up Arms againſt the Emperor's Governour, and to reſtrain the *Ghibilines*, and correct the inſolence of their Nobility, put the City under a new form of Government. It was in the year 1282. when the Corporation of the *Arts* having been inveſted with the Magiſtracy and Militia, had gain'd great reputation; whereupon by their own Authority they order'd that inſtead of the XIV. Three Citizens ſhould be created (with the Title of *Priori*) who ſhould Govern the Common-wealth for two Months, and be choſen indifferently out of Commons or Nobility, provided they were Merchants, or profeſſed any Art. Afterwards the chief Magiſtracy was reduc'd to Six perſons (one for each Ward) where it continued to the year 1342. in which the City was reduc'd into Quarters, and the *Priori*, to Nine; they having been advanc'd to XII. by ſome accident in the mean time. This Conſtitution was the occaſion (as ſhall be ſhew'd in its place) of the Nobilities ruine, who upon ſundry provocations were excluded, and afterwards without any reſpect, oppreſs'd by the people. At firſt the Nobility conſented to its Erection, as an expedient to unite, and acommodate all differences; but afterwards incroaching, and interfering for the Government, all of them loſt it. There was likewiſe a Palace aſſign'd for the conſtant Reſidence of this Council, (in which the Magiſtrates were formerly accuſtom'd to confer with the Commiſſioners of the Church) and Serjeants, and other neceſſary Officers, for their greater honour, appointed to attend: Which Council, though at firſt it had only the Title of *Priori*; yet afterwards for Magnificence ſake, it had the addition of *Signori*.

Martinus Pope.

The Government reformed by the Citizens.

The three *Priori* to govern two Months, to be choſen out of the City indifferently.

For a while the *Florentines* continu'd quiet within themſelves, though they had Wars abroad with the *Aretines* (who had driven out the *Guelfs*) with whom they ingag'd ſucceſsfuly in *Campaldino*, and overcame them. Upon which, the City increaſing both in Wealth, and number of Inhabitants, it was thought good to enlarge their Walls, which they did to its preſent Circumference; whereas before its Diameter was only from the Old Bridge to S. *Lorenzo*. The Wars abroad, and Peace at home, had almoſt exterminated both the *Ghibilines* and *Guelfs* in that City; there remain'd only thoſe ſparks of animoſity (which are unavoidable in all Cities) betwixt the Nobles and the People; for the one ſollicitous of their freedom according to their Laws, and the other impatient to command them, it is not poſſible they ſhould agree. Whilſt they were apprehenſive of the *Ghibilines*, this humour did not ſhow it ſelf in the Nobility; but when the *Ghibilines* were low and depreſs'd, it began to exert, and the people were injur'd daily, beyond the Vindication either of the Magiſtrates, or Laws; every Nobleman making good his inſolence, by the multitude of his Friends and Relations, both againſt the *Priori*, and the Captain. The Heads therefore of the *Arts* (by way of remedy againſt ſo great inconvenience) provided that in the beginning of its Office, every Counſel of the *Priori*, ſhould create an Enſign, or *Gonfaloniere di juſticia*, out of the people, aſſigning him 1000 men in 20 Companies, which were to be ready with their Arms, and their *Gonfaloniere* to ſee Juſtice adminiſter'd whenever the Court or their Captain requir'd them. The firſt in this Office, was *Ubaldo Ruffoli*, who drawing out his Bands, demoliſh'd the Houſes of the *Galetti*, becauſe one of that Family had ſlain one of his Fellow-Citizens in *France*. The eſtabliſhment of this Order by the *Arts* was not difficult, by reaſon of the jealouſies and emulations amongſt the Nobility, who were not in the leaſt ſenſible it was intended againſt them, till they felt the ſmart of it when 'twas put in execution. This Conſtitution was terrible to them at firſt, but afterwards they return'd to their old inſolence again; for having inſinuated themſelves into the Council of the *Priori*, they found means to hinder the *Gonfaloniere* from executing his Office. Beſides, Witneſs being always required upon any accuſation, the Plaintiff could hardly find any body that would give Teſtimony againſt the Nobility. So that in a ſhort time *Florence* was involved in its own diſtraction, and the people expoſed to their former oppreſſion, Juſtice being grown dilatory and tedious, and Sentence, though given, ſeldom or never executed. The Populace not knowing what reſolution to take in this Caſe, *Giano della Bella* (a perſon of Noble extraction, but a Lover of the Liberty of the City) incourag'd the Heads of the *Arts*, to reform the City, and by his perſuaſion it was Ordain'd that the *Gonfaloniere* ſhould reſide with the *Priori*, and have 4000 men under his Command; they likewiſe excluded the Nobility out of the Council of the *Signori*.

The *Signori*.

Diſcord betwixt the Nobility and people.

The *Priori*
The *Gonfaloniere*.

They made a Law that all Acceſſories, or Abettors, ſhould be liable to the ſame puniſhment with thoſe who were actually Guilty; and decreed that Common report ſhould be ſufficient to convict them. By theſe Laws (which were called *Ordinamenti della Giuſtitia*) the people gain'd great reputation: but *Giano della Bella*, being look'd upon as the contriver

of

of their Deſtruction, became odious to the Nobility; and not to them only, but to the wealthieſt of the Populace, who began to ſuſpect his Authority, and not without reaſon, as appear'd afterwards upon the firſt occaſion was given him to abuſe it. It happened one of the Commons was killed in a fray, where ſeveral of the Nobility were preſent; *Corſo Donati* being one amongſt the reſt, the Murder was laid to his Charge, as the moſt furious and deſparate. He was taken into Cuſtody by the Captain, but (however cauſes went) whether he was innocent of the Crime, or the Captain fearful to condemn him, he was preſently diſcharg'd. The people offended at his diſcharge, betook themſelves to their Arms, ran to the Houſe of *Giano della Bella*, and beg'd of him, that he would be the means that the Laws he had invented might be put in Execution. *Giano* had privately a deſire that *Corſo* ſhould be puniſh'd, and therefore advis'd not the people to lay down their Arms, (as many conceived he ought) but incouraged them to addreſs to the *Signori* with their Complaints, and deſire their Vindication. The people full of rage, thinking themſelves abuſed by the Captain, and abandon'd by *Giano*, went not to the *Signori* (as directed) but away they ran to the Captain's Palace, and plunder'd it; which action diſpleaſed the whole City, and was laid upon *Giano*, by ſuch as meditated his ruine; whereupon ſome of his Enemies happening afterwards to be of the *Signori*, he was accuſed to the Captain as an Incendiary and Debaucher of the people.

Whil'ſt his Cauſe was in agitation, the people took Arms again, flocked in great numbers to his Houſe, and offer'd to defend him againſt the *Signori* his Enemies. *Giano* had no mind to experiment the popular favour, or truſt his life in the hands of the Magiſtrates, as fearing the malignity of the one, no leſs than the unconſtancy of the other; but to ſecure himſelf againſt the malice of his Enemies, and his Country againſt the commotion of his Friends, he reſolved to give way to their Envy, and baniſh himſelf from that City which he had preſerv'd from the Tyranny of the Nobility by his own danger and charge. The Nobility, after his departure, to recover their dignity, which they conceived loſt by the diſſentions among them, united, and apply'd themſelves by two of their Number, to the Senate or *Signoria* (which they judg'd to be their friends) to intreat them to mitigate in ſome meaſure the acerbity of thoſe Laws which were made againſt them: which demand was no ſooner known, but the people (fearing the *Signoria* ſhould comply) began immediately to tumultuate, and, betwixt the ambition of the one, and ſuſpicion of the other, they fell ſoon after to blows. The Nobility ſtood upon their Guards in three places, at St. *John's*, in the *Mercato nuovo*, and the *Piazza de Mozzi*, under three Commanders, *Foreſe Adinari*, *Vanni de Mozzi*, and *Geri Spini*. The people were got together under their Enſigns in great Numbers at the Senator's Palace, which at that time was not far from St. *Pruocolo*; and becauſe the people were jealous of the *Signori*, they deputed ſix Citizens to ſhare with them in the Government. In the mean time, while both parties were preparing for the Combat, ſome, both of the Nobility and Commons, with certain Religious perſons of good Reputation, interpos'd themſelves, remonſtrating to the Noblility, that the Honour they had loſt, and the Laws made againſt them, were occaſioned by their Arrogance and ill Government; that now to take Arms, and betake themſelves to force, for the recovery of what was loſt by their own diſſention and ill-management, would be the ruine of their Country, and a detriment to themſelves. That they ſhould conſider in number, riches, and malice, they were much inferiour to the people. That that Nobility they ſo vainly affected, by which they thought to advance others, when they came to fight, would prove but a meer Title and Name, unable to defend them againſt the advantages which their Enemies had over them. To the people it was repreſented imprudence to drive things too far, and make their Adverſaries deſparate; *For he that hopes no good, fears no ill.* That it ought to be conſidered, their Nobility were they which had gain'd ſo much Honour to their City in its Wars, and were not therefore in juſtice to be uſed at that rate. That they could be content to have the Supream Magiſtracy taken from them, and endure it patiently; but they thought it unreaſonable, and inſupportable to be at everybodies mercy (as their new Laws rendered them) and ſubject to be driven out of their Countrey upon every *Cappriccio*. That it would be well to mitigate their fury, and lay down their Arms, rather than to run the hazard of a Battel, by preſumption upon their Numbers, which had many times fail'd, and been worſted by the leſs. The people were divided in their Judgments, ſome were for ingaging, as a thing ſome time or other would neceſſarily be; and better now, than to defer till their Enemies were more powerful: and if it could be imagined the mitigation of the Laws would content them, they ſhould be mitigated accordingly; but their inſolence and pride could never be laid by, till by force they were conſtrain'd to't. To others more moderate and prudent, it appeared that the alteration of the Laws would not ſignifie much, but to come to a Battel might be of very great importance; and their Opinion prevailing, it was

Perſwaſion to the Nobility to be quiet.

The ſame to the people.

provided

provided that no accusation should be admitted against a Nobleman without necessary testimony. Though upon these terms both parties laid down their Arms, yet their jealousies of one another were mutually retain'd, and they began again to fortifie on both sides. The People thought fit to re-order the Government, and reduc'd their *Signori* to a less number, as suspecting some of them to be too great favourers of the Nobility, of whom the *Mansini*, *Magalotti*, *Altoviti*, *Peruzzi*, and *Cerretani* were the chief. Having settled the State in this manner in the year 1298. for the greater Magnificence and Security of their *Signori*, they founded their Palace, and made a *Piazza* before it, where the houses of the *Uberti* stood formerly. About the same time also the Foundation of the Prisons were laid, which in few years after were finished. Never was this City in greater splendor, nor more happy in its condition than then, abounding both in men, riches, and reputation. They had 3000 Citizens in the Town fit to bear Arms, and 70000 more in their Territory. All *Tuscany* was at its devotion partly as subjects, and partly as friends. And though there were still piques and suspicions betwixt the Nobility and the People, yet they did not break out into any ill effect, but all lived quietly and peaceably together; and had not this tranquility been at length interrupted by dissention within, it had been in no danger from abroad; being in such terms at that time, it neither feared the Empire, nor its Exiles, and could have brought a force into the Field equivalent to all the rest of the States in *Italy*. But that disease from which *ab extra* it was secure, was ingendred in its own bowels. There were two Familes in *Florence*, the *Cerchi*, and the *Donati*, equally considerable, both in numbers, riches, and dignity, being Neighbours both in City and Country, there happened some exceptions and disgust betwixt them, but not so great as to bring them to blows, and perhaps they would never have produc'd any considerable effects, had not their ill humours been agitated and fermented by new occasion. Among the chief Families in *Pistoia*, there was the Family of the *Cancellieri*. It happened that *Lore* the Son of *Gulielmo*, and *Geri* the Son of *Bertaccio*, fell out by accident at play, and passing from words to blows, *Geri* received a slight wound. *Gulielmo* was much troubled at the business, and thinking by excess of humility to take off the scandal, he increased it and made it worse. He commanded his Son to go *Geri's* Father's house, and demand his pardon; *Lore* obey'd, and went as his Father directed: but that act of humanity did not at all sweeten the acerbity of *Bertaccio's* mind, who causing *Lore* to be seiz'd by his servants (to aggrivate the indignity) he caused him to be led by them into the Stable, and his hand cut off upon the Manger, with instruction to return to his Father, and to let him know, *That wounds are not cured so properly by words, as amputation.* *Gulielmo* was so enraged at the cruelty of the fact, as he and his friends immediately took Arms to revenge it; and *Bertaccio* and his friends doing as much to defend themselves, the whole City of *Pistoia* was engaged in the quarrel, and divided into two parties. These *Cancellieri* being both of them descended from one of the *Cancellieri* who had two Wives, one of them called *Bianca*: that party which descended from her, called it self *Bianca*; and the other in opposition was called *Nera*. In a short time many conflicts happen'd betwixt them, many men killed, and many houses destroy'd. Not being able to accommodate among themselves, though both sides were weary, they concluded to come to *Florence*, hoping some expedient would be found out there, or else to fortifie their parties by the acquisition of new friends. The *Neri* having had familiarity with the *Donati*, were espoused by *Corso*, the head of that Family. The *Bianchi*, to support themselves against the accession of the *Donati*, fell in with *Veri* the chief of the *Cerchi*, a man not inferior to *Corso* in any quality whatever. The malignity of this humour being brought hither from *Pistoia*, began to revive the old quarrel betwixt the *Cerchi* and *Donati* in such manner, that the *Priori*, and other Principal Citizens began to apprehend they should fall together by the ears, and the whole City come to be divided. Hereupon they apply'd themselves to the *Pope*, desiring he would interpose his Authority to asswage those differences which were too great for their private power to compose. The *Pope* sent for *Veri*, and prest him earnestly to a reconciliation with the *Donati*. *Veri* seem'd to be surprised at his importunity, pretended he had no prejudice to them at all, and because reconciliation presupposed a quarrel, there being nothing of the latter, he thought there was no necessity of the first. So that *Veri* returning from *Rome* without any other conclusion, the Malevolence increas'd, and every little accident (as it happened afterwards) was sufficient to put all in confusion. In the Month of *May*, several Holidays being publickly celebrated in *Florence*, certain young Gentlemen of the *Donati*, with their friends on Horseback, having stopt near St. *Trinity*, to see certain Women that were dancing, it fell out that some of the *Cerchi* arriv'd there likewise with some of their friends, and being desirous to see as well as the rest, not knowing the *Donati* were before, they spurr'd on their horses, and justled in among them. The *Donati* looking upon it as an affront, drew their Swords; the *Cerchi* were as ready to answer them, and after several cuts and slashes given and received,

New Reformation in *Florence* 1298.

The difference in the family of the *Cancellieri*, the occasion and consequence.

The *Bianchi* and *Neri*.

both

both sides retir'd. This accident was the occasion of great mischief; the whole City (as well People as Nobility) divided, and took part with the *Bianchi* and *Neri*, as their inclinations directed them. The chief of the *Bianchi* were the *Cerchi*, to whom the *Adimari*, the *Abbati*, part of the *Tosinghi*, the *Bardi*, *Rossi*, *Frescobaldi*, *Nerli*, *Mannilli*, all the *Mozzi*, the *Scali*, *Gherardini*, *Cavalcanti*, *Malespini*, *Bostichi*, *Giandonati*, *Vecchietti*, and *Arriguelzi*, joyn'd themselves; with these sided several of the Populace and all the *Ghibiline* Faction in *Florence*; so that in respect of their Numbers, they seem'd to have the whole Government of the City. The *Donati* on the other side were Heads of the *Neri*, and follow'd by all the rest of the before-mention'd Nobility, who were not engag'd with the *Bianchi*; and beside them, all the *Parzi*, *Bisdomini*, *Manieri*, *Bagnesi*, *Tornaquinci*, *Spini*, *Buondelmonti*, *Gianfigliazzi*, and *Brunelleschi*. Nor did this humour extend it self only in the City, but infected the whole Country. Insomuch that the Captains of the *Arts*, and such as favour'd the *Guelfs*, and were Lovers of the Commonwealth, very much apprehended least this new distraction should prove the ruin of the City, and the restauration of the *Ghibilines*. Whereupon they sent to the Pope, beseeching him to think of some remedy, unless he had a mind that City (which had been always a bulwark to the Church) should be destroy'd, or become subject to the *Ghibilines*. To gratifie their request, the Pope dispatch'd *Matteo d' Aquasparta* (a *Portugal* Cardinal) as his Legate to *Florence*, who finding the Party of the *Bianchi* obstinate and untractable, as presuming upon the advantage of their Numbers, he left *Florence* in an anger, and interdicted them; so that the Town remain'd in more confusion at his departure than he found it. All Parties being at that time very high, and dispos'd to mischief, it happen'd that several of the *Cerchi* and *Donati* meeting at a Burial, some words pass'd betwixt them, and from words they proceeded to blows, but no great hurt done, for that time. Both sides being return'd to their houses, the *Cerchi* began to deliberate how they might fall upon the *Donati*, and in conclusion they went in great numbers to attack them; but by the courage of *Corso* they were repell'd, and several of them wounded. Hereupon the City fell to their Arms; the Laws and the Magistrates were too weak to contest with the fury of both Parties. The wisest and best Citizens were in perpetual fear. The *Donati* and their Friends having less force, were more anxious and sollicitous of their safety, to provide for it as well as was possible: At a meeting of *Corso* with the heads of the *Neri*, and the Captain of the *Arts*, it was concluded that the Pope should be desired to send them some person of the Blood Royal to reform their City, supposing that way the most probable to suppress this *Bianchi*. The Assembly, and their resolution was notified to the *Priori*, and aggravated against the adverse Party as a conspiracy against their Freedom. Both Factions being in arms, *Dante*, and the rest of the *Signori* taking courage, with great wisdom and prudence causing the people to put themselves in arms, by conjunction of several out of the Country, they forc'd the Heads of both Parties to lay down their Arms, confin'd *Corso*, *Donati*, and several of the Faction of the *Neri* to their houses; and that their proceedings might seem impartial, they committed several of the *Bianchi*, who afterwards upon plausible pretences were dismiss'd. *Corso* and his Accomplices were discharg'd likewise; and supposing his Holiness to be their Friend, took a Journey to *Rome*, to perswade him personally to what by Letters they had begg'd of him before. There happen'd to be at the Pope's Court at that time *Charles de Valois* the King of *France* his Brother, call'd into *Italy* by the King of *Naples* to pass over into *Sicily*. The Pope (upon the importunity of the *Florentine* Exiles) thought fit to send him to *Florence*, to remain there till the season of the year serv'd better for his transportation. *Charles* arrived, and though the *Bianchi* (who had then the Supremacy) was jealous of him, yet being Patron of the *Guelfs*, and deputed thither by the Pope, they durst not oppose his coming; but on the contrary, to oblige him, they gave him full authority to dispose of the City as he pleased. *Charles* was no sooner invested with his Authority, but he caused all his Friends and Partizans to arm; which gave the people so great a jealousie that he would usurp upon their Liberties, that they also put themselves in arms, and stood ready every man at his door to resist any such attempt. The *Cerchi* and the chief of the *Bianchi* (having had the Government in their hands, and manag'd it proudly) were become generally odious; which gave encouragement to *Corso* and the rest of the *Neri* who were banish'd, to return to *Florence*, being assured that *Charles*, and the Captains of the Companies were their Friends. Whilst their suspicion of *Charles* had put the City in arms, *Corso*, his Comrades, and many of their Followers, enter'd into *Florence* without any impediment: And although *Veri de Cerchi* was perswaded to oppose, he refused it, and told them, he would leave their Chastisement to the People of *Florence*, against whose interest *Corso* did come. But he was mistaken in his measures, for instead of being punished, he was received

Charles of *Valois* made Governour of *Florence*.

ceived very kindly by the people; and *Veri* was forc'd to fly for his ſafety. For *Corſo* having forc'd his entrance at the *Porta Pinti*, drew up and made a ſtand at *S. Pietro Maggiori* (a place not far from his Palace) and having united with ſuch of the people, and his Friends as deſired Novelty, and were come thither on purpoſe; the firſt thing he did was to diſcharge all Priſoners whatever and however committed, whether by private or publick Authority. He forc'd the *Signori* to return privately to their Houſes, and elected a certain number (of the the Faction of the *Neri*) out of the People, to ſupply their places. For five days together they ranſack'd and plunder'd the houſes of the chief of the *Bianchi*. The *Cerchi* and the heads of that Faction, ſeeing the people for the moſt part their Enemies, and *Charles* none of their Friend, were retir'd out of the City, to ſuch Caſtles as they had; and whereas before they would not entertain the Counſel of the Pope, they were now glad to implore his aſſiſtance, and to let him underſtand that *Charles* was not come to the advantage, but to the prejudice of the City. Whereupon the Pope ſent his Legate *Matteo di Aquaſparta* to *Florence* the ſecond time, who not only made a Peace betwixt the *Cerchi* and *Donati*, but fortified it by ſeveral marriages and alliances. Nevertheleſs inſiſting to have the *Bianchi* participate of the chief Offices, and being denied by the *Neri*, who had them in poſſeſſion, he left the City as ill ſatisfied as before, and again excommunicated it for its diſobedience. Thus both Parties continued diſcontented. The *Neri*, ſeeing their Enemies ſo near, were apprehenſive leaſt by their deſtruction they ſhould recover the honours and authority which they had loſt; and as if theſe fears and animoſities had been not ſufficient to do miſchief, new affronts and injuries were offer'd. *Nicolas de Cerchi*, being going with ſome of his Friends to ſome of his houſes, as he paſs'd by the *Ponte ad Africo*, was aſſaulted by *Simon* ſon of *Corſo Donati*. The Conflict was ſharp, and on either ſide deplorable, for *Nicolas* was kill'd upon the place, and *Simon* ſo wounded, that he died the next morning. This accident diſturb'd the whole City afreſh; and though the *Neri* were indeed moſt culpable, yet they were protected by the Government, and before judgment could be obtain'd, a Conſpiracy was diſcover'd between the *Bianchi* and *Piero Terranti* (one of *Charles* his Barons) with whom they practiſed privately to be reſtored to the Government. The Plot was detected by ſeveral Letters from the *Cerchi* to the ſaid *Piero*, though ſome imagin'd they were counterfeited by the *Donati*, to divert the infamy they had incurr'd by the aſſaſſination of *Nicolas*. The *Cerchi* and all their Clan were at this time Priſoners to the *Donati* (and among the reſt *Dante* the Poet) their Eſtates were confiſcated, and their Houſes demoliſh'd. Their Party, with ſeveral of the *Ghibilines*, that had joyn'd themſelves with them, were diſperſed up and down in ſundry places, attending new Troubles to better their condition; and *Charles* having finiſh'd what he deſign'd when he came thither, return'd to the Pope in purſuance of his Expedition into *Sicily*, in which he managed himſelf with no more prudence than he had done in *Florence*; but loſing many of his men, he went back into *France*, with no little diſhonour.

New Troubles occaſioned by *Corſo Donati*.

After *Charles* was departed, for ſome time *Florence* was quiet, only *Corſo* was diſſatisfied, as not thinking himſelf in authority equal to his deſerts: for the Government being in the hands of the People, he believ'd it manag'd by ſuch are were much his inferiours. Moved therefore by theſe provocations, to varniſh over a foul deſign with a fair pretence, he calumniated ſeveral Citizens who had had charge of the Publick money, for imbezling of it, and applying it to their private uſe; giving out that it was fit they ſhould be inquir'd after, and puniſh'd: ſeveral of his mind did the ſame, and many others by their ignorance and credulity were perſwaded, that what *Corſo* did, was out of pure care and affection to his Country. On the other ſide, the perſons accuſed, having the favour of the People, ſtood upon their juſtification, and ſo far theſe differences proceeded, that after ſeveral expoſtulations, and civil controverſies, they came at length to take Arms. On one ſide there were *Corſo*, *Lotieri* Biſhop of *Florence*, with many of the Nobility, and ſome of the Commons. On the other ſide there were the *Signori*, and the greateſt part of the People: ſo that there was fighting in many places of the City. The *Signori*, perceiving their affairs in ſome danger, ſent to *Lucca* for aid, and immediately all the People in *Lucca* came in to their aſſiſtance; by whoſe ſuperveniion things were preſently compoſed, the tumults aſſwag'd, and the People continued in their former Liberty and Government, without any other puniſhment of the Author of the ſcandal. The *Pope* had heard of the tumults at *Florence*, and ſent thither *Nicolas da Prato* his Legate to appeaſe them, who, for his quality, learning and behaviour, being a man of great reputation, he quickly obtain'd ſuch credit with the People, that they gave him authority to reform, or model their Government as he pleas'd. Being of the *Ghibiline* Faction, he was inclined to call home thoſe of that Party who were baniſh'd: But firſt he thought it convenient to ingratiate with the People, by reſtoring their ancient Companies, which Act added as much

ſtrength

ſtrength to their intereſt, as it took away from the Nobleſs. When he had, as he thought, ſufficiently oblig'd the multitude, The Legate deſign'd to call home the Exiles, and try'd many ways to effect it, but was ſo far from ſucceeding in any of them, that he render'd himſelf ſuſpected to the Governours, was forc'd out of the City, and leaving all in confuſion, in a great paſſion he excommunicated it at his departure. Nor was this City moleſted with one humour only, but ſeveral; there being at once the factions betwixt the Nobility and the People, the *Guelfs* and the *Ghibilines*, the *Bianchi* and the *Neri*. At that time all the City was in Arms, and many Bickerings happen'd. Many were diſcontented at the Legates departure, being willing the baniſh'd Citizens ſhould return. The Chief of them who rais'd the report were the *Medici* and the *Giugni*, who (with the Legate) were diſcover'd to be favouters of the Rebels; in the interim Skirmiſhes and Rencounters paſs'd in ſeveral places of the Town, and to add to their Calamity, a Fire broke out in the *Orto S. Michael* among the houſes of the *Abbati*, from thence it went to the houſes of the *Caponſacchi*, and burn'd them, from thence to the houſes of the *Macci*, *Amieri*, *Toſchi*, *Cipriani*, *Lamberti*, *Cavalcanti*, and all the new Market; from thence it paſs'd to the *Porta S. Maria*, burn'd that, and then wheeling about to the old Bridge, it conſum'd the Palaces of the *Gherardini*, *Pulci*, *Amidei*, *Lucardeſi*, and with them ſo many other houſes, that the number of all that were conſum'd by that Fire, amounted to more than thirteen hundred. Some were of opinion it began by accident in the height of the Conflict. Others affirm it was done on purpoſe by *Neri Abbati*, Prior of *S. Piero Scharagio* (a diſſolute and miſchievous perſon) who ſeeing every body ingaged, thought he might commit a piece of wickedneſs then, which no body ſhould be able to remedy; and to the end it might ſucceed the better, and give leſs ſuſpicion of him, he ſet the houſes of his own party on fire, where he could do it with convenience. Theſe Conflicts, and this Conflagration, happen'd in *July* 1304. at which time *Corſo Donati* was the only perſon who did not arm in thoſe tumults; and not without reaſon, for thereby he preſumed (when weary of their fighting they ſhould incline to an agreement) he ſhould more eaſily be choſen Umpire betwixt them. At length all Arms indeed were laid down, but more that they were tired, and weary of their miſeries, than from any relentment or condeſcenſion on either ſide. The whole conſequence of all was, that the Rebels were not ſuffer'd to return, and the Party which favour'd them was forc'd to comply. The Legate being come back to *Rome*, and underſtanding the new diſtractions in *Florence*, perſuaded the *Pope*, that if he deſign'd to compoſe them, it would be neceſſary to ſend for twelve of the Principal Malecontents of that City, which being the nouriſhment and fomentors of their miſeries, their miſeries would ceaſe as ſoon as they were remov'd. The *Pope* took his Counſel, ſent for twelve of the chief Citizens (who came to *Rome* in obedience to his ſummons) and among them *Corſo Donati* was one. Upon the departure of theſe Citizens, the Legate ſignifi'd to the Exiles, that now was their time (the City being deſtitute of their Heads) to return. Whereupon the Citizens which were baniſh'd, getting what force together they were able, they march'd to *Florence*, enter'd where the Walls were unfiniſh'd, and paſs'd on as far as the *Piazza* of S. *John*. It was a remarkable paſſage to conſider, that thoſe people who fought in their behalf whilſt humbly and unarm'd they begged to be admitted, ſeeing them come forcibly into the City with their weapons in their hands, turn'd againſt them immediately, and joining with the people, beat them out of the City. This Enterprize was loſt by leaving part of their forces at *Laſtra*, and not attending the arrival of *Toloſetto Uberti*, who was coming from *Piſtoia* with three hundred horſe; but ſuppoſing Expedition of greater importance to their ſucceſs, than ſtrength, they found (as many had done before) That *delay takes away the opportunity, and celerity the force.* The Rebels repuls'd, *Florence* returned to its old Diviſions. To leſſen the Authority of the *Cavalcanti*, the People aſſaulted and took from them the Caſtle of *Stinche* in the *Val di Greve*, which had belonged anciently to that family; and becauſe thoſe who were taken in this Caſtle were the firſt which were put in the new built Priſons, that Building took its name from the Caſtle from whence they came, was called *le Stinche* from thence, and is called ſo to this day. After this, thoſe who had the Government in their hands re-eſtabliſhed the Companies of the People; gave them the Enſigns which had been us'd at firſt under the diſcipline of the *Arts*. The Captains, the *Gonfalonieri* of the Companies, and the College of the *Signori* were call'd, and Orders were given that they ſhould aſſiſt the *Signoria* or Senate at all times, in time of Commotion or Injury, with their Swords, and in time of Peace with their Counſels. To the two old Governours they added another call'd *Eſſecutore*, whoſe Office it was by conjunction with the *Gonfalonieri* to reſtrain and correct the inſolence of the Grandees. In the mean time the *Pope* dying, *Corſo* and his fellow Citizens return'd from *Rome*, and

The *Medici* and *Giugni*

Florence burned, 1304.

might have liv'd quietly, had not the inſatiableneſs of *Corſo's* ambition created new troubles. To gain reputation, it was always his cuſtom to oppoſe the ſentiment of the Nobility in whatever was propos'd; and which way he obſerved the people to encline, thither he conſtantly directed his Authority, to work himſelf into their favour; ſo that in all Innovations and Controverſies he was the Head; all perſons reſorting to him who had any thing extraordinary in deſign. Hereupon he became ſo odious to ſeveral conſiderable Citizens, that the faction of the *Neri* ſubdivided, and fell into open diviſion among themſelves, becauſe *Corſo* made uſe of private Force and Authority, and of ſuch Perſons as were enemies to the State. Yet ſuch was the Awe and Majeſty of his Perſon, that every body fear'd him; to deprive him of the peoples favour (which, that way, was eaſily diſengaged) it was given out that he deſign'd upon the Government, and meant to make himſelf King: Which from his extravagant way of living was credible enough, and much confirm'd when afterwards he married a daughter of *Uguccione della Faggivola*, chief of the *Bianchi* and *Ghibilines*, and the moſt powerful Perſon in the City. This Alliance was no ſooner known among his enemies, but his adverſaries took Arms, and the people for that reaſon were ſo far from appearing in his defence, that the greatet part of them joyn'd with his enemies. The Chief of his enemies (and who were at the head of them) were *Roſſo della Toſa, Pazzino de Pazzo, Geri Spini*, and *Berto Brunelleſchi*. They, their followers and the greateſt part of the people, ran with their Swords drawn to the foot of the Palace of the *Signori*, by whoſe order an accuſation was preferr'd to *Piero Bianchi* Captain of the people, againſt *Corſo*, as a perſon who (by the aſſiſtance of *Uguccione*) conſpired to be King. Upon this impeachment he was ſummon'd, and refuſing to appear, was declared a Rebel for his Contumacy; there having been but two hours time betwixt the accuſation and ſentence: judgment pronounc'd, the *Signori*, with the ſeveral Companies of the people (their Banners diſplay'd) went preſently to apprehend him. *Corſo* on the other ſide not at all diſmay'd either at the ſeverity of the ſentence, the authority of the *Signori*, nor the unconſtancy of his friends (who had many of them forſaken him) fell to fortifying his houſe, hoping to have defended himſelf there till *Uguccione* (to whom he had ſent word of his condition) ſhould come to his reſcue. His houſes and avenues were fortifi'd and barricado'd by him, and ſtrengthen'd with ſuch Garriſons of his friends, that though the people were very numerous and preſs'd hard to have enter'd them, they could not prevail. The Conflict was ſmart, many kill'd and wounded on both ſides, and the people finding there was no entrance that way by force, got into the houſes of his Neighbours, and through them they brake unexpectedly into his. *Corſo* finding himſelf inviron'd by his Enemies, and no hopes of relief from *Uguccione*, diſpairing of Victory, he reſolv'd to try what was poſſible for his Eſcape; advancing therefore with *Gherardo Bondini* and ſeveral other his moſt faithful and valiant friends, he charg'd ſo furiouſly upon his Enemies, that he brake them, and made his way thorow them (fighting) out of the *Porta della Croce*: Nevertheleſs being purſu'd, *Gherardo* was ſlain by *Boccacio Cavicciulli* upon the *Africa*, and *Corſo* was taken Priſoner at *Rouezano* by certain Spaniſh horſemen belonging to the *Signoria*. But diſdaining the ſight of his victorious Enemies, and to prevent the torments which they would probably inflict, as they were bringing him back towards *Florence*, he threw himſelf off his horſe, and was cut to pieces by one of the Company; his body was gather'd together by the Monks of S. *Salvi*, and bury'd, but without any ſolemnity. This was the ſad End of that Magnanimous Perſon, to whom his Country, and the *Neri*, ow'd much both of their good fortune and ill; and doubtleſs had his mind been more moderate, his memory would have been more honourable; however he deſerves a place amongſt the beſt Citizens this City did ever produce, though indeed the turbulency of his Spirit caus'd his Country and Party both to forget their obligations to him, and at length procur'd his death, and many miſchiefs to them. *Uguccione* coming to the relief of his Son in Law as far as *Remoli*, and hearing he was taken by the people, preſuming he could do him no good, to ſave his own ſtake, he return'd back as he came.

Corſo Donati.

Condemned

His Death.

1308. *Corſo* being dead in the year 1308, all tumults ceas'd, and every body liv'd quietly till news was brought that *Arrigo* the Emperor was come into *Italy* with all the *Florentine* Exiles in his Company, whom he had promis'd to reinſtate on their own Country. To obviate this, and leſſen the number of their Enemies, the Magiſtrates thought fit of themſelves to reinvite all thoſe who had been rebels, but ſome few which were particulary excepted. Thoſe which were excepted, were the greateſt part of the *Ghibilines*, and ſome of the faction of the *Bianchi*, among which were *Dante Aleghieri*, the Sons of *Veri de Cerchi* and *Giano della Bella*. They ſent likewiſe to deſire the aſſiſtance of *Robert* King of *Naples*, but not prevailing in an amicable way without terms, they gave him the Government of their City for five years, upon condition he would defend them as his ſubjects. The Emperor in his paſſage

came

came to *Pisa*, and from thence coasting along the shore, he went to *Rome*, where he was Crown'd in the year 1312; after which, addressing himself to the subduction of the *Florentines*, he marcht by the way of *Perugia* and *Arezzo* to *Florence*, and posted himself with his Army at the Monastery of St. *Salvi*, where he continued fifty days without any considerable exploit. Despairing of success against that City, he mov'd to *Pisa*, confederated with the King of *Sicily* to make an Enterprize upon *Naples*, and march'd forward with his Army; but whilst he thought himself sure of Victory, and *Robert* gave himself for lost, the Emperor died at *Buonconvento*, and that Expedition miscarried. Not long after it fell out that *Uguccione* became Lord of *Pisa*, and by degrees of *Lucca*, where he joyn'd himself with the *Ghibilines*, and by the assistance of that faction, committed great depredations upon the Neighbours. The *Florentines* to free themselves from his Excursions, desir'd King *Robert* that his Brother *Piero* might have the Command of their Army. In the mean time *Uguccione* was not idle. To increase his numbers, and extend his dominion, partly by force, and partly by stratagem, he had possess'd himself of many strong Castles in the Vallies of *Arno*, and *Nievole*, and having advanc'd so far as to besiege *Monte Catani*, the *Florentines* thought it necessary to relieve it, lest otherwise that Conflagration should consume their whole Country. Having drawn together a great Army, they march'd into the *Val di Nievole*, gave battel to *Uguccione*, and after a sharp fight, were defeated. In the battel, they lost 2000 men besides *Piero* the King's Brother, whose body could never be found. Nor was the Victory on *Uguccione*'s side without some qualification, he having lost one of his Sons, and several Officers of Note. After this disaster, the *Florentines* fortifi'd at home as much as they could, and King *Robert* sent them a new General call'd the *Conte di Andrea*, with the title of *Conte Novello*. By his deportment (or rather by the Genius of the *Florentines*, whose property it is to increase upon every settlement, and to fall afterwards into factions upon every accident) notwithstanding their present War with *Uguccione*, they divided again, and some were for King *Robert*, and others against him. The chief of his Adversaries were *Simon della Tosa*, the *Magalotti*, and other popular Families, who had greatest interest in the Government. These persons sent first to *France*, and then into *Germany*, to raise Men, and invite Officers, that by their assistance they might be able to rid themselves of their new Governour the *Conte*. But their fortune was adverse, and neither could be procur'd. Nevertheless they gave not their Enterprize over, though they had been disappointed both in *Germany* and *France*; they found out an Officer in *Agobbio*; having driven out King *Robert's* Governour, they sent for *Laudo* from *Agobbio*, and made him *Effecutore*, (or indeed Executioner) giving him absolute power over their whole City. *Laudo* being naturally cruel and avaritious, march'd with arm'd men up and down the City, plundering this place, and killing in that, as those who sent for him gave him directions; and not content with this insolence, he coyn'd false money with the *Florentine* stamp, and no man had the power to oppose it, to such grandeur was he arriv'd by the dissention of the Citizens. Miserable certainly, and much to be lamented was the Condition of this City, which neither the Consequences of their former divisions, their apprehension of *Uguccione*, nor the Authority of a King was sufficient to unite. Abroad they were infested by *Uguccione*; at home they were pillag'd by *Laudo*; and yet no reconciliation. The King's Friends, many of the Nobility, several great men of the *Populace*, and all the *Guelfs*, were Enemies to *Laudo* and his party. Nevertheless, the Adversary having the Authority in his hand, they could not without manifest danger discover themselves; however, that they might not be deficient in what they were able to do towards the freeing themselves of so dishonourable a Tyranny, they writ privately to King *Robert*, to intreat that he would make *Conte Guido da Buttefolle* his Lieutenant in *Florence*. The King granted their request, sent the *Conte* to them forthwith, and the adverse party (though the *Signori* also were Enemies to the King) had not the Courage to oppose him. But the *Conte* for all that, had not much Authority conferr'd, because the *Signori*, and *Gonfalonieri* of the Companies were favourers of *Laudo* and his accomplices. During these troubles in *Florence*, the daughter of *Alberto* coming out of *Germany*, pass'd by the City in her way to her husband *Charles* Son to King *Robert*. She was very honourably receiv'd by such as were friends to the King, who complaining to her of the sad Condition of their City, and the Tyranny of *Laudo* and his party, she promis'd her assistance, and by the help of her interposition, and such as were sent thither from the King, the Citizens were reconcil'd, *Laudo* depos'd from his Authority, and sent home to *Agobbio* full of treasure and blood. *Laudo* being gone, they fell to Reform, and the *Signoria* was confirm'd by the King for three years longer; and because before there were VII in the Senate of *Laudo*'s party, VI new were chosen of the King's, and they continu'd XIII for some time;

New divisions.

Laudo de Agobbio

Castruccio Castracani.

but they were reduced afterwards to VII, their old number. About this time *Uguccione* was driven out of *Lucca*, and *Pisa*, and *Castruccio Castracani*, a Citizen of *Lucca*, succeeded him in the Government; and being a brave and couragious young Gentleman, and fortunate in all his Undertakings, in a short time he made himself Chief of the *Ghibiline* faction in *Tuscany*. For this cause, laying aside their private discords, the *Florentines* for several years made it their business, first to obstruct the growth of *Castruccio's* Power, and afterwards, (in case he should grow powerful against their will) to consider which way they were to defend themselves against him: and that the *Signori* might deliberate with more Counsel, and execute with more Authority, they created XII Citizens (which they call'd *Buonhuomini*) without whose advice and concurrence the *Signori* were not to do any thing of importance. In the mean time the Authority of King *Robert* expir'd; the Government devolv'd once more upon the City, which set up the old *Rectori* and Magistrates as formerly, and their fear of *Castruccio* kept them Friends, and united. *Castruccio* after many brave things performed against the Lords of *Luginiani*, sat down before *Prato*: The *Florentines* alarm'd at the news, resolv'd to relieve it, and shutting up their Shops, they got together in a confus'd and tumultuous manner about 20000 Foot and 1500 Horse; and to lessen the force of *Castruccio* and add to their own, Proclamation was made by the *Signori*, that what ever Rebel of the *Guelfs* should come in to the relief of *Prato*, should be restor'd afterwards to his Country: Upon which Proclamation more than 4000 of the *Guelfs* came in and joyned with them, by which accession, their Army being become formidable, they march'd with all speed towards *Prato*, but *Castruccio*, having no mind to hazard a Battel against so considerable a force, drew off and retreated to *Lucca*. Upon his retreat, great Controversie arose in the Army betwixt the Nobility and the People. The People would have pursued, and fought, in hopes to have overcome and destroyed him; the Nobility would return, alledging they had done enough already in exposing *Florence* for the relief of *Prato*. That there being a necessity for that, it was well enough done, but now, no necessity being upon them, little to be gotten, and much to be lost, Fortune was not to be tempted, nor the Enemy to be follow'd. Not being able to accord among themselves, the business was referred to the *Signori*, which consisting of Nobility and Commons, they fell into the same difference of opinion, which being known to the City, they assembled in great multitudes in the *Piazza*, threatning the Nobility highly, till at last they condescended. But their resolution coming too late, and many constrain'd to joyn in it against their perswasions, the Enemy had time, and drew safely off to *Lucca*. This difference put the people into such a huff against the Nobility, the *Signori* refus'd to perform the Promise they made to the Rebels which came in upon Proclamation, which the Rebels perceiving, they resolv'd to be before hand, if possible, and accordingly presented themselves at the Gates of the City to be admitted before the Army came up; but their design being suspected, miscarryed. and they were beaten back by those who were left in the Town: To try if they could obtain that by treaty, which they could not compass by force, they sent eight *Embassadors* to the *Signori*, to commemorate to them the Faith they had given; the dangers they had run thereupon; and that it could not be unreasonable they should have their promised reward. The Nobility thought themselves obliged, having promis'd them particularly as well as the *Signori*, and therefore employ'd all their interest for the advantage of the Rebels; but the Commons (being inrag'd that the Enterprize against *Castruccio* was not prosecuted as it might have been) would not consent; which turn'd afterwards to the great shame and dishonour of the City. The Nobility being many of them disgusted thereat, endeavoured that by force, which was denyed them upon applications; and agreed with the *Guelfs*, that if they would attempt their entrance without, they would take up Arms in their assistance within; but their Plot being discover'd the Day before it was to be executed, when the banish'd *Guelfs* came to make their attack, they found the City in Arms, and all things so well dispos'd to repell them without, and suppress those within, that none of them durst venture, and so the Enterprize was given over without any effort. The Rebels being departed, it was thought fit those Persons should be punish'd who invited them thither; nevertheless though every body could point at the Delinquents, yet no body durst name them, much more accuse them. That the truth might impartially be known, it was ordered that the Names of the Offenders should be written down; and deliver'd privately to the Captain; which being done, the Persons accused were *Amerigo Donati*, *Teghiaio Frescobaldi*, and *Loteringo Gherardini*, whose Judges being now more favourable than (perhaps) their crime deserv'd, they were only condemn'd to pay a Sum of Money, and came off.

The tumults in *Florence* upon the alarm by the Rebels, demonstrated clearly that to the Company of the People one Captain was not sufficient; and therefore it was ordered for the

the future, that every Company ſhould have three or four, and every *Gonfalonier* two or three joyn'd to them, which ſhould be call'd *Pennonieri*, that, in caſe of neceſſity, where the whole Company could not be drawn out, part of it might appear under one of the ſaid Officers. And as it happens in all Commonwealths, after any great accident, ſome or other of the old Laws are abrogated, and others reviv'd to ſupply them, ſo the *Signoria* being at firſt but occaſional and temporary, the Senators and *Collegi* then in being (having the power in their hands) took Authority upon themſelves to make a Council of the *Signori*, which ſhould ſit forty Months for the future, their Names being to be put into a Purſe, and drawn out every two Months. But for as much as many of the Citizens were jealous their Names were not in the Purſe, there was a new *Imborſation* before the forty Months began. Hence it was, the cuſtom of the Purſe had its Original, and was us'd in the Creation of their Magiſtrates, both at home and abroad, whereas formerly they were choſen by a Council of the Succeſſors, as the term of the Office began to expire. At firſt this way of election was call'd *Imborſationi*, and afterwards *Squittini*. And becauſe every three, or at moſt five years, this cuſtom was to be us'd, it was thought they had prevented great miſchiefs to the City, occaſion'd by multitude of Competitors, and tumults at every election of Magiſtrates, which tumults being to be corrected no way (in their Judgments) ſo readily, they pitched upon this, not diſcerning the evils which they conceal'd under ſo ſmall a convenience. It was now in the year 1325, when *Caſtruccio* having ſeiz'd on *Piſtoia*, was grown ſo conſiderable, that the *Florentines* (jealous of his greatneſs) reſolv'd before he had ſettled his new conqueſt, to fall upon him, and recover it (if poſſible) out of his hands. Whereupon of Citizens and their Friends they aſſembled 20000 Foot, and 3000 Horſe, and encamp'd before *Alto Paſcio*, by taking it, to render the relief of *Piſtoia* the more difficult. The *Florentines* took that Paſs, and when they had done, they march'd towards *Lucca*, foraging and waſting the Country. But by the Imprudence and Treachery of their Commander, little progreſs was made. This Perſon (call'd *Ramondo da Cardona*) obſerving the *Florentines* to have been very liberal of their Liberty, and to have conferr'd the Government ſometimes upon Kings, ſometimes upon Legates, and ſometimes upon more inferiour Perſons; he thought with himſelf, that if he could bring them into any exigence, or diſtreſs, it might eaſily fall out that they would make him their Prince; to this purpoſe he frequently deſir'd and preſs'd to have the ſame Authority inveſted in him in the City, as he had in the Army, otherwiſe he could not require nor expect that Obedience which was neceſſary for a General. The *Florentines* not hearing on that Ear, their Captain proceeded but ſlowly, neglecting his time, as much as *Caſtruccio* improv'd it; for *Caſtruccio* having procur'd ſupplies from the *Viſconti*, and other Princes of *Lombardy*, and made himſelf ſtrong, *Ramondo* (who before loſt his opportunity of conquering for want of fidelity) now loſt the poſſibility of preſerving himſelf, for want of diſcretion; for marching up and down lazily with his Army, he was overtaken by *Caſtruccio* near *Alto Paſcio*, aſſaulted, and after a long fight, broken to pieces; in which Action many *Florentines* were taken Priſoners and Kill'd, and their General among the reſt, who receiv'd the reward of his Infidelity and ill Counſel from Fortune her ſelf, which had been more properly beſtow'd by the hands of the *Florentines*. The calamities which *Caſtruccio* introduced upon the *Florentines* after his Victory; the Depradations, Impriſonments, Ruines, and Burnings, are not to be expreſs'd; having no Body to oppoſe him, for ſeveral Months together, he went where, and did what he had a mind to, and the *Florentines* thought themſelves happy (after ſuch a defeat) if they could ſave the City. Nevertheleſs they were not ſo deſparately low, but they made great proviſions of Money, rais'd what Soldiers was poſſible, and ſent to their Friends for aſſiſtance; but no providence was ſufficient againſt ſuch an Enemy: they were forc'd therefore to make choice of *Carlo* Duke of *Calabria* (the Son of King *Robert*) to be their Sovereign; if it would pleaſe him to undertake their defence; for that Family having been us'd to the Supremacy of that City, they promis'd him rather their Obedience, than Friendſhip. But *Carlo* being perſonally imploy'd in the Wars of *Sicily*, he ſent *Gualtieri* (a French Man and) Duke of *Athens*, to take poſſeſſion in his behalf. He as his Maſter's Lieutenant, took poſſeſſion of the Government, and created Magiſtrates as he pleas'd. Notwithſtanding his behaviour was ſo modeſt, and in a manner ſo contrary to his own Nature, every one lov'd him. Having finiſh'd his War in *Sicily*, *Charles* came with a thouſand Horſe to *Florence*, and made his entry in *July* 1326. His arrival gave ſome impediment to *Caſtruccio*, and kept him from rummaging up and down the Country with that freedom and ſecurity which he had formerly done. But what the City gain'd abroad, it loſt at home, and when their Enemies were reſtrain'd, they became expos'd to the inſolence and oppreſſion of their Friends: for the *Signori* acting nothing without the conſent of the Duke, in a years time he drain'd the City of four hundred thouſand *Florins*, though in the Articles of agreement

The Council of the *Signori* to ſit forty months, whereas before it was occaſional.

Election of Magiſtrates by *Imborſation*.

Ramondo da Cardona General of the *Florentines*.

The Duke of *Athens* Governour of *Florence*.

agreement it was expresly provided he should not exceed 200000. So great were the Impositions which he, or his Father laid upon the Town; and yet as if these were too few, their miseries were increas'd by an accumulation of new jealousies, and new enemies. For the *Ghibilines* of *Lombardy* were so fearful of *Carlos* advance into *Tuscany*, that *Galiazzo Visconti*, and the rest of the Princes of *Lombardy*, with Money and fair Promises perswaded *Lewis* of *Bavaria*, (who had been elected Emperor against the Pope's will) to pass into *Italy* with an Army. Being arriv'd in *Lombardy*, he pass'd forward into *Tuscany*, made himself Master of *Pisa* by the assistance of *Castruccio*, and having receiv'd a considerable supply of Money there, he march'd on towards *Rome*: Whereupon *Charles* (being fearful of his Kingdom) and leaving *Philippo da Saginnitto* his Lieutenant in *Florence*, went home with the Force he brought with him. Upon his departure, *Castruccio* seiz'd upon *Pisa*, and the *Florentines* got *Pistoia* by stratagem: *Castruccio* march'd immediately to recover it, sat down before it, and manag'd his business with so much conduct and resolution, that though the *Florentines* made many attempts to relieve it, both by insults upon his Army, and incursions into his Country, their Attacks, and their diligences were all ineffectual; they could not possibly remove him; for so firmly was he resolv'd to chastise the *Pistoians*, and weaken the *Florentines*, that the *Pistoians* were constrain'd to surrender, and receive him once more for their Lord; by which Action, as he contracted much Honour and Renown, so he thereby contracted so much Sickness and Infirmity, that he died shortly after upon his return to *Lucca*. And, because one ill or good accident goes seldom alone; *Charles* Duke of *Calabria* and Lord of *Florence* died at *Naples* much about the same time; so that in a very small space the *Florentines* were freed from the oppression of the one, and the apprehension of the other. They were no sooner free, but they fell to reforming, null'd all the Laws and Ordinances of the ancient Councils, and created two new, one of them consisting of three hundred of the Commons, the other of two hundred both Commons and Gentlemen; the first was call'd the Council of the People, and the second the Common Council.

Lod the Emperour called into *Italy*.

The Death of *Castruccio* and the *Duke* of *Calabria*.

New Reformation.

The *Emperor* being arriv'd at *Rome*, he created an *Anti-pope*; decreed many things to the prejudice of the Church; and attempted more, which he was not able to carry; that so at length he removed (with no little disgrace) from *Rome* to *Pisa*, where, either disdaining his Conduct, or for want of their Pay, eight hundred *German* Horse mutiny'd, fortified themselves at *Monte Ariaro*, and as he was departed from *Pisa* towards *Lombardy*, possess'd themselves of *Lucca*, and drave out *Francisco Castracani*, whom the *Emperor* had left Governour of the Town. Being Masters of that City, and their intentions to make what profit of it they could, they offered it to the *Florentines* for twenty thousand *Florins*, but by the advice of *Simon della Tosa* it was refus'd. This resolution would have been much to the advantage of our City, had the *Florentines* persever'd, but changing it afterwards, it prov'd much to their detriment; for refusing it at that time when they might have had it so cheap, they had much more for it afterwards, and were denied it; which was the occasion that *Florence* chang'd its Government often, to its great inconvenience. *Lucca* being refus'd in this manner by the *Florentines*, was purchased for 30000 *Florins* by *Gherardino Spinoli*, a Genoueſe, and (because People are more slow and indifferent in accepting what is offer'd, than in conceiving what is not) as soon as it was known to be bought by *Gherardini*, and at how cheap a rate, the *Florentines* were much troubled they had it not themselves, and blam'd all those who had any way discouraged them. To buy it being too late, they sought to gain it by force, and to that end sent their Army to over-run and spoil the Country about it. About this time the Emperor was return'd out of *Italy*, and the *Pope*, by order of the *Pisani*, sent Prisoner into *France*. The *Florentines* upon the Death of *Castruccio* (which follow'd in the year 1328) till the year 1340, continued quiet at home; intent only upon their Wars abroad. In *Lombardy* upon the coming of *John* King of *Bohemia*, and in *Tuscany* upon the account of *Lucca*; they adorn'd their City likewise with many new Buildings, and particularly the Tower of St. *Reparata*, according to the directions of *Giolto* the most Famous Painter in his time. Moreover, upon an inundation of the River *Arnus* in the year 1333 (in which the Water swelling twelve fathoms high in some places of *Florence*, carried away several Bridges, and many Houses were ruin'd) they repair'd all, with great care and expence. But in the year 1340 this tranquility was disturb'd, and they had new occasion of alteration. The Grandees of the City had two ways to maintain, and increase their Authority: one was by ordering the *Imborsations* so, as the Magistracy should fall always either to them or their Friends. The other was by making themselves chief in the Elections of the *Rettori*, and thereby obliging them to be favourable to them afterwards in all their determinations. And of this second way they were so fond and conceited, that not content with two *Rettori* (as they had formerly)

The *Florentines* quiet at Home.

Their Buildings.

formerly. A while after they ſet up a third, with the Title of the Captain of the Guards, in which Office they plac'd *Jacomo Gabrieli d' Agobbio*, with abſolute Power over the Citizens. *Jacomo* in the light of the Government, committed daily many Injuries, but more eſpecially to *Piero de Baldi*, and *Bardo Freſcobaldi*. Being nobly deſcended, and by conſequence proud, they could not endure to have a ſtranger do them wrong, in defiance of their other Magiſtrates. To revenge themſelves of him, and the Government, they enter'd into a Conſpiracy with ſeveral Noble and Popular Families in the City, who were diſguſted with their Tyranny. The manner concluded upon was, that every one ſhould get as many Arm'd Men into his Houſe as he could, and that on *All-Saints* Day in the Morning, when all the People were at Maſs, they ſhould take Arms, kill the Captain, and the Chief of their Governours, and afterwards make new Magiſtrates, and new Laws for the State. But becauſe dangerous enterprizes, the more conſidered, are always the leſs willingly undertaken; it happens that Plots which allow too much time for their Execution, are generally diſcover'd: There being among the Conſpirators a Gentleman call'd *Andrea di Bardi*, whoſe fear of Puniſhment prevailing upon him, beyond his deſire of Revenge, he betray'd all to *Jacomo Alberti*, his Kinſman, *Jacomo* imparted it immediately to the *Priori*, and the *Priori* to the Governors. And becauſe the deſign was ſo near Execution, *All-Saints* day being at hand, many of the Citizens aſſembled in the Palace, and judging it unſafe to defer, they would needs perſuade the *Signori* to cauſe the great Bell to be rung, and the People commanded to their Arms. *Taldo Valori* was at that time *Gonfaloniere*, and *Franciſco Salviati* one of the *Signori*. Being Relations of the *Bardi*, they diſſuaded the ſounding of the Bell, alledging it was not ſecure to Arm the People upon trivial Occaſions, becauſe Authority given to them, without ſome power reſerv'd to reſtrain them, was never known to produce any good, and that it was much eaſier to raiſe a Tumult, than to ſuppreſs it. They judg'd it better therefore to inquire farther into the verity of the thing, and puniſh it rather Civilly (if it appear'd to be true) than in a furious and tumultuous manner to correct it, perhaps with the deſtruction of the whole City. But theſe Arguments ſerv'd not the turn, but with Vilanous language, and Inſolent behaviour the *Signori* were conſtrain'd to cauſe the Bell to be rung, upon which the People immediately took Arms, and away to the *Piazza*. The *Bardi* and *Freſcobaldi* perceiving they were diſcover'd, and reſolving to overcome with Honour or die without Shame, betook themſelves to their Arms, hoping they would be able to defend that part of the City beyond the Bridge where their Houſes were; whereupon they broke down the Bridges, and fortifi'd themſelves, till they ſhould be reliev'd by the Nobility of the Country, and other Perſons their Friends. But that deſign was fruſtrated by the People which lived among them in the ſame part of the City, who took up Arms for the *Signori*; finding themſelves entermixt, and that deſign not like to ſucceed, they abandon'd the Bridges, and retreated to the Street where the *Bardi* dwelt, as ſtronger than the reſt, where they made a moſt valiant defence. *Jacomo d' Agobbio* knew well enough that all this Conſpiracy was againſt him; and having no great inclination to be kill'd, in a terrible fright, with his hair ſtanding right up, he ran to the Palace of the *Signori*, and ſecur'd himſelf among the thickeſt of the Arm'd Men. The other of the *Rettori*, though not ſo conſcious, were much more couragious, eſpecially the *Podeſta* call'd *Maffeo da Maradi*, who preſenting himſelf where they were fighting, and paſſing the Bridge *Rubaconte*, threw himſelf undauntedly among the Swords of the *Bardi*, and made a ſign for a Parley. Upon which, out of reverence to his Perſon, his Courage and good Qualities, they let fall their Arms, and ſtood quietly to attend him. In a modeſt and grave harangue he blam'd their proceedings; remonſtrated the danger they were in, if they did not yield to the indignation of the People; he gave them hopes likewiſe of a fair hearing, and a merciful ſentence, and promis'd his interceſſion for them; then returning to their *Signori* he perſuaded that they would not uſe extremities, and conquer with the loſs of ſo many Citizens lives, nor condemn without hearing. In ſhort, ſo far he obtain'd, that by conſent of the *Signori*, *Baldi*, *Freſcobaldi* and their Friends left the City, and retir'd to their Caſtles without any Impediment. They being gone, and the People diſarm'd, the *Signori* proceeded only againſt ſuch of the Families of the *Baldi* and *Freſcobaldi* as had taken Arms, and to leſſen their Power, they bought the Caſtles of *Mangona* and *Vernia* of the *Bardi*, and made a Law that no Citizen ſhould for the future poſſeſs any Caſtle within twenty Miles of *Florence*. Not many months after, *Stialta Freſcobaldi*, and ſeveral others of that Family were beheaded, having been proclaim'd Rebels before. But it was not ſufficient for theſe Governours to have conquer'd and ſuppreſs'd the *Baldi* and *Freſcobaldi*; like other People (whoſe inſolence for the moſt part increaſes with their Power) they grew imperious as they grew ſtrong. Whereas, before the *Florentines* had only one Captain of the Guards to afflict them, they choſe another now for the Country, inveſting him with great Authority,

A Captain of the Guards.

Maffeo da Maradi.

Authority, that those Persons whom they suspected, might not be suffered to live quietly either within the City or without; and besides this, they abus'd and provok'd the Nobility in such manner, that they were ready to sacrifice, and sell both themselves and City to be reveng'd; and watching for an occasion, they met one, and improv'd it. By the many troubles in *Lombardy* and *Tuscany*, *Lucca* was fallen under the Dominion of *Mastino della Scala*, Lord of *Verona*, who ingaged to deliver it up to the *Florentines*, but did not perform; for being Lord of *Parma*, he thought himself able to keep it, and valued not the breach of his Faith. The *Florentines*, in revenge, joyn'd with the *Venetians*, and made such war upon him, he had well nigh lost most of his Territory: but the *Florentines* got little by it, more than the satisfaction to have distress'd *Mastino*: for the *Venetian* (according to the practice of all States when enter'd into League with People less powerful than themselves) having taken *Trevigi*, and *Vicenza*; made a peace without any regard to the *Florentines*. A while after, the *Visconti* Lords of *Milan*, having taken *Parma* from *Mastino*, conceiving himself unable to keep *Lucca* any longer, he resolv'd to sell it. The *Florentines* and the *Pisani* were Competitors in the purchase, and whilst the bargain was driving, the *Pisani* perceiving the *Florentines* like to carry it, in respect that they were the more wealthy of the two; they betook themselves to force, and joyning with the *Visconti*, they sat down before it. The *Florentines* not at all discourag'd, proceeded in their bargain, and having concluded their terms, they paid down part of the Money to *Mastino*, and giving Hostages for the rest, the Town was to be deliver'd; whereupon *Naddo Ruccellai*, *Giovanni di Bernardino de Medici*, and *Rosso di Ricciardo de Ricci*, were sent to take possession, who passing by force into *Lucca*, they were receiv'd by *Mastino*, and the Town deliver'd up into their hands. However, the *Pisani* continued their siege, and endeavour'd by all possible industry to gain it by force. The *Florentines* on the other side were as sollicitous to relieve it; but after a long War, with great dishonour, and the loss of their money, they were driven out of it, and the Town became subject to the *Pisans*. The loss of this City (as in such cases doth frequently happen) put the People of *Florence* into a Mutiny against their Governours, so that in all places they upbraided the conduct and administration of their Superiors. At the beginning of the War, the management of the Military affairs was committed to XX Citizens, who made *Malatesta di Rimini* their General, who having executed his Command with little courage, and less discretion, they apply'd themselves to *Robert* King of *Naples* for assistance. In complyance with their request, King *Robert* sent them supplies under the Command of *Gualtieri* Duke of *Athens*, who (the Heavens ordaining that all things should concur to their future misery) arriv'd at *Florence* at the very time when the Enterprize of *Lucca* was utterly lost. The XX Governours of the Militia, seeing the People inrag'd, thought by choosing a new General, either to inspire them with new hopes, or take away the occasion of their obloquy; and because their fears were still upon them, that the Duke of *Athens* might defend them the better, they first made him Conservator, and afterwards General. The Nobility, upon the reasons above said, being highly discontented, and many of them retaining a correspondence with *Gualtieri* ever since he was Governour of *Florence* in the behalf of *Charles* Duke of *Calabria*, they began to think now was their time to wreck their malice, and to ruine the City, believing there was no way left them to subdue the People who had insulted so long, but by subjecting them to a Prince, who knowing the Generosity of the Nobless, and the insolence of the Commons, might recompense both according to their deserts; besides they presum'd it would be something meritorious, if upon their motion, and by their co-operation he acquir'd the Government. In pursuance of this design, they had many private meetings, in which they prest him to take the Government wholly into his hands, and they would assist him to the utmost. Nor were the Nobility alone in this business, some of the Popuplar families (as the *Peruzzi*, *Acciaivoli*, *Antellesi*, and *Buonaccorsi*) joyn'd themselves with them; for being much in debt, and unable out of their own Estates to clear themselves, they plotted against other Peoples, and to free themselves of their Creditors, made no scruple of enslaving their Country. These persuasions exasperated the Ambition of the Duke, who, to gain the reputation among the people of being just and exact, persecuted those who had the management of the Wars against *Lucca*, caus'd *Giovan de Medici*, *Naddo Ruccellai*, and *Gulielmo Altoviti* to be put to death, banish'd several others, and others he fined. These Executions startled the middle sort of the Citizens, only the Grandees, and the Common People were satisfi'd; the last, out of their natural pleasure in mischief, the first to see themselves so handsomly reveng'd for the insolencies they had receiv'd from the People. Whereupon, when ever the Duke appear'd in the streets, he was pursued with acclamations, and applauses of his integrity, every one exhorting him to go on in finding out, and punishing the frauds of their Neighbours. The Authority

Lucca sold to the *Florentines*.

Taken from them by the *Pisans*.

The Duke of *Athens*.

of

of the XX. was much leſſen'd, the Duke's reputation increas'd, and a general fear of him overſpread the whole City; ſo that to ſhow their affections towards him, all People caus'd his Arms to be painted upon their Houſes, and nothing but the bare title was wanting to make him a Prince. Being now in a condition (as he thought) of attempting any thing ſecurely, he caus'd it to be ſignifi'd to the Senate, that for the good of the Publick he judg'd it neceſſary they ſhould transfer their Authority upon him, and that (ſeeing the whole City approv'd it) he deſir'd he might have reſignation. The *Signori*, having long foreſeen the ruine of their Country approaching, were much troubled at the meſſage: They were ſenſible of the danger they were in, yet not to be deficient in any Act of duty to their Country, they refus'd him couragiouſly. As a pretence and ſpecimen of his Religion and Humility, the Duke had taken up his quarters in the Monaſtery of St. *Croce*, and being deſirous to give the finiſhing ſtroke to his wicked deſigns, he by Proclamation requir'd all the People to appear before him the next morning in the *Piazza* belonging to that Monaſtery. This Proclamation alarmed the *Signori* more than his meſſage whereupon joyning themſelves with ſuch as were lovers both of their Liberty and Country, upon conſideration of the Power of the Duke, and that their force was inſufficient, it was reſolv'd they ſhould addreſs themſelves to him in an humble and ſupplicatory way, to try if by their Prayers they might prevail with him to give his Enterprize over, or elſe to execute it with more moderation. All things being concluded, part of the *Signori* were ſent to attend him, and one of them accoſted him in this manner.

The Speech of one of the Senators to the Duke of *Athens*.

My Lord, we are come hither, mov'd firſt by your Propoſal, and next by your Proclamation for aſſembling the People, preſuming your reſolution is to obtain that by force, to which upon private application we have not conſented: it is not our deſign to oppoſe force againſt force, but rather to remonſtrate the burden and heavineſs of that load you would take upon your ſelf, and the dangers which will probably occur. And this we do, that you may hereafter remember, and diſtinguiſh betwixt ours, and the Counſel of ſuch as adviſe the contrary, not ſo much out of reſpect and deference to your advantage, as for the venting their own private fury and revenge. Your endeavour is to bring this City into ſervitude, (which has always liv'd free) becauſe the Government has been formerly given by us to the King of Naples, *whereas that was rather an aſſociation than a ſubjection. Have you conſidered how important and dear the name of Liberty is to us? A thing, no force can extirpate, no time can extinguiſh, nor no merit preponderate. Think, Sir, I beſeech you, what Power will be neceſſary to keep ſuch a City in ſubjection. All the ſtrangers you can entertain will not be ſufficient; thoſe which are Inhabitants you cannot prudently truſt; for though at preſent they are Friends, and have puſh'd you forward upon this reſolution, yet, as ſoon as they have glutted themſelves upon their Enemies, their next Plot will be to expel you, and make themſelves Princes. The People in whom your greateſt confidence is placed, will turn, upon every ſlight accident, againſt you, ſo that in a ſhort time you will run a hazzard of having the whole City your Enemies, which will infallibly be the ruine both of it and your ſelf; becauſe thoſe Princes only can be ſecure, whoſe Enemies are but few, and they eaſily remov'd either by baniſhment or death; but againſt univerſal hatred there is no ſecurity, becauſe the ſpring and fountain is not known, and he that fears every Man, can be ſafe againſt no Man. If yet you perſiſt, and take all poſſible care to perſerve your ſelf, you do but encumber your ſelf with more danger, by exciting their hatred, and making them more intent and ſerious in their revenge. That time is not able to eradicate our deſire of Liberty, is moſt certain. We could mention many good Cities in which it has been reaſſum'd by thoſe who never taſted the ſweetneſs of it, yet upon the bare character and tradition of their Fathers, they have not only valu'd, but fought and contended to recover it, and maintain'd it afterwards againſt all difficulties and dangers. Nay, ſhould their Fathers have neglected, or forgot to recommend it, the publick Palaces, the Courts for the Magiſtrates, the Enſigns of their freedom (which are of neceſſity to be known by all Citizens) would certainly proclaim it. What action of yours can counterpoize againſt the ſweetneſs of Liberty? For what can you do to expunge the deſire of it out of the Hearts of the People? Nothing at all, no, though you ſhould add all* Tuſcany *to this State, and return every day into this City with new victory over your Enemies. The Honour would be yours, not ours; and the Citizens have gain'd fellow-ſervants rather than ſubjects. Nor is it the power of your deportment to eſtabliſh you. Let your Life be never ſo exact, your converſation affable, your judgments juſt, your liberality never ſo conſpicuous, all will not do, all will not gain you the affections of the People; if you think otherwiſe, you deceive your ſelf, for to People that have liv'd free, every link is a load, and every bond a burthen. And to find a State violently acquir'd, to accord quietly with its Prince (though never ſo good) is impoſſible; of neceſſiey one muſt comply*

and frame it ſelf to the other, or elſe one muſt ruine and deſtroy the other. You have this therefore to conſider, whether you will hold this City by violence (for which all the Guards and Citadels within, and all the Friends could be made abroad, have been many times too weak) or be content with the Authority we give you; to which laſt we do rather adviſe, becauſe no Dominion is ſo durable as that which is voluntary, and the other (however your ambition may diſguiſe it) will but conduct you to a height, where being neither able to advance, nor continue, you muſt tumble down of neceſſity, to your own great detriment as well as ours.

The Duke's Anſwer.

But the Dukes heart was too hard for ſuch impreſſions as theſe. He reply'd, *That it was not his intention to extirpate, but to eſtabliſh their Liberty: that Cities divided were the only Cities that were ſervile, and not thoſe that were united. That if he by his Conduct could clear their City of their Schiſms, Ambitions, and Animoſities, he could not be ſaid to take away, but to reſtore their Liberty. That he did not aſſume that Office out of any ambition of his own, but accepted it at the importunity of ſeveral of the Citizens, and that they would do well to conſent themſelves, as their fellows had done. That as to the dangers he was like to incur, he did not conſider them; it was the part of an ignoble Perſon to decline doing good, for fear of evil that might follow; and of a Coward, to lay aſide a glorious Enterprize, upon the meer doubtfulneſs of the ſucceſs. That he hop'd ſo to demean himſelf, that they ſhould in a ſhort time confeſs, they had fear'd him too much, and truſted him too little.* The Senate finding by this anſwer no good was to be done, conſented the People ſhould meet next morning, as appointed, and the Government by their Authority to be transferr'd upon the Duke for a year with the ſame conditi-

1342. ons it had been formerly given to the Duke of *Calabria*. On the 8th of *September* 1342. the Duke, accompany'd by *Giovan della Toſſa*, all his Conſorts, and many Citizens beſides, coming into the *Piazza*, taking the Senate with him, he mounted upon the *Ringhieria*, (which are the Stairs at the foot of the *Palagie de Signori*) and caus'd the Articles of agreement betwixt the Senate and Him to be read. When the Perſon who read them came to the place where the Government was mentioned to be given to him for a year, the People cry'd out, *For his Life, For his Life: Franceſco Ruſticheſi*, one of the *Signori*, roſe up to have ſpoke, and endeavour'd to compoſe the tumult; but he was in-

The Duke of *Athens* choſen Prince by the People.

terrupted, and could nor be heard: So that he was choſen Lord by conſent of the People, not for a year, but for ever, and afterwards taken and carried thorow the multitude with general acclamation. It is a cuſtom among the *Florentines* that who ever is intruſted with the Guard of their Palace, is to be ſhut up in it in the abſence of the *Signori*. That truſt was at that time in the hands of *Rinieri di Giolto*, who being corrupted by ſome of the Duke's Creatures, receiv'd him into the Palace without any conſtraint. The Senate being ſurpriz'd, and much affronted, return'd to their Houſes, left the Palace to be plundered by the Duke's ſervants, the *Gonfalone del Populo* to be turn'd out, and the Duke's Standard to be ſet up; all which were immediately done to the ineſtimable trouble of all good Men, but to the joy and ſatisfaction of thoſe who maliciouſly or ignorantly had conſented to his exaltation. The Duke was no ſooner ſettled in his Dominion, but to ſuppreſs

The Duke of *Athens* his practice in *Florence*.

their Authority, who were the greateſt Propugnators of their Liberty, he forbid the *Signori* to meet in the Palace, and conſign'd them a private Houſe: He took away the Enſigns from the *Gonfalonieri* of the Companies of the People: He diſcharg'd all Priſoners. He recall'd the *Baldi* and *Freſcobaldi* from baniſhment: Prohibited the wearing of Arms; and to defend himſelf within, he made what friends he could abroad: to that purpoſe he careſs'd the *Aretini* and all others which depended any way upon the *Florentines* juriſdiction. He made a Peace with the *Piſani* (though he was become a Prince) that with the more advantage he might make War with them afterward: He took away their Bills and Aſſignments from the Merchants, who had lent the State money in their War with *Lucca*: He increas'd the old Gabels, and impos'd new: He diſſolv'd the Authority of the *Signori*, and in their places he ſet up three *Rettori*, *Barglione da Perugia*, *Guglielmo da Sceſi*, and *Cerrettieri Biſdomini*, with whom he conſtantly adviſed. The Taxes he laid upon the People were great, his Judgments unjuſt, and that Humanity and Preciſeneſs which he counterfeited at firſt, was now turn'd moſt manifeſtly into Cruelty and Pride; by which means many Citizens of the more Noble and Wealthy ſort, were Condemn'd, Executed, and ſome time Tortur'd. And that his Government might be as unſupportable abroad as at home, he inſtituted ſix new *Rettori* for the regiment of the Country, who carryed themſelves with the ſame inſolence and oppreſſion there, as he did in the City. He was jealous of the Nobility, though he had been often oblig'd by them, and ſome of them had been recall'd from their baniſhment by him; yet he could not imagine it compatible with the generoſity of a Noble Spirit to ſubmit and truckle to him. Hence it was, he apply'd himſelf to the People, cajoling them, and ſcrewing into their favour, by which and his power abroad, he doubted not to be able to juſtifie

his

his proceedings, how unjuſt and tyrannical ſo ever. The month of *May* being come, in which the People were wont to make merry, he caus'd the inferiour ſort of the People to be diſpos'd into ſeveral Companies, gave them Enſigns and Money, and honoured them with ſplendid Titles, ſo that half of the City went up and down feaſting and junketing among their Brethren, while the other half was as buſie to entertain them. The fame of his new Dominion being ſpread abroad, many Perſons of *French* extraction repair'd to him, and he preferr'd them all, as the moſt faithful of his freinds; ſo that in a ſhort time *Florence* was not only ſubject to the *Frenchmen*, but to the *French* cuſtoms and garb; all People, Men as well as Women, without reſpect of indecency or inconvenience, imitating them in all things: But that which was incomparably the moſt diſpleaſing, was the violence he and his Creatures us'd to the Women, without any regret. Upon theſe provocations the Citizens were full of indignation. It troubled them to ſee the Majeſty of their Government proſtitute and ruin'd: It troubled them to ſee Ordinances aboliſh'd; their Laws abrogated; honeſt converſation corrupted, and civil modeſty deſpiſed; for they who had never been accuſtom'd to any Regal pomp whatſoever, could not without ſorrow behold the *Duke* environ'd with his Guards both on foot and on horſe-back. But their deſtruction being in his hands, they were neceſſitated to diſſemble, and to court and honour him outwardly whom they hated at their hearts; another inducement was the fear they had conceiv'd upon the frequent executions, and continual taxes with which he impoveriſh'd and exhauſted the City; and the *Duke* underſtood very well both their fear, and their anger. It happen'd that *Matteo di Morrozzo*, to ingratiate with the *Duke*, or to diſintangle himſelf, had diſcover'd to him a certain Plot which the houſe of *Medici* and ſome others had contriv'd againſt him. The *Duke* was ſo far from inquiring into the matter, thathe caus'd the informer to be put to death; by which act he diſcourag'd ſuch as would otherwiſe have odvertis'd him, upon occaſion, and animated thoſe who were diſpos'd to deſtroy him. He likewiſe caus'd the tongue of *Betoni Cini* to be pull'd out with ſuch cruelty, that he died of it, and for no other cauſe but that he had ſpoke againſt the taxes, which he impos'd upon the City. This laſt outrage compleated the reſt; the People grew perfectly mad, and the *Duke* perfectly odious: for that City, which was accuſtomed heretofore to ſpeak of every thing freely, and to do what they liſted, could not poſſibly brook to have their hands tyed, and their mouths ſtop'd up by a ſtranger. Their fury and paſſion increaſing at this rate, not only the *Florentines* (who neither know how to maintain liberty, nor endure ſlavery) were incens'd, but the moſt ſervile Nation in the World would have been inflam'd to have attempted the recovery of its freedom. Whereupon many Citizens of all qualities and degrees reſolv'd to deſtroy him; and it fell out, that at the ſame time three Conſpiracies were on foot by three ſorts of People, the Grandees, the People, and Artificers. Beſides the General oppreſſion, each party had its peculiar reaſon. The Nobility were not reſtor'd to the Government; the People had loſt it; and the Artificers trade was decay'd. The Archbiſhop of *Florence*, *Agnolo Acciaivoli*, had in his Sermons highly magnified the qualities of the *Duke*, and procur'd him great favour among the People; but after he was Governor, and his tyranny became notorious, they found how the Archbiſhop had deluded them. To make them amends for the fault he had committed, he thought nothing could be more reaſonable, than that the ſame hand that gave them the wound ſhould endeavour to cure it, and therefore he made himſelf Head of the firſt and moſt conſiderable Conſpiracy, in which were ingag'd with him the *Bardi*, *Roſſi*, *Freſcobaldi*, *Scali*, *Altoviti*, *Magalotti*, *Strozzi*, and *Mancini*. The Principals of the ſecond Conſpiracy were *Manno* and *Corſo Donati*, and with them the *Pazzi*, *Cavicciulli*, *Cerchi*, and *Albizzi*. Of the third *Antonio Adimari* was the Head, and with him the *Medici*, *Bordini*, *Ruccellai*, and *Aldobrandini*. Their deſign was to have kill'd him in the houſe of the *Albizzi*, whither it was ſuppos'd he would go on Midſummer-day to ſee the running of the Horſes; but he went not that day, and that deſign was loſt. The next propoſition was, to kill him as he was walking in the ſtreets; but that was found to be difficult, becauſe he went always well arm'd, and well attended, and his motions being various and uncertain, they could not tell where it was moſt proper to way-lay him. Then it was debated to ſlay him in the Council; but that alſo was not without danger, becauſe though they ſhould kill him, they muſt of neceſſity remain at the mercy of his Guards. Whilſt theſe things were in debate among the Conſpirators, *Antonio Adimari*, in hopes of aſſiſtance from them, diſcover'd the Plot to ſome of his Friends in *Siena*, told them the Principal of the Conſpirators, and aſſur'd them the whole City were diſpos'd to redeem themſelves; whereupon one of the *Sienneſi* communicated the whole buſineſs to *Franceſco Brunelleſchi* (not with intention to have betray'd it, but in preſumption he had been privy to it before) and *Franceſco*, out of fear, or malice to ſome that were ingag'd in it, diſcover'd all to the *Duke*. *Pagolo*

Matteo di Morrozzo.

Three Conſpiracies againſt the Duke at one time.

de Mazzecchi, and *Simon de Monterapoli* being immediately apprehended, they confeſs'd the whole matter, with the number and quality of the Conſpirators; at which the Duke was much ſurpriz'd; and counſel being given him, rather to ſummon the Conſpirators to appear, than to ſecure them abruptly (becauſe if they fled of themſelves, he would be as ſafe without ſcandal) he ſummon'd *Adimari*, who appear'd in confidence of the number of his Accomplices. *Adimari* was arreſted, and the Duke adviſ'd by *Franceſco Brunelleſchi*, and *Uguccione Buondelmonti*, to betake himſelf to his arms, and go up and down to their houſes, and kill all of them they met. But, his force in the Town was judg'd too ſmall for that reſolution, and therefore he pitch'd upon another, which (had it ſucceeded) would have ſecur'd him againſt his Enemies, and provided him with Men. The Duke was wont upon any great Emergencies, to call the chief Citizens together, and to adviſe with them. Having firſt ſent to prepare what force he was able, he caus'd a liſt of three hundred Citizens to be made and deliver'd to his Sergeants, to ſummon them to Council by their Names, reſolving when they were met, to kill, or impriſon them as he pleas'd. *Antonio Adimari* being ſecur'd, and ſo many great Citizens ſummon'd (which could not be done without noiſe) many of them (and eſpecially thoſe who were conſcious) began to ſuſpect, and ſome refus'd abſolutely to obey. The Liſt having been brought to them all, and perus'd by every one of them, they began to underſtand, and incourage one another to take Arms, and dye manfully like men, rather than be driven quietly like ſheep to the ſlaughter: ſo that in few hours all the Conſpiracies were known, and the Conſpirators united: holding Counſel among themſelves, it was concluded, that the next day being the 26 of *July* 1343, a tumult ſhould be rais'd in the old Market-place, upon which all were to take Arms, and excite the people to liberty. The next day, the Signal being given by ſounding a Bell (as it was agreed before) every Body took Arms, and crying out Liberty, Liberty, the People betook themſelves to their Arms likewiſe, and fell to fortify in their ſeveral Quarters, under their reſpective Enſigns, which was done by the contrivance of the Conſpirators. The chief of all Families, both Nobility and People, met, and took an Oath to live and die with one another in the deſtruction of the Duke (except only the *Buondelmonti*, the *Cavalcanti*, and the four Families of the People, which conſented to make him Prince, who, with the Butchers and Raſcality of the City, ran down arm'd to the *Piazza* in defence of the Duke.) The Duke, alarm'd at theſe proceedings, fortifi'd his Palace, call'd home his Servants, which were lodg'd in ſeveral parts of the Town, and ſallying forth with them on Horſeback towards the Market-place, they were many times aſſaulted by the way, and many of them ſlain, being forced back, and recruited with 300 freſh Horſe, he was in doubt with himſelf, whether he had beſt fall upon them again, or ſtand upon his guard; and in the mean time the *Medici*, *Cavicciulli*, *Ruccellai*, and other families that were moſt diſoblig'd by the Duke, were in no leſs fear, that if he ſhould make a ſally, many who had taken Arms againſt him in the uproar, would ſhow themſelves his friends; deſirous therefore to keep him from ſallying, and by that means, increaſing his numbers, drawing what force together they were able, they advanc'd towards the Market-place, where ſome of their fellow Citizens had poſted themſelves in defence of the Duke. The Citizens which were there in the front, and had appear'd firſt for their Prince, ſeeing themſelves ſo briskly confronted, chang'd their ſides, left their Duke in the lurch, and joyn'd with their fellow Citizens, all but *Uguccione Buondelmonti*, who retired into the Palace, and *Giamozzo Cavalcanti*, who retreating with ſome of his party into the New-Market, and getting upon a bench, made an earneſt Speech, exhorting the people to ſtand firm to the Duke; and having got more force to him, to fright them (if his perſwaſion fail'd) he threatned to kill them all, Man, Woman, and Child, if they joyn'd or perſiſted in any deſign againſt him. But ſeeing no body follow him, nor no body near to chaſtiſe him for his inſolence, perceiving he had troubled himſelf hitherto in vain, he reſolv'd to tempt his fortune no farther, and ſo retir'd peaceable to his houſe. The conflict, in the mean time, in the Market-place, betwixt the People and the Duke's party was great, and though the Duke's Creatures were reinforc'd from the Palace, yet they were beaten, part taken Priſoners, and part leaving their Horſes to their Enemies, got on foot into the Palace. Whilſt the conteſt continu'd in the Market-place, *Corſo*, and *Amerigo Donati*, with part of the People broke up the *Stinche*, burn'd the Records of the *Poteſta*, and publick Chamber, ſack'd the Houſes of the *Rettori*, and kill'd all the Duke's Officers they could meet with. The Duke on the other ſide, finding he had loſt the *Piazza*, the whole City was become his Enemy, and no hopes left him of being reliev'd, he reſolv'd to try if by any act of kindneſs or humanity he might work upon the People. Calling his Priſoners (therefore) to him, with fair and gentle language he gave them their liberty, and made *Antonio Adimari* a Knight, (though not at all to his ſatisfaction) he caus'd his Enſign to be taken down, and the Standard

Commotion in *Florence*.

dard of the People to be set up upon the Palace. Which things being done unseasonably, and by force, they avail'd but little. In this manner he remain'd block'd up in his Palace, not at all delighted with his condition; having coveted too much formerly, he was now like to lose all, and in a few days was in danger of being famish'd or slain. The Citizens, to give some form to their Government, assembled themselves in the *S. Reparata*, and created XIV Citizens (half of the Nobility, and half of the People) who with their Bishop should have full power to model and reform the State as they pleas'd. The Authority of the *Pratica* they committed to VI Persons of their own election, which they were to exercise till he that was elected should come. There were at that time many strangers resorted to *Florence*, in assistance to that City, among the rest the *Senneſi* had sent six Embassadors (of honourable condition in their own Country) to negotiate a Peace betwixt the Duke and the People. The People refus'd any overture, unless *Guglielmo da Scesi*, his Son, and *Cerretieri Bisdomini* were deliver'd into their hands, which the Duke obstinately deny'd, till the threats of those who were shut up with him in the Palace constrain'd him to consent. Greater, doubtless, is the insolence and contumacy of the People, and more pernicious the mischiefs which they do, whilst they are in pursuit of their Liberty, than when they have acquir'd it. *Guglielmo* and his Son were brought forth, and deliver'd up among thousands of their Enemies: his Son was a young Gentleman, not yet arriv'd at eighteen years of age; yet neither his youth, his comliness, nor innocence, were able to preserve him, those who could not get near enough to do it whilst he was alive, wounded him when he was dead; and as if their swords had been partial, and executed the dictates of their fury with too much moderation, they fell to it with their teeth, and their hands, biting his flesh, and tearing it to pieces. And that all their Senses might participate in their revenge, having feasted their ears upon their groans, their eyes upon their wounds, and their touch upon their bowels (which they rent out of their bodies with their hands) their taste must (likewise) be treated and regal'd, that their inward parts, as well as their outward, might have a share of the *Ragouſt*. This barbarous outrage, how fatal soever it was to them two, was very lucky to *Cerretieri*, for the People being tyr'd in the formalities of their execution, forgot they had any more to punish, and left him in the Palace, not so much as demanded, from whence the next night he was safely convey'd by his Relations and Friends. The People having satiated themselves upon the Blood of those two, the Peace was concluded; the Duke to depart safely himself, and all that belong'd to him, for which he was to renounce all his Claim and Authority in *Florence*, and to ratify his Renunciation when he came out of the *Florentine* Dominions to *Casentino*. The Articles being agreed, on the 6th. of *August*, attended by a multitude of Citizens, the Duke departed from *Florence*, and arriv'd at *Casentino*, where he ratify'd the Renunciation, but so unwillingly, that had not *Conte Simone* threatned to carry him back to *Florence*, it had never been done. This Duke (as his actions demonstrate) was covetous, cruel, difficult of access, and insolent in his answers. Not being so much effected with the kindness and benevolence of People, as with their servitude and servility, he chose to be fear'd rather than belov'd. Nor was the shape and contexture of his Body less contemptible, than his manners were odious. He was very little, exceeding black, his beard long and thin, not a part about him, but concurr'd to make him despicable. In this manner the exhorbitancies of his Administration in ten Months time depriv'd him of his Dominion, which had been plac'd upon him by the Counsels of ill Men. These accidents happening thus in the City, all the Towns under the jurisdiction of *Florence*, took courage, and began to stand up for their liberty; so that in a short time *Arrezzo*, *Castiglione*, *Pistoia*, *Volterra*, *Colle St. Gimignano* rebell'd, and the whole Territory of *Florence* (after the example of its Metropolis) recover'd its freedom. After the Duke and his Creatures were remov'd, the XIV chief Citizens, and the Bishop, consulting together, thought it better to pacify the People with Peace, than to provoke them again by War; and therefore pretended to be as well pleas'd with their liberty as their own. They sent Embassadors therefore to *Arrezzo*, to renounce the Authority they had over them, and to enter into an alliance of amity with them, that though they might not hereafter command them as Subjects, they might (upon occasion) make use of them as Friends. With the rest of the Cities, they made as good terms as they could, retaining amity with them all. This resolution being prudently taken, succeeded very happily; for in a few months *Arrezzo*, and all the other Towns, return'd to their Obedience; and it is frequently seen, to decline, or renounce things voluntarily, is the way to gain them more readily, and with less danger and expence, than to pursue them with all the passion and impetuosity in the world. Affairs abroad being compos'd in this manner, they apply'd themselves to a settlement at home, and after some debates and alterations betwixt the Nobility and the People, it was concluded, the third part of the *Signoria* or Senate should consist

The Duke expell'd.

His Character.

of

of the Nobility, and half the other Magiſtracies to be executed by them. The City (as is ſaid before) was divided into ſix parts, out of which ſixth, ſix *Signori* were choſen, (one out of every ſixth) only by accident now and then their number was increas'd to XII or XIII, and reduc'd it again to ſix afterwards; at length they reſolv'd to reform in that particular, either becauſe the *Seſti* or ſixths were ill diſtributed, or elſe (deſigning more Authority to the Nobility) they thought it convenient to increaſe the number of the Senators. Hereupon they divided the City into Quarters, and in every Quarter, three *Signori* were created, to ſuperinſpect it. The *Gonfaloniere della Juſtitia*, and *Gonfalonieri* of the Popular Companies, were laid aſide, and inſtead of them they created XII *Buon-Huomini*, and VIII *Conſiglieri*, four of each ſort.

New Reformation.

The Common-wealth being ſettled in this method, might have continued quiet and happy, had the Grandees been contented to have fram'd it themſelves to ſuch modeſty of Converſation as is requiſite in a Civil Government. But their practices were quite contrary; when they were but private Perſons, no body was good enough to be their Companions; and being in Office, ſcarce any too good to be their Subjects, every day producing new inſtances of their Arrogance and Pride, inſomuch that the People were exceedingly troubl'd, to conſider with what impatience and fury they had remov'd one Tyrant to make room for a thouſand. In this manner things ſtood at that time, the inſolence of one ſide, and the indignation of the other fermenting to that degree, that the Chief of the People (complaining of the Enormity of their Great ones, and their haughtineſs to the People and to the Biſhop) deſir'd that he would be an inſtrument to reſtrain the Grandees to their ſhare in the other Offices, and effect that the Senate might conſiſt only of the People. The Biſhop was naturally a good Man, but eaſie and unconſtant; from that unconſtancy of temper it was, that his Aſſociates firſt wrought upon him to favour the Duke of *Athens*, and afterwards perſuaded him againſt him: in the late Reformation he appear'd highly for the Nobility, now upon the inſtance and ſollicitation of the Popular Citizens, he was as earneſt for the People; and ſuppoſing to have found the ſame irreſolution in other People, as was eminent in himſelf, he fancy'd himſelf able to prevail with the Nobility to conſent. Hereupon convoking the XIV (who were as yet in poſſeſſion of their Authority,) with the beſt language he could uſe, he exhorted them to reſign the dignity of the Senate to the People, if they bare any reſpect to the tranquility of the City, or their own ſafety and preſervation. But theſe Words wrought a contrary effect in the minds of the Nobility, *Ridolpho de Bardi* reprehending him very ſmartly, upbraided the Levity and Treachery of his behaviour with the Duke, and concluded at laſt, that the Honours and Imployments they were in, they had acquir'd with hazard, and would defend them with the ſame; and in this ſquabble he and his Brethren left the Biſhop, and went to the reſt of the Nobility to communicate with them. The People were made acquainted with their anſwer on the other ſide, and whilſt the Grandees were providing what ſtrength they could for the defence of their Senators, the Commons thought it no time to attend for Orders, but ran immediately to their Arms, and with them to the Palace, calling out to the Nobility to renounce. The noiſe and tumult were great; the *Signori* found themſelves forſaken; for the Grandees finding the People univerſally in Arms, durſt not appear, but kept themſelves cloſe at home as obſcurely as they could: whereupon the Popular Senators, endeavouring to pacifie the People, alledg'd that they were honeſt and good Men, and prevail'd (though with great difficulty) that they might be ſent ſafe to their houſes. The Senators of the Nobility being diſmiſs'd, the Office was taken away from the four Grand Counſellors, and transferr'd upon XII of the People, and the eight Popular Senators which remain'd. They reſtor'd the *Gonfaloniere della Juſtitia*, and XVI *Gonfalonieri* of the Companies of the People, and reform'd all Counſels in ſuch manner that the Government remain'd entirely in the People. When thoſe exorbitances happen'd, there was a great ſcarcity in the City, which occaſion'd the diſcontents both of Nobility and People (the People for want of Victuals, the Nobility for want of Command) and gave encouragement to *Andrea Strozzi* to uſurp upon their liberty. *Andrea* ſelling his Corn at a cheaper rate than his Neighbours, had great reſort of poor People to his Houſe, which he obſerving, mounted on Horſeback one morning, with ſeveral of the Rabble at his heels, he cry'd out to the reſt to take Arms, and in a few hours he got together more than 4000 Men, with whom he march'd to the Palace of the Senate, and demanded to have it open'd: but the Senators partly by threatning, and partly by force, diſengag'd themſelves of them, and afterward, when they were gone, frighted them ſo with their Proclamations, that by little and little they diſſolv'd, and went every Man to his Home, and left *Andrea* alone to eſcape as he could. Though this accident was raſh, and had the common end of ſuch deſperate attempts, yet it gave no little hopes to the Nobility of prevailing againſt the People, ſeeing the Refuſe and Raſcality of the City had an animoſity againſt them,

The Nobility depos'd.

them. That they might not ſlip ſo fair an occaſion, it was reſolv'd that they ſhould fortify themſelves with their Aſſiſtance (if they could gain it) and recover by force, what by injuſtice was taken from them. And ſo bold they grew in their confidence of Victory, that they began to provide Arms publickly, to fortify their Houſes, and ſend to their Friends in *Lombardy* for Help and Supplies. The People and their Senators were as buſie on the other ſide, they provided themſelves with what Arms they could get, and ſent to the *Saneſi* and *Perugini* for Relief. The Auxiliaries on both ſides being arriv'd, the whole City was immediately in Arms. The Nobility had poſted themſelves in three places on this ſide the River *Arnus*, at the Palace of the *Cavicciulli* near *S. John's*; at the Palaces of the *Pazzi*, and *Donati* near *S. Piero Maggiore*; and the Palace of the *Cavalcanti* in the new Market: thoſe of the Nobility who were on the other ſide of the River, had fortified the Bridges and Streets which were in the way to their Houſes. The *Nerli* poſſeſs'd themſelves of the *Ponte alla Carraia*; the *Freſcobaldi* and *Mannelli*, of *S. Trinita*; the *Roſſi* and *Barde* were upon their guard at the old Bridge, and the *Rubaconte*. The People in the mean time form'd themſelves into a poſture under the *Gonfalone della Giuſtitia*, and the Enſigns of the People, and being drawn up in array, it was thought beſt immediately to fall on: the firſt that march'd were the *Medici* and *Rondinelli*, who aſſaulted the *Cavicciulli* on that ſide which is towards the *Piazza de S. Giovanni*. The Service was very hot (great Stones being tumbled upon them from above, and vollies of Arrows ſent liberally among them from below) and continued three hours compleat; but the numbers of the People increaſing, and no relief like to get near them, the *Cavicciulli* ſubmitted to their multitudes, and ſurrendred. The People ſav'd the Houſe and the Furniture, only they took away their Arms, and commanded them to diſtribute and diſperſe themſelves into ſuch popular houſes as were their acquaintance and friends. The *Cavicciulli* being beaten from their Poſt, the *Pazzi* and *Donati* (being leſs powerful) were ſooner remov'd. The *Cavalcanti* were only remaining on that ſide of the River, yet more conſiderable than the other, both in reſpect of their numbers and ſituation. But they ſeeing all the *Gonfalonieri* advancing againſt them, whereas three of them only had overpower'd the reſt, ſurrendred like their Neighbours without any remarkable defence: and now three parts of the City were in the hands of the People, there was but one left in the power of the Nobility, but more difficult and inacceſſible, by reaſon it was ſo ſecure by the River *Arno*, the Bridges and Avenues were of neceſſity to be clear'd before any good could be done, and they (as is ſaid before) were abundantly provided. The firſt of them that was aſſaulted was the old Bridge, which was as bravely defended, and the People repuls'd. Finding their further Attempts there, would be but in vain, they try'd what could be done at the *Ponte Rubaconte*; but finding their entertainment no better, they left four *Gonfaloni*, and ſome other Enſigns to block up thoſe Paſſes, and march'd with the reſt to the *Ponte alla Carraia*. The *Nerli* had the defence of that Quarter, and behav'd themſelves valiantly, yet their Bridge (as having no Towers) being weaker or elſe overlaid with the numbers of their Enemies, (which were much increas'd by the acceſſion of the *Capponi* and other Families about them) they were on every ſide oppreſs'd, forc'd from their Barricadoes, and conſtrain'd to retire. When they were defeated, they advanc'd againſt the *Roſſi*, and from them againſt the *Freſcobaldi*, overwhelming them both, the whole Populace beyond the River being come in to their aſſiſtance. The *Bardi* was the only party remaining, but that ſo obſtinately couragious, neither the fortune of their Comrades, the unanimity of the People againſt them, nor the impoſſibility of relief, could prevail with them to ſurrender, but they would rather die fighting, or ſee their Houſes pillag'd or burn'd, than ſubmitted themſelves quietly into the Hands of their Enemies: And they defended themſelves; for though many times they were aſſaulted, both at the old Bridge, and the *Ponte Rubaconte*, the People were alway repuls'd, and with conſiderable loſs. There was in old time a Lane to paſs from the *Via Romana*, betwixt the Palaces of the *Pitti*, to the Wall upon *S. George's-hill*: To this Lane the People ſent ſix *Gonfalonieri* with Orders to fall upon the *Bardi* behind, who purſued them ſo effectually, the *Bardi* were diſheartend, and the people prevail'd; thoſe of the *Bardi* who were appointed for the keeping of the Barricadoes, no ſooner hearing that their houſes were attack'd, but they quitted their Poſts, and ran in, in hopes to defend them. By this means the Barracadoes at the old Bridge were won, and the *Bardi* diſcomfitted, who (as many as could) betook themſelves to their heels, and were received by the *Quarateſi*, *Panzanſi*, and *Mozzi*. The People (eſpecially the baſer ſort) greedy of Prey, plunder'd their Houſes; demoliſh'd their Caſtles; and when they had done, burn'd them all with ſuch inhumanity, as the greateſt Enemy the City had would have been aſham'd to have committed. The Nobility being utterly ſubdued, the People took upon them the Government of the State; and becauſe it conſiſted of three ſorts (the more potent, the middle ſort, and the

The Nobility attempt to recover their Authority.

The People Arm againſt them.

the baſe) it was ordain'd that the more potent ſhould have the nomination of two Senators; the middle ſort of three, and the meaner of three. The *Gonfalonieri* to be choſen (*alternatim*) of the one and the other. Beſides this, all the Old Laws againſt the Nobility were reviv'd and put in force, and to weaken them the more, many of them were mingled with the Common People. The deſtruction of the Nobility was ſo great at this time, and their party ſo irrecoverably debilitated, that not daring to take Arms again againſt the People, they became puſilanimous and abject, which was the occaſion that *Florence* loſt not only its Gentry but its Generoſity alſo. From this depreſſion of the Grandees, the City continued quiet to the year 1353, in which interval happen'd the Famous Peſtilence (ſo eloquently celebrated by *Giovanni Boccacio*) in which there died in *Florence* above 96000 People. The firſt War the *Florentines* made, was againſt the *Viſconti*, being provok'd by the Ambition of the Archbiſhop, who at that time was Prince of *Milan:* which War was no ſooner finiſhed, but new Factions began in the City; for though the Nobility was ſo cow'd, and intimidated, there was no danger of them; yet fortune had her ways to create them new troubles by new and different diſſentions.

The Nobility utterly depreſs'd.

THE

THE THIRD BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF *FLORENCE.*

THE great and natural Animosities betwixt the People and the Nobility, arising from an ambition in the one to command, and an aversion in the other to obey, are the springs and fountains of all the Calamities incident to a City: and indeed there is scarce any thing dangerous or troublesome to a Common-wealth, but takes its original and nourishment from their diversity of Humour. This was it which kept *Rome* divided. This was it (if it be lawful to compare great Things with little) which kept *Florence* divided, though in each City with different effects. For, in *Rome*, the enmity betwixt the People and the Nobility was determined by Expostulation and Reason; in *Florence*, by the Sword. In *Rome*, those Things were settled and compos'd by Law, which, in *Florence* were scarce done by the slaughter and banishment of many of their best Citizens. *Rome* increased still in its Military Vertue; but that in *Florence* was utterly exhaust. From a primitive equality of its Citizens, *Rome* was brought to an immense equality: whereas *Florence*, on the contrary, from a vast inequality, was reduced to a strange equality. Which diversity of effects must have certainly proceeded from diversity in their designs. The People of *Rome* desired no more than to share and communicate with the Nobility in the great Offices of the City. The People of *Florence* not only desired, but fought and contended to have the Government to themselves, with perfect exclusion to the Nobility: and the desires of the *Romans* being more reasonable, there importunity was the more supportable by the Nobles, so that they condescended without coming to blows; and after some small controversie and dispute, it was concluded a Law should be made, by which the People should be satisfied, and their Dignities preserved to the Nobility.

On the other side, the demands of the People of *Florence* were extravagant and unjust; upon which score the Nobility preparing for the defence, their differences determined in banishment and blood: and the Laws which ensued were fram'd more to the advantage of the Victor, than the benefit of the Publick. Hence it proceeded, that the success of the People in *Rome*, rendred that City more potent and considerable; for the People being admitted to the administration of the Magistracy, Armies, and Empire, equally with the Nobles, they became inspir'd with the same Vertue and Magnanimity as they: and as their Vertue increased, their Power increased with it.

But in *Florence* the People prevailing, divested the Nobility of their Authority; and if they had a mind to recover it, it was necessary by the irconversation and behaviour not only to be, but to profess themselves like the People. And this was the cause of the changing

their Arms, the variation of their Titles, and Families, which was frequent in thoſe times among the Nobility, to recommend them to the Commons, and make them paſs amongſt them: ſo that the Eminency of their Arms, and the Generoſity of their minds, (for both which the Nobility was formerly famous) was ſpent and expir'd, and not to be reviv'd in the people, where the leaſt ſpark of it was not to be found; which rendered *Florence* every day more abject and baſe. And whereas *Rome*, tranſported with its own Vertue, grew to that height of Pride, that it could not ſubſiſt longer without a Prince; *Florence* was reduced to that paſs, that a wiſe Legiſlator might have form'd the Government according to what ſcheme and model he pleaſed. All which, by peruſing of the preceeding Books, will be obvious to any body. Having ſhewn therefore the Foundation of *Florence*; the Original of its Liberty; the Occaſion of its Diſſention; and how the Factions of the Nobility and People concluded with the Tyranny of the Duke of *Athens* and the deſtruction of the Nobility: it remains now, I ſhould diſcourſe of the Emulations betwixt the people and the multitude, and ſeveral accidents which they produced.

Emulation betwixt the middle and the meaner ſort of people.

The power of the Nobility being depreſs'd, and the War with the Arch-Biſhop of *Milan* at an end, there appeared no reſpect of future contention in *Florence*: But the ill fate of our City, the ill conduct of their Affairs, ſuffered a new Emulation to ſpring up (betwixt the Families of the *Albizi* and *Ricci*) which produced as great diviſion in the Town, as was at firſt betwixt the *Buondelmonti* and the *Uberti*, and afterwards betwixt the *Cerchi* and *Donati*. The Popes (who had then their reſidence in *France*) and the Emperors who reſided in *Germany*, to make good their reputation in *Italy*, had many times, upon ſeveral occaſions, ſupplied us with multitude of Soldiers of all Nations, *Engliſh*, *Dutch*, and *Britains*. The Wars ended, and they out of pay, being Soldiers of Fortune, they were conſtrain'd to make bold ſometimes with one Prince, and ſometimes with another; and force them to contribution. In the year 1353, it happened one of the Companies came into *Tuſcany* (under the Command of Monſieur *Real* of *Provence*) and put the whole Country into a fear: whereupon the *Florentines* not only made publick proviſion of men, but ſeveral private Citizens (and the *Albizi* and *Ricci* among the reſt) furniſhed themſelves with Arms for their proper defence. There was a mortal hatred betwixt thoſe two Families, each of them aſpiring at the Government, and conſpiring the deſtruction of the other. However as yet they were not come to Hoſtility; only they claſh'd, and interfer'd in their Counſels, and in the executions of the Magiſtracy. But upon this occaſion, the City being arm'd, there happen'd a quarrel, by accident, in the old Market-place; to which the People, that were near, flock'd, as they do on all ſuch occaſions. To the *Ricci* it was reported the *Albizi* had fallen upon ſome of their Family. To the *Albizi*, that the *Ricci* were come out in defiance of them. Hereupon the whole City got together; and no ſmall difficulty it was to the Magiſtrate to reſtrain either of their Families, or to put an end to a Conflict which was begun by chance, without the fault or contrivance of either. This accident, though meerly contingent, reviv'd their animoſity, and put them both upon deſigns of increaſing their Parties. And becauſe, by the ruine of the Nobility, the Citizens were reduced to ſuch an equality, that the Magiſtrates were become more venerable than formerly; they reſolved both of them to advance their intereſt rather by ordinary means, than private violence. We have declar'd before, how, after the Victory of *Charles* the Firſt, the *Guelfs* were created Magiſtrates; and great authority given them over the *Ghibilin* Faction: which authority and preheminence, time, accident, and their new diviſions had ſo far enervated, that the *Ghibilins* were grown into the Government, and exerciſed the principal Offices as well as the *Guelfs*. *Uguccione de Ricci* being at that time the Head of that Family, prevail'd to have the Laws againſt the *Ghibilins* renewed: to which Faction, it was ſuppos'd by many, the *Albizi* were inclin'd; whoſe Original being anciently from *Arezzo*, they tranſplanted from thence, and ſettled in *Florence*: ſo that *Uguccione* deſign'd by the renovation of thoſe Laws, to render that Family incapable of any great Office; providing thereby, that it ſhould be criminal for any perſon deſcended from the *Ghibilins*, to exerciſe the Magiſtracy. This practice of *Uguccione* was diſcovered to *Piero*, Son of *Philippo de gli Albizi*, who reſolved to connive at it; preſuming he ſhould declare himſelf a *Ghibilin*, if he oppoſed it. Theſe Laws, though renewed by the prevalence and ambition of the *Ricci*, ſubſtracted nothing from the reputation of the *Albizi*, but were the foundation of many miſchiefs. Nor indeed can a Republick make any Law ſo pernicious, as a Law of *Retro*-ſpection. *Piero* having rather promoted, than reſiſted thoſe Laws, that which his enemies intended as an impediment, proved a means and occaſion of his preferment: for, being made the chief perſon to *ſuper*-inſpect the execution of thoſe Laws, he exerciſed more authority than before; and became the only favourite of the Faction of the *Guelfs*. And,

becauſe

becauſe in theſe Laws there was no definition of a *Ghibilin*, nor no Magiſtrate deputed to diſcover them, they were of little importance; only the Captains were appointed to inquire them out, and to admoniſh them, that they were not to take the Magiſtracy upon them; if they did, they ſhould be liable to a penalty. Whereupon, thoſe who were afterwards incapacitated for the Magiſtracy, were called *Ammoniti*. But, at length, the Captains growing bold and audacious in their office, without any regard whether they were conſcious or not; they admoniſhed who they pleaſed, as their avarice or animoſity directed them. The *Ammoniti*.

So that from the year 1357, (in which this Law was renew'd) to the year 1366, there were more than 200 Citizens admoniſhed. By which means, the Captains, and the Faction of the *Guelfs* were grown great and conſiderable; eſpecially *Piero de gli Albizi*, *Lapo da Caſtiglionochio*, and *Carlo Strozzi*, for the fear of being admoniſhed, made all people reſpect them. And, though the inſolence of their proceedings diſguſted many more, yet none look'd upon it with ſo much indignation as the Family of the *Ricci*, who had been the occaſion of that diſorder, which was not only like to be the ruine of the Common-wealth, but the promotion and advancement of their Enemies, quite contrary to what they deſign'd. *Uguccione* therefore (being one of the Senate, to put an end to thoſe inconveniences which he by accident had created) obtain'd a new Law; that to the ſix Captains, three more ſhould be added; two of them to be choſen out of the inferior Mechanicks: and prevail'd that the *Ghibilins* ſhould not be convicted but by XXIV of the *Guelfs*, deputed particularly to that office. For the time, theſe Laws in ſome meaſure tempered the exorbitance of the Captains, ſo as their admonitions loſt much of their terror; and if any, they were but few that were admoniſhed. Notwithſtanding the emulation betwixt the *Albizi* and *Ricci* continued; their leagues, practices, and conſultations going on with more eagerneſs, as their fury ſuggeſted. In this diſtraction the City continued from the year 1366, to the year 1371; at which time the *Guelfs* recovered their power.

In the Family of the *Buondelmonti*, there was a Gentleman called *Benchi*; who for his Gallantry in the Wars againſt the *Piſans*, was preferr'd to be one of the people; and by that means qualified to be a Senator. But when he expected to be admitted into the Senate, a Decree was made, that no perſon of Noble Extraction, that was become one of the people, ſhould be received into the Senate. This Decree was highly offenſive to *Benchi*, who, upon conſultation with *Piero de gli Albizi*, reſolv'd with his admonitions to depreſs the meaner ſort of the people, and make themſelves Governours of the City. And indeed, by his influence upon the Nobility, and *Piero*'s upon the wealthieſt of the Citizens, the Faction of the *Guelfs* began to grow more conſiderable: for with their new models and regulations they ordered things ſo, that the Captains and XXIV Citizens were wholly at their diſpoſing; their admonitions exerciſed with as much audacity as formerly; and the houſe of the *Albizi* (being head of that Faction) increaſed exceedingly. The *Ricci* in the mean time were not behind-hand in uſing all their intereſt and friends to obſtruct their deſigns; ſo that every one lived in great apprehenſion, as fore-ſeeing their deſtruction was approaching. Whereupon many Citizens out of affection to their Country aſſembled in *S. Piero Scheraggio*; and having diſcourſed of their diſorders among themſelves, they went afterwards to the Senate, to whom one of the moſt eminent among them, made this harrangue.

The Citizens Oration to the Senate.

Moſt Magnificent Lords; We have many of us doubted, whether to aſſemble by private order, (though upon publick occaſion) might not be offenſive, and render us remarkable for our preſumption, and puniſhable for our ambition. But when we conſidered, that daily, without the leaſt caution or regard, many Citizens do meet, and conferr; not for any benefit to the Common-wealth, but in purſuit of their own private deſigns: We preſum'd, that if they were permitted to meet, and conſpire againſt the peace of their Country, without diſpleaſure to your Lordſhips, thoſe whoſe deſign was nothing but its preſervation and proſperity, needed not to fear your reproof. If therefore we have not incurr'd your Lordſhips diſfavour, we are not much ſollicitous what others judge of us, becauſe we find they are as indifferent what we think of them. The love we bear to our Country, moſt Magnificent Lords, was that which aſſembled us at firſt, and now preſents us before you, to remonſtrate our diſtractions; (which, though too great, encreaſe daily upon our hands,) and to offer our utmoſt aſſiſtance to remove them. How difficult ſoever their Enterpriſe may appear, we cannot deſpair of ſucceſs; if laying aſide private reſpects, you would be pleaſed with publick force to exert your authority. The corruption of their Cities in Italy, *has vitiated ours: for ſince* Italy *freed it ſelf from the yoke of the Empire, all the Towns (wanting their former reſtraint) flew out into extreams, and ordain'd Laws and Governours, not as free men, but as people divided into Factions. From this Fountain all our miſeries, all our diſorders do ſpring. In the firſt place, no friendſhip nor integrity is to be found among the Citizens, unleſs among thoſe whoſe wicked-*

wickedneſs makes them faithful, having been formerly engaged together in ſome villainous action, either againſt their Neighbour, or Country. Religion, and the fear of God, is utterly extinguiſhed. Promiſes and Oaths are binding no farther than they are profitable; and uſed not for a tye, but a ſnare, and as a means to facilitate their cheats, which are always more honourable, by how much their ſucceſs is leſs difficult and dangerous. Hence it is, that vitious and miſchievous men are commended for their induſtry; and good men, which are innocent and quiet, are reckoned for ſots. And certainly, as there is no ſort of corruption but may be found in Italy, ſo there are no ſort of people more unhappily adapted to receive it. The young men are idle; the old men laſcivious; all ſexes, all ages, all places full of licentious brutality, above the correction of the Laws. Hence ſprings that avarice among the Citizens; and that ambition, not of true glory, but of diſhonourable preferment; which, being accompanied with hatred, enmity, ſchiſm, and diſſention, are commonly followed by executions, baniſhments, affliction of good men, and exaltation of evil: for good men depending upon their innocence, and not looking abroad for any thing extraordinary, either to advance, or defend themſelves, do too often miſcarry without either, and become the ſad objects of the cruelty of Uſurpers. This creates inclination to parties, and increaſes their power; ill people ſiding for covetouſneſs, ambition, revenge, or ſome other ſiniſter end; and good people for fear: and that which renders our condition more deplorable, is, to behold the Contrivers and Ringleaders of all, (as if a word could make them innocent, and conſecrate the iniquity of their actions) gilding, or rather decking over their ill deſigns with ſome illuſtrious Title: for, being all enemies to Liberty, let them pretend as they pleaſe, either to defend an Optimacy, or Populacy, the reſult muſt be deſtruction: for the fruit they expect from their Victory, is not the honour of having delivered their Country, but the ſatisfaction of having maſtered their Enemies, and uſurped the dominion to themſelves: and being arrived at that height, what is there ſo unjuſt, what is there ſo cruel, what is there ſo ravenous as they? Henceforward Laws are made, not for publick benefit, but their private advantage; henceforward, War, and Peace, and Amity is concluded, not for common honour, but particular humour. And if the other Cities of Italy are repleat with theſe diſorders, ours is much more: Our Laws, our Statutes, and Civil Ordinances, are made according to the ambition and capricio of the Conqueror; and not according the true intereſt of People that would be free: whence it follows, that one Faction is no ſooner extinguiſhed, but another ſucceeds: for that City which would maintain it ſelf by Faction rather than by Law, can never be quiet: when one party prevails, and depreſſes its rival beyond the power of oppoſition, it ſub-divides of neceſſity, and falls out with it ſelf; and then all goes to wrack, the people not being able to defend themſelves with thoſe private Laws which were made at firſt for their preſervation. That theſe things are true the ancient and modern diſſentions in our own City can ſadly demonſtrate. When the Ghibilins were deſtroyed, it was every man's judgment the Guelfs would have lived honourably and quietly a long time after: and yet it was not long before they divided into the Factions of the Neri and Bianchi. When the Bianchi were over-powered, new parties aroſe, and new troubles attended them; ſometimes fighting in behalf of the Exiles, and ſometimes quarreling betwixt the Nobility and the People: and (to give that to others, which either we could not, or would not poſſeſs quietly our ſelves) committing our Liberty ſometimes to King Robert, ſometimes to his Brother, and at laſt to the Duke of Athens; never fixing or repoſing in any Government; as not being agreed to live free, nor contented to be ſervile. Nay, ſo much was our State diſpos'd to diviſion, that rather than acquieſce in the adminiſtration of a King, it proſtituted it ſelf to the regiment of an Agobbian, of mean and ignominious extraction. The late Duke of Athens cannot be mentioned with any honour to this City; yet his inſolence and tyranny may make us wiſer for the future. Being in Arms at his expulſion, we fell to it among our ſelves, and fought with more fury one againſt another, than we had ever done before; till at length the Nobility was overcome, and at the mercy of the People: and it was the general opinion (their inſupportable pride and ambition being taken down) there could be no more faction or troubles in Florence: but we have found to our coſt, how falſe and fallacious man's judgment is: The pride and ambition of the Nobility was not extinct, but tranſmigrated into the People; who, by degrees, grew as impatient for authority as they; and having no other way to attain it, but by domeſtick diſſention, they reviv'd the obſolete names of Guelfs, and of Ghibilins; which it had been happy for this City never to have known. And, that nothing which is humane, may be perpetual and ſtable, it is the pleaſure of the Heavens that in all States or Governments whatſoever, ſome fatal Families ſhould ſpring up for their ruine and deſtruction. Of this, our City can afford as many, and as lamentable inſtances

ſtances as any of her neighbours, as owing its miſeries not only to one or two, but ſeveral of thoſe Families: as firſt, the Buondelmonti *and* Uberti; *next, the* Donati *and the* Cerchi; *and now, the* Ricci *and* Albizi, *(a ſhameful and ridiculous thing.) We have not enumerated our diviſions, nor deduc'd our ill cuſtoms ſo high, to upbraid or to diſcourage you by them; but rather as a memorial of their cauſes, to ſhew that they are in our memory as well as yours; and to exhort you by their example, not to be diffident or timerous in correcting them. For in thoſe days the power of the Nobility was ſo great, and their alliances ſo conſiderable; the Laws and Civil Magiſtrates were too weak to reſtrain them: but now the Emperor having no power, the Pope no influence, all* Italy, *and particularly this City, reduc'd to ſuch a parity, as to be able to govern our ſelves; where is the difficulty? What impediment remains, why this Common-wealth (in ſpight of all examples to the contrary) may not only be united, but reform'd and improv'd by new Laws and Conſtitutions, were your Lordſhips diſpoſed to create them? To which good work, we do moſt humbly importune you, not out of private paſſion, ſo much as publick compaſſion for our Country. Our corruption is great, and 'tis you only can correct the rage, and expel the contagion that ſpreads and luxuriates among us. The diſorders of our Anceſtors are not imputable to the nature of the men, but to the iniquity of thoſe times; which being now altered, gives this City fair hopes, by the inſtitution of better Laws, to better its fortune; whoſe malignity is eaſily to be overcome by a prudent reſtraint of ambition; a ſeaſonable inhibition of ſuch cuſtoms as propagate Faction, and a diſcreet election and adherence to ſuch things as are compatible with our freedom. And better it is you do it now legally of your ſelves, than by deferring it, to divert that office upon the people, and make them do it by force.*

The *Signori* mov'd then by theſe arguments, (which they had fram'd to themſelves before) and by authority and encouragement afterwards, commiſſionated LVI Citizens to ſuperintend for the ſafety of the Common-wealth. True it is, many men are more proper to preſerve good Laws, than to make them; and theſe Citizens imploy'd themſelves more in extirpating the preſent Factions, than providing againſt new; by which means they ſucceeded in neither: for not taking away the occaſion of the new; and one of the preſent Factions being more potent than the other, it could not be done without great danger to the Common-wealth. However, they depriv'd three of the Family of the *Albizi*, and as many of the *Ricci*, of all Magiſtracy (unleſs of the *Guelfiſh* party) for three years; in which number, *Piero de gli Albizi*, and *Uguccione de Ricci* were two. They prohibited all Citizens for the coming into the Palace, unleſs the Senate was ſitting. They decreed, that in caſe of battery or unjuſt interruption in the poſſeſſion of their Eſtates, it ſhould be lawful to accuſe any man (though of the Nobility) to the Council, and to make them anſwer to their Charge. Theſe Laws had greater reflection upon the *Ricci* than the *Albizi*; for though they were equally intended, the *Ricci* ſuffered moſt by them: *Piero* indeed was ſhut out of the Palace of the *Signori*; but at the Palace of the *Guelfs* (where his authority was great) his entrance was free; and though he and his Comrades were forward enough in their admonitions before, they were much forwarder now, and new accidents occurr'd to make them yet worſe. *Gregory* XI. was Pope at that time, whoſe reſidence being at *Avignon*, he governed *Italy* by Legates, (as his Predeceſſors had done before him.) Theſe Legates being proud and rapacious, had brought great calamity upon ſeveral of the Cities. One of theſe Legates being at that time in *Bologna*, took the advantage of a ſcarcity which was in *Florence*, and reſolved to make himſelf Lord of *Tuſcany*; to which end, he not only omitted to ſupply the *Florentines* with proviſions, but to deprive them utterly of all other relief as ſoon as the Spring appeared, and gave opportunity for his motion, he invaded them with a great Army, hoping they would be eaſily conquered, becauſe they were both famiſhed, and diſarm'd: and poſſibly his deſign might have taken, had not his Army been mercenary, and corrupt; for the *Florentines* having no other weapons to defend themſelves, betook themſelves to their bags, and paid his Army 130000 *Florins* to draw off. To begin a War, is in any man's power; but, alas! no body can end one. This War was commenc'd by the ambition of the Legate, but proſecuted by the indignation of the *Florentines*; who entred into an immediate League with Monſieur *Barnabo*, and all the Cities which were at enmity with the Church. To manage it, they created eight Citizens, whom they inveſted with abſolute authority of proceeding without appeal, and diſburſing without account. This War againſt the Pope, though *Uguccione* was dead, reviv'd thoſe who had followed the fortunes of the *Ricci*, who in oppoſition to the *Albizi*, had favoured *Barnabo*, and appeared againſt the Church; and the rather, becauſe the VIII were all enemies to the *Guelfs*: whereupon *Piero de gli Albizi, Lapo da Caſtiglionchio, Carlo Strozzi*, and others, united to defend themſelves againſt their adverſaries. And while the eight great Citizens were imployed

New Reformation.

Gregory XI. holds his Reſidence at *Avignon*.

New Commiſſion for the management of the War.

ployed in the management of the War, and they in their admonitions, the War continued three years, till the death of that *Pope*. However, it was carried on with ſo univerſal ſatisfaction, that the Eight were continued yearly in their Office, and got the Title of *Santi*; notwithſtanding they had ſequeſtred the riches of the Churches, forc'd the Clergy to the execution of their Functions, and deſpiſed the cenſures of the *Pope*. So much did the Citizens at that time prefer the advantage of their Country before the quiet of their Conſciences: and ſo earneſt were they to make it appear to the Church, that, as when they were friends, they had power to defend it; ſo now being enemies, they were as able to diſtreſs it; having put all *Romagna*, *la Marcha*, and *Perugia*, into Rebellion. But, though they were able to maintain War, at this rate, againſt the *Pope*, they could not ſo well defend themſelves againſt their Captains and Factions. The indignation and hatred the *Guelfs* had conceived againſt the Eight, augmented their inſolence; and they affronted them as well as the reſt of the chief of the Citizens. Nor was the arrogance of the Captains inferior to the inſolence of the *Guelfs*; they had made themſelves more formidable than the *Signori*; and men went with more awe and reverence to their Houſes, than to the Senators Palace: inſomuch, that not an Embaſſador was ſent to *Florence*, but he receiv'd audience from, and had particular commiſſion to the Captains. *Pope Gregory* being dead, this City had no more Wars abroad; yet, at home, it was in great confuſion: the imperiouſneſs of the *Guelfs* was grown inſupportable, and no way viſible to ſuppreſs them: it was judged therefore neceſſary to take Arms, and commit the ſuperiority to the deciſion of Fortune. On the *Guelfs* ſide there were all the ancient Nobility, and the greateſt part of the more powerful Citizens; of whom, as (we have ſaid) *Lapo*, *Piero*, and *Carlo* were the chief. On the other ſide, were all the inferior ſort of the People headed by the Eight, and aſſiſted by *Georgio Scali*, *Tomaſo Storzzi*, the *Ricci*, the *Alberti*, and the *Medici*. The reſt of the multitude (as it happens always in ſuch caſes) joyned with the Diſcontents. The power of their adverſaries ſeemed very conſiderable to the *Guelfs*; and their danger great, if any Senate ſhould prove their enemies, and go about to deſtroy them: deſirous to prevent it, they aſſembled together; where, examining the State and Condition of the City, they found the perſons which had been admoniſhed, were ſo numerous, that they had thereby diſobliged moſt of their Citizens and made them their enemies. They could propoſe no other remedy; but as they had degraded them of their honours, ſo to baniſh them the City, ſeize upon the Senators Palace by force, and conſtrain the whole Town to come over to their ſide, according to the example of the *Guelfs* their Predeceſſors; whoſe quiet and ſecuriry was to be attributed wholly to their baniſhing their adverſaries. As to the deſign, all of
1377. them agreed; but they differed about the time. It was in the year 1377, in the month of *May*, when *Lapo* conceiving it unſafe to defer; acquainted them that delays were dangerous, eſpecially to them; conſidering, that in the next Senate *Salveſtro de Medici* might be choſen *Gonfaloniere*, who was a known enemy to their Sect. *Piero de gli Albizi* was of another ſentiment, and thought it beſt to protract; in reſpect that more force would be neceſſary, which were not to be got together privately; and to raiſe them publickly, was to run themſelves into palpable danger. His judgment therefore was, that they ſhould have patience till *S. John's* day, which was at hand; at which time, in regard it was one of the greateſt Feſtivals, and great reſort would come to the City of courſe, they might convey in what numbers they pleaſed, without danger of diſcovery. And to obviate their apprehenſion of *Salveſtro*, he propoſed to have him admoniſhed; and if that would not do, to put the change upon him, by ſome fraud or artifice in the imborſation; and foiſt in ſome other of the Colledge of his quarter, to defeat him ſecurely of that Office. This laſt opinion being approved, it was reſolved to put off; though *Lapo* conſented unwillingly, urging, that delay was uncertain; that no time can, in all circumſtances, be convenient; and that he who expects a perfect opportunity, ſeldom attempts any thing; and when he does, it turns commonly to his own diſadvantage. However, they proceeded to admoniſh him, but could not hinder *Salveſtro*. And, for the change, the Eight had got an inkling of that, and took care to prevent it; ſo that *Salveſtro* was drawn for *Gonfaloniere* by *Alamanno de Medici*. Being of a Noble Popular Family, he could not endure that the People ſhould be oppreſſed by the power of a few great perſons; reſolving therefore with himſelf, to put a period to their inſolence: ſeeing he was favoured by the people, and back'd by ſeveral of the principal Citizens; he communicated his deſigns with *Benedetto Alberto*, *Tomaſo Strozzi*, and *Georgio Scali*; all of them concurring in the Plot, and ingaging their aſſiſtance. Upon this they form'd a Law privately, whereby the *Ordini della Giuſtitia* againſt the Grandees were reviv'd, the authority of the *Capitani di parte* retrench'd; and the *Ammoniti* readmitted to the Magiſtracy. And, becauſe it was beſt to propoſe and enact it at one time, if it were poſſible (for it was firſt to be preſented to the Colledges, and afterwards deba-

A Conſpiracy of the *Guelfs*.

The Conſpiracy defeated.

 ted

ted in the Councils,) *Salveſtro* being in his Office (which, for the time, is, at it were, Prince of the City) he cauſed a Colledge and Council to be called both together in one morning; and coming in perſon to the Colledge, (which were none of his friends) he propoſed the Law to them which he had prepared; but it was rejected as an innovation, and he could not prevail to have it paſs'd. *Salveſtro*, ſeeing himſelf defeated in his firſt practice to obtain it, pretended ſome neceſſity to go forth; and, without being perceiv'd, ſlip'd away to the Council; where, having placed himſelf ſo as he might be heard and ſeen by the whole Aſſembly, he told them as follows:

The Speech of *Salveſtro de Medici.*

That, being made Gonfaloniere, *he did not think he had been deſigned for the Cognizance and Determination of private Cauſes (which have their peculiar Judges) but to ſuperintend the State, to correct the inſolence of the Grandees, and to moderate and rectifie ſuch Laws as were found prejudicial, nay, deſtructive to the Commonwealth. That in both caſes he had been diligent to the utmoſt; and employ'd himſelf with all poſſible induſtry: But the perverſeneſs and malevolence of ſome men was ſo untractable, and contrary to his good deſigns; they did not only hinder him from perpetrating any thing for the benefit of the Publick; but they denied him their Counſel, and refuſed for to hear him. Wherefore, finding it was not in his power to be any way beneficial to his Country, he knew not for what reaſon, or with what confidence he ſhould continue in an Office which either he did not really deſerve, or of which he was thought unworthy by others. For this cauſe his intention was to retire and leave the People to the election of another, who might be more vertuous, or more fortunate than he.*

And having ſaid, he departed from the Council towards his own houſe. Thoſe of the Council, who were privy to the Deſign, and others, deſirous of novelty, raiſed a tumult thereupon; to which the Senators and Colledges immediately reſorted; and meeting their *Gonfaloniere*, they prevailed with him, partly with their authority, and partly with their intreaty, to return to the Council, which, by that time, was in great confuſion: many of the noble Citizens had been threaten'd, and injuriouſly treated; and, among the reſt, *Carlo Strozzi* had been taken by the Buttons, by an Artificer, and doubtleſly ſlain, had not the Standers-by interpoſed; and with ſome difficulty, ſaved him. But he which made the greateſt hubub, and put the City in Arms, was *Benedetto di gli Alberti*, who, from a window of the Palace, cry'd out aloud to the People, to Arm: Upon which the *Piazza* was fill'd with armed men immediately; and the Colledges did that out of fear, which they had denied upon requeſt. The Captains of the Parties had in the mean time, got together what Citizens they could, to adviſe what was to be done againſt this Decree of the Senate: But when they heard of the tumult, and underſtood what had paſſed in Council, they all of them ſlunk back to their houſes. Let no man that contrives any alteration in a City, delude himſelf, or believe that he can either ſtop it when he will, or manage it as he pleaſes. *Salveſtro*'s intention was to have procured that Law, and ſettled the City. But it fell out quite otherwiſe; for their humours being ſtirr'd, every man was diſtracted: the Shops ſhut up; the Citizens aſſaulted in their houſes: ſeveral removed their goods into the Monaſteries and Churches to ſecure them; all people expecting ſome miſchief at hand. The whole Corporation of the *Arts* met, and each of them made a *Syndic*. Hereupon the *Priori* called their Colledges, and were in Council a whole day together with the *Syndics*, to find out a way to compoſe their diſorders to the ſatisfaction of all Parties; but, being of different judgments, nothing was agreed. The next day the *Arts* came forth with Enſigns diſplaid; which the Senate underſtanding, and doubting what would follow, they called a Council to prevent the worſt; which was no ſooner met, but the tumult increaſed, and the Enſigns of the *Arts* march'd up into the *Piazza* with Colours flying, and ſtore of arm'd men at their heels. Thereupon to ſatisfie the *Arts*, and the multitude, and, if poſſible, to diſpel that cloud of miſchief which was impending, the Council gave general power (which, in *Florence* is called *Balia*) to the Senators, Colledges, the Eight, the Captains of the Parties, and the *Syndics* of the *Arts*, to reform the State as they ſhould think moſt advantagious for the Publick. Whilſt theſe things were in agitation, ſome of the Enſigns of the *Arts* joyning themſelves with ſome of the Rabble (being ſtimulated by certain perſons, who were deſirous to revenge themſelves of ſome late injuries which they had received from the *Guelfs*) ſtole away from the reſt; went to the Palace of *Lapo da Caſtaglionchio*, broke into it, plunder'd it, and burn'd it. *Lapo*, upon intelligence of what the Senate had done, in contradiction to the Orders of the *Guelfs*, and ſeeing the people in Arms, having no variety of choice, but either to hide, or to fly; he abſconded firſt in S. *Croce*, but afterwards fled away into *Caſentino*, in the diſguiſe of a Frier; where he was often heard to complain of himſelf, for having conſented to *Piero de gli Albizi*: and of *Piero* for having protracted their attempt upon the Government till S. *John*'s day. *Piero* and *Carlo Strozzi*, upon the

The *Balia.*

firſt

first noise of the tumult, hid themselves only, presuming (when it was over) they had relations and friends enough to secure their residence in *Florence*. The Palace of *Lapo* being burn'd, (mischiefs being more easily propagated than begun) several other Houses ran the same fate, either out of publick malice, or private revenge: and that the greediness and rapacity of their Companions might, if possible, out-do theirs; they broke up the Goals, and set the Prisoners at liberty: and, after this, they sack'd the Monastery of *Agnoli*, and the Convent *di S. Spirito*, to which many Citizens had convey'd much of their goods. Nor had the publick Chamber escap'd their violence, had not the awe and reverence of one of the *Signori* defended it; who being on horse-back, with some persons in Arms attending him, opposed himself, in the best manner he could, against the fury of the people; which being appeased in some measure, either by the authority of the *Signori*, or the approach of the night, the next day the *Balia* indemnified the *Ammoniti*, with proviso, that for three years they should not exercise any Magistracy in that City. They rescinded those Laws which were made in prejudice to the *Guelfs*. They proclaimed *Lapo da Castiglionochio*, and his Accomplices, Rebels: after which, new Senators were chosen, and of them, *Luigi Guicciardini* was made *Gonfalioniere*. Being all look'd upon as peaceable men, and lovers of their Country, great hopes were conceived the tumult would have ceased: notwithstanding, the Shops were not opened; the people stood to their Arms, and great Guards kept all over the City: so that the *Signori* enter'd not upon the Magistracy abroad, with the usual pomp, but privately within doors, and without any ceremony at all. These Senators concluded, nothing was so necessary nor profitable for the Publick, at the beginning of their Office, as to pacifie the tumult: whereupon, by Proclamation, they required all Arms to be laid down; all Shops to be opened; and all persons, who had been called out of the Country, to the assistance of any Citizen, to depart. They disposed Guards in several places of the Town; and order'd things so, that if the *Ammoniti* could have been contented, the whole City would have been quiet. But they not being satisfied to attend three years before they should be capable of Office, the *Arts*, in favour to them, got together again; and demanded of the Senate, that, for the future, no Citizen might be admonished as a *Ghibilin*, by either the Senate, the Colledge, the Captains of the Parties, the Consuls, or *Syndics* of any *Art* whatsoever: requiring likewise, that new imborsation might be made of the *Guelfs*, and the old one be burn'd. Their demands were presently accepted, both by the Senate and Counsels; supposing thereupon, their new tumult would have ceased. But those that are covetous, and impatient for revenge, are not to be satisfied with bare restitution. Such as desired disorder, to enrich and wreck themselves upon their enemies, persuaded the Artificers they could never be safe, unless many of their Adversaries were banished or destroyed. Which practices being remonstrated to the Senate, they caused the Magistrates of the *Arts*, and the *Syndics*, to appear before them, to whom *Luigi Guicciardini* the *Gonfalioniere*, spake in this manner:

Reformation again.

Luigi Guicciardini's Oration.

If these Lords, and my self, had not long since understood the fortune of this City; and observ'd, that its Wars abroad were no sooner determined, but it was infested with new troubles at home; we should have more admired, and more resented the tumults which have happened: But things that are familiar, carrying less terror along with them, we have born the late passages, with more patience; especially, considering we were not at all conscious to their beginning; and had reason to hope they would have the same end as former tumults have had upon our condescension to their great, and their numerous demands. But finding (to our sorrow) you are so far from composing your thoughts, or acquiescing in what has been granted, that you are rather exasperated, and conspire new injury against your fellow Citizens, and endeavour to banish them; we must needs say, the ignobleness of your proceeding provokes us to displeasure. And certainly, had we imagined, that in the time of our Magistracy, our City should have been ruined, either in siding with, or against you, we should have declined that honour, and freed our selves from it, either by banishment, or flight. But, supposing we had to do with people not utterly destitute of humanity, and void of all affection to their Country; we willingly accepted of the preferment, as hoping by the gentleness of our deportment, to be too hard for your ambition and violence. But we see now, by unhappy experience, the mildness of our behaviour, and the readiness of our condescensions, do but enhance and elate you, and spur you on to more dishonourable demands. We say not this to disgust, but to inform you: let others represent to you what will please; it shall be our way to remonstrate what is profitable. Tell me (upon your words) what is there more that you can justly desire of us? You proposed to have the Captains of the Parties divested of their Authority; it is done. You mov'd, the old Imborsations might be burn'd, and new ones decreed to supply them; we consented. You had a mind the Ammoniti *should be re-admitted to*

places of honour and trust; we granted it: Upon your intercession, we pardoned those who had burned houses, and robb'd Churches; and, to satisfie you, have sent several of our principal Citizens into Exile. To gratifie you, the Grandees are circumscrib'd with new Laws, and all things done that might satisfie you: What end therefore will there be of your demands? Or, how long will you abuse the liberty you enjoy? Do you not perceive, that we can be overcome with more patience, than you can subdue us? What will be the conclusion; or, whither will your dissentions hurry this poor City? Can you have forgot how Castruccio, *(an inconsiderable Citizen of* Lucca*) taking advantage of the divisions, possessed himself of it? Do not you still remember, that the Duke of* Athens, *from a private person, became your Lord and your Sovereign; and all from our own differences at home? Whereas, when we were united, the Arch-Bishop of* Milan, *nor the Pope himself, were able to hurt us; but were glad (after several years War) to lay down with dishonour. Why then will you suffer your own discords (in time of Peace too) to bring a City into slavery, which so many potent enemies, in time of War, were not able to captivate? What can you expect from your divisions, but servitude? What from the goods you have, or shall hereafter take violently from your neighbours, but poverty? The persons you plunder, are they, who, by our care and appointment, supply the City with all things; and if it be defeated of them, what can we do to sustain it? What-ever you gain, (being unjustly acquir'd) you can hardly preserve: from whence, famine and poverty must necessarily follow. These Lords therefore, and my self do command, and (if it be consistent with our Dignity) intreat, and beseech you, that you would compose your selves for this once, and be content with our past condescensions; or, if they be too little, and there remains still something to be granted, that you would desire it civilly, and not with the force and clamour of a tumult; and if your request be just, you will not only be gratified; but occasion taken away from wicked men, to ruine your Country, under your shelter and pretence.*

These words being true, had great influence upon the people; insomuch that they return'd their thanks to the *Gonfalonier*, acknowledged that he had behav'd himself like a good Lord to them, and a good Citizen to the City, and promised their obedience to what-ever he commanded. To break the Ice, the *Signori* deputed two Citizens for each of the chiefest Offices, to consult with the *Syndics* of the *Arts*, what, in order to the publick good, was most fit to be reform'd, and to report it to the Senate. But, whilst these things were transacting, a new tumult broke out, which put the City into more trouble than the former. The greatest part of the robbery, and late mischief, was committed by the rabble, and rascality of the people; and of them, those who had been most eminently mischievous, apprehended, when the greater differences were reconcil'd, they might be questioned, punished for the crimes they had committed, and (as it always happens) be deserted by those very persons who instigated them at first: to which was added, a certain hatred the Inferior sort of the people had taken against the richer Citizens, and the Principals of the *Arts*, upon pretence that they were not rewarded for the service they had done, with proportion to their deserts. For when, as in the time of *Charles* the First, the City was divided into *Arts*, every *Art* had its proper Head and Governour, to whose jurisdiction, (in Civil cases) every person in the several *Arts*, were to be subject. These *Arts* (as we said before) were originally but XII, afterwards they increased to XXI, and grew to that power and authority, that, in a few years, they ingrossed the whole Government of the City: and because, among them, some were more considerable, and some less; they came, by degrees, to be distinguished, and VII of them were call'd *Maggiori*, and XIV, *Minori*. From this division, and the other reasons aforesaid, proceeded the arrogance of the Captains of the Parties; for those Citizens who had anciently been *Guelfs*, (under whose Government those Offices were always preserved) did ever indulge the chief and better sort of the *Arts*; and discountenance the more inferior, and all that took their parts: hence it was, all the before-mentioned troubles and tumults were derived. But because, in the ordinary Companies and Corporations of the *Arts*, there were many trades (in which the meaner sort of people were imployed) of no distinct and peculiar Company, but were incorporated with other Trades, as the quality of their imployments made them fit; it fell out, that when they were not satisfied with their work, or any other ways injured by their Masters; they had no person to repair to for redress, but to the Magistrate of that Company of which they were Sworn; from whom, they conceived, they had not received that justice, which ought to have been done them. Of all Companies of the City, the Company of Clothiers was the greatest, and had most of these sort of people depending upon it; insomuch, that being the first in wealth and authority by the industry of its Members, it maintain'd (and does still) the greatest part of the multitude. The baser sort of people there-

New troubles.

fore (both of this Company, and the reſt) were highly incenſed upon the foreſaid occaſions; and being excited, by fear of correction, for the pillaging and firing of the Palaces, they met many times in the night, to diſcourſe of what was paſs'd; and to admoniſh one another of the danger they were in; and to animate and unite them, one of the moſt darring, and moſt experienced among them, made this Speech:

The Speech of a Plebeian.

Were it now to be conſidered, whether we were immediately to take Arms; to burn, and plunder the houſes of our fellow Citizens, and rob the Churches; I ſhould be one of thoſe who ſhould think it worthy of further debate, and perhaps, prefer harmleſs poverty before hazardous gain. But, ſince Arms are taken, many miſchiefs have been done; and much prize has been got; it is (in my judgment) moſt natural, to adviſe which way our gains are to be preſerved; and how we may beſt ſecure our ſelves againſt the ills we have committed. I am certainly of opinion, if no Man ſhould do you that ſervice, your own neceſſity would adviſe you. You ſee the whole City full of complaints, and indignation againſt us; the Citizens, frequent in their meetings; and the Senators perpetually with the Magiſtrate. Be confident, 'tis to deſign againſt us; to contrive new ways, and to contract new Forces to deſtroy us. It remains therefore upon us, to do two things; one is, to provide, that we be not puniſhed for our paſs'd offences: the other, that we may live with more liberty and ſatisfaction for the future. To juſtifie therefore our former miſdeeds, in my thoughts, it is convenient to increaſe them with new; and by the the artifice of redoubling our miſchiefs, our conflagrations, and robberies, to allure and ingage more companions to our Party. For, where many are guilty, none are puniſhed; though ſmall faults are revenged, great ones are generally rewarded; and where the diſeaſe is epidemical, few people complain; an univerſal calamity being always more ſupportable than a private. So then, to multiply our miſdeeds, is the readieſt way of obtaining our pardon, and prevailing for thoſe things which we believe conducive to our liberty: nor is there any difficulty to diſcourage us; it ſeems to me, the enterpriſe is not only eaſie, but certain; becauſe thoſe who ſhould oppoſe us, are divided, and rich their diviſions will give us the Victory; and their Riches (when we have got them) ſhall maintain it. Let not the antiquity of their blood diſmay you, (though objected ſo inſolently.) All men having the ſame original, are equally ancient; and nature has made no difference in their contexture: ſtrip them naked, you are as well as they: dreſs them in your rags, and your ſelves in their robes, and you will doubtleſs be the Nobles; for 'tis nothing but poverty and riches that diſcriminates betwixt you. It troubles me, to think, that there are many of you unquiet in your conſciences, for what you have done; and reſolved to be guilty of no more: if it be ſo, I was miſtaken in my judgment, and you are not the perſons I thought you. Neither conſcience, nor diſgrace, ought at all to deterr you; they that overcome, (let the means be what they will) are never troubled with the diſhonour: and, for conſcience, you ought not to be concern'd. Where the fear of famine, and death, and priſons, are ſo pregnant, there is no room for apprehenſions of Hell. Obſerve the ways and progreſs of the World; you will find the rich, the great, and the potent, arrive at all that wealth, and grandeur, and authority, by violence or fraud; and when once they are poſſeſſed, you will ſee with what confidence and ſecurity they gild over the brutality of their uſurpations, with the unjuſt (but glorious) title of acqueſts. Obſerve, on the other ſide, thoſe whoſe puſillanimity or ſottiſhneſs affrights them from thoſe courſes, what becomes of them? they are choak'd up and conſumed in ſervitude and poverty: honeſt ſervants, are perpetual ſervants; good men are always badly provided for; the bold and unſcrupulous, do ſooneſt free themſelves from bondage; and the moſt fraudulent and rapacious, from indigence and diſtreſs. God and Nature have laid every man's fortune before him; and we ſee men more naturally diſpos'd to rapine, than induſtry; to bad actions, than good. Hence it is, we devour one another; and he that can do leaſt, goes always by the worſt. Force, therefore, is to be uſed, when occaſion is given; and what fairer opportunity can be offered by Fortune? The Citizens are divided; the Senate irreſolute; the Magiſtrate frighted; ſo that before they can unite, and come to any reſolution, our work will be done, and we be either abſolute Princes of the City, or Maſters of ſuch Cantons, as will not only pardon us for what is paſs'd, but enable us to awe our enemies for the future. I confeſs, this reſolution is dangerous, and bold; but where neceſſity urges, boldneſs is prudence; and danger in great things, was never conſidered by men of the leaſt courage and gallantry. Thoſe enterpriſes which begin with danger, do end with reward; and men never free themſelves from one peril, but by adventuring a greater. Again, having priſons, and tortures, and death before our eyes, (as we have) it cannot but be more hazardous to ſtand ſtill, than to look out for ſecurity: in the firſt, our deſtruction is certain; in the other, contingent. How often have I heard you complain of the avarice of your ſuperiors; and the injuſtice of your Magiſtrates? Now, in your time,

time, not only to free, but to advance your selves into a capacity of retaliating, and giving them as much occasion of fearing you, as you have had of them. Time has wings, opportunity flies away; and when once pass'd, is never to be regain'd. You see our enemies are preparing, let us prevent their preparation: whoever begins first, is sure to prevail, to the ruine of their enemies, and exaltation of themselves. Go on therefore with courage, 'tis an enterprise will yield honour to many of us, but security to us all.

The designs of the People.

Though their own propensity was too much, this speech push'd the people forward, with more impetuosity, to mischief; so that after they had drawn together what company they were able, they concluded to take Arms, and oblig'd themselves, by oath, to relieve one another, when any of them should fall under the correction of the Magistrate. Whilst they were in this manner conspiring against the Government, the Senators had notice of it from one, and having caused one *Simone* to be apprehended, he confessed the whole plot, and that the next day was intended for a tumult. Whereupon, fore-seeing the danger they were in, they assembled the Colledges, and such Citizens as sided with the *Syndics* of the *Arts*, and laboured the preservation of the City. Before they could be got together, it was night: and the *Signori* were advised to consult with the *Consoli dell' Arti*, who agreed unanimously, that the whole City should Arm; and the *Gonfaloniere del Popolo*, draw all the Companies, the next morning, into the *Piazza*. At the time when the Citizens met, and *Simone* was upon the Rack, one *Nicolada Firiano* being in the Palace, to do something about the clock, returned with all speed to his house, put the whole neighbourhood into an uproar, and brought above a thousand arm'd men together into the *Piazza di Santo Spirito* in a moment. The alarm increasing, came to the rest of the Conspirators, who immediately took Arms; and in a short space, *San Piero Maggiore*, and *San Lorenza*, (as they had appointed before) were full of Arm'd men. The day being arriv'd, which was the 21st of *July*, in favour of the Senate, there were not above LXXX men appeared in their Arms, and none of the *Gonfalonieri*; for they having intelligence the whole City was in Arms, were afraid to stir out of their houses. The first party of the people which advanced to the *Piazza*, was that which had met at *San Piero Maggiore*; but the Forces which were drawn there before, did not remove. Not long after them, appeared the rest of the multitude, who, finding no resistance, with hideous noise, demanded their prisoners of the *Signori*; and not succeeding by threats, to gain them by force, they set fire to the Palace of *Luigi Guicciardini*, and burned it to the ground: whereupon, for fear of worse mischief, their prisoners were ordered to be delivered. When they had recovered their prisoners, they took the Standard *della Giustitia* from the *Effecutore*, burned many houses under it, and persecuted all people that they were angry with, whether upon publick, or private account; many Citizens, upon particular quarrels, conducting the tumult to the houses of their adversaries, it being sufficient, to cry out in the multitude, *To such an House, to such a Man*; or for him that carried the Standard, to direct it to such a place. They burned the Accounts and Books of the Company of the Clothing Trade; and after they had done mischief good store, that they might accompany their exorbitance with some laudable action, they made *Salvestro de Medici*, a Knight, and as many more of their Partners, as the whole number amounted to LXIV. among which, there were *Benedetto*, and *Antonio de gli Alberti*, *Tomaso Strozzi*, and several others; some of which, received their honour much against their wills. In which accident, one thing is more then ordinarily remarkable; that those persons, some of them, whose houses were burned, were the same day knighted by the same persons which had burned them; so unconstant are the people, and so small the distance betwixt their kindness and revenge; an experiment of which, was seen in their behaviour to *Luigi Guicciardini*, the *Gonfaloniere della Giustitia*. The Senators finding themselves abandoned by their Guards, by the chief of the *Arts*, and their *Gonfaloniere* themselves, were very much perplexed, no body coming in to their assistance, as they were commanded; and, of the XVI *Gonfaloni*, there was only the Company of the Golden Lion, and two more, which appeared, and they staid not long in the *Piazza*; for, not finding themselves followed by their Brethren, they also returned to their houses. The Citizens, on the other side, seeing the fury of the multitude uncontroulable, and the Palace of the *Signori* deserted, some of them kept close in their houses; others thrust themselves into the crowd, thereby to secure there own houses, and their friends; by which means, the numbers of the people were much increased, and the power of the Senate extreamly diminished. The tumult continued in this violence all day long; and, at night, there were above 6000 men together at the Palace of *Stephano*, behind the Church of S. *Barnaby*. Before day, they constrained the several *Arts* to send for their Ensigns; and having got them in the morning, they march'd with their Colours before them, to the Palace of the *Podesta*, who re-

The People rise again.

fusing to surrender; they fell upon it, and forced it. The Senate desirous to compose things another way, perceiving nothing was to be done by force, called three Members of their Colleges, and sent them to the Palace of the *Podesta*, who found, that the heads of the people had been already in consultation with the *Syndics* of the *Arts*, and some other considerable Citizens, to resolve what was fit to be demanded of the Senate: so that they returned in a short time to the Senate, with four Deputies from the people, and these following Proposals. That the Cloathing Trade might not, for the future, be subject to the Government of a foreigner. That three new Companies, or Corporations, should be erected; one to consist of Carders, and Diers; another of Barbers, Taylors, Shoemakers, and such other Mechanicks; and the third, of the more inferior Trades; out of which Companies, two should be chosen to sit in the Senate, and three to sit among the XIV which had the Government of the *Artiminori*, or inferior Trades. That the Senate should provide Halls for these new Companies, where they might meet, and consult about their affairs. That no person, of any of these Companies, should be constrained to pay any debt under fifty Duckets, for the space of two years. That no Interest should be paid out of the Banks, and only the Principal to be restor'd. That all prisoners, and condemn'd persons, should be discharged. That all the *Ammoniti* should be re-admitted to all honours. Many other things were demanded in behalf of their friends; and, on the contrary, as to their enemies, they insisted, that several of them might be imprisoned, and several admonished. To give perfection to all, it was necessary they should be ratified in the Council of the Commons; which was deferred till the next, because two Councils were not to be held in one day. In the mean time, the *Arts* seemed all of them to be content, and the people to be satisfied; having promised, as soon as their Laws and Demands were confirmed, they would retire to their houses. The next morning being come, and the Council of the Commons deliberating upon their demands; the voluble and impatient multitude were got together, and marching, with Ensigns displaid into the *Piazza*, with so obstreperous and dreadful a noise, as affrighted both the Council and Senate: whereupon, *Gueriante Marignouli*, one of the *Signori*, (induced more by fear than any private exception) went down, under pretence to secure the Gate below, and march'd off to his house. He could not, however, convey himself so privately away, but the Rabble discovered him, yet without any violence to him, only crying out, as he passed, that all the Senators should leave the Palace; if not, they would burn their houses, and knock their children on the head. By this time the Law they urg'd was concluded; the Senators returned to their Chambers; and the Council gone down, (not daring to go forth) were walking up and down the Court and the Cloisters, dispairing of the safety of the City, by reason of the brutishness and barbarity of the multitude, and the crossness or pusilanimity of those who might have either bridled or suppressed them. The *Signori* were likewise in no less doubt and confusion, seeing themselves not only forsaken by one of their own Members, but relieved by no body, neither with intelligence, nor supplies. Whilst they were in this hesitation, uncertain what they ought, or what they were able to do, *Tomaso Strozzi*, and *Benedetto Alberti* (prompted by private ambition, of being themselves the last of the Senators which should remain in the Palace, or else, because it was really their judgment) persuaded them to give way, to yield to the fury of the people, and retire privately, every man to his own house. This counsel being given by persons who had been Heads of the people, (though others seem to approve it) displeased *Alamanno Acciaivoli*, and *Nicolo de Bene*, exceedingly, who (recollecting their courage) made answer; That, if others of the Senate had a mind to depart, they would not hinder them; but, for their parts, till the expiration of their authority permitted them, they were resolved not to leave the Palace, but with the loss of their lives. This difference redoubled the horror of the Senate, and the rage of the people: insomuch, that the *Gonfaloniere*, chosing to resign his Office with shame, rather than retain it with danger, recommended himself to *Tomaso Strozzi*'s protection, who took him out of the Palace, and conducted him to his house: in like manner, the rest of the *Signori* departed one after another; and *Alamanno* and *Nicolo*, (who were so magnanimous before) lest they should be thought more valiant than wise, got out also, and returned like the rest; so that the Palace remained in the hands of the people, and the eight Officers for the administrations of War, who had not as yet laid down their Commands. When the people made their entrance into the Palace, the Ensigns of the *Gonfaloniere di Giustitia*, was carried by one *Michaele di Lando*, a Carder of Wooll. This *Michaele* (without shoes on his feet, and scarce cloaths on his back) being followed by a great rout, ran up to the top of the stairs; and being got within hearing of the place where the Senators sate, he turned himself about to the multitude, and said; *You see, Gentlemen, this Palace, and this City, is yours; how shall they be disposed of, or, what is your pleasure shall be done?*

The demands of the People.

Michaele di Lando.

To which, they universally replied, it was their pleasure he should be *Gonfaloniere*, and govern the City as he thought best. *Michaele* accepted the Office, being a prudent and sagacious Man, more obliged to Nature than Fortune; and the first thing he resolved, was, to compose the Tumults, and settle the City. To hold the People imployed, and gain time for the digestion of his designs, he commanded them abroad, in search of one *Ser Nuto*, (who had been intended for Provost Marshal by *Lapo da Castiglionochio*) and most of those who were about him, went away in his pursuit. To begin (then) his dominion with Justice, as he had acquired it by Grace, he caused Proclamation to be made, that no Man should dare to burn or steal any thing for the future; and to terrifie the more, he caused a Gallows to be set up in the *Piazza*: proceeding next to the reformation of the City, he turned out the *Syndics* of the *Arts*, and put new in their places; He deprived the *Signori*, and the Colleges of their Authority, and burned the Bags of their Office. By this time the People had found *Ser Nuto*, brought him to the Palace, tied him up to the Gallows by one of his legs, and every one that was about him, having torn off a piece, in a moments time, there was nothing of him to be seen, but one of his feet. On the other side, the *Otto della Guerra* (supposing the Government in them, upon the departure of the *Signori*) had designed new Senators to succeed them. But *Michaele* understanding it, sent to them to be gone out of the Palace, and to let them know, it should appear to all People, that he could govern *Florence* without their counsel or assistance. After this, he assembled the *Syndics* of the *Arts*; and created four new Senators out of the inferior sort of People; two for the better, and two for the worser Trades. Moreover, he divided the State into three parts; one of them to relate to the new *Arts*; another to the less; and the third to the greater. He gave to *Salvestro de Medici*, the revenue of the Shops upon the old Bridge; to himself, the *Podestaria* of *Empoli*; besides many other Acts of beneficence to several Citizens, and friends of all people, not so much for their own sakes, but that they might be always willing, and able to defend him. The People however, began to suspect that *Michaele* was partial to the better sort; and to discern that they had not so much interest in the Government, as would be necessary for their safety. Whereupon, push'd forward by their accustomed insolence, they took Arms again, and came marching, with their Colours flying, to the *Piazza*, in a bravado, requiring the Senators to come down to the *Ringheria*, and deliberate upon certain new Things they had to propose for their security and good. *Michaele* was sensible of their insolence, but (not to provoke them any farther, before he knew what they would have) he only blamed their manner of address; desired them to lay down their Arms, and that then, by fair means, they should obtain that, which did not stand with the Dignity of the Government to grant by constraint: with which answer, the People being highly incensed, they drew up at new S. *Maries*, against the Palace, and created eight Commissioners, with their Ministers and Dependants, to gain themselves reverence and reputation: so, as at that time, the City had two Tribunals; and were governed by two distinct Administrations. Among the Commissioners it was resolv'd, that eight Persons, to be chosen by the body of the *Arts*, should be always resident in the Palace, with the Senators, to give sanction to what ever the *Signori* resolv'd upon. They took from *Salvestro de Medici*, and *Michaele de Lando*, what ever in their former Councils they had conferred upon them; assigning several Offices, and Pensions, to many of their Friends, to support the Dignity of their Imployments. Having concluded, in this manner, among themselves; to make all the more valid, they sent two of their Members to the Senate, to demand their confirmation; otherwise, to let them know, that what they could not obtain by civil application, they were able to do by force. These two Commissioners delivered their message to the Senate with great confidence and presumption; upbraiding the *Gonfaloniere* by his Office, and other honours which he had received from them; and that, in return, he had most ungratefully behav'd himself towards them; and coming, at the end of their objurgation, to threaten him, *Michaele*, unable to indure so great insolence, (more suitably to the Majesty of his Place, than the Meanness of his Birth) resolved, by some extraordinary way, to correct such extraordinary impudence; and drawing his sword, he cut them very much, and caused them afterwards to be manacled and imprisoned.

This action of the *Gonfaloniere* was no sooner known, but it put all the multitude in a flame: and believing they should be able to gain that by violence which they could not compass without, they immediately to their Arms, and march'd round about the Palace, to find where, with most advantage, they might fall on. *Michaele*, on the other side, suspecting the worst, resolved to be before-hand, as judging it more honourable to fall upon them abroad, than to expect them within the walls, till they fell upon him, and forced him out of the Palace (as they had done his Predecessors) with great shame and dishonour. Gathering therefore together a great number of Citizens, (who having found their error)

were

were resorted to him; he marched out as strong as he could, on horseback, and advanced to fight them as far as new *S. Maria*.

Michaele overcomes the multitude.

The people (as I said before) were as forward as he; and marching about towards the Palace, to take their advantage, it happened, *Michaele* made his sally at the same time, and they missed one another. *Michaele* returning, found the people had possessed themselves of the *Piazza*, and were storming the Palace; whereupon, he charged them so smartly on the rear, that he brake them immediately; some of them he chaced out of the City: and forced the rest to throw down their Arms, and hide themselves. This victory being obtained, the tumult dissolved; and the City became quiet, and all by the single valour of the *Gonfalonier*; who for Courage, Generosity, and Prudence, was superiour to any Citizen of his time, and deserves to be numbred among the few Benefactors to their Country: for, had he been ambitious, or ill-disposed, the City had lost its liberty, and relapsed into greater tyranny than that in the time of the Duke of *Athens*. But his goodness would not admit a thought against the good of the publick; and his prudence managed things so, that many submitted to him, and the rest he was able to subdue.

These passages amazed the common people, and put the better sort of Artificers into an admiration of their own stupidity, who could not endure the grandeur of the Nobility, were now forced to truckle to the very skum of the people. When *Michaele* had this good fortune against the people, at the same time, new Senators were drawn, two of which were of so vile and abject condition, every body desired to quit themselves of so infamous a Magistracy. Whereupon, the first day of *September*, when the *Signori* made the first entrance upon their Office, the people being so thick, that the *Palaci* was full of arm'd men; there was a cry sent forth from them, that no Senator should be made out of the meaner sort of the people; and, in satisfaction to them, the Senate degraded the other two, (one of which was called *Tira*, and the other *Boraccio*) and, in their places, *Georgio Scali*, and *Francesco di Michaele*, were elected.

Afterwards they dissolved the Corporations of the meaner Trades, and of all their dependants; only *Michaele di Lando*, *Ludovico di Puccio*, and some few others were excepted. They divided the Magistracy into two parts; one for the greater, the other for the lesser sort of *Arts*. Only it was concluded, the Senate should contain five of the lesser *Arts*, and four of the greater; the *Gonfalonier* to be chosen sometimes out of one, and sometimes out of the other. This Constitution and Establishment, settled the City for a while: and although the Government was taken out of the hands of the people; yet, the Artificers of the meanest quality had more power than the popular Nobility, who were forced to comply, to satisfie the *Arts*, and divide them from the baser sort of people. This was much approved by those who desired the faction of the *Guelfi* (which had handled several of the Citizens with so great violence) might be depressed; among the rest which were advanced by this new model, *Georgio Scali*, *Benedetto Alberti*, *Salvestro de Medici*, and *Tomaso Strozzi* were made, as it were, Princes of the City. These proceedings exasperated the jealousies betwixt the popular Nobility, and the meaner sort of people, by the instigation of the *Ricci*, and *Albizi*; of which two parties, because we shall have frequent occasion to discourse (many sad and great actions happening afterwards betwixt them) we shall, for better distinction, call one of them the Popular, and the other the Plebeian Party, for the future.

The popular Faction distinguished from the Plebeian.

This Government continued three years, with frequent examples both of banishment and death: for those who were at the helm, knowing there were many male-contents both within the City, and without, lived in perpetual fear. They who were discontented within, attempted, or conspired every day something or other against the State. Those without, (having no restraint upon them) by means sometimes of this Prince, sometimes of this Common-wealth, raised several scandals both of the one side and the other. At that time, *Gionnozzo da Salerno*, General for *Carlo Durazzo*, who was descended from the King of *Naples*, happened to be at *Bologna*, attending a design, which, they said, *Durazzo* had undertaken against Queen *Giovanna*, at the instigation of the Pope, who was her mortal enemy. There were in *Bologna*, at the same time, several Exiles from *Florence*, who held strict intelligence both with Pope *Urban* and *Carle*: which was the cause, that those who governed in *Florence*, living in great jealousie, gave credit easily to the calumniations of all those Citizens that were suspected. During this general apprehension, news was brought to the Magistrate, that *Gionnozza da Salerno*, with the assistance of all those who were banished, was to march down with his Army against *Florence*; and that several in the City had ingaged to take Arms in his behalf, and to deliver up the Town. Upon this information, many were accused; in the first place, *Piero degli Albizi*, and *Carlo Strozzi* were named; and after them, *Capriano Mangioni*, *Jacopo Sacchetti*, *Donato*

nato Barbadori, Philippo Strozzi, and *Giovanni Anſelmi*; all which were ſecured, except *Carlo Strozzi*, who eſcaped; and (that no body might dare to take Arms for their reſcue) the Senate deputed *Tomaſo Strozzi*, and *Benedetto Alberti*, with a competent number of Soldiers, to ſecure the City. The Priſoners being examined, and their Charge and Anſwer compared, they were found, not Guilty, and the Captain refuſed to condemn them: hereupon thoſe who were their enemies, incenſed the people ſo highly againſt them, that, in a great fury, they forc'd the Captain to condemn them. Neither could *Piero de gli Albizi* be excuſed, either for the greatneſs of his family, or the antiquity of his reputation; he having a long time been the moſt fear'd, and the moſt reverenc'd Citizen in *Florence*. Whereupon, either ſome of his true friends (to teach him moderation in the time of his greatneſs), or ſome of his enemies (to check, and alarm him with the unconſtancy of fortune) at a great Treat which he had made for ſeveral of the Citizens, ſent him a ſalver of Comfits; among which a Nail was privately convey'd; which being diſcovered in the diſh, and view'd by the whole Table, it was interpreted as an admoniſhment to him, to fix the wheel of his fortune; for being now at the height, if its rotation continued, he muſt of neceſſity fall to the ground; which interpretation was verified firſt by his fall, and then by his death. After this execution the City remained full of confuſion, both Conquerors and Conquered being afraid: but the ſaddeſt effects proceeded from the jealouſie of the Governours, every little accident provoking them to new injuries againſt the Citizens, by condemning, admoniſhing, or baniſhing them the Town; to which may be added, the many new Laws and Ordinances which they made to fortifie their authority; which were executed with great prejudice to all ſuch as were ſuſpected by their party: for by them 66 were commiſſioned, with the aſſiſtance of the Senate, to purge the Common-wealth of ſuch people as they thought dangerous to the State. Theſe Commiſſioners admoniſhed 39 Citizens; ſeveral of the Populace; and debaſed many of the Nobles; and to oppoſe themſelves more effectually againſt foreign invaſions, they entertain'd into their pay an Engliſhman, call'd *John Aguto*, an excellent Officer, and one who had commanded in *Italy* for the Pope, and other Princes, a long time. Their alarms from abroad were cauſed by intelligence, that *Carlo Durazzo* was raiſing ſeveral Companies for the invaſion of the Kingdom of *Naples*; and the *Florentine* Exiles joyned with him in the Expedition; but to obviate that danger, they provided not only what force, but what money was poſſible; and when *Carlo* came with his Army to *Arezzo*, the *Florentines* being ready with forty thouſand Florins to receive him, he promiſed he would not moleſt them. After he had received their money, he proceeded in his enterprize againſt *Naples*; and having taken the Queen, he ſent her Priſoner into *Hungary*. His Victory there ſuggeſted new jealouſie into the Governours of *Florence*: they could not imagine their money could have greater influence upon the King, than the friendſhip his family had long maintained with the Faction of the *Guelfs*, who were undone by him. Apprehenſions increaſing at this rate, enormities increaſed with them; which were ſo far from extinguiſhing their fears, that they were exceedingly multiplied; and the greater part of the City were in great diſcontent. To make things worſe, the inſolence of *Giorgio &ali*, and *Tomaſo Strozzi* were added; who being grown more powerful than the Magiſtrate, every one feared, leſt, by their conjunction with the Plebeians, they ſhould be ruined.

Nor did this Government ſeem violent and tyrannical to good men only, but to the ſeditious and debauched: for this arrogance of *Giorgio*'s being ſome time or other of neceſſity, to have an end; it happen'd that *Giovanni di Cambio* was accuſed by one of his acquaintance, for practiſing againſt the State; but upon examination, *Cambio* was found innocent by the Captain; and the Judge gave ſentence, that the Informer ſhould ſuffer the ſame puniſhment which ſhould have been inflicted on the other, had his charge been made good. *Giorgio* interpoſed, with his intreaties and authority to preſerve him; but, not prevailing, he, and *Tomaſo Strozzi*, with a number of armed men, reſcued him by force, plunder'd the Captain's Palace, and forc'd him to hide himſelf. This action made the whole City deteſt him; put his enemies upon contriving his deſtruction, and plotting which way they might redeem the City out of his hands, and the Plebeians (who, for three years together, had had the command of it.)

To this deſign the Captain gave the opportunity; for, the tumult being appeaſed, he went to the Senate, and told them;

That he had chearfully accepted the Office to which they had elected him, preſuming he had ſerved Perſons of Honour and Equity, who would have taken Arms to have promoted and vindicated Juſtice, rather than to have obſtructed it: But his obſervation and experience had acquainted him with the Governours of the City, and their manner of Converſation; that dignity which ſo willingly he had taken up for the benefit of his Country, to avert the danger and detriment impending, he was as ready to lay down.

The

The Captain was ſweetned by the Senate, and much confirmed by a Promiſe made to him of Reparation for what he had ſuffered already, and Security for the future. Hereupon, ſeveral of them conſulting with ſuch of the Citizens as they thought greateſt lovers of their Country, and leaſt ſuſpicious to the State; it was concluded that they had now a fair opportunity to redeem the City out of the clutches of *Giorgio* and his Plebeians; (moſt People having alienated their Affections from him, upon his laſt Inſolence) and the beſt way would be to improve it before they had time to reconcile; for they knew the Favour of the People was to be loſt and gained by the leaſt accident in the world.

For the better conduct of their Affairs, it was thought neceſſary that *Benedetto Alberti* ſhould be drawn into the Plot; without whoſe Concurrence, the Enterprize would be dangerous. This *Benedetto* was a very rich Man, courteous, ſober, a true lover of his Country, and one infinitely diſſatisfied with the irregularity of their ways; ſo that it was no hard matter to perſuade him to any thing that might contribute to the ruine of *Giorgio*; for that which had made him before an enemy to the Popular Nobility, and the faction of the *Guelfs*, was the inſolence of the one, and the tyranny of the other; and afterwards finding the Heads of the Multitude no better than they, he forſook them likewiſe, and all the Miſdemeanors and Impieties which were committed after that, were done without his Approbation or Conſent; ſo that the ſame Reaſons which inclined him to the People at firſt, the ſame Reaſons impelled him now to deſert them.

Having brought *Benedetto* and the Heads of the *Arts* to their Lure in this manner, and furniſhed themſelves with Arms, they ſeized upon *Giorgio*, but *Tomaſo* eſcaped. The next day after he was apprehended, *Giorgio* was beheaded, with ſo great terror and conſternation to his Party, that they were ſo far from endeavouring his Reſcue, that all of them crowded in to behold his Execution. Being brought to die before thoſe People who had ſo lately adored him, he complained of the iniquity of his Fortune, and the malignity of thoſe Citizens, who, by their Injury and Juſtice had conſtrained him to ſide with a Multitude which was not capable either of Gratitude or Fidelity; and diſcovering *Benedetto* in the midſt of the Guards, he ſaid; And can you, *Benedetto*, conſent that this Wrong ſhould be done to me? Were you in my place, I aſſure you, I would not ſuffer it: but let me tell you, this day is the laſt of my Misfortunes, and the firſt of yours. After which, lamenting his unhappineſs in having committed his Fortunes and Life to the conſtancy of the People, which is ſhaken by every rumor, or accident, or conceit, he laid down his Head, and it was cut off in the midſt of his armed and inſulting Enemies: after him ſeveral of his Confederates were executed, and their Bodies dragged about the Streets by the People. His death put the whole City into commotion; for at his execution, many Citizens had put themſelves into Arms in favour of the Senators, and the Captain of the People, and ſome upon the dictates of their own private ambition and revenge. The City being full of various humours, every one had his private deſign, which all deſired to compaſs before they laid down their Arms. The ancient Nobility called *Grandi*, could not brook that they were deprived of publick Imployments, and therefore ſet all their Wits upon the Tenters, to recover what they had loſt; and arm'd, upon pretence of re-inveſting the Captains of the *Arts* with their original Authority. The popular Nobility and the greater *Arts* were diſguſted, that the Government ſhould be communicated to the inferior *Arts*, and the loweſt ſort of the People. On the other ſide, the inferior *Arts* were diſpoſed to augment, not detract from their Authority; and the meaner ſort of People were as tender and jealous of loſing their Colleges: which Diſtractions cauſed the City to tumultuate ſeveral times in one Year; ſometimes the Nobility; ſometimes the better Trades; ſometimes the leſſer; ſometimes the common People; and ſometimes altogether betaking to their Arms in ſeveral parts of the Town; upon which, many Skirmiſhes and Rencounters happened betwixt them and the Guards of the Palace; the Senators contending ſometimes, and ſometimes complying, as they judged moſt likely to remedy thoſe Inconveniences: ſo that after two Treaties, and ſeveral *Balias* created for the Reformation of the City; after many Miſchiefs, and Troubles, and Dangers, they came to an Agreement, That all who had been impriſoned after *Salveſtro de Medici* was made *Gonfaloniere*, ſhould be diſcharged. That all Dignities and Penſions conferred by the *Balia* of LXXVIII ſhould be taken away. That their Honours ſhould be reſtored to the *Guelfs*. That the two new *Arts* ſhould be deprived of their Incorporation and Governors, and all their Members and Dependents diſpoſed into the old Companies as formerly. That the *Gonfaloniere di Giuſtitia* ſhould not be elected by the leſſer *Arts*; and whereas before they had the diſpoſition of half, they ſhould hereafter be capable but of a third part of the Offices of the City, and the beſt of them too, to be put out of their Power: ſo that the popular Nobility and the *Guelfs* re-aſſumed the whole Government and

Reformation.

and the Commons were absolutely dispossessed, after they had held it from the year 1378, to 1381. Nor was this Magistracy less injurious towards the Citizens, nor less grievous in its principles, than the Government of the people; many of the popular Nobility, who had been eminent defenders of the peoples interest, being clap'd in prison, with great numbers of the chief of the Plebeians: Among which *Michaele Lando* was one; nor could the many good Offices which he had done in the time of his authority, protect him from the rage of that party, when the licentious and unrestrained multitude ruined the City: so little was his Country thankful for all his great actions. Into which error, because many Princes and Common-wealths do frequently fall, it happens, that men terrified by such examples, before they can be made sensible of their Princes ingratitude, do fall into their displeasure. These slaughters and these exilements had always, and did then displease *Benedetto Alberti*; and he both publickly and privately condemn'd them. Whereupon, the Government were fearful of him, as believing him one of the Plebeians principal friends, and one who had consented to the death of *Giorgio Scali*, not out of any disapprobation of his conduct, but that he might remain alone in authority after him. By degrees, his words and demeanor came to be suspicious, and the party that was uppermost watch'd him very narrowly, to find out some occasion to send him after *Giorgio*. Things being in this posture at home, no great action happened abroad; that little which did happen, was occasioned more by fear of what they might, than from any prejudice that was actually sustain'd; *Lodovico d' Angio* coming into *Italy* about that time, to drive *Carlo Durazzo* out of the Kingdom of *Naples*, and repossess the Queen *Giovanna*. The passage of this Prince put the *Florentines* into no little distraction; *Carlo*, upon the old score of amity, desired their assistance; *Lodovico* (like those who seek new friendships) demanded their neutrality. The *Florentines*, (that they might please both parties, if possible) to comply with *Lodovico*, and supply *Carlo*, discharged *Aguto* from their service, and recommended him to Pope *Urban*, who was a professed enemy to *Carlo*; which artifice was easily discovered by *Lodovico*, and he thought himself much injured thereby. While the War continued in *Puglia* betwixt *Lodovic* and *Charles*, supplies were sent out of *France* to reinforce *Lodovico*: which Forces (being arrived in *Tuscany*) were conducted to *Arezzo* by those who were banished out of that Town, where they removed all those who were of *Charles* his party; and just as they design'd the same measures against *Florence*, as they had taken against *Arezzo*, *Lodovic* died, and the affairs of *Puglia* and *Tuscany* followed his fate, for *Charles* secur'd himself of his Kingdom, which he thought he had lost; and the *Florentines*, who were not sure do defend their own, bought *Arezzo* of those who had kept it for *Lodovic*. *Charles* having secured himself of *Puglia*, departed for *Hungaria*, (which Kingdom was, by inheritance, descended to him) leaving his Wife behind him in *Puglia*, with *Ladislao* and *Giovanna*, (two of his children,) as shall be shewn more fully.

The Commons expell'd from the Government. 1381.

Michaele Lando imprisoned.

Lodovic's death.

Carlo possessed himself of *Hungary*, but died shortly after; however his Conquest of that Country was so grateful an exploit to the *Florentines*, that never greater expressions of joy were made for any victory of their own, as appeared as well by publick as private magnificence; many Families keeping open houses, and feasting exceedingly, but none with that pomp and extravagance as the Family of the *Alberti*; the provision and ostentation of whose entertainments were fitter for the condition of a Prince, than for a private person. Which extravagance gained him much envy, and that, being seconded by a jealousie in the Government, that *Benedetto* had designs against it, was the occasion of its destruction; for they could not be safe, whilst they thought it might fall out every day, that he (reconciling himself with the people) might turn them out of the City as he pleased. Things being at this uncertainty, it happened that he being *Gonfaloniere della Compagnie*, his Son in Law *Philippo Magalotti* was made *Gonfaloniere di Giustitia*; which accident redoubled the apprehension of the Governors, as thinking *Benedetto* grew upon them so fast, their authority must of necessity decline; but desirous to remedy it what they could, and, if possible, without a tumult, they encouraged *Bese Magalotte* (his enemy and competitor) to acquaint the Senate, that *Philippo* not being of age for the execution of that Office, he could not, nor ought not enjoy it: and the cause being heard in the Senate, *Philippo* was adjudged incapable of that Dignity; and *Bardo Mancini* succeeded in his place; a person fiercely against the faction of the people, and a perfect enemy to *Benedetto*. Having entered upon his Office, he called a *Balia* for reformation of the State; which *Balia* imprisoned *Benedetto Alberti*, and banished all the rest of his Family, only *Antonio* was excepted. Before he was carried away, *Benedetto* called all his friends together, to take his leave of them; and finding them sad, and the tears in their eyes, he spake to them as follows.

Carlo d' Angio's death.

Magnificence envied.

Benedetto's Speech.

You see (Gentlemen) in what manner fortune has ruin'd me, and threatned you; I do not wonder at it, nor indeed ought it to be strange to you, seeing it so happens always to them

them, who, among ill men, are ſtudious of being good, or ſollicitous of ſuſtaining that which all people are deſirous to pull down. The love to my Country aſſociated me firſt with Salveſtro de Medici; *and the ſame love divided me afterward from* Giorgio Scali: *it is nothing but that, and the injuſtice of their proceedings, which have made me hate thoſe who are now at the Stern; who, as they have had no body that could puniſh them; ſo they are deſirous to leave no body to reprehend them. I am content with my baniſhment, to free them of the fear they have conceived not only of me, but of that are ſenſible of all their Tyranny and Injuſtice. For my ſelf I am not ſo much concern'd; the honours conferred upon me when my Country was free, I can quietly relinquiſh whilſt it is in ſervitude and bondage; and the memory of my paſt Condition will give me more pleaſure, than the infelicity of my preſent can give me regret. My greateſt affliction will be, to conſider, my Country is become a prey to particular men, and expoſed to their inſolence and rapine: it troubles me likewiſe for you, leſt thoſe evils which this day are conſummated in me, and but commencing in you, ſhould prove greater detriment to you than they have done to me; however, comfort your ſelves, bear up againſt any misfortune, and carry your ſelves ſo; that if things happen adverſly, (as doubtleſs they will) it may appear to all people that you were innocent, and that they ſucceeded without the leaſt fault or contribution of yours.*

nedetto at :s.

Afterwards, to give as great teſtimony of his virtue abroad as he had done at home, he went to the Sepulchre of our Saviour, and, in his return back, died at *Rhodes*. His bones were brought back to *Florence*, and buried with great ſolemnity by thoſe very people who purſued him, whilſt he was living, with all the calumny and injuſtice imaginable: nor were the *Alberti* the only ſufferers in theſe diſtractions, many Families beſide that, were admoniſhed, and impriſoned. Among the reſt there were *Piero Benini*, *Matteo Alderotti*, *Giovanni e Franceſco del Bene*, *Giovanni Benchi*, *Andrea Adimari*, and with them ſeveral of the leſſer Artificers. Among them which were admoniſhed, were the *Covoni*, the *Benini*, the *Rinucci*, the *Formicini*, the *Corbizzi*, the *Manelli*, and the *Alderotti*. The *Balia* was by cuſtom created for a preciſe time; and being now in the execution of theſe Citizens, who were fairly elected; having done what they could for the ſatisfaction of the State, they deſired to lay down, though their time was not critically expir'd; which the people underſtanding, many of them ran with their Arms to the Palace, crying out, there were ſeveral more to be admoniſhed, and ſeveral more to be impriſoned, before they renounced. The Senate was much diſpleaſed, but entertained them with fair promiſes, till they had fortified themſelves ſo, as they were able to make them lay by thoſe Arms, for fear, which in their rage they had taken up: nevertheleſs, to comply in ſome proportion with the fierceneſs of the humour, and leſſen the Authority of the Plebeian Artificers; it was ordered, that whereas the third part of the Offices of the City were in their hands before, they ſhould now be reduced to a fourth part only: and (that there might always be two of the moſt truſty and faithful perſons to the State, in the Senate) authority was given to the *Gonfaloniere di Giuſtitia*, and four other Citizens, to put a certain number of ſelect mens names into a purſe, out of which, at every meeting of the Senate, two were to be drawn.

1381.

Affairs thus ſettled in the year 1381, the City continued quiet within till 1393; in which year *Giovan Galeazzo Viſcomi* (called the *Conte di Vertu*) took his Uncle *Barnabo* priſoner, and made himſelf, by that, Maſter all *Lombardy*. This *Conte di Vertu* had an opinion he could make himſelf King of *Italy* by force, as eaſily as he had made himſelf Duke of *Milan* by fraud; ſo that in the year 1390, he began a War upon the *Florentines*, which, though proſecuted with variety of fortune on both ſides, yet the Duke was many times in danger to have ruined *Florence*; and doubtleſs had ruined it, had not it been prevented by his death. However, their defence was couragious, as might be expected from a Republick; and the end of the War leſs unhappy, than the courſe of it had been dreadful; for when the Duke had taken *Bologna*, *Piſa*, *Perugia* and *Siena*, and prepared a Crown, to be crowned King of *Italy* in *Florence*, he died in the nick, and his death permitted him not to taſte the pleaſures of his paſt Victories, nor the *Florentines* to feel the calamities which would have followed their Loſſes. Whilſt this War with the Duke was on foot, *Maſo degli Albizzi* was made *Gonfaloniere di Giuſtitia*, who, upon *Piero*'s death, was become a great enemy to the *Alberti*: and (becauſe in all Factions, the humour and animoſity does ſtill ferment and increaſe) *Maſo* (though *Benedetto* was dead in his baniſhment) had an itching deſire, before he laid down his Office, to be revenged of that Family; and he took his opportunity upon the examination of a certain perſon who impeach'd *Alberto*, and *Andrea de gli Alberti* of intelligence with the Rebels. Upon this accuſation they were immediately taken into cuſtody, and the whole frame of the City altered. The Senate (took Arms) aſſembled the People, created a *Balia*, by authority of which many Citizens were confined, and new

imborſation of Officers made: moſt of the *Alberti* were confined; many Artificers admoniſhed, and put to death. Upon which provocation, the *Arts* and inferior ſort of People took Arms, in as much heat as if their Lives or Reputation had been taken from them. Part of them ran to the *Piazza*, and part to the Houſe of *Veri de Medici*, who, after the death of *Salveſtro*, was become the head of that Family. To cajole thoſe who were in the Market-place, the Senate ſent *Rinaldo Gianfigliazzi*, and *Donato Acciaivoli* (as perſons more acceptable to the people than any elſe) to command them, and ſent with them the Enſign of the *Guelfs*, and the People. Thoſe who went to the houſe of *Veri*, begg'd of him to take the Government upon him, and free them from the Tyranny of thoſe Citizens who were enemies to every thing that was good. All thoſe who have left any memorials of the paſſages of thoſe times, do agree in this: That, had not *Veri* been more vertuous than ambitious, he might have made himſelf Prince of the City, without any impediment: for the great damages juſtly and unjuſtly ſuſtained by the *Arts* and their friends had ſo incenſed them, that there wanted nothing but an head, to ſatiate their revenge. Nor was *Veri* without thoſe that minded him of his advantage; for *Antonio de Medici* (who had long time born him a grudge) perſuaded him very earneſtly to take the Government upon him; to whom *Veri* returned this Anſwer,

As your threats, when you were mine enemy, did never affright me; ſo your Counſels now you are my friend, ſhall never delude me.

And, turning about to the multitude, he bid them be couragious, for he would ſecure them, if they would follow his direction. Then, marching in the midſt of them into the *Piazza*, he went up to the Senate, and told them;

Veri de Medici's Speech to the Senate

That he could not be ſorry his converſation had been ſuch, as had procured him the love of the People; but yet he was much troubled they had made a wrong judgment of him, not at all ſuitable to what his converſation had deſerved: for, never having given the leaſt example of ambition, or faction, he could not but wonder from whence they ſhould deduce their opinion; that, as a turbulent perſon, he would be the maintainer of their factions, and as an ambitious Man, the Governour of their State. He begg'd of their Lordſhips, that the error of the multitude might not be imputed to him; for what ever was in his power, he ſubmitted to them, with the firſt opportunity; he recommended it to them to uſe their fortune temperately, and content themſelves quietly with an imperfect victory, rather than to make it intire by the deſtruction of the whole City.

Veri was much applauded by the Senate; they deſired that he would be a means that all Arms might be laid down, and that afterwards they would not fail to do what he and the other Citizens ſhould adviſe. After his harangue in the Senate, *Veri* returned into the *Piazza*, and having joyned his Brigade with thoſe under the Command of *Rinaldo* and *Donato*, he gave this account to them all; That he found the *Signori* very well diſpoſed towards them: that many things had been propoſed, but the ſhortneſs of the time, and the abſence of the Magiſtrates had prevented any concluſion; wherefore he made it his requeſt to them, that they would lay aſide their Arms, and give obedience to the Senate, aſſuring them, that with the Senate, gentleneſs would prevail farther then inſolence, and entreaty than threatning; and that they ſhould want neither ſecurity nor preferment, if they would be directed by him: upon which aſſurance they all returned to their Houſes. Arms being in this manner laid down, the Senate ſecured the palace with the Guards; then they liſted 2000 Citizens which were beſt affected to the State, and divided them equally by Companies, with orders to be ready to relieve them when ever they were called: the reſt which were not liſted, were not ſuffered to bear Arms. Theſe preparations being made, they impriſoned many of the Artificers, and put ſeveral of them to death who had been moſt pragmatical in the late commotions; and, to add more majeſty and reputation to the *Gonfaloniere della Guiſtitia*, it was provided, that no perſon ſhould be capable of that Office under 45 years of age: to ſecure their Government, they made ſeveral other Laws and Ordinances which were inſupportable, not only to the perſons againſt whom they were made, but even to thoſe who were honeſt, and of their own party; for they could not believe a State well grounded, or ſafe, that was to be defended with ſo much violence and ſeverity. Nor were the *Alberti* which remained in the City, the only perſons diſſatisfied with theſe proceedings, nor the *Medici* (who look'd upon the People as meerly over-reach'd) many others were with this extravagant ſeverity exceedingly diſguſted. The firſt man that oppoſed them, was *Donato* the ſon of *Acciaivoli*. This *Donato* though he was one of the Grandees of the City, and rather ſuperior, than equal to *Maſo de gli Albizi*, (who, for ſervice done in his *Gonfalonierſhip*, was become, as it were, Maſter of the City) yet, among ſo many malecontents, it was impoſſible he ſhould be pleaſed, nor prefer (as many people do) private advantage before publick convenience: and therefore his firſt project was, to try if he could

call those who were baniſhed, or at leaſt reſtore the *Ammoniti* to their old Offices and Commands. To this purpoſe he inſinuated with ſeveral Citizens, whiſpering it into the ears firſt of one, and then of another; that there could be no other way to quiet the People, or ſtop the diſſention of the Parties; concluding, that he attended only till he was of the Senate, and then he would make it his buſineſs to bring it to paſs. And becauſe, in all humane Actions, delay breeds wearineſs, and haſte danger; to avoid the one, he ran himſelf upon the other. Among the Senators, there was *Michaele Acciaivoli* his confederate, and *Nicolo Ricoveri* his friend. *Donato* judged this too fair an opportunity to be ſlip'd; and therefore deſired them, that they would move to the Council for a Law for reſtauration of the Citizens. Being over-perſuaded by him, they propoſed it to their Brethren, who were all of opinion, that Innovations are not to be attempted where the Succeſs is doubtful, and the Danger inevitable. Whereupon *Donato*, having tried all ways in vain, in his Paſſion cauſed it to be told them, that ſeeing they would not permit the City to be reformed by fair means, it ſhould be done by foul: which Words being highly reſented, the Senate communicating the whole Buſineſs with the principal Governors, cited *Donato*, who, upon his Appearance, being confronted, and convicted by the Perſon to whom he delivered his Meſſage, he was committed to cuſtody, and confined to *Barlette*. With him were impriſoned *Alamanno*, and *Antonio de Medici*, with all which were deſcended of *Alamanno*'s Family, and ſeveral others of the more inferior *Arts*, that were in Reputation with the People. All theſe Things happened within two Years after *Maſo* had reaſſumed the Government. The City remaining in this Poſture, many Diſcontents at home, and many Exiles abroad; there chanc'd to be at *Bologna* among the baniſhed Men, *Picchio Cavicciulli*, *Tomaſo de Ricci*, *Antonio de Medici*, *Benedetto de gli Spini*, *Antonio Girolami*, *Chriſtofano di Carlone*, with two more of inferior Condition, all of tham young, briſk, and diſpoſed to encounter any Difficulty that hindred their return to their Country. To theſe it was privately ſignified by *Piggiello*, and *Baroccio Cavicciulli*, (who, at the ſame time, were admoniſhed in *Florence*) that if they would come into the Town, they would convey them into an Houſe, from whence they might kill *Maſo de gli Albizi*, and call the People to Arms; who being diſcontented, would be eaſily provoked; and the rather, becauſe they would be headed by the *Ricci*, *Adimari*, *Medici*, *Menelli*, and ſeveral other conſiderable Families. Allured by theſe hopes, on the fourth of *Auguſt* 1397, they arrived privately in *Florence*; and (being diſpoſed of according to Agreement) they ſent out to obſerve the Motions of *Maſo*, by whoſe Death they preſumed they ſhould raiſe a Tumult among the People. *Maſo* was gone out, and (by accident) in an Apothecary's Shop not far from *San Piero Maggiore*; the Meſſenger that was to ſet him, ſeeing of him there, repaired immediately to his Comrades to give them Information; who taking their Swords, ran directly to the Place, but he was gone. Not at all diſcouraged with their firſt Miſcarriage, they turned towards the old Market, where they killed one of their Adverſaries. Upon which, a great noiſe being raiſed, and a clamor of the People, crying out, *Arm, Liberty, Arm; let the Tyrants die*; they marched towards the new Market, where near the *Calimara* they ſlew another; and ſo going forward with they ſame ſhout and out-cry, no-body taking Arms, they ſtopped in the *Loggia della Nighitoſa*: and mounting there upon the higheſt Place they could find, the Multitude being round about them, (but come rather to ſtare than aſſiſt) they exhorted them to take Arms, and free themſelves from a Bondage which ſo highly they abhorr'd; they aſſured them, the Complaints and Lamentations of ſuch as were oppreſſed in the City, had moved them to endeavour their Liberty, and not any private Injury to themſelves: that they were ſenſible they had the Prayers of many good People; that God would give opportunity to their Deſigns. Had they had an Head to have commanded them, it was believed they would have ſucceeded at any time; but now occaſion was offered, and they had Captains enough to conduct them; they ſtood gaping one upon another, expecting like Sots, till thoſe Perſons who endeavoured their Freedom, were knock'd on the Head, and their Slavery redoubled. They could not likewiſe but marvel, that they, who, upon the leaſt Injury, were heretofore ready to take Arms, ſhould not ſtir now upon ſo great and numerous Provocations, but ſuffer ſo many of their Citizens to be baniſhed, and admoniſhed, when it was in their Power to reſtore the one to their Country, and the other to their Offices. Theſe Words (how true ſoever) moved not the Multitude in the leaſt, either becauſe they were afraid, or elſe becauſe the death of the two Perſons which were killed, had made the Murderers odious: ſo that the founders of the Tumult perceiving that neither Words nor Actions would work any thing, underſtanding too late, how dangerous it is to enterprize the liberty of a People that are reſolved to be Slaves; and deſpairing of ſucceſs, they retreated into the Church of S. *Reparata*, not to ſecure their Lives, but to protect their Deaths. Upon the firſt noiſe of this Tumult, the Senate had arm'd, and cauſed the Palace to be ſhut up; but when they heard

Donato Acciaivoli confin'd.

1397.

A new Conſpiracy defeated.

heard what the business was, who were the Authors, and what was become of them; they took courage, and commanded the Captain, with what Forces he could get, to go and apprehend them; which was no hard matter to perform; for the Church-doors being broken open, and part of them slain, the rest were taken prisoners; who, upon examination, confessed nothing, but that *Baroccio* and *Pigniella Cavicciulli*, were the only Incendiaries, and they were both of them killed.

After this accident, there happened another of greater importance. About this time (as we said before) the City had Wars with the Duke of *Milan*, who finding open force was not like to prevail, applyed himself to artifice; and by the help of the *Florentine* Exiles, (of which *Lombardy* was full) he procured a treaty with several in the Town, in which it was concluded, that at a certain day, from the neareſt places to *Florence* they could contrive, the greateſt part of the Exiles which were able to bear Arms, should pass by the river *Arnus* into the City; and then joyning suddenly with their friends within, should run to the Palace of the Senate, and other houses of the chief Officers, and having slain them, model, and reform afterwards as they pleased. Among the Conspirators in the Town, there was one of the *Ricci* called *Samminiato*, who (as it falls out in most plots, where few are not sufficient, and many not secure) seeking for a companion, found an informer; for imparting the business to *Salvestro Cavicciulli*, (whose own injuries, as well as his relations, might have made him more faithful) he post-poning his future hopes to his present fear, discovered all to the Senate. Whereupon *Samminiato* being seized, they extorted the whole process of the Conspiracy, but of his accomplices no-body was taken, but one *Tomaso Davisi*; who coming from *Bologna*, not knowing what was happened in *Florence*, was apprehended by the way, before he got thither; all the rest, upon the imprisonment of *Samminiato*, fled away in great fear, and dispersed. *Samminiato* and *Tomaso* being punished according to the quality of their offence, a new *Balia* was made of several Citizens; and authority given them to inquire farther after delinquents, and to secure the State. This *Balia* proclaimed Rebels, 6 of the Family of the *Ricci*, 6 of the *Alberti*, 2 of the *Medici*, 3 of the *Scali*, 2 of the *Strozzi*, *Bindo Altoviti*, *Bernardo Adimari*, and several others of meaner condition. They admonished, besides, the whole Family of the *Alberti*, *Ricci*, and *Medici*, for ten years, except only some few. Among those of the *Alberti* which were not admonished, *Antonio* was one, being esteemed a quiet and a peaceable Man. Their jealousie of this plot being not yet out of their heads, a Monk happened to be apprehended, who had been observed, whilst the conspiracy was on foot, to have passed many times betwixt *Bologna* and *Florence*, and he confessed he had frequently brought Letters to *Antonio*; *Antonio* being taken into custody, denied it obstinately at first; but being confronted by the Monk, and the charge justified against him; he was fined in a sum of money, and banished three hundred Miles distance from the City; and that they might not always be in danger of the *Alberti*, they decreed, that none of that Family above 15 years of age, should be suffered to continue in the Town. These things happened in the year 1400, two years after *Giovan Galezo* Duke of *Milan*, died: whose death, (as we have said before) put an end to a War that had been prosecuted for twelve years. After which, the Government having extended its authority, and all things at quiet both abroad and at home, they undertook the enterprize of *Pisa*, which succeeded so well; they took the Town very honourably, and enjoyed that and the rest very peaceably, till the year 1433: Only in the year 1412, the *Alberti* having transgress'd against the terms of their banishment, a new *Balia* was erected, new provisions made for the security of the State, and new impositions inflicted upon that Family.

The Duke of *Milan* practises against the City.

Several Families banished.

1400.

About this time, the *Florentines* had War likewise against *Ladislaus* King of *Naples*, which ended in the year 1416, upon the death of that King. During the time of the War, finding himself too weak, he had given the City of *Cortona* to the *Florentines*, of which he was Lord; but afterwards recovering more strength, he renewed his War with them, and managed it so, that it was much more dangerous than the former; and had not his death determined it, (as the other was by the death of the Duke of *Milan*) doubtless he had brought *Florence* into as great exigence as the Duke of *Milan* would have done; and endangered, if not ruined its Liberty. Nor did their War with this King conclude with less good fortune than the other; for when he had taken *Rome*, *Sienna*, *la Marka*, and *Romagna*; and nothing remained but *Florence*, to hinder his passage with his whole force into *Lombardy*, he died; so that, death was always a true friend to the *Florentines*, and did more to preserve them, than all their own conduct or courage could do. From the death of this King, this City remained at peace (both abroad and at home) eight years: at the end of that term, their Wars with *Philip* Duke of *Milan*, reviv'd their factions

The King of *Naples* dies.

factions, which could nver be suppressed, but with the subversion of the State, which had governed from the year 1371, to 1434, with much honour, and maintained many Wars with much advantage, having added to their Dominion, *Arezzo*, *Pisa*, *Cortona*, *Livorno*, and *Monte Pulciano*, and doubtless would have extended it farther, had the City been unanimous, and the old humours not been rubb'd up, and reviv'd, as in the next Book shall be more particularly related.

The Duke of Milan practises against the City.

Several Families banished.

THE

THE FOURTH BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF FLORENCE.

ALL Cities (especially such as are not well constituted under the Titles of Common-wealths) do sometime or other alter their Government, yet not (as many think) by means of Liberty and Subjection; but by occasion of servitude and licentiousness: for only the name of Liberty is pretended by popular Persons, such as are the instrument of licentiousness; and Servitude is sought for by those that are Noble, neither of them both desiring to be restrain'd either by Laws or any thing else. Nevertheless when it does happen, (as it happens but seldom) that a City has the good fortune to produce, and advance some Wise, Honest, and Potent Citizen, by whom the Laws may be so order'd, that the humours and emulations betwixt the Nobility and the People, if not perfectly compos'd, may be yet so well circumscrib'd and corrected, that they may be check'd from breaking forth to its prejudice; Then it is, that City may be call'd free, and that State pronounce it self durable; for being founded upon good Laws and Orders at first, it has not that necessity of good Men no maintain it. Of such Laws and Principles many Common-wealths were antiently constituted, and continued a long time. Others have wanted, and do still want them; which has frequently occasion'd the variation of the Government, from Tyranny, to Licentiousness; and from Licentiousness, to Tyranny: for by reason of the powerful animosities in all of them, it is not, nor can be possible, they should be of any duration, one disgusting the Good, and the other the Wise. One doing mischief with ease, and the other good with difficulty: in this the Insolent have too much authority; in another the Sots; and therefore it is convenient that both one and the other be supported and maintaind by the fortune and valour of some eminent Man, though he may be taken from them by death, or made unserviceable by misfortune. I say therefore, that Government which flourished in *Florence* from the death of *Giorgio Scali*, which fell out in the year 1381, was supported first by the conduct of *Maso di gli Albizi*, and afterwards by *Nicolo Uzano*.

This City from the year 1414, till the end of the 22, remain'd quiet, King *Ladislaus* being dead, and *Lombardy* divided into several Cantons; so that neither abroad nor at home, had they the least cause of apprehension. The next Citizens in Authority to *Nicolo Uzano*, were *Bartolmeo Valori*, *Nerone de Nigi*, *Rinaldo de gli Albizi*, *Neri di Gino*, and *Lapo Nicolini*. The factions which sprung from the animosity betwixt the *Albizi*, and the *Ricci* (which were with so much mischief reviv'd afterward by *Salvestro de Medici*) could never be extinguish'd, and although that which was most generally succour'd, prevailed but three years,

years, and was afterwards depreſs'd, yet the greateſt part of the City had imbib'd ſo much of their humour, as could never be wrought out. True it is, the frequent exprobrations, and conſtant perſecutions of the heads of that party from the year 1381, to 1400, had almoſt brought them to nothing. The firſt Families which were perſecuted, as the chief of that faction, were the *Alberti*, *Ricci*, and *Medici*, who were robb'd of their Men, as well as their Money; and if any of them continued in the City, their imployments and dignities were moſt certainly taken from them; which uſage had indeed debas'd that party, and almoſt conſum'd it. However the memory of the injuries receiv'd, and a ſecret deſire of being reveng'd, lay cloſe in the Hearts of many of them; and having no opportunity to ſhow it, they kept it private to themſelves. Thoſe of the Popular Nobility who govern'd the City ſo quietly, committed two errours, which were the ruine of their Government: One was in their inſolence, upon the long time of their Government: The other, that by reaſon of emulations among themſelves, contracted by long poſſeſſion of the State, they had not preſerv'd that inſpection which they ought to have done, over thoſe who were able to diſturb them: Whereby (daily running themſelves deeper in the diſpleaſure of the People, and either not regarding new Plots, becauſe they did not apprehend them, or elſe encouraging them, to ſupplant one another) the houſe of *Medici* recover'd its Authority. The firſt of them which began to riſe, was *Giovanni* the Son of *Bicci*, who, being grown very wealthy, of a benign and courteous nature, by conceſſion of thoſe who govern'd, was made Supream Magiſtrate; and his advancement celebrated with ſo univerſal ſatisfaction and joy (the People believing they had now got a Protector) that the graver ſort began to ſuſpect it, and obſerving all the old humours reviving again. And *Nicolo Uzano* fail'd not to advertiſe the other Citizens, and to remonſtrate how dangerous it was to promote one of ſo general a reputation: that diſorders were eaſily ſuppreſs'd in the beginning; but when grown to any height, they were hardly to be remedy'd: and that he knew *Giovanni* to be a man in parts much ſuperiour to *Salveſtro*. But *Nicolo* was not regarded by his Brethren, who envy'd his reputation, and deſir'd more company to take him down. *Florence* being in this manner infeſted with theſe humours, which began privately to ferment, *Philippo Viſconti*, ſecond Son to *John Galeazo*, becoming Lord of *Lombardy* by the death of his Brother, ſuppoſing himſelf in a condition for ſome great enterprize, was very ambitious to recover the Sovereignty of *Genoua*, which was then free, under the adminiſtration and conduct of *Tomaſo da Campo Tregoſo*; but he durſt not be too confident of ſucceſs either in that, or any other deſign, till he had enter'd into an alliance with the *Florentines*, the reputation of which, he concluded would carry him thorow all. To that purpoſe he ſent two Embaſſadors to *Florence*, to propoſe it. Many Citizens adviſed to the contrary, though they were contented the amity which had been betwixt them for many years, ſhould be continu'd, yet they had no mind to a League, as knowing what reputation, and advantage would accrue to him thereby, and how unprofitable it would be to their City. Others were for the League, by vertue of which they might put ſuch terms upon him, as (if he tranſgreſs'd) ſhould diſcover his ill intentions to the World, and juſtifie any War they ſhould make upon him for the breach of his agreement: After great debate, a Peace was concluded, and *Philip* oblig'd himſelf not to meddle with any thing on this ſide the Rivers *Magra* and *Panaro*. Having ſettled his alliance, *Philip* fell upon *Breſcia*, and took it; and after that upon *Genoua*; and took that contrary to the opinion of *Florence*, who had promoted the peace, they having been confident that *Breſcia*, by the help of the *Venetian*, and *Genoua* by its own proper ſtrength, would have been able to have held out. And becauſe in his Treaty with the *Doge* of *Genoua*, *Philip* had reſerv'd *Serezana* and other Towns on this ſide the *Magra*, with condition when ever he would part with them, that the *Genoeſes* ſhould have the refuſal (having broke his promiſe) the whole League was violated; beſides, he had made an agreement with the *Legat* of *Bologna*. All which things conſider'd together, alter'd the affections of the *Florentines* towards him, and being jealous of new troubles, made them look out for new remedies. *Philip* having intelligence of their apprehenſions; to juſtifie himſelf, and feel the inclinations of the Citizens, or elſe to lull and delude them; he ſent Embaſſadors to *Florence*, to let them know he was much ſurpriz'd at the ſuſpicion he underſtood they had conceiv'd againſt him, and was ready to renounce any thing that might give them the leaſt occaſion of diſpleaſure. The effect this Embaſſy produc'd in the City, was only to divide it; part (and that the moſt conſiderable in the Government) was of opinion they ſhould Arm, and put themſelves into a Poſture againſt the deſigns of their Enemies. If preparations were made, and *Philip* was quiet, no War would enſue, and they might contribute to a Peace. Others out of envy to the Government, or apprehenſion of the War, concluded it no Wiſdom to be ſuſpicious of a friend without great provocation; and that what he had done was not

Uzano advices againſt the *Medici*.

Philippo Viſconti, Lord of *Lombardi*.

Peace betwixt *Florence*, and *Milan*.

 worthy

worthy (in their judgments) of such rigid proceeding. They knew well enough to create the *Ten*, and to raise Men was the same thing as declaring of War, which if done with so potent a Prince, would be certain ruine to the City, without any prospect of advantage; for if they prosper'd, and got the Victory, they could not make themselves Masters of any thing considerable, *Romagna* being betwixt; nor could they attempt any thing against *Romagna* by reason of its vicinity to the Church. However their opinion prevail'd who were for preparations; they created the *Ten*, they rais'd Soldiers, and laid new Taxes upon the People; which lying more heavily upon the common than the better sort of Citizens, fill'd the City with complaints, all People crying out of the oppression of the great People, who to satiate their Ambition, and inlarge their Authority, had ingag'd them in an expensive and unnecessary War: they were not yet come to an absolute rupture with the Duke, but all things were full of suspicion: For *Philip*, at the request of the Legate of *Bologna* (who was fearful of *Antonio Bentivogli*, a banish'd Man, and at that time in the Castle *Bolognese*) had sent new Forces into that City to secure it, which Forces being near the Dominions of *Florence*, created no little jealousie in that State. But that which gave the strongest alarm to all People, and made the greatest discovery of the War, was the Duke's practices at *Furli*. The Lord of *Furli* at that time was *Giorgio Ordelaffi*, who dying, left his Son *Tibaldo* to the Tutelage of *Philip*. The Mother suspecting the integrity of his Tutor, would have sent him to her Father *Lodovico Alidossi* Lord of *Imola*, but the People of *Furli* constrain'd her to deliver him up to *Philip*, in pursuance of the Testament of *Ordelaffi*. *Philip* to disguise his designs, and give less occasion of jealousie, order'd the Marquels of *Ferrara*, to send *Guido Torelli* with certain Soldiers to take possession of *Furli* in his Name, and as his Lieutenant; and so that Town fell into the hands of *Philip*. Which intelligence coming to *Florence* at the same time with the news of the arrival of Forces at *Bologna*, facilitated the resolution for War, though before there had been strong opposition, and *Giovanni de Medici* did publickly dissuade it; alledging that though they were certain enough of the Duke's inclinations, yet it was better to expect him, and receive his attack, than to prevent it by advancing against him; for it was the beginning of the War must justifie the prosecution; the Agressor would be in the fault, and the other excusable to all the Princes of *Italy*. Neither could they demand the assistance of their Neighbours with so much confidence, to invade other People, as to defend themselves; nor would any body fight so chearfully to gain from others, as to secure their own. To this it was answer'd, that the Enemy was not to be expected at home; that fortune is oftner a friend to the Invader, than to the Invaded; and that (though it may be possibly more expence) yet there is less damage and detriment in making War in an Enemies Country than in ones own. These arguments carried it; and Orders were given to the *Ten* to try all ways, and turn every stone for the recovery of *Furli* out of the hands of the Duke. The Duke observing how serious and busie the *Florentines* were in retrieving a place he had undertaken to secure, sent *Agnolo della Pergola* with a considerable force, to *Imola*, That the Prince having his hands full at home, might not be at leisure to think of the defence of his *Grandson*. *Agnolo* advanc'd with his Army, near *Imola* and (though the *Florentines* lay at *Modigliana*) took the Town one night by the benefit of a great Frost which had frozen the Ditches, and sent *Lodovico* Prisoner to *Milan*. The *Florentines* seeing *Imola* lost, and the War publickly owned; commanded their Army to march and besiege *Furli*, which being accordingly performed, that Town was immediately beleagure; and to hinder the Conjunction of the Dukes Forces to relieve it, they hired the Comte *Alberigo* with his Squadron from *Zagonara*, to keep them in perpetual alarm, and to make daily in roads to the very walls of *Imola*. *Agnolo* perceiv'd by the strong intrenchment of our Army, that *Furli* could not without great difficulty be reliev'd, so he resolv'd to set down before *Zagonara*, presuming the *Florentines* would not lose that place; and that if they came to relieve it, they must not only raise their Siege before *Furli*, but fight his Army upon great disadvantage. Hereupon the Duke *Alberigo*'s Forces were constrain'd to a Parley, in which it was agreed the Town should be surrender'd, if in fifteen days time it was not reliev'd by the *Florentines*. Their condition being known in the *Florentine* Camp, begot great disorders there, as well as in the City; and every body desiring to wrest so great a prize out of the hands of the Enemy, their Host hasten'd the loss of it; for marching from *Furli* to the relief of *Zagonara* they came to an engagement and were utterly defeated, not so much by the valour of their Enemies, as the badness of the Weather; for our Men having march'd several hours thorow deep ways in perpetual rain, finding the Enemy fresh and drawn up with advantage, it was no hard matter to overcome them. Nevertheless in a Victory so famous all over *Italy*, it was strange, and yet true, that there died no body of any Eminence but *Lodovico Albizi*, and two of his Sons, who falling from their Horses, were stifled in the dirt. The

Imola taken by the Duke *Philip*.

The *Florentines* overthrown.

news of this defeat put the whole City of *Florence* into a dumps, especially the Grandees, who had perſuaded the War; they ſaw the Enemy ſtrong and couragious; themſelves without force or friends; the People incens'd, railing up and down the Streets, upbraiding them with the great Taxes, and the impertinence of the War; girding and ſcoffing at them with moſt contumelious Expoſtulations, Are theſe they which created the *Ten*, to terrifie the Enemy? Are theſe they who have reliev'd *Furli*, and reſcued it out of the hands of the Duke? See how ſtrangely their Counſels are diſcover'd, and the ends to which they inclin'd, not to defend our Liberty (which is an Enemy to them) but to increaſe their Power, which God in his Wiſdom has moſt juſtly diminiſh'd. Nor is this the only enterprize they have pull'd upon the City, but ſeveral others, and particularly that againſt *Ladiſlao*, which was parallel exactly. To whom will they now addreſs for ſupplies? To *Pope Martin? Braccio* can be witneſs how they us'd him before: To Queen *Giovanna?* She was forc'd formerly to deſert them, and throw her ſelf into the Protection of the King of *Arragon?* Such Language as this, and whatever could be invented by an enraged People, was the common Dialect in the Streets. To prevent inconveniencies, the *Senate* thought good to aſſemble ſeveral Citizens, who with gentle words ſhould endeavour to quiet thoſe humours which were ſtirr'd in the People. *Rinaldo de gli Albizi* was one of them, who (being eldeſt Son to *Maſo*, and by means of his own Vertue and the Reputation of his Father, arriv'd at conſiderable eſteem in the City) ſpake to them at large. *He told them that it was neither Juſtice nor Prudence to judge Things by ſucceſs, ſeeing many times good Counſels miſcarry, and ill ones do proſper. That to commend ill Counſels upon their good ſucceſs, was to encourage Errour, rather than Virtue, which would turn to the great prejudice of the Publick, becauſe they are not always unfortunate. On the other ſide, to condemn wiſe Counſels for the unhappineſs of their Event, is as blameable as that; ſeeing thereby honeſt Citizens are diſcouraged and deterr'd from ſpeaking their Judgments, though the Exigence be never ſo great. Then he demonſtrated the neceſſity of the War, and how (if it had not been carried into* Romagna) *it would have broke out in* Tuſcany. *He told them, it had pleas'd God their Army ſhould be beaten; yet their loſs was not ſo great as it would be, if the deſign ſhould be abandon'd; but if ſtill they would bear up againſt their misfortune, and put themſelves forward to the utmoſt of their power, they ſhould not need to be much ſenſible of their Loſs nor the Duke of his Victory. That they ought not to be diſcourag'd at their Expences and Taxes, it being neceſſary to increaſe them at preſent, as a way to leſſen them hereafter. He told them that greater ſupplies are more neceſſary in an offenſive; than a defenſive War, and in concluſion he exhorted them to the imitation of their Fore-fathers, who by the manlineſs of their Behaviour in all their Diſtreſſes, did always defend themſelves againſt any Adverſary whatever.*

Albizi's Exhortation to be quiet.

Encouraged by his Authority, the Citizens entertain'd the Comte *de Oddo*, Son to *Braccio*, into their pay; committing him to the inſtruction of *Nicolo Piccinino*, who had been brought up under *Fraccio*, and was reputed the beſt of his Officers; to whom they joyn'd other Commanders of their own, and certain Horſe Officers, which were remaining of the late defeat. For the raiſing of more Monies, they created XX Commiſſioners out of the Citizens; who finding the chief Citizens low, and depreſs'd upon the late overthrow, over-laid them with Taxes, and oppreſs'd them exceedingly. Theſe impoſitions diſguſted them much; yet at firſt in the point of honour they thought it beneath them to complain of their own private uſage; only they blam'd the Taxes in general, and preſs'd to have them abated; being publickly known, it was publickly oppos'd; and ſo far neglected in the Councils, that to make them ſenſible how difficult a matter they had undertaken, and to render them odious to the People, order was given that the Taxes ſhould be collected with all ſtrictneſs and ſeverity; and in caſe of oppoſition, it ſhould be lawful for any Man to kill him who reſiſted an Officer. Whereupon many ſad accidents enſued among the Citizens; many being wounded, and not a few ſlain: ſo that it was believ'd the Parties would have proceeded to Blood; and every ſober Man apprehended ſome miſchief at hand. The Grandees having been accuſtomed to be favour'd, could not endure that ſtrictneſs, and the others thought it but juſt to have all taxed proportionably. In theſe confuſions, ſeveral of the prime Citizens met, and concluded to take the Government upon themſelves, becauſe their backwardneſs and remiſſneſs had given the multitude confidence to reprehend actions of the State, and reincourag'd ſuch as were wont to be the Heads of the People. After many Cabals, and frequent Diſcourſes among themſelves, it was propos'd to meet altogether at a time, which they did above LXX of them in the Church of St. *Stephano*, by the connivance of *Lorenzo Ridolfi de Midi*, and *Franceſco Gianfigliazzi*, two of the *Senate*. *Giovanni de Fedici* was not at the meeting, either not being call'd (as a Perſon in whom they could put no confidence) or refuſing to come, being contrary to his Judgment. *Ri-*

naldo de gli Albizi made a Speech to them all. He remonstrated to them the condition of the City; how by their negligence the Authority was relaps'd to the People, which in the year 1381, their Fathers had taken out of their hands. He represented the iniquity of the Government from 1377, to the Year 1380; and remember'd them how in that Interim, many there present had had their Fathers and Relations kill'd. That now the dangers were the same, and the disorders no better. That the multitude had already impos'd a Tax as they pleas'd, and would doubtless by degrees (unless greater force, or better order was taken to prevent them) create Magistrates at their pleasure. Which if they should do, they would usurp their places, and ruine a State which for 42 years together had flourish'd with much honour and reputation to the City; and Florence fall under the Government of the multitude, (one half in perpetual luxury, and the other in fear) or else under the Tyranny of some single Person that should usurp. Wherefore he assured himself that whoever was a lover of Honour or his Country, would think himself oblig'd to resent it, and be put in mind of the Virtue of Bardo Mancini, who with the destruction of the Alberti rescued the City from the same dangers; and as the occasion of that boldness and incroachment of the multitude proceeded from negligence and remissness in the Magistrate, the Palace of the Senate being full of new and inferior Men, he concluded, the best way to remedy it, would be to do as they did then; to restore the Government to the Grandees, to clip the wings of the inferior Trades, by reducing them from XIV. to VII. By which means their authority in the Councils would be retrench'd, both by the diminution of their number, and the restauration of the Nobility, who upon the old score of animosity would be sure to keep them under; adding that it was great Wisdom to make use of all people, opportunity, and according to the convenience of their time: for if there Fore-fathers had done prudently to make use of the Multitude to correct the insolence of the Grandees, it would be no less discretion, now the people were grown insolent, and the Nobility under hatches, to make use of the Nobility to reduce them to their balance; which might be two ways effected, either by artifice, or force: for some of them being in the Commission of Ten, it was in their power to bring what numbers they thought good into the City, and to dispose them as they pleas'd without any observation.

Rinaldo de gli Albizi.

Rinaldo was much applauded, his Counsel by every Body approv'd; and Urano among the rest, return'd this Answer. *That indeed all that had been said by* Rinaldo *was true, his remedies good and secure, when applyable without manifest division of the City; and that might be done exactly, if* Giovanni de Medici *could be drawn to their party; if he were separated from them, the people might rise, but could do nothing for want of a head; but whilst he was firm to them, nothing was to be done without force, and if they should betake themselves to that, he could not but foresee a double danger, either of not gaining the Victory, or not injoying it when it was got. He modestly remember'd them of his former advices, and how they had neglected to prevent these difficulties in time; which might easily have been done; But that now he thought it unpracticable, unless some way could be found to gain* Giovanni *to their party.*

Nicolo Urano.

Hereupon *Rinaldo* was deputed to attend *Giovanni*, and try what might be done He waited upon him, and press'd him with all the arguments he could use to joyn with them, and that he would not, by favouring and indulging the People, make them insolent and sawcy to the ruine both of the City and Government. To which *Giovanni* reply'd,

That it was the Office of a wise and good Citizen (at least in his judgment) to preserve the ancient Laws and Customs of a City; nothing being more injurious than those alterations; that many being offended, it must necessarily follow many must be discontented, and where many are so, some ill accident or other is daily to be expected. That in his opinion this resolution of their's would be subject to two most pernicious effects.

Giovanni de Medici's reply to Rinaldo.

The first by conferring honours upon them, who having born none of them before, would understand less how to value them, and by consequence complain less for the want of them. The other in taking them away from those who have been accustomed to them, and would assuredly never be quiet till they be restor'd to them again. So that the injury to one party will be greater than the benefit to the other; the Author of the change gains fewer Friends than Enemies; and the latter be much more industrious to do him a mischief, than the former to defend him. Men being naturally more prone to revenge than gratitude; loss (for the most part) being in the one, but profit or pleasure always in the other. Then, turning about to *Rinaldo*, he said. *And you, Sir, if you would recollect what has pass'd, and with what cunning, and subtility things have been formerly transacted in this City, you would be cooler and less hasty in this resolution; for who ever advised*

wiſed it, as ſoon as with your power he has diveſted the People of their Authority, he will uſurp upon you, and become your Enemy by the ſame means you intend to oblige him. Nor will it fall out better to you than it did to Benedetto Alberto, *who by the perſuaſions of thoſe who did not love him, conſented to the ruine of* Giorgio Scali *and* Tomaſo Strozzi, *and not long after was himſelf baniſhed by the ſame Perſons which inveigled him: be adviſed him therefore to conſider more ſeriouſly of the buſineſs, and rather than to proceed, to follow the example of his Father, who to ingratiate with the people, abated the Exciſe upon Salt; procured, that whoſoevers Taxes was half a Florin, or under, ſhould pay it if they pleas'd, otherwiſe it ſhould never be levied; prevailed, that the day the Councils aſſembled, ſhould be priviledged, and all Perſons for that time protected from their Creditors; and at laſt concluded, that for his own part he was reſolved to acquieſce in the Government as it ſtood then, and to leave the City as he found it.*

Theſe tranſactions being talk'd of abroad, procured much reputation to *Giovanni*, but more hatred to the other Citizens, whoſe converſation he declined what he could, to give the leſs encouragement to thoſe who deſigned new troubles, under his familiarity and favour; declaring to every body he diſcourſed withal about it, that in his judgment, factions were rather to be extinguiſhed than fomented at that time; and that as to himſelf, he deſired nothing more cordially, than love and unanimity in the City, tho' ſeveral of his own party were diſſatisfied with him, and had adviſed him to be more ſtirring and active in the buſineſs. Among the reſt *Alamanno de Medici* was one, who being naturally furious, egg'd him on to take this opportunity of revenging himſelf upon his enemies, and obliging his friends; reproaching him by the coldneſs of his proceedings, which (as he told him) gave his enemies occaſion to practiſe againſt him, without fear or reſpect; which practices (it was to be doubted) would ſucceed one time or other, and be the deſtruction both of his family and friends. *Coſimo*, his ſon, importuned him to the ſame; but *Giovanni*, neither for what had been revealed nor prognoſticated, could be moved from his reſolution; however, the faction appear'd plain enough, and the whole City was moſt manifeſtly divided. There were at that time attending the *Senate* in the Palace, two Chancellors, *Martino* and *Pagolo*. The latter was a favourer of *Uzano*, the former of the *Medici*. *Rinaldo*, finding *Giovanni* inexorable, and not to be wrought over to them, contrived to turn *Martino* out of his office; preſuming after that the *Senate* would be more inclinable to them. Which deſign being ſmelt by the Adverſary, *Martino* was not only continued in his Place, but *Pagolo* turn'd out, to the great detriment and diſſatisfaction of his party; and doubtleſs the effects would have been dreadful, had not the War lain ſo heavy upon them, and the late defeat at *Zagonara* put the City into ſuch confuſion. For whilſt theſe things were agitated in *Florence*, *Agnolo della Pergola* with the Duke's Troops had taken all the Towns which the *Florentines* held in *Romagna*, (except *Caſtracaro* and *Modigliana*) ſome for want of due fortification, and ſome for want of courage or fidelity in the Garriſons. In the acquiſition of theſe Towns, two things happen'd, which demonſtrate how grateful valour is, even to an Enemy, and how much cowardice and puſillanimity is deſpiſed. *Biagio del Milano* was Captain of the Caſtle call'd *Montepetroſo*, which being not only beſieged, but ſet on fire by the Enemy, looking over the walls, and finding no way to eſcape, or preſerve the Caſtle, he cauſed ſtraw and bedding, and what other cloaths he had, to be thrown over the walls, where he ſaw the fire was not yet come, and then letting down two of his Children upon them, he cry'd out to the Enemy, *Here take ſuch moveables as God and my fortune have given me; 'tis in your power to force them, and not in mine to preſerve them; but for the treaſure of my mind, in which my glory and honour conſiſts, you cannot raviſh that from me, and I will never ſurrender it.* The Enemy (amaz'd at his gallantry) ran preſently to ſave the Children, and preſented him Ropes and Ladders to have preſerv'd himſelf; but he refuſed them, and choſe rather to die in the flames, than to be ſaved by the Enemies of his Country. An example worthy of the commendation of Antiquity, and the more remarkable, by how much few of them are to be found. The Children were reſtored to whatever could be preſerv'd, and ſent home by the Enemy (with ſingular generoſity) to their Relations, who receiv'd them not with more joy, than they were entertain'd by the State, which for their Fathers and their own ſakes, kept them at the publick charge during their lives.

The factions of *Uzano*, and the *Medici*.

The great courage of *Biagio del Milano*.

The other happen'd in *Galeata*, where *Zenobi del Pino* was *Podeſta*, who without any defence at all, deliver'd up his Caſtle to the Enemy, and afterwards perſuaded *Agnolo* to quit the *Alps* in *Romagna*, and betake himſelf to the hills in *Tuſcany*, where he might ſpin out the War with more advantage, and leſs danger to himſelf. *Agnolo* not able to brook ſuch meanneſs and baſeneſs of his Spirit, deliver'd him over to his ſervants to diſpoſe of himas they pleaſed, who after millions of affronts and deriſions, allow'd him nothing but

The cowardice of *Zenobi del Pino*.

painted cards for his diet, declaring they intended of a *Guelf* to make him a *Ghibilin* that way; but whatever they intended, in a ſhort time he was ſtarv'd to Death.

In the mean time *Conte Oddo*, with *Nicolo Piccinino*, were enter'd into the *Valdi Lamona*, to ſee if they could reduce the State of *Faenza* to an amity with the *Florentines*; or at the leaſt hinder *Agnola della Pergola* from making his incurſions ſo freely into the territory of *Romagna*. But the vale being very ſtrong, and the inhabitants martial, *Conte Oddo* was ſlain, and *Piccinino* carried Priſoner to *Faenza*. However, as it fell out, the *Florentines* obtain'd by this loſs, what they would have hardly gain'd by the victory; for *Nicolo Piccinino* tranſacted ſo well with the Governour of *Faenza* and his mother, that by his perſuaſion they became friends to the *Florentines*, and enter'd into a League with them, by which he was releaſed. But *Piccinino* follow'd not that Counſel which he had given to others; for either being debauch'd by the Towns he paſs'd thorow, or looking upon the condition of the *Florentines* to be but low, and his own to be better'd in another place, he departed abruptly from *Arrezzo*, where his poſt was, and ſtealing away into *Lombardy*, he took up Arms under that Duke. The *Florentines* weaken'd by theſe accidents, and diſhearten'd by the expence of the War, concluded they were unable to carry it on, upon their own private account; hereupon they ſent Ambaſſadors to the *Venetians*, to deſire their aſſiſtance (which they might eaſily and effectually grant) againſt the growing greatneſs of a Perſon, who, if let alone, would be as dangerous and deſtructive to them, as to the *Florentines*. *Franceſco Carmignuola* perſuaded them likewiſe to the ſame enterprize, who was an excellent Soldier as any in thoſe times, had ſerved formerly under the Duke: but then he was revolted from him, and come over to the *Venetian*. The *Venetian* was uncertain what to determine, not daring to be too confident of *Carmignuola*, becauſe not ſure whether his animoſity to the Duke was real or pretended. Whilſt they remain'd in this ſuſpence, the Duke found a way, by corrupting one of his Servants, to cauſe him to be poiſon'd; but the poiſon being too weak, did not kill him outright, but brought him to great extremity. The *Venetians* having notice of this, laid their ſuſpicion aſide; and the *Florentines* continuing their ſollicitations, they enter'd into League with them, by which it was agreed the War ſhould be proſecuted by both parties, at the common expence; that whatever ſhould be taken in *Lombardy*, ſhould be deliver'd to the *Venetians*; and whatever in *Romagna* and *Tuſcany*, ſhould be put into the hands of the *Florentines*; and *Carmignuola* was made General of the League. By means of this alliance the War was transferr'd into *Lombardy*, where it was managed by *Carmignuola* with that diſcretion and courage, that in a few months time he took ſeveral Towns from the Duke, and *Breſcia* among the reſt; which laſt in thoſe times, and according to the method of thoſe Wars, was accounted a miracle. This War continued five years, and the Citizens of *Florence* were much impoveriſh'd by the Taxes, which had been continued as long. Hereupon a regulation was agreed upon, and (that all people might be charg'd according to their Eſtates) it was propos'd the perſonal Eſtate ſhould be chargeable as well as the real; and that whoever had to the value of a hundred Florins in goods, ſhould pay half a proportion. But there being Law and Authority to levy this Tax, but not men enough to compel them, the Grandees were diſguſted, and oppos'd it, before it was perfectly concluded: only *Giovanni de Medici* promoted it ſo vigorouſly, that he carried it againſt them all. And becauſe in the Books of aſſeſſment, every man's goods were rated (which the *Florentines* call *Accataſtare*) this impoſition was call'd *Cataſto*. Moreover this Law reſtrain'd the Tyranny of the Nobles, not permitting them to ſtrike, or terrifie ſuch as were inferior to them in the Councils, as formerly they had preſum'd. This Tax therefore, tho' accepted chearfully enough by the Commons, went much againſt the minds of the Nobility. But it being in the nature of man never to be ſatisfied, and as ſoon as poſſeſs'd of what with great vehemence he deſir'd, to wiſh as fiercely for another: The people, not content with the proportions ſet them by the Law, demanded a retroſpection, and that it might be conſider'd how much the Nobility had paid leſs in times paſt, than was now allotted them by the *Cataſto*, and that they might be forced to pay it for the reimburſement of ſuch as had ſold their Eſtates to enable them to pay their Taxes before. This proportion afrighted the Grandees much more than the *Cataſto*: ſo that to defend themſelves againſt both, they decry'd the *Cataſto* as unjuſt and unequal, in laying a duty upon goods and houſholdſtuff, (which are here to day, and loſt to morrow) and exempting money, which many people kept privately in their hands, ſo as the *Cataſto* could not diſcover it. To which they added, that it was not but reaſonable thoſe Perſons who relinquiſh'd or neglected their own private affairs for the better management of the publick, ſhould be favour'd in the Taxes; for devoting their whole labour to the benefit of the State, there was no juſtice nor equity in the world, that the City ſhould have the profits

Piccinino revolts.

Carmignuola General of the League.

Cataſto.

profits of their Industry, and Estate, and from others receive only the contribution of their Estates. Those who were for the *Catasto*, reply'd, that as their goods varied, the Taxes might be varied too; and to any inconvenience from that, a remedy might be found. As to the money conceal'd, that was not to be considered, for making no profit of it, there was no reason it should be paid for; and when ever they imploy'd it, it would be sure to be discover'd. For the pains they took, and their solicitude for their Country, if it were troublesome to them, they might have liberty to retire, for there was no doubt but some well affected Citizens would be found, who would not repine to serve the City both with their Counsel and Estates: and that there were so many honours, and other perquisits attending those great Offices, as might suffice any reasonable Persons, without abatement of their Taxes. But their great discontent was from another cause; the Nobility were offended that they could not make War at other peoples charge, as they were us'd to do formerly, but were oblig'd to bear their share as well as their Neighbours. Had this way been found out before, there would have been no War with King *Ladislao* then, nor with Duke *Philip* now; both which Wars were undertaken to fill the coffers of some particular Citizens, more than for any general necessity: but this commotion of humours was appeas'd by *Giovanni de Medici*, who convinc'd the people, it was not convenient to look backward. That their business now was to provide carefully for the future, and if the former impositions had been unequal and injust, they were to thank God, a way was found to relieve them, and not make that a means to divide which was intended to unite the City; as it would certainly do, if the old assessments, and the new were adjusted; for it was better to be contented with half a victory than to venture all for an absolute; many instances making it out, that where more has been striv'd for, all has been lost. With these and such like discourses, he pacified the people, and the design of retrospection was quite laid aside.

However the War with the Duke being carried on for a while, a peace at length was concluded at *Ferrara* by the mediation of a Legate from the *Pope*. But the Duke not observing the conditions at first, the League took Arms again, and coming to an engagement with his Army at *Maclovio*, they defeated him quite, and forc'd the Duke to new propositions, which were accepted by the League: by the *Florentines*, because they were grown jealous of the *Venetian*, and sensible, that the vast charge which their City was at, was to make others more powerful than themselves: By the *Venetians*, because they observ'd *Carmignuola*, after the Duke was overthrown, to advance but slowly, and make little or no advantage of his victory, so as they could not place any further confidence in him. In this manner the Peace was concluded in the year 1428, by which the *Florentines* were restor'd to what they had lost in *Romagna*; the *Venetians* had *Brescia*, and the Duke gave them *Bergamo*, and the Territory belonging to it, over and above. This War cost the *Florentines* three millions and five thousand Ducats; the success of which, was Grandeur and Authority to the *Venetian*, but Poverty and Dissention to themselves. Peace being concluded abroad, the War was transplanted, and broke out at home. The *Grandees* of the City could not digest the *Catasto*; and not seeing any way of suppressing it, they contriv'd ways of incensing the people against it, that they might have more Companions to oppose it. They remonstrated therefore to the Officers for collection, that they were to search, and Catastat the goods of the neighbouring Towns, lest any of the *Florentine* goods should be conveyed thither. Whereupon all that were Subjects to that City, were requir'd to bring in Inventories of their goods within a certain time. But the *Volterrani* complaining to the *Senate*, incensed the Officers so highly, they put eighteen of them in Prison. This action provok'd the *Volterrani* exceedingly, but the regard they had for their Prisoners, kept them at present from any commotion.

Peace betwixt the League and and the Duke.

1428.

About this time *Giovanni de Medici* fell Sick, and finding his Sickness to be mortal, he call'd his Sons *Cosimo* and *Lorenzo* to him, and said;

Giovanni de Medici's Speech to his Sons at his Death.

I suppose the time that God and Nature allotted me at my Birth, is now expir'd; I die contented, leaving you rich, and healthful, and honourable, (if you follow my footsteps and instruction) and indeed nothing makes my Death so easie and quiet to me, as the thought that I have been so far from injuring or disobliging any Person, that I have done them all the good offices I was able; and the same course I recommend to you. For matter of Office and Government (if you would live happy and secure) my advice is, you accept what the Laws and the People conferr upon you; that will create you neither envy nor danger; for 'tis not what is given that makes men odious, but what is usurp'd; and you shall always find greater number of those who incroaching upon other peoples interest, ruine their own at last, and in the mean time live in perpetual disquiet. With these arts, among so many factions and enemies, I have not only preserv'd but augmented my

reputation in this City, if you follow my example, you may maintain and increase yours. But if neither my example nor persuasion can keep you from other ways, your ends will be no happier than several others who in my memory have destroy'd both themselves and their Families.

Not long after he died, and was infinitely lamented by the greatest part of the City, as indeed his good qualities deserv'd: for he was charitable to the height; not only relieving such as he ask'd, but preventing the modesty of such as he thought poor, and supplying them without it. He lov'd all People: the good he commended; the bad he commiserated. He sought no Office, and went through them all. He never went to the Palace, but invited. He was a lover of Peace, and an Enemy to War. He relieved those who were in adversity, and those who were in prosperity he assisted. He was no friend to publick Extortion, and yet a great argumenter of Common Stock. Courteous in all his Employments; not very eloquent, but solid, and judicious. His Complexion appear'd melancholy, but in company he was pleasant and facetious. He died rich, especially in Love and Reputation; and the inheritance of all descended upon his Son *Cosimo*.

Cosimo Heir to his Father.

The *Volterrani* were weary of their imprisonment, and to recover their liberties, promis'd to condescend to what was requir'd. Being discharg'd, and return'd to *Volterra*, the time for the new *Priori's* entrance into the Magistracy arriv'd, and one *Giusto* (a Plebeian, but a Man of good interest among them) was chosen in the place. Having been one of those who were imprison'd at *Florence*, he had conceiv'd a mortal hatred against the *Florentines*, and it was increas'd by the instigation of one *Giovanni* (a Person of Noble extraction) who being in Authority with him at the same time, persuaded him, that by the authority of the *Priori*, and his own interest, he would stir up the People to rescue themselves from their dependance upon *Florence*, and afterwards make himself Prince. Upon this encouragement *Giusto* took Arms; possess'd himself of the Town; imprison'd the *Florentine* Governor, and, by consent of the people, made himself Lord. The news of these revolutions in *Volterra*, was not at all pleasing to the *Florentines*: But their peace being made with the Duke, and their Articles sign'd, they thought they had leisure enough to recover that Town; and to lose no time, they made *Rinaldo de gli Albizzi*, and *Palla Strozzi* Commissioners, and sent them thither out of hand. *Giusto* suspecting the *Florentines* would assault him, sent to *Sienna* and *Lucca* for relief. The *Sienneſi* refus'd him, alledging they were in League with the *Florentine*: and *Pagolo Guinigi* (who was then Lord of *Lucca*) to reingratiate with the people of *Florence* (whose favour he had lost in their Wars with the Duke) not only deny'd his assistance to *Giusto*, but sent his Embassador Prisoner to *Florence*. The Commissioners to surprize the *Volterrani* before they were aware, assembled what strength they had of their own, rais'd what Foot they could in the lower *Val d' Arno*, and the territory of *Pisa*, and march'd towards *Volterra*. *Giusto* discourag'd neither by the desertion of his Neighbours, nor the approach of the Enemy, rely'd upon the situation and strength of the Town; and prepar'd for his defence. There was at that time in *Volterra*, one *Arcolano* (a Brother of that *Giovanni* who had persuaded *Giusto* to take the Government upon him) a Person of good credit among the Nobility. This *Arcolano* having got several of his Confidents together, he remonstrated to them, how God Almighty by this accident had reliev'd the necessities of their City; for if they would take Arms with him; remove *Giusto* from the Government, and deliver all up to the *Florentines*, they should not only have their old Priviledges confirm'd, but be themselves made the chief Officers of the Town. Having consented to the design; they repair'd immediately to the Palace where *Giusto* resided; and leaving the rest below, *Arcolano* with three more went up into the Dining-room, where they found him with other Citizens: they pretended to speak with him about business of importance, and having (in the variety of their discourse) drill'd him to another Chamber, *Arcolano* and his accomplices fell upon him with their Swords: but they were not so nimble but *Giusto* had the opportunity to draw his, and wound two of them, before he fell himself; yet his destiny being unavoidable, he was kill'd, and thrown into the Palace-yard. Whereupon those who were Confederate with *Arcolano* taking Arms, they deliver'd up the Town to the *Florentine* Commissioners, who were not far of with their Army. The Commissioners march'd directly into the Town, without any Capitulation, so that then the condition of the *Volterrani* was worse than before; for among other things, a great part of their Country was dismembred; and the Town it self reduc'd to a *Vicariata*. *Volterra* being in this manner lost, and recover'd at the same time, there had been no danger of new War, had not the ambition of some Men pull'd it down upon their heads. There was a person who for a long time had serv'd the *Florentines* in their Wars against the Duke; his name was *Nicolo Fortebraccio*, Son of a Sister of *Braccio de Perugia*. This *Nicolo* was disbanded upon the Peace; and at the time of these

Giusto.

Volterra revolts.

Giusto slain.

theſe accidents at *Volterra* had his quarters at *Fucecchio*, ſo that the Commiſſioners made uſe of him and his Soldiers in that enterprize. It was believ'd, that whilſt *Rinaldo* was engag'd with him in that War, he had perſuaded *Nicolo* upon ſome pretended quarrel, to fall upon the *Luccheſi*; aſſuring him that if he did, he would order Things ſo in *Florence*, that an Army ſhould be ſent againſt *Lucca*, and he have the command of it. *Volterra* being reduc'd, and *Nicolo* return'd to his old Poſt at *Fucecchio*, either upon *Rinaldo*'s inſtigation, or his own private inclination, in *Novem.* 1429. with 300 Horſe and 300 Foot, he ſurpriz'd *Ruoti* and *Compito*, two Caſtles belonging to the *Luccheſi*; and afterwards falling down into the Plain, he made great depredation. The news being brought to *Florence*, the whole Town was in uproar, and the greateſt part was for an expedition againſt *Lucca*. Of the chief Citizens which favour'd the Enterprize, there were all the *Medici*, and *Rinaldo*, who was prompted thereto either out of an opinion it would be for the advantage of that Common-wealth, or out of an ambition to be made Head of it himſelf. Thoſe who oppos'd it were *Nicolo da Uzano*, and his party. And it ſeems an incredible thing, that in one City, upon one occaſion, there ſhould be ſuch contrariety of Judgments. For the ſame People who after ten years Peace, oppos'd the War againſt Duke *Philip*, (which was undertaken in defence of their Liberties) the ſame Perſons now, after ſuch vaſt Expence, and ſo many Calamities as their City had undergone, preſs'd and importun'd for a War with the *Luccheſi*, to diſturb the Liberties of other People. And on the other ſide, thoſe who were for the War then, reſiſted it now: So ſtrangely does time alter the Judgments of Men; ſo much more prone are People to invade their Neighbours than to ſecure themſelves, and ſo much more ready are they to conceive hopes of gaining upon others than to apprehend any danger of loſing their own. For dangers are not believ'd till they be over their heads; but hopes are entertain'd though at never ſo great diſtance. The People of *Florence* were full of hopes upon intelligence of what *Nicolo Fortebraccio* had done and did ſtill do, and upon certain Letters which they received from their *Rettori* upon the Confines of *Lucca*. For their Deputies in *Peſcia*, and *Vico*, writ them word that if they might have liberty to receive ſuch Caſtles and Towns as would be deliver'd up to them, they ſhould be Maſters of the greateſt part of the Territory of *Lucca*: and it contributed not a little to their encouragement, that at the ſame time they received an Embaſſie from the *Senate* of *Lucca*, to complain of *Nicolo*'s invaſion, and to beg of the *Senate* that they would not make War upon a neighbour City, which had preſerv'd a conſtant amity with them. The Embaſſador's name was *Jacopo Vicciani*; who had been Priſoner not long before to *Pagolo Guinigi* Lord of *Lucca*, for a Conſpiracy againſt him; and (though found guilty) had been pardon'd for his Life. Suppoſing he would have as eaſily have forgiven his impriſonment as *Pagolo* had done his Offence, he imploy'd him in this Embaſſie, and ſent him to *Florence*. But *Jacopo* being more mindful of the danger he had eſcap'd, than the benefit he had receiv'd, encouraged the *Florentines* to the Enterprize; which Encouragement added to the hopes they had conceiv'd before, and caus'd them to call a General Council (in which 498 Citizens appear'd) before whom the whole Project was more particularly debated.

Rinaldo perſuades the War.

Among the principal Promoters of the Expedition (as I ſaid before) Rinaldo was one, who repreſented to them, the great Advantage that would accrue to them by the taking of that Town. He inſiſted upon the Convenience of the Time, as being abandon'd by the Venetian, and the Duke; and not capable of Relief from the Pope, who had his Hands full another way. To which he added the eaſineſs of the Enterprize, the Government having been uſurp'd by one of its own Citizens, and by that means loſt much of its natural Vigour, and ancient diſpoſition to defend its Liberties; ſo that it was more than probable, either the People would deliver it up, in oppoſition to the Tyrant, or the Tyrant ſurrender for fear of the People. He exaggerated the Injuries that Governour had done to their State, the ill Inclination he ſtill retain'd towards them; and the Dangers which would enſue if the Pope or Duke ſhould make War upon it; concluding that no Enterprize was ever undertaken by the State of Florence more eaſie, more profitable, or more juſt.

Uzano oppoſes it.

In oppoſition to this it was urg'd by Uzano, that the City of Florence never undertook any War with more injuſtice or hazard, nor any that was more like to produce ſad and pernicious Effects. That firſt, they were to invade a City of the Guelfiſh Faction, which had been always a Friend to the City of Florence; and to its own danger and prejudice many times receiv'd the Guelfs into its boſom, when they were baniſh'd, or unſafe in their own Country. That in all the Chronicles of our Affairs, it was not to be found that City had ever offended Florence, whilſt it was free; and if at any time ſince its ſubjection, it had tranſgreſs'd, (as indeed it had during the Government of Caſtruccio, and

under this present Lord) it was but reasonable to lay the Saddle upon the right Horse; and to impute the fault rather to their Tyrants, than Town. If War could be made against the Tyrant, without detriment to the City, well and good; the injustice would be the less. But that being impossible, he could never consent that a City of so ancient amity and alliance, should be ruin'd for nothing. However because Men liv'd then at such a rate, that no account was made of what was just and unjust, he would wave so trifling an Argument, and proceed to the profit and emolument of that War, which was the thing now-a days most seriously considered: did believe those Things were most properly call'd profitable, which carried least damage along with them; but how that Expedition could with any equity be call'd profitable, he could not understand; seeing the damage was certain, and the benefit but contingent. The certainty of the damage consisted in the vastness of the Expence, which must of necessity be great enough to discourage a City that was quiet and at peace, much more one that had been already harrass'd out with a tedious and a chargeable War, as their City had been. The advantages propos'd, were the taking of Lucca, *which he confess'd would be considerable. Yet the accidents and impediments with which they might meet, were so far from being to be slighted, that to him they seemed numerous and insuperable, and the whole Enterprize impossible. Nor ought they to presume that either the* Venetian *or the Duke would be content that they should conquer it; for though the* Venetian *seem'd to comply, it was but in gratitude to the* Florentines, *at whose charges they had so largely extended their Empire, and the other was only cautious of engaging in a new War, and new Expence, and attended till they were tired and exhausted, that he might fall upon them with advantage. He minded them likewise, that in the middle of their Enterprize, and in the highest hopes of their Victory, the Duke would not want means to relieve the* Luccheſi, *either by supplying them with Money under-hand, or if that would not do, by disbanding his Men, and sending them as Soldiers of Fortune, to take Pay under them. Upon these Reasons he perswaded them to give over that design, and to live so with that Usurper, as to create him what Enemies they could; for he knew no way so ready to subdue the Town, as to leave it to his Tyranny, and let him alone to afflict and weaken it as he pleas'd. So that if the business was manag'd as it should be, that City might quickly be brought to such terms, that the Usurper, not knowing how to hold it, and the City as unable to govern it self, would be constrain'd to throw it self voluntarily under their Protection. Nevertheless seeing their eagerness was such, that his Reasons could not be heard, he would undertake to prognosticate, that the War which they were about should cost them much Money; expose them to many dangers at home, and in stead of taking* Lucca, *and keeping it to themselves, they should deliver it from an Usurper, and of a poor, servile, but friendly City, make it free, and malicious, and such as in time would grow to be a great Obstacle to the greatness of* Florence.

This Enterprize being thus canvassed on both sides, it came (privately and according to custom) to the Votes of the whole Convention, and of the whole Number, only 98 were against it. Resolution being taken, and the ten Men created for the carrying on of the War, they rais'd Men with all speed, both Infantry and Horse. For Commissaries, they deputed *Astorre Gianni*, and *Rinaldo de gli Albizi*, and made an Agreement with *Nicolo Fortebaccio* that he should deliver what Towns he had taken, into their Hands, and take Pay under them. The Commissaries being arriv'd with their Army in the Country of *Lucca*, they divided, *Astorre* extending himself upon the Plain towards *Camaggiore*, and *Pietra Santa*; and *Rinaldo* with his Squadron marching towards the Mountains, presuming that if they cut off its intercourse with the Country, it would be no hard matter to become Masters of the Town. But both their Designs were unhappy; not but that they took several Castles and Towns, but because of sundry Imprudences committed in the management of the War, both by the one and the other. *Astorre Gianni* gave particular Evidence of his Indiscretion in the Passage which follows. Not far from *Pietra Santa* there is a Vale call'd *Seravezza*, rich, and full of Inhabitants; who understanding the approach of that Commissary, went out to meet him, and to desire that he would receive and protect them as faithful Servants to the People of *Florence*. *Astorre* pretended to accept their offer, but afterwards he caus'd his Soldiers to sieze upon all the strong Places and Passes in the Vale; and assembling all the Inhabitants in their principal Church, he kept them Prisoners, and commanded his Men to plunder and destroy the whole Country; after a most cruel and barbarous way, prophaning the Churches and Religious Houses, and abusing the Women, as well Virgins as others. These Passages being known in *Florence*, offended not only the Magistrates, but the whole City. Some of the *Seravezi*, who had escap'd the hands of the Commissary, fled directly to *Florence*, telling the sadness of their Condition to all Persons they met with; and being encouraged by several who were desirous to have *Astorre* punish'd, either

The Cruelty of *Astorre*.

ther as an evil Man, or as an Adversary to their Faction; they addres's'd themselves to the *Ten*, and desired to be heard; and being introduc'd, one of them step'd forth and spake to this purpose.

The *Saravezesi* complain.

We are assured (most magnificent Lords) our Words would not only find Belief, but Compassion among you, did you but know in what manner your Commissary first seiz'd upon our Country, and afterwards upon us. Our Vale (as 'tis likely your Chronicles may remember you) was always of the Guelfish *party; and many times a faithful Receptacle for such of your Citizens as by the persecution of the* Ghibilins *were not suffered at home. Our Ancestors and we have always ador'd the very name of this illustrious Republick; and esteem'd it as the head and principal Member of that Party. Whilst* Lucca *was* Guelfish, *we submitted very quietly to their Commands; but since it fell under the dominion of an Usurper, who has relinquished its old Friends, and joyn'd himself with the* Ghibilins, *we have obey'd him, 'tis true, but rather by force than by consent: and God knows how often we have begg'd for an opportunity to express our Affection to our old Friends. But how blind and deceitful are the desires of Man! That which we prayed for, as our only Felicity, is become our Destruction. As soon as we heard your Ensigns were marching towards us, supposing them not our Enemies, but our ancient Lords, and Friends, we went immediately to wait upon your Commissary, and committed our Valley, our Fortunes, and our selves into his Hands, relying wholly upon his Generosity, and presuming he had the Soul (if not of a* Florentine) *at least of a Man. Pardon (I beseech you) my freedom, we have suffer'd so much already, nothing can be worse, and that gives me this Confidence.*

Your General has nothing of a Man but his Person, nor of a Florentine *but his Name. He is a mortal Disease, a savage Beast, and as horrid a Monster as ever any Author ever describ'd. For having wheedled us together into our Cathedral, under pretence of discoursing some Things with us, he made us his Prisoners: ruin'd and burn'd our Valley; robb'd, and spoiled, and sacked, and beat, and murdered the Inhabitants: the Women he ravish'd, the Virgins he forced, tearing them out of the arms of their Parents, and throwing them as a prey to his Soldiers. Had we provok'd him by any injury either to his Country or himself, we should have been so far from complaining, we should have condemn'd our selves; and esteem'd it no more than what our own insolence and unworthiness had pull'd upon our Heads. But having put our selves freely into his power, without Arms or any other capacity of resistance; to be then robb'd, and abus'd, with so much injury and insolence, is beyond humane patience, and we cannot but resent it. And though we might make all* Lombardy *ring with the sadness of our Complaints; and with imputation, and scandal to this City, diffuse the story of our Sufferings all over* Italy, *we have waved and declin'd it, thinking it unjust to asperse so Noble, so Charitable a Common-wealth, with the cruelty and dishonour of a barbarous Citizen, whose insatiable Avarice had we known, or could have but suspected, before we had try'd it; we would have strain'd and forc'd our selves to have gorg'd it (though indeed it has neither bounds nor bottom) and by that means (if possible) preserv'd part of our Estates, by sacrificing the rest. But that being too late, we have addres's'd our selves most humbly to your Lordships, begging that ye should relieve the infelicity of your Subjects; that other People may not (by our President) be terrify'd or discourag'd from committing themselves under your Empire and Dominion. If the infinite and unsupportable Injuries we have suffer'd, be too weak or few to procure your Compassion; yet let the fear of God's Displeasure prevail, whose Temples have been plunder'd and burn'd, and his People betray'd in the very Bowels of his Churches.*

And having said thus, they threw themselves before them upon the Ground, yelling, and imploring that they might be repossess'd of their Estates and their Country; and that their Lordships would take care (seeing their Reputation was irrecoverable) that at least the Wives might be restored to their Husbands, and the Children to their Parents. The cruelty and inhumanity of his Behaviour having been understood before; and now particularly related by the Sufferers themselves; wrought so highly upon the Magistrates, that immediately they commanded *Astorre* back from the *Army*, cash'eir'd him, and made him afterwards incapable of any Command. They caus'd Inquisition likewise to be made after the Goods of the *Saravezesi:* such as were found, were restor'd; what could not be found, was repris'd afterwards by the City, as opportunity was offer'd.

Rinaldo accus'd.

Rinaldo de gli Albizi was accus'd on the other side for managing the War, not so much for the publick profit of his Country, as for his own; it was objected against him, that from the very hour of his Commission, he laid aside all thoughts of reducing *Lucca*, and design'd no farther than to plunder the Country, to fill his own Pastures with other Peoples Cattle, and furnish his own Houses with other Peoples Goods. That his own Booty and his

his Officers being too little to satisfie him, he barter'd and bought the Plunder of his common Soldiers, and, of a General, made himself a Merchant. These Calumniations being come to his Ears, nettled his honest, but haughty Mind, more perhaps than a wise Man would have suffer'd them to do. However they disturb'd him so, that in a Rage both against Magistrate and City, without expecting, or so much as desiring leave, he return'd upon the spur to *Florence*, presented himself before the *Ten*, and told them;

His Speech to the *Ten*.

That he now found how difficult and dangerous it was to serve an unconstant People, and a divided City; the one entertain'd all Reports and believ'd them: The other punish'd what was amiss, condemn'd what was uncertain, but rewarded nothing that was done well. So that if you overcome, no body thanks you; if you mistake every body blames you; if you miscarry every body reproaches you; either your Friends persecute you for Emulation, or your Enemies for Malice. However for his part he had never, for fear of Scandal or Imputation, omitted any thing which he judg'd might be of certain Advantage to his Country. But that now indeed the baseness of the Calumnies under which at present he lay, had master'd his Patience, and chang'd his whole Nature. Wherefore he begg'd the Magistrates would for the future be more ready to justifie their Officers, that they might act with more Alacrity for the good of their Country. And that seeing in Florence *no Triumph was to be expected, that they at least would concern themselves so far, as to secure them from Obloquy. He admonish'd them likewise to reflect, that they themselves were Officers of the same City, and by consequence every Hour liable to such Slanders as may give them to understand how great Trouble and Disquiet honest Men conceive at such false Accusations.*

The *Ten* endeavour'd to pacifie him as much as the Time would allow, but transferr'd his Command upon *Neri di Gino*, and *Alamanno Salviati*, who instead of rambling, and harrassing the Country, advanced with their Army, and block'd up the Town. The Season being cold, the Army was lodg'd at *Capanole*, the new Generals, thinking the Time long, had a mind to be nearer, and encamp before the Town; but the Soldiers objected the ill Weather, and would not consent, though the *Ten* sent them positive Orders to that purpose, and would not hear of Excuse.

There was at that time Resident in *Florence*, a most excellent Architect, call'd *Philip*, the Son of *Brunelesco*, of whose Workmanship this City is so full, that after his Death he deserv'd to have his Statue set up in Marble in the principal Church of the Town, with an Inscription under it, to testifie his great Excellence to the Reader. This *Philip* upon consideration of the banks of the River *Serchio*, and the situation of the Town, had found out a way to drown it. This invention he imparted to the *Ten*, and so convinc'd them, that by their order, experiment was to be made, which was done; but it turn'd more to the prejudice of our Camp, than to the detriment of the Town. For the *Luccheſi* perceiving the design, heighten'd and strengthned their banks on that part where the River was to over-flow, and afterwards taking their opportunity one night, they brake down the Sluice which was made to turn the Water upon them; so that their banks being firm and high, and the banks towards the Plain open, it overflowed their Camp, and forc'd them to remove. This design miscarrying, the *Ten* call'd home their Commissioners, and sent *Giovanni Guiccardini* to command the Army in their stead; who clap'd down before the Town, and straiten'd it immediately. Finding himself distress'd, the Governor of the Town, upon the encouragement of *Antonio del Rosso*, a *Sienneſe* (who was with him as Resident from the Town of *Sienna*) sent *Salveſtro Trenta* and *Lodovico Bonviſi* to the Duke of *Milan*, to desire he would relieve him. Finding him cold in the business, they entreated him privately that he would at least send them supplies, and promis'd him (from the People) that as soon as they were arrived, they would deliver both Lord and Town into their hands; assuring him that if this resolution were not suddenly taken, their Lord would surrender it to the *Florentines*, who had tempted him with several fair proffers. The fear of that, made the Duke lay aside all other respects; wherefore he caus'd the Conte *Franceſco Sforza* his General, publickly to desire leave to march with his forces into the Kingdom of *Naples*; and having obtain'd it, he went with his Troops to *Lucca*, notwithstanding the *Florentines*, upon notice of his transaction, sent to the Conte *Boccaccinor Almanni* their friend to prevent it. *Franceſco* having forced his passage into the Town, the *Florentines* drew off to *Librafatta*, and the Conte march'd out, and sat down before *Peſcia*, where *Pagolo da Diaccetto* was Governor, and in great fear ran away to *Piſtoia*. Had not the Town been better defended by *Giovanni Malavolti* than by him, it had been most dishonourably lost. The Conte, not able to carry it at the first assault, drew off, to *Buggiano*, took that and *Stilano* a Castle not far off and burn'd both of them to the ground. The *Florentines* displeas'd with this devastation, apply'd themselves to a remedy which had often preserv'd them; and knowing that Soldiers of Fortune are easier corrupted than beaten, they caus'd

a conſiderable Sum to be proffer'd to the Conte, not only to depart, but to deliver them the Town. The Conte perceiving no Man was to be ſqueez'd out of that City, accepted the Propoſition in part; but not thinking it convenient in point of honour to put them in poſſeſſion of the Town, he articled to draw away his Army upon the payment of 50000 Ducats. This agreement being made, that the People of *Lucca* might excuſe him to the Duke, he ſeiz'd upon their Governour, which they had promis'd to depoſe. *Antonio del Roſſo* (the *Sienna* Embaſſador) was at that time in *Lucca*, as we ſaid before. This *Antonio* by the Authority of the Conte, meditated the deſtruction of *Pagolo*. The heads of the Conſpiracy were *Pietro Cennami*, and *Giovanni da Chivizano*.

The Conte was quartered out of the Town, upon the Banks of the *Serchio*, and with him the Governour's Son. The Conſpirators, about 40 in number, went in the night to find out *Pagolo*, who hearing of their intention, came forth in great fear to meet them, and inquire the occaſion. To whom *Cennami* made anſwer; That they had been too long govern'd by him: that the Enemy was now about their walls, and they brought into a neceſſity of dying either by Famine or the Sword; That for the future they were reſolv'd to take the Government into their own hands, and therefore they demanded that the Treaſure, and the Keys of the City might be delivered to them. *Pagolo* reply'd, that the Treaſure was conſum'd; but both the Keys and himſelf were at their ſervice, only he had one requeſt to make to them, that as his Government had begun, and continued without blood, ſo there might be none ſpilt at its concluſion. Hereupon *Pagolo* and his Son were deliver'd up to the Conte *Franceſco*, who preſented them to the Duke, and both of them died afterwards in Priſon.

Pagolo Lord of *Lucca* depos'd.

This departure of the Conte, having freed the *Luccheſi* from the Tyranny of their Governour, and the *Florentine* from the fear of his Army; both ſides fell again to their preparations; the one to beleaguer, and the other to defend. The *Florentines* made the Conte *Orbino* their General, who begirt the Town ſo cloſe, the *Luccheſi* were conſtrain'd once more to deſire the aſſiſtance of the Duke, who under the ſame pretence as he had formerly ſent the Conte, ſent *Nicolo Piccinino* to relieve them. *Piccinino* advancing with his Troops to enter the Town, the *Florentines* oppoſing his paſſage over the River, the *Florentines* were defeated after a ſharp engagement, and the General with very few of his Forces, preſerv'd themſelves at *Piſa*. This Diſaſter put the whole City in great Conſternation; and becauſe the Enterprize had been undertaken upon the Peoples account, not knowing where elſe to direct their Complaints, they laid the fault upon the Officers and Managers, ſeeing they could not fix it upon the Contrivers of the War; and reviv'd their old Articles againſt *Rinaldo*. But the greateſt part of their Indignation fell upon *Giovanni Guiccardini*; charging him that it was in his power to have put an end to the War, after Conte *Franceſco* was departed; but that he had been corrupted by their Money; part of which had been remitted to his own Houſe by Bills of Exchange; and part he had received himſelf, and carried it with him. Theſe Reports and Rumours went ſo high, that the Captain of the People, moved by them, and the importunity of the contrary Party, ſummon'd him before him; *Giovanni* appear'd, but full of Indignation; whereupon his Relations interpos'd, and to their great Honour, prevail'd ſo far with the Captain, that the proceſs was laid aſide. The *Luccheſi* upon this Victory not only recover'd their own Towns, but over-ran, and poſſeſs'd themſelves of the whole Territory of *Piſa*, except *Biantina*, *Calcinaia*, *Liccorno*, and *Librafatta*; and (had not a Conſpiracy been accidentally diſcover'd in *Piſa*) that City had been loſt among the reſt. The *Florentines* however recruited their Army, and ſent it out under the command of *Micheletto*, who had been bred up a Soldier under *Sforza*.

The *Florentines* defeated.

The Duke having obtain'd the Victory, to overlay the *Florentines* with multitude of Enemies, procured a League betwixt the *Genoueſi*, *Saniſi*, and the Lord of *Piombino*, for the defence of *Lucca*; and that *Piccinino* ſhould be their General; which thing alone was the diſcovery of the Plot. Hereupon the *Venetians* and *Florentines* renew their League: open Hoſtilities are committed both in *Lombardy* and *Tuſcany*; and many Skirmiſhes and Rencounters happen with various Fortune on both ſides; till at length every Body being tir'd, a general Peace was concluded betwixt all Parties in the Month of *May* 1433, by which it was agreed that the *Florentines*, *Sienneſi*, *Luccheſi*, and who ever elſe during that War had taken any Towns or Caſtles from their Enemies, ſhould reſtore them, and all Things return to the poſſeſſion of the Owners. During the time of this War abroad, the malignant and factious Humours began to work again and ferment at home; and *Coſimo de Medici* after the Death of his Father, began to manage the publick Buſineſs with greater Intenſion and Magnanimity; and converſe with his Friends with greater freedom than his Father had done. Inſomuch that thoſe who

1433.

Peace betwixt the *Florentines* and *Luccheſi*.

before

before were glad at the death of *Giovanni*, were much surpriz'd and confounded, to see him so far out-done by his Son. *Cosimo* was a wise and sagacious Gentleman, grave, but graceful in his presence; liberal, and courteous to the higheſt; never attempted any thing against any Party, nor the State, but watch'd all opportunities of doing good to every Body, and obliging all People with his continual beneficence. So that indeed the excellency of his Converſation, was no little distraction and disadvantage to those who were at the Helm. However, by that way he presum'd he should be lyable to live as freely, and with as much Authority in *Florence*, as other People: or else being driven to any strait by the malice of his Adversaries, it would be in his power to deal with them, by the assistance of his friends. The great Instruments for the propagation of his interest were *Averardo de Medici* and *Puccio Pucci*, *Averardo* with his prudence procuring him much favour and reputation. This *Puccio* was a Person so eminent for his Judgment, and so well known to the People, that he denominated the Faction, which was not cal'd *Cosimo*'s, but *Puccio*'s Party. The City was divided in this manner at that time, when the enterprize was taken against *Lucca*; during which, the ill humours were rather provok'd and incens'd than extinguish'd. And although *Puccio*'s Party were the great promoters of it at first, yet afterwards in the prosecution of it, many of the contrary party were imploy'd, as Men of more reputation in the State. Which being above the power of *Averardo de Medici*, and his Comrades to prevent, he set himself with all possible Art to calumniate those Officers; and upon any misfortune (and no great thing can be managed without it) all was imputed rather to their Imprudence and ill Conduct, than to the Virtue of their Enemies. He it was that aggravated his Enormities so strongly against *Astorre Gianni*. He it was disgusted *Rinaldo de gli Albizi*, and caus'd him to desert his Command without leave. He it was which caus'd the Captain of the people to cite *Guiccardini* before him. From him it was all the other aspersions which were laid upon the Magistrates and the Generals did proceed. He aggravated what was true; he invented what was false; and what was true, and what was false were readily believ'd by those who hated them before.

These unjust and irregular ways of proceeding were well known to *Nicolo Uzano*, and other heads of that Party. They had many times consulted how they might remedy them, but could never pitch upon a way. To suffer them to increase, they were sensible would be dangerous; and to endeavour to suppress them, they knew would be difficult. *Nicolo da Uzano* was the first Man that expos'd his disgust; but observing the War to be continued without, and the Distractions increasing at home; *Nicolo Barbadori*, desirous of *Uzano*'s concurrence to the destruction of *Cosimo*, went to seek him at his house, and finding him alone very pensive in his study, he persuaded him with the best arguments he could use, to joyn with *Rinaldo* in the expulsion of *Cosimo*; to whom *Nicolo da Uzano* reply'd in these Words:

Nicolo da Uzano's answer to *Barbadori*.

It were better for your self, for your Family, and the whole Common-wealth, if both you and your whole party had their Beards (as they say you have) rather of Silver than Gold. Their Counsels then, proceeding from Heads that were gray, and repleat with experience, would be fuller of Wisdom, and advantage to the Publick. Those who design to drive Cosimo *out of* Florence, *ought first to consider his interest with their own. Our party you have christen'd the party of the Nobility, and the contrary faction, is call'd the faction of the People. Did the truth of the matter correspond with the name, yet in all adventures the victory would be doubtful, and we ought in discretion rather to fear than presume, when we remember the Conditon of the Anciem Nobility of this City, which have not only been depress'd, but extinguish'd by the People. But we are under greater discouragements than that, our Party is divided, theirs is entire. In the first place* Neri de Gino, *and* Nerone de Nigi *(two of the Principal of our City) have not declar'd themselves as yet; so that it remains uncertain which side they will take. There are several houses and families divided among themselves. Many out of a pique to their Brothers, or some other of their Relations, have abandon'd us, and betaken to them. I shall instance in some of the chief, and leave the rest to your private consideration. Of the Sons of* Maso de gli Albizi, Lucca, *out of animosity to* Rinaldo, *has engag'd himself on the other side. In the Family of the* Guiccardini, *among the Sons of* Luigi, Piero *is an Enemy to his Brother* Giovanni, *and sides with our adversaries.* Tomaso *and* Nicolo Soderini, *in opposition to* Francesco *their Unkle, are manifestly defected. So that if it be seriously deliberated, who are on their side, and who are on ours, I know no reason why ours should be call'd the faction of the Nobility more than theirs. And if it be alledg'd, that the People are all on their side; so much is ours the worse; for when ever we come to blows, we shall not be able to oppose them. If we insist upon our Dignity, it was given us at first, and has been continued to us*

for

for fifty years by this State; and if now we should discover our weakness, we should certainly lose it. If you pretend the justice of our cause, and that that will give us reputation, and detract from our Enemies.

I answer, it is fit that justice should be known and believ'd by other People as well as our selves; which is quite contrary, the whole cause of our present Commotion being founded upon a bare suspicion, that Cosimo *would usurp, and make himself Sovereign of our City. Though this suspicion passes among us, it does not with other People, who accuse us even for our accusation of him. Examine the crimes upon which we ground our suspicion; what are they, but that he distributes his money freely, according to every Man's necessity; and that not only upon a private, but publick account, not only to the* Florentines, *but to the foreign Commanders: that he favours this or that Citizen which desires to be a Magistrate; that by the general reputation he has among all People, he advances this, or that of his friends to employments as he sees occasion: so that the whole weight and strength of his impeachment, lyes in this; that he is charitable, liberal; ready to his friend; and belov'd by all People. Tell me I beseech you what Laws is it that prohibits, that blames, and condemns beneficence or love? 'Tis true, these are ways by which Men aspire and do many times arrive at the Supremacy; but they are not thought so by other People; nor are we sufficient to obtrude them; because our own ways have defam'd us; and the City (having lived always in faction) is become corrupt and partial, and will never regard our accusations. But admit you succeed, and should prevail so far as to banish him (which truly if the Senate concur might be done without difficulty) how can you think among so many of his friends as will be left behind, and labour incessantly for his return, to obviate or prevent it? Certainly it will be impossible, his interest is so great, and himself so universally belov'd, you can never secure him. If you go about to banish the chief of those who discover themselves to be his friends, you do but multiply your adversaries, and create more Enemies to your self: return he will, in a very short time, and then you have gain'd only this point, to have banish'd a good Man, and re-admitted a bad; for you must expect he will be exasperated, his Nature debauch'd by those who call him back; and being oblig'd to them so highly, it will be no prudence in him to reject them. If your design be to put him to Death formally, by the co-operation of the Magistrate; that is not to be done; his wealth, and your corruption, will preserve him. But admit he should die, or being banish'd never return, I do not see what advantage will accrue to our State. If it be deliver'd from* Cosimo, *it will be in the same danger of* Rinaldo; *and I am of their number who would have no Citizen exceed another in Authority. If either of them prevail (as one of them must) I know not what obligation I have to favour* Rinaldo *more than* Cosimo. *I will say no more, than God deliver this City from private usurpation, and (when our sins do deserve it) particularly from his. Do not therefore persuade to a thing that is every way so dangerous; do not fancy that by the assistance of a few, you can oppose against a multitude: all the Citizens you converse with, partly by ignorance, and partly by malice, are dispos'd to sell their Country; and fortune is so favourable as to have presented them a Chapman. Manage your self therefore by my Counsel for once; live quietly, and observe, and (as to your liberty you will have as much reason to be jealous of your own party, as the adverse. When troubles do happen, let me advise you to be a Neuter; by it you will stand fair with both sides, and preserve your self, without prejudice to your Country.*

These words rebated the edge of *Barbadoro*'s fury; and all things remain'd peaceable during the War with *Lucca*. But peace being concluded, and *Uzano* deceased, the City was left without wars abroad, or Government at home; every Man driving on his own pernicious designs; and *Rinaldo* (looking upon himself now as Chief of the Party) press'd and importun'd all such Citizens as he thought capable of being *Gonfalonieri* to take Arms and wrest their Country out of the jaws of a person, who by the malice of a few, and the ignorance of the multitude, would otherwise inevitably enslave it. These Plots and Counter-plots on *Rinaldo*'s side, and his Adversaries, kept the City in a perpetual jealousie: Insomuch that at the creation of every Magistrate it was publickly declar'd how every Man stood affected both to the one faction and the other; and at the Election of Senators, the whole City was in an uproar: every thing that was brought before the Magistrate (how inconsiderable and trifling so ever) created a mutiny: all secrets were discover'd: nothing was so good, or so evil, but it had its favourers and opposers; the good as well as the bad were equally traduc'd, and no one Magistrate did execute his Office.

Florence remaining in this confusion; and *Rinaldo* impatient to depress the Authority of *Cosimo*; considering with himself that *Bernardo Guadagni* (were it not for his arrears to the

the Publick) was a fit Perſon to be choſen *Gonfaloniere*; to qualifie him for that Office, he diſcharg'd them himſelf. And coming afterwards to a *Scrutiny*, it fell out that Fortune (which has been always a friend to our diſorders) made *Bernardo*, *Gonfaloniere* for the Months of *September* and *October*. *Rinaldo* viſited him forthwith, and told him that the Nobility, and all People that deſir'd to live happily, were much rejoyced at his preferment; and that it was now his buſineſs to carry himſelf ſo as they might never repent it: He laid before him the danger of dividing among themſelves; and how nothing could contribute ſo much to their Union, as the depreſſion of *Coſimo*; for he was the Man, and no other, who kept them down, by the immenſity of his treaſure, and rais'd up himſelf ſo high, that without timely prevention he would make himſelf Sovereign. That (as he was a good Citizen) it was his Office to provide againſt it, by aſſembling the People in the *Piazza*; taking the State into his protection; and reſtoring its liberty to its Country: He put him in mind that *Salveſtro de Medici* could (though unjuſtly) curb and correct the Authority of the *Guelfs*, to whom (if for no other reaſon but for the Blood which their Anceſtors loſt in that quarrel) the Government belong'd; and what he did unjuſtly againſt ſo many, *Bernardo* might do juſtly, and therefore ſafely againſt one. He encourag'd him not to fear; for his friends would be ready to aſſiſt him, with their Arms in their hands. The People that were his Creatures, were not to be regarded, for no more aſſiſtance was to be expected by *Coſimo* from them, than they had formerly yielded to *Giorgio Scali*. His Riches was not to be dreaded; for, when ſeiz'd by the *Senate*, his wealth would be theirs; and for concluſion he told him, that in doing thus, he would unite and ſecure the Common-wealth, and make himſelf glorious. *Bernardo* reply'd in ſhort, that he believ'd what he ſaid to be not only true but neceſſary: and that time being now fitter for action than diſcourſe, he ſhould go and provide what force he could, that it might appear he had companions in his Enterprize. As ſoon as he was in poſſeſſion of his Office; had diſpos'd his Companies, and ſettled all things with *Rinaldo*, he cited *Coſimo*, who (though diſſuaded by moſt of his friends) appeared, preſuming more upon his own Innocence, than the Mercy of his Judges. *Coſimo* was no ſooner enter'd into the Palace, and ſecur'd; but *Rinaldo* with all his ſervants in Arms, and his whole party at his heels, came into the *Piazza*, where the *Senators* cauſing the People to be call'd, 200 Citizens were ſelected to conſtitute a *Balia* reformation of the State. This *Balia* was no ſooner in force, but the firſt thing they fell upon, in order to their Reformation, was the proceſs againſt *Coſimo*: many would have him baniſh'd; many executed; and many were ſilent, either out of compaſſion for him, or apprehenſion of other People: by means of which non-concurrence, nothing was concluded. In one of the Towers of the Palace (call'd *Alberghettino*) *Coſimo* was a Priſoner in the Cuſtody of *Federigo Malavolti*. From this place *Coſimo* could hear and underſtand what was ſaid; and hearing the clutter of Arms, and frequent calling out to the *Balia*, he began to be fearful of his Life, but more, leſt he ſhould be aſſaſſinated by his particular Enemies. In this terror he abſtain'd from his meat, and eat nothing in four days but a morſel of Bread. Which being told to *Federigo*, he accoſted him thus.

Federigo's ſpeech to *Coſimo* his Priſoner.

You are afraid to be poiſon'd, and your kill you ſelf with hunger. You have but ſmall eſteem for me, to believe I would have a hand in any ſuch wickedneſs: I do not think your Life is in danger, your friends are too numerous both within the Palace, and without: if there be any ſuch deſigns, aſſure your ſelf they muſt take new meaſures; I will never be their inſtrument, nor imbrue my hands in the Blood of any Man, much leſs of yours, who has never offended me. Courage then; feed as you did formerly, and keep your ſelf alive for the good of your Country and Friends; and that you may feed with more confidence, I my ſelf will be your Taſter.

Theſe words reviv'd *Coſimo* exceedingly: who with tears in his Eyes kiſſing and embracing *Federigo*, in moſt pathetical and paſſionate terms he thank'd him for his humanity; and promis'd him reward, if ever his fortune gave him opportunity. *Coſimo* being by this means in ſome kind of repoſe; and his buſineſs and condition in diſpute among the Citizens; to entertain *Coſimo*, *Federigo* brought home with him one night to Supper, a Servant of the *Gonfaloniere*'s call'd *Fargannaccio*, a pleaſant Man, and very good company. Supper being almoſt done, *Coſimo* (hoping to make advantage by his being there, having known him before very well) made a ſign to *Federigo* to go out; who apprehending his meaning, pretended to give order for ſomething that was wanting, and went forth. After ſome few preliminary words when they were alone, *Coſimo* gave *Fargannaccio* a token to the Maſter of the Hoſpital of S. *Maria Nuova* for 1100 Ducats, a thouſand of them to be deliver'd to the *Gonfaloniere*, and the odd hundred for himſelf. *Fargannaccio* undertook to deliver them: the Money was paid; and the *Gonfaloniere* was deſir'd to take ſome opportunity of viſiting *Coſimo* himſelf. Upon the receipt of this ſum, *Bernardo* became more moderate,

moderate, and *Cosimo* was only confin'd to *Padua*, tho' *Rinaldo* design'd against his Life. Besides *Cosimo*, *Averardo*, and several others of the *Medici* were imprison'd, and among the rest *Puccio* and *Giovanni Pucci*. For greater terrour to such as were dissatisfied with the Banishment of *Cosimo*, the *Balia* was reduc'd to the Eight of the Guards, and the Captain of the People. Upon which resolution, *Cosimo* being conven'd before the *Senate* the 3*d* of *October* 1433. received the sentence of Banishment; with exhortation to submit, unless he intended they should proceed more severely both against his Person and Estate. *Cosimo* received his sentence very chearfully. He assured them, that honourable Convention could not order him to any place, to which he would not willingly repair. He desir'd of them, that since they had not thought fit to take away his Life, they would vouchsafe to secure it, for he understood there were many in the *Piazza* who attended to kill him; and at length he protested, that in what ever place or condition he should be, himself and his Estate should be always at the service of that City, *Senate* and People. The *Gonfaloniere*, bad him be satisfied; kept him in the Palace till Night; convey'd him then to his own House; and having supped with him, delivered him to a Guard, to be conducted safely to the Frontiers. Wherever he pass'd, *Cosimo* was honourably receiv'd; visited publickly by the *Venetians*; and treated by them more like a Sovereign than a Prisoner. *Florence* being in this manner deprived of a Citizen so universally belov'd, every Body was dismay'd, as well they who prevail'd, as they who were over-power'd. Whereupon *Rinaldo*, foreseeing his Fate, that he might not be deficient to himself, or his party, call'd his Friends together, and told them.

Cosimo banished. 1433.

Rinaldo's speech to his Friends.

That he now saw very evidently their destruction was at hand; that they had suffer'd themselves to be overcome by the intreaties, and tears, and bribes of their Enemies, not considering that ere long it would be their turns to weep, and implore, when their Prayers would not be heard, nor their tears find any compassion; and for the money they had received, not only the Principal would be required, but Interest extorted with all possible cruelty. That they had much better have died themselves, than Cosimo *should have escap'd with his Life, and his friends be continued in* Florence. *Great Men should never be provok'd: when they are, there is no going back. That now there appear'd no remedy to him, but to fortifie in the City; which our Enemies opposing (as doubtless they will) we may take our advantage and banish them by force, since we cannot by Law. That the result of all this would be no more (than what he had inculcated before) the restauration of the Nobility; the restitution of their Honors and Offices in the City; and the corroboration of their party with them, as the adversary had strengthened his with the People. And that by this means, their party would be made more strong by assuming more courage and vigour, and by acquiring more credit and reputation, At last supperadding, that if these remedies were not apply'd in time, he could not see which way, amidst so many Enemies, the State was to be preserv'd, and he could not but foresee the City and their whole Party would be destroy'd.*

To this, *Mariotto Boldovinetti* oppos'd himself, alledging the haughtiness of the Nobility, and their insupportable Pride; and that it was not prudence in them to run themselves under a certain Tyranny, to avoid then ucertain dangers of the People. *Rinaldo* perceiving his Counsel not likely to take, complain'd of his misfortune, and the misfortune of his party; imputing all to the malignity of their Stars, rather than to the blindness and inexperience of the Men. Whilst things were in this suspense, and no necessary provision made, a Letter was discover'd from *Agnalo Accinivoli* to *Cosimo*, importing the affections of the City towards him, and advising him to stir up some War or other, and make *Neri de Gino* his friend, for he did presage the City would want Money, and no Body being found to supply them, it might put the Citizens in mind of him, and perhaps prevail with them to sollicit his return: and if *Neri* should be taken off from *Rinaldo*, his party would be left too weak to defend him. This Letter coming into the hands of the *Senate*, was the occasion that *Agnolo* was secur'd, examin'd, and sent into banishment; and yet his example could not at all deter such as were *Cosimo*'s friends. The year was almost come about since *Cosimo* was banished; and about the latter end of *August* 1434, *Nicolo di Croco* was drawn *Gonfaloniere* for the next two months, and with him eight new *Senators* chosen of *Cosimo*'s Party.

So that that election frighted *Rinaldo* and all his friends. And because by Custom it was three days after their election before the *Senators* were admitted to the execution of their office, *Rinaldo* address'd himself again to the heads of his Party, and remonstrated to them the danger that was hanging over their heads: that the only remedy left them was immediately to take Arms, to cause *Donati Velluti* (who was *Gonfaloniere* at that time) to

to erect a new *Balia*; to degrade the new *Senators*; to create others (for their turns) in their Places: to burn the old, and fill up the next Imborſation with the Names of their Friends: This Reſolution was by ſome People held neceſſary and good, but by others it was thought too violent, and that which would draw very ill Conſequences after it. Among the number of Diſſenters, *Palla Strozzi* was one; who being a quiet, gentle, and courteous Perſon, apter for Study, than the reſtraining of Factions, or oppoſing Civil Diſſentions, reply'd, that all Enterprizes that are contriv'd with the leaſt ſhadow of Wiſdom, or Courage, ſeem good at firſt, but prove difficult in the execution, and deſtructive in the end. That he had thought (the Duke's Army being upon their Frontiers in *Romagna*) the apprehenſion of new War abroad, would have employ'd the thoughts of the *Senate*, better than the Differences at home. That if it ſhould appear they deſign'd an Alteration of the Government (which could hardly be conceal'd) the People would always have time enough to get to their Arms, and perform what was neceſſary for their common Defence; which being done of neceſſity, would not carry with it either ſo much wonder, or reproach.

Upon theſe Conſiderations it was reſolv'd, that the new *Senators* ſhould be permitted to enter; but ſuch an eye to be had to their Proceedings, that upon the leaſt injury, or reflection upon their Party, they ſhould unanimouſly take Arms and rendezvous at the *Piazza* of St. *Pulinare*, from whence (being not far from the Palace) they might diſpoſe of themſelves as their Advantage directed. This being the reſult of that Meeting, the new *Senators* entred upon the Office; and the *Gonfaloniere*, to give himſelf a Reputation, and to render himſelf formidable to his Enemies, caus'd his Predeceſſor *Donato Velluti* to be clap'd in Priſon, as a Perſon who had embezzled the Publick Treaſure: After this, he felt, and ſounded his Brethren about *Coſimo*'s return; and finding them diſpos'd, he communicated with ſuch as he thought the Heads of the *Medici*'s Party, who encouraging him likewiſe, he cited *Rinaldo Ridolfo Peruzzi*, and *Nicolo Barbadori*, as the Principals of the contrary Faction. Upon this citation, *Rinaldo* concluding it no time longer to protract, iſſued forth from his Houſe with a conſiderable number of Arm'd Men, and joyn'd himſelf with *Ridolfo Peruzzi* and *Nicolo Barbadori*, immediately: There were among them ſeveral other Citizens, beſides a good number of Soldiers (which being out of Pay were at that time in *Florence*) and all drew up (as was before agreed) at the *Piazza di* St. *Pulinare*. *Palla Srozzi*, though he had got good ſtore of People together, ſtir'd not out of his Houſe, and *Giovanni Guiccardini* did the ſame; whereupon *Rinaldo* ſent to remember them of their Engagement, and to reprehend their Delay: *Giovanni* reply'd, that he ſhould do diſſervice enough to the Enemy, if by keeping his Houſe, he prevented his Brother *Piero*'s going forth to the relief of the *Senate*. *Palla*, after much Solicitation, and ſeveral Meſſages, came on Horſeback to St. *Pulinare*, but unarm'd, and with only two Footmen at his heels. *Rinaldo* perceiving him, advanc'd to meet him; upbraided him with his Negligence, and told him, that his not joyning with the reſt, proceeded from the want of Fidelity or Courage; either of which was unworthy a Perſon of his Quality or Rank. That if he thought by not doing his Duty againſt the other Faction, he ſhould ſave his own ſtake, and eſcape with his Liberty and Life; he ſhould find himſelf miſtaken. That for his own part, if things happen'd adverſly, he ſhould have this Conſolation, that he was not backward with his Advice before the Danger; nor in it with his Power: Whereas he and his Comrades could not without horror remember that this was the third time they had betray'd their Country. Firſt, when they preſerv'd *Coſimo*; the next, when they rejected his Counſels; and the third then, in not aſſiſting with their Supplies; to which *Palla* made no anſwer that the Standers-by could underſtand, but muttering to himſelf, he fac'd about with his Horſe, and returned from whence he came.

The *Senate* perceiving *Rinaldo* and his Party in Arms, and themſelves utterly deſerted, they caus'd the Gates of the Palace to be barracado'd up, as not knowing what elſe was to be done. But *Rinaldo* neglecting his opportunity of marching into the *Piazza*, by attending Supplies which never came to him, depriv'd himſelf of his Advantage; gave them Courage to provide for their Defence, and to ſeveral other Citizens to repair to them, both with their Perſons and Advice. In the mean time, ſome Friends of the *Senators* which were leaſt ſuſpected went to *Rinaldo* and acquainted him, that the *Senate* could not imagine the reaſon of this Commotion; that if it was about the Buſineſs of *Coſimo* they had no thoughts of recalling him. That they never had any Inclination to offend him; if theſe were the Grounds

of their Jealouſie, they might aſſure themſelves if they pleas'd; come into the Palace, be civilly received, and readily gratified in their demands. But fair Words would not down with *Rinaldo*, who told them that the way he had propos'd to aſſure himſelf, was by reducing the *Senators* to their private Condition; and reforming the City to the benefit of all People. But it ſeldom happens that any thing is well done where there is equality in Power, and difference in Judgment.

Ridolfo Peruzzi (moved with what the Citizens had ſaid) told them, that for his part he ask'd no more, but that *Coſimo* might be kept out: that if that were granted, he had his deſigns: that he would not fill the City with Blood, nor impoſe upon the *Senate*; that he was ready to obey them if they pleas'd, and accordingly he marched with all his Followers into the Palace, and was joyfully received. *Rinaldo*'s ſtaying at St. *Pulinare*; puſillanimity of *Palla*, and *Ridolfo*'s revolt defeated *Rinaldo* of his Victory, and rebated much of the firſt edge and vigor of his Party: with all which, the Pope's Authority concurr'd. Pope *Eugenius*, being driven out of *Rome* by the People, was at that time reſident in *Florence*; who underſtanding the Tumult, and judging it incumbent upon his Office (if poſſible) to appeaſe it, he ſent *Giovanni Vitelleſchi* (a Patriarch and great Friend of *Rinaldo*'s) to deſire he might ſpeak with him, for he had Authority and Intereſt enough with the *Senate* to ſecure and content him, without Bloodſhed, or other detriment of the Citizens: upon the perſuaſion of his Friend, *Rinaldo* with all his Squadron march'd to St. *Maria Novella*, where the Pope lay. *Eugenius* let him know the promiſe the *Senate* had made him to commit all differences to his determination; and that (when their Arms were laid down) all things ſhould be ordered, as he pleas'd to award. *Rinaldo* obſerving the coldneſs of *Palla*, and the inconſtancy of *Peruzzi*, and having no more Cards to play, caſt himſelf into his Holineſs his Arms, not doubting but his Intereſt was ſufficient to protect him.

Eugenius the *Pope* labours a Peace.

Hereupon by the *Pope*'s direction notice was given to *Nicolo Barbadori* and the reſt which attended *Rinaldo* without, that they ſhould go home and lay down their Arms, for *Rinaldo* was in Treaty with him about a Peace with the *Senate*; upon which News they all disbanded, and laid down their Arms. The *Senate* continued their Treaty by the mediation of the *Pope*; but in the mean time ſent privately into the Mountains of *Piſtoia* to raiſe Foot, and cauſing them to joyn with their own Forces and march into *Florence* in the Night, they poſſeſs'd themſelves of all the Poſts in the City; call'd the People together into the Palace; erected a new *Balia*; which the firſt time they met, recall'd *Coſimo*, and all that were baniſh'd with him. And on the contrary Faction, they baniſh'd *Rinaldo de gli Albizi*, *Ridolfo Peruzzi*, *Nicolo Barbadori*, *Palla Strozzi*, and ſo great a number of other Citizens, that there was ſcarce a Town in *Italy* but had ſome of their Exiles, beſides ſeveral which were baniſh'd into foreign Countries. So by this and ſuch Accidents as theſe, *Florence* was impoveriſh'd in its Wealth and Induſtry, as well as Inhabitants. The *Pope* beholding the deſtruction of thoſe Men who by his Interceſſion had laid down their Arms, was much troubled, complained heavily to *Rinaldo* of their Violence, exhorted him to patience, and to expect ſubmiſſively till his Fortune ſhould turn. To whom *Rinaldo* made this Anſwer.

Coſimo recall'd.

Rinaldo's Anſwer to the *Pope*.

The ſmall confidence they had in me, who ought to have believ'd me, and the too great confidence I had in you, has been the ruin of me and my Party. But I hold my ſelf more culpable than any body, for believing that you who had been driven out of your own Country, could keep me in mine. Of the viciſſitudes, and uncertainty of Fortune, I have had experience enough. I have never preſum'd in its Proſperity, and Adverſity ſhall never deject me; knowing that when ſhe pleaſes ſhe can take about and indulge me: If ſhe continues her Severity, and never ſmiles upon me more, I ſhall not much value it, eſteeming no great Happineſs to live in a City where the Laws are of leſs Authority, than the Paſſions of particular Men. For might I have my choice, that ſhould be my Country where I may ſecurely enjoy my Fortune and Friends; not that where the firſt is eaſily ſequeſter'd, and the latter to preſerve his own Eſtate, will forſake me in my greateſt Neceſſity. To wiſe and good Men 'tis always leſs ungrateful to hear at a diſtance, than to be a Spectator of the Miſeries of his Country; and more honourable they think to be an honeſt Rebel, than a ſervile Citizen.

Having

Having ſaid thus, he took his leave of the *Pope*, and complaining often to himſelf of his own Counſels, and the cowardice of his Friends, in great Indignation he left the City, and went into Baniſhment. On the other ſide, *Coſimo* having notice of his Reſtauration, return'd to *Florence*, where he was received with no leſs Oſtentation and Triumph, than if he had obtain'd ſome extraordinary Victory; ſo great was the concourſe of People, and ſo high the demonſtration of their Joy, that by an unanimous and univerſal Concurrence he was ſaluted, *The Benefactor of the People, and the Father of their Country.*

THE HISTORY OF FLORENCE.

BOOK

THE HISTORY OF FLORENCE.

BOOK V.

OVER[illegible] which moſt commonly happen to them, d[illegible] Order to Confuſion, and that Confuſion afterwards tur[illegible] Order again. For Nature having fixed no ſublunary Things, [illegible] as they arrive at their achme and perfection, being capable of no further aſcent, of neceſſity they decline. So, on the other ſide, when they are reduced to the loweſt pitch of diſorder, having no farther to deſcend, they recoil again to their former perfection: good Laws degenerating into bad Cuſtoms, and bad Cuſtoms ingendring good Laws. For, Virtue begets Peace; Peace begets Idleneſs; Idleneſs, Mutiny; and Mutiny, Deſtruction: and then *vice verſa*, that Ruin begets Laws; thoſe Laws, Virtue; and Virtue begets Honour and good Succeſs. Hence it is, as wiſe Men have obſerved, that Learning is not ſo ancient as Arms; and that in all Provinces as well as Cities, there were Captains before Philoſophers, and Soldiers before Scholars. For good and well-conducted Arms having gotten the Victory at firſt, and that Victory, Quiet; the courage and magnanimity of the Soldier could not be depraved with a more honourable ſort of idleneſs, than the deſire of Learning; nor could idleneſs be introduced into any well-governed City by a more bewitching and inſinuating way. This was manifeſt to *Cato* (when *Diogenes* and *Carneades* the Philoſophers were ſent Ambaſſadors from *Athens* to the Senate) who obſerving the *Roman* Youth to be much taken with their Doctrine, and following them up and down with great admiration; foreſeeing the ill conſequences that honeſt lazineſs would bring upon his Country, he obtain'd a Law, that no Philoſopher ſhould be admitted into *Rome*. All Governments therefore do, by theſe means, ſome time or other come to decay; and when once at the loweſt, and Mens ſufferings have made them wiſer, they rebound again, and return to their firſt Order, unleſs they be ſuppreſt, and kept under by ſome extraordinary force.

Theſe Viciſſitudes and Revolutions (firſt by means of the *Tuſcans*, and then of the *Romans*) kept *Italy* unſettled, and rendred it ſometimes happy, and ſometimes miſerable: and although nothing was afterwards erected out of the *Roman* Ruins, comparable to what was before; (which nevertheleſs might have been done with great glory under a virtuous Prince) yet in ſome of the new Cities and Governments, ſuch ſprouts of *Roman* Virtue ſprung up; that though they did not uſurp upon one another, yet they lived ſo amicably and orderly together, that they not only defended themſelves, but repelled the *Barbarians*.

Among theſe Governments was the *Florentine*, though perhaps inferior in circumfe-

rence

rence of Territory, yet in power and authority equal to any of them: for being ſeated in the heart of *Italy*, rich, and ready upon all occaſions, they defended themſelves bravely whenever they were invaded, or brought the Victory to their Allies, where-ever they ſided.

If therefore by reaſon of the courage of thoſe new Principalities, the Times were not altogether quiet; yet the ſeverity of the War did not make them inſupportable. For that cannot be called Peace, where the Governments claſh, and invade one another; nor that War, in which no Men are ſlain, no Towns pillaged, nor no Governments deſtroy'd. The Wars of thoſe Times were begun without fear, carried on without danger, and concluded without detriment. Inſomuch, that that Virtue which uſed to be extinguiſht in other Provinces, by means of a long Peace, was ſpent and exhauſted in *Italy* by the faintneſs of the War, as will be more conſpicuous by our deſcription of the Occurrences betwixt 1434 and 1494. In which it will appear how, at length, a new way was opened to the excurſions of the *Barbarians*; and *Italy* relapſed into its old ſervitude and Bondage. And if the actions of our Governors, both at home and abroad, be not to be read (as the actions of our Anceſtors) with ſo much wonder and admiration of their Courage and Grandeur. Yet, in other reſpects they may ſeem as conſiderable, ſeeing how many noble and great People have been reſtrained, and kept under by their Arms, how weak and ill managed however. And tho' in our deſcription we make no mention of the fortitude of the Soldier, the conduct of the Captains, nor the love of the Citizen towards his Country; yet we ſhall diſcover what cheats, what cunning, and what arts were uſed by both Princes, Soldiers, and Citizens, to preſerve a Reputation which they never deſerved. And this perhaps may be as worthy our knowledge, as the Wiſdom and Conduct of old; for if the Examples of Antiquity do teach us what to follow, our more modern Tranſactions will tell us what to avoid.

Italy, by thoſe who commanded it, was reduced into ſuch a Condition, that when by agreements of the Princes, a Peace was made up, it was preſently interrupted by thoſe who had Arms in their hands: ſo that they neither gained honour by their Wars, nor quiet by their Peace. A Peace being concluded betwixt the Duke of *Milan* and the League in the year 1433, the Soldiers unwilling to disband, turned the War upon the Church. Theſe Soldiers were at that time of two Factions, the *Braccheſcan*, and the *Sforzaſcan* Faction. Of this latter, *Conte Franceſco*, the Son of *Sforza*, was Captain; the firſt was commanded by *Nicolo Piccinino*, and *Nicolo Forte Braccio*. To theſe two Parties all the reſt of the Soldiers in *Italy* joyned themſelves. Of the two, *Sforza*'s Party was moſt conſiderable, as well for the courage of their *Conte*, as for a promiſe the Duke of *Milan* had made him, to give him in Marriage a natural Daughter of his called *Madona Bianca*; the probability of which Alliance gained him great Reputation. After the Peace of *Lombardy* was concluded; both theſe Parties, upon ſeveral pretended occaſions, turned their Arms againſt *Eugenius* the *Pope*. *Nicolo Conte Braccio* was moved by an old animoſity *Braccio* had always retained to the Church. The *Conte* was ſpurr'd on by his Ambition. *Nicolo* aſſaulted *Rome*, and the *Conte* poſſeſſed himſelf of *la Marca*; whereupon the *Romans* (to evade the War) turned *Eugenius* out of *Rome*, who fled to *Florence*, though with no little danger and difficulty. Being arrived there, upon conſideration of the danger he was in, and that he was deſerted by all the Princes, who refuſed, upon his ſcore, to take up thoſe Arms again, which ſo lately, and ſo willingly they laid down; made his Peace with the *Conte*, and gave him the *Signorie* of *la Marca*, though the *Conte* had added inſolence to his Uſurpation, and, in his Letters to his Agents, dated them in *Latin* (as they do frequently in *Italy*) *Ex Girifalco noſtro Firmiano, invito Petro & Paulo.* But not contented with the Grant of that Country, he would needs be created *Gonfaloniere* of the Church, and the *Pope* condeſcended; ſo much did his Holineſs prefer an ignominious Peace before dangerous War. The *Conte*, upon theſe Terms, became a Friend to the *Pope*, and converted his Arms againſt *Nicolo Forte Braccio*; betwixt whom, for many Months together, ſeveral accidents happened in the territory of the Church, ſo that which ſide ſoever prevailed, the *Pope* and his Subjects ſuffered more than thoſe that managed the War. At length, by the mediation of the Duke of *Milan*, an Agreement (in the nature of a Truce) was concluded betwixt them, by which both of them remained Maſters of ſeveral Towns in the Patrimony of the Church. The War was in this manner extinguiſh'd in *Rome*, but it brake out again preſently in *Romagna*, by the means of *Battiſta da Canneto*, who had cauſed certain of the Family of the *Grifoni* in *Bologna* to be aſſaſſinated, and drove out the *Pope*'s Governor, and many others which he ſuſpected to be his Enemies; to keep by Force, what he had got by Surprize, he addreſs'd himſelf to *Philippo* for aid: and the *Pope* to countermine him, and revenge the Injuries he had received, applied to the *Venetian* and *Florentine*. Both Parties being ſupplied, there were two great Armies in *Romagna* of a ſudden. *Philip*'s Auxiliaries were

1433. The Soldiers in *Italy* diſtinguiſh'd into two Parties.

The Duke of *Milan* promiſes his Daughter to *Conte Fran. Sforza*.

The *Pope* invaded, makes Peace with *Fran. Sforza*.

Wars in *Romagna*.

were commanded by *Nicolo Piccinino*. The *Venetian* and *Florentine*, by *Gattamelata*, and *Nicolo de Tolentino*. Not far from *Imola* they came to a Battle, in which the *Venetians* and *Florentines* were defeated; and *Nicolo da Tolentino* ſent Priſoner to the Duke, where he died in a few days, either by Poiſon or Grief. The Duke being either impoveriſhed by the War, or apprehending this Victory would quiet the League, followed not his advantage, but gave the *Pope* and his Confederates opportunity to recruit; who chooſing the *Conte Franceſco* for their General, they ſent him to drive *Forte Braccio* out of the Lands of the Church; and to try if they could put an end to that War which they had begun in favour of the *Pope*. The *Romans* ſeeing his Holineſs in the Field again, and his Army conſiderable, they deſired to be reconciled; and, having concluded the Terms, they received a Governor from him. Among other Towns, *Nicolo Forte Braccio* had poſſeſſed himſelf of *Fiboli*, *Monteſiaſconi*, the City of *Caſtello*, and *Aſceſi*: not being able to keep the Field, *Nicolo* was retreated into this latter Town, and beſieged by the *Conte*. The Siege proving long, by the braveneſs of *Nicolo*'s defence, the Duke began to caſt about, and conſider, he muſt either hinder the League from carrying the Town, or look to himſelf as ſoon as it was taken. To give the *Conte* therefore diverſion, he commanded *Nicolo Piccinino*, by the way to *Romagna*, to paſs into *Tuſcany*: whereupon, the League judging the defence of *Tuſcany* of more importance than the reducing of *Aſceſi*, they ſent to the *Conte* to ſtop *Piccinino*'s paſſage, who was at that time with his Army at *Furli*. Upon theſe Orders the *Conte* raiſed his Siege, and marched with his Forces to *Ceſena*, having left the War of *la Marca*, and the care of his own Affairs to the management of his Brother *Lione*. Whilſt *Piccinino* was labouring to paſs, and *Franceſco* to obſtruct him, *Nicolo Forte Braccio* fell upon *Lione*, and with great honour to himſelf, took him Priſoner, plundered his People, and following his blow, took ſeveral Towns in *la Marca* at the ſame excurſion. This News was very unwelcome to the *Conte*, who gave all his own Country for loſt; nevertheleſs, leaving part of his Army to confront *Piccinino*, he marched himſelf againſt *Forte Braccio* with the reſt, forc'd him to an Engagement, and beat him. In which defeat *Forte Braccio* was hurt, taken Priſoner, and died of his wounds.

Fran. Sforza General of the *Pope*'s League.

This Victory recover'd all that *Nicolo Forte Braccio* had taken from him; and forced the Duke of *Milan* to deſire a Peace, which he obtained by the mediation of *Nicolo da Eſti*, Marqueſs of *Ferrara*, by which it was agreed, that the Towns which the Duke had got in *Romagna* ſhould be reſtored; and his Forces withdrawn into *Lombardy*; and *Battiſta da Caneto* (as its happens to thoſe who owe their Dominion to the Courage or Power of other People) as ſoon as the Duke's Forces were drawn off, deſpairing to remain in *Bologna* upon his own Legs; quitted the Town, and left it to re-admit its old Governor *Antonio Bentivogli*, who was chief of the contrary Party.

Peace betwixt the League and the Duke.

All theſe Things ſucceeded, during the baniſhment of *Coſimo*; upon whoſe return, thoſe Perſons who were active in his Reſtauration, and thoſe who had ſuffer'd more than ordinarily before, concluded (without regard to any body elſe) to ſecure themſelves of all the Offices in the State. The Senate which ſucceeded for the Months of *November* and *December*, not ſatisfied with what their Predeceſſors had done in favour of their Party; they lengthned the time, changed the Places of ſeveral which were baniſhed, and ſent many new ones into baniſhment after them. The Citizens were queſtioned and moleſted, not only for their inclinations to the Parties, but for their Wealth, their Relations, and private Correſpondencies. And, had this Proſcription proceeded to Blood, it had been as bad as *Octaviano*'s, or *Silla*'s: nor was it altogether without; for *Antonio di Bernardo* was behadeded, and four other Citizens, (of which *Zanobi Bel Fratelli*, and *Coſimo Barbadori* were two) who having eſcaped out of their Dominions, and being gotten to *Venice*; the *Venetians* (valuing *Coſimo*'s Friendſhip before their own Honour and Reputation) cauſed them to be ſecured, ſent them Priſoners home; where they were moſt unworthily put to Death. However, that Example gave great advantage to *Coſimo*'s Party, and great terror to the adverſe; when it was conſidered that ſo potent a Republick ſhould ſell its Liberty to the *Florentines*, which was ſuppoſed to be done not ſo much in kindneſs to *Coſimo*, as to revive and incenſe the Factions in *Florence*; and by engaging them in Blood, to render the animoſities in that City irreconcilable, the *Venetians* being jealous of no other obſtruction to their Greatneſs, but the Union of thoſe Parties. Having pillaged and baniſhed all ſuch as were Enemies, or ſuſpected to be ſo to the State, they applied themſelves to careſs and oblige new Perſons to corroborate their Party; reſtored the Family of the *Alberti*, and whoever elſe had been proclaimed Rebel to his Country. All the Grandees (except ſome few) were reduced into the popular Rank; the Eſtates of the Rebels they ſold to one another for a ſong. After which, they fortified themſelves with new Laws, new Magiſtrates, and new Elections, pulling out ſuch as they thought their Enemies, and filling the Purſes with

New Ordinances in *Florence*.

the

the names of their Friends. But, admoniſhed by the ruin of their Friends; and thinking not enough for the ſecurity of their Government, to make the Imborſation as they pleas'd; they contrived, that all Officers of Life and Death ſhould be created out of the chief of their Party; and that the Perſons who were to overſee the Imborſations, and the new *Squittini*, ſhould (with the Senators) have power to create them. To the Eight of the Guards, they gave authority of Life and Death. They decreed, that the baniſhed Perſons ſhould not return (though the time of their Baniſhment was expired) till leave given them by four and thirty of the Senate and the Colleges, when their whole number amounted but to thirty and ſeven. They made it criminal to write, or receive Letters from them: every word, every ſign, every motion that was unpleaſing to the Governors, was puniſh'd ſeverely; and if any one remained ſuſpected who had eſcaped theſe Injuries, they loaded him with new Duties and Impoſitions, till, in a ſhort time, they had cleared the City of their Enemies, and ſecured the Government to themſelves. However that they might want no Aſſiſtance from abroad, and intercept it from ſuch as ſhould deſign againſt them; they enter'd into League with the *Pope*, the *Venetians*, and the Duke of *Milan*.

Things being in this poſture in *Florence*, *Giovanna* Queen of *Naples* died, and, by Will, made *Rinieri d' Angio* her Heir. *Alphonſo*, King of *Arragon*, was at that time in *Sicily*, and having good Intereſt with many of the Nobility of that Kingdom, he prepared to poſſeſs it. The *Neapolitans* and ſeveral others of the Lords were favourers of *Rinieri*. The *Pope* had no mind that either the one or the other ſhould have it, but would willingly have governed by a Deputy of his own. In the mean time *Alphonſo* arrived out of *Sicily*, and was received by the Duke of *Seſſa*; where he entertained certain Princes into his pay, with deſign (having *Capua* in his poſſeſſion, which was governed at that time, in his name, by the Prince of *Taranto*) to force the *Neapolitans* to his Will. Wherefore he ſent his Army againſt *Caietta*, which was defended by a Garriſon of *Neapolitans*. Upon this Invaſion, the *Neapolitans* demanded aſſiſtance of *Philip*; who recommended the Enterprize to the People of *Genoa*; the *Genoeſes* not only to gratifie the Duke, who was their Prince, but to preſerve the Goods and Effects which they had at that time both in *Naples*, and *Caietta*, rigg'd out a ſtrong Fleet immediately. *Alphonſo* having news of their Preparations, reinforc'd himſelf, went in Perſon againſt the *Genoeſes*, and coming to an Engagement with them of the Iſland of *Pontus*, he was beaten, taken Priſoner, (with ſeveral other Princes) and preſented by the *Genoeſes* into the hands of Duke *Philip*. This Victory aſtoniſhed all the Princes of *Italy*, who had any apprehenſion of the Power of *Philip*, believing it would give him opportunity to make himſelf Maſter of all: but he (ſo different are the Judgments of Men) took his meaſures quite contrary. *Alphonſo* was a wiſe and prudent Prince, and as ſoon as he had convenience of diſcourſing with *Philip*, remonſtrated to him how much he was miſtaken in ſiding with *Rinieri*; for that aſſuredly, having made himſelf King of *Naples*, he would endeavour, with all his Power, to bring *Milan* in ſubjection to the *French*, that his Aſſiſtance might be near him, and that upon any Diſtreſs, he might not be put to it to force a way for his Supplies; nor was there any way to do it ſo effectual, as by ruining him, and introducing the *French*. That the contrary would happen by making *Alphonſo* Prince; for then, having no body to fear but the *French*, he ſhould be obliged to love and careſs the Duke above any body, in whoſe Power it would be to give his Enemies a paſſage; by which means *Alphonſo* ſhould have the Title, but the Power and Authority would remain in Duke *Philip*: inſomuch, that it imported the Duke much more than himſelf, to conſider the Dangers of one ſide, with the Advantages of the other, unleſs he deſired more to ſatisfie his Paſſion than to ſecure his State. For, as by that way he would continue free and independent; by the other, (lying betwixt two powerful Princes) he would loſe his State quite, or living in perpetual apprehenſion, be a Slave to them both. Theſe Words wrought ſo much upon the Duke, that, changing his deſigns, he ſet *Alphonſo* at liberty, ſent him back to *Genoa*, and from thence into the Kingdom of *Naples*, where he landed at *Caietta*, which upon the news of his enlargement, had been ſeiz'd by ſome Lords of his Party. The *Genoeſes* (underſtanding how, without any regard to them, the Duke had diſcharged the King; and, conſidering with themſelves, that of all their Danger and Expence, he had ingroſſed the Honour, impropriated the Thanks of the King's Inlargement, and left them nothing but his Regrate and Indignation for having defeated and taken him Priſoner) were highly diſſatisfied with the Duke.

Alphonſo brought Priſoner to Duke *Philip*.

In the City of *Genoa*, when it has the free exerciſe of its Liberty by the free Suffrages of the People, a Chief is choſen, which they call their *Doge*; not with the abſolute Power of a Prince, to determine arbitrarily of any thing; but to purpoſe and recommend what is to be debated and reſolved upon by the Magiſtrates in the Council. In the ſame

The *Doge* and his Authority in *Genoa*.

ſame City there are many Noble Families ſo mighty and potent, they are not without difficulty to be brought to any obedience to the Magiſtrate. Of all thoſe Familes, the *Tregoſi* and *Adorni* are moſt powerful and wealthy; and from them ſpring all the Diviſions of the City, and all the contempt of the Laws; for differing perpetually among themſelves, and pretending both to the *Dogeſhip*; they are not contented to have it fairly decided, but came many times to blows; by which as one is ſet up, the other is always depreſſed; and ſometimes it falls out, that that Party which is overpower'd, and unable to carry that Office otherwiſe, calls in foreign Aſſiſtance, and proſtitutes that Government, which they cannot enjoy themſelves, to the dominion of a Stranger.

By this means it comes often to paſs, that they who have the Government in *Lombardy*, have the command of *Genoa* likewiſe; as it happened at the time when *Alphonſo* was taken Priſoner. Among the principal Citizens of *Genoa*, who cauſed that City to be delivered into the hands of the Duke, *Franciſco Spinola* was one; who not long after he had been very active to enſlave his Country, became ſuſpected to the Duke (as it often happens in thoſe Caſes) *Franciſco* being highly diſſatisfied, left the Town; and by a kind of voluntary Exile, had his reſidence at *Caietta*; being there at that time when the Engagement was with *Alphonſo*, and having behav'd himſelf very well in it; he preſumed he had again merited ſo much favour from the Duke, as to be permitted to live quietly in *Genoa*: but finding the Duke's Jealouſie to continue, (as not believing he, that had betray'd his Country, could ever be true to him) he reſolved to try a new Experiment, to reſtore his Country to its Liberty, and himſelf to his Honour and Security at once; believing no remedy could be adminiſtred ſo properly to his fellow-Citizens, as by the ſame hand which gave them their Wound. Obſerving therefore the general Indignation againſt the Duke for having delivered the King; he concluded it a convenient time to put his Deſigns in execution; and accordingly he communicated his Reſolutions with certain Perſons, which he had ſome confidence were of the ſame opinion, and encouraged them to follow him. It happened to be St. *John Baptiſt*'s Day (which is a great Feſtival in that City) when *Ariſmino*, a new Governor, ſent them from the Duke, made his Entry into *Genoa*. Being entred into the Town in the Company of *Opicino* (his Predeceſſor in the Government) and other conſiderable Citizens, *Franciſco Spinola* thought it no time to protract, but running forth Armed into the Streets, with ſuch as were before privy to his Deſign, he drew them up in the *Piazza* before his Houſe, and cry'd out, *Liberty, Liberty*. 'Tis not to be imagined with what alacrity the People and Citizens ran to him at that very name; inſomuch, that if any out of Intereſt or other Conſideration, retain'd an Affection for the Duke, they were ſo far from having time to arm, and make defence, they had ſcarce leiſure to eſcape. *Ariſmino*, with ſome of the *Genoeſes* of his Party, fled into the Caſtle which was kept for the Duke. *Opicino* preſuming he might get thither, fled towards the Palace, where he had 2000 Men at his command, with which he ſuppoſed he might not only be able to ſecure himſelf, but to animate the People to a defence; but he reckoned without his Hoſt; for, before he could reach it, he was knock'd on the Head, torn in pieces by the Multitude, and his Members dragg'd about the Streets.

Franciſco Spinola.

Genoa recovers its Liberty.

After this the *Genoeſes* having put themſelves under new Magiſtrates and Officers of their own, the Caſtle and all other Poſts which were kept for the Duke, were reduced, and the City perfectly freed from its dependance on the Duke. Theſe things thus managed, tho' at firſt they gave the Princes of *Italy* occaſion to apprehend the growing Greatneſs of the Duke, yet, now obſerving their concluſion, they did not deſpair of being able to curb him; and therefore, notwithſtanding their late League with him, the *Florentines Venetians* and *Genoeſes* made a new one among themſelves. Whereupon *Rinaldo de gli Albizi*, and the other chief *Floretine* Exiles, ſeeing the face of Affairs alter'd, and all things tending to Confuſion, they conceiv'd hopes of perſuading the Duke to a War againſt *Florence*, and going upon that deſign to *Milan*, *Rinaldo* accoſted the Duke as followeth:

Rinaldo's Oration to the Duke of *Milan.*

If we, who have been formerly your Enemies, do now with confidence ſupplicate your Aſſiſtance for our return into our own Country; neither your Highneſs, nor any body elſe, (who conſiders the Progreſs of humane Affairs, and the volubility of Fortune) ought at all to be ſurprized, ſeeing both of our paſs'd and preſent Actions, of what we have done formerly to your ſelf, and of what we intend now to our Country, we can give a clear and a reaſonable Account. No good Man will reproach another for defending his Country, which way ſoever he defends it. Nor was it ever our thoughts to injure you, but to preſerve our Country; which will be evident, if you conſider how in the greateſt ſtream of our Victories and Succeſs, we no ſooner found your Highneſs diſpos'd to a Peace, but we readily embraced it, and purſued it with more eagerneſs than your ſelf: ſo that as yet we are not conſcious to our ſelves of any thing that may make us doubt of your Favour. Neither can our Country, in juſtice, complain, that we are now preſſing and importuning

your

your Highneſs to employ thoſe Arms againſt it, when we have obſtinately oppos'd them before, in its defence: for that Country ought equally to be beloved by all which is equally indulgent to all; and not that, which deſpiſing the reſt, advances and admires only a few. No-body maintains it unlawful in all Caſes to bear Arms againſt one's Country. Cities are mix'd Bodies, yet have they their reſemblance with natural Bodies; and, as in theſe, many Diſeaſes grow which are not to be cur'd without violence: ſo in the other, many times ſuch Inconveniences ariſe, that a charitable and good Citizen would be more criminal to leave it infirm, than to cure it, though with Amputation, and the loſs of ſome of its Members. What greater Diſtemper can befal a Politick Body than Servitude? And what more proper Remedy can be applied than that which will certainly remove it: Wars are juſt, when they are neceſſary; and Arms are charitable when there is no other hopes left to obtain Juſtice. I know not what Neceſſity can be greater than ours; nor what Act of Charity more commendable, than to wreſt our Country out of the Jaws of Slavery. Our Cauſe then being both juſt and charitable, ought not to be ſlighted, either by us, or your Highneſs, though it were only in Compaſſion. But your Highneſs has your particular Provocation beſides; the Florentines *having had the Confidence, after a Peace ſolemnly concluded with you, to enter into a new League with the* Genoeſes *your Rebels; ſo that if our Prayers and Condition ſhould be unable, your own juſt Indignation and Reſentment ſhould move you, eſpecially ſeeing the Enterprize ſo eaſie. Let not their paſs'd Carriage diſcourage you, you have ſeen their Power and Reſolution to defend themſelves formerly; and both of them were reaſonably to be apprehended, were they the ſame now as they have been. But you will find them quite contrary; for, what Strength, what Wealth, can be expected in a City which has lately exploded the greateſt part of its rich and induſtrious Men? What Obſtinacy or Reſolution can be apprehended in a People which are divided, and at Enmity among themſelves? Which Enmity is the cauſe that that very Treaſure which is left, cannot now be employed ſo well as it formerly was; for Men do chearfully diſburſe, when they ſee it is for the Honour and Security of their Country; hoping, that Peace may reprize, what the War has devour'd. But when in War and Peace they find themſelves equally oppreſſed; and under a neceſſity in the one. of enduring the Outrages of their Enemies; and in the other, of truckling to the Inſolencies of their Friends; Nobody will ſupply or Advance one Farthing towards its Relief: and the People ſuffer more many times by the Avarice of their Friends, than by the Rapacity of their Enemies; for in this laſt Caſe they have hopes ſome time or other to ſee an end of it; but in the other they are deſperate. In your laſt War you took up Arms againſt an intire and united City; in this, you have to do only with a Remnant. Then, you attempted upon the Liberty of the City; now, you will endeavour to reſtore it: And it is not to be feared, that in ſuch diſparity of Cauſes, the Effects ſhould be the ſame. Nay, rather your Victory is certain, and what Advantage and Corroboration that will be to your own State, is eaſily judged; having* Tuſcany *obliged to you thereby, and readier to ſerve you in any of your Deſigns, than* Milan *it ſelf. So that, though formerly this acqueſt would have been look'd upon as Uſurpation and Violence; it will be now eſteemed an high piece of Juſtice and Charity. Suffer not therefore this opportunity to paſs, and be ſure, if your other Enterprizes againſt this City have produced nothing but Expence, Difficulty and Diſhonour; this will make you amends, and with great eaſe, turn to your great Honour and Advantage.*

The Duke needed not many Words to excite him againſt the *Florentines*; he had an hereditary Quarrel to them, which (beſides the blindneſs of his Ambition) did always provoke him, and now more than ordinarily, upon occaſion of their new League with the *Genoeſes*. However the Expences and Dangers he had formerly paſs'd, the memory of his late Defeat, and the vanity and ill-grounded hopes of the Exiles, diſcouraged him quite. The Duke, upon the firſt news of the Rebellion in *Genoa*, ſent *Nicolo Piccinino*, with what Forces he had and could get together, towards that City, to recover it, if poſſible, before the Citizens ſhould have compos'd themſelves, or put the Government into order; preſuming much upon the Caſtle which ſtood out for him. And though *Nicolo* drove the *Genoeſes* up into the Mountains, and took from them the Vale of *Pozivori*, where they had fortified themſelves; yet he found ſo much difficulty afterwards, (though he had beat them into the Town) that he was forc'd to draw off. Whereupon at the inſtigation of the Exiles, he receiv'd Orders from the Duke, that he ſhould attack them on the Eaſt-ſide of the River, and make what Devaſtations he could in their Country towards *Piſa*; ſuppoſing that by the ſucceſs of this Expedition, he ſhould be able to judge from time to time what Courſe he was to ſteer. Upon the receipt of theſe Orders, *Nicolo* aſſaulted *Serezana*, and took it; and then having done much miſchief in thoſe Parts to alarm the *Florentines*, he marched towards *Lucca*, giving out, he would paſs that way into the Kingdom of *Naples*, to aſſiſt the

King of *Aragon*. Pope *Eugenius*, upon these new Accidents, departed from *Florence* to *Bologna*, where he proposed and negotiated an Accommodation betwixt the Duke and the League; representing to the Duke, that if he would not comply, he would be forc'd to part with the Conte *Francesco* to the League; for *Francesco* being his Confederate, was at that time under his Pay. But, though his Holiness took much pains in the business, that Treaty came to nothing; for the Duke would not consent, unless *Genoa* were restored; and the League were as obstinate to have it remain free; so that all Parties growing diffident of the Peace, each of them began to make provision for War. *Nicolo Piccinino* being arrived at *Lucca*, the *Florentines* began to apprehend new Troubles, caused *Neri di Gino* to march with all speed into the Country of *Pisa*, and obtained of the *Pope* that Conte *Francesco* might join with him, and their united Forces take their Post before St. *Gonda*: *Piccinino* being at *Lucca*, desired a Pasport to go into the Kingdom of *Naples*, and being denied, he threatned to force it. The Armies and Officers were of equal number and eminence; so that neither side being over-forward to run the hazard of a Battle, by reason of the extraordinary coldness of the Weather, (it being in *December*) they lay by one another several days without any Action at all. The first that moved was *Nicolo Piccinino*; who was inform'd, that if in the Night he assaulted *Vico Pisano*, he should easily carry it. *Nicolo* attempted it; but failing of his design, he plunder'd the Country about it, and burn'd the Town of S. *Giovanni alla Vena*.

This Enterprize (though for the most part ineffectual) encouraged *Nicolo* to proceed nevertheless; especially, observing that the Conte and *Neri* stir'd not to molest him: thereupon he assaulted St. *Maria* in *Castello* and *Filetto*, and took them both: nor did the *Florentine* Army move for all that: not that the Conte was afraid to come forth, but because the Magistrates in *Florence* (out of respect to the *Pope*, who was mediating a Peace) had not as yet resolved upon the War: and that which was but Prudence in the *Florentines*, being interpreted Fear by the Enemy, they took Courage, and with all the Forces they could make, sate down before *Barga*. The news of that Siege caused the *Florentines* to lay aside all Compliments and Respect; and to resolve not only to relieve *Barga*, but to invade the Country of the *Lucchesi*. Whereupon the Conte marching directly against *Nicolo*, and giving Battle to force him from the Siege, he worsted his Army, and made him draw off: the *Venetians* in the mean time perceiving the Duke had broke the League, sent *Giovan Francesco da Gonzague* their General, with an Army as far as *Chiaradadda*, who spoiling the Duke's Country, constrained him to call back *Nicolo Piccinino* out of *Tuscany*. Which Revocation, with the Victory they had lately obtained against *Nicolo*, encouraged the *Florentines* to an Expedition against *Lucca*, and gave them great hopes of Success: in which they carried themselves without either fear or respect, seeing the Duke (who was the only Person they apprehended) imploy'd by the *Venetians*, and the *Lucchesi*, by having, as it were, received their Enemies into their Houses, and given them cause to invade them, had left themselves no grounds to complain.

1437. In *April* therefore, in the Year 1437, the Conte march'd with his Army; and before he would fall upon any thing of the Enemy's, he address'd himself to the recovery of what had been lost, and accordingly he reduced S. *Maria de Castello*, and whatever else had been taken by *Piccinino*. Then advancing against the *Lucchesi*, he sate down before *Camajore*; whose Garrison and Inhabitants (though well enough affected to their Lord) being more influenced by the terror of an Enemy at hand, than their Fidelity to their Friends afar off, surrender'd immediately; after which, he took *Massa* and *Serazan* with the same dexterity and reputation; and then, turning his Army towards *Lucca* in the Month of *May*, he destroy'd their Corn, burn'd their Villages, stubb'd up their Vines, and their Fruit-trees, drove away their Cattle, and omitted nothing of Outrage and Inhospitality that is or can be committed by Soldiers. The *Lucchesi* seeing themselves abandon'd by the Duke, and unable to defend their Country, retir'd into the Town, where they intrench'd and fortified so well, that they did not doubt (by reason of their Numbers within) but to be able to make it good for some time, as they had formerly done. Their only fear was of the Unconstancy of the People, who being weary of the Siege, would probably consider their own private Danger before the Liberty of their Country, and force them to some ignominious Accord. Whereupon, to encourage them to a vigorous Defence, they were called together into the Market-place, and one of the wisest and gravest of the Citizens spake to them as followeth.

The Speech of a Citizen of *Lucca* to the People.

You have often heard, and must needs understand, that things done of necessity, are neither to be praised, nor condemn'd. If therefore you accuse us of having drawn this War upon you, by entertaining the Duke's Forces, and suffering them to assault you; you

are

are highly mistaken. You cannot be ignorant of the ancient and inveterate Hatred the Florentines *bear you; so that 'tis not any Injury in you, nor any Resentment in them, but your Weakness and their Ambition which has provoked them; the first giving them hopes, the other impatience to oppress you. Do not think that any Kindness of yours can divert them from that desire; nor any Injury of yours provoke them to be worse. 'Tis their Business therefore to rob you of your Liberty; 'tis yours to defend it; and what either of you do in pursuance of those ends may be lamented, but cannot be wondred at by any body: We may be sorry our Country is invaded, our City besieged, our Houses burned; but who of us all is so weak as to admire it? Seeing, if our Power were as great we would do the same to them, and, if possible, worse. If they pretend this War was occasioned by our admitting of* Nicolo; *had he not been received, they would have pretended another; and, perhaps, had this Invasion been deferred, it might have proved more fatal and pernicious; so that 'tis not his Coming is to be blamed, but our ill Fortune, and the Ambition of their Nature; for we could not refuse the Duke's Forces; and when they were come, it was not in our power to keep them from doing Acts of Hostility: You know very well, that without the Assistance of some considerable Prince, we had not been able to defend our selves; nor was any Man more proper to relieve us, both in respect of his Fidelity and Power, than the Duke. He restored us to our Liberty, and 'twas but reasonable he should secure it. He was always an Enemy to those who would never be our Friends; if therefore we have provoked the Duke, rather than we would disoblige the* Florentines, *we have lost a true Friend and made our Enemy more able and more ready to offend us: so that it is much better for us to have this War, with the friendship of the Duke; than to have Peace, with his displeasure: and we have reason to hope he will rescue us from these Dangers to which he has exposed us, if we be not wanting to our selves. You cannot forget with what fury the* Florentines *have many times assaulted us, and with what Honour and Reputation we have repelled them, even when we have had no hopes but in God and in Time, and how both of them have preserved us. If we defended our selves then; what reason now is there to despair? Then we were deserted by all* Italy, *and left as a Prey to the Enemy; now we have the Duke on our side, and 'tis not improbable the* Venetians *will be but slow in their Motions against us; seeing it can be no pleasure to them to see the Power of the* Florentines *encrease. Then the* Florentines *were more free and unengaged, had more hopes of Assistance, and were stronger of themselves, and we every way weaker; for then we defended a Tyrant, now we fight for our selves; then the Honour went to other People, now it returns upon us; then they were united and entire, now they are divided, and all* Italy *full of their Rebels. But if we had none of these Reasons, nor none of these Hopes to excite us, extreme Necessity would be sufficient to animate us to our defence. Every Enemy ought in reason to be apprehended by us, because all of them seek their own Glory, and our Destruction; but, above all, the* Florentines *ought to be most dreadful, who are not to be satisfied with our Obedience, Tribute, nor the Government of our City; but they must have our Persons and Wealths, to satiate their Cruelty with our Blood, and their Avarice with our Estates; so that there is no Person nor Condition among us so mean, but ought justly to fear them. Let No-body therefore be dismay'd to see our Country wasted, our Villages burn'd, and our Lands possessed by the Enemy: If we preserve our City, they of course will revert: if we lose our City, to what purpose will they be kept? Maintaining our Liberty; the Enemy can hardly enjoy them: but losing our Liberty, what comfort would it be to retain them? Take Arms therefore with Courage, and when you are engaged with your Enemy, remember the reward of your Victory is not only the safety of your Country, but the preservation and security of your Children and Estates.*

These last Words were receiv'd by the People with such warmth and vigor of Mind, that unanimously they promised to die rather than to desert their City, or entertain any Treaty that might intrench upon their Liberty; so that immediately order was taken for all things necessary for the defence of the City. In the mean time the *Florentine* Army was not idle, after many Mischiefs and Depredations in the Country, they took *Monte-Carlo* upon Conditions; after which they encamp'd at *Uzano*, that the *Luccheſi* being straitned on all sides, and made desperate of Relief, might be constrained to Surrender. The Castle was strong, and furnish'd with a good Garrison; so that was not so easily to be carried as the rest. The *Luccheſi* (as was but reason) seeing themselves distressed, had recourse to the Duke, and recommended their Case to him with all manner of Expression; sometimes they commemorated the Services they had done him; sometimes they remonstrated the Cruelty of the *Florentines*: what Courage it would give the rest of his Friends to see him interpose in their Defence; and what Terror it would infuse to see them expos'd: for if they lost their Liberty and their

Lives, he would loſe his Honour, and his Friends, and the Fidelity of all thoſe who had ever expos'd themſelves to any danger for his ſake: which Words were deliver'd with Tears, that if his Obligations ſhould fail, his Compaſſion might move him to aſſiſt them. Inſomuch that the Duke, adding to his old Animoſity to the *Florentines*, his late Engagements to the *Luccheſi*, but above all being jealous of the greatneſs of the *Florentine*, which of neceſſity would follow ſo important acqueſt; he reſolved to ſend a great Army into *Tuſcany*, or elſe to fall ſo furiouſly upon the *Venetians*, that the *Florentines* ſhould be conſtrain'd to quit that Enterprize to relieve them: he had no ſooner taken this Reſolution, but they had News at *Florence* that the Duke was ſending Forces into *Tuſcany*; which made them ſuſpicious of their Deſigns, and therefore, to find the Duke Imployment at home, they ſollicited the *Venetian* very earneſtly, that they would attack him in *Lombardy* with all the Power they could make: but they were not only weaken'd, but diſhearten'd by the departure of the Marqueſs of *Mantoua*, who had left their Service, and taken Arms under the Duke. Whereupon they return'd this Anſwer, that they were ſo far from being able to ingroſs the War, they could not aſſiſt in it, unleſs they ſent *Conte Franceſco* to command their Army; and oblig'd him by Articles to paſs the *Po* with them in Perſon (ſeeing by the old Agreement he was not to go ſo far) for without a General they would undertake no War; nor could they have confidence in any but the Count; nor in him neither, unleſs he oblig'd himſelf to purſue the War in all places alike.

The *Florentines* were of opinion the War was to be carried on briskly in *Lombardy*; yet on the other ſide to remove the *Conte* was to deſtroy their Deſigns againſt *Lucca*, and they were very ſenſible, that demand was made, not ſo much out of any neceſſity they had of the *Conte*, as to defeat that Enterprize. The *Conte*, for his part, was by Contract oblig'd to go into *Lombardy* whenever he ſhould be requir'd by the League; but now he was unwilling to forfeit his hopes of that Alliance which the Duke had promis'd him, by marrying him to one of his Relations. So that betwixt the deſire of conquering *Lucca*, and the fear of having Wars with the Duke, the *Florentines* were in no little diſtraction. But their Fear (as it always happens) was the ſtronger Paſſion of the two, inſomuch as they were content (as ſoon as *Uzano* was taken) the *Conte* ſhould paſs into *Lombardy*. But there was ſtill a difficulty behind, which not being in their power to diſſolve, gave the *Florentines* more Trouble and Jealouſy, than any thing elſe; and that was, that the *Conte* would not be oblig'd to paſs the *Po*, and without it the *Venetians* would not entertain him: there being no way to accommodate this Difference, but of neceſſity one of them muſt ſubmit; the *Florentines* perſuaded the *Conte*, that in a Letter to the *Senate* of *Florence* he ſhould oblige himſelf to paſs that River, alledging that a private Promiſe not being ſufficient to diſſolve a publick Stipulation, he might do afterwards as he pleas'd; and which way ſoever he acted, this Convenience would certainly follow, that the *Venetians* having begun the War, would be compelled to purſue it; and that Humour be inevitably diverted, which was ſo much to be fear'd.

To the *Venetians* they intimated on the other ſide, That the latter, though private, was ſufficient to bind him, and that they ought to be ſatisfied therewith: that whilſt it might be done ſecurely it would be beſt to conceal it; and indulge his Reſpects to his Father-in-Law; for it would be neither for his, nor their advantage to have it diſcover'd, without manifeſt neceſſity: and in this manner the *Florentines* concluded upon the *Conte*'s Paſſage into *Lombardy*; and the *Conte* having taken in *Uzano*, caſt up certain new Works about *Lucca* to keep from ſallying, and recommended the War to the Commiſſioners which ſucceeded; he paſs'd the *Alpes*, and went to *Reggio*, where the *Venetians* (being jealous of his Proceedings) to diſcover his Inclinations, put him at firſt daſh upon paſſing the *Po*, and joining the reſt of their Army; which the *Conte* peremptorily refus'd, and many ill Words paſſed betwixt him and *Andrea Mauroceno*, who was ſent about it from the *Venetians*: upbraiding one another by their Pride and Infidelity; and after ſeveral Proteſtations on both ſides; on the one, that he was not oblig'd to it; on the other, that he ſhould not be paid without it, the *Conte* return'd into *Tuſcany*, and his Adverſary to *Venice*. The *Conte* was quarter'd by the *Florentines* in the Country of *Piſa*; and they were not without hopes of prevailing with him to reaſſume his Command againſt the *Luccheſi*; but they found him not diſpos'd; for the Duke not underſtanding he had refus'd to paſs the *Po*, in compliment to him (fancying by his means he might preſerve *Lucca*) he deſir'd him that he would be an Inſtrument to make Peace betwixt the *Luccheſi* and the *Florentines*, and if he could to comprehend him alſo, inſinuating by the bye, that in convenient time he ſhould marry his Daughter. This Match had great influence upon the *Conte*, who perſuaded himſelf the Duke having no Heirs Males, might thereby in time come to the Government of *Milan*. Upon which grounds he diſcouraged the *Florentines* from proſecuting

Jealouſy betwixt the *Venetian* and the *Conte*.

ſecuting the War, affirming, that for his own part, he would not ſtir, unleſs the *Venetians* paid him his Arrears, and performed the reſt of their Covenants; for his Pay alone would not do his Buſineſs, wherefore it concern'd him to ſecure his own State, and therefore he was to look out for other Allies, and not depend only upon the Friendſhip of the *Florentines*; that ſeeing he was abandon'd by the *Venetians* he was oblig'd to a ſtricter regard to his own Affairs, and threaten'd very likely to make an Agreement with the Duke. Theſe Tricks and Expoſtulations were not at all to the *Florentines* ſatisfaction. They found their Deſign upon *Lucca* loſt, and their own State in danger, whenever the Duke and the *Conte* united. To prevail with the *Venetians* to make good their Terms, *Coſimo de Medici* was diſpatch'd to them, (ſuppoſing his Reputation might have ſome influence upon them) and in a long Speech to their *Senate*, he repreſented the poſture of Affairs in *Italy*; the Power and Conduct of the Duke; and concluded, that if the Count and he joined, the *Venetians* would be confin'd to the Sea, and the *Florentines* in no ſmall danger of their Liberty: to which it was anſwer'd by the *Venetian*, that they had well conſider'd the Condition of *Italy*, and their own; and did believe they were every way able to defend themſelves; however it was not their Cuſtom to pay any body for doing other People Service. It belonged therefore to the *Florentines* to ſee the *Conte* ſatisfied, ſeeing it was they had had the benefit of his Service, or rather (if they had a mind to preſerve themſelves in Security for the future) to correct and rebate his Inſolence than to pay him; for Men put no bounds to their Ambition; and if he ſhould then be paid without doing any Service, his next Demand, in all likelihood, would be more inſolent and dangerous: in their Judgment therefore it was high time to put a ſtop to his career, and not let him run on, till he became incorrigible; but if out of fear, or any other Conſideration they had a mind to continue him their Friend, their beſt way would be to pay him: With which Anſwer *Coſimo* return'd, and nothing was concluded.

The Venetians untractable.

The *Florentines* nevertheleſs interceded very earneſtly with the *Conte*, that he would not forſake the League; who had no great inclination to it himſelf; but his deſire to conſummate the Marriage with the Duke's Daughter, kept him in ſuch ſuſpence, that upon every little Accident he was ready to leave them. The *Conte* had left his Towns in *la Marca*, to be ſecured by *Furlano*, one of his principal Officers: This *Furlano* was earneſtly ſollicited by the Duke, that he left the *Conte*'s Service, and joined himſelf to him. Whereupon laying aſide all other reſpects to ſave his own Stake, the *Conte* came to an Agreement likewiſe with the Duke, and among the reſt of the Articles, this was one, that for the future the *Conte* ſhould not intermeddle in the Affairs either of *Romagna* or *Tuſcany*. After he had made this Peace with the Duke, the *Conte* was very importunate with the *Florentines* to come to an Agreement with the *Luccheſi*; and he perſuaded them ſo far, that finding no other remedy, they came to a Compoſition with them in the Month of *April* 1438, by which Capitulation the *Luccheſi* were to have their Liberties preſerved; and the *Florentines* to keep poſſeſſion of *Monti Carlo*, and ſome other Caſtles which they had taken before: after which they writ many ſad Letters up and down *Italy*, lamenting, that ſeeing God and Man were unwilling that the *Luccheſi* ſhould fall under their Dominion, they had been conſtrain'd to a Peace with them: and ſo much were they concern'd for their diſappointment in that Enterprize, that ſeldom has any body been known to loſe their own Eſtates with more impatience and regret, than the *Florentines* expreſs'd, for not gaining other Peoples. However, tho' the *Florentines* at that time had ſo many Irons in the Fire; they forgot not their Alliances with their Neighbours, nor the Decoration of their City. *Nicolo Fortebraccio* (who had married a Daughter of the *Conte di Poppi*) being dead, *Poppi* had the command of the *Borgo ſan Sepulcro*, the Caſtle, and other Appendixes, which he kept in behalf of his Son-in-Law, whilſt his Son-in-Law lived; refuſing afterwards to ſurrender them to the *Pope*, who demanded them as uſurped from the Church: upon which refuſal the *Pope* ſent the *Patriarch* with an Army to recover them by force. The *Conte di Poppi* finding himſelf unable to defend them, offer'd them to the *Florentines*, who would not accept them: however, upon the *Pope*'s return to *Florence*, they interpoſed, and labour'd an Agreement betwixt his Holineſs and the *Conte*.

Conte di Poppi.

But finding the Treaty difficult and dilatory; the *Patriarch* fell upon *Caſentino*, took *Prato Vecchio* and *Romena*, and proffer'd them likewiſe to the *Florentines*; but they could not be accepted, unleſs the *Pope* would conſent they ſhould reſtore them to the *Conte*, which after much Argumentation he did, upon condition the *Florentines* ſhould uſe their Intereſt with *Conte Poppi* to reſtore *Burgo* to him. The mind of his Holineſs being at quiet by this means, the *Florentines* (the Cathedral Church of their City, call'd *Santa Reparata*, having been out of repair, long ſince begun to be mended, and now brought to that perfection Divine Service might be celebrated in it) entreat-

ed

ed his Holiness, that he would oblige them so far, as to consecrate it himself: to which he willingly condescended, and for the greater magnificence of the Church and City, and the ostentation and honour of the *Pope*, a Gallery was built from *Santa Maria Novella* (where the *Pope* held his Court to the Church which was to be consecrated) four Fathoms wide, and two high, cover'd over with very rich Cloths, under which only his Holiness, his Court, and such Magistrates of the City as were appointed to attend him, were to pass; all the rest of the Citizens and People having dispos'd themselves in the Street, the Church, and a top of their Houses, to behold so glorious a Spectacle. The Ceremony being pass'd with the usual Solemnity; his Holiness, as a token of more than ordinary Respect, confer'd the Honour of Knighthood upon *Guiliano da Avenzati*, at that time *Gonfaloniere di Giustitia*, but always a very eminent Citizen; to whom the *Senate* (that they might not seem behind-hand with the *Pope* in any point of Beneficence) gave the Government of the *Pisa* for a Year.

Controversies betwixt the *Greek* and *Roman* Churches.

About this time certain Differences arising betwixt the *Greek* and the *Roman* Churches, they could not agree in all Particulars about the Divine Worship: and forasmuch as in the last Council of *Basil* much had been said upon that Subject by the Prelats of the Church; it was resolved, that all diligence should be us'd to bring the Emperor and the Prelats of the *Greek* Church together to the Council of *Basil*, to try if there was any way to accommodate them with the *Romans*. Though it was derogatory to the Majesty of the Emperor, and contrary to the Pride of his Prelats, to yield in any thing to the *Romans*, yet the *Turk* lying heavy upon them, and fearing that of themselves they should not be able to resist him, that they might with the more confidence and security desire Relief from other People, they resolv'd to comply: and accordingly, as was directed by the Council of *Basil*, the Emperor, the *Patriarch*, and several other Prelats and Barons of *Greece*, arriv'd at *Venice*; but being frighted from thence by the Plague, it was resolv'd they should remove to *Florence*, and all their Differences be discussed and determined in that City: Being assembled, and for many Days together, both *Roman* and *Greek* Prelats, all of them in the Cathedral; after many and long Disputations, the *Greeians* condescended, and comply'd with the Church and Bishop of *Rome*.

Determined at *Florence*, by the Submission of the *Greek*.

The Peace betwixt the *Lucchesi* and the *Florentines*, and betwixt the Duke and the *Conte*, being concluded; it was thought no hard matter to put an end to the Wars of *Italy*, especially in *Lombardy*, in *Tuscany*; for the War in the Kingdom of *Naples* betwixt *Rinato di Angio* and *Alphonso d' Aragona*, was hardly to be compos'd but by the ruin of them: and though the *Pope* was discontented for the loss of so many Towns; and the Ambition of the Duke and *Venetian* was sufficiently known; yet it was suppos'd Necessity would force the one to lay down, and Weariness the other: but they were out in their Conjectures; for neither Duke nor *Venetian* could be persuaded to be quiet; but on the contrary they took Arms afresh, and *Lombardy* and *Tuscany* was filled again with their Hostilities. The ambitious and haughty Mind of the Duke could not brook that the *Venetians* should keep *Bergamo* and *Breschia*; and the rather because he observ'd them always in Arms, perpetually making Incursions all over his Country; in which, he thought he should not only restrain them, but recover all he had lost, whenever the *Pope*, the *Florentines*, and the *Conte* should desert them: he designed therefore to take *Romagna* from the *Pope*, supposing when he had gained that, it would not be in his Holiness's Power to offend him; and the *Florentines* seeing the Fire at their own Doors, would not stir for fear of themselves; or if they did, they could not assault him conveniently. The Duke understood likewise how angry the *Florentines* were with the *Venetians* about the business of *Lucca*, and upon that score concluded them the less likely to take up Arms for the *Venetians*: and as to *Conte Francesco*, he did not doubt his new Amity, and the hopes of his Marriage, would keep him quiet and safe.

To prevent Scandal, and give less occasion to any body to stir (having oblig'd himself by his Articles with the *Conte* not to meddle with *Romagna*) he caus'd *Nicolo Piccinino* to take the Enterprize upon himself, and fall upon it as of his own Ambition and Avarice. *Nicolo*, at the time of the Treaty betwixt the Duke and the *Conte*, was in *Romagna*, and (by the Duke's direction) shew'd himself much dissatisfied at his Agreement with his implacable Adversary, the *Conte*. Whereupon he retir'd with his Army (in great discontent as was pretended) to *Camurata* (a Town betwixt *Furli* and *Ravenna*) and fortified himself, as if he design'd to make good that Quarter, till he could find some better Entertainment: and the report of his Disgust being spread all over *Italy*, *Nicolo* took order to have his Services, and the Duke's Ingratitude, remonstrated to the *Pope*; and that though by the interest of two of the principal Generals, he had got all the Forces of *Italy* under his Command, yet if his Holiness would say the word, he could contrive things so, that one of them should become his Enemy, and the other unserviceable; for

if he would provide him with Monies, and ſupply him with Men, he would fall upon the Towns which the *Conte* had uſurped from the Church, and by giving the *Conte* Imployment for the preſervation of his own Countries, render him incapable of being ſubſervient to the Ambition of the Duke. The *Pope* believing what he ſaid to be rational and true, ſent him 5000 Ducats, beſides large promiſes of Proviſion for himſelf and his Children; and though many times he was admoniſhed to have a care of being deceived, yet he would never ſuſpect nor admit one word to the contrary.

The *Pope* deluded, and his Country invaded by *Piccinino*.

The City of *Ravenna* was at that time commanded for the Church by *Oſtaſio da Polenta*, *Nicolo* conceiving it no time to protract (his Son *Franceſco* having plunder'd and ſack'd *Spoleto*, to the great Satisfaction of the *Pope*) reſolv'd to attack *Ravenna*, either thinking the Enterprize eaſie in it ſelf, or elſe holding private Intelligence with *Oſtaſio* the Governour; which ſoever it was, he had not inveſted it many Days before it was ſurrender'd upon Articles; and that being taken, *Bologna*, *Imola*, and *Furli* follow'd in a ſhort time; and that which was moſt ſtrange, was, that of twenty ſtrong Holds which in thoſe Parts were garriſon'd by the *Pope*, there was not any one but ſubmitted to *Nicolo*; and not contented with theſe Affronts to his Holineſs, he added contumely to his Injuſtice; and writ the *Pope* word, that he had us'd him according to his Deſerts: for having impudently endeavoured to interrupt the old Friendſhip betwixt him and the Duke, and fill'd all *Italy* with Letters that he abandon'd the Duke, and ſided with the *Venetian*. Having poſſeſſed himſelf of *Romagna*, he left it to the Government of his Son *Franceſco*; and paſſing himſelf with the greateſt part of his Army into *Lombardy*, he joined the reſt of the Duke's Forces, aſſaulted the Country of *Breſchia*, and in a ſhort time brought it under ſubjection, and when he had done ſo, laid Siege to the City: the Duke deſirous that the *Venetians* might be expoſed, excus'd himſelf to the *Pope*, the *Florentines*, and the *Conte*, pretending that what was done by *Nicolo* in *Romagna*, if it were contrary to their Capitulations, was no leſs contrary to his Inclination; ſuggeſting privately, that when time and opportunity contributed, he would make him ſenſible of his Diſobedience: the *Florentines* and the *Conte* gave no great credit to what he ſaid; believing (as was true) that it was nothing but Artifice to keep them in ſuſpence till he conquer'd the *Venetians*, who ſuppoſing themſelves able alone to contend with the Duke, were too proud to deſire Aſſiſtance of any body, but with their Captain *Gatamelato*, would wage War with him by themſelves. The *Conte Franceſco* deſir'd, by permiſſion of the *Florentines*, that he might have gone to the Relief of King *Rinato* (had not the Accidents in *Romagna* and *Lombardy* diverted him) and the *Florentines*, for the old Friendſhip betwixt them and *France* would have willingly conſented, and the Duke would have aſſiſted *Alphonſo*, for the kindneſs he had expreſs'd to him in his former Diſtreſs: but both the one and the other had too much Imployment at home, to concern themſelves in any Differences abroad: the *Florentines* ſeeing *Romagna* over-run, and the *Venetians* baffled by the Duke (apprehending their own by the Calamity of their Neighbours) deſir'd the *Conte* to come into *Tuſcany*, that they might conſider of ſome way to obſtruct the Duke's Forces, which were then much ſtronger than ever they had been; adding withal, that if their Inſolence was not ſuddenly reſtrain'd, there was no State in *Italy* but would feel the inconvenience.

The *Conte* knew well enough the apprehenſion of the *Florentines* was but reaſonable, yet his deſire that his Marriage with the Duke's Daughter might proceed, kept him in ſuſpence: and the Duke perceiving his mind, kept him up with reiterated hopes, (if he ſtirr'd not againſt him) for the young Lady was now of Age to have it conſummated, and many times the Treaty was ſo far advanc'd, that all convenient Preparations were made for the Wedding, when of a ſudden ſome new Scruple or Cavil was found to protract it: however, to make the *Conte* more ſecure, he added ſome Deeds to his Promiſes; and ſent him thirty thouſand *Florens*, to which the Duke had engaged himſelf by the Articles of Marriage. But this Tranſaction hinder'd not the proceeding of the War in *Lombardy*. Every day the *Venetian* loſt ſome Town or other; the Boats they ſent to ſecure the Rivers, were ſunk and diſpers'd by the Duke's Forces; the Country of *Breſca* and *Verona* harraſs'd and poſſeſs'd; and thoſe Cities both of them ſo ſtraightly block'd up, the common Opinion was, they could not hold out: the Marqueſs of *Mantua*, who for many Years had been their General, left them, and went over to the Duke; ſo what their Pride would not ſuffer them to do in the beginning, in the proceſs of War they were driven to by their Fear; for finding now they had no Remedy but in the Friendſhip of the *Conte* and the *Florentines*, they demanded it of themſelves; but not without much Diffidence and Suſpicion, leaſt the *Florentines* ſhould make them the ſame anſwer, which in the Enterprize of *Lucca*, they had received from them about the Affairs of the *Conte*: but they found them more tractable than they expected, and indeed more than their Carriage towards them had deſerved. So much

much more prevalent in the *Florentines* was their old Quarrel to their Enemies than their new Pick and Exceptions to their Friends. And having long before preſaged the diſtreſs into which the *Venetians* of neceſſity would fall; they had repreſented to the *Conte* how inſeparable his Ruin would be from theirs; and that he would find himſelf deceiv'd, if he expected the Duke would eſteem him more in his good, than in his adverſe Fortune; for it was fear of him (whilſt his Affairs were uncertain) and nothing elſe, had moved him to that Treaty about his Daughter; and foraſmuch as the ſame thing which neceſſity conſtrains People to promiſe, it conſtrains them to perform; it was neceſſary to continue the Duke in the ſame diſtreſs; which could not be done, but by preſerving the Grandeur of the *Venetians*. He ought therefore to conſider, that if the *Venetians* ſhould be forced to quit their Territory upon the Land, he would not only be deprived of the Conveniences he might have from them, but of all that he might reaſonably expect from other People who were afraid of them; and if he reflected upon other States of *Italy*, he would find ſome of them poor, and ſome of them Enemies, and alone (as they had often inculcated) the *Florentines* were not able to maintain him; ſo that in all reſpects it was his Intereſt to ſuſtain the Dominion of the *Venetians* upon the *Terra-firma*. Theſe Perſuaſions added to the Hatred the *Conte* had conceived againſt the Duke, for his juggling about his Daughter, diſpos'd him to the Agreement; yet not ſo as to oblige himſelf to paſs the *Po*.

The *Conte* earneſtly perſuaded not to deſert the *Venetians*.

1438. The Articles were agreed in *February* 1438, in which the *Venetians* engag'd to defray two thirds of the Charge of the War, and the *Florentines* one; each of them obliging themſelves at their own Expences to defend the *Conte*'s Lands in *la Marca* in the mean time. Nor was the League contented with theſe Forces and Allies; for they joined to them the Lord of *Faenza*, the Sons of *Pandolfo Malateſta da Rimino* and *Piero Giampagolo Urſino*; they tried the Marqueſs of *Mantoua* likewiſe; but they could not remove him from the Duke, to whom the Lord of *Faenza* revolted (upon better Conditions) though he had enter'd the League; which put them into great fear they ſhould not be able to execute their Deſigns in *Romagna* ſo readily as they propos'd: At this time *Lombardy* was in ſuch diſtreſs, that *Breſchia* was beſieged by the Duke's Forces, and reduc'd into ſuch a Condition, it was daily expected when by Famine it ſhould be conſtrain'd to ſurrender. *Verona* was in the ſame Condition, and if either of them was taken, it was concluded all farther Oppoſition would be in vain, and all their Expences hitherto loſt: againſt this there was no viſible Remedy, but to ſend the *Conte* into *Lombardy*, and in that there were three difficulties. One was to perſuade the *Conte* to paſs the *Po*, and carry on the War in all Places: the ſecond was, that the *Florentines* ſeemed to be expoſed thereby, and left to the diſcretion of the Duke, who retiring into his own Faſtneſſes, might divide his Forces, and facing the *Conte* with one Party, join with their Rebels with the other, and march into *Tuſcany*; which was a courſe they were not a little afraid of. The third was, to reſolve which way the *Conte* might paſs moſt ſecurely into the Country of *Padua* to the *Venetian* Army. Of theſe three difficulties, the ſecond relating to the *Florentines* took up the greateſt Debate; but knowing the neceſſity, and tired with the *Venetians* (who preſs'd for the *Conte* with all imaginable opportunity, and proteſted that without him they would give over all) they preferr'd the neceſſity of their Aſſociate before any danger of their own.

However, the difficulty of the way was refer'd to be ſecured by the *Venetians*; and becauſe for the managing of this Treaty, and inclining the *Conte* to paſs into *Lombardy*, it was thought fit that *Neri* the Son of *Gino Capponi* ſhould be diſpatch'd to him; the *Senate* concluded to ſend for him to *Venice*, to make the Imployment the more grateful, and inſtruct him the more commodiouſly about the way the *Conte* was to march. Upon this invitation, *Neri* departed from *Ceſena*, and came by Water to *Venice*, where never any Prince was receiv'd with more Honour and Acclamation than he was by the *Senate*; for upon his coming and the Reſolutions which thereupon they were to take, they believed the whole Happineſs and Safety of their Government did depend: *Neri* being introduc'd into the *Senate*, ſpake to them in this manner.

Moſt Serene Prince,

Neri's Speech to the *Venetian* Senate.

MY Maſters were always of Opinion, that the greatneſs of the Duke would be the deſtruction of your Commonwealth and their own; and that if any thing prevented it, it muſt be the Grandeur and Proſperity of both. Had this been credited in time by your Lordſhips, our Condition had been better than it is; and your State ſecure from many Dangers wherewith it is now infeſted; but you not having given us either Aſſiſtance, or Credit, when our Neceſſities required, we could not make ſuch haſte to your relief; nor you deſire it ſo readily as you might have done, had you known us better either in Proſperity or Adverſity; or underſtood that where we love once, our love is inextinguiſhable,

guiſhable, and where we hate once, our Hatred is immortal: the love and reſpect we have always retained to this illuſtrious Senate, *you your ſelves do know; having many times ſeen* Lombardy *full of our Forces which was ſent in to your relief: our Animoſity to* Philip *is known to all the World, and we ſhall continue it to his Family; for 'tis impoſſible old Love, or inveterate Hatred can ever be expung'd, let the new Injuries, or Endearments be as many as they will: we are, and have been aſſured, that in this War we might have ſtood neuter, with great favour from the Duke, and no danger to our ſelves; for though by your expulſion he had made himſelf Maſter of* Lombardy; *yet there would be enough left in* Italy *to ſecure us; ſeeing Envy is always concomitant with Power; one encreaſes with the other; and where Envy is, War and Diſtraction muſt follow. We were not inſenſible likewiſe (by declining this War) how great Charges, and Danger we ſhould have avoided, and how eaſily, by our ſtirrings, we may tranſplant into* Tuſcany: *but all theſe diſcouragements have been over-rul'd by our affection of the State, and we reſolved to aſſiſt you with the ſame vigour, as we would defend our ſelves: to this end (moſt Noble Lords) my Maſters judging it neceſſary above all things to relieve* Verona *and* Breſcia; *and imagining that impoſſible, but by the Conduct of the* Count; *they ſent me firſt to him to perſuade his paſſing into* Lombardy, *(to which your Lordſhip knows he would never be oblig'd) and to try the ſame Arguments with him, as wrought upon us: as he is invincible in Arms, ſo he is not to be outdone in Courteſie; and that Frankneſs and Generoſity which he ſaw us practiſe towards you, he has endeavoured to exceed: he underſtood very well how much he ſhould leave* Tuſcany *expos'd by his departure, but obſerving how we poſtponed our own Safety to yours, he very generouſly has promiſed to do the ſame, and prefers your Intereſt before his own. My buſineſs here is to proffer you the* Count *at the head of 7000 Horſe, and 2000 Foot, ready to receive your Orders, and ſeek out the Enemy as you pleaſe to direct. My requeſt therefore is (and it is the requeſt of my Maſters, and his own) that as he has exceeded the number which he was obliged to bring into your Service, ſo you would enlarge your Reward; that neither he may repent of his Enterprize, nor we be ſorry we perſuaded him.*

Theſe Words of *Neri*'s were heard with as much attention by the *Senate*, as if they had been deliver'd from an Oracle; and ſo much was the Auditory reviv'd thereby, they had not Patience to let their Duke reply according to Cuſtom; but riſing all of them upon their Feet, with their Hands lifted up, and Tears in their Eyes, they gave the *Florentines* thanks for the good Office they had done them; and him, for the diligence and dexterity of his Diſpatch, promiſing, that no time ſhould ever obliterate it, not only in their own Hearts, but in the Hearts of their Poſterity; and that their Country and themſelves would always be at the Service of the *Florentines*. But the Tranſport being over, they fell into ſerious debate about the way the *Count* was to take, that Bridges and all other Conveniencies might be provided: four ways there were before them. One from *Ravenna*, along the ſhore; but that lying moſt upon the Sea, and the Fens, was not approved: the next was the direct way, but obſtructed by a Caſtle call'd the *Ucellino*, which was garriſon'd by the Duke, and to be taken before they could paſs; and that could not be done in a ſhort time without great difficulty, and to be long about it would fruſtrate their Relief in another place, which required all poſſible expedition. The third way was by the Foreſt of *Lugo*, but the *Po* being overflown, that was unpaſſable. The fourth was thorow the Country of *Bologna*, over the Bridges at *Puledrano*, *Cento*, and *Picue*, and ſo by *Finale* and *Bondeno* to *Ferrara*, from whence partly by Water, and partly by Land, they might paſs into the Country of *Padua*, and join with the *Venetian* Army: this way alſo had its difficulties, and they were liable to be impeded by the Enemy's Army; yet being choſen as the beſt, notice was given to the *Count*, who departing with all imaginable ſpeed, arrived in the Country of *Padua* on the 20th of *June*: the arrival of ſo great a Captain in *Lombardy*, reviv'd the whole Government of *Venice*; and whereas before they were almoſt deſperate of their Safety; they began now to take Courage, and expect new Conqueſts upon the Enemy. The firſt thing the *Count* attempted, was the relief of *Verona*; to prevent which, *Nicolo* marched with his Army to *Soave* (a Caſtle betwixt the Country of *Vicenſa* and *Verona*) there he entrenched, throwing up a Ditch from *Soave* to the Marches of *Adice*.

The *Count* finding himſelf obſtructed thorough the Plain, reſolv'd to march over the Mountains to *Verona*; preſuming, that *Nicolo* would either believe he could not paſs that way, by reaſon of its ſteepneſs and cragginess; or let him paſs ſo, before he believ'd it, that it would be too late to interrupt him. Wherefore, taking eight Days Proviſion along with him, he march'd his Army over the Mountains, and at *Soave* came down into the Plains. And though *Nicolo* had thrown up ſome Works to incommode him; yet they were too weak to give him a ſtop. *Nicolo* finding the Enemy

paſs'd beyond his Imagination; and fearing to be forc'd to an Engagement upon ſome diſadvantage, he drew off to the other ſide of the *Aldice*, and the *Count*, without farther obſtacle, march'd into *Verona*. Having overcome the firſt difficulty, and reliev'd *Verona*, the next thing the Count was to attempt, was to ſuccour *Breſcia*. That City is ſeated ſo near the Lake *di Garda*, that tho' it was block'd up by Land, yet the Lake was open, and they could ſupply themſelves with Proviſions. Upon that conſideration, the Duke had put what force he could upon the Lake, and in the beginning of his Deſigns had ſecured all the Towns which were capable of ſupplying them by the benefit of the Lake.

The *Venetians* had Gallies likewiſe upon the Lake; but they were not ſtrong enough to encounter the Duke's. The Count thought it neceſſary with his Army to Land, to give the *Venetian* Gallies ſome advantage upon the Water; and therefore he concluded to attempt ſome of thoſe Towns which lay conveniently for the famiſhing of *Breſcia*, he clapp'd down therefore with his Army before *Bandolino* (a Caſtle ſtanding upon the Lake) hoping, if he took that, the reſt would ſurrender. But in that Enterprize his Fortune deceiv'd him; for moſt of his Men falling ſick, he was forc'd to raiſe the Siege and remove his Army to *Zemo*, a Caſtle belonging to the *Veroneſi*, where the Air was more healthful, and the Country more plentiful. The Count retired: *Nicolo*, not to ſlip the opportunity of making himſelf Maſter of the Lake, left his Camp at *Vegaſio*, and with a ſelect Party went to the Lake, where joining with the reſt, he fell ſo furiouſly upon the *Venetian* Squadron, that he broke it quite, and took moſt of them Priſoners. Upon this Victory, moſt of the Caſtles upon the Lake ſurrender'd to the Duke. The *Venetians*, ſtartled at this Defeat, and fearing leſt the *Breſcians* ſhould yield thereupon, they ſolicited the Count very earneſtly, both by Letters and Meſſages, that he would attempt to relieve them. The Count perceiving his hopes of doing it by the Lake abſolutely defeated, and his way by the Fields impoſſible, by reaſon of the Trenches and Bulwarks, which were ſo numerous and ſtrong, and an Army to make them good, ſo that to venture among them would be inevitable deſtruction; the way by the Mountains having been ſucceſsful to him at *Verona*, he reſolv'd to try it once more for the relief of *Breſcia*. Having pitch'd upon his way, the Count departed from *Zeno*, and by the *Val d' Acri*, marching to the Lake of St. *Andrea*, he paſs'd to *Forboli* and *Penda* upon the Lake *di Garda*, from whence he advanc'd to *Tenna*, and ſate down before it; it being neceſſary that Caſtle ſhould be taken before he could get into *Breſcia*. *Nicolo* having intelligence of his Deſign, marched his Army to *Piſchiera*, and from thence (joining with the Marqueſs of *Mantoua*, and a commanded Party of his beſt Men) he proceeded to engage the Count, who giving him Battle, *Nicolo* was beaten; his Army diſperſed; many of them taken Priſoners; and thoſe which eſcaped, many of them fled to their Camp, and many of them to the Fleet. *Nicolo* got off himſelf into *Tenna*, and Night being come, concluding if he ſtaid till Morning he could never get farther; to avoid a certain danger, he expos'd himſelf to a doubtful. Of all his Retinue, *Nicolo* had only one Servant with him, a luſty ſtrong *German*, and one that had always been very faithful to him. *Nicolo* perſuaded his *German*, that if he would put him into a Sack, he might carry him off to ſome ſecure place upon his Shoulders, as ſome Luggage of his Maſter's. The Enemy lay round before the Caſtle, but (tranſported and ſecure upon their Victory the Day before) without any Order or Guards: by which means the *German* found no great difficulty in the Buſineſs; for putting himſelf into the Habit of a Freebooter, and mounting his Maſter upon his Shoulders, he paſſed thorow their whole Camp, and brought him ſafe to his Party. This Victory, had it been improved as happily as it was gained, might have given more Relief to *Breſcia*, and more Felicity to the *Venetians*: but being ill managed, they had little reaſon to exult, and *Breſcia* remaining in the ſame neceſſity as before; for *Nicolo* was no ſooner return'd to the Forces which he had left behind, but he ſet all his Wits to work which way he might exploit ſome new thing to attone for his Loſs, and obſtruct the Relief of the Town: he knew himſelf the ſituation of the Citadel of *Verona*, and had learned from the Priſoners taken in that War, not only that it was ill guarded, but the way how it might eaſily be ſurprized: he believed therefore, that Fortune had preſented him with an opportunity of recovering his Honour, and converting his Enemy's Joy into Sadneſs and Sorrow. *Verona* is in *Lombardy*, ſeated at the foot of thoſe Mountains which divide *Italy* from *Germany*; ſo that it ſtands partly upon the Hill, and partly upon the Plain; the River *Adice* raiſes in the Valley *di Trento*, and running into *Italy*, does not extend himſelf immediately thorow the Plains; but banding to the Left-hand among the Mountains, it comes at length to the City, and paſſes thorow the midſt of it, yet not ſo as to divide it into equal parts; for towards the Plain it is much greater than towards the Mountains: upon the riſing part of the City there are two Caſtles, one of them called *San Piero*, and the other *San Felice*, which

Nicolo Piccinino defeated by the *Count*.

Eſcapes to *Tenna*, and from thence very ſtrangely to his Army.

appear

appear ſtronger in their ſituation than their Walls, and do by it command the whole Town. In the Plain, on this ſide the *Adice*, behind the Wall of the City, there are two Fortreſſes about a thouſand paces diſtant one from the other; of which the one is called the old Citadel, and the other the new. On the inſide of one of them, there paſſes a Wall to the other, and is (in reſpect of the other Walls which fetch a compaſs) as the String to a Bow. All the ſpace betwixt theſe two Walls is full of Inhabitants, and called the Borg of *San Zeno*. Theſe two Caſtles and the Burg, *Nicolo* deſign'd to ſurprize, believing it would be no difficult matter, both becauſe of the former negligence of the Guards (which he preſumed after the late Victory would be much greater) and of an opinion he had, that no Enterprize was ſo feaſible as that which the Enemy believ'd was impoſſible to be done. Having drawn out a Party of choice Men in order to his deſign, he join'd with the Marqueſs of *Mantoua*, and marching in the Night to *Verona*, he ſcaled the new Citadel, and took it without being perceiv'd, and then forcing upon the *Port di* S. *Antoine*, the ſignal was given to his Horſe, and they march'd all of them into the Town. Thoſe of the old Citadel, who were upon the Guard, hearing the noiſe when the Sentinels in the other Citadel were knock'd on the head, and when the Gate of S. *Antoine* was broken up, believing it was the Enemy, cry'd out to the People to Arm; and fell a ringing their Bells. The Citizens taking the alarm, came together in great confuſion; thoſe of them who had moſt Courage, got to their Arms, and retreated with them to the Palace of the *Rettori*: in the mean time *Nicolo*'s Soldiers had plunder'd the Borgo *di* S. *Zeno*, and advancing towards the Town, the Citizens, perceiving the Duke's Forces was entred, and no way left to defend themſelves, adviſed the *Venetian Rettori* to retire into the Fortreſſes, and preſerve themſelves and their Goods; for (as they ſaid) it would be much better to do ſo, and attend better Fortune, than by endeavouring to avoid the preſent Danger, to be knock'd on the Head, and the whole City pillaged: hereupon the *Rettori* and all the *Venetians* betook themſelves to the Caſtle of S. *Felice*; and ſeveral of the principal Citizens went to meet *Nicolo* and the Marqueſs of *Mantoua*, to beg of them that they would rather poſſeſs that City rich and with honour, than poor to their diſgrace; eſpecially ſeeing they had not by an obſtinate Defence deſerved preferment from their old Maſters, or hatred from their new. The Marqueſs and *Nicolo* having encourag'd them what they could, they protected them from Plunder as much as was poſſible; and becauſe they were confident the Count would immediately addreſs himſelf to the recovery of the Town, they contrived with all imaginable induſtry to get the Fort into their hands; but what they could not take, they block'd up with Ditches and Trenches cut about to obſtruct the Enemy from relieving them.

Verona ſurprized by *Nicolo*.

The Count *Franceſco* was with his Army at *Tenna*, where, upon the firſt report of this Surprize, he believ'd it but vain, afterwards underſtanding the truth, he reſolv'd by a more than ordinary ſpeed to recompence his former Negligence, and expiate its Diſgrace. And though all the chief Officers of his Army adviſ'd him to give over his Enterprize of *Breſcia* and *Verona*, and retire to *Vicenza*, leſt otherwiſe the Enemy ſhould encompaſs him where he was, yet he would not conſent; but reſolved to try his Fortune for the recovery of *Verona*; and turning about to the *Venetian Proveditori* and *Barnardetto de Medici* (who aſſiſted as Commiſſioner for the *Florentines*) he encouraged them in their Doubts, and aſſured them he would retake it if any of the Caſtles held out for him. Having put all things in order, and drawn out his Men, he marched towards *Verona* with all expedition: at firſt ſight, *Nicolo* imagin'd he was marching to *Vicenza*, as he had been counſelled by his Officers; but obſerving him to march on, and direct his Forces towards the Caſtle of S. *Felice*, he thought it time to provide for his Defence: but all was too late, the Trenches and Embarraſments were not finiſh'd; the Soldiers ſeparated, and plundering, and could not be got together time enough to hinder the Count from getting into the Citadel, and from thence into the City, to the great diſparagement of *Nicolo*, and detriment of his Party, who with the Marqueſs of *Mantoua*, retreated firſt into the Citadel which they had taken, and from thence eſcap'd to the City of *Mantoua*, where rallying the remainder of their Forces, they joined themſelves with the Army before *Breſcia*: ſo that in four Days time *Verona* was won and loſt by the Duke's Forces. Being Winter-time, and the Weather very cold, the Count having after his Victory, put in ſome ſupplies of Victual into *Breſcia*, though with very great difficulty, he remov'd his Quarters to *Verona*, having given order for the building certain Gallies to *Forboli* that Winter, to be ready againſt the Spring, that then he might be ſo ſtrong both by Land and by Water, as to give *Breſcia* an effectual and total Relief.

Recovered by the *Count*.

The Duke ſeeing the War at a ſtand for a time, and his hopes of being Maſter of *Verona* and *Breſcia* at an end, all which he attributed to the Counſel and Supplies of the *Florentines*, whoſe Affection could not be alienated, by all the provocations the *Venetians*

had given them; nor gained over to his ſide, by all the promiſes which he had made them; that they might be ſenſible of their own overſight, and feel the inconveniencies they had pulled upon themſelves, he reſolv'd to invade *Tuſcany*, to which he was much encouraged by *Nicolo* and the *Florentine* Exiles. *Nicolo*'s deſign was upon the Poſſeſſions of *Braccio*, and to drive the Count out of *La Marca*: the other had an itching after their own Country, and a mind to be at home, ſo that both Parties animated the Duke with ſuch Arguments as were moſt ſuitable to their particular deſigns: *Nicolo* told him he might ſend him with an Army into *Tuſcany*, and leave *Breſcia* beſieged; for he was Maſter of the Lake; was well entrenched about the Town; had ſeveral ſtrong Caſtles in the Country; and good Officers and Soldiers enough to reſiſt the Count, if he ſhould make any Attempt in another place; which was not to be imagined till he had relieved *Breſcia*; and that was impoſſible; ſo that if he pleaſed, he might make War in *Tuſcany*, and not quit his Enterprize in *Lombardy*: he remonſtrated beſides, that the *Florentines* would be conſtrain'd, as ſoon as they ſaw him in *Tuſcany*, to call back the Count, or be ruin'd; and whichſoever of the two happen, his Victory would be certain.

The Duke encouraged in his Expedition into *Tuſcany* by *Nicolo* and the *Florentine* Exiles.

The Exiles inculcated, that if *Nicolo* came near *Florence* with his Army, it was impoſſible but the People, tired out with their Taxes and the inſolence of the Grandees, would take Arms and revolt; as to his paſſage to *Florence*, they promiſed it ſhould be eaſie, and *Caſentino* open to them, by the intereſt and correſpondence which *Rinaldo* held with that Governor: ſo that the Duke, inclinable of himſelf, was much fortified and encouraged by their perſuaſions: the *Venetians* on the other ſide (tho' the Winter was very ſharp) preſs'd the Count to the relief of *Breſcia* with his whole Army; but he refuſed, alledging, it was not to be done at that time, that better Weather was to be expected, and that in the interim their Fleet ſhould be got ready, and then it might be attempted both by Land and by Water: which Anſwer giving no ſatisfaction, the *Venetians* became ſlow and remiſs in ſending them Proviſions, ſo that in their Army many People died. The *Florentines* having advertiſement of all theſe paſſages, were greatly diſmaid, ſeeing the War brought home to them of *Tuſcany*, and that in *Lombardy*, not turn'd to account: nor were they leſs fearful of the Forces of the Church; not that the Pope was their Enemy, but that they found that Army at the Devotion of the Patriarch, who was their implacable Adverſary: *Giovanni Vitelleſchi Cornetano* was firſt Apoſtolical *Notarie*, then Biſhop of *Ricanati*, after the Patriarch of *Alexandria*, and being at laſt created Cardinal, was called the Cardinal of *Florence*; This Cardinal was a cunning and courageous Perſon, ſo capable of Buſineſs, that the Pope had a ſtrong affection for him, gave him command of the Forces of the Church; and in all the Pope's Enterprizes in *Tuſcany*, *Romagna*, *Naples* and *Rome*, he was conſtantly his General; ſo that by degrees he gained ſo great authority both over the Army and the Pope, that the Pope began to be afraid to command him, and the Army to refuſe their Obedience to any body but he. The Cardinal being at that time in *Rome*, when the news arriv'd that *Nicolo* was marching into *Tuſcany*.

The Patriarch of *Alexandria* General for the Pope.

The fear of the *Florentines* was highly encreaſed, becauſe from the time of *Rinaldo*'s expulſion, that Cardinal had been an Enemy to their State; for the Articles of Agreement which were by his mediation procured in *Florence*, were not made good, but rather managed to the prejudice of *Rinaldo*, he having been the occaſion of his laying down his Arms, and that, the occaſion of his Baniſhment; ſo that the Government of *Florence* began to fear the time was come for the reſtauration of *Rinaldo*, if he joined with *Nicolo* in his Expedition into *Tuſcany*; and their apprehenſions were augmented by the ſudden departure of *Nicolo*, who ſeemed to them to leave an Enterprize which he had almoſt compleated, to embark himſelf in another that was more dangerous and doubtful: which they preſumed he would never have done, without ſome private Intelligence, or unknown Invitation: Theſe their Apprehenſions they had infuſed into the Pope, who was grown ſenſible of his error, in having transferred ſo much Authority upon other People. But whilſt the *Florentines* were in this ſuſpence, Fortune preſented them a way to ſecure themſelves of the Patriarch: that State had Scouts abroad to intercept, and peruſe all Letters, to ſee if they could meet with any Correſpondence to the prejudice of the State; at *Monte Pulciano* it happen'd a Pacquet was taken, which the Patriarch had written to *Nicolo Piccinino* without the knowledge or conſent of the Pope. Tho' the Character was ſtrange, and the Senſe ſo implicite and abſtruſe, that nothing could be made out of it; yet that obſcurity, conſider'd with its directions to an Enemy, alarmed his Holineſs ſo, as he reſolv'd to ſecure him. The care of his Apprehenſion he committed to *Antonio Rido da Padoua*, whom he had made Governor of the Caſtle of *Rome*. *Antonio*, as ſoon as he had his Orders, was ready to execute them, and expected an opportunity. The Patriarch had reſolv'd to paſs into *Tuſcany*, and having fixed upon the next day for his departure from *Rome*, he ſent to the Governor that he would be upon the Bridge next morning at a preciſe hour, for he had

The Patriarch a Friend to *Rinaldo*.

The Pope diſcovers Intelligence betwixt the Patriarch and *Nicolo*, and reſolves to ſecure him.

had ſomething to diſcourſe with him: *Antonio* thought now his opportunity was come, order'd his People as he thought convenient, and at the time appointed was ready expecting the Patriarch upon the Bridge, which was to be drawn up, or let down, as occaſion requir'd. The Patriarch was punctual, and came exactly at his time, and *Antonio* entertaining him a while upon the Bridge, gave a ſign, and on a ſudden the Bridge was pulled up, and the Patriarch in the Caſtle; ſo that of the General of an Army he became a Priſoner in a moment. The People which were with him, began to ſwagger at firſt, but underſtanding afterwards it was his Holineſs's direction, they were pacified and quiet: and the Governor of the Caſtle comforting him with fair words, and giving him hopes of a better condition, the Patriarch reply'd, that great Perſons were not ſecured to be diſcharged again; that thoſe who deſerved to be ſeized, did not deſerve to be diſmiſſed; and it was his own caſe, for he died in Priſon not long after; and *Ludovico* Patriarch of *Aquileia* was made General of the Pope's Army in his place; who, tho' before he could not be engaged in the Wars betwixt the Duke and the League, yet then he was perſuaded; and promiſed to be ready for the defence of *Tuſcany* with 4000 Horſe and 2000 Foot.

The Patriarch ſecured and dies.

Being deliver'd from this danger, there was another of no leſs importance, and that was, their fear of *Nicolo* upon the confuſion of Affairs in *Lombardy*, and the differences betwixt the *Venetians* and the Count: For better information, the *Florentines* ſent *Neri* the Son of *Gino Capponi*, and *Guiliano d' Anazenti* to *Venice*, as alſo to ſettle the proſecution of the War for the next Year, commanding *Neri*, upon the reſolution of the *Venetians*, to repair to the Count, to ſound his, and exhort him to ſuch Courſes as ſhould be neceſſary for the ſecurity of the League: theſe Ambaſſadors were ſcarce got onward on their way as far as *Ferrara*, before they had the news that *Piccinino* had paſſed the *Po* with 6000 Horſe. Thereupon they made what haſte was poſſible, and being come to *Venice*, they found that *Senate* very poſitive to have *Breſcia* relieved at that very time, not being (as they ſaid) able to attend any better, nor their State to put out any Fleet; ſo that without preſent Supply, they would be forced to ſurrender, which would compleat the Duke's Succeſſes, and be the loſs of all their Territories by Land: finding them ſo perverſe, *Neri* went to *Verona*, to hear what Arguments the Count could produce to the contrary, who with good Reaſons made it out to him, that to endeavour the relief of *Breſcia* in that juncture, would be not only ineffectual at preſent, but much to their prejudice afterwards; for conſidering the Seaſon of the Year, and ſituation of the Town, nothing could be done; he ſhould only harraſs and diſorder his Men ſo, as when a proper time for Action ſhould come, he ſhould be forced to draw off to *Verona* to ſupply himſelf with what the Winter had conſumed, and what was neceſſary for their future Support; ſo that all the time that was fit for Action, would be ſpent in marching backward and forward. To adjuſt theſe Things, *Orſalto Fuſtiniani*, and *Giovan Piſoni* were ſent to *Verona* to the Count, by whom it was concluded (after much diſpute) that the *Venetians* for the enſuing Year ſhould give the Count 80000 Ducats, and 40 a piece to the reſt of his Army. That he ſhould march forth with his whole Army, and fall upon the Duke, endeavouring by ſome ſmart impreſſion upon his Country, to make him recall *Nicolo* out of *Lombardy*. After which concluſion, they returned to *Venice*, but the *Venetians* (the Sum being thought very great) went on but ſlowly with their Preparations. *Nicolo Piccinino* proceeded however, was got already into the Country of *Romagna*, and tampered ſo ſucceſsfully with the Sons of *Pandolfo Malateſta*, that they deſerted the *Venetians* and took up Arms under the Duke: this News was unpleaſing at *Venice*, but at *Florence* much more; becauſe that way they thought to have given *Nicolo* a ſtop. But the *Malateſti* being in Rebellion, the *Florentines* were not a little diſmaid, eſpecially fearing, that their General *Piero Giampagolo Orſino* (who was then in the Territories of the *Maleteſti*) might be defeated, and they by conſequence diſarm'd: theſe Tidings were alſo no ſmall trouble to the Count, who began to apprehend, if *Nicolo* paſſed into *Tuſcany*, he might be in danger of loſing *La Marca*; and (diſpoſed to ſecure his own Country if he could) he came to *Venice*, and being introduc'd to the Duke, he declar'd to him, that his paſſage into *Tuſcany* would be convenient for the League; for the War was to be carried on where the General and Army of the Enemy was, and not among their private and particular Towns and Garriſons: becauſe their Army once beat, there is an end of the War; but tho' their Garriſons be taken, and their Towns reduced, if their Army be entire, they ſhould be never the nearer, but the War (as it does many times happen) would break out more ſeverely. Aſſuring them that *La Marca* and all *Tuſcany* would be loſt, if *Nicolo* was not briskly oppoſed; which being loſt, no remedy could be expected in *Lombardy*; but if it might, he did not underſtand how he could with any excuſe abandon his own Subjects and Friends; for coming into *Lombardy* a Prince, he ſhould be loth to leave it as a private Captain. To this the Duke of *Venice* replied, that it was manifeſt, and nothing

Commiſſioners to the Count from the *Venetians*.

The Count deſirous to follow *Nicolo*.

more

Diſſuaded by the Duke of *Venice.*

more certain, that if he left *Lombardy*, and paſſed the *Po* with his Army, all their Territories upon Land would be loſt; and that it would be to no purpoſe to conſume more Money in defending it. For he can be no wiſe Man, who endeavours to defend that which he is ſure to loſe; and he no Fool, who chuſes to loſe his Country alone, rather than his Country and Money too; and if the loſs of their Affairs ſhould follow, it would then be clear enough how much it imported the Reputation of the *Venetians* to protect *Romagna* and *Tuſcany*. But the whole *Senate* was againſt his Opinion, believing, if he ſucceeded in *Lombardy*, he ſhould be ſure every where elſe, and that could be no bad Task; that State, upon *Nicolo*'s departure, being left weak and infirm, ſo that that might be ruined before *Nicolo* could be called back, or any other ſufficient remedy provided. That if things were curiouſly examined, it would be found, that *Nicolo* was ſent into *Tuſcany* upon no other errand, but to divert the Count from his Enterprize in *Lombardy*, and remove the War from his own Country by carrying it into another; ſo that if the Count ſhould purſue him without irreſiſtable neceſſity, he would rather accompliſh his Deſigns, and do as he would have him: but if they continued their Army in *Lombardy*, and ſhifted in *Tuſcany* as well as they could, they would be ſenſible of their ill Reſolution when it was too late, and find that they had loſt all in *Lombardy* irrecoverably, without any Equivalence or Repriſal in *Tuſcany*.

They came to a Reſolution.

In this manner every Man having ſpoken and reply'd, as his Judgment directed him; it was concluded, to be quiet for ſome Days, to ſee what the Agreement betwixt *Nicolo* and the *Malateſti* would produce: whether the *Florentines* might rely upon *Piero Giam Pagolo*; and whether the Pope proceeded fairly with the League, as he had promiſed he would. This Reſolution being taken, not long after they had Intelligence, that *Piero Giam Pagolo* was marched towards *Tuſcany* with his Army; and that the Pope was better inclin'd to the League at that time, than before; with which Advertiſements the Count being confirmed, he was content to remain in *Lombardy* himſelf; that *Neri* ſhould be diſpatched thither with a 1000 of his Horſe, and 500 others; and if things ſhould proceed ſo, as that his preſence ſhould be neceſſary in *Tuſcany*, upon the leaſt Summons from *Neri*, the Count engaged to repair to him without any delay. Accordingly *Neri* marched away, arriv'd with his Forces at *Florence* in *April*, and the ſame Day *Giam Pagolo* arriv'd there alſo; in the mean time *Nicolo Piccinino* having ſettled the Affairs of *Romagna*, was deſigning for *Tuſcany*; and being inclined to have marched by the way of the *Alps* of S. *Benedetto*, and the Vale of *Montone*, he found that Paſſage ſo well defended by the Conduct of *Nicolo da Piſa*, that he believ'd his whole Army would not be able to force it: and becauſe of the ſuddenneſs of this Irruption, the *Florentines* were but indifferently provided either with Soldiers, or Officers, they committed the Paſſes of the other *Alps* to the Guard of certain of their Citizens, with ſome new raiſed Companies of Foot, among which Citizens *Bartholomeo Orlandini* had the command, and more particularly the keeping of the Caſtle of *Marradi*, and the Paſs that was by it. *Nicolo Piccinino* ſuppoſing the Paſs of S. *Benedetto* inſuperable, by reaſon of the Courage and Vigilance of the Commander, choſe rather to attempt the other way, where the Cowardice and Inexperience of the chief Officer was not like to give him ſo great oppoſition. *Marradi* is a Caſtle built at the foot of thoſe *Alps* which divide *Tuſcany* and *Romagna*; but on the ſide of *Romagna*, at the entrance into the *Vale di Lamona*, tho' it has no Walls, yet the River, the Mountains, and the Inhabitants make it ſtrong. For the Men are martial and faithful, and the River has worn away the Banks, and made ſuch Grotes and Hollows therein, that it is impoſſible from the Valley to approach it, if a little Bridge which lies over the River be defended; and on the Mountain-ſide the Rocks and the Cliffs are ſo ſteep, it is almoſt impregnable: but the puſillanimity of *Bartolomeo* debas'd the Courage of his Men, and render'd the ſituation of his Caſtle of no Importance: for no ſooner did he hear the Report of the Enemy's Approach, but leaving all in confuſion, away he ran with his Party, and never ſtopp'd till he came at *Borgo a San. Lorenzo*. *Nicolo* (having poſſeſs'd himſelf of that Paſs, ſtrangely ſurpriz'd to conſider how poorly it had been defended; and as much pleaſed that now it was his own) marched down into *Mugello*, and having taken ſeveral Caſtles, he ſtaid at *Puliciano* to refreſh; from whence he made his Excurſions as far as *Monte Fieſole*, and was ſo bold to paſs the River *Arno*, ſcouring, forraging, and plundering the Country within three Miles of *Florence*. The *Florentines* however were not at all diſmaid, but the firſt thing they did was to ſecure the Government, of which they were not much afraid, both for the Intereſt which *Coſimo* had with the People, and the method they had taken to reduce the chief Officers of the City into the Hands of a few of the moſt potent Citizens, who with their Vigilance and Severity kept under all ſuch as were diſcontented, or ſtudious of new things: beſides they had News of the Reſolutions in *Lombardy*; of *Neri*'s Approach; with the number of his Forces, and that

the Pope had promiſed to ſupply them with more: which hopes were ſufficient to ſupport them till *Neri's* Arrival. But *Neri* finding the City in ſome diſorders, reſolv'd to take the Field, and reſtrain *Nicolo* from forraging ſo freely: and therefore drawing together what Infantry he could out of the People, he join'd them with his Horſe, marched into the Field, and took *Remole*, which the Enemy had poſſeſs'd. After the taking of that Town, he encamp'd his Army there; obſtructed the Excurſions of *Nicolo*, and gave the City great hopes of ſending him farther off. *Nicolo* obſerving, tho' the *Florentines* had loſt many of their Men, it procur'd no Commotion; and underſtanding they were all quiet and ſecure in the Town, he concluded it vain to loſe time any longer; wherefore he changed his Deſigns, and reſolv'd to do ſomething which might cauſe the *Florentines* to provoke him to a Battle, in which he doubted not to overcome, and then all things would follow as he expected, of courſe. There was at that time in *Nicolo's* Army *Franceſco Conte di Poppi*, who (when the Enemy was in *Mugello*) revolted from the *Florentines*; with whom he was in League; the *Florentines* had a jealouſie of him before, and endeavoured to continue him their Friend, by enlarging his Pay, and making him their Deputy over all the Towns which were near him, but nothing could do, ſo ſtrongly did his Affection incline him to the other Party, that no Fear, nor Act of Kindneſs whatever, was ſufficient to divide him from *Rinaldo* and the reſt of the Brethren, who had had the Government formerly: ſo that he no ſooner heard of *Nicolo's* approach, but he went in to him immediately, and ſolicited him with all imaginable importunity to advance towards the City, and march into *Caſentino*; diſcovering to him the whole ſtrength of the Country, and with what eaſe and ſecurity he might ſtraiten the Enemy. *Nicolo* took his Counſel, and marching into *Caſentino*, he poſſeſs'd himſelf of *Romena* and *Bibiena*, and afterwards encamp'd before *Caſtle San Nicolo*. That Caſtle is placed at the foot of thoſe *Alps* which divide *Caſentino* from the Vale of *Arno*; and by reaſon it ſtood high, and had a ſtrong Garriſon in it, it was no eaſie matter to take it, tho' *Nicolo* ply'd it continually with his Cannon.

The Count *Poppi* revolts from the *Florentines*.

This Siege continu'd twenty days, during which time the *Florentines* had got together what Force they could, and had already under ſeveral Officers 3000 Foot at *Feghine*, commanded by *Piero Giam Pagolo* as General, *Neri Capponi* and *Bernardo de Medici* as Commiſſioners. The Caſtle of *San Nicolo* had ſent out four Perſons to give them notice of their Condition, and preſs them for relief: whereupon the Commiſſioners examining the ſituation of the Place, found it was not to be reliev'd but by the *Alps* which came down from the *Vale of Arno*; the tops of which might eaſily be poſſeſs'd by the Enemy, before they could come at them, in reſpect they had a ſhorter cut to them, and the *Florentines* could not ſtir, but they muſt of neceſſity be ſeen: ſo that to attempt a thing which was not like to ſucceed, was to expoſe and caſt away their Men without doing any good. Upon theſe Conſiderations the Commiſſioners having commended their Courage paſs'd, adviſed them to continue it whilſt they were able, and when they found they could hold it no longer, to ſurrender upon as good Terms as they could. Hereupon, after 32 days Siege, *Nicolo* became Maſter of the Caſtle; but the loſing ſo much time upon ſo inconſiderable a Place, was (in great part) the miſcarriage of that Enterprize: for had he inveſted *Florence*, or but kept it block'd up at a diſtance, the Governour of that City would have been conſtrain'd to raiſe Money and Men, and muſt have ſupplied it with Proviſions, with much more difficulty, having the Enemy ſo near them; beſides many would have been preſſing for Peace, ſeeing the War ſo likely to continue: but the deſire the Count *di Poppi* had to be reveng'd of that Garriſon (which had been his Enemy a long time) cauſed him to give that Counſel; and *Nicolo*, to oblige him, conſented to it, which was the deſtruction of both: and indeed it ſeldom happens, but private Animoſity, proves a prejudice to the Intereſt of the Publick. *Nicolo*, purſuing his Victory, took *Paſſina* and *Chiuſi*, and the Count *di Poppi* perſuaded him to continue in thoſe Parts, alledging that he might extend his Quarters betwixt *Chiuſi* and *Pieve* as he pleaſed, and make himſelf Maſter of the *Alps*, he might, as he ſaw occaſion, return to the old Poſt in *Caſentino* and the Vale *Arno*, or falling down into *Vale di Chiana* and the *Vale de Fevere*, be ready upon the leaſt motion of the Enemy. But *Nicolo* reflecting upon the Rockineſs of thoſe Places, only he reply'd his Horſes could ſwallow no Stones, and remov'd to *Borgo a S. Sepulchro*, where he was receiv'd with all demonſtration of Kindneſs; from whence he endeavour'd to debauch the Citizens of *Caſtello*, but they were too firm to the *Florentines* to entertain any ſuch motion. Being deſirous to have *Perugia* (where he was born) at his devotion, he went thither with 40 Horſe to make them a Viſit, and was honourably treated; but in a few days he rendred himſelf ſuſpected, having been wheedling with the Legate and ſeveral of the Citizens, and made many Propoſals to them, but none of them ſucceeded; ſo that receiving 8000 Ducats of them, he returned to his Army.

Nicolo ill advis'd by Count *Poppi*.

After

After this he got Intelligence in *Cortona*, and was very buſie in ſeducing it from the *Florentines*, but being diſcover'd before it was ripe, that alſo came to nothing. Among the principal of that City there was one *Bartolomeo di Senſo*, who going the Rounds one Night by the Captain's order, was told by a Country-man, his Friend, that if he had no mind to be kill'd, he ſhould have a care, and go back. *Bartolomeo* preſſing to know his Reaſon, he found the whole Series of the Plot, and went immediately to the Governour, and acquainted him: how, ſeizing upon the Conſpirators, and doubling his Guards thereupon, expected the coming of *Nicolo* according to Agreement; who came indeed punctually at his time, but finding himſelf diſcover'd, return'd to his Quarters. Whilſt things were carried on in *Tuſcany* at this rate, with little advantage to the Forces of the Duke, his Affairs in *Lombardy* were as unquiet, but with more detriment and loſs; for Count *Franceſco*, as ſoon as the Seaſon gave leave, took the Field with his Army; and the *Venetians* having repair'd their Fleet in the Lake, he thought it beſt in the firſt place to make himſelf Maſter of that, and to drive the Duke out; ſuppoſing when he had done that, the reſt would be eaſie. Whereupon he cauſed the *Venetian* Fleet to ſet upon the Duke's; which they did, and defeated them: after which he took all the Caſtles which they had in their poſſeſſion; ſo that the Enemy which beſieged *Breſcia* by Land, underſtanding the deſtiny of their Comrades, drew off from the Siege, and left the Town free, after it had been ſtraitned three years. Having finiſhed his buſineſs there, and obtain'd ſo important a Victory, the Count thought fit to ſeek out the Enemy, who was retired to *Socino*, a Caſtle upon the River of *Oglio*, and diſlodging them there, they retreated to *Cremona*; where the Duke made a Head, and reſolved to defend that part of his Country. But the Count advancing daily againſt him; being fearful he ſhould loſe all, or a great part of his Territory, he began to lament the Reſolution of ſending *Nicolo* into *Tuſcany*; and to redreſs his Error, he writ word to *Nicolo* of the Condition he was in, preſſing him with all ſpeed to come back to his relief. The *Florentines* in the mean time had joined their Forces with the Pope's, and made a halt at *Anghiari*, a Caſtle at the foot of the Mountains which part *Val di Tevere* from *Valdichiana*, four Miles diſtant from *San Sepulcro*; betwixt which Places the way was plain, the Country champain, fit for Horſe, and proper for Battle. Having heard of the Count's Victory, and that *Nicolo* was recall'd, they thought the Victory might be obtain'd without more hazard or labour, and therefore Orders was diſpatch'd in all haſte to the Commiſſaries to avoid an Engagement by all means; for *Nicolo* could not ſtay in *Tuſcany* many days. Theſe Orders coming to *Nicolo*'s ear, finding that of neceſſity he muſt part; that he might have left nothing untried, he reſolv'd to provoke them to a Battle, believing he ſhould take them unprovided, ſeeing (according to their Intelligence) they could have no reaſon to expect any ſuch thing; and to this he was much encourag'd by *Rinaldo*, the Count *di Poppi*, and all the *Florentine* Exiles, who knew well enough they were undone if *Nicolo* departed; but if they could bring them to a Fight, there was a poſſibility of prevailing, and if they did loſe the Victory, they ſhould loſe it with Honour.

Nicolo practiſes to ſurprize *Cortona*.

Breſcia reliev'd.

This Reſolution being taken, the Army moved; and being advanc'd as far as *Borgo* before the *Florentines* perceiv'd it, he commanded 2000 Men out of that City, who, (relying much upon the Conduct of their General, and the promiſes he made them, being alſo deſirous of Plunder) follow'd him chearfully. Marching on from thence directly towards *Anghiari* in *Battalia*, *Nicolo* arriv'd with his whole Army within two Miles, when *Micheletto Attendulo* perceiving a great Duſt, and ſuſpecting it to be the Enemy, cry'd out to have all People ſtand to their Arms. The Tumult in the *Florentine* Camp was not ſmall; for that Army encamp'd ordinarily without any Diſcipline; and being negligent beſides, in preſumption the Enemy were further off, they were fitter to fly than to fight; all of them being diſarm'd, and ſtraggled from their Quarters into ſuch Places as the ſhade, or their recreations had carried them. Nevertheleſs, ſo much diligence was uſed by the Commiſſaries and the General, that before the Enemy could get up, they were on Horſeback, and in order to receive them; and as *Micheletto* was the firſt that diſcover'd them, ſo he was the firſt that engag'd them, running with his Troop to ſecure the Bridge which croſſed the way not far from *Anghiari*. *Micheletto* having poſted himſelf at the Bridge, *Simomino*, an Officer of the Pope's, and his Legate, plac'd himſelf on the Right-hand, and the *Florentine* Commiſſaries and General on the Left; having planted the Foot as thick as poſſible upon the Banks; there was only one way for the Enemy to attack them, and that was by the Bridge; nor had the *Florentines* any where to defend themſelves but there; only they order'd their Foot, that if the Enemy's Foot ſhould leave the High-way, and fall upon the flanks of the Horſe, they ſhould let fly at them with their Croſs-bows, and give their Cavalry a ſecure paſſage over the Bridge.

The Battle of *Anghiari*.

The

The firſt that appear'd, were gallantly receiv'd by *Micheletto*, and repulſed; but *Aſtore* and *Franceſco Piccinino* coming in with a commanded Party to their relief, they charged him ſo briskly, that *Micheletto* was not only beat back over the Bridge, but purſued to the very end of the Town; and they which purſued them being charged again in the Flank, were repulſed over the Bridge, and all things as at firſt. This Skirmiſh continued two Hours compleat: ſometimes *Nicolo*, and ſometimes the *Florentines* being Maſters of the Bridge; and tho' the Fight upon the Bridge was equal to both, yet on this ſide and the other, *Nicolo* had much the diſadvantage. For *Nicolo*'s Men paſſing the Bridge, were receiv'd by a groſs of the Enemy, which being drawn up with Advantage, by reaſon of the Ground, could charge, or wheel, or relieve thoſe that were diſtreſſed, as they ſaw occaſion. But when the *Florentines* paſs'd over, *Nicolo* had no Place to relieve his Men for the Ditches and Banks in the way, as it appear'd in the Conflict; for tho' *Nicolo*'s Forces gained the Bridge ſeveral times, yet by the freſh ſupplies of the Enemy they were ſtill forced to give back: but when the *Florentines* prevailed and paſſed over the Bridge, *Nicolo* had not time, by reaſon of the briskneſs of their Charge, and the incommodity of the Ground, to reinforce his Men, but thoſe which were behind were forced to mix with thoſe that were before; one diſorder'd the other, and the whole Army was conſtrained to fly, and every Man got to *Borgo* as well as he could. The *Florentines* let them go, as having more inclination to the Plunder, which in Horſes, Arms, and other things, afforded them a plentiful Prey; for with *Nicolo* there eſcap'd not above 1000 Horſe, moſt of the reſt being taken Priſoners: the Citizens of *Borgo*, who had follow'd *Nicolo* for prize, became prize themſelves, and were moſt of them taken, with all their Carriages and Colours. This Victory was not ſo much prejudicial to the Duke, as it was advantageous to *Tuſcany*, for had the *Florentines* loſt the Day, that Province had been his; but he loſing it, loſt nothing but his Arms and his Horſes, which a little Money would recruit. Never was there any War made in an Enemy's Country with leſs Execution than in this; for in ſo great a Rout, and ſo ſharp an Engagement, which laſted four Hours, there was but one Man ſlain, and he not by any Wound or honourable Exploit, but falling from his Horſe, he was trodden to Death: with ſuch ſecurity did they fight then; for all of them being Cuiraſſiers on Horſeback, and compleatly armed, they could not preſently be kill'd; and if they found there was no likelihood of getting off themſelves, or being reſcued by their Friends, they ſurrendred before they could come at them to ſlay them. This Battle both in its ſelf and Conſequences, was a great inſtance of the unhappineſs of that War; for the Enemy being beaten, and *Nicolo* fled to *Borgo*, the Commiſſioners would have purſued and beſieged him in that Place, to have made their Victory intire: but ſome of the Officers and Soldiers would not obey, pretending they would diſpoſe of their Plunder, and cure themſelves of their Wounds; and which is more remarkable, the next Day about Noon, without any regard to, or leave from their ſuperior Officers, they went to *Arezzo*, depoſited their Prey, and return'd to *Anghiari* when they had done.

Piccinino defeated.

A thing ſo contrary to all Order and Military Diſcipline, that the Reliques and remainder of any well-govern'd Army, would eaſily have robb'd them of their Victory, which ſo undeſervedly they had obtain'd. And beſides this, the Commiſſioners giving order, that all Priſoners ſhould be kept (to prevent their rallying, or getting together again) in ſpight of their Orders, they diſmiſs'd them all. A thing moſt juſtly to be admir'd, that an Army ſo conſtituted, ſhould be able to get the Victory, and that the Enemy ſhould be ſo poor ſpirited as to be beaten by them. Whilſt the *Florentines* therefore were marching to *Arezzo* and returning again, *Nicolo* had opportunity to quit *Borgo*, and draw off all his Men towards *Romagna*; and with him the *Florentine* Exiles, who ſeeing their hopes deſperate of returning to *Florence*, they diſpers'd themſelves into all Parts of *Italy*, and ſome of them into other Countries, as their Conveniencies prompted them: of theſe *Rinaldo* choſe *Ancona* for his Reſidence, and afterwards (to obtain a Manſion in Heaven, for that which he had loſt upon Earth) he went to viſit the Sepulchre of our Saviour; from whence being returned, as he was ſitting at Table very merry at the Wedding of one of his Daughters, he fell down on a ſudden and died. His Fortune being favourable ſo far, as to take him away in one of the moſt pleaſant Days of his Life; a Man truly honourable in all Conditions, but would have been much more, had his Stars brought him forth in a City that had been united; for *Florence* being factious, the ſame things diſguſted there, which would have been rewarded in another place. The Commiſſaries, when their Men were come back from *Arezzo*, and *Nicolo* departed, preſented themſelves before *Borgo*; whereupon the Townſmen would have ſurrendred to the *Florentines*, but could not be accepted. In this Treaty and Negotiation the Commiſſaries became jealous of the *Pope*'s Legate, leſt he had a deſign for ſeizing it for the Church; ſo that they came to ill Language, and

doubtleſs ſome ill Accident would have happen'd, had thoſe Propoſals proceeded: the *Pope*'s Legate being gratified in his deſires, that Controverſy fell to the Ground. Whilſt they were ſo ſolicitous for the Enterprize of *Borgo*, News came, that *Nicolo Piccinino* was marched towards *Rome*; but others ſaid towards *La Marca*; wherefore the Legate, and many of the reſt, gave their opinions to march towards *Perugia*, to be ready to defend either *Rome* or *La Marca*, whither *Nicolo* was fled with *Bernardo de Medici*; and *Neri*, with the *Florentines*, were to march for *Caſentino*: This being determined, *Neri* departed with his Forces to *Raſſina*; took it, and *Bibiena*, *Prato Vecchio*, and *Romeni*; from thence he marched to *Poppi*, and beſieg'd it on two ſides; one towards the Plain of *Certomondo*; and the other, upon the Mountain that goes along to *Fronzoli*. Count *Poppi* ſeeing himſelf forſaken both by God and Man, had ſhut himſelf up in *Poppi*, not with any hopes of Relief, but to make his Conditions ſo much the better; and *Neri* coming before it, and forming his Siege, he deſir'd a Parly, and had as good Terms offer'd, as in his State could be expected; which were, to go away himſelf, and his Children, with whatever they could carry with them; for which the Town, and its Territory, was to be deliver'd to the *Florentines*: Whilſt the Treaty was managing, he came down to the Bridge over the *Arno*, which is at the end of the Town, and calling to *Neri*, in great ſorrow and affliction he ſaid to him:

Poppi beſieg'd.

Poppi's Speech to the *Florentine* Commiſſaries.

Had I conſidered my own ill Fortune, and your Power, as I ſhould have done, I had been now as a Friend congratulating your Victory, and not ſupplicating your Mercy as an Enemy. Fortune at preſent is favourable and propitious to you: to me it is rigid and ſevere; I had Horſes and Arms, and Subjects, and Eſtate, and who can wonder if I part with them unwillingly? but if you pleaſe (as you may) to command all Tuſcany, *we muſt of neceſſity obey: I have this only to comfort me, that had not I committed this error, ſuch would not have been that exerciſe nor demonſtration of your Generoſity; for if now you ſhould think fit to preſerve me, you will leave to the World an indelible inſtance, and example of Clemency: let therefore your Compaſſion exceed my Offence, and permit at leaſt that this ſingle Reſidence may continue to thoſe from whom your Predeceſſors have received formerly many Obligations.*

Neri's Anſwer.

Neri reply'd, *That he had unhappily placed his Hopes upon People which could do him no good. That he had tranſgreſſed ſo highly againſt the Republick of* Florence, *that as things then ſtood, there was a neceſſity of yielding up all, and that he muſt abandon thoſe Places, as he was an Enemy to* Florence, *which as a Friend he had refuſed to preſerve; for he had given ſo ill a Teſtimony and Example of himſelf, that he could not be continued; and in every chance of Fortune had been ſo Unconſtant and Various, that they could not have any confidence but that ſtill he would be working to the prejudice of their State, and yet it was not ſo much him, as his Intereſt they were afraid of. But if he would withdraw into* Germany, *the Government of* Florence *would intercede, that he might reſide there as a Prince, and be a Friend to him, for the Obligations he ſaid they had received from his Anceſtors. To which the Count anſwer'd in great paſſion, that he would be further off the* Florentines *than ſo; and laying aſide all further Capitulation (ſeeing no remedy) the Count deliver'd up the Town, and all his other Concerns to the* Florentines; *only his Goods, his Wife and Children departed with him, very diſconſolate, for having loſt a Dominion which his Predeceſſors had enjoy'd above* 400 *Years.* Theſe Succeſſes being known in *Florence*, were receiv'd with great Joy and Acclamation, both by the Magiſtrates and People. And becauſe *Barnardetto de Medici* found that *Nicolo*'s marching towards *Rome* or *La Marca* would be of little importance, he return'd with his Forces to *Neri*; and both of them coming back to *Florence*, it was reſolv'd, that they would be entertained with the higheſt Honours which could be conferr'd by that City, upon their victorious Members; and accordingly they were received in a Triumphant Manner by the *Senate*, the Captains of the Parties, and the whole City beſide.

THE

THE HISTORY OF FLORENCE.

BOOK VI.

IT always was (and 'tis reasonable it be) the design and end of all those who make War, to enrich themselves, and impoverish the Enemy; nor is Conquest and Victory desired upon any other score, but to magnifie the one, and to depress the other: hence it is, that whenever Victory impoverishes or debilitates you, you have either transgressed, or fallen short of what you aimed at in the War. That Prince or Commonwealth is enriched by Victory, when he extirpateth his Enemy, and impropriates the Spoil. On the other side, his Victory impoverishes him, when tho' he overcomes his Enemy) he cannot utterly extinguish him, and the Spoil and Prey is left to the Soldiers. This Prince, this Commonwealth is unhappy in its Losses, but more in its Victories; for being defeated, it is liable to the injuries of its Enemies; and being victorious, to the contumely of its Friends, which as they are less reasonable, are less supportable, seeing it is again necessitated to oppress and disgust its Subjects by new Impositions and Taxes: and if there be the least humanity in Government, it cannot rejoice or exult in a Victory, which makes all its Subjects sad. The well-govern'd Commonwealths of old, were wont to fill their Bags with Gold and Silver; destribute Donatives; remit Subsidies and Tribute to the People, and solemnize their Victories with Merriment and Feasting; but those of whom we write, drained their Exchequer, impoverish'd the People, and never secured themselves of their Enemies; which proceeded from the Disorders in the management of the War: for having beaten, and pillaged the Enemy, they neither kept them Prisoners, nor killed them; so that (being incens'd) they forbare revenging themselves upon the Conqueror no longer than he which commanded them could recruit them with Horses and Arms: and the Plunder and Ransoms falling to the Soldiers, the Conquerors made no advantage of the Spoils of the Enemy, but were forc'd to tear their Supplies out of the Bowels of their Subjects; nothing of benefit occurring to the People, they were rendred more imperious and cruel in their Taxes: And those Soldiers had brought things to that pass, that both the Conqueror and Conquered (if they intended to preserve their Authority over their Men) were in necessity of more Money; for the one side was to be recruited, the other to be rewarded: and as the one could not fight, unless he was newly equipp'd; so the other would not engage him without Recompence for what was passed: from whence it happen'd, that one side had no great joy of its Victory; and the other, no great sense of its Loss; for the Conquered had time to recruit, and the Conqueror had none to pursue. This Disorder and perverseness in the Soldier was the reason that *Nicolo* was recruited, and on Horseback again, before his De-

feat was known thorow *Italy*; and ſharper War he made upon his Enemies afterwards, than he had ever done before. This it was, that after this Rout before *Breſcia*, enabled him to ſurprize *Verona*: this it was, that after he was worſted at *Verona*, gave him opportunity to invade *Tuſcany*; this it was, that after his loſs at *Anghiari*, recruited him again, and made him ſtronger in the Field (e're he got to *Romagna*) than he was before, which gave the Duke new hopes of defending *Lombardy*, tho' by means of his abſence he had looked upon it as loſt: for whilſt *Nicolo* was giving the Enemy an Alarm at *Tuſcany*, the Duke of *Milan* was reduced to a Condition of hazarding all; and therefore apprehending he might be undone, before *Nicolo* (who was ſent for) would come to his reſcue, to ſtop the Career of the Count, and temper his Fortune by Induſtry, which he could not do by Force: He had recourſe to thoſe Remedies which in the like Caſe he had many times uſed, and ſent *Nicolo da Eſti*, Prince of *Ferrara*, to *Peſchiera* to the Count, to perſuade him in his Name to a Peace; and to remonſtrate to him, that the proſecution of the War could not turn to his Advantage: for if the Duke ſhould be diſtreſſed, and unable to maintain his Reputation, the *Count* would be the firſt which would ſuffer by it, by reaſon the *Venetians* and *Florentines* would have no farther occaſion, and by Conſequence no farther eſteem for him: and as a Teſtimony of the ſincerity of his Propoſal, the Duke offer'd to conſummate his Marriage, and ſend his Daughter to *Ferrara* to be deliver'd to him as ſoon as the Peace was concluded. To which the Count replied, that if the Duke did truly deſire Peace, he might eaſily have it; for the *Venetians* and *Florentines* were as much inclin'd to it as he; but the difficulty would be to perſuade them he was in earneſt, as knowing he would never have propoſed any ſuch thing, had not ſome neceſſity conſtrain'd him; and as ſoon as that ſhould be removed, he would make War upon them again.

The Duke propoſeth a Peace.

As to the buſineſs of his Marriage, he could not repoſe any Confidence in his Promiſe, having been ſo often baffled by him before: nevertheleſs, if every thing elſe were agreed, he ſhould proceed in it as his Friends ſhould adviſe. The *Venetians*, who are jealous of their Soldiers, where they have no reaſon to be ſo, had reaſon enough to be ſuſpicious here, which the *Count* being deſirous to remove, proſecuted the War with all diligence imaginable; but his mind was ſo inflamed with Ambition, and the *Venetians* ſo ſlack, and intepidated with Jealouſie, little more was done that Summer: ſo that when *Nicolo Piccinino* returned into *Lombardy*, Winter came on, and the Armies were ſent to their Winter Quarters: The Count to *Verona*; the Duke to *Cremona*; the *Florentines* into *Tuſcany*, and the Pope's Army to *Romagna*; which, after the Battle of *Anghiari*, aſſaulted *Furli* and *Bologna*, in hopes to have taken them from *Franceſco Piccinino*, who kept them from his Father, and defended them ſo well, they could not get them out of his hands; nevertheleſs, their coming into thoſe Parts ſo terrified the People of *Ravenna*, that to avoid the Domination of the Church by conſent of *Oſtaſio di Potenta* their Lord, they ſubmitted to the *Venetian*, who (in recompence of his Kindneſs, that he might never recover by Force what he had given them with ſo little diſcretion) ſent *Oſtaſio* with his only Son to ſpend their Days in *Candia*, where they died: in which Expedition his Holineſs wanting Money (notwithſtanding the Victory of *Anghiari*) he was glad to ſell the Caſtle of *Borgo a San Sepulcro* to the *Florentines* for 25000 Ducats.

The Ingratitude of the *Venetians*.

Things being in this poſture, and all ſides thinking themſelves ſafe as long as it was Winter; all thoughts of Peace were laid aſide, eſpecially by the Duke, who thought himſelf doubly ſafe, both in the Seaſon of the Year, and the Arrival of *Nicolo*; had therefore broke off his Treaty with the Count a little abruptly, and in great haſte rigged out *Nicolo* again with all Proviſions and Accoutrements that were neceſſary for the War. The Count having notice of his Preparations, went to *Venice* to conſult the *Senate* how Affairs were to be order'd the next Summer. When *Nicolo* was ready (perceiving the Enemy out of order) he never ſtaid for the Spring, but in the coldeſt of the Winter he paſſed the *Adda*, and *Acri*, ſurprized 2000 Horſe, and took moſt of them Priſoners: but that which touched the Count neareſt, and ſtartled the *Venetians*, was the defection of *Cierpellone*, one of his principal Officers, who went over to the Duke. The Count had no ſooner the News, but he left *Venice*; and coming with all poſſible ſpeed to *Breſcia*, he found *Nicolo* retir'd, and gone back to his former ſtation: the Count had no mind, finding the Enemy gone, to follow him at that time; but choſe rather to defer, till ſome Advantage ſhould tempt him, and give him opportunity to revenge himſelf: he prevailed therefore with the *Venetians* to recall the Forces they had in the *Florentine* Service in *Tuſcany*, and to confer the Command of them upon *Michelletto Attendulo*, *Gattamelata* being dead. The Spring being come, *Nicolo Piccinino* was firſt in the Field, and beſieged *Cignano*, a Caſtle ſome twelves Miles diſtant from *Breſcia*; to the Relief of which, the Count addreſs'd himſelf: and betwixt theſe

Michelletto General for the League.

two

two Generals the War was managed as formerly. The Count being fearful of *Bergamo*, went with his Army and encamped before *Martinengo*, a Caſtle which (if taken) lay very convenient for the ſuccouring of *Bergamo* (which City was by *Nicolo* greatly diſtreſſed) who finding he could not eaſily be diſturbed, but by the way of *Martinengo*, had ſupplied it plentifully with all things, ſo as the Count was forced to beſiege it with all his Army: whereupon *Nicolo* marched with his Forces where he might moſt conveniently incommode him, and intrenched himſelf ſo ſtrangely, the Count could not (without manifeſt danger) aſſail him; ſo that thereby he brought things to that paſs, that the Beſieger was in more Diſtreſs than the Beſieged, and the Count than the Caſtle. For the Count could neither keep the Siege for want of Proviſions, nor riſe, for fear of *Nicolo*'s Army; and every body expected Victory for the Duke, and deſtruction for his Enemy: but Fortune (which never wants ways of favouring her Friends, and diſobliging her Enemies) brought it about, that *Nicolo*, in confidence of his Victory, was grown ſo inſolent-haughty, that without reſpect to the Duke, or himſelf, he ſent him word, that he had ſerved him a long time, and as yet not gained ſo much Ground as would bury him when he died; he deſir'd therefore to know, what Recompence he was to expect for all his Dangers and Fatigues; for it being now in his Power to make him abſolute Maſter of *Lombardy*, and to put all his Enemies into his hands, he thought it but reaſonable, as he was certain of his Victory, to be ſecured of his Reward; and therefore he did propoſe he might have the City of *Piacenza* made over to him, that when he had tired and worn himſelf out in his Wars, he might have that Town for his receſs; and at the laſt he took the boldneſs to threaten the Duke with the quitting his Enterprize, if he was not gratified in his Demands. This contumelious and inſolent way of Capitulation was ſo offenſive and deteſtable to the Duke, that he reſolved to loſe all, rather than comply; ſo that this Arrogance in *Nicolo* wrought an effect upon him, to which the Arms nor the Menaces of the Enemy could never reduce him; and that was, to make Peace with the Count, to whom he ſent *Guido Buone da Fortona* with Propoſals of Peace, and the Proffer of his Daughter; which was embraced with both Arms by the Count and his Collegues.

Nicolo's Inſolence to the Duke.

All being privately agreed among themſelves; the Duke ſent a Meſſage to *Nicolo* to require him to make a Truce with the Count for a Twelve-month; pretending his Treaſure was low, and had been ſo exhauſted with the War, that he could not but prefer a certain Peace, before a Victory that was doubtful. *Nicolo* admir'd his Reſolution, as not able to imagine what ſhould make him reject ſo glorious a Victory; not in the leaſt ſuſpecting, that he boggled at the Remuneration of his Friends, and choſe rather to let his Enemies eſcape; ſo that not obeying him readily, the Duke was conſtrained to threaten, that without immediate compliance, he would deliver him up as a Prey for his own Soldiers, and his Enemy. Whereupon *Nicolo* ſubmitted, but with the ſame Alacrity as on that is forced to forſake both his Country and Friends; complaining, and lamenting his Unhappineſs, whoſe Victory over his Enemies was always interrupted either by his Fortune, or the Duke. The Truce being made, the Marriage betwixt *Madona Bianca* and the Count was conſummated, and the City of *Cremona* given to her in Dower: after which, the Peace was concluded in *November* 1441. at which, for the *Venetians*, *Franceſco Barbadico*, and *Pagolo Frono*; for the *Florentines*, *Agnolo Acciailo* were preſent. The *Venetians* got by this Peace, *Peſchiera*, *Aſola*, and *Leonata*, a Caſtle belonging to the Marqueſs of *Mantoua*.

Peace betwixt the Duke and the Count. 1441.

The Wars in *Lombardy* being ended; the only part of *Italy* where there was any Hoſtility, was in the Kingdom of *Naples*; which not being able to be compoſed, was the occaſion of new Troubles in *Lombardy*. During the Wars in thoſe Parts, *Alfonſo* of *Aragon* had over-run the whole Kingdom of *Naples*, and left the King of *Rinato* nothing at all, but the Country about the Metropolis. Whereupon *Alfonſo* conceiving the Victory already in his hands, reſolv'd whilſt he beſieg'd *Naples*, to ſeize upon *Benevento*, and the reſt of the Towns which were yet remaining to the Count in thoſe Countries, ſuppoſing it might be done without much danger, the Count himſelf being employ'd in *Lombardy*, and his Deſign ſucceeding as eaſily as he imagin'd; for he took all his Towns with little or no Oppoſition. But the News arriving of the Peace in *Lombardy*, *Alfonſo* began to apprehend leſt the Count (to recover what he had loſt) ſhould join with *Rinato*, and *Rinato* being of the ſame opinion, ſent to invite and ſolicite the Count, that he would come and revenge himſelf of his Enemy, by relieving his Friend. On the other ſide, *Alfonſo* was as earneſt with the Duke, that in reſpect of the Friendſhip which was betwixt them, he would give the Count ſome Diverſion; and by employing him in greater Affairs, enforce him from undertaking of this. *Philippo* entertain'd the Motion very readily; not conſidering it intrenched upon that Peace, which not long before he had concluded with ſo much prejudice to himſelf: he cauſed therefore to be ſignified

fied to the Pope *Eugenius*, that then was the time to recover the Towns which the Count had taken from the Churches; and for his eaſier Succeſs, he proffer'd him *Nicolo Piccinino* (who was in his Pay) during the War, but diſcharged upon the Peace, and was at that time in *Romagna* with his Forces. The Pope received the Propoſition very joyfully upon a double account, both as he hated *Franceſco*, and deſired his own; and tho' he had been cheated by *Nicolo* once before, yet now the Duke interpoſing, he could not ſuſpect him in the leaſt; joining his Forces therefore with *Nicolo's*, he marched into *la Marca:* the Count being much alarm'd at the News, got what ſtrength together he could, and went to encounter them.

Naples taken by *Alfonſo.*

In the mean time *Alfonſo* took *Naples*; and all that Kingdom fell into his hands, except *Caſtelnuovo*. *Rinato* having left a ſtrong Garriſon in *Caſtelnuovo*, went away himſelf for *Florence*, where he was moſt honourably received; but finding he was not able to continue the War, he ſtaid there but ſome certain Days, and away he paſſed to *Marſilia*; during which time *Alfonſo* had taken *Caſtelnuovo*, and the Count was got into *La Marca*, but not ſo ſtrong as the Pope and *Nicolo:* wherefore he addreſſed himſelf to the *Venetian* and *Florentine* for Aſſiſtance both of Men and Money; repreſenting to them, that unleſs they now look'd upon them, and did ſomething to reſtrain the Pope and *Alfonſo*, whilſt he was in being, afterwards they would have enough to do to ſecure themſelves; for they might join with Duke *Philip*, and divide all *Italy* betwixt them: for ſome time both *Venetian* and *Florentine* ſuſpended their Anſwer, either becauſe they were unwilling to make his Holineſs and *Alfonſo* their Enemies; or elſe, becauſe their hands were already full in *Bologna*. *Hannibal Bentivoglio* had driven *Franceſco Piccinino* out of that City; and to enable himſelf to defend it againſt the Duke (who was a Favourer of *Franceſco*) he had deſired the Aſſiſtance of the *Venetians* and *Florentines*; and they not denied it. Whilſt the Affairs in *Bologna* were in this manner uncertain, they could not reſolve to give the Count their aſſiſtance; but *Hannibal* defeating *Franceſco* afterwards, ſo that all things there ſeemed to be compoſed, they then concluded to ſupply him. Yet, firſt, to ſecure themſelves againſt the Duke, they renewed the League with him, to which the Duke was not averſe; for tho' he had conſented to the War againſt the Count, whilſt *Rinato* was in the Field, yet now *Rinato* was routed, and his whole Kingdom taken from him, he had no mind the Count ſhould be deſtroy'd likewiſe: and to that end he not only conſented to the Aid which they deſir'd, but he writ to *Alfonſo* to draw his Forces back again into *Naples*, and not to proſecute the War there any longer; to which, altho' *Alfonſo* was very unwilling, yet in reſpect of his Obligations to the Duke, he quietly conſented, and drew off his Army to the other ſide of *Trento*.

Whilſt Things were in this poſture in *Romagna*, the *Florentines* were not unanimous at home: Among the Citizens of chiefeſt Reputation and Authority in that Government, *Neri*, the Son of *Gino Capponi*, was one; of whoſe Intereſt *Coſimo de Medici* was moſt particularly jealous, in reſpect of the great vogue he had both in the City and Army: For having a long time had the Command of the *Florentine* Forces, he had gained them exceedingly by his Courage and Deportment; beſides the many great Services performed by him and his Father (the Father having taken *Piſa*, and the Son defeated *Nicolo* at the Battle of *Anghiari*) were freſh upon the memory, and cauſed him to be belov'd by moſt People, but dreaded by ſuch as were fearful of more Companions in their Government. Amongſt other of their principal Officers, there was one *Baldaccio d' Anghiari*, an excellent Soldier, not to be ſurpaſſed, either for Courage or Conduct in all *Italy* at that time: Having always commanded their Foot, he had gained ſo great influence upon them, that it was generally believ'd, with him they would undertake any Enterprize whatever, whenever he deſir'd them. This *Baldaccio* was a great lover of *Neri*, of whoſe Bravery and Prudence he had all along been a Witneſs, which to the reſt of the Grandees gave great occaſion of Suſpicion; and thinking with themſelves, that to let him alone would be dangerous, but to impriſon him much more; they reſolved to make him away, and Fortune effected it. *Bartolemeo Orlandini* was at that time *Gonfaloniere di Giuſtitia*; who having been ſent to keep the Paſs at *Marradi* (as was ſaid before) when *Nicolo Piccinino* made his inroad into *Tuſcany*, had moſt baſely deſerted it, and expoſed a Country which was almoſt inacceſſible of it ſelf. *Baldaccio* was ſo much provok'd, or rather aſham'd at his Cowardice, that he ſpake ſlightly of him, and writ ſeveral Letters expreſſing his Cowardice; which *Bartolomeo* reſenting highly, and being conſcious it was true, he reſolv'd to be reveng'd, and expiate his own Fault with the Death of his Accuſer: His reſolution being known to other of his Enemies, they encourag'd him to proceed, and at one blow to revenge himſelf for the Injury he had receiv'd; and deliver the State from a Perſon they could neither retain without Danger, nor diſmiſs without Ruin. Having fix'd upon his way, *Bartolomeo* ſhut up ſeveral armed Men one day in the Chamber; and *Baldaccio* being come to the *Piazza* (as he

Baldaccio General of the *Florentine* Foot.

he constantly did) to discourse with the Magistrates, and require Orders for his Conduct, the *Gonfalonere* sent to speak with him, and he presently obey'd: seeing him coming, the *Gonfalonere* went to meet him, and entertain'd him about his Affairs three or four turns in the *Senators* Chamber; but at length having drilled him near the Chamber where his Ambush was laid, he gave the Signal, and all of them rushing upon him (who was alone and without Arms) they kill'd him, and threw him out of the Palace-window, which looks towards the *Dogana*, and then cutting off his Head, and carrying his Trunk into the *Piazza*, they left it there all day as a Spectacle for the People: He had only one Son by his Wife *Annalena*, which living not long after him, *Annalena* deprived both of Husband and Child, and resolving to have no further Conversation with Man, she made a Monastery of her House, and shutting herself up with several other Noble Persons, which came to her to that purpose, she spent the remainder of her Days there in great Piety and Devotion, calling the Monastery by her own Name, and immortalizing her Memory both by the one and the other. This Action was no small diminution to *Neri*, and took away a considerable part of his Reputation and Friends: yet it did not satisfie the Contrivers; for having been more than ten Years at the Helm, the Authority of the *Balia* expir'd, and every body began to talk and act with more freedom than they thought convenient, they judged it necessary to revive that Court, for the encouragement of their Friends, and the depression of their Enemies. Hereupon, in the Year 1444, the Councils created a new *Balia*, which re-established the Offices; contracted the number of the Officers which were to chuse the *Senators*; renewed the *Chancery* of Reformation; removing *Philippo Perazzi* out of the *Chancellorship*, and putting one into his place, who they believ'd would be govern'd by them. They prolong'd the Banishment of those that were refractory; imprison'd *Giovanni*, the Son of *Simone Vespucci*; degraded the *Accoppiatori*, as Enemies to the State, and with them, the Sons of *Piero Baroncelli*; all the *Seragli*, *Bartolomeo*, *Francesco Castellani*, and several others; by which means they procured great Reputation and Authority to themselves, and no little Prejudice and Disparagement to their Enemies: and having settled themselves at home in the Government, they began to look about, and inquire how things were manag'd abroad. 1444. *Florence* reformed.

Nicolo Piccinino (as we said before) being abandon'd by *Alfonso*, and the Count, by assistance of the *Florentines*, became formidably powerful, he assaulted *Nicolo* not far from *Fermo*, and gave him so great a defeat, that *Nicolo* was glad to fly (almost alone) to *Montecchio*; where he fortified himself so well, and defended himself so bravely, that in a short time his whole Army repaired to him again, and putting him into a Condition of supporting easily against the Count; and the rather, because Winter being come, both of them were constrain'd to send their Armies into Quarters. All Winter long, *Nicolo* was employ'd in encreasing his Army, which was much furthered by the assistance of the Pope and *Alfonso*; insomuch, that when the Spring appear'd, and both Armies took the Field, the Count was much too weak for *Nicolo*, and indeed brought to that extremity of Want, that he must of necessity have been ruin'd, had not the Duke frustrated the advantage which *Nicolo* had got over him. *Philip* sent to *Nicolo*, to desire he would come presently to him, for he must needs speak personally with him about Business of very great importance; and *Nicolo*, being greedy to know it, left his command to his Son *Francesco*, and went to *Milan* to the Duke; relinquishing a certain Victory, for an uncertain Reward: which being perceived by the Count, he thought that occasion of engaging the Son in his Father's absence, was not to be slipp'd: and coming to a Fight with him near the Castle *di Montelovo*, he overthrew *Francesco*, and took him Prisoner.

Nicolo arriving at *Milan*, finding himself deluded by the Duke, and understanding the Defeat and Imprisonment of his Son, he took it to heart, and died with Sorrow 1445, in the 64th Year of his Age; a more brave than fortunate General. He left only two Sons, *Francesco* and *Giacoppa*, whose Conduct was less, and Fortune worse than their Father's; so that the Disciples of *Bracio* were almost extinct, whilst the *Sforzeschan* being more successful, became more glorious. The Pope understanding *Nicolo* was dead, and his Army overthrown (not daring to rely much upon the King of of *Aragon*'s Supplies) desired a Peace of the Count, and obtain'd it by the Mediation of the *Florentines*, by which the Pope was to have in *la Marca*, *Osimo*, *Fabriano*, and *Ricanato* restor'd, and all the rest were to remain to the Count. After this Accommodation in *la Marca*, all *Italy* had been quiet, had not the *Bolognesi* disturbed it. There were two super-eminent Families in *Bologna*, the *Canneschi* and the *Bentivogli*; *Hannibal* was the head of the latter, and *Battista* of the first. To beget the greater Confidence betwixt them, many Matches had been made; but among Men that aspire to the same degree of Greatness, an Alliance is sooner made than a Friendship. *Bologna* was in League with the *Venetians* and *Florentines*, which League was made by *Hannibal Bentivogli*'s means, after *Francesco Piccinino* was expell'd. *Battista* understanding how earnestly *Nicolo* dies. 1445. Troubles in *Bologna*.

earneſtly the Duke deſir'd the Friendſhip of that City, contriv'd how he might kill *Hannibal*, and deliver that City to the Duke; and having concluded the Circumſtances, on the 24th of *June*, 1445, *Battiſta* and his Accomplices ſet upon *Hannibal*, and ſlew him, and when they had done, declar'd themſelves for the Duke. The *Venetians* and *Florentine* Commiſſaries were at the ſame time in the Town; and at the firſt report of the Tumult, return'd privately to their Houſes: but finding the People thronging in great numbers in the Market-place, complaining and exclaiming againſt the Murderers of *Hannibal*, they took Courage, joined themſelves with them; and putting them into a poſture, they fell upon the *Canneſchi*, and in half an hour's time, routed them, killed part of them, and drove the reſt out of the City. *Battiſta* not having opportunity to get away, nor his Enemies to kill him, betook himſelf to his Houſe, where hiding himſelf in a Cheſt, or Bing to keep Corn in, they ſearched for him a whole day, and could not diſcover him: Being aſſur'd he was not gone out of Town, they came back again, and threaten'd his Servants ſo, that one of his Lacqueys betray'd him, and carried them to him; then drawing him out of his hole in Armour as he was, they kill'd him, and dragg'd him about the Streets, and burned him: ſo that the Victory of the Duke was ſufficient to encourage that Enterprize; but his expedition in relieving it, was not great enough to make it good. By the death of *Battiſta*, and the expulſion of the *Canneſchi*, their Tumults were compoſed; but the *Bologneſi* remain'd in no little confuſion, there being none of the Family of the *Bentivoglio*'s left to govern them; for *Hannibal* had only one Son, of about ſix Years old, called *Giovanni*; and it was feared leſt ſome Difference and Diviſion might ariſe betwixt the Friends of *Bentivoglio* (in whoſe power it was to reſtore the *Canneſchi*) to the deſtruction of their Party and Country.

Whilſt they were in this ſuſpence, the *Conte di Poppi* being by accident in *Bologna*, ſent word to the Principal of the City, that if they would be govern'd by one of *Hannibal*'s Blood, he could direct them where they might have one; for about twenty Years ſince, *Hercules*, a Couſin-German of *Hannibal*'s, being at *Poppi*, had the enjoyment of a young Maid in that Town, who was brought to bed afterwards of a Son, called *Santi*; which, *Hercules* affirmed to him many times was his; nor was it to be denied; for whoever knew them both, muſt needs own a more than ordinary Reſemblance. The Citizens giving credit to what he ſaid, diſpatched ſome of their Citizens to *Florence* immediately to ſee the Youth, and to deſire *Neri* and *Coſimo*, that he might be deliver'd to them: The reputed Father of *Santi* was dead, and the Son lived with an Uncle, called *Antonioda Caſceſe*, a rich Man, without Children of his own, and a great Friend of *Neri*'s: *Neri* out of reſpect to his Uncle, thinking the Buſineſs not to be deſpiſed, nor on the other ſide, raſhly accepted, propoſed, that *Santi* might be ſent for; and that in the preſence of *Coſimo* and the *Bolognian* Ambaſſadors, they might hear what he could ſay for himſelf; he was ſent for accordingly, and behav'd himſelf ſo well, the *Bologneſi* were ready to worſhip him; ſo ſtrangely prevalent ſometimes is the love of a Faction: yet there was nothing concluded at this Meeting, only *Coſimo* took *Santi* aſide, and told him:

Santi Bentivoglio.

Coſimo's Speech to Santi.

No body can counſel you better in this Caſe, than your ſelf; becauſe you may follow your own Inclination. If you be the Son of Hercules Bentivogli, *you will apply your ſelf to ſuch things as are worthy and ſuitable to the Honour of that Houſe: But if you be the Son of* Agnalo de Caſceſe; *you will continue in* Florence, *and ſpend the reſt of your Days baſely in the ordering of Wooll.*

This Speech nettled the young Man: and whereas before he ſeem'd to be irreſolute, he now declared he would refer himſelf wholly to *Coſimo* and *Neri*, and do as they directed him; and (it being agreed with the Ambaſſadors) Clothes and Horſes were bought, and Equipage provided, and a while after being honourably conducted to *Bolonia*, he was made Governor both of *Hannibal*'s Son, and the City; which Office he executed ſo well, that whereas all his Predeceſſors were kill'd by their Enemies; he liv'd quietly all his time, and died lamented at laſt.

After the death of *Nicolo*, and the Peace concluded in *La Marca*, *Philip* wanting a new General to command his Army, made private Overtures to *Cierpellone*, one of the moſt experienc'd Officers in the Count's Army; and at laſt coming to an Agreement, *Cierpellone* deſired leave of the Count to go to *Milan*, and take poſſeſſion of certain Caſtles which *Philip* had given him in the late Wars. The Count ſuſpecting the buſineſs (to diſappoint the Duke, and prevent his ſerving againſt him) he caus'd him firſt to be ſtopp'd, and afterwards to be killed, pretending to have found him engag'd in Conſpiracy againſt him; at which manner of proceeding the Duke was highly incens'd, but the *Venetians* and the *Florentines* were pleaſed well enough, as apprehending the leaſt amity betwixt the Count and the Duke: however this Indignity ſet all *La Marca* in an uproar, and was the occaſion of new War there. *Giſmondo Malateſti* was Lord of *Rimino*, and being Son-in-Law to the

Count,

Count, he expected to have had the Government of *Pesaro*; but the *Count* having reduced it, gave the Command of it to his Brother, which *Gismonda* took very ill; and to make it the worse, his mortal Enemy *Alderico di Monte Feltro*, by the Count's means, had usurp'd the Dominion of *Urbino*. Upon these Provocations *Gismonda* joined himself with the Duke, and solicited the Pope and the King of *Naples* to make War upon the Count; who to give his Son-in-Law a relish of the War, to which he had such a mind, he resolved to begin, and to fall first upon him; whereupon the Countries of *Romagna* and *La Marca* were in a tumult immediately; for *Philip*, the King of *Naples*, and the Pope sent all of them Assistance to *Gismonda*, and the *Venetians* and *Florentines* (tho' they sent him no Men) supply'd the Count with what Monies he wanted. *Philip*, not content to make War against him in *Romagna* only, designd to deprive him of *Cremona* and *Pontremoli*; but *Pontremoli* was defended for him by the *Florentines*, and *Cremona* by the *Venetians*: so that the War was received again in *Lombardy*: and many Troubles ensued in the Country of *Cremona*, among which the Duke's General *Francesco Piccinino* was overthrown at *Casale* by *Michelotto* and the *Venetian* Army; and the *Venetians* conceiving hopes thereupon of deposing the Duke, sent their Commissary to *Cremona*, assaulted *Ghiaradadda*, and took all that Country, except *Crema* it self; and then passing the *Adda*, they made their Excursions to the very Walls of *Milan*: the Duke not satisfied with his Condition, applyed himself to *Alfonso*, King of *Aragon*, for succour; representing the ill Consequences which would follow upon his Dominions in *Naples*, if *Lombardy* should fall into the Hands of the *Venetians*: *Alfonso* promised to send him Supplies, but their passage would be difficult without the permission of the Count; upon which Consideration, Duke *Philip* addressed himself to the Count, and begg'd of him, that he would not abandon the Father-in-Law, who was both aged and blind. The Count was much offended with the Duke, for having pull'd those Wars upon him; and on the other side, the greatness of the *Venetians* did not please him at all; besides his Money was gone, and the League supplied him but coldly: For the *Florentines* were now freed from their apprehensions of the Duke, which was the great cause of their caressing the Count; and the *Venetians* desir'd his ruin, as the only Person capable of carrying the whole State of *Lombardy* from them.

New War in *Lombardy*.

The Count courted by all Parties.

Nevertheless, whilst *Philip* was seducing him to his side, and promised him the Command of all his Forces, upon a Condition he would leave the *Venetians*, and restore *La Marca* to the Pope; they sent Ambassadors to him, promising him *Milan*, when it was taken, and the Generalship of their Army *in perpetuum*, so he would prosecute the War in *La Marca*, and obstruct the Supplies which were sending by *Alfonso* into *Lombardy*. The *Venetian* Proffers were great, and his Obligations to them considerable, they having made that War on purpose to secure *Cremona* to the Count. Again, the Duke's Injuries were fresh, and his Promises not to be trusted; yet the Count remained doubtful which he should accept: his obligation to the League, his Faith given, the late good Offices which they had done him, and their many Promises for the future, were great Arguments on one side; yet he was loth on the othe other side to deny the Importunities of his Father-in-Law: But that which sway'd with him most of all, was the Poison which he suspected was hid under the Promises of the *Venetians*, to whose discretion he must leave himself (if he succeeded in their Wars) both for their Performance, and his own Preservation; which no wise Prince would ever do, till necessity compelled him. But this suspence and difficulty of Resolution in the Count, was taken away by the *Venetians*; who having a design by some Practices and Intelligences in the Town, to get it for themselves, upon some other pretence they caused their Forces to march into those Parts; but their Plot was discover'd by him that governed there for the Count, and instead of gaining *Cremona*, they lost the Count, who laid aside all Respects, and join'd with the Duke.

Pope *Eugenius* was dead, *Nicolo* V. created his Successor, and the Count advanced with his whole Army to *Cotegnola*, in order to his passage in *Lombardy*, when news was brought to him, that Duke *Philip* was dead, which happen'd in the Year 1447. on the last of *August*. These Tidings much troubled the Count, whose Army could not be in good order, because they had not had their full Pay. The *Venetians* he feared, as being in Arms, and his professed Enemies, now upon the revolt to the Duke. *Alfonso* had been always his Enemy, and he was fearful of him; he could have no confidence in either the Pope or the *Florentines*, for the *Florentines* were in League with the *Venetians*, and he was in possession of several Towns which he had taken from the Pope: However, he resolv'd to bear up bravely; look his Fortune in the face; and comport himself according to the Accidents which should occur: for many times Secrets are discover'd in Action, which Dejection and Despondency would have conceal'd for ever. It was no

Duke *Philip* died.

1447.

little ſupport to him to believe, that if the *Milaneſi* were oppreſſed, or their jealous of the Ambition of the *Venetian*, no Man was ſo proper for them to apply to, for protection, as himſelf: ſo that taking Courage thereupon, he marched into the Country of *Bologna*, and from thence paſſing by *Modena* and *Reggio*, he encamp'd upon the *Lenzo*, and ſent to the *Milaneſi* to offer them his Service. The *Milaneſi*, after the Duke's death, were divided into Factions; part of them had a mind to be free, and part of them to live under a Prince; and thoſe which were for a Prince, part were for the Count, and part for *Alfonſo*: but they which were for a Commonwealth, being more unanimous, prevailed and erected a Republick according to their own Model, to which many of the Cities in the Dukedoms refuſed to conform, ſuppoſing they might make themſelves free as well as *Milan*, if they pleas'd, and thoſe who were not inclin'd to that Government, would not ſubmit to it in them. *Lodi* and *Piacenza* therefore ſurrender'd to the *Venetians*; *Pavia* and *Parma* made themſelves free: upon which Confuſions, the Count remov'd to *Cremona*, where certain Deputies of his to that purpoſe, met with certain Commiſſioners from *Milan*, and came to an Agreement, by which it was agreed, that he ſhould be General of their Forces, and all Conditions performed to him which were concluded in his laſt Treaty with the Duke; to which was ſuperadded, that *Breſcia* ſhould be put into the Count's hands, till he ſhould be poſſeſs'd of *Verona*, and that then keeping the laſt, the firſt ſhould be reſtor'd.

The Count made General for the *Milaneſi*.

Before the Death of the Duke, Pope *Nicolo*, upon his aſſumption to that Chair, endeavoured to make a general Peace, betwixt all the Princes of *Italy*; and to that purpoſe he negotiated with the *Florentine* Ambaſſadors, which were ſent to his Creation, for a Diet to be held at *Ferrara*, to treat either of a long Ceſſation, or a firm Peace; and accordingly the Pope's Legate was met there by Commiſſioners from the *Venetians*, the Duke, and the *Florentines*. *Alfonſo* ſent none, for he was at *Tiboli* with a great Army in favour of the Duke, and believ'd (as ſoon as the Count could be debauched from them) he ſhould have a fair opportunity to fall upon both the *Venetian* and *Florentine*. In the mean time the Count lay ſtill in *Lombardy*, attending the confirmation of the Peace; to which *Alfonſo* would not ſend, but promiſed to ratifie what ſhould be agreed by the Duke. This Peace was a long time in debate, but at length it was concluded, it ſhould either be a Ceſſation for five Years, or a perpetual Peace, as the Duke of *Milan* ſhould chuſe; the Duke's Commiſſioners, returning to know his Reſolution, they found him dead; however the *Milaneſi* were willing to ſtand to their Agreement, but the *Venetians* would not condeſcend, fancying great hopes to themſelves of over-running that State, becauſe *Lodi* and *Piacenza* had ſubmitted to them ſoon after the Death of the Duke; and believing either by Treaty or Force they ſhould be able to reduce the reſt, before any body could come in to their relief; and this they fancied the rather, becauſe the *Florentines* were engag'd in a War with *Alfonſo*. *Alfonſo* was at this time at *Tiboli*, and being impatient to purſue his Deſigns upon *Tuſcany* (according to Agreement betwixt him and the Duke) conceiving the War already commenced in *Lombardy*, would give him convenience, he had a great mind to have ſome footing in the State of *Florence*, before the War ſhould apparently break out; to that purpoſe he entred into correſpondence with ſome Perſons in the Caſtle of *Cennina*, in the upper *Val d' Arno*, and took it: the *Florentines* were much ſurprized at ſo unexpected an Accident, and ſeeing the King in motion againſt them, they liſted Men, created a new Council of Ten, and provided themſelves for War, with as much induſtry as any of their Predeceſſors. The King was marched already with his Army into the Country of *Siena*, and had uſed his utmoſt endeavours to get that City into his clutches; but it continued firm to the *Florentines*; refuſed to admit him, and all the reſt of the Towns, under its Juriſdiction, did the ſame. Yet they furniſhed him with Proviſions, their weakneſs and the King's great ſtrength excuſing it.

The *Venetians* Ambition of the Dutchy of *Milan*.

Alfonſo invades the *Florentines*.

The King's Reſolution was changed of invading the *Florentines* by the way of the *Val d' Arno*, either becauſe *Cennina* was taken from him again, or that the *Florentines* were too well furniſhed with Soldiers in thoſe Parts; wherefore he turned towards *Volterra*, and ſurprized many Caſtles in the County belonging thereto. From thence he paſſed into the County of *Piſa*, where, by the aſſiſtance of *Arrigo* and *Fatio* (Counts of *Gherardeſca*) he took ſome Poſts, and then aſſaulted *Campiglia*, which being defended by the *Florentines*, he was not able to carry; ſo that the King leaving Garriſons in the Places he had taken; and certain Troops to make Excurſions upon the Enemy; with the reſt of his Army retired and took his Quarters in the Country of *Siena*. The *Florentines* in the mean time being ſecured by the ſeaſon of the Year, provided themſelves with Soldiers with all poſſible care, and gave the command of them to *Federigo* Lord of *Urbino*, and *Giſmondo Malateſta da Rimino*, betwixt whom there was ſome precedent difference, yet it was ſo prudently compoſed by *Neri de Gino*, and *Bernardetto de Medici*, their Commiſſaries, that they took the Field together before the Winter was over;

recover'd

recover'd the Places loſt in the Country of *Piſa*; and the *Pomerancie* in the *Volterran*; curbing and reſtraining his Excurſions of thoſe who were left by *Alfonſo* upon the Coaſts, ſo as they were ſcarce able to ſecure their Garriſons. As ſoon as the Spring was come, the Commiſſaries had a Rendezvous of all their Army (which conſiſted of about 5000 Horſe and 2000 Foot, at *Spedalletto*; and the King had another, of about 15000, ſome three Miles from *Campiglia*: and when it was ſuppoſed he would have fallen upon that Town, he turned about to *Piombino*, believing it would be no hard matter to gain it, in reſpect that it was but indifferently provided; and if he did, it would be no little prejudice to the *Florentines*, ſeeing from thence he could harraſs them with a tedious War, and by ſending Forces there by Sea, infeſt the whole Country of *Piſa*. This Policy of *Alfonſo*'s ſtartled the *Florentines*, and conſulting what was to be done, it was concluded, that if they could lie with their Army upon the Coaſts of *Campiglia*, he would run a hazard of being beaten, or be forc'd to draw off with no little Diſgrace. To this purpoſe they rigg'd out four *Galliaſſes* which they had at *Ligorn*, and ſent three thouſand Foot in them to reinforce *Piombino*, and then poſted themſelves at *Caldane*, a Place of no eaſy acceſs; for to lie upon the Coaſts in the Plain, they judged it more dangerous, and more ſubject to Attacks: the *Florentines* were to be ſupplied from the neighbouring Towns, which being thin, and but ill-inhabited, they were but indifferently furniſhed, ſo that the Army was much incommoded, eſpecially for Wine; for none growing there, and coming with great difficulty from other Parts, it was not poſſible to provide for them all. But the King (though ſtraitned by the *Florentines*) had plenty of all things by the way of the Sea. The *Florentines* perceiving it, had a mind to try Experiment, whether their Forces could not be ſupplied by Sea likewiſe; whereupon they cauſed their *Galliaſſes* to be brought, loaded them with Victuals, and having diſpatch'd them accordingly, they were ſet upon by ſeven of *Alfonſo*'s Gallies, and two of them taken, and the other two fled. This Diſaſter cut off all hopes of relieving that way: ſo that 200 of the looſer ſort of Soldiers ran away to the King's Camp for want of Wine, and the reſt mutiny'd, grumbling that they ſhould be confin'd to ſo hot Places where there was no Wine, and the Water very bad: hereupon the Commiſſaries took it into debate, and it was concluded that they ſhould leave that Poſt, and addreſs themſelves to the recovery of certain Caſtles which remained in the hands of the King.

On the other ſide, the King, tho' he wanted no Proviſion, and was more numerous in Men, found himſelf no leſs diſtreſſed; for his Army was full of the Diſeaſes which thoſe Maritime Countries do produce, they were grown ſo general and fierce, that many Men died, and moſt of them were ſick. Upon this conſideration, a Peace was propoſed, and the King inſiſted upon 50000 *Florens*, and that *Piombino* might be left to his diſcretion. Which Demands being deliberated at *Florence*, many who deſir'd Peace, were earneſt to have them accepted; affirming, they could not expect Succeſs in a War, which requir'd ſo vaſt an Expence to maintain it: but *Neri Capponi* going to *Florence*, gave them ſuch pregnant Reaſons to the contrary, that the whole City agreed to refuſe them, and the Governor of *Piombino* was well entertain'd, and promiſed to be reliev'd both in time of War and Peace, if he would defend it couragiouſly as he had hitherto done. The King having notice of their Reſolution, and perceiving his Army too ſickly and infirm to take the Place, he brake abruptly from his Siege; left above 2000 of his Men dead behind him; retreated with the reſt of his Army thorow the County of *Siena*, and from thence into the Kingdom of *Naples*, highly diſſatisfy'd with the *Florentines*, and threatning them with a new War when occaſion offer'd. *Alfonſo* retreats off *Tuſcany*.

Whilſt theſe things paſs'd in *Tuſcany*, the Count *Franceſco* being made General for the *Milaneſi*, thought fit, before any thing elſe, to reconcile himſelf with *Franceſco Piccinino* (who had a Command likewiſe under him) that he might aſſiſt him in his Enterprizes, or at leaſt oppoſe them with more circumſtances of Reſpect: after which, he took the Field with his Army, and the Citizens of *Pania*, ſuſpecting their own Ability to defend themſelves againſt ſo formidable a Force, and yet unwilling to bring themſelves under the Yoke of the *Milaneſi*, they offer'd to ſurrender to him, upon condition they might not fall under their Domination. The Count had a great mind to that City, and look'd upon it as a fine initiation and pretence to the reſt of his Deſigns. Nor was it Fear, or the imputation of breaking his Faith, that reſtrain'd him from taking it; for Great Men think it diſhonourable for to loſe, but none to gain, tho' with Fraud and Injuſtice. His great Doubt was, leſt in taking it, he ſhould diſoblige the *Milaneſi* ſo, as they ſhould give themſelves to the *Venetians*; and in not taking it, he was jealous they ſhould ſurrender to the Duke of *Savoy*, to which he ſaw too many of the Citizens inclin'd, in either of which Caſes, his Authority in *Lombardy* would be loſt. At length judging it leſs danger to take that City himſelf, than to let another Man

get it; he resolv'd to accept it, perswading himself it would satisfie the *Milaneſi* to let them know, how fatal it might have been for him to have refused it, seeing those Citizens would certainly have deliver'd it to the *Venetian*, or the Duke of *Savoy*; either of which ways their State had been undone; and that it was better in his possession, who was their Friend, than in either of theirs, both of them being too potent, and both of them their Enemies. The *Milaneſi*, for all his Compliments, were much unsatisfied with the Business, as plainly discovering the Ambition and Ends of the Man; but they thought best at present to conceal it, not knowing whither they were to betake themselves (upon a Rupture with the Count) but to the *Venetians*, whose Pride, and arrogant Terms they dreaded and abhorred: so that they concluded not to break with the Count, but to obviate their present Miseries, with his assistance, hoping when they were freed from the former, some propitious opportunity might happen to quit them of him; for they were not only infested by the *Venetians*, but by the *Genoeſes*, and the Duke of *Savoy* in the name of *Charles* of *Orleans*, descended from a Sister of *Philip*'s; but the Count defended all against them without any trouble. Their greatest Adversary was the *Venetian*, who was come near with a powerful Army to seize upon their State, and had *Lodi* and *Piacenza* already in their possession; which last, the Count beleagured, and after a long Siege, took it, and sack'd it: after he had recover'd that City, Winter coming on, he drew his Army into Quarters, and went himself to *Cremona*, where he entertain'd himself with his Wife: but as soon as the Spring appear'd, the *Venetian* and *Milaneſi* were both in the Field: the *Milaneſi* had a great desire to retake *Lodi*, and afterwards to come to an Agreement with the *Venetian*; for the expence of the War was encreased, and the fidelity of the Count suspected. In order to this, it was resolved their Army would march to *Carravaggio*, and besiege it; supposing that upon the taking of that Castle, *Lodi* would surrender. The Count obey'd their Orders, tho' his own Inclination was to have passed the *Adda*, and invaded the Country of *Breſcia*. Being set down before *Caravaggio*, he intrenched and fortified his Army so well with Ditches and Ramparts, that the *Venetians* could not attempt to relieve it without great disadvantage.

However the *Venetians* advanc'd with their Army, under the Command of their General *Micheletto*, within two flights shot of the Count's Camp; continued there several Days, and had many Skirmishes with them. Notwithstanding the Count persisted in his Siege, and prest them so hard, they must of necessity surrender. The *Venetians* believing the loss of that Castle would be the loss of their whole Enterprize, were much dissatisfied with the News; and calling a Council, after many Disputes, it was concluded, there was no way but to attack the Count in his Trenches, which was not to be done without great disadvantage; but the *Senate* of *Venice*, tho' naturally timorous, and not apt to any sudden or dangerous Resolutions, was in this case so much transported, as rather to venture all than lose that, tho' the loss of that would be the ruin of all. It was concluded therefore to fall upon the Count, and standing to their Arms one Morning very early, they assaulted that part of the Camp which was the weakest guarded, and (as it usually happens in such Surprizes as that) at the very first onslaught, they put the whole *Sforzeſcan* Army into disorder. But the Count so rallied them again, that after many Attempts and Eruptions upon their Works, they were not only repulsed, but so shattered and dispersed, that of their whole Army (in which there were more than 12000 Horse) there were not above 1000 escaped, and their whole Baggage and Train of Artillery taken; so that never till that Day had the *Venetians* received so considerable a Defeat.

The *Venetians* totally defeated.

Among the rest of the Prey and Prisoners there was found a *Venetian Proveditore*, who before the Battle had spoken opprobrious Words of the Count, calling him Bastard and Coward: this *Proveditore* finding himself in the hands of his Enemies, being conscious of his Offence, and expecting no otherwise, but that his Reward would be suitable, according to the Nature of base Spirits (who are always insolent in Prosperity, and poor and abject in Adversity) throwing himself with Tears at the Feet of the Count, he acknowledg'd his Fault, and beseech'd his Pardon. The Count took him up by the Arm, and bad him be of good Courage; but afterwards he told him, he could not but wonder, a Person of Prudence and that Gravity, as he desir'd to be thought, should commit so great an Error and Indecorum, as to speak reproachfully of those who did not deserve it. As to Bastardy he accus'd him of, he knew not the Passages betwixt *Sforza*, his Father, and *Madona Lucia*, his Mother; for not being then present, he was not able to order them better, and therefore he did hope nothing which they did could be imputable to him: But this he knew, that since he had been capable of any thing himself, he had carried himself so, as no body could reprehend him; to which, both he and his *Senate* could give fresh and irrefragable Testimony: At last he admonish'd

nish'd him to be more modest for the future, to have more caution in all his Enterprizes, and then he dismiss'd him. After this Victory, the Count march'd his Army into the Country of *Brescia*, possess'd himself of all where-ever he came, and then encamp'd within two Miles of the City. The *Venetians* upon their overthrow, suspecting (as it happen'd) that *Brescia* would be the first thing the Count would attempt, reinforc'd it as much as in so short a time they were able, got what Forces they could together with all imaginable diligence, and sent to the *Florentines* to desire their Assistance by virtue of their League, who being freed from their War with *Alfonso*, supplied them with a 1000 Foot and 2000 Horse: with which Forces having got an Army together, the *Venetians* began to think they were in a Condition to treat, and for a long time, it had been the Custom and Fate of the *Venetians* to recover twice as much by Peace, as they lost by the War. They understood very well, the *Milanesi* were jealous of the Count, whose design was not so much to be their General, as their Prince, they knew it was in their own power to make Peace with which of them they pleased, for both of them desired it, one out of Ambition, the other for Fear. They concluded at last to compose with the Count, and to proffer him their Assistance for the Subduction of *Milan*, presuming, that the *Milanesi* finding themselves betray'd by the Count, in their Fury would submit to any Dominion but his, and then they being most capable of defending them, were the most likely to be the Persons they would chuse for their protection.

Upon this Resolution, they sent to try the Count, and found him very inclinable to a Peace, as desiring the Victory at *Carravaggio* might be appropriated to him, and not to the *Milaneses*. A Peace therefore was struck up, and the *Venetians* oblig'd themselves to pay to the Count (till *Milan* should be taken) 130000 *Florens* a Month, and maintain in his Service 4000 Horse, and 2000 Foot during the War. The Count on the other side engaged to restore to them all the Towns, Prisoners, and whatever else had been taken in that War by him, reserving to himself only such Towns as were in Duke *Philip*'s possession when he died. The news of this Agreement disquieted the *Milanesi* much more than their Victory had rejoiced them. The Magistrates storm'd, the People complain'd, the Women and Children lamented, all of them in one Chorus pronouncing the Count a Traytor and an Infidel. And tho' they did not expect to reclaim him from his Ingratitude by any Prayers or Promises they could make him, nevertheless they thought fit to send Ambassadors to him, to see with what Confidence and Expressions he could receive them after such barbarous Disloyalty, and being brought into his presence, one of them spake to him to this Effect:

Peace betwixt the *Venetians* and the Count excluding the *Milanesi*.

The Oration of one of the *Milan* Ambassadors to the Count.

Those who desire to obtain any thing of other People, are wont to accost them with Prayers, or Promises, or Threats; that either their Compassion, or Profit, or Poverty might move them to condescend: but in Men that are cruel, and covetous, and prepossest with their own Greatness and Authority; there being no room for either of the three, 'tis in vain for any Man to think to mitigate them with Prayers, to oblige them with Promises, or to fright them with Threats. We therefore, understanding (tho' too late) your Cruelty, your Ambition, and your Insolence; are come hither, not to beg any thing of you (for if we did, we are sensible it would not be granted) but to commemorate and charge you with the Benefits you have received from the People of Milan; *and to remonstrate with what Ingratitude you have requited them; that among the many Miseries which you have brought upon us, we may have at least the pleasure to reprehend you for them. You ought to remember your Condition after the Death of the Duke; you were at Hostility with the Pope and King* Alfonso; *you were discarded by the* Venetians *and the* Florentines, *who, upon some just and late Provocation, or else finding you useless, were become (as it were) your Enemies: you were tired and weary of the War you had maintained against the Church; you were left without Men, without Money, without Friends, desperate of preserving your own, much more of gaining from others; under which Exigencies, of necessity you must have sunk, had not our Innocence and Plain-heartedness supported you. We, we were they who received you into our Arms, moved by the Reverence we retained for the Memory of our Duke, with whom you had enter'd into so near and so late an Alliance; presuming (and as we thought) with reason, that the Love you profest to him, would have been extended to his People; and that our Rewards being added to his, the Amity betwixt us would not only have been firm, but indissolvable; and for that cause to your old Articles with the Duke, we threw in* Verona *and* Brescia. *What could we give, or promise you more? and you, what could you have (or indeed ask) more of us, or any body else at that time? You received from us a Kindness you could not look for; and we, in recompence, have received a Mischief we never deserved: nor was this the first instance of your Falshood; for no sooner were you in possession of the Command of our Army, but against all Justice and Obligation, you received* Pavia *into your hands; which, indeed, gave us the*

first

first hint of what was to be expected from your Friendship: however, he swallow'd that Injury, in hopes such an Acquest as that might have satiated your Ambition. But alas! those who must have all, will not be satisfied with a part. You promised, that all your Conquests afterwards should be ours, because you knew, what you should give us at several times, you could take from us at once: this is verified since your Victory at Caravaggio, *which though won with the expence of our Treasure and Blood, is by your baseness perverted to our ruin. Oh! unhappy are those Cities who are constrain'd to defend their Liberty against such as invade them, but much more unhappy are they who in their defence are inforced to employ such mercenary and such treacherous Instruments as you. May we be Example to Posterity, tho' Thebes and the King of* Macedon *could be no warning to us, who having beaten their Enemies, was made their General by them, and their Prince afterwards by himself. We are not therefore to be condemn'd for any thing, but our Confidence in you; whose past Life, and insatiable Appetite of Dominion, ought to have taught us better, than to have trusted a Person which betray'd the Prince of* Lucca, *squeez'd the* Florentines *and the* Venetians, *disrespected the Duke, despised a King, and committed several Injuries (above all) both against God and the Church. And indeed we had no reason to believe, that so many Princes and Potentates should be of less Authority with* Francesco Sforza *than the* Milanesi, *or that he would be just in his Engagements to us, when he had broke them with every body else. But our Indiscretion cannot excuse your Treachery, nor clear you of that Infamy, which our just and deplorable Complaints will fix upon you all the World over. Nor can any thing secure you against the Stings and Compunctions of your own Conscience; for inverting those Arms which we had provided for our defence, against our own Liberty and Freedom, you cannot think any thing so proper for you, as the Reward of a Parricide. And if yet your incontroulable Ambition should blind you; the Evidence the whole World will give of your Impiety, will open your Eyes, and God himself will open them, if either Perjury, or Falshood, or Treason, do offend him; or if his divine Providence, for some occult good, he sees it fit to forbear it, and to show himself to us a favourer of ill Men. Do not therefore delude your self with the assurance of Victory; the just Anger of God will oppose you; and we are resolved to lose* Lives and *Liberties together: and if it so fall out, that we should be constrain'd to submit, there is no Prince in* Italy *but we will choose before you; and if our Sins be so great, as to pull down the greatest Misery in the World upon our heads, and force us into your Hands, be assured, that Dominion which you begin with Infamy and Fraud, will end in the Destruction of you or your Children.*

The Count was nettled by every part of the Speech, yet without any extraordinary Commotion in either Gesture or Words, he made them this Answer:

The Count's Answer.

That being injur'd so highly as they thought themselves, he would bear with the Indiscretion of their Language; tho' to Persons capable of judging betwixt them, there was nothing that they had charged him with, which he could not easily resel. He could make it appear, that he had not injur'd the Milanesi, *but secured himself only against their Intelligence and Designs. That if they reflected upon their Carriage after the Battle of* Carravaggio, *they would find, that instead of rewarding him with* Verona *and* Brescia, *as they had contracted, they were underhand negotiating a Peace with the* Venetians; *that the burden and scandal of the War might be left upon his Shoulders, whilst they ran away with the Profits of it, and the Honour of the Peace: so that if they looked impartially into the matter, they would find, he had done nothing but what they had endeavour'd before; and that if he had deferr'd to do it so long, the more they were oblig'd to him; and with the more justice he might retort Ingratitude upon them. That as to the truth or falsity of what was on either side alledg'd, the end of the War would make it appear, in which, that God which they had so solemnly invocated to revenge them, would demonstrate which of the two was most tender of displeasing him, and which with most Equity he opposed.*

The Ambassadors being departed, the Count prepared to invade them, and the *Milanesi*, for their defence; to which purpose they joined themselves with *Francesco* and *Giacopo Piccinino*, who upon the score of the old Animosity betwixt the *Bracceschi* and *Sforzeschi*, had been faithful to the *Milaneses*: hoping by their means to preserve their Liberties, till they should have opportunity to divide betwixt the *Venetians* and the Count; which Amity they did not think would be of any long continuance. The Count was of the same Opinion, and thought it his best way to bind them by Rewards, seeing they were tickliſh in their Promises. In the distribution therefore of the War, he was contented the *Venetians* should attack *Cremona*, whilst he with the remainder of the Army assaulted the rest of that State. This Article being proposed to the *Venetians*, was so grateful, that upon that very reason they continued their Friendship to the Count, till he had over-run most of the Country of *Milan*; and so straitned that City, that no Provisions could come at it. So that despairing of other relief, they

sent

sent Ambassadors to *Venice*, to intreat, that they would commiserate their Case, and (according to the practice of all Commonwealths) rather support those who stood for their Liberty, than a Tyrant, who if he should gain their City, would be too strong afterwards for them. Nor ought they to believe that he would be content with the Terms of their Capitulation, who had violated his League with that State. The *Venetians* were not yet Masters of *Crema*, and being loth to discover themselves till they were in possession, they answer'd them in publick, that their Alliance with the Count would not suffer them to assist them; but privately they entertain'd them so, as they might give their Masters assured hopes of their Friendship. The Count was got already so near *Milan*, that he had taken some part of the Suburbs; and the *Venetians* having reduc'd *Crema*, they thought it time to publish their Amity with *Milan*, with whom they were secretly agreed: and the first Article they agreed to, was the conservation of their Liberty. This League being ratified, the *Venetians* commanded such Forces as they had with the Count, to march back to their Army; they signified likewise to the Count, the Peace which they had concluded, and gave him twenty Days time to accept it himself. The Count was not at all surprized at the Inconstancy of the *Venetians*; he had foreseen it long before, and expected it should happen every day. Yet he could not but regret it as much, as the *Milanesi* had been molested at his: he desir'd two Days to give in his Answer to the Ambassadors, which time he resolv'd to detain the *Venetians* who were in his Service, and go on with his Enterprize. He gave out publickly he would accept of the Peace, and sent Ambassadors to *Venice* with full Power to ratifie it; but they had private Instructions to the contrary, to spin out and protract the conclusion by all the Cavils and Subtleties they could invent: and that the *Venetian* might give the more credit to his Pretences, he made a Truce with the *Milanesi* for a Month; drew off his Army, and dispers'd it into such places as he had taken in that Country. This Stratagem of his was the occasion of his Victory afterwards, and the ruin of the *Milanesi*; for the *Venetians* presuming upon the Peace, were slower and more remiss in their Preparations for War.

And the *Milanesi* seeing the Cessation confirmed, the Enemy removed, and the *Venetian* their Friend, believed for certain the Count would trouble them no more; which Opinion was pernicious to them two several ways; in making them more negligent for their Defence, and in sowing their Land, which devour'd much of their Corn, and was the reason they were sooner distress'd. On the other side, nothing was hurtful to them, but was beneficial to the Count, and gave him time to respite, and look abroad for Allies. During this War in *Lombardy*, the *Florentines* had not declar'd of either side, nor shown any favour to the Count when he took part with the *Milanesi*, not afterwards; for the Count having no great need of them, had not sought their Assistance, only after the Defeat at *Caravoggio* (as they were oblig'd by the League) they sent Aid to the *Venetians*. But now the Count was alone, and had no body else to resort to, he was inforc'd to press their Assistance publickly to the State, and privately to his Friends, but especially to *Cosimo de Medici*, who in all his Undertakings had counsel'd him faithfully, and freely supplied him: nor did he desert him now in his distress, but furnish'd him with what could privately be convey'd, encourag'd him to go on in his Design: he propos'd likewise, that the City would publickly own him; but he found difficulty, in that *Neri* the Son of *Capponi* was the most potent Man in *Florence*, and to him it appear'd more for the interest of that City, that the Count should accept of the Peace, than prosecute the War. His first apprehension was least out of Indignation to the Count, the *Milanesi* should give themselves up to the Dominion of the *Venetian*, which would be the ruin of them all: then, if the Count should succeed, and *Milan* come into his hands, so great an Army, with so great a Territory added to it, must needs (in his Judgment at least) become dangerous and formidable; for if he were troublesom whilst but a Count, when a Duke he would be insupportable. For these Reasons he affirm'd it would be better for the Republick of *Florence*, and for all *Italy* besides, that the Count should remain as he was, with his Reputation in the Army; and *Lombardy* be divided into two Commonwealths, which were never like to join to the ruin of their Neighbours; and singly, and by themselves, they were not able to do hurt: to compass which, he saw no way so probable, as by preserving their old Amity with the *Venetians*, and disclaiming the Count.

Cosimo de Medici a Friend to *Francesco*.

Neri Capponi against him.

These Arguments were not approv'd by *Cosimo*'s Friends, believing they were not so much *Neri*'s Judgment as Jealousie; lest the Count being made a Duke, *Cosimo* should grow too powerful by being his Friend. *Cosimo*, on the other hand, perswaded, that their Alliance with the Count would be for the advantage both of *Florence* and all *Italy*; for it was madness to imagine *Milan* could continue a Commonwealth, seeing the Humour of the Citizens, their manner of Life, and the old Factions and Differences among

mong them, were not capable of any Form or System of Civil Government; so that of necessity the Count must be Duke of it, or the *Venetians* Lords: and in that case no body could be so weak, but to prefer a single Neighbour, competently powerful, before an Enemy that was remote, but more great and incontroulable. Neither could he believe the *Milaneſi* would give themselves up to the *Venetians*; for the Count had the bigger Party in the Town; and whenever they found themselves unable to defend their Liberties any longer, they would more probably surrender to the Count than the *Venetian*. These varieties of Opinions kept the City a long time in suspence; but at length it was agreed, that Ambassadors should be dispatch'd to the Count, to treat about their Alliance: if they found him so strong, that there was likelihood he should prevail, then they should conclude, but if otherwise, they were to cavil and protract. By the time these Ambassadors had got to *Reggio*, they had news the Count was become Master of *Milan*. For the Count as soon as his Truce was expir'd, and had clapp'd down again before it with his Army, hoping to carry it in a short time, in despight of the *Venetians*, for they could not come to relieve it, but by the River *Adda*, which was easie to be hindred; being Winter, he could not fear they would remove him with their whole Army, and before the Spring he doubted not to carry it, especially seeing *Francesco Piccinino* was dead, and *Giacopo* his Brother remain'd sole Captain of their Forces. The *Venetian* had sent an Ambassador to *Milan* to encourage them to defend themselves, and to assure them of speedy and effectual Relief: and so far they were as good as their words, that during the Winter many Skirmishes and Conflicts pass'd betwixt the *Venetians* and the Count, till when the Weather began to be open, they came down with their Army (under the Command of *Pandolfo Malateſta*) and encamped upon the River of *Adda*; where it being debated in Council, whether they should fall upon the Count, and run the hazard of a Battle, it was opposed by *Pandolfo* (upon his Experience both of the Count and his Army) who advis'd, the Town might be reliev'd without any such danger, the Count being distressed already both for Forrage and Corn. Wherefore his Opinion was, that they should block him up where he was, and intercept his Provisions, which would keep up the Spirits of the *Milaneſi*, and divert them from surrendring to him.

The *Venetians* assist the *Milaneſi*.

This Resolution was most plausible to the *Venetians*, because they thought it safe in it self, and did hope by keeping the Town in constant necessity, it would be forc'd at last to deliver up to them; for considering how the Count had provok'd them, they could not imagine they would surrender to him. In the mean time the *Milaneſi* were reduced to extream Misery, for being a populous City, the poor People fell down dead in the Streets for want of Bread; and this Scarcity begetting Murmurs and Complaints in several Places, the Magistrates were afraid of some Tumult or other, and us'd all possible diligence to prevent their assembling. The Multitude is not suddenly to be engag'd in any Mischief; but when once they are dispos'd, the lest Accident imaginable sets them on work. It happen'd that two Persons of indifferent Condition being in discourse near the *Porta Nuova* about the Calamities of the City, and what ways were left to preserve it; People got about them by degrees, so as in a short time they were in a considerable number; upon which a Rumour was spread in the Town, that they were in Arms against the Magistrates at *Porta Nuova*: hereupon, the whole Multitude (who expected some Occasion) put themselves in Arms, made *Gaſparre da Vico Mercato* their Leader, and marching up to the place where the Magistrates were in Council, they fell upon them with such Fury, that all which could not escape were slain; among the rest, *Lionardo Veneto*, the *Venetian* Ambassador, who had laugh'd at their Miseries, and was judg'd the principal occasion of their Wants. Having made themselves Masters of the City, they deliberated which way to relieve themselves of their Distresses, and it was unanimously resolv'd (seeing their Liberty was not to be preserv'd) that they should throw themselves under the Protection of some Prince which should be able to defend them, but they were divided about the Person; some were for King *Alfonſo*, some for the Duke of *Savoy*, some the King of *France*, not one Word all the while of the Count; so great and implacable was the Indignation of the People against him; yet at last, not agreeing in the rest, *Gaſparre da Vico Mercato* mention'd the Count, and display'd gravely before them, that if their design was to rid themselves of the War, the Count was the only Person to be chosen; for the People of *Milan* were in necessity of a certain and present Peace, not of a tedious and only possible Supply.

Gaſparre da Vico Mercato his Advice.

Then he fell with great Words to mitigate the Proceedings of the Count; he accus'd the *Venetians*; he accus'd all the Princes of *Italy*, who (some for Ambition, and some for Avarice) would not permit them to live free. And now since their Liberty was lost, and they must yield to some body or other, his Opinion was, they should do it to one that knew them, and was able to defend them; that they might be sure of Peace for

their

their ſervitude, and not be engag'd in greater, and more pernicious War. The People heard him with great intention, and when he had done, they cry'd out with one Voice, that the Count ſhould be the Man; and *Gaſparre* their Ambaſſador to invite him; who carrying him the joyful News, was kindly entertain'd, and the Count entred into *Milan* 26th of *February*, 1450, and was receiv'd with great Acclamation, even by thoſe Perſons which not long before had ſo highly traduc'd him. The news of this Conqueſt arriving at *Florence*, they diſpatched Orders immediately to their Ambaſſadors, who were upon the way, that inſtead of treating an Agreement with him as Count (which was their Inſtruction before) their buſineſs ſhould now be to congratulate him as Duke. Theſe Ambaſſadors were honourably entertain'd, and bountifully preſented by the Duke, who knew, againſt the Power of the *Venetians*, he could not have in all *Italy* more faithful nor more potent Allies, than the Citizens of *Florence*, who tho' freed from their apprehenſions of the Houſe of the *Viſconti*, were nevertheleſs obnoxious to the Forces of the King of *Aragon* and the *Venetians*; for they knew the Kings of *Aragon* would be their Enemies, for the Amity and Correſpondence they had always maintain'd with the *French*; and the *Venetians* knew their old Fears of the *Viſconti* were occaſion'd by them, and remembring with what eagerneſs the *Viſconti* were perſecuted, and that if they came into their Power, they were like to fare no better, they were bent wholly upon their ruin. For theſe Reaſons the new Duke embrac'd an Agreement with the *Florentines*, very willingly, and the *Venetians*, and the King of *Aragon* confederated againſt them; the King of *Aragon* undertaking the *Florentines*, and the *Venetians* the Duke; who being new, and ſcarce ſettled in his Government, they ſuppos'd would not be able to confront them with all his own Forces, nor all the Friends he could make. But becauſe the League betwixt the *Florentines* and the *Venetians* was not yet fully expir'd; and the King of *Aragon*, upon concluſion of the War at *Piombino*, had made an Accord with them, it did not ſeem convenient to break the Peace abruptly, but rather to attend ſome Accident that might give them pretence to invade them. Whereupon they ſent Ambaſſadors to *Florence* (each of them apart) to let the *Florentines* know, that the Leagues which had paſſed betwixt them were not made to offend any body, but to defend one another. Then the *Venetians* complained that the *Florentines* had ſuffer'd *Alexander* the Duke's Brother to paſs with his Forces into *Lombardy* by the way of *Lunigiana*: and beſides, had been the Authors and Counſellors of the Agreement betwixt the Duke and the Marqueſs of *Mantoua*; all which they affirm'd was done to the prejudice of their State, and contrary to the Amity betwixt them; inſinuating, as Friends, that whoever injures another Perſon wrongfully, gives him a right to revenge himſelf; and whoever breaks Peace, muſt prepare for War. The Anſwer to theſe Ambaſſies was committed to *Coſimo*, who in a wiſe and eloquent Oration, recapitulated the Benefits the Republick of *Venice* had receiv'd from that State; declaring what Empire and Dominion they had gain'd with that Treaſure and Forces, and advice of the *Florentines*; demonſtrating, that as the Amity betwixt them was propos'd by the *Florentines*, they would not be the firſt which would break it. For having been always lovers of Peace, they were well ſatisfied with their Friendſhip, and would always endeavour to preſerve it. The truth was, all People wonder'd at their Complaints, and that ſo grave and judicious a *Senate* ſhould concern themſelves for things ſo trivial and vain; but ſeeing they thought them worthy of their conſideration, they could not but declare, that their Country was free and open to any body; and that the Duke was a Perſon of ſuch Qualifications, that he needed not the Advice or Favour of any in the choice of his *Allies*, and therefore he was afraid there was ſomething more at the bottom, than they had hitherto diſcover'd; which, if hereafter it ſhould appear, the *Florentines* doubted not but to manifeſt it eaſily to the World, that as their Friendſhip had been profitable, their Enmity could be dangerous. However things were ſmoothed over pretty handſomly for that time, and the Ambaſſadors ſeemed to go away well enough content; yet the Alliance the King of *Aragon* and the *Venetians* had made, and the manner of their deportment, gave the Duke and *Florentines* both, more reaſon to prepare for War, than to rely upon their Peace: upon which the *Florentines* confederating with the Duke, the *Venetians* diſcover'd themſelves, made a League with *Sienna*, and baniſh'd all the *Florentines*, and their Subjects, out of *Venice* and its Dominions: and not long after, *Alfonſo* did the ſame, without any reſpect to the League he had made with them the Year before; and without any juſt, or ſo much as pretended occaſion. Tne *Venetians* were deſirous to get *Bologna* into their hands, and to that end furniſhing certain of their Exiles with a proportionable Force, they marched thither in the Night, and by the Common-ſhore got into the Town ſo privately, their entrance was not perceiv'd, till they gave the Alarm themſelves; upon which *Santi Bentivogli* leaping out of his bed, was inform'd the whole City was in poſſeſſion of the Enemy. *Santi* was adviſed by many which were about him, to fly, and preſerve himſelf

Franceſco enter'd *Milan*, and made Duke of it. 1450.

The Duke of *Milan* and the *Florentines* Confederate.

The King of *Aragon* and the *Venetians*.

Ambaſſadors from them to *Florence*.

The *Florentines* Anſwer.

ſelf that way, ſeeing there was not any left to ſecure the State. However he reſolv'd to try his Fortune, and taking Arms, and encouraging his Servants to follow him, he went forth, and having join'd them to ſome of his Friends, he charg'd a Party of the Enemy, beat them, kill'd ſeveral, and forc'd all of them out of the Town; by which Action he was thought to have given ample Teſtimony of his Extraction from the Houſe of the *Bentivogli*. Theſe Paſſages made it clear to the *Florentines*, that a War was intended; and therefore they betook themſelves to their ancient methods of Defence. They created a Council of Ten. They entertain'd new Officers. They ſent Ambaſſadors to *Rome*, *Naples*, *Venice*, *Sienna* and *Milan*, to deſire Aid of their Friends; to diſcover ſuch as were ſuſpicious; to gain ſuch as were irreſolute, and to pry into the Councils of their Enemies. From the Pope, they could obtain nothing but general Words, Civility and Exhortations to Peace. From the King of *Aragon* nothing but idle Excuſes for having diſmiſs'd the *Florentines*, offering his Paſsport to any which demanded it; and although he endeavour'd by all means to conceal his Preparation for War, yet the Ambaſſadors found him a Juggler, and perceived ſeveral of his Practices againſt their State. With the Duke therefore they renew'd their League; procured an Amity with the *Genoeſes*; compos'd the Differences about the Repriſal, and many other things which had formerly obſtructed it: they try'd all ways to fruſtrate or break the Treaty; and they went ſo far as to ſupplicate the great *Turk*, to baniſh all *Florentines* out of his Country; but that Emperor would not hearken. The *Florentine* Ambaſſadors were prohibited entrance into the Dominions of the *Venetian*, becauſe (forſooth) they were in League with the King of *Aragon*, and could not ſend any Ambaſſies without his participation. The *Sienneſi* receiv'd their Ambaſſadors, treated them well, leſt they ſhould be over-run before the League could relieve them; and therefore they thought it beſt to collogue and lull thoſe Arms aſleep, which they were not able to reſiſt. It was conjectur'd then, that the *Venetian* and King both, ſent Ambaſſadors to juſtifie the War; but the *Venetian* Ambaſſador being refus'd likewiſe to be admitted into the Territories of *Florence*, the King denied to do that Office alone, and the whole Ambaſſy came to nothing: by which the *Venetians* found themſelves us'd with the ſame rudeneſs and contempt, which not many Months before they had exercis'd upon the *Florentines*.

Preparations for War in *Florence*.

In the midſt of theſe Apprehenſions, the Emperor *Federigo* III. paſs'd into *Italy* to be Crown'd, and on *Jan.* 30. 1451. enter'd into *Florence* with an Equipage of 1400 Horſe. He was honourably entertain'd there by the *Senate*, and continu'd with them to the 6th of *February*, upon which day he departed for *Rome*, in order to his Coronation; where having perform'd that Ceremony, and celebrated his Nuptials with the Empreſs (which was come thither by Sea) he departed again for *Germany*; return'd by *Florence* (where all the old Honours were retreated) and having been oblig'd in his paſſage by the Marqueſs of *Ferrara*, he gave him a grant of *Modena* and *Reggio* as a Reward. But the *Florentines* were not by all thoſe Solemnities diverted from their Preparations; for their own Reputation, and the Terror of their Enemies, the Duke and they had enter'd into a League with *France*, which with great joy and oſtentation they publiſh'd all over *Italy*.

Federigo the Emperor enters into *Florence*.

In the Month of *May* 1452, the *Venetians*, not thinking it fit to diſſemble any longer, invaded the Territories of the Duke of *Milan*, by the way of *Lodi*, with 16000 Horſe, and 6000 Foot; whilſt at the ſame time the Marqueſs of *Montferrat* (upon ſome deſigns of his own, or the ſtimulation of the *Venetians*) aſſaulted him on the other ſide by the way of *Alexandria*. The Duke had got an Army together of 18000 Horſe, and 3000 Foot, with which (after he had furniſh'd *Alexandria* and *Lodi* with ſtrong Garriſons, and fortified all Places where the Enemy might offend him) he fell into the Country of *Breſcia*, where he did great miſchief to the *Venetians*, both Parties plundring the Countries, and burning ſuch Towns as were not able to defend themſelves: but the Marqueſs of *Montferrat* being defeated not long after by the Garriſon at *Alexandria*, the Duke was at more leiſure to infeſt, and make his Inroads into the Countries of the *Venetian*. Whilſt the War was carried on in *Lombardy* in this manner, with various, but inconſiderable Accidents, the Wars in *Tuſcany* was commenced betwixt the King of *Aragon* and the *Florentines*, and manag'd with as little Ardor and Succeſs as the other. *Ferrando* (a natural Son of *Alfonſo*'s) march'd into *Tuſcany* with 12000 Men under the command of *Federigo* Lord of *Urbin*. His firſt Enterprize was to aſſault *Foiano* in *Valdiſciana* (for the *Sienneſi* being their Friends, they enter'd that way into the *Florentine* Dominions) the Caſtle was weak, the Walls but indifferent, the Garriſon but ſmall; yet thoſe they had within it were valiant and faithful; the whole Number which were ſent for the ſecurity of that Place, not exceeding 200. Before this Caſtle *Ferrando* encamp'd, and either their Courage was ſo little without, or theirs ſo great within, that it took him up 36 Days before he could maſter it. Which time gave the *Florentines* great convenience of providing other Places of higher importance, and drawing

Tuſcany invaded by the King of *Aragon*'s Forces.

drawing their Forces together and diſpoſing them into better order, than otherwiſe they could have done.

This Caſtle being taken, the Enemy march'd into *Chianti*, where they attempted two little Towns which were held by a few private Citizens, and were repuls'd. Leaving them, they remov'd to *Caſtellina* (a little Caſtle upon the Confines of *Chianti*) and ſate down before it. This Caſtle was about ten Miles from *Sienne*; weak in its Works, but weaker in its Situation; yet in neither ſo weak, as the Courage of the Aſſailants; for after 44 days Siege, and all the Art and Force they could uſe, they were glad to draw off, and leave the Caſtle as they found it. So little formidable were the Armies in thoſe Days, and ſo inconſiderable the Wars, that thoſe Places which are now deſerted as impoſſible to be kept, were then defended as if they had been impoſſible to have been taken. Whilſt *Ferrando* was with his Army in *Chianti*, he made many Incurſions into the Country of *Florence*, running up with his Parties within ſix Miles of the Town, to the great Terror and Detriment of their Subjects, who, having got together about 8000 Soldiers, under the Command of *Aſtorre de Faenza* and *Giſmondo Malateſta*, held off from the Enemy towards the Caſtle of *Colle*, being unwilling to come to a Battle, becauſe they knew if they loſt not their Army, there was no danger of the War; for the little Caſtles which ſhould be taken, would be reſtored upon the Peace; and the great Towns were ſecure. The King had likewiſe a Fleet of about twenty Veſſels (Gallies and Foiſts) in the Sea of *Piſa*, which Fleet (whilſt *La Caſtellina* was aſſaulted by Land) was employ'd by the King to batter the Caſtle of *Vada* that ſtood upon the Sea; and they did it ſo effectually, that in a ſhort time, by the inadvertency of the Governour, they got it into their hands: from whence afterwards they ran over the whole Country thereabouts; but thoſe Excurſions were preſently reſtrain'd by certain *Florentines* Soldiers which were ſent to *Campiglia*. The Pope in the mean time concern'd himſelf no farther, than to mediate an Accord. But tho' he was ſo tender in engaging abroad in any Action of War, he found himſelf at home in no little danger. There was at that time in *Rome* a Perſon call'd *Stephano Porcari*, a Citizen born, of good Extraction and Learning, but moſt eminent for the Generoſity of his Mind. This *Stephano* was ambitious (as moſt are which are deſirous of Glory) to perform, or at leaſt attempt ſomething that might make him memorable to Poſterity. And nothing occur'd ſo honourably to his thoughts, as to deliver his Country from the inſolence of the Prelates, and reduce it to its primitive Liberty; hoping, if he effected it, he ſhould be call'd either the *Father* or the *Reſtorer* of his Country. His great hopes and encouragement in this Enterprize was deduc'd from the Iniquity and ill Lives of the Prelates, which were highly diſpleaſing both to the Barons and People of *Rome*. But his greateſt confidence was grounded upon certain Verſes of *Petrarch*'s, in that *Canto* which begins, *Spirito Gentile*, &c. The Verſes are theſe:

Stephano Porcari.

Sopra il monte Tarpeio Canzon vedrai.
Un Cavalier ch' Italia tutta honora,
Penſoſo piu d' altrui che di ſe ſteſſo.

Stephano was of opinion, that Poets were many times inſpir'd, and had perfect and divine Inflations from above. So that he concluded what *Petrarch* had propheſied in that *Canto* would certainly come to paſs, and he did not know any Man fitter than himſelf to accompliſh it, in reſpect of his Eloquence, and Learning, and Favour, and Friends. Having taken up this Fancy, he could not contain himſelf, but his Words, Geſture, and manner of Living diſcover'd him, and render'd him ſuſpicious to the Pope; who, to ſecure himſelf againſt his Plots, confin'd him to *Bologna*, and ſent Inſtructions to the Governour, to have an eye over him every day. But *Stephano* was not to be diſcourag'd by one Diſaſter; it rather animated him in his deſign; inſomuch, that with the greateſt caution he could, he continued his Practices with his Friends, and now and then would ſteal to *Rome* and back again with ſuch expedition, as he would be ſure to preſent himſelf before the Governour at that time he was to appear. But afterwards, having drawn in as many as he thought neceſſary for his Work, he reſolv'd to proceed to Action, without farther delay; and ſent to his Correſpondents in *Rome*, that at a prefix'd time, a ſplendid Supper ſhould be prepar'd, all the Conſpirators to be invited to it, and each of them to have private Orders to bring his Confident along with him; and he promis'd to be there himſelf preciſely at the time. All things were order'd exactly to his Directions, and he himſelf was punctually with them; for as ſoon as ſupper was ready, and ſerv'd up to the Table, he preſented himſelf amongſt them, in a Robe of Cloth of Gold, his Collar and other Ornaments about him, to give him Majeſty and Reputation: and having embrac'd all the Conſpirators, in a

long Oration he exhorted them to be couragious, and diſpoſe themſelves chearfully in ſo glorious an Enterprize. Then he appointed the way, ordering one of them to ſeize the Pope's Palace the next Morning, and the other to run about the Streets, and excite the People to Arm. But his Conſpiracy coming to the ear of the Pope (ſome ſay by the Treachery of his Confederates, others by his being ſeen in the Town) which way ſoever it was, the Pope caus'd him and the greateſt part of his Comrades to be apprehended the very ſame Night after Supper, and put to Death, as they deſerved. This was the end of that Enterprize: and tho' among ſome People, perhaps, his Intention might be commended, yet his Judgment muſt neceſſarily be blam'd; for ſuch Attempts may have ſome ſhadow of Glory in the contrivance, but their Execution is certain Deſtruction.

Stephano and his Confederates put to Death.

1453. The War in *Tuſcany* had continued about a Year, and in the Spring, 1453, both Armies had taken the Field, when in relief of the *Florentines*, *Alexandro Sforza*, the Duke's Brother, arriv'd with a ſupply of 2000 Horſe, by which the *Florentine* Army being much encreas'd, and the King's Army become inferior in Number, the *Florentines* thought fit to recover what they had loſt, and with little labour took ſome of their Towns again: after which they encamp'd at *Foiano*, which by the careleſneſs of the Commiſſaries was ſack'd; ſo that the Inhabitants being diſpers'd, they were hardly got to inhabit there again: and when they did come, it was not without great Exemptions and Reward. The Caſtle of *Vada* alſo was retaken; for the Enemy perceiving they could not hold it, they ſet it on fire, and departed. Whilſt the *Florentine* Army was employ'd in this matter, the King of *Aragon*'s Army not having the Courage to come near them, were retreated towards *Sienna*, from whence they made frequent Excurſions into the Country about *Florence*, where they made great Hubbubs, committed many Outrages, and brought great terror upon the People: nor was the King defective in contriving other ways of aſſaulting his Enemies, dividing their Forces, or detracting from their Reputation. *Gherardo Gambatorti* was at that time Lord of *Valdibagno*. This *Gherardo* and his Anceſtors, had always been in the *Florentine* Service, either as hired, or recommended. *Alfonſo* was tampering with this *Gherardo* to deliver up his Territory to him, and he promis'd to give him an Equivalence in the Kingdom of *Naples*. This Tranſaction was not ſo private, but they had News of it in *Florence*, and an Ambaſſador was diſpatch'd to remember him of his own and his Predeceſſors Obligations to that State, and to admoniſh him to perſevere in his Amity with them, as they had conſtantly done. *Gherardo* pretended to be ſurpriz'd at what the Ambaſſador told him; ſwore a thouſand Oaths, that never any ſuch Wickedneſs enter'd into his thoughts; proffer'd to have gone in Perſon to *Florence*, and reſided there, to ſecure them of his Fidelity; but being unhappily indiſpos'd himſelf, his Son ſhould go along with him, and remain there as a perpetual Hoſtage. His Proffers and his Imprecations together, made the *Florentines* believe that *Gherardo* was honeſt, and his Accuſer the Knave, in which opinion they acquieſc'd. But *Gherardo* went on with the King, and rather with more eagerneſs than before; and when all was agreed, *Alfonſo* ſent Fryer *Puccio* (a Knight of *Jeruſalem*) to take poſſeſſion of the Caſtles and Towns which belong'd to *Gherardo*.

The Vale of *Bagno* revolts.

But *Bagno* retaining its affection to *Florence*, promis'd Obedience to the King's Commiſſary, with no little regret: *Puccio* was in poſſeſſion of almoſt all that State, only the Caſtle of *Corzano* was behind, which was likewiſe to be deliver'd. When *Gherardo* made this Surrender, among the reſt of his own Creatures about him, there was one *Antonio Gualandi*, a *Piſan*, a young Gentleman and brave, and one that highly deteſted this Treachery in *Gherardo*. Pondering with himſelf the ſituation of the Place, the number of the Garriſon, the diſſatisfaction he obſerved both in their Geſtures and Looks, and finding *Gherardo* at the Gate ready to introduce the Enemy; he convey'd himſelf betwixt the Caſtle and *Gherardo*, and taking his opportunity, with both his hands thruſt him away; and then cauſing the Wicket to be ſhut, he exhorted the Guards to ſtand faithfully to the *Florentines* againſt ſo falſe and ſo flagitious a Man: The report of this Action arriving at *Bagno*, and the Towns which were about it, they unanimouſly took Arms againſt their new Maſters; and ſetting up the *Florentine* Colours upon the Walls, they drove them all out of that Country. This News coming to *Florence*, they immediately clapp'd their young Hoſtage into Priſon, and diſpatch'd Supplies to *Bagno* and thoſe Parts to ſecure them, and made that Country dependant upon themſelves. *Gherardo* (a Traytor in the mean time, both to his Friends and his Son) had much ado to eſcape; leaving his Wife, Family, and Fortune in the hands of his Enemies. This Accident was look'd upon as a great Deliverance in *Florence*; for had the King made himſelf Maſter of thoſe Parts, he might with little expence have over-run all as far as *Valdi Tevere* and *Caſentino*, and brought ſuch diſtraction upon their Affairs, that the *Florentines* muſt have divided their Army, and been diſabled thereby from attending

tending the *Aragonian* Forces about *Sienna*, with their Army entire. Besides the Provisions which the *Florentines* had made in *Italy* to oppose the Confederacy of their Enemies; they sent *Agriolo Acciaivoli* their Ambassador into *France*, to negotiate with that King for the sending King *Rinato d' Angio* into *Italy*, in the behalf of the Duke and themselves, and to represent to him, that coming thither for the defence of his Friends, when he was once entred, and had settled them, he might set up his own claim to the the Kingdom of *Naples*, and they would be engag'd to assist him, and so whilst in *Lombardy* and *Tuscany* the War was carried on (as we have related) in *France*, the Treaty was concluded, and *Rinato* oblig'd in *June* to come into *Italy* with 2400 Horse; and the League on the other side oblig'd at his arrival at *Alexandria*, to pay him 30000 Florens, and 10000 *per men.* afterwards whilst the War should continue: but being ready (upon this stipulation) to pass into *Italy*, he was obstructed by the Duke of *Savoy* and the Marquess of *Montferrat*, who were Friends to the *Venetians*, and would not suffer him to pass. Hereupon *Rinato* was desir'd by the *Florentine* Ambassador to march with his Forces into *Provence*, and for the encouragement and reputation of his Friends, to pass himself and part of them into *Italy* by Sea, leaving the rest in *Provence*, till the King of *France* should prevail with the Duke of *Savoy*, that they might march through his Country: and as the Ambassador advised, it was done; for *Rinato* went by Sea, and the rest, at the King of *France*'s mediation, were permitted to pass into *Italy* through the Dominions of the Duke of *Savoy*. King *Rinato* was receiv'd by the Duke of *Milan* with all the demonstrations of Kindness imaginable; and having joined their Forces, they assaulted the *Venetians* with such terror, that in a little time, all the Towns they had taken about *Cremona* were recover'd; and not contented with them, they took almost all the Country of *Brescia*; for the *Venetian* Army not thinking it self secure in the Field, was retreated under the very Walls of that City. Winter coming on, and the Duke at *Verona*, he thought fit, for the refreshment of his Men, to put them into Quarters, and consigned *Piacenza* for the Quarters of *Rinato*; where having remained all that Winter in the Year 1453, without any Action considerable; when the Spring was 1453.
come, and the Duke resolved to draw into the Field, and drive the *Venetians* out of all they had upon the *Terra firma*, *Rinato* signified to the Duke, that of necessity he must return into *France*. This Resolution of *Rinato*'s was unexpected to the Duke, and gave him no little Anxiety. He went to him immediately himself, and endeavour'd with all possible importunity to dissuade him; but neither Prayers nor Promises could prevail with him any farther, than to leave part of his Forces with them, and to engage himself to send his Son *Giovanni*, who in his room should continue in the Service of the League. How unwelcome soever it was to the Duke, *Rinato*'s departure was not at all displeasing to the *Florentines*; for having recover'd what they had lost themselves, and being grown fearless of *Alfonso*, they had no maw, that the Duke should get more than his Troops in *Lombardy*. *Rinato* continuing his Resolution, departed for *France*, and (as he had promis'd) sent his Son *Giovanni* into *Italy*; who staid not in *Lombardy*, but remov'd presently to *Florence*, where he was honourably entertain'd. This departure of *Rinato* dispos'd Duke *Francesco* to Peace; the *Venetians*, the *Florentines*, and *Alfonso* were all weary of the War, and ready to embrace it; and the Pope desir'd it above all, by reason that that very Year *Mahomet* the great *Turk* had taken *Constantinople*, and made himself Master of all *Greece*: which alarm'd all *Christendom*, but especially the *Venetians* and the Pope, who imagin'd already they felt his Talons in *Italy*. The Pope therefore desir'd all the Potentates of *Italy*, that they would send their several Plenipotentiaries to him, to negotiate a general Peace. His motion being accepted, and the Ambassadors met; when they came to the matter, so much difficulty arose, as there was but small hopes of Accommodation.

Alfonso required that the *Florentines* should reimburse him for all the Charges he had been at in the War: and the *Florentines* expected the same. The *Venetians* demanded *Cremona* of the Duke; and the Duke *Bergamo*, *Brescia* and *Crema* of them. So that these Difficulties seem'd impossible to be remov'd. Nevertheless, what was so desperate at *Rome*, among so many, was easily concluded betwixt two of them, at *Milan* and *Venice*; for whilst the Peace was negotiating at *Rome*, and proceeded thus slowly, Peace betwixt the Duke and *Venetians*.
on the 9th of *April* 1454, it was determin'd betwixt the Duke and the *Venetians*, that each of them should be restor'd to what they were possess'd of before the War. That the Duke should have liberty to recover what the Marquess of *Montferrat* and the Duke of *Savoy* had taken from him; and that three Months time should be allow'd to the rest of the Princes of *Italy* to come in. The Pope, the *Florentines*, the *Siennesi*, and other little Potentates came in within the time prefix'd, and ratifi'd it; and the *Venetians*, *Florentines* and Duke, made a Peace betwixt them three for 25 Years. *Alfonso* was the only Prince of *Italy* who seem'd to be refractory; conceiving he could not concur without

out diminution, in respect he was to be admitted rather as an Auxiliary, than a Principal: upon which score he continued irresolute a good while, and would not declare; at length upon several Ambassies from the Pope and other Princes, he suffer'd himself to be prevail'd upon, and he and his Son entred into the League for 25 Years. After the which the King and the Duke made several Alliances and Cross-matches together; marrying their Sons and Daughters reciprocally into one another's Families. Yet, that *Italy* might not be left without Seed or Foundation for a new War, *Alfonso* would not enter into the League, till he had leave by consent of the Collegues to make War upon the *Genoeses*, and *Gismondo Malatesta*, and *Astorre* Prince of *Faenza*. Peace being concluded upon those Terms, *Ferrando*, *Alfonso*'s Son, who had been at *Sienna*, return'd into *Naples*, having done nothing considerable in *Tuscany*, but lost many of his Men.

Alfonso enters into League.

This Peace being made, and most of the Princes comprehended, the only fear that remain'd, was, lest the Differences betwixt *Alfonso* and the *Genoeses* might disturb it. But it prov'd otherwise, for *Alfonso* did nothing openly to molest it; it was the Ambition and Avarice of the mercenary Soldier which interrupted it; the *Venetians* (as their custom is, upon the conclusion of Peace) disbanding their Army, *Giacopo Piccinino*, one of their Generals, with several other considerable Officers (without leave) departed into *Romagna*, and from thence to *Sienna*, where he began new Hostilities, and took several Towns. In the beginning of these Troubles, and of the Year 1455, Pope *Nicolo* died, and *Calisto* III. was chosen to succeed. This Pope, to repress these new and approaching Wars, rais'd what Forces he could, under the Command of his General *Giovanni Ventimiglia*, and joining them with the Forces of the *Florentines* and the Duke (who were likewise got together to suppress those Commotions) they march'd together in a Body against *Giacopo*, and coming to an Engagement with him near *Bolsena*, notwithstanding *Ventimiglia* was taken Prisoner, *Giacopo* was worsted, and got off in disorder to *Castigliona della Pescaia*, where had he not been supplied with Money by *Alfonso*, he had been utterly ruin'd. Which Relief made all People believe, that that Enterprize was undertaken and prosecuted by *Alfonso*'s order and direction: and *Alfonso* perceiving he was discover'd, to reconcile himself to the Collegues (whom he had disoblig'd with that pitiful War) he brought it about, that *Giacopo* should restore all he had taken in the Territory of *Sienna*, upon the payment of 20000 *Florens*; after which conclusion, he received *Giacopo* and his Forces into the Kingdom of *Naples*. In these Times, tho' the Pope was very intent upon the curbing of *Piccinino*, yet not so but he had eye still upon the interest of *Christendom*, which was then much overlaid by the *Turk*.

New Troubles by *Giacopo Piccinino* encourag'd privately by *Alfonso*.

To this end he sent Ambassadors and Preachers into all the Provinces of *Europe*, to persuade them to arm against the common Enemy of their Religion, and with their Persons and Purses to give what Assistance they were able: so that in *Florence* great store of Alms were collected; and several People wore the red Cross, to intimate that they were ready in their Persons to engage in that War. Besides which, several solemn Processions were made; nor was there any thing in publick or private wanting, to show them among the forwardest of the Christians in that Enterprize, either for Counsel, or Money, or Men. But the edge of this *Croisad* was taken off, by a late Intelligence they receiv'd, that the *Turk* having besieg'd *Belgrade*, a Town in *Hungary*, not far from the *Danube*, was beaten off by the *Hungarians*, and himself wounded: so that the terror which all *Christendom* conceiv'd upon the taking of *Constantinople*, being abated, they went on but coolly in their Preparations for War; and in *Hungary* likewise, upon the Death of the *Waywod* their General, their Victory was prosecuted but faintly. But to return to the Affairs in *Italy*. The Troubles commenc'd by *Giacopo Piccinino*, being compos'd in the Year 1456, and all human Contention in appearance at an end; it pleased God to begin a new War of his own, and to send such a Storm and Tempest of Wind in *Tuscany*, as produc'd most strange and memorable Effects, above the Records of Time past, or the credit of Time to come. Upon the 24th of *August*, about an hour before Day, near the upper Sea towards *Anconia*, a thick dark Cloud, of about two Miles wide, was seen crossing over *Italy*, and pointing towards *Pisa*; which Cloud being driven by an extraordinary impulse (whether natural or supernatural I cannot say) was divided into several parts; sometimes hurried up to the Sky; sometimes as furiously towards the Earth; sometimes twisting round like a Cylinder, knocking and dashing one against the other with unconceivable violence, with great Lightnings and flashes of Fire before them; which Concussions made a noise more dreadful and loud than ever any Thunder or Earthquake was known to have done. The Terror of this Tempest was so great, every one believ'd the World was at an end; and that the Heavens, the Earth, the Waters, and the rest of the Elements, were resolving into their first Chaos and Confusion: nor were the Effects less formidable where it pass'd, especially about the Castle of S. *Casiana*. This Castle is about eight Miles from

Calisto III. solicites a war against the *Turks*.

A prodigious Tempest.

from *Florence*, ſituate upon the Mountain which parts the Vales of *Piſa* and *Grieve*; betwixt this Caſtle, and the Town of S. *Andrea* (upon the ſame Mountain) this Whirlwind paſſing, reach'd not to the Town; and of the Caſtle it carried away only the Battlements and Chimnies; but betwixt the ſaid Places it laid ſeveral Houſes flat with the ground; tore up the Churches from their Foundations, and carried the Roofs of the Churches of *San. Martino a Bagnuolo*, and of *Santa Maria della pace*, whole and entire, above the diſtance of a Mile. A Meſſenger and his Mules were hurried out of the way, into the neighbouring Valley, and found dead the next day. The ſtardieſt Oaks and the ſtrongeſt Trees were not only blown down, but carried an incredible diſtance from the place where they grew. Inſomuch that when Day appeared, and the Tempeſt was over, the People remained ſtupid, and in ſtrange Conſternation. The Country was deſolate, and waſted; the Ruines of the Houſes and Churches terrible; the Lamentation of thoſe whoſe Houſes were ſubverted, and their Cattle, Servants, or Friends found dead in their Ruins, was not to be ſeen or heard without great Horror and Compaſſion. But God, ſure, intended rather to affright, than chaſtiſe the *Tuſcans*. For had this Tempeſt happen'd in any of their Cities where the Houſes were thick, and the Inhabitants numerous, as it fell upon the Hills where the Oaks and Trees and Houſes were thin; doubtleſs the Miſchief and Deſolation had been greater than the mind of Man can comprehend. But God Almighty was pleaſed to content himſelf with this Eſſay, to make Mankind more ſenſible of his Power, if they perſiſted to offend him.

But to return where I left. *Alfonſo*, as I ſaid before, was not at all ſatisfied with the Peace; and ſeeing the War which he had cauſed *Giacopo Piccinino* to make, upon the *Sienneſi* (without any reaſonable occaſion) had produc'd no conſiderable Effect; he had a mind to try what that would come to, which by the League he was permitted to undertake: So that in the Year 1456. (deſiring to fix that Government in the Family of the *Adorni*, and to ſupplant the *Fregoſi*, who were then in poſſeſſion) reſolved to invade the *Genoeſi* both by Sea and by Land. To this end, he cauſed *Giacopo Piccinino* to paſs *Tronto* with his Forces, and fall upon *Giſmondo Malateſta* (by way of diverſion) who having ſecured his Towns was not much terrified at his reproach, ſo that his Enterprize on that ſide turn'd to little account: but his Invaſion of *Genoa* created him and his Kingdom more Troubles, than he ever deſir'd. *Piero Fregoſo* was at that time Duke of *Genoa*. This *Piero* finding himſelf unable to bear up againſt ſo powerful a King; upon conſideration of his own Weakneſs, reſolv'd at leaſt to ſurrender that State to one that ſhould be able to defend it, and perhaps ſome time or other give him a reaſonable Reward; he ſent Ambaſſadors therefore to *Charles* VII. of *France*, to deſire his Protection, and tender him the Government. *Charles* accepted the Offer; and to take Poſſeſſion of the City, he ſent *Giovanni d' Angio* (King *Rinato*'s Son) who not long before was returned from *Florence* into *France*; for *Charles* was perſuaded, that *Giovanni* being acquainted with the Humours and Cuſtoms of the *Italians*, was properer for that Government, than any Man he could ſend: beſides, from thence he believ'd he might proſecute his Deſigns againſt *Naples* with more eaſe and convenience; his Father *Rinato*, having been expell'd that Kingdom by *Alfonſo* of *Aragon*. Hereupon *Giovanni* departed for *Genoa*, was receiv'd honourably by the Town, and inveſted with the whole Power both of the City and State.

The *Genoeſi* aſſaulted by *Alfonſo*.

Genoa deliver'd to the *French*.

This Accident was not at all pleaſing to *Alfonſo*; he found now he had pull'd an old Houſe over his head: however, he carry'd it bravely, went on with his Enterprize, and was advanc'd with his Fleet under *Villa Marina* at *Porto Fino*, when ſurprized with a ſudden Diſtemper, he died. The death of *Alfonſo* put an end to the Wars againſt *Giovanni* and the *Genoeſes*, and *Ferrando* ſucceeded his Father *Alfonſo* in the Kingdom, was in no little trouble, having an Enemy upon his hands of ſuch reputation in *Italy*; and a jealouſie of ſeveral of his Barons, who being inclin'd to new Changes, he was afraid might ſide with the *French*: beſides, he was acquainted with the Ambition of the Pope, and being ſcarce ſettled in his Kingdom, was fearful leaſt he ſhould attempt ſomething to ſupplant him; his only hopes were in the Duke of *Milan*, who was no leſs ſolicitous for the Affairs of that Kingdom, than himſelf; apprehending, that if ever the *French* came to be Maſters of *Naples*, their next Enterprize of courſe would be againſt him; for he knew they might pretend to *Milan* as an Appendix to that Crown. For theſe Reaſons, as ſoon as *Alfonſo* was dead, *Franceſco* ſent Letters and Men to *Ferrando*, the firſt to keep up his Heart, the other his Reputation. Upon the death of *Alfonſo*, the Pope deſign'd to give his Nephew *Piero Ludovico Borgia* the Government of that Kingdom; and to gloſs over the buſineſs, and make it more plauſible to the Princes of *Italy*, he gave out, that that Kingdom belonging formerly to the Church, his Intention was only to reduce it to that Condition, and therefore he deſir'd the

Alfonſo dies.

Duke

Duke of *Milan* would not give any Assistance to *Ferrando*; and offer'd him such Towns as he had possess'd formerly in that Kingdom. But in the midst of his Contrivances *Calisto* died, and *Pius* II. succeeded him, who was a *Siennesi* of the Family of the *Piccol Huomini*, and his Name *Æneas*.

Calisto III. dies, and *Pius* II. chosen in his Chair.

This Pope imploying his Thoughts wholly for the benefit of *Christendom*, and the Honour of the Church, and laying aside all private Passion and Advantage, at the Intreaty of the Duke of *Milan*, crown'd *Ferrando* King of *Naples*; judging it a readier and safer way to compose the differences of *Italy*, by confirming him that was already in possession, than by assisting the pretences of the *French*, or setting up (as *Calisto* did) for himself. However *Ferrando* took it for a favour, and to requite it he made *Antonia*, the Pope's Nephew, Prince of *Malfi*; married him to his natural Daughter: and besides this, restor'd *Benevento* and *Ferracina* to the Church. And now all the Arms in *Italy* were visibly laid down, and *Pius* (as *Calisto* had begun before) was moving all *Christendom* against the *Turk*; when a new Quarrel sprung up betwixt the *Fregosi* and *Giovanni* the Lord of *Genoa*, which produc'd a greater and more important War than the last: *Pietrino Fregosi* was retir'd to a Castle of his in *Riveria*; much discontented, that *Giovanni d' Angio* having been preferr'd to his Dignity in *Genoa* by him and his Family, had not gratified them as they deserv'd: so that by degrees it was come to a Feud. *Ferrando* was very well pleas'd with the Difference, as being the only way to secure him in his Kingdom, and therefore he sent *Pietrino* Supplies both of Men and Money, hoping thereby *Giovanni* might be expuls'd out of the State of *Genoa*. *Giovanni* having notice of their Intelligence, sent for Relief into *France*, which having received, he march'd out against *Pietrino*; but *Pietrino*, by the access of more Supplies from sundry Places, being grown too strong, *Giovanni* retreated, and apply'd himself to securing the City; which he did not do so carefully, but *Pietrino* in one Night surprized several Posts in it, but was beaten the next Morning, himself and most of his Men slain. This Victory elevated *Giovanni* so far, that he resolv'd to attempt upon *Ferrando*; departing from *Genoa* in *October* 1459, with a great Fleet, he sail'd to *Baia*, and from thence to *Sessa*, where he was honourably receiv'd by that Duke.

The *Genoesi* revolts from the *French*.

1459.

There had join'd themselves with *Giovanni*, the Prince of *Taranto*, and the Citizens of *Aquila*, besides several other Princes and Cities; so that already that Kingdom was more than half lost. Upon which *Ferrando* desir'd Aid of the Pope and the Duke of *Milan*, and to lessen the number of his Enemies, made Peace with *Gismondo Malatesti*, which Peace disgusted *Giacopo Piccinino* so highly (*Gismondo* being his natural Enemy) that he deserted *Ferrando*, and took up Arms under *Giovanni*. *Ferrando* sent Money likewise to *Federigo* Lord of *Urbin*, and as soon as could be expected, got together a considerable Army (according to those Times) with which he march'd against the Enemy, and finding them upon the River *Sarni*, he engaged them, but was defeated, and his most considerable Officers taken: After this Victory, most of the Towns and Castles surrendred to *Giovanni*, only *Naples* and some few neighbouring Towns and Princes adher'd still to *Ferrando*. *Giacopo Piccinino* advis'd to march directly for *Naples*, and make himself Master of the chief City; but *Giovanni* reply'd, he would first ruin the Country, and then the City would come with more ease: but his rejecting the Counsel of *Piccinino*, was the loss of that design; for he did not know, that the Members follow the Head more naturally, than the Head the Members. *Ferrando* was fled into *Naples*, and there resorted to him divers of his Subjects who were driven from their homes, whom he receiv'd; and having with all possible gentleness gain'd some Monies of the Citizens, he got a small Body of an Army together; he sent new Ambassies to the Pope and Duke for Supplies, and was reliev'd with more plenty and speed than before; for they were both of them afraid, that the loss of that Kingdom would turn to their prejudice. Much strengthen'd by their Supplies, *Ferrando* march'd out of *Naples*; and having recover'd his Reputation, in part, he recover'd some of his Towns. But whilst the War was carried on in that Kingdom with such variety, an Accident happen'd which robb'd *Giovanni* of his opportunity of compleating that Enterprize. The *Genoesi* were extreamly dissatisfied with the insolent Government of the *French*; had taken Arms against the Governor, and forc'd him into the Castle; in this Action the *Fregosi* and *Adorni* concurr'd, and the Duke of *Milan* supplied them both with Money and Men: King *Rinato* passed that way with a Fleet towards the relief of his Son, imagining by the help of the Castle he might recover the Town, and landing his Men in order thereunto, he was beaten in such sort, that he was forc'd back into *Provence*. This News dismaid *Giovanni* not a little: however, he gave not his Enterprize over, but continued the War by the help of such Barons whose revolt from *Ferrando* had render'd them desperate of pardon: at length, after many Occurencies, both Armies came to a Battle near *Troia*, in which *Giovanni* was routed; but his Defeat troubled him not so much, as the loss

The Kingdom of *Naples* invaded by *Giovanni d' Angio*.

Ferrando discomfited.

loſs of *Piccinino*, who left his ſide, and went back again to *Ferrando*. His Army being broke, he got off into *Iſtria*, and from thence into *France*. This War continu'd four Years, and miſcarried by the negligence of the General, when the Soldiers had many times overcome. In this War however the *Florentines* were not publickly concern'd. The truth is, upon the death of *Alfonſo*, his Son *John* of *Aragon* being come to that Crown, ſent his Ambaſſadors to deſire their aſſiſtance for his Nephew *Ferrando*, according to their obligation by their late League with *Alfonſo*; but the *Florentines* returned, that they did not think themſelves oblig'd to aſſiſt the Son in a Quarrel commenc'd by the Father; and as it was begun without their conſent or knowledge, ſo without any aſſiſtance from them it might be continued or ended. Whereupon, in behalf of their King, the Ambaſſador proteſted them guilty of the breach of the League, and reſponſible for all the Loſſes which ſhould follow; and having done that, in a great huff they departed. During the Revolutions in this War, the *Florentines* were at quiet abroad, but at home it was otherwiſe, as ſhall be ſhown more particularly in the following Book.

Giovanni defeated.

THE HISTORY OF FLORENCE.

BOOK VII.

IN the reading of the laſt Book, it may appear (poſſibly) impertinent, and a digreſſion, for a Writer of the *Florentine* Hiſtory to have broke out and expatiated upon the Affairs of *Lombardy* and *Naples*. Yet I have done it, and ſhall do it for the future. For tho' I never profeſs'd to write the Tranſactions of *Italy*; yet I never bound my ſelf up from giving a relation of ſuch important and memorable Paſſages, as would make our Hiſtory more grateful and intelligible; eſpecially ſeeing from the Actions of other Princes and States, Wars and Troubles did many times ariſe, in which the *Florentines* were of neceſſity involv'd: for Example, the War betwixt *Giovanni d'Angio* and King *Ferrando*, proclaim'd in them ſo great a Hatred and Animoſity one towards the other, that it was continued afterwards betwixt *Ferrando* and the *Florentines*, and more particularly the Houſe of *Medici*. For King *Ferrando* complaining, not only that they had refus'd him their Aſſiſtance, but given it to his Enemies; that Reſentment of his was the occaſion of much Miſchief, as will be ſhown in our Narration.

And becauſe in my Deſcription of our Foreign Affairs, I am advanc'd to the Year 1463. (being return'd to our Domeſtick) it will be neceſſary to look back for ſeveral Years. But firſt, by way of Introduction (as my cuſtom) I ſhall ſay, that they who imagine a Commonwealth may be continu'd united, are egregiouſly miſtaken. True it is, Diſſention does many times hurt, but ſometimes it advantages a State. It hurts when it is accompanied with Parties and Factions; it helps, when it has none. Seeing therefore, it is impoſſible for any Legiſlator or Founder of a Republick, to provide there ſhould be no Piques, nor Unkindneſs betwixt Men; it is his buſineſs, what he can, to ſecure them againſt growing into Parties and *Clans*. It is then to be conſider'd, that there are two ways for Citizens to advance themſelves to Reputation among their

Neighbours, and they are, either publickly or privately. The publick way is, by gaining ſome Battle, ſurprizing and diſtreſſing ſome Town, performing ſome Ambaſſy carefully and prudently; or counſelling their State wiſely and with ſucceſs; the private way is, by being kind to their Fellow-Citizens, by defending them from the Magiſtrates, ſupplying them with Money, promoting them to Honours, and with Plays and publick Exhibitions to ingratiate with the People. This laſt way produces Parties and Factions, and as the Reputation acquir'd that way is dangerous and fatal, ſo the other way it is beneficial (if it ſides with no Party) as extending to the Publick. And altho' among Citizens of ſuch qualification, there muſt needs be Emulations and Jealouſies, yet wanting Partiſans, and People which for their Advantage will follow them, they are rather a convenience than otherwiſe, to a Government; for to make themſelves more eminent and conſpicuous than their Competitors, they imploy all their Faculties for its Advancement, prying and obſerving one another's Actions ſo ſtrictly, that neither dares venture to tranſgreſs.

The Emulations in *Florence* were always with Faction; and for that reaſon always were dangerous; nor was any Party unanimous any longer, than it had an adverſe Party in being; for that being overcome, and the predominant Party having no fear, nor order to reſtrain it, ſubdivided on courſe. *Coſimo de Medici*'s Party prevail'd in the Year 1434; but (the depreſs'd Party being great, and many powerful Men amongſt them) for a while they continued unanimous and ſupportable; committing no Exhorbitance among themſelves, nor Injuſtice to the People, which might beget them their hatred. Inſomuch as whenever they had uſe of the People for their readvancement to any Place of Authority, they found them always ready to confer it upon the chief of that Party, whether it was the *Balia*, or any other Power which they deſir'd: and ſo from the Year 1434 to 55, (which was 21 Years) they were ſix times created of the *Balia* by the Counſels of the People.

Coſimo de Medici and *Neri Capponi* the two great Citizens in *Florence*.

There were in *Florence* (as we have many times hinted) two principal Citizens, *Coſimo de Medici*, and *Neri Capponi*. *Neri* had gain'd his Reputation in the publick way, and had many Friends, but few Partiſans: *Coſimo* on the other ſide had advanc'd himſelf both ways, and had Friends and Partiſans both; and theſe two continuing Friends, whilſt they liv'd together, they could ask nothing of the People, but it was readily granted, becauſe Unanimity went along with the Power. But *Neri* dying in the Year 1455, and the adverſe Party being extinct, the Government found great difficulty to recover its Authority; and *Coſimo*'s great Friends were the cauſe of it, who were willing to detract from his Authority, now his Adverſaries were ſuppreſt. This was the beginning of the Diviſions in 1466, in which Year, in a ſolemn Council, where the publick Adminiſtration was debated, thoſe to whom the Government at that time belonged, adviſed, that there ſhould be no *Balia* for the future; that the way of Imborſation ſhould be laid aſide, and the Magiſtrates be choſen by Lots, as in the former *Squittini*'s, or Elections. To obviate this Humour, *Coſimo* had two ways, either to poſſeſs himſelf forcibly of the Government by the Power of his Party, and depoſe his Enemies: or to let things go which way they would, and attend till time ſhould make his Friends diſcern, that they did not take the Government and Authority ſo much for him, as from themſelves. Of the two, he made choice of the laſt; knowing, that according to that Conſtitution, the Purſes being full of his Friends, he could without any danger reaſſume his Authority when he pleas'd. The City being thus reduc'd to its old way of Creation of Magiſtrates by Lots, they thought they had perfectly recover'd their Liberty, and that for the future, Elections were to be made not according to the influence of the Nobility, but the inclination of the People. So that ſometimes the Friend of one Grandee was rejected, and ſometimes of another; and thoſe whoſe Houſes were formerly full of Clients and their Preſents, had now ſcarce Houſhold-ſtuff left, or Servant to attend them: thoſe who were formerly their Inferiors, were now become their Equals, and their Equals advanced to be their Superiors: they were not regarded nor reſpected, but rather derided and abus'd; all People taking the freedom to talk of them and their Government as they pleas'd, even in the Streets and High-ways, without any contradiction; ſo that it was not long after, they diſcover'd, that, as he had told them, it was not ſo much *Coſimo*, as themſelves, which were degraded.

However, *Coſimo* took no notice, but in all Propoſitions that would pleaſe the People, he was the firſt who concurr'd. But that which was moſt terrible to the Nobility, and made *Coſimo* look about him, was the receiving of the *Caſtrato* of the Year 1427, by which the Impoſitions were to be laid by order of Law, and not by the Capricio's of particular Men. This Law being reviv'd, and Magiſtrates already choſen to put in execution, the Nobility aſſembled, and went to *Coſimo*, to beg of him that he would be a means to reſcue them out of the Jaws of the People, and reſtore the State to a Con-

dition

dition that might make him powerful, and them honourable. To which *Cosimo* reply'd, he would do it with all his heart, provided it might be done legally by the consent of the People and without any Force, of which he could not endure to hear. Then they endeavour'd in the Councils to prevail for a new *Balia*, but they could not obtain it; whereupon they return'd to *Cosimo*, and press'd him with all Expressions of Humility, that he would consent to a Parliament; but *Cosimo* (resolv'd to make them fully sensible of their Error) absolutely refus'd it; and because *Donati Cochi* (being *Gonfaloniere di Giustitia* at that time) presum'd to call a Parliament without his consent, *Cosimo* made him so ridiculous and contemptible in the *Senate*, he was not able to continue there, but as a distracted Man was sent home again to his House: Nevertheless, lest things should run too far to be recover'd, *Luca Pitti* (a bold and tenacious Man) being made *Gonfaloniere di Giustitia*, he thought it a convenient time to have the Government to him, that if any thing miscarried in that Enterprize, it might be imputed to *Luca*. And accordingly *Luca*, in the very beginning of his Office, urged the People many times to the restauration of the *Balia*, threatning those of the Councils with opprobrious and insolent Language; and not long after, he executed what he had threatned; for in *August* 1453, in the Vigil of *San. Lownzo*, having filled the Palace with Armed Men, he called the People together in the *Piazza*, and constrained them by force to consent to what they had voluntarily refused. Having repossess'd themselves of the State, created a new *Balia*, and changed the Magistrates according to the pleasure of a few; that the beginning of their Government might be as terrible, as it was forcible, they confin'd *Girolamo Machiavelli* and some others, and deprived many of their Honours. *Girolamo* not being exact in observing his bounds, was proscrib'd; and wandring up and down *Italy* to excite the several Princes against his own Country, by the Treachery of one of the *Senators* in *Lunigiana*, he was apprehended, brought back to *Florence*, and executed in Prison. This Government (which lasted eight Years) was very violent and insupportable: for *Cosimo* being grown old, weary of Business, and infirm in his Body, could not be so sedulous as formerly; so that the City was become a Prey to a few particular Citizens; who, in requital of his good Service to the State, made *Luca Pitti* a Knight, and he (in return of their Kindness) appointed, that whereas before they were call'd *Priori dell Arti*, now (that they might at least retain the Title, tho' they lost the Possession) they should be called *Priori della liberta*. He order'd likewise, that whereas formerly the *Gonfaloniere* sat on the Right-hand of the *Retori*, they should sit in the midst of them hereafter: and (that God might have his share in the Revolution) he caused solemn Services and Processions to be performed, by way of thanks for the Honours to which they were restored.

Luca Pitti.

Girolamo Machiavelli.

Luca was richly presented both by *Cosimo* and the *Senate*; after whom the whole City came in flocks, so that it was believed he had given him that Day to the value of 20000 Ducats; by which means he grew into such Reputation, that not *Cosimo*, but he was look'd upon as the Governour of the City; and he arriv'd at that point of Vanity, to begin two stately and magnificent Houses, one in *Florence*, and the other at *Rucina*, not above a Mile's distance from the City: but that in *Florence* was greater and more splendid, than the House of any other private Citizen whatsoever; for the finishing of which, he baulk'd no extraordinary way; for not only the Citizens, and better sort, presented him, and furnish'd him with what was necessary about it; but the common People gave him all of them their Assistance: besides all that were banish'd, or guilty of Murder, Felony, or any other thing which expos'd them to publick Punishment, had Sanctuary at that House, provided they would give him their Labour. The rest of his Brethren, tho' they built not such Houses, they were no less rapacious than he; so that tho' *Florence* had no Wars abroad to destroy it, it had Citizens at home, in its own Bowels, which would not suffer it to prosper. In the mean time, as we have said before, the Wars happen'd in the Kingdom of *Naples*, and the Pope had difference with the *Malatesti* in *Romagna* concerning *Rimino* and *Cesana*, which they had taken from him, and desir'd to recover: so that betwixt the thoughts of that, and the Enterprize against the *Turks*, the time of *Pius* his whole Papacy was consum'd. But *Florence* fell again into its old Factions and Dissentions. The Divisions in *Cosimo*'s Party began in 55, upon the occasions aforesaid; and by his Wisdom (as is said before) they were restrained. But in 64, *Cosimo* fell sick and died, generally lamented, both by his Friends and his Enemies; for they who lov'd him not whilst at the Helm, seeing their Fellow-Citizens so rapacious whilst he was living (the Reverence they bore to his Person making them less insupportable than otherwise they would be) could not but fear, now he was dead, and his Influence lost, they should be utterly ruin'd, and in his Son *Piero* they could repose little Confidence; for tho' he was of himself a good Man, yet being infirm, and but young in the State, they supposed he would be con-

Cosimo dies.

ſtrained to comply with them, and they become more head-ſtrong and incontroulable in their Wickedneſs: ſo that *Coſimo* died univerſally lamented, and certainly he deſerv'd it; for he was the moſt famous and memorable Citizen (of a Perſon that was no Soldier) that ever *Florence* or any other City produc'd: he exceeded all his Contemporaries, not only in Authority and Eſtate, but in Liberality and Prudence, which Qualities made him a Prince in his Country, and belov'd by all People: his Munificence was more eminent after his death, than before; for when his Son *Piero* came to look over his Writing, and to enquire into the particulars of his Eſtate, he found there was ſcarce a Man of any quality in the City, to whom *Coſimo* had not lent a conſiderable Sum; and many times when he heard of the Exegencies of any Perſon of Quality, he ſupply'd them unasked. His Magnificence appear'd in the multitude of his Buildings; for in *Florence* he built the Convents of S. *Marco* and S. *Lorenzo*, and the Monaſtry of S. *Verdiano*: In the *Monti di Fieſole*, S. *Giralamo*, and the Abbey in *Magello*, he not only repaired a Church of the *Minor's*, but he took it down, and rebuilt it from the ground. Beſides this, in S. *Croce*, in *Servi*, in *Agnoli*, in S. *Miniato*, he erected Altars and moſt ſumptuous Chapels; all which, beſides the Building, he adorn'd with all the Utenſils and Decorations required in ſo ſacred a Place. Beſides theſe Religious Houſes, he built ſeveral private Houſes for himſelf, one in the City ſuitable to his Quality; four without, at *Careggio*, *Fieſole*, *Caſaggivolo*, and *Trebi*, all of them fitter for Princes than private Men; and, as if his Buildings in *Italy* were too few to make him famous, he built an Hoſpital in *Jeruſalem*, for the reception and relief of poor and infirm Pilgrims brought thither by their Devotion; in which Fabrick he laid out a vaſt Sum of Money. And albeit in his Actions and Buildings he behav'd himſelf like a King, and was the only Prince in *Florence*, yet he was ſo moderate and untranſported in all things, that in his Converſation, his *Parades*, his Alliances, and his whole manner of Life, he retained the modeſty of a Citizen; for he was ſenſible that Oſtentation and Pomp in that which is every day to be ſeen, contracts more Envy, than Moderation and Gravity. Being to ſeek for Matches for his Sons, he did not endeavour for the Alliance of Princes, but married his Son *Giovanni* to *Cornelia Aleſſandri*, and *Piero* to *Lucretia Tornabuoni*, and contracted his Grand-children by *Piero*, *Bianca* to *Gulielmo di Pazzi*, and *Nannina* to *Bernardo Rucellai*. Among all the States, Princes, and Civil Governments of his time, no Perſon came near him for Sagacity and Intelligence. Hence it was, that in all the variety of his Fortunes, when the City was ſo uncertain, and the People ſo voluble, he kept his Authority 31 Years; for being a wiſe Man, and of great Proſpect, he foreſaw any miſchief at a diſtance, and was ready to prevent it, before it proceeded too far; or to fruſtrate the Effects of it, if it did. Whereby he did not only ſubdue all domeſtick and private Ambition at home, but reſtrained it ſo happily in ſeveral Princes, that whoever confederated with him and his Country, came off upon equal Terms, if not worſted their Enemies; and whoever oppos'd him, either loſt their Money, their Time, or their State: and of this the *Venetians* can give ample Teſtimony, who whilſt in League with him againſt Duke *Philip*, were always victorious; but that League was no ſooner broken, but they were beaten both by *Philip* and *Franceſco*: and when they joined with *Alfonſo* againſt the Republick of *Florence*, *Coſimo* with his own credit drained *Naples* and *Venice* ſo dry, that they were glad to accept what Terms of Peace he would allow. Of all the difficulties therefore which *Coſimo* encountred both within the City and without, the Concluſion was ſtill honourable for him, and deſtructive for his Enemies; ſo that the civil Diſcords gain'd him Authority at home, and his foreign Wars, Power and Reputation abroad; inſomuch, that to the Territory and Dominion of his Country, he added the City of *Borgo a Sepulcro*, *Montedoglio*, *Caſentino*, and *Val di Bagno*, and by his virtue and fortune, ſuppreſs'd his Enemies, and exalted his Friends. He was born 1389, on S. *Coſimo* and *Damiano's* day. The firſt part of his Life was full of Troubles, witneſs his Baniſhment, his Impriſonment, and his Dangers in being killed. From the Council of *Conſtance*, after Pope *John* was ruin'd (whom he had attended thither) he was forced to fly in diſguiſe, or otherwiſe he had been ſlain: But after the fortieth Year of his Age, it was more pleaſant and happy; not only ſuch as were employ'd with him in publick Affairs, but the Managers alſo of his private Treaſure in foreign Parts, participating of his Felicity. From him many Families in *Florence* may derive their great Eſtates; particularly the *Fornabuoni*, the *Benci*, the *Portinari*, the *Sapetti*, and in ſhort all that had dependance either upon his Counſel or Fortune.

Tho' his Diſburſments were vaſt in building his Houſes and Temples, and in his Diſtributions to the Poor, yet he would complain ſometimes among his Friends, that he had not laid out ſo much to the honour of God, as he was oblig'd; and that if he had done much more, he muſt confeſs himſelf his Debtor. His Stature was ordinary, his Complexion worthy, his Preſence venerable: his Learning was not great, but his Eloquence admirable;

admirable; he was naturally prudent, courteous to his Friends, merciful to the Poor, profitable in his Converſe, cautious in his Counſels, ſpeedy in his Executions, and in his Sayings and Replies, both ſolid and facetious. When he went firſt into Baniſhment, *Rinaldo de gli Albizi* (drolling upon his Exilement) ſent him word, *The Hen was hatching*; to which *Coſimo* returned, *that ſhe would have but ill hatching ſo far from her Neſt.* To ſome of his Rebels, who in a threatning way ſent him word, *They were not aſleep*; he reply'd, *he believ'd it, for he had ſpoil'd their ſleeping.* When Pope *Pius* was encouraging and preſſing all Chriſtian Princes againſt the *Turk*, *Coſimo* ſaid, *The Pope was an old Man, but he had begun an Enterprize as if he had been a Boy.* To the *Venetian* Ambaſſadors, who came to *Florence* with the Ambaſſadors of *Alfonſo*, to complain of that Commonwealth, putting his Hat off to them, he demanded the colour of his Hair, they told him it was gray; he reply'd, *in time your Senators will be of the ſame Colour.* Not many hours before his Death, his Wife ſeeing him ſhut his Eyes, enquir'd why he did ſo, and he told her, *to uſe them.* Some Citizens after his return complaining to him, that the City would be depopulated, and God Almighty offended, if he baniſh'd ſo many wealthy and Religious Men; he told them, *the City had better be depopulated than deſtroyed. That two yards of Cloth were enough to keep a Man from the cold; and that States were not to be preſerved by the Beads a Man carried in his hand.* Theſe laſt Expreſſions gave his Enemies occaſion to calumniate him, as a Perſon that was a greater lover of himſelf than his Country, and one that took more care of this World than the next. Many other of his wiſe Sayings might be inſerted, but being unneceſſary, they are omitted. *Coſimo* was likewiſe a great lover and advancer of Learned Men; upon which ſcore he entertain'd in *Florence*, *Argiropolo*, a *Grecian*, as learned as any in his time, that by him the Youth of *Florence* might be inſtructed in the *Greek* Tongue, and in ſeveral of his Tenets. He entertain'd likewiſe in his Houſe, *Marcileo Ficino*, a great Patron of the Platonick Philoſophy, whom he lov'd ſo entirely; and that he might follow his Studies with more convenience, he gave him a Houſe near his own Palace at *Caraggi*. So that his Prudence, his Beneficence, his Succeſs, and his way of living made him be belov'd, and feared among the Citizens, and much eſteemed by all Princes of *Europe*. Whereby he left ſuch a Foundation to his Poſterity, that by their Virtue they might equal him, by their Fortune tranſcend him, and obtain as much Honour as he had in *Florence*, in all the Cities and Countries of *Chriſtendom*. Nevertheleſs, towards the latter end of his Days, he had ſeveral Afflictions: he had but two Sons, *Piero* and *Giovanni*, of which *Giovanni* (the moſt hopeful) died, and *Piero*, who ſurvived, was infirm, and by the weakneſs of his Body unfit either for publick or private buſineſs; ſo that after the death of his Son, cauſing himſelf to be carried about his Houſe, he ſighed and ſaid, *this Houſe is too big for ſo ſmall a Family.*

It troubled him alſo, that he had not (in his Judgment) enlarged the Dominion of the *Florentine* State, nor added to it Empire, any conſiderable Acqueſt: and it troubled him the more, for that he found himſelf cheated by *Franceſco*, who when he was but Count, had promis'd him, as ſoon as he had made himſelf Maſter of *Milan*, to employ his Arms againſt *Lucca* in the behalf of the *Florentines*; but his Mind chang'd with his Fortune, and having got to be the Duke of *Milan*, had a deſire to enjoy in Peace, what he had obtain'd by War; ſo that after his Elevation, he never meddled in foreign Concerns, nor made any more Wars, than were neceſſary for his own defence: which was a great diſturbance to *Coſimo*, who now diſcern'd he had been at great pains and expence to advance a Man who was both falſe and ingrateful. He perceiv'd likewiſe, that in reſpect of his Age, and the Infirmities of his Body, he was not able to apply himſelf to publick or private Buſineſs, as he was wont; and he ſaw both the one and the other decline, the City going to wrack by the Diſſentions of the Citizens; and his Fortune, by his Miniſters and Sons. Theſe Conſiderations gave him no little diſquiet towards his end; yet he died full of Glory and Renown: All the Cities and Princes of *Chriſtendom* ſent their Compliments of Condolency to his Son *Piero*; the whole City attended his Corps with great Solemnity to the Grave, and by publick Decree it was inſcrib'd upon his Tomb, *Padre della Patria.*

If in my Deſcription and Character of *Coſimo*, I have rather follow'd the Example of thoſe who have written the Lives of Princes, than of an Hiſtorian, it is not to be admir'd. He was a Perſon extraordinary in our City, and I thought my ſelf oblig'd to give him a more than ordinary Commendation. During the time that *Italy* and *Florence* were in the Condition aforeſaid, *Lewis* King of *France* was infeſted with a furious War, which his Barons (at the inſtigation of *Francis* Duke of *Britan*, and *Charles* Duke of *Burgundy*) had rais'd. This War lay ſo heavy upon him, he could not aſſiſt *Giovanni* in his Deſigns upon *Genoa* and *Naples*; but believing he had need enough of all the Supplies he could get, he call'd back his Forces; and *Savona* being at that time in the hands of the *French*, he order'd it to be deliver'd to the Count, and left him if he pleas'd to purſue the Enterprize

terprize againſt *Genoa:* the Count was eaſily perſuaded to a thing ſo much to his Advantage; ſo that by the reputation of his Amity with the *French* King, and the Aſſiſtance given him by the *Adorni*, he poſſeſs'd himſelf of *Genoa*; and, in gratitude to the *French* King, ſent him a Supply of 1500 Horſe into *France*, under the Command of his eldeſt Son *Galeazzo:* by this means *Ferrando* of *Aragon*, and *Franceſco Sforza* remain'd at quiet; the one Duke of *Lombardy*, and Lord of *Genoa*; the other King of the whole Kingdom of *Naples*; and having contracted Alliances together, and married their Children the one to the other, they began to conſider how they might ſecure their States to themſelves whilſt they liv'd, and to their Heirs when they were dead.

In order to this, it was thought neceſſary, the King ſhould make ſure of ſuch of his Barons as had ſided againſt him in his Wars with *Giovanni d' Angio*, and the Duke ſhould endeavour to extirpate all that had been Favourers of the *Bracci*, who were mortal Enemies to the ſaid Duke, and at that time in great Reputation, under the Conduct of *Giacopo Piccinino*. For *Giacopo* being the greateſt Captain in *Italy*, and having no Sovereignty of his own; it concern'd all who had any, to have an eye over him, and more eſpecially the Duke, who thought he could not enjoy his Dominion ſafely himſelf, nor leave it to his Sons, whilſt *Giacopo* was living. Hereupon the King with all induſtry endeavour'd an Accord with his Barons, uſed all poſſible Art to reconcile himſelf to them; and he ſucceeded with much difficulty; for they found that whilſt they were in Wars with the King, they muſt certainly be ruin'd: but by Accommodation of their Differences, and truſting themſelves to him, there was only a hazard; and becauſe Men do always avoid thoſe Evils with more readineſs, which are moſt certain, Princes do eaſily deceive ſuch as are not able to contend. The Barons ſeeing nothing before them but Deſtruction, if they continu'd the War, accepted his Conditions, and threw themſelves into his Arms; but not long after, ſundry pretences were taken againſt them, and they were all of them extinguiſh'd. Which News was ſo terrible to *Giacopo Piccinino* (who was then with his Forces at *Salmona*) that by the Mediation of his Friends, he immediately practiſed his Reconciliation with the Duke: and the Duke having offer'd him honourable Terms, *Giacopo* reſolv'd to accept them, and come in; and accordingly he went to *Milan* to preſent himſelf to him, attended by 100 Horſe. *Giacopo* had ſerved under his Father, and with his Brother a long time; firſt for Duke *Philip*, and then for the People of *Milan*; ſo that by long converſation in thoſe Parts he had got a good Intereſt, and was generally belov'd, and the preſent Condition of Affairs had much increas'd it; for the Proſperity and Grandeur of the *Sforzeſchi* had created them Envy, and *Giacopo*'s Adverſity and long Abſence had gain'd him compaſſion among the People, and a great deſire to ſee him advanced: all which Kindneſs diſcover'd it ſelf at his arrival, there being ſcarce any of the Nobility but went out to meet him, the Streets were full of People to behold him, and no talk in the whole City but of him and his Family. But their extravagant Acclamations were his Ruin; for as they increas'd the Duke's Jealouſy, ſo they confirm'd his Reſolution to remove him; and that it might be done the more plauſibly, and with leſs danger of Detection, he order'd that his Marriage with *Druſiano*, his natural Daughter (to whom he had been contracted long before) ſhould be conſummate. After which he practis'd with *Ferrando* to entertain him as General of his Army, and to give him 100000 *Florens* by way of advance. Upon concluſion of theſe Articles, *Giacopo* and his Wife accompanied an Ambaſſador from the Duke to *Naples*, where they were all very well receiv'd, and for ſeveral Days entertain'd with all imaginable Affluence and Diverſion; but deſiring leave to paſs to his Army at *Solmona*, he was invited by the King into the Caſtle, and after Supper both he and his Son *Franceſco* were apprehended, and clapp'd up into Priſon, where not long after they were murdered.

Giacopo Piccinino murdered.

Thus were the Princes of *Italy* jealous of that Vertue which they had not in themſelves; and not enduring it in other People, they expoſed that Country to Calamities which not long after afflicted and deſtroy'd it.

Pope *Pius* having in the mean time accommodated the Differences in *Romagna*, and finding an univerſal Peace all over *Europe*, thought it a convenient time to ſolicite the Chriſtians againſt the *Turks*, and reaſſumed the whole Methods which his Predeceſſors had taken, by which all the Princes of Chriſtendom were prevailed withal to aſſiſt either with Money or Men: *Matheo* King of *Hungary*, and *Charles* Duke of *Burgundy*, engaged to go in Perſon, and were made Generals of that Enterprize by the Pope; who was ſo well pleas'd with what he had done, that he went from *Rome* to *Ancona* to be at the Rendezvous of the Army, which was to meet there, and (by Ships which the *Venetians* had promis'd to furniſh) be tranſported into *Sclavonia*. After the arrival of his Holineſs, there was ſo great a throng and confluence of People, that in a few Days all their Proviſion was devour'd; and the neighbouring Towns not being able to ſupply, every body

dy was ready to ſtarve for hunger: beſides which, they neither had Money to pay the Soldier, nor Weapons to arm them; there was neither Duke of *Burgundy* nor King of *Hungary* there: the *Venetians* indeed had ſent a few Gallies under one of their Captains, but it was rather to ſhow their Pomp, than to perform their Promiſe, ſo far were they unfit for the Tranſportation of an Army. So that in the midſt of theſe Diſaſters, by reaſon of his great Age and Infirmities, the Pope died; the whole Army disbanded, and return'd to their own homes. Pope *Pius* dying in the Year 1465, *Paul* II. (by Birth a *Venetian*) was elected in his Place. And as moſt of the Principalities in *Italy* had changed their Governors about that time, ſo *Franceſco Sforza* Duke of *Milan* died, after he had enjoy'd that Dukedom ſixteen Years, and *Galeazzo* his Son was declared his Succeſſor. The Death of this Prince was the occaſion that the Diviſions in *Florence* encreaſed and broke out much ſooner than otherwiſe they would have done. *Coſimo* being dead, *Piero* his Son ſucceeded both to his Authority and Eſtate, and having call'd to him *Diotiſalvi Neroni*, as honourable and great a Man as moſt in the City (by whom, *Coſimo* upon his Death-bed had commanded his Son *Piero* to be govern'd in all his Affairs) he let him know the great confidence his Father had repos'd in him, and that being deſirous to obey him after his Death, as he had done whilſt he was living, he did intreat his Advice not only in his private and domeſtick Affairs, but in his publick Adminiſtration of the Government; and that he might begin firſt with his own particular Buſineſs, he would ſhow him the Accounts and Books of his Eſtate, that he might underſtand how things ſtood; and direct him afterwards as he pleas'd. *Diotiſalvi* promiſed to be ready, and faithful; but the Accounts being produc'd and examin'd, were found very diſorderly and imperfect: *Diotiſalvi* (as a Perſon which reſpected his own Intereſt, more than his Profeſſions to *Piero*, or his Obligations to his Father, ſuppoſing it eaſy to rob him of his Reputation, and diveſt him of the Authority which *Coſimo* had left him as hereditary) came to him therefore with Counſel very fair and reaſonable in appearance, but inwardly deſtructive and pernicious. He repreſented to him the diſorder of his Accounts; and what Sums of Money would be neceſſary to have by him, if he meant to keep up his Credit, or preſerve his Preferment in the State: he told him, that thoſe diſorders were not any way ſo readily to be redreſs'd, nor his Coffers ſo naturally ſupplied, as by calling in ſuch Sums as were owing to his Father both abroad and at home. For *Coſimo* (to gain himſelf an Intereſt) had been very ready to accommodate any body that wanted; and the Monies he had lent amounted to an incredible Sum. *Piero* was well ſatisfied with his Advice, and thinking it but juſt, he called in his Money: but no ſooner had he done it, but the Citizens cry'd out upon him; declaimed againſt him as ingrateful and covetous, and uſed him as opprobriouſly, as if he had robbed them, and not demanded his own. *Diotiſalvi* finding his deſign ſucceed, and that *Piero* was fallen into diſgrace with the People, he conſulted with *Luca Pitti*, *Agnolo Acciaivoli* and *Nicolo Soderini*, how they might depoſe him: they were all of them ready to embrace the Deſign, but upon ſeveral Grounds and Provocations: *Luca* deſir'd to ſucceed *Piero* in his Command, for he was grown ſo great, he diſdain'd to obey him; *Diotiſalvi* knew *Luca* was not fit to be Chief in the Government, and therefore he thought, if *Piero* was removed, in a ſhort time that Authority would devolve upon him: *Nicolo Soderini* had a mind the City ſhould be more free, and govern'd by direction of the chief Magiſtrates: *Agnolo* had a private Quarrel to the *Medici* for ſeveral Reaſons, and particularly theſe. *Raffaello*, his Son, had long before married *Aleſſandri de Bardi*, and had a great Fortnne with her: this Lady, either for her own Defects, or other Peoples, was ill treated by both Father-in-Law and Husband. *Lorenzo d' Ilarione*, a young Gentleman, her Relation, pitying her Condition, went with certain of his Comrades one Night well armed, and took her by force out of the Houſe of *Agnolo*. The *Acciaivoili* complain'd heavily of the Outrage, and the Cauſe being referr'd to *Coſimo*, he awarded that the *Acciaivoili* ſhould refund her Portion, and that then it ſhould be left to the Lady's election, whether ſhe would return to her Husband or no. *Agnolo* did not think *Coſimo*, in this Determination, had dealt with him as a Friend, and not being able to revenge it upon him, he reſolv'd to do it upon his Son. Yet tho' their Reaſons and Ends were diverſe, the Conſpirators agreed all in their pretence, that the City ſhould not be govern'd by a peculiar Council, but by the Magiſtrates. The hatred of the People, and their occaſions to revile him, were much exaggerated by the failing of ſeveral Merchants about that time, which was objected to *Piero* as a great prejudice to the City, as if the calling in of his Money had broke them. To this Aſperſion, it was added, that he was negotiating a match for his eldeſt Son *Lorenzo*, with *Clarice*, a Daughter of the *Orſini*, which they took in great dudgeon, and upbraided him by it; declaring, that it was now apparent what he drove at; and that thinking his Son too good for any Alliance in *Florence*, it was manifeſt he did not now look upon himſelf as a Citizen, but was caſting about how he might make himſelf Sovereign: for he was too proud to

Franceſco Sforza died.

have

have the Citizens to his Kindred, had a desire to make them his Subjects; and therefore he did not deserve to have them his Friends. These Conspirators believ'd they had all sure in their hands, for the greater part of the Citizens being deluded with the name of Liberty (with which the Conspirators had gilded and embellish'd their designs) had profess'd themselves on their side. There being a general ebolition of these fore or Humours at that time in the City; it was thought convenient by some that were not at all taken with them, seeing they could not be absolutely depress'd, to find out a way to discuss and divert them, for whilst the People are idle, they are proper Instruments for any Commotion: to employ them therefore, and remove their Thoughts from contriving against the Government (it being a compleat Year since *Cosimo* died) for the entertainment and recreation of the City, they took occasion to make two publick and solemn *Feasts*, or Shows (which are usual there) one of them represented the three Wise-men, who were conducted by the Star to the place where our Saviour was born, and this was perform'd with so much Pomp and Magnificence, that for several Months together the whole City was employ'd about the Pageants and Preparation. The other was call'd a Tornament (which is a kind of skirmishing on Horseback) in which the young Gentlemen of the City had challeng'd the most eminent Knights of *Italy*; and among these young Gentlemen, *Lorenzo*, the eldest Son of *Piero*, carried the Applause, not by favour or partiality, but by his own valour and dexterity. But these Sports and Divertisements were no sooner over, but the Citizens return'd to their old Jealousies, and every one pursu'd his own fancy with more eagerness than before; which occasion'd great Feuds, and they were augmented much by two unfortunate Accidents: The one was, that the Authority of the *Balia* was expir'd; the other, that *Francesco* Duke of *Milan* was dead; upon whose death, the new Duke *Galeazzo* sent Ambassadors to *Florence* to confirm the Capitulations which his Father *Francesco* had made with that City; one of the Articles obliging them to pay *Francesco* an annual Sum of Money: The chief of the adverse Party thinking this a fair opportunity, oppos'd the *Medici* in the Ratification; alledging, that the Agreement was made with *Francesco*, not with his Son; and that *Francesco* being dead, the Obligation was void; for *Galeazzo* was not so great and considerable as his Father, and therefore his Amity unlikely to be so profitable; so that tho' indeed there was not much gain'd by *Francesco*, there was less to be expected from his Son: and if any Citizen, to maintain his own private Interest, would pay him his Annuity, it would be against the freedom and the safety of the City.

To this *Piero* reply'd, that so an important an Alliance was not so carelesly to be lost; that nothing was more advantageous and necessary (as well for all *Italy* as *Florence*) than their Alliance with the Duke; for thereby the *Venetians* would be discourag'd from attempting upon that Dutchy, either by counterfeit Friendship, or manifest War. But should this Alliance be dissolv'd, no sooner would it be known to the *Venetians*, but they would fall immediately upon the Duke; and finding him young, without Friends, and scarce warm in the State, they would easily carry it from him, either by fallacy or force; and in either of those Cases, the Commonwealth of *Florence* must be destroy'd. But his Reasons could not be accepted; the Sedition began to break out openly: the adverse Party assembled in several Companies in the Night, the greatest part of them in *La Pista*, and the Friends of the *Medici* in the *Crocetta*: the Conspirators being impatient to have *Piero* destroy'd, had gotten the Subscription of several Citizens as favourers of their designs: But being got together, one Night above the rest, after solemn debate in Council which way they were to proceed; it was unanimously agreed, that the power of the *Medici* should be rebated; but they were divided in the way; the most moderate part propos'd, that seeing the *Balia* was extinct, they should only take care it should not be revived; for if the Government fell into the Hands of the Councils and Magistrates (as it would do of course) in small time *Piero*'s Authority would evaporate; and with that, his Interest among the Merchants; for his Affairs were now in such a posture, that unless he could relieve himself by the publick Treasure, he would be certainly ruined; and when that should happen, there would be no farther danger of him, their Liberty would be recover'd without Banishment or Blood, which all good Citizens ought to desire; but if Force was apply'd, infinite hazards might occur. If one be falling of himself, no body thrusts him; if any one thrusts him, every body sustains him. Besides, if nothing extraordinary being acted against him, he will have no occasion to Arm, or strengthen his Party; and if he should, it must be with great Charge and Disadvantage; for every one would suspect him, which would facilitate and hasten his Ruin. Others were not satisfied with this delay; affirming, that time would be more for his benefit, than theirs; and if they would proceed by cold dilatory Gradations, *Piero* would run no hazard, but they should run many. For the Magistrates (tho' they were his Enemies) suffering him to enjoy the Privileges of the City; his Friends would make him Prince (as had happen'd in 58.) to their utter destruction: and that tho' that Council was honest and peaceable,

yet

yet this was wiſer and more ſecure, and therefore to be executed, whilſt the minds of the People were incens'd: the way they propoſed, was to Arm at home, and to entertain the Marqueſs of *Ferrara* into their Pay abroad; and when a *Senate* of their Friends happen'd to meet, then to riſe, and ſecure themſelves as well as they could. The reſult of all was, that they ſhould attend ſuch a *Senate*, and then make the beſt of their time. *Nicolo Fedini* (who was employ'd as Chancellor) was one of this Council; who, being tempted by greater and more practicable hopes, diſcover'd the whole Plot to *Piero*, and gave him a Liſt of the Conſpirators, and a Catalogue of the Subſcriptions. *Piero* was aſtoniſh'd at the number and quality of his Adverſaries; and upon conſultation with his Friends, it was concluded, that he alſo ſhould take Subſcriptions: and having committed the care of them to ſome of his Confidents, he found the Citizens ſo fickle and unſtable, that many of them who had ſubſcrib'd to the Enemy came over, and oblig'd themſelves to him. Whilſt things were in this diſtraction, the time came about in which the Supream Magiſtracy was to be renew'd; to which *Nicolo Soderini* was advanced by the *Gonfaloniere de Giuſtitia*. It was a wonder to ſee the concourſe not only of the better ſort of Citizens, but of the common People which attended him to the Palace, and put on an Olive-Garland upon his Head by the way (to ſignifie, that he was the Perſon upon whom the Safety and the Liberty of their City did depend.) By this, and many Examples of the ſame nature, it is evident, how inconvenient it is to enter upon the Magiſtracy, or Government, with more than ordinary Acclamation; for not being able to perform as is expected (and for the moſt part more is required) the People abate of their eſteem, and come by degrees to deſpiſe you. *Thomaſo* and *Nicolo Soderini* were Brothers; *Nicolo* was a Perſon of greater Spirit, but *Thomaſo* the more prudent. *Thomaſo* being a Friend to *Piero*, and knowing the Humour of his Brother; that he deſir'd the Liberty of the City, and that the Government might be preſerved without offence to any body, he encourag'd him to a new *Squittini*, by which means the *Borſi* might be filled with the Names of ſuch Citizens as were lovers of Liberty: and the Government continu'd without violence, as he deſir'd. *Nicolo* was eaſily perſuaded by his Brother, and ſuffer'd the time of his Magiſtracy to expire in the vanity of that Opinion; and his Friends which were of the Conſpiracy were well enough contented, as being already emulous of him, and not deſiring the Reformation ſhould fall out during his Authority; preſuming they could effect it when they pleas'd, tho' another was *Gonfaloniere*. Whereupon his Office expir'd with leſs Honour than he entred upon it; by reaſon he had begun many good things, but perfected nothing.

This Accident fortified the Party of *Piero* exceedingly; confirmed his Friends, and brought over ſuch as were neuter: ſo that tho' all things were ready on all ſides, they were delay'd for ſeveral Months, and not the leaſt Tumult appeared. Nevertheleſs, *Piero*'s Party encreaſing, his Enemies began to reſent it, and met together, to perform that by force, which they might more eaſily have done before by means of the Magiſtrates; in order to which they concluded to kill *Piero* (who was at that ſame time ſick at *Coreggi*) and cauſe the Marqueſs of *Ferrara* to advance towards the City; for when *Piero* was dead, they reſolv'd to come armed to the Palace, and force the *Senate* to ſettle the Government as they ſhould direct: for tho' all of them were not their Friends, yet they doubted not but to frighten them into a concurrence. *Diotiſalvi*, to diſguiſe his Deſign, viſited *Piero* very often; diſcourſed with him about uniting the Factions, and adviſed him very frankly. But *Piero* was informed of the whole Conſpiracy, and beſides *Domenico Martegli* had given him notice, that *Franceſco Neroni*, the Brother of *Diotiſalvi*, had been tempting him to their Party, aſſuring him of Succeſs: Hereupon *Piero* reſolved to be firſt in Arms, and took occaſion from their Practices with the Marqueſs of *Ferrara*. He pretended he had receiv'd a Letter from *Giovanni Bentivogli*, Prince of *Bologna*, importing, that the Marqueſs of *Ferrara* was with certain Forces upon the River *Albo*, and that it was given out, his deſign was for *Florence*; upon which Intelligence, *Piero* pretended to arm, and (attended by a great number of armed Men) he came to the City. At his arrival his whole Party took Arms, and the Adverſary did the ſame, yet not in ſo good order as *Piero*; for his Men were prepared, and the other ſurprized. *Diotiſalvi*'s Palace being not far from *Piero*'s, *Diotiſalvi* judged himſelf inſecure at home, and therefore went up and down, ſometimes exhorting the *Senate* to cauſe *Piero* to lay down his Arms; ſometimes ſeeking out *Luca*, and encouraging him to be conſtant: but the briskeſt and moſt couragious of them all, was *Nicolo Soderini*, who taking Arms immediately, and being follow'd by moſt of the Populace of his Quarter, went to *Luca*'s Houſe, intreated him to mount, and march with him to the Palace for the ſecurity of the *Senate*, who (he aſſured him) were of his ſide; by doing of which, the Victory would be certain: but if he remain'd in his Houſe, he would run the hazard of being ſlain by thoſe who were armed, or abuſed

Nicolo Soderini perſuades *Luca* to take Arms againſt *Piero*.

ſed by thoſe who were not; and then he would repent him when too late, whereas now it was in his Power by force of Arms to ruin *Piero* if he pleaſed; or if he deſired Peace, it was more honourable to give Conditions, than to receive them. But all his Rhetorick could not work upon *Luca:* he had alter'd his mind, and receiv'd new promiſes of Alliances and Rewards from *Piero*, and already married one of his Neices to *Giovanni Tornabuoni*; ſo that inſtead of being perſuaded by him, he admoniſhed *Nicolo* to lay down, and return quietly to his Houſe; for he ought to be ſatisfied, that the City ſhould be governed by its Magiſtrates: for whether he was ſatisfied or not, it would be ſo; all People would lay down their Arms; and the *Senate* having the ſtronger Party, would be Judges of their Quarrel. There being no remedy, and *Nicolo* having no where elſe to diſpoſe himſelf, went back to his Houſe; but before he departed he told him thus: *I cannot alone do this City any ſervice, but I can prognoſticate its Miſeries. The Reſolution you have taken, will deprive your Country of its Liberty; your ſelf of your Authority; me of my Eſtate, and others of their Country.*

At the firſt news of this Tumult, the *Senate* had cauſed their Palace to be ſhut up, where they kept themſelves cloſe with the Magiſtrates, without appearing for either ſide: The Citizens (eſpecially thoſe who had follow'd *Luca*, ſeeing the Party of *Piero* armed, and the other diſarmed) began to contrive how they might ſhew themſelves his Friends, not how they might expreſs themſelves his Enemies. Whereupon the principal Citizens, and the Heads of the Factions met in the Palace before the *Senators*, where many things were debated relating to the Government of the City in that juncture, and the ways of Reconciliation: but becauſe *Piero* could not be there in reſpect of his Indiſpoſition, all agreed to go to him to his Houſe, except *Nicolo Soderini*, who (having recommended his Children and Family to the protection of *Tomaſo*) was retir'd to his Country-houſe, to attend there the concluſion of theſe Troubles, which he expected would be unhappy to him, and fatal to his Country. The reſt being arriv'd at *Piero*'s Palace, one of them being deputed, complained to him of the Condition of the City by reaſon of the Tumults; declared, that they who took Arms firſt, were moſt conſcious of them; that underſtanding *Piero* was the Man, and his deſign unknown, they were come to him to be informed from himſelf, and if it appeared to be for the advantage of the City, they promiſed to comply. To which *Piero* reply'd, that he who takes Arms firſt is not in the fault, but he who gives the occaſion; that if they conſider'd more ſeriouſly of their Behaviour towards him, they would not wonder at what he had done for his own Preſervation: for they would find it was their Conventions in the Night; their Subſcriptions, and Practices to defeat him both of his Authority and Life, which had forced him to his Arms; yet having extended them no farther than his own Houſe, he conceiv'd it was good Evidence his Intentions were innocent, and rather to defend himſelf, than injure any body elſe; that he deſired nothing but his own Security, and had never given them occaſion to ſuſpect him of other; that when the Authority of the *Balia* expir'd, he never attempted to revive it in any extraordinary way; but was willing (if they were ſo themſelves) that the Magiſtrates ſhould have the Government of the City; that *Coſimo* and his Sons knew how to live honourably in *Florence*, either with or without the *Balia*; and that in 58, it was for their Intereſt, not his, that it was reſtored. But this was not ſufficient, he found them of opinion, that whilſt he was in *Florence* there would be no Safety, no Tranquillity for them; a thing truly ſo far from his belief, he could never have imagin'd or thought upon it, that his own Friends and his Father ſhould not endure to live with him in the ſame City, ſeeing no Action of his had ever expreſs'd him otherwiſe, than a quiet and peaceable Man.

The *Senate* and chief Citizens attend *Piero* at his Houſe.

Then turning about to *Diotiſalvi* and his Brothers, who were all preſent, he reproached them ſeverely by the Favours they had received from *Coſimo*; by the Confidence he had placed in them; and the great Ingratitude which they had returned (which Reprimand was deliver'd with ſo much Zeal and Efficacy, that had not *Piero* himſelf reſtrain'd them, ſome there preſent were ſo much enraged at their deportment towards him, they would certainly have killed him) and at laſt he concluded, that whatever they and the *Senate* determin'd, he would conſent to; for he deſir'd nothing of them but to live quiet and in peace. Hereupon many things were propoſed, but nothing concluded; only in general it was thought neceſſary the City ſhould be reformed, and new Laws created. The then *Gonfaloniere de Giuſtitia* was *Bernardo Lotti*, a Perſon in whom *Piero* had no confidence, and ſo reſolved not to do any thing whilſt he was in Office, which he conceiv'd would be no great prejudice to his Affairs, becauſe his time was almoſt expir'd. But at the Election of *Senators* in *September* and *October* following, 1466. *Roberto Lioni* was choſen *Gonfaloniere*; who was no ſooner ſettled in his Office, but (all other things being prepared to his hand) he called the People together into the *Piazza*, and created a new *Balia*, all of *Piero*'s Creatures, who fell preſent-

ly

ly upon the creation of new Magiſtrates, and choſe them as *Piero* directed. Which manner of proceeding ſo terrified the Heads of the adverſe Party, that they fled out of the City moſt of them; *Agnolo Acciavoli* to *Naples*, *Diotiſalvi Neroni* and *Nicolo Soderini* to *Venice*: But *Luca Pitti* remain'd behind, preſuming upon his late Alliance, and the Promiſes which he had receiv'd from *Piero*. *Giovanni*, the Son of *Neroni*, at that time Archbiſhop of *Florence* (to prevent the worſt) baniſh'd himſelf voluntarily to *Rome*. All the Fugitives were proclaim'd Rebels, and the Family of the *Neroni* diſpers'd. Many other Citizens were baniſh'd likewiſe, and confin'd to particular Places: Nor was this all; a ſolemn Proceſſion was order'd, to give God thanks for the preſervation of the State, and the unity of the City: in the time of which Solemnity, certain Citizens were apprehended, tortured, and then part of them put to death, and part of them baniſhed. But in all the inconſtancy and variations of Fortune, nothing was ſo remarkable as the fall of *Luca Pitti*. He quickly learned the difference betwixt Victory and Misfortune; betwixt Honour and Diſgrace: his Houſe (which was formerly thronged with the Viſits and Attendancies of the better ſort of Citizens) was now grown ſolitary and unfrequented. When he appear'd abroad in the Streets, his Friends and Relations were not only afraid to accompany him, but to own or ſalute him; ſome of them having loſt their Honours for doing it, ſome of them their Eſtates; and all of them threatned. The noble Structures which he had begun, were given over by the Workmen; the good Deeds which he had done were requited with contumely; and the Honours he had conferr'd, with Infamy and Diſgrace. So that many Perſons who in his Authority had preſented him largely, in his Diſtreſs requir'd it again, pretending it was lent, and no more; and theſe very People who before commended him to the Skies, cried him down again as faſt, for his Ingratitude and Violence: ſo that now, when it was too late, he began to repent himſelf, that he had not taken *Nicolo*'s Advice, and died honourably, ſeeing he could not live ſo. Nevertheleſs, *Agnolo Acciaivoli* being then at *Naples*, before he attempted any thing of Innovation, he reſolv'd to to try *Piero*, and ſee if there was no hopes of Reconciliation; to which purpoſe he writ to him this following Letter.

The Enemies of the *Medici* depreſs'd.

Luca Pitti deſerted.

I cannot but ſmile to obſerve the wantonneſs of Fortune, and what Sport ſhe makes her ſelf in turning Friends into Enemies, and Enemies into Friends, according to her own Humour and Capricio; you may remember how at the Baniſhment of your Father (reſenting the injury done to him above any danger of my own) I loſt my Country, and eſcaped narrowly with my Life. In Coſimo's *Days I refuſed no opportunity of honouring your Family; and ſince he died, I have entertain'd none to offend it. True it is, the weakneſs of your Complexion, and the minority of your Sons, gave ſome kind of diſquiet, and I was willing our Country might be put in ſuch a poſture, as to ſubſiſt after your Death; whatever I have done, was only to that end; not againſt you ſo much, as for the benefit of my Country: if that was an Error, I am ſorry for it, and do hope the innocence of my Intention, and the ſervice of my former Actions may attone for it; nor can I fear but I ſhall find Mercy in a Family which has had ſo long experience of my Fidelity, or that one ſingle Fault will be able to extinguiſh ſo many Obligttions.* Piero, having receiv'd this Letter, by the ſame Hand return'd him this Anſwer:

Agnolo's Letter to *Piero de Medici.*

Your ſmiling at that diſtance, is the reaſon I weep not where I am: were you ſo merry in Florence, *I ſhould be more melancholy at* Naples. *I grant you have been a well-wiſher to my Father, and you confeſs be gratified you for it; ſo that if there be obligation on any ſide, 'tis on yours, becauſe Deeds are more valuable than Words; and if you have been already rewarded for your good Actions, it's but reaſonable you ſhould be puniſhed for your evil: your pretence of love to your Country cannot excuſe you, for no body but will believe the* Medici *as great Lovers and Propagators of their Country as the* Acciaivoli. *Live therefore where you are, in diſhonour, ſince you had not the diſcretion to live honourably here.*

Piero's Anſwer.

Agnolo upon the receipt of this Letter, deſpairing of Pardon, remov'd his Quarters to *Rome*; where aſſociating with the Archbiſhop, and the reſt of the Exiles, they conſulted what was the beſt way of leſſening the Reputation of the *Medici*, which at that time was tottering in *Rome*, and gave *Piero* no ſmall trouble to ſuſtain it; but by the aſſiſtance of his Friends, they failed of their deſign. *Diotiſalvi* and *Nicolo Soderini* on the other ſide, uſed all poſſible diligence to provoke the *Venetian Senate* againſt their Country; ſuppoſing its Government being new, and ungrateful to many People, the firſt Invaſion would ſhake it, and that it would not be able to ſtand. There was at that time in *Ferrara*, *Giovan Franceſco*, the Son of *Palla Strozzi*, who in the Revolutions in 34, was baniſh'd with his Father out of *Florence*: This *Giovanni* was a Man of great credit, and reputed as rich a Merchant as any in the City. Theſe new Rebels inſinuating with him, perſuaded him how eaſie it would be to recover their

Country whenever the *Venetians* would undertake it; and they doubted not but they would undertake it, if part of the Charge could be defray'd; otherwise it was not to be expected. *Giovanni* was willing to revenge the Injuries he had received; believed what they said, and promised to assist with all the Money he could make; upon which *Diotisalvi* and *Soderini* address'd themselves to the *Doge*.

Complained to him of their Banishment, which they pretended was for no other cause, but that they were desirous their Country might be govern'd by the Laws; and the Magistrates (not a few of their Grandees) have the power to put them in execution. Upon this account it was, that Piero de Medici, *and his Followers, having been used to a tyrannical way, had taken Arms by an Artifice, disarmed them by a Cheat, and banish'd them by a Fallacy; and as if this were not enough, God Almighty must be brought in, and made an Accessary to their Cruelty, whilst in a solemn Procession, and the sacred Exercise of their Devotion, many Citizens, who (upon Faith given that they should be safe) had remained behind, were seized, secured, tortured, and executed: a thing of most execrable and nefarious Example. To revenge the inhumanity of those Actions, and avert the Judgments which they would otherwise pull down upon their Country, they knew not where to apply themselves with more hopes than to that illustrious* Senate, *which having done so much for the preservation of their own Liberty, must needs have some compassion for such as have lost theirs. They beseeched them therefore, as Free-men, to assist them against their Tyrants; as merciful, against the merciless; and remember them how the Family of the* Medici *had defeated them of* Lombardy, *when* Cosimo *(contrary to the Inclinations of all the rest of the City) assisted* Francesco *against them: so that if the equity of their Cause did not move them, the justice of their own Indignation might provoke them.*

These last Words prevailed so far upon the *Senate*, that they resolved, *Bartolomeo Coligni* (their General) should fall upon the Dominion of the *Florentines*; and to that purpose their Army being drawn together with all possible speed, and *Hercules da Esti* being sent by *Borso*, Duke of *Ferrara*, joined himself with them. Their first Enterprize was upon the Town of *Doadola*, which (the *Florentines* being in no order) they burned, and did some mischief in the Country about it. But the *Florentines* (as soon as *Piero* had banish'd the adverse Party) had enter'd into a new League with *Galeazzo* Duke of *Milan*, and *Ferrando* King of *Naples*; and entertain'd *Federigo*, Count of *Urbin*, for their General: so that being fortified by such Friends, they did not much value their Enemies. For *Ferrando* sent his Son *Alfonso*, and *Galeazzo* came in Person (both of them with considerable Forces) to their Relief; and all of them together made a Head at *Castracaro*, a Castle belonging to the *Florentines*, at the bottom of the *Alps* which descend out of *Tuscany* into *Romagna*. In the mean time, the Enemy was retir'd towards *Imola*; so that betwixt the one and the other, according to the Custom of those Times, there happen'd several light Skirmishes, but no besieging nor storming of Towns, nor no provocation to a Battle on either side, both Parties keeping their Tents, and staring one upon another, with extraordinary Cowardice. This manner of proceeding was not at all pleasing to the *Florentines*, who found themselves engaged in a War, which was like to be expensive, and no Profit to be expected: insomuch, that the Magistrates complain'd of it to those Citizens which they had deputed as Commissaries for that Expedition; who reply'd, that *Galeazzo* was wholly in the fault; and that having more Authority than Experience, he knew not how to make any advantageous Resolution; nor would he believe them which were able to instruct him, and that therefore it was impossible (whilst he was in the Army) that any great Action should be atchieved. Hereupon the *Florentines* address'd themselves to the Duke, and let him know,

The *Florentines* invaded by the *Venetians*.

That he had done a great Honour (and it had been much for their Advantage) in coming personally to their Assistance; for his very Name and Reputation had made their Enemies retire: Nevertheless, they could not but prefer his Safety, and the good of his State, before their own; because whilst he was safe, they could not be capable of fear; and if lost, they should be incapable of Comfort. They could not therefore discharge themselves, nor express the Respect they had for him better, than by remembring him, that (besides the Danger where he was) it could not be secure for him to be any longer at that distance from Milan; *for being but young in the Government, and his Enemies powerful and industrious; who knew what Mischief they might meditate? and how easily execute it when they had done? So that they made it their request to him, for the safety of his own Person, and the preservation of his State, that he would leave only part of his Forces with them, and return himself with the rest.*

Galeazzo was as well pleased with their Counsel, as they were to give it; and without more ado returned from whence he came. The *Florentine* Generals (being rid of this Incumbrance, and that it might appear to the World who was the Impedi-

ment

ment before) advanced againſt the Enemy, ſo that they came preſently to a Battle, which continued half a Day without any diſadvantage; for there was not one Man kill'd, a few Horſe hurt, and but a few Men taken Priſoners. When Winter was come, and the time that their Armies were accuſtom'd to go into Quarters, *Bartolomeo* retreated towards *Ravenna*; the *Florentines* into *Tuſcany*; and the Forces of the King and the Duke into their ſeveral Countries: but finding no Tumult nor Commotion in *Florence*, as they were promiſed by the Rebels; and the Soldiers which were hired not being punctually paid, the *Venetians* thought fit to treat, and in a ſhort time a Peace was concluded: this Peace having depriv'd the Rebels of all hopes, they divided, and went to ſeveral Parts. *Diotiſalvi* went to *Ferrara*, where he was entertain'd and reliev'd by the Marqueſs *Borſo*: *Nicolo Soderini* remov'd to *Ravenna*, where he liv'd long with a ſmall Penſion from the *Venetians*, and at laſt died: this *Nicolo* was accounted a juſt and couragious Man, but ſlow and irreſolute; which was the cauſe that he ſlipp'd an opportunity when he was *Gonfaloniere*, that he could never afterwards retrieve. Grown inſolent upon their ſucceſs, thoſe of the *Florentines* who were in Power (as if they fanſied they had not prevail'd, unleſs their Cruelty did teſtify it) plagu'd and tormented not only their Enemies, but whoever elſe they thought good to ſuſpect; and obtain'd of *Bardo Altovili* to diveſt ſeveral Citizens of their Honours, and that others ſhould be baniſh'd; which was ſo great a ſtrengthening to that Party, and depreſſion to the other, that they exercis'd the Power which they had uſurped, as if God and Fortune had given them that City for a Prey.

Peace between the *Florentines* and the *Venetians*.

Theſe Practices *Piero* underſtood not; and if he had, his Illneſs would not have permitted him to redreſs them: for he was ſo ſtiff, and contracted with the Gout, he had the uſe of nothing but his Tongue, with which he could only admoniſh and adviſe them to live civilly, and enjoy their Country in Peace, and not be acceſſary to its Deſtruction. To pleaſe and entertain the People, he reſolv'd to celebrate the Marriage of his Son *Lorenzo*, to whom he had contracted *Claricia*, a Daughter of the Houſe of *Urſina*; which Wedding was performed with a Pomp and Magnificence anſwerable to the Perſons by whom, and for whom it was made: Several days were ſpent in Balls, in Banquets, and Shows; and to demonſtrate the Grandeur of the Houſe of the *Medici*, two Martial Spectacles were exhibited; one repreſenting Horſe and Men charging as in a Field-Fight; the other, the Siege and Expugnation of a Town; both of them contriv'd and diſcharg'd with the greateſt Glory and Gallantry imaginable. Whilſt Affairs were in this poſture in *Florence*, all *Italy* was at Peace; but under great Apprehenſions of the *Turk*, who advancing in his Deſigns, had taken *Negropont*, to the great ſcandal and detriment of all Chriſtendom. *Borgo*, Marqueſs of *Ferrara*, died about this time, and was ſucceeded by his Brother *Hercules*. *Giſmondo da Rimini* died (a perpetual Enemy to the Church) and left the Dominion to his Son *Roberto*, who was reckon'd afterwards among the beſt Commanders of that Age. Pope *Paul* died likewiſe, in whoſe place was created likewiſe *Sextus*, called firſt *Franceſco da Savona*, a Perſon of mean or rather baſe Extraction, but for his Courage made General of the Order of S. *Francis*; and after that, Cardinal: This Pope was the firſt which ſhew'd to the World what the Papacy could do; and that many things called Errors before, might not only be excuſed, but hid and obtected by the Papal Authority. He had in his Family two Perſons (*Piero* and *Girolamo*) who (as was generally believed) were his Natural Sons, tho' they paſſed under more ſpecious and honourable Appellations. *Piero* being a Fryar, was by degrees promoted to the Cardinalſhip, with the Title of *San Seſto*. To *Girolamo* he gave the Government of *Furli*, which he had taken by violence from *Antonio Ordelaffi*, whoſe Predeceſſors had a long-time been Princes of that City: This ſecular and ambitious way of proceeding, procured his Holineſs great Eſtimation among the Princes of *Italy*; inſomuch as all of them deſiring his Friendſhip, the Duke of *Milan* gave to *Girolamo*, his Natural Daughter *Catharine* in Marriage; and in Dower with her, he gave him the City of *Imola*, which by the like violence he had taken from *Taddeo Alidoſſi*. Betwixt this Duke and *Ferrando* the King, a new Alliance was contracted: for *Elizabeth*, the Daughter of *Alfonſo* (the King's eldeſt Son) was married to *Giovan Galeazzo*, eldeſt Son to the Duke. In the mean time *Italy* was full of Tranquillity; no Care incumbent upon thoſe Princes, but to pay their Reſpects one to the other, and by mutual Matches, new Obligations and Leagues, to fortifie and ſecure one another. Yet in the midſt of this Peace, *Florence* was not without its Convulſions; the ambition and diſſention of the Citizens diſtracting their Affairs: and *Piero* being interrupted by his own Diſtempers, could not apply any Remedy to theirs. However, to diſcharge his Conſcience, endeavour what he was able, and try whether he could ſhame them into a Reformation, he called them all to his Houſe, and ſainted them in this manner:

I ne-

Piero's Speech to the Florentines.

I never imagined the time could come in which the Carriage of my Friends should have made me inclinable to my Enemies; or the consequences of my Victory, have made me wish I had been beaten. I thought my Party had consisted of Men whose Appetites might have been bounded and circumscribed, and such as would have been satisfied to have lived quietly and honourably in their own Country, especially after their Enemies were expelled. But I find now, I was mistaken; ignorant of the natural Ambition of the World, and more particularly yours. It is not enough (it seems) for you to be Chief and Principal in so illustrious a City, and (tho' but a few) to have the Honours, and Offices, and Emoluments, with which heretofore a much greater number was satisfied. It is not enough, to have the Forfitures and Confiscations of your Enemies divided among you; it is not enough that (exempting yourselves) you load and oppress the rest with Taxes, and appropriate them to your own private uses when they come in, but you must abuse and afflict your Neighbours with all the circumstances of Injury: you rob them of their Estates; you sell them Justice; you abhor the Laws; you oppress the Peaceable, and exalt the Insolent. I did not think there had been such Examples of Rapine and Violence in all Italy, *as I find in this City. Has this City given us the Authority to subvert it? Has it given us Preheminence to destroy it? Has it honour'd us to afflict it? I do profess by the Faith of an honest Man, and declare here publickly to you all, that if you persist in these Courses, and force me to repent of my Victory, I will order things so, that you shall have but little comfort in abusing it.*

The Citizens reply'd modestly at that time, but not a jot of Reformation; whereupon *Piero* sent privately to *Agnolo Acciaivoli* to meet him at *Cafaggiolo*, where they had long discourse about the Condition of the City; and it is not doubted but if he had lived, he would have recalled his Enemies to have restrained the Exorbitances of his Friends: But Death would not suffer it; for after great Conflicts both in his Body and Mind, in the 53d year of his Age, he died. His Vertue and his Bounty could not be perfectly conspicuous to his Country, being eclipsed by his Father, who died not long before him; and these few years he survived, were wholly taken up either by his own Sickness, or the dissention of his Friends. He was interr'd in the Temple of *San. Lorenzo*, near his Father; and his Exequies performed with a Pomp proportionable to his Quality and Deserts. He left behind him two Sons, *Lorenzo* and *Guiliano*, pregnant and hopeful enough of themselves, but the tenderness of their Age was that which made every body apprehensive. Among (or rather above) the principal of that Government, was *Thomaso Soderini*, whose Prudence and Authority was not only eminent in *Florence*, but in the Courts of all the Princes of *Italy*. After the death of *Piero*, *Tomaso* had the respect of the whole City, most of the Citizens flocking to his House, as their Chief; and many Princes directed their Correspondencies to him: But he being wise, and sensible of his own Fortune, and the Fortunes of his Family, refused their Correspondence, received none of their Letters, and let the Citizens know, it was not upon him, but the *Medici*, they were oblig'd to attend: and that his Actions might quadrate with his Exhortations, having called all the chief Families together in the Convent of S. *Antonio*, he brought in *Lorenzo* and *Guiliano de Medici* amongst them; where, after a long and solid Discourse about the Condition of that City, *Italy*, and the several Principalities within it; he concluded, that if ever they would live happily and in peace, secure against foreign Invasion, and Dissention at home, it was necessary to continue their observance to the Family of the *Medici*, and to give those young Gentlemen the Authority of their Predecessors; for Men are not troubled at the promotion of Ancient Families; but Upstarts, as they are suddenly advanced, are suddenly forsaken: and it has been always found more easie to preserve a Family in power (where time has worn out his Enemies) than to raise a new one which will unavoidably be subject to new Emulations. After *Tomaso* had spoke, *Lorenzo* began, and (tho' but young) deliver'd himself with so much gravity and composedness, that he gave them great hopes of his future Abilities; and before they parted, both of them were perfectly adopted. Not long after, they were installed in the Dignities of their Father; entertain'd as Princes of the Government; and *Tomaso* appointed their chief Minister: by which means they liv'd quietly, for a while, both abroad and at home, without the least prospect or apprehension of Troubles; but on a sudden, a new Tumult unexpectedly arose to disturb them, and give them a hint of their following Miseries.

Piero de Medici dies.

Tomaso Soderini in great favour with the *Florentines*, declines it discreetly.

Lorenzo and *Guiliano de Medici* made Princes of the City.

Among the Families which suffer'd with *Luca Pitti*, and his Party, was the Family of the *Nardi*: *Salvestro*, and his Brothers (the chief of that House) were first banished, and then (upon the War with *Bartolomeo Coglione*) proclaimed Rebels. Among the Brothers, there was one of them call'd *Bernardo*, a brisk and courageous Youth, who (not being able to subsist abroad by reason of his Poverty, and having no hopes of returning by reason of the Peace) resolv'd to attempt something that might be an occasion

of

of reviving the War: a ſlight and inconſiderable beginning, producing great Effects many times, becauſe People are generally more prone to aſſiſt and improve a Commotion, than to contrive and begin it. *Bernardo* had good acquaintance in *Prato*, and in the Country about *Piſtoia*, but more eſpecially with the *Palandre*, which (tho' a Country Family) was numerous, and brought up, like the reſt of the *Piſtoleſi*, in Arms and in Blood. He knew they were highly diſcontented, as having been ill uſed in the time of the Wars by the Magiſtrates in *Florence*: he knew likewiſe the diſguſts of the *Pratiſi*; the pride and rapacity of their Government, and ſome body had told him how ready they were for any practice againſt the State: ſo that from all theſe Circumſtances he conceiv'd hopes (by debauching of *Prato*) of kindling ſuch a Fire in *Tuſcany*, as by ſupplying it by Fewel, they ſhould not be able to extinguiſh: he communicated his deſign with *Diotiſalvi*, and inquir'd of him, in caſe *Prato* ſhould be ſurprized, what aſſiſtance he could procure him from the Princes of *Italy*. *Diotiſalvi* looked upon the Buſineſs as deſperate and almoſt impoſſible; however, ſeeing the part he was to beat in it, was ſecure enough; and that the Experiment was to be made at another Man's coſt; he encourag'd him to go on, and promiſed him aſſiſtance from *Bologna* and *Ferrara*, if he could but ſecure the Town for a Fortnight. *Bernardo* (tickled with his Promiſes, and perſuading himſelf his Succeſs would be good) convey'd himſelf privately to *Prato*, and imparting his deſigns to ſome Perſons, he found them readily diſpoſed: The ſame compliance and alacrity he found in the *Palandre*; and having agreed with them both of the Time and the Place, he ſent the News immediately to *Diotiſalvi*. The *Poteſta* or Governor of *Prato* at that time was *Ceſare Petrucci*; who being put in by them, preſerv'd it for the *Florentines*. The Governours of ſuch Towns had a cuſtom to keep the Keys of the Caſtle themſelves; yet (eſpecially where there was no Jealouſy) if any of the Town deſir'd to go in or out in the Night, they were ſo civil as to ſuffer them. *Bernardo* underſtanding the Cuſtom, came himſelf, and the *Palandre* with about a hundred armed Men, and lay cloſe near the Gate which goes towards *Piſtoia*, whilſt thoſe in the Town, who were privy to the Conſpiracy, armed likewiſe, and ſent one of their number to the Governor to beg the favour of the Keys, pretending there was a Citizen which deſir'd to enter. The Governor ſuſpecting nothing, ſent one of the Servants with the Keys, who being gone a convenient diſtance from the Palace, was knock'd down, his Charge taken from him; and the Gate being open'd, *Bernardo* and his Party were let it. Having enter'd, and diſcourſed a little while with their Friends in the Town, they divided into two Bodies; one of them under the conduct of *Salveſtro*, a *Prateſe*, ſurprized the Caſtle; the other commanded by *Bernardo*, poſſeſs'd themſelves of the Palace, took the Governour and his whole Family Priſoners, and committed them to the cuſtody of ſome of his Men: which done, they ſet up a great cry for Liberty in the Streets, and upon it many of the People reſorted to the Market-place. It being now day, and the Magiſtrates inform'd that the Caſtle and Palace were ſurpriz'd, and the Governour and all his Family in Priſon, they could not imagine from whence this Accident ſhould proceed. The Eight (who in that City were ſupream) met together in the Palace to conſult what was to be done. But *Bernardo* and his Accomplices, having run ſome time about the Streets, and found few or no body come in; upon Information that the Eight were aſſembled, they went directly to them, and *Bernardo* took occaſion to let them know, that their deſign was only to deliver their Town from Servitude; and that if they would take Arms and join with them in it, they would create immortal Honour to themſelves, perpetual Peace to the People; then he remembred them of their ancient Liberty, and compared it with their preſent Condition; and promiſed them ſuch Aſſiſtance in a few days, as the *Florentines* ſhould not be able to contend withal: beſides, he aſſured them he had Intelligence in *Florence*, and they would ſhow themſelves as ſoon as they underſtood their Succeſs in this Town. But the Eight were not to be moved with bare Words, and anſwer'd, that they knew not whether *Florence* was in Liberty or Bondage, nor did it belong to them to inquire; this they knew, that for their parts they deſired no farther Liberty, than to continue under the ſame Magiſtrates, which had then the Government of *Florence*, from whoſe hands they had never received any Injury that might provoke them to take Arms againſt them: they admoniſh'd him therefore to releaſe the Governour, leave the Town as he found it, and withdraw in time from an Enterprize which he had raſhly begun. But *Bernardo* was not to be diſcourag'd ſo eaſily; for ſeeing Intreaties and fair Means had no better Succeſs, he reſolv'd to try how far terror would work; and as a taſte of what was to be expected, concluded to put the Governour to Death; having cauſed him to be haled out of Priſon, he gave orders he ſhould be hang'd out of one of the Windows in the Palace: *Petrucci* was brought almoſt to the Window with a Rope about his Neck, when he ſpied *Bernardo* attending to ſee him Executed, and turning to him, he ſaid:

A Conſpiracy of the *Nardi*.

Bernardo,

Bernardo, *you think by cutting me off, to make the* Prateſi *follow you; but the Effect will be quite contrary. The Veneration they bear to the Governors which are ſent hither from* Florence, *is ſo great, it will incenſe them to ſee me deſtroy'd, and your Cruelty to me, will turn to your Ruin; ſo that 'tis my Life, not my Death, muſt do your Buſineſs; if I command them what you think fit to direct, they will obey me before you, and I following your Deriction, your Deſign will be fulfilled.*

Bernardo (who was no Conjurer) thought his Counſel was good, and therefore ordered him (out of a back Window which look'd into the Market-place) to require the Obedience of the People, which as ſoon as he had done, he was carried back from whence he came. The weakneſs of the Conſpirators was by this time diſcover'd; and ſeveral of the Inhabitants were got together, and *Giorgio Ginori* (a Knight of *Rhodes*) among the reſt. This *Giorgio* being the firſt who took Arms, advanced againſt *Bernardo*, who was riding up and down the Streets, ſometimes perſuading, and ſometimes threatning the City. Having found him, and charged him with a conſiderable number that followed, *Bernardo* was wounded and taken Priſoner, after which it was not hard to releaſe the Governour, and over-power the reſt; for being but few, and divided into ſeveral Parties, they were moſt of them either taken or killed.

Bernardo defeated and taken.

In the mean time, the News of this Accident arrived at *Florence*, and was repreſented much greater than the Truth. The firſt Report was, that *Prato* was ſurpriz'd; the Governor and his whole Family ſlain; the Town full of the Enemy's Forces; *Piſtoia* in Arms; and ſeveral Citizens of that City engaged in the Plot: ſo that of a ſudden the Palace was full of Citizens, expecting Orders from the *Senate* for what was to be done. There was in *Florence* at that time an eminent Captain called *Roberto San Severino*; it was reſolv'd to ſend what Forces they could get together of a ſudden, under his Command, towards *Prato*; that he ſhould advance as near it as he could, give them particular notice of all Paſſages, and act as he in his diſcretion ſhould ſee occaſion. *Roberto* was preſently diſpatch'd, and marched with his Party as far as the *Caſtello di Campi*, when he was met by a Meſſenger from *Petrucci* with the News that *Bernardo* was taken, his Party defeated, and all things in quiet; ſo that he marched back again to *Florence*, and not long after *Bernardo* was brought thither to be examined by the Magiſtrates. Being queſtion'd upon ſeveral things, and particularly what induc'd him to that Enterprize, he reply'd, that chooſing rather to die in *Florence*, than to live any longer in Exile, he determin'd to do ſomething which might make him memorable when he was dead. This Tumult being compoſed almoſt as ſoon as begun, the Citizens began to return to their old way of Security, thinking (without any regard or conſideration) to enjoy the Profits of a Government which they had ſo lately reeſtabliſh'd and confirmed; from whence all thoſe Inconveniences enſued, which are too often the Followers of Peace; the Youth being more vain and extravagant than formerly, ſquandred away vaſt Sums in Cloaths and Treats, and all manner of Luxury; and having nothing to do, ſpent their whole time and Eſtates among Dancing-Maſters and Women: their whole ſtudy and ambition was to be thought glorious in their Habit, and ſmart and poinant in their Diſcourſe; for he that could retort or bite the moſt readily, was thought the greateſt Wit, and had the greateſt applauſe: and yet theſe Effeminacies were much encreas'd, by the arrival of the Duke of *Milan*, who with his Lady and the whole Court was come to *Florence* (to fulfil a pretended Vow) where he was entertain'd with Magnificence ſuitable to his Quality, and the Alliance betwixt them. Then was the firſt time it ever was ſeen in that City, that in Lent, when all Fleſh was forbidden by the Church, it was eaten publickly, without Diſpenſation, or reſpect to the Laws of God or of Men. Among the reſt of the Shows which were made to entertain him, the Holy Ghoſt's deſcending upon the Apoſtles being repreſented and expoſed in the Church *di S. Spirito*, ſo many Candles were uſed in the Solemnity that ſome of them took fire, and burnt the Church to the ground, which was look'd upon as a Judgment and a manifeſt Expreſſion of God's Anger towards us; if then the Duke found the City of *Florence* full of niceneſs and delicacy, and exorbitance in their Manners, he left them much worſe when he went away; ſo that the ſoberer ſort of the Citizens thought it neceſſary for ſumptuary Laws and Edicts of Reſtraint for the regulation of Expences in Cloaths, Funerals, and Feaſtings, to confine them within the compaſs of Frugality and Diſcretion.

The Duke of *Milan* in *Florence*.

In the midſt of this Peace, there happen'd a new and unexpected Tumult in *Tuſcany*, about this Town of *Volterra*, it was the fortune of ſome of thoſe Citizens to find a Mine of Allom; who knowing the uſefulneſs of it, and the advantage which might accrue, that they might be the better ſupplied with Monies, and juſtified by better Authority, they applied themſelves to ſome of the conſiderable Citizens of *Florence*, and made them Sharers in the Profits. The buſineſs at firſt (as all things of that nature are) was lit-

Tumults in *Volterra*.

tle

tle regarded by the *Volterrans*, but after, when they grew ſenſible of their Gains, they ſtrove too late, to do what at firſt might have been eaſily prevented. They began to examine and argue it in the Councils, alledging there was no reaſon a Commodity found in the publick Lands, ſhould be converted to particular uſe: hereupon Ambaſſadors were ſent to *Florence*, and the cauſe referr'd to a Committee of Citizens, who, being either bribed, or convinced, reported, that the deſires of the People of *Volterra* were (in their judgment) unjuſt. That they could not find any reaſon why the Defendants ſhould be deprived of what by their own Labour and Induſtry they had acquired; and that therefore the Mine was in all equity to be continu'd to them: tho' if they pleaſed they might command them to pay an annual Sum of Money, as a Fee and Acknowledgement of their Superiority. This being reported, it rather increas'd than leſſen'd the Mutiny of the *Volterrans*; nothing was diſcours'd of in the whole City, but this Affair: the People preſs'd hard for what they thought themſelves robb'd of: The Partizans were as zealous to keep what they had got, and upon reference to the *Florentines* it was confirmed to them; ſo that in a diſpute, there was one eminent Citizen call'd *Picorino* ſlain, and after him ſeveral more of his Party, and their Houſes plunder'd and burn'd: In the heat of their Rage, they had much ado to forbear the ſame Violence to the *Florentine* Magiſtrates; the fierceneſs of their Fury being over, they ſent Ambaſſadors to *Florence* to repreſent to that *Senate*, that if they would preſerve to them their old Privileges, they would continue their ſubjection, and maintain the City in its ancient dependance. But there was great Argument about the anſwer: *Tomaſo Soderini* was of opinion the *Volterrans* were to be receiv'd upon any Terms, as thinking it dangerous at that time to kindle a fire ſo near their own Houſes: for he was fearful of the diſaffection of the Pope and the Power of the King; nor durſt he depend upon the Amity either of the Duke or the *Venetian*, as not being certain of the Courage of the one, or the Fidelity of the other; harping ſtill upon an old Adage, *that a lean Peace was better than a fat Victory*. *Lorenzo*, on the other ſide, thinking this a fair opportunity to demonſtrate his Wiſdom, and his Magnanimity together, and the rather becauſe encourag'd by ſuch as envy'd *Tomaſo*, he declar'd againſt the Tumult, reſolv'd to puniſh them by force, and affirmed, that if theſe were not corrected *in terrorem*, upon the leaſt trivial and impertinent Occaſion, the reſt of the Territories would do the ſame, without any fear or reverence in the World. The reſult of all being, that they ſhould be corrected; anſwer was return'd to the Ambaſſadors, that the *Volterrans* were not to expect the continuation of their Privileges, having broken them themſelves, and that therefore they were either to ſubmit to the *Senate* without any Capitulation, or to expect the Conſequences of War. The *Volterran* Ambaſſador being return'd with this Anſwer, they prepared for their Defence, fortified their Town, and ſent for Supplies to all the Princes of *Italy*; but none of them gave them any encouragement, but the *Sienneſi*, and the Governour of *Piombino*.

The *Florentine*, on the other ſide, placing much of their Succeſs in their ſpeed, diſpatch'd away 10000 Foot and 2000 Horſe, under the command of *Federigo* Lord of *Urbin*, who falling upon the Country of *Volterra*, did eaſily ſubdue it; after which he ſat down before the City, but that ſtanding high, and the Hill being ſteep, it was not to be aſſaulted but on that ſide where the Church of S. *Aleſſandro* ſtood. The *Volterrans* for their better defence had hired about 1000 Soldiers, who obſerving the *Florentines* reſolution to carry it, and that they were very ſtrong in their Leaguer, believing it untenable, they began to be remiſs and careleſs in their Duties; but in any thing of miſchief to their Maſters, they were vigorous enough: ſo that the poor Citizens being aſſaulted without, and abuſed within, began to encline to a Peace; but not being admitted to Conditions, they were glad to throw themſelves into the Arms of their Enemies, who having cauſed them to open the Gates, the greateſt part of the Army marched in, and advancing to the Palace where their *Priori* were aſſembled, they commanded them to return to their Houſes; but by the way one of them was unluckily pillaged and reviled by a Soldier, and from that Action (the diſpoſition of Mankind prompting him more naturally to Miſchief than Good) proceeded the deſtruction of that City, which for a whole day together was robb'd, and rummag'd by the Soldiers: neither Women, nor Children, nor Churches, nor any place being exempt from the Rapacity as well of their Mercenaries, as Enemies. The News of this Victory was entertain'd in *Florence* with extraordinary Joy, and being *Lorenzo*'s own Enterprize, it turned highly to his Reputation: and one of his moſt intimate Friends upbraided *Tomaſo Soderini* by his Counſel to the contrary; what think you now, Sir (ſaid he to him) *Volterra* is won? To whom *Tomaſo* reply'd, I think it rather loſt; for had you received it upon Terms, it might have been ſerviceable, and contributed to the ſecurity of this City; but being ſo to be kept by force, it will be a trouble and weakneſs to

Volterra ſurrendred and ſacked.

you in time of War, and an expence and inconvenience in time of Peace.

In those Days, the Pope being desirous to keep the Lands of the Church in their natural Obedience, had caused *Spoliro* to be sacked, which Town by Instigation of the Factions within it, had been in Rebellion; and the City of *Castello* having been in the same Contumacy, was afterwards besieged. In that Town *Nicoli Vitelli* was Prince, who retaining a great Correspondence and Friendship with *Lorenzo di Medici*, had Supplies sent him from *Florence*; tho' not enough to defend *Nicolo*, yet sufficient to sow the Seeds of such Enmity betwixt the Pope and the *Medici*, as produced most pernicious Effects. Nor had it been long before they had discover'd themselves, had not the Death of *Piero* Cardinal *di S. Sisto* intervened. For that Cardinal (having travelled thorow all *Italy*, and spent some time both at *Venice* and *Milan*, in honour (as he pretended) to the Marquess of *Ferrara*'s Wedding) had sifted the Princes to see how they stood inclined to a Difference with the *Florentines*: but being return'd to *Rome*, he died, not without suspicion of being poisoned by the *Venetians*, out of an apprehension of his Power, whenever he should have opportunity to exert it; for tho' his Humour and Extraction were mean, and his Education retir'd in a Convent, yet upon his promotion to the Cardinalship, he discover'd more Pride and Ambition, than was becoming not only a Cardinal, but a Pope. For he had the vanity to make a Feast at *Rome* which cost him above 20000 *Florens*, and would have been thought an Extravagance in the greatest King of his time. Pope *Sixtus* having lost his Minister, proceeded more coolly in his Designs; nevertheless the *Florentines*, the Duke, and the *Venetians* entred into a League: *Sixtus* and the King of *Naples* entred into another, and left room for several other Princes to come in if they pleased. By this means all *Italy* was divided into two Factions, every Day producing something or other which augmented the Feuds; and particularly a dispute about the Isle of *Cyprus*, to which *Ferrando* pretended, but the *Venetian* had got the possession; upon which the Pope and *Ferrando* confederated more strictly. The great Captain of those Times, and the most eminent for Conduct, was *Federigo* Prince of *Urbin*, who had served under the *Florentine* a long time: that their League might not have the advantage of such a General, the Pope and *Ferrando* resolved, if possible, to debauch him from them, and to that end both of them invited him to *Naples*. *Federigo* obey'd, with great astonishment and displeasure to the *Florentines*, concluding he would run the same fate which *Giacopo Piccinino* had done before him; but they were utterly mistaken; for *Federigo* returned with great Honour from *Naples* and *Rome*, and was made General of their League. In the mean time the Pope and the King were not idle, but still feeling and tempting the *Senates* of *Romagna* and *Sienna*, to make them their Friends, and enable themselves thereby to be revenged on the *Florentines*; of which the *Florentines* having advertisement, they provided such remedy against their Ambition, as would consist with their Time; and having lost *Federigo*, they entertained *Roberto da Pimino* into their Pay: they renew'd their Leagues with the Citizens of *Perugia*, and the *Senate* of *Faenza*.

Italy in two Factions.

The Pope and the King pretended, that the grounds of their Dissatisfaction was, for that they had seduced the *Venetians* from their League, and associated with them themselves; and the Pope did not think that he could preserve the Honour and Reputation of the Church, nor Count *Girolamo* his Sovereignty in *Romagna*, whilst the *Venetian* and *Florentine* were united. The *Florentines* on the other side feared, that they did not desire to separate them from the *Venetians* so much, to make them their Friends, as to enable themselves more easily to injure them; so that for two Years together, *Italy* remain'd under these Jealousies, and diversities of Humours, before any Tumult broke out. The first which happen'd (and that was no great one) was in *Tuscany*. *Braccio* of *Perugia* (a Person, as we have said before, of great reputation in the Wars) left two Sons, *Oddo* and *Carlo*; whilst the last was very young, his Brother was slain unhappily in a Tumult in the *Val di Lamona*. And *Carlo* (when capable for his Age) was preferr'd by the *Venetians* to a Command in their Army, out of respect to the memory of the Father, and the hopefulness of the Son. The time of his Commission expir'd about that time, and *Carlo* would not suffer it to be renew'd by the *Senate*; being resolv'd to see whether his own Reputation, or his Father's, could bring him back again to *Perugia*. To which the *Venetians* readily consented, as People which added something to their Empire by every Commotion. *Carlo* therefore marched into *Tuscany*, but finding the *Perugians* in League with the *Florentines*, and his Enterprize by consequence more uneasie than he expected, that nevertheless he might do something worthy to be talk'd of, he assaulted the *Siennesi* (pretending an old Debenture to his Father for Service he had done them) and fell upon them with such fury, that their whole Country was overrun. The *Siennesi* seeing themselves so fiercely invaded (and being naturally jealous

Troubles in *Tuscany*.

of

of the *Florentines*) perſuaded themſelves, it was done by their conſent, and made their Complaints to the Pope and the King: they ſent Ambaſſadors likewiſe to *Florence*, who complain'd of the Injuries they had receiv'd; and remonſtrated, that without their privacy and connivance, *Carlo* could never have aſſaulted them ſo ſecurely. The *Florentines* excus'd themſelves, aſſuring them they would employ their greateſt Intereſt that *Carlo* ſhould not injure them any farther; and that in what way ſoever their Ambaſſadors ſhould propoſe, they would require him to deſiſt: of which Proceedings, *Carlo* complain'd as much on the other ſide, declaring, that for not having ſupplied him, the *Florentines* had robb'd themſelves of a conſiderable Acqueſt, and him of great Honour and Reputation; for he promiſed them the poſſeſſion of that City in a ſhort time; ſo much Cowardice he had obſerved in the People, and ſo much diſorder in their Defence: whereupon *Carlo* drew off, and retir'd to his old Maſters the *Venetians*: And the *Sienneſi* (tho' deliver'd by the *Florentines* means) remained full of diſguſt, as not thinking it an Obligation to reſcue them from a Calamity they had brought upon their heads. Whilſt the Affairs in *Tuſcany* were carried on in this manner, by the Pope and the King, there fell out an Accident in *Lombardy* of greater importance, and threatned greater deſtruction. There was a Perſon called *Cola* (of *Mantoua*) who taught the *Latin* Tongue to ſeveral young Gentlemen in *Milan*; this *Cola*, being a learned, but ambitious Man, out of pique to the Duke's Converſation, or ſome private Exceptions of his own, took occaſion in all his Diſcourſe, wherever he came, to declaim againſt ſubjection to an ill Prince; and to magnify their Felicity, whoſe Fortune it was to be born and brought up in a Commonwealth, affirming, that all famous Men had their Education, not under Princes, but Republicks; the latter preferring them as vertuous, the other deſtroying them as dangerous. The Gentlemen with whom he had entred into more particular Familiarity, were *Giovanandrea Lampognano*, *Carlo Viſconti*, and *Girolamo Olgiatto*, and to theſe he had many times inculcated the excellence of the one Government, and the perniciouſneſs of the other, and by degrees he became ſo confident both of their Courage and Inclination, that he perſuaded them to a ſolemn Oath, that as ſoon as their Age would give them leave, they ſhould employ all their Faculties to redeem their Country from the Tyranny of their Prince.

The young Gentlemen, full of his Documents, and a deſire of obſerving their Oaths, deteſting the Courſes of the Duke, and reſenting ſome particular Injuries of their own, were impatient to put his Directions in execution. *Galeazzo* was in his Carriage both cruel and laſcivious (each of which good Qualities were ſufficient to make him odious) it was not enough for him to debauch and vitiate the nobleſt Ladies of the City, but he took delight to publiſh it; no Man (in his Judgment) was handſomly puniſhed, who was not executed with ſome unuſual Circumſtance of Cruelty. He was ſuſpected likewiſe to have murder'd his Mother; for not fancying himſelf Prince enough, whilſt ſhe was in the way, he behav'd himſelf ſo towards her, that ſhe deſir'd to retire to *Cremona* (which was the place of her Dower) in which Journey ſhe was ſurprized with a ſudden Fit of Sickneſs, and died, and her Death by many People imputed to her Son. By tampering with, or reflecting upon ſome Ladies of their Relations, *Galeazzo* had highly diſobliged both *Carlo* and *Girolamo*; and to *Giovanandrea* he had refuſed to give the poſſeſſion of the Abbey of *Miramando*, which was granted to his Predeceſſors by the Pope. Theſe private Injuries, egg'd on the young Gentlemen to revenge themſelves, and deliver their Country; preſuming, if they could kill him, not only the Nobility, but the whole body of the People, would follow them: reſolved therefore upon the Fact, they met many times to conſult of the way, and their old Familiarity render'd them unſuſpected. Whilſt they were contriving their Buſineſs, to make themſelves more dextrous and courageous when they came to it, their way was to ſtrike and ſtab one another with the Sheaths of thoſe Daggers which they had prepared to do the work, ſometimes upon the Arms, and ſometimes upon the Breaſts of one another. At length they came to conſider of the time and the place: in the Caſtle it was thought unſafe; a hunting, dangerous and uncertain; a walking, difficult and unpracticable; in the Conventions impoſſible: at length it was concluded, he ſhould be Aſſaſſinated at ſome Show or publick Feſtivity, to which he would certainly come; at which time, upon ſundry Pretences, they might have opportunity to aſſemble their Friends. They concluded likewiſe, that if any of them, upon any occaſion whatever, ſhould be abſent or apprehended, the reſt ſhould proceed, and kill him upon the Place.

Conſpiracy againſt the Duke of *Milan*.

In the Year 1476, *Chriſtmas* coming on, and the Duke accuſtom'd on S. *Stephen*'s Day with great Solemnity to viſit the Church of that Martyr, they pitched upon that for the Time and the Place. The Morning arriving, they cauſed ſome of their principal Friends and Servants to arm, pretending they were to aſſiſt *Giovanandrea*, who (con-

trary to the Inclinations of ſome of his Enemies) was to bring certain Pipes of Water into his Grounds for his greater Convenience: being armed according to Directions, they conducted them to the Church, alledging, that they would get leave of the Prince to juſtify what might happen: they cauſed ſeveral others likewiſe of their Friends and Allies to meet there, upon ſeveral Pretences, preſuming when the ſtroke was ſtruck, and the buſineſs done to their hand, they would fall in then without any difficulty or ſcruple. Their Reſolution was, as ſoon as the Duke was killed, to get all thoſe armed Men at their heels, and to march into that part of the Town where they thought they could raiſe the People with moſt eaſe, and perſuade them to arm againſt the Dutcheſs; and the Miniſters of the State not doubting but the People would readily follow them, being much diſtreſſed for want of Proviſions and promiſed (as they intended) the Houſes of *Cecco Simonetta*, *Giovanni Botti*, *Franceſco Lucani*, and all the reſt of the Governors, to plunder. Having laid their deſign thus, and encouraged one another to execute it bravely, *Giovanandrea*, with his Accomplices, went to Church betimes, and heard Maſs together; after which *Giovanandrea* turning towards the Image of S. *Ambrogio*, he ſaid, *Moſt venerable Patron of our City, thou knoweſt our Intention, and for what end we expoſe ourſelves to ſo many dangers; be, I beſeech you, kind and propitious to our Enterprize, and by favouring of Juſtice, let the World ſee how much Injuſtice diſpleaſes you.* To the Duke on the other ſide, before he came to Church, many things happened which ſeemed to preſage his Death. When he dreſſed himſelf that Morning, he put on a Coat of Mail which he uſually wore, but on a ſudden thinking it unhandſom or troubleſom, he cauſed it to be pulled off and laid by. He had a mind to hear Maſs in his own Chapel, but his Chaplain was gone to S. *Stephen*'s Church, and carried all the Implements along with him: having News of that, he order'd the Biſhop of *Como* ſhould officiate for him, but he excuſed himſelf upon very reaſonable Impediments; ſo that he was neceſſitated (as it were) to go to Church. Before he went, he cauſed *Giovan Galeazzo* and *Hermes*, his Sons, to be brought to him; and when they came, he kiſſed and embraced them, as if he was never to ſee them again: at length (and very loath) being parted from them, he reſolved to go to Church; and marching out of the Caſtle betwixt the Ambaſſadors of *Ferrara* and *Mantoua*, he went towards S. *Stephen*'s. The Conſpirators in the mean time, to give the leſs Suſpicion, and avoid the Cold, which at that time was very great, were got up into a Chamber belonging to the Arch-Prieſt, who was of their Acquaintance; but hearing the Duke was coming, they went down and plac'd themſelves in the Porch, *Giovanandrea* and *Girolamo* on the Right-hand, and *Charles* on the Left. Thoſe who marched before the Duke were already entred, then came the Duke himſelf encompaſſed with a great multitude of People, as is uſual in ſuch pompous Solemnities. The firſt which addreſſed themſelves to their Work, was *Giovanandrea* and *Girolamo*, who pretending to make room, preſſed up to the Duke, and with ſhort Daggers which they had ready drawn in their Sleeves, they ſtabb'd him. *Giovanandrea* gave him two Wounds, one in the Belly, the other in the Throat: *Girolamo* ſtruck him in the Throat likewiſe, and in the Belly. *Carlo Viſconti* being placed nearer the Door, the Duke was paſt him before he was aſſaulted, and therefore he could not ſtrike him before he was dead; however, he muſt do his ſhare, and with a Schine gave him two deep Wounds upon his Shoulders. His Blows were ſo ſudden and thick, he was cut down and dead, before almoſt any body perceived it. Nor had he time to do or ſay more, than to call upon the Name of our Lady (and that but once) as he fell. The Duke being ſlain, great Hubbub was rais'd, many Swords drawn, and (as it happens frequently in ſuch Caſes) many People ran in great confuſion about the Streets, without any certain knowledge of what had paſſed. However thoſe who were about the Duke, had ſeen him killed, and knew who they were that did it, preſſed hard upon them to revenge it.

The Duke of *Milan* ſlain.

Giovanandrea being willing to have diſengag'd himſelf, got out of the Church, thruſt himſelf among the Women who were there in great numbers upon their Knees; but being intangled and ſtopped by their Coats, a Moor (who was one of the Duke's Footmen) got up to him, and killed him. *Carlo* was ſlain alſo by thoſe who were by; but *Girolamo Olgiato* got out of the Church among the Crowd: for ſeeing his Companions dead, and not knowing whether to betake himſelf, he went to his own Houſe, but was refuſed by his Father and his Brothers: His Mother having more Commiſeration, recommended him to a Prieſt, who had been an ancient Friend of that Family, which Prieſt changed Habits with him, and convey'd him to his Houſe, where he remain'd two Days in hopes ſome Tumult or other would fall out, and he might have opportunity to ſave himſelf. But finding he was miſtaken in that, and fearing to be found out where he was, he diſguiſed himſelf, and endeavour'd to get off; but was diſcover'd, ſecur'd, and deliver'd

deliver'd up to the Magiſtate, to whom he confeſſed the whole Proceſs of the Conſpiracy. This *Girolamo* was about twenty three Years old, no leſs courageous and reſolute at his Death, than at the perpetration of the Fact. Being ſtripp'd, and the Executioner with his Knife in hand ready to give the ſtroke, he ſpake theſe Words in *Latin*, *Mors acerba, fama perpetua ſtabit vetus memoria facti.* This Plot was carried on with ſtrange Secrecy, and executed with prodigious Courage, by theſe unhappy young Gentlemen; but being neither follow'd, nor defended by thoſe whom they expected, they miſcarried, and were ſlain. Let Princes by this Example live ſo as to make themſelves honour'd and belov'd, that no body may hope to kill them and eſcape; and let other People have care of relying upon the Multitude too far, how diſcontented ſoever; for in their diſtreſs they will be ſure to forſake them. This Accident put all *Italy* into an Amaze, but much more what happen'd in *Florence* not long after; for that brake the Peace of all *Italy*, which had continu'd for 12 Years, as ſhall be ſhown in the next Book, whoſe End will be no leſs ſad and deplorable, than the Beginning is bloody and terrible.

THE HISTORY OF FLORENCE.

BOOK VIII.

THE beginning of this Eighth Book falling betwixt two Conſpiracies, the one executed at *Milan*, and already deſcribed; the other at *Florence*, and remaining to be related; it would have been convenient (according to my Cuſtom) to have ſaid ſomething of the quality and importance of Conſpiracies; and I ſhould willingly have undertaken it, had it not been done in another place, and the Subject too copious to be paſſed over with brevity. Waving therefore a Matter which would require ſo much conſideration, and is elſewhere amply diſcourſed; I ſhall tell, how the Family of the *Medici* (having ſubdued the Adverſaries which openly oppoſed them) to make themſelves abſolute in the City, and reduce the reſt to a civil Submiſſion, were neceſſitated to diſable thoſe who were privately their Enemies. For whilſt the *Medici* were but equal in Authority, and as it were but in Competition with other great Families; the Citizens which emulated their Greatneſs, might oppoſe them publickly without danger, becauſe the Magiſtrates being free and independant, neither Party was afraid, till one of them was ſuppreſs'd. But after the Victory in 66, the Government devolving wholly upon the *Medici*, they exerciſed it with ſo much rigor, that thoſe who were diſcontented were forc'd to comport themſelves patiently under it, or by private and clandeſtine Machinations to endeavour to remove it; which ſeldom and with great difficulty ſucceeding, they moſt commonly ruin'd the Conſpirators, and augmented their Grandeur, againſt whom they were contrived. So that a Prince, according to that method, to be depoſed, if he be not killed dead (as the Duke of *Milan*) which happens but rarely, he breaks forth into greater Authority; and how good ſoever before, becomes bad and tyrannical. For the Practices of thoſe Men, give him occaſion to fear; Fear, to ſecure himſelf; Security, to be inſolent; and from thence ſprings ſuch Averſions and Hatred as is commonly his ruin: ſo that, in concluſion, Treaſon does uſually deſtroy the Contrivers, and ruin them in time againſt whom they conſpired.

Italy

Italy (as we said before) was divided into two Factions; the Pope and the King of *Naples* made one; the *Venetians*, the Duke of *Milan*, and the *Florentines* made the other: and tho' betwixt them War was not solemnly declared, yet daily Provocations were given on both sides, and the Pope very busie in his designs against *Florence*. *Philippo di Medici*, the Archbishop of *Pisa*, being dead, in crosness to that Family, his Holiness invested *Francesco Salviati* in that Bishoprick, as knowing him to be their Enemy; and the *Senate* of *Florence* refusing him possession, new Quarrels arose which created much trouble. Hereupon the Family of the *Pazzi* was encourag'd at *Rome*, and the Family of the *Medici* affronted in every thing. The Family of the *Pazzi*, for Quality and Estate, was the most illustrious in *Florence*. The chief of them was *Messer Giacopo*, who for his Wealth and Nobility was made a Knight by the People: This *Giacopo* had only one natural Daughter living, but several Nephews by *Piero* and *Antonio*, his Brothers: the chief of them, were *Guilielmo*, *Francesco*, *Rinato*, *Giovanni*, and (after them) *Andrea*, *Galeotto*, and *Nicolo*. *Cosimo di Medici* observing the Grandeur of that Family, had married *Bianca*, his Niece, to the eldest, *Guilielmo*, in hopes by that Alliance to remove the Jealousie and Animosity which was then betwixt the Families. But (so uncertain and fallacious are all human Designs) it proved quite contrary. For those who were of *Lorenzo*'s Cabal, persuaded him it was dangerous, and a diminution to his Authority, to advance such Citizens as were wealthy and potent; whereupon *Giacopo* and his Nephews were not preferred to those Dignities which (in the opinion of other People) they deserved. This gave occasion of disgust to the *Pazzi*, and apprehension to the *Medici*; and the increase of the one, gave Matter for the augmentation of the other: So that in all things where other Citizens were entertain'd, the *Pazzi* were rejected by the Magistrates. The Council of Eight (upon a trivial occasion, without respect and difference usually shown to Persons of his Quality) recalled *Francesco de Pazzi* from *Rome*, and required his residence in *Florence*. Hereupon the *Pazzi* complained highly of the Government, and spake bitterly of them wherever they came, which produced more Suspicion in the Government, and more Injury to themselves. *Giovanni de Pazzi* was married to the Daughter of *Giovanni Boromei*, a very rich Man, who being dead without other Children, his Estate descended to his Daughter. Notwithstanding, *Carlo* his Nephew got possession of part, and refused to surrender. The Controversy coming to a hearing, it was decreed, that *Carlo* should keep his possession, and the Daughter was defeated: which Injustice, the *Pazzi* imputed wholly to the Malevolence of the *Medici*; of which *Giuliano* complained many times to his Brother *Lorenzo*, admonishing him to have a care lest grasping at too much, he robb'd himself of all. But *Lorenzo* being young, and elated with his Power, would have a hand in every thing, and all must be acknowledg'd from him. The *Pazzi* being too noble and opulent, to swallow so many Affronts, began to cast about how they might revenge themselves. The first who brake the Ice, was *Francesco*, who being more sensible and courageous than the rest, determin'd to recover what was his Right, or to lose what he had.

Animosity betwixt the *Pazzi* and the *Medici*.

Retaining an implacable hatred to the Government at *Florence*, he liv'd most commonly at *Rome*, where he employed great Sums of Money, as other *Florentine* Merchants did usually do. Having an intimate acquaintance with Count *Girolamo*, they complained to one another oftentimes of the Inhumanity of the *Medici*, at length they came to a solemn Debate, and it was concluded that for the one's recovery of his Estate and the other's living freely in that City, it was necessary the present Government in *Florence* should be subverted, which could not be done, but by killing *Giuliano* and *Lorenzo*. They were confident (having first convinc'd them of the easiness of the Fact) the Pope and the King of *Naples* would give their consents. Having entertain'd these Thoughts betwixt themselves, they thought fit to communicate with the new Archbishop of *Pisa*; who being naturally ambitious and lately disobliged, most readily embraced it: consulting themselves what measures were to be taken, it was resolved, that *Giacopo de Pazzi* should be drawn in, without whose concurrence the design was like to be more difficult. To this purpose it was concluded, that *Francesco de Pazzi* should repair immediately to *Florence*; and the Count and Archbishop continue at *Rome* to be near the Pope when things should be fit to be imparted. *Francesco* finding *Giacopo* more formal and untractable than he desired, and signifying it to *Rome*, it was resolved, to apply greater Authority to dispose him, whereupon the Archbishop and the Count communicated the whole Affair with *Giovan Baptista*, one of his Holiness's Generals.

Conspiracy against *Lorenzo* and *Guilian di Medici*.

This *Giovanni* was a Man of great Reputation in War, and particularly obliged both by the Count and the Pope. Nevertheless he objected the great danger and difficulties of the Enterprize, which the Archbishop endeavour'd to repel, by urging the Assistance they were to expect both from the Pope and the King of *Naples*. The hatred the Citizens of *Florence* bare to the *Medici*; the number of Relations and Friends which

which would follow the *Salviati* and the *Pazzi*; the eaſineſs to kill them, by reaſon of their frequent walking alone about the City without either Guards or Suſpicion; and (after they were dead) the ſmall or no oppoſition to be expected in the change of the Government: which Allegations *Giovanni Battiſta* could not abſolutely believe, becauſe he had been aſſured the contrary by ſeveral conſiderable Citizens. Whilſt theſe things were in this ſuſpence, it happen'd that *Carlo* Lord of *Faenza* fell ſick, and was given over for dead. Hereupon the Count and Archbiſhop conceived they had a fair opportunity to diſpatch *Battiſta* to *Florence*, and thence into *Romagna*, under pretence of recovering certain Towns which *Carlo* of *Faenza* had taken from them. The Count therefore commiſſion'd *Battiſta* to wait upon *Lorenzo*, and in his Name to deſire his Advice how he was to behave himſelf in *Romagna*: after which he was to viſit *Franceſco di Pazzi* and *Giacopo di Pazzi*, and ſee if he could engage them in the deſign: and that he might carry the Pope's Authority along with him, they appointed him, before he departed, to receive his Holineſs's Commands, who promiſed what could be imagined for the promotion of the Enterprize. *Battiſta* departing ſpeedily from *Rome*, arriv'd at *Florence*; conſulted *Lorenzo* according to his Inſtructions; was very civilly received, and ſo wiſely and amicably anſwered in all his demands, that *Battiſta* was ſurprized, and began to look upon him as a courteous, diſcreet Friend to the Count, and one that had been maliciouſly miſrepreſented. However, he was to purſue his Orders, and viſit *Franceſco*; he being at *Lucca*, he went directly to *Giacopo*, and upon the firſt motion found him very averſe. But before he went away, the Pope's Recommendation ſweetned him ſo, that he told *Battiſta* he might proceed in his Journey to *Romagna*, and by that time he came back, *Franceſco* would be in *Florence*, and they would talk farther of the buſineſs. *Battiſta* went to *Romagna* and returned; purſued his pretended Tranſactions with *Lorenzo*: when he had done with him, went to the *Pazzi*, and ordered things ſo, that *Giacopo* was drawn in upon ſerious Conſultation of the way. *Giacopo* was of opinion their deſign was impoſſible whilſt both the Brothers were together in *Florence*; that they had better attend till *Lorenzo* went to *Rome*, which by report would be certain, and in a very ſhort time. *Franceſco* was willing enough to have had *Lorenzo* at *Rome*, but if the worſt came to the worſt, and he did not go thither, they might be ſure to kill them both together at ſome Wedding, ſome Show, or ſome Act of Devotion: As to their foreign Aſſiſtance, it was thought convenient, that the Pope ſhould ſend his Forces againſt *Caſtello de Montone*, having juſt occaſion of invading the Count *Carlo*, for the Troubles and Tumults he had raiſed in the Country of *Perugia* and *Sienna*. Notwithſtanding, they came to no poſitive Reſolution at that time; only they agreed, that *Franceſco di Pazzi* and *Giovan Battiſta* ſhould return to *Rome*, and there determine all things with his Holineſs and the Count. The whole matter being redebated ſolemnly at *Rome*, they came to this concluſion (the Enterprize againſt *Montone* being confirmed) that *Giovan Franceſco da Tolentino* (an Officer of the Pope's) ſhould go into *Romagna*, and *Lorenzo da Caſtello* into his Country; each of them get together what Forces they were able, and keep them ready to be diſpos'd of, as the Archbiſhop *Salviati* and *Franceſco dei Pazzi* ſhould order; who being come to *Florence* with *Giovan Battiſta*, they prepared all that was neceſſary; and King *Ferrando*'s Ambaſſador aſſured them of his Maſter's utmoſt aſſiſtance. The Archbiſhop and *Franceſco* being arriv'd at *Florence*, they perſuaded into their Party *Giacopo*, the Son of *Poggio*, a learned Youth, but ambitious, and ſtudious of new things. That drew in likewiſe two *Giacopo Salviati*'s, one of them a Brother, the other a Kinſman of the Archbiſhop's. They hired *Bernardo Bandini* and *Napoleone*, two valiant young *French* Gentlemen, who had been much obliged to the Family of the *Pazzi*. Of Foreigners, beſides them two, they entertained *Antonio da Volterra*, and one *Stephano* a Prieſt, who taught the *Latin* Tongue to *Giacopo*'s Daughter, and lived in his Houſe.

Rinato dei Pazzi (a wiſe and ſtudent Man, and one who very well underſtood the conſequences of ſuch Plots) conſented not to it, but rather deteſted it, and by all plauſible ways endeavour'd to diſſuade it. The Pope had maintained at *Piſa* to ſtudy the Canon-Law, *Rafaelo di Riario*, Nephew to the Count *Girolamo*, from which place he was recalled by his Holineſs, and promoted to a Cardinalſhip. It was judged commodious by the Conſpiracy, that this Cardinal ſhould come to *Florence* for the better concealment of their Deſign, ſeeing that in his Equipage all ſuch of their Confederates as were neceſſary might be convey'd into the Town, which would much facilitate the Work. Accordingly the Cardinal arrived, and was lodged by *Giacopo dei Pazzi* at a Country-houſe of his at *Montughi*, not far from *Florence*. They deſired by his means, that *Lorenzo* and *Guiliano* might be brought together; and it was reſolved, that the firſt opportunity they ſhould be killed. It was contrived then to make an Entertainment for the Cardinal at *Fieſole*, but by accident, or on purpoſe, it fell out that *Guiliano*

Rinato dei Pazzi diſſuades from the Enterprize, but in vain.

liano was not there; ſo that that Deſign being defeated, their next was to invite the Cardinal to *Florence*, and thither they made no queſtion but both the Brothers would come: The 26th of *April* 1478. was appointed to be the Day. The Night before, they met all together, and prepared and diſpoſed all things for execution the next Morning: but the Day being come, News was brought to *Franceſco*, that *Guiliano* was not there: upon that, the Chief of them met together again, and concluded the Buſineſs was no longer to be delay'd, for being communicated to ſo many, it was not poſſible to conceal it: ſo that they determin'd without more ado, to aſſaſſinate him in the Church of *Santa Riparata*, when (the Cardinal being preſent) both the Brothers they preſumed would be of courſe. They appointed *Giovanni Battiſta* to attack *Lorenzo*, and *Franceſco dei Pazzi* and *Bernardo Bandini*, to do as much to *Guiliano*. But *Giovanni Battiſta* excuſed himſelf; the former Familiarity he had had with *Lorenzo*, or ſome other accident, having mollified his heart: He pretended his Courage would not ſerve him to commit ſuch an Act in the Church, as would add Sacrilege to his Treaſon, and his denial was the firſt ſtep to the deſtruction of them all; for being ſtraitned in time, they were forced to depute *Antonio da Volterra*, and *Stephano* the Prieſt, to that Office, two Perſons very unapt for ſuch an Action, both in reſpect of their Nature and Education; and certainly if in any thing a reſolute and great Mind (accuſtom'd by long Experience to Cruelty and Blood) be neceſſary, it is in this Caſe where Princes are to be kill'd. Having concluded of their time, and other Circumſtances, there was nothing behind but the ſignal when they were to begin; which was when the Prieſt which celebrated the principal Maſs, ſhould receive the Sacrament himſelf: at which time the Archbiſhop of *Salviati* with his own Followers, *Giacopo di Poggio* with his ſhould poſſeſs themſelves of the Palace of the *Senate*, that either by perſuaſion or force the *Senate* might be brought over to their ſide, as ſoon as the Brothers were ſlain. Upon this Reſolution they went to the Church where the Cardinal and *Lorenzo* were already in their Seats. The Church was thronged with People, and Divine Service begun, when it was obſerved that *Guiliano* was not there: whereupon *Franceſco dei Pazzi* and *Bernardo*, who were deſign'd to murder him, went to him to his Houſe, and with Intreaties and other Artifice, got him along with them to the Church. It is very remarkable, and not often to be matched, that with ſo horrid and deteſtable a deſign at their Hearts, they could carry themſelves with that Tranquillity and Compoſedneſs; for all the way as they paſſed, they entertained him with youthful and pleaſant Diſcourſe: and ſuch was the Security of *Franceſco*, that under pretence of Careſſing and Embracing, he felt about his Body to ſee whether he was armed. *Guiliano* and *Lorenzo* both, knew well enough that the *Pazzi* bore them no good Will, and that with all their hearts they would depoſe them if they could; but they believed whenever they attempted againſt them it would be legally, and without any violence upon their Perſons, and therefore ſuſpecting nothing of danger in that kind, they diſſembled as much kindneſs to the *Pazzi*, as the *Pazzi* did to them. The Aſſaſſines being ready (thoſe who were to kill *Lorenzo*, by the help of the Crowd being got up to him without any ſuſpicion, on that ſide, and *Guiliano*'s on the other) the Sign was given, and *Bernardo Bandini*, with a ſhort Dagger provided on purpoſe, ſtabbed *Guiliano* into the Breaſt, who paſſing a ſtep or two forward, fell down upon the ground; *Franceſco dei Pazzi* threw himſelf upon him, ſtabbed him all over, and ſtruck with ſuch fury, that he hit his own Leg, and made a deſperate Wound: *Antonio* and *Stephano* in the mean time attempted upon *Lorenzo*, and making ſeveral ſtrokes at him, they wounded him ſlightly in the Throat, and no where elſe; for either by their own Faint-heartedneſs, or his Courage in defending himſelf, or the Interpoſition of thoſe who were by, all of them were put off, and their whole Enterprize miſcarried; whereupon they fled in great terror, and hid themſelves as well as they could; but being found, they were ſhamefully put to death, and their Bodies dragged about the City. *Lorenzo* on the other ſide, joining with thoſe Friends he had about him, betook himſelf to the Veſtry, and ſtood upon his guard. *Bernardo Bandini* ſeeing *Guiliano* dead, having an old quarrel to *Franceſco Nori*, a great Friend to the *Medici*, he killed him into the bargain; and not ſatisfied with two Murders, he crowded up to *Lorenzo* with his Courage and Alacrity to ſupply what the ſlackneſs and Cowardice of his Accomplices had left unfiniſhed: but finding him barricado'd in the Veſtry, he could not come at him. In the midſt of this great Tumult (which was ſo dreadful it was thought the Church would have been pulled down upon their heads) the Cardinal got up cloſe to the Altar, where by the labour of the Prieſts he was preſerved till the Tumult was appeaſed, and the *Senate* ſent to conduct him to his own Palace, where he remained in great fear till the time he was diſmiſſed. There were at that Time in *Florence* certain *Perugians*, who had been baniſhed from their Houſes in the time of their

their Factions; theſe *Perugians* the *Pazzi* had drawn to their Party, by promiſes of Reſtitution. So that the Archbiſhop of *Salviati* marching with *Giacopo di Poggio* and their Followers to ſecure themſelves of the Palace, took them along with him; and being come to the Palace, he left ſome of his Company below, with orders upon the firſt Noiſe above ſtairs, that they ſhould ſeize upon the Gate, whilſt he and the reſt of the *Perugians* went up into the Caſtle. Finding the *Senate* was riſen (by reaſon it was late) after a ſhort time he was met by *Ceſare Petrucci* the *Gonfaloniere di Giuſtitia*; ſo that entring further with him, and ſome few of his Crew, he left the reſt without, who walking into the Chancery, by accident ſhut themſelves in; for the Lock was ſo contriv'd, that without the Key it was not eaſily to be open'd either within or without. The Archbiſhop being entred with the *Gonfaloniere*, pretending to impart ſome great matter to him from the Pope, he accoſted him in ſo confuſed and diſtracted a way, the *Gonfaloniere* from the diſorder both of his Looks and Expreſſions, began to ſuſpect, ſprung from him out of the Chamber with a great cry, and finding *Giacopo di Poggio*, he caught him by the Hair of the Head, and delivered him to one of the Sergeants. The noiſe running immediately to the *Senators*, with ſuch Arms as they had about them, they ſet upon the Conſpirators, and all of them who went up with the Archbiſhop (part being ſhut up, and part unable to defend themſelves) were either kill'd, or thrown alive out of the Windows. Of this number, the Archbiſhop, the two other *Salviati*, and *Giacopo di Poggio* were hang'd. Thoſe who were left below, had forc'd the Guards, and poſſeſſed themſelves of the Gate; inſomuch that the Citizens which upon the firſt Alarm had run into the Caſtle, were not able to aſſiſt the *Senate* either with their Counſel or Arms. *Franceſco de Pazzi* in the mean time, and *Bernardo Bandini* ſeeing *Lorenzo* eſcaped, and one of themſelves (upon whom the hopes of that Enterprize did principally depend) moſt grievouſly wounded, they were much diſmay'd; *Bernardo* concluding all loſt, thinking to provide for his Safety with the ſame Courage, as he had injured the *Medici*, he made his eſcape. *Franceſco* being return'd to his Houſe, tried if he could get on Horſeback (for orders were, as ſoon as the Fact was committed, to gallop about the Town, and excite the People to Liberty and Arms) but finding he could not ride by reaſon of the deepneſs of his Wound, and the great quantity of Blood which he had loſt, he deſired *Giacopo* to do that Office for him; and then ſtripping, he threw himſelf upon the Bed. *Giacopo*, tho' an ancient Man, and not verſed in ſuch kind of Tumults, to try the laſt experiment of his Fortune, he got on Horſeback, and with about an hundred Horſe well armed, and formerly prepared, he marched towards the Palace, crying out *Liberty*, *Liberty*, to the People as he went along; but ſome of them being deafned by their Obligations to the *Medici*, and the reſt not deſirous of any change in the Government, none of them came in. The *Senators* who were on the top of the Palace, and had ſecured themſelves as well as they could, threw down Stones upon their Heads, and frighted them with Threats as much as poſſible. *Giacopo* was in great Confuſion, and knew not what to do, when his Couſin *Giovanni Sariſtori* coming to him, and reproaching him by what was done already, adviſed him to go home to his Houſe and be quiet, aſſuring him there were other Citizens who would be as careful of the People, and their Liberties, as he. Being therefore utterly deſtitute of all hopes, *Lorenzo* alive, *Franceſco* wounded, and no body appearing for him, he reſolved to ſave himſelf if he could, and marched out of *Florence* with his Party at his heels, and went towards *Romagna*. In the mean time the whole City was in Arms, and *Lorenzo*, ſurrounded by a ſtrong Party of armed Men, was reconveyed to his Palace. The *Senate*'s Palace was recovered, and all thoſe who poſſeſs'd it were either taken or killed. The Name of the *Medici* was with great Acclamation cried about the City, and the Members of thoſe who were ſlain were either dragged or carried upon the point of their Swords about the Streets; every body with great Anger and Cruelty perſecuting the *Pazzi*. Their Houſes were all broken up by the People; *Franceſco*, naked as they found him in his bed, was hurried out of his Houſe to the Palace, and hanged up by the Biſhop and his Brethren: Yet with all their Contumely by the way, and all their Affronts when he came there, they could not provoke him to give them one Word; only he looked grim, and fixed his Eyes upon every one that abuſed him, and without any other complaint, he ſilently expired. *Guglielmo de Pazzi*, Brother-in-Law to *Lorenzo*, was preſerved in his Houſe, both out of reſpect to his Innocence, and the interceſſion of *Bianca* his Wife. There was not a Citizen in all the City, but went either armed or diſarmed to *Lorenzo* in this Exigence, and proffered him both themſelves and their Fortunes; ſo great was the kindneſs and intereſt which that Family by their Prudence and Liberality had gained in the People. Whilſt this Buſineſs happened, *Rinato di Pazzi* was retired to his Country-houſe, intending to diſguiſe himſelf, and eſcape if he could; but he was diſcovered, apprehended

The Conſpiracy miſcarries.

by the way, and brought back again to *Florence*. *Giacopo* was taken likewise paſſing the *Alps*; for the *Alpigines* hearing what happened in *Florence*, ſeeing him paſs that way, they purſued, took him, and returned him to *Florence*; nor could he prevail with them (tho' ſeveral times he made it his earneſt Requeſt) to kill him by the way. Four days after this Accident, *Giacopo* and *Rinato* were condemned and put to Death; but among all who were executed (and they were ſo many that the Streets and High-ways were full of their Limbs) none was ſo much lamented as *Rinato*; for he was always eſteemed an honeſt good Man, not guilty of that Pride and Arrogance which was obſerved in the reſt of his Family. And that this Story might not paſs without an extraordinary inſtance of the fury of the People, *Giacopo*, who was buried at firſt in the Sepulchre of his Fathers, afterwards was torn from thence as an excommunicated Perſon, dragged out of the Walls of the City, and thrown into a Hole; and being taken up again, his Body was drawn (in the ſame Halter with which he was hanged) naked about the Streets, and having no place allowed it to be quiet at Land, was at laſt thrown into the *Arnus*. A great Example of the inconſtancy of Fortune, to ſee a Perſon of his Wealth and Authority, pulled ſo ignominiouſly in pieces, and ruined with ſo many circumſtances of Contempt. They ſpake indeed of his Vices, and of a ſtrange propenſity in him to Swearing and Play, above the degree of the moſt profligate Perſon; but thoſe Infirmities were abundantly recompenſed in his Charity and Beneficence: for he was a great reliever of the Poor, and endow'd ſeveral Places of Devotion. The *Sunday* before this Plot was to be executed, that no Man might be a Sufferer by any ill Fortune of his, he paid all his Debts; and all the Effects in his Warehouſes or Cuſtody which belonged to other Perſons, he conſigned to their ſeveral Owners with an unimaginable care. After a long Examination, *Giovan Battiſta Monteſecco* was at laſt condemned, and his Head ſtruck off. *Guglielmo de Pazzi* was baniſhed, and his Kinſmen which were left alive, impriſoned in a Dungeon in the Caſtle of *Volterra*. When the Tumult was over, and the Conſpirators executed, *Guiliano*'s Funeral was celebrated with the univerſal Condolement of the City, he having been a Perſon of as much goodneſs and humanity as could be deſired in one of his quality and extraction. He had only one Son, born ſome Months after his Death, who was chriſtned *Giulio*, who proved ſo remarkable for his Vertue and Fortune, that the whole World rings of his Reputation at this day; and if God gives me Life, I ſhall ſpeak largely of, when I come to the deſcription of his Times.

The Forces which were got together under *Lorenzo da Caſtello* in the Vale of *di Tevero*, under *Giovan Franceſco Tolentino* in *Romagna*, in behalf of the *Pazzi*, were in their march towards *Florence*: but hearing of the miſcarriage of their Affairs, they returned from whence they came. Nevertheleſs the Pope and the King of *Naples* (tho' their Conſpiracy had failed, and not produced thoſe Mutations which they hoped for in *Florence*) reſolved to attempt that by open War, which could not otherwiſe be effected, and both the one and the other cauſed their Forces to advance towards that City with all poſſible diligence, declaring as they went, that all the deſign of their march, and all their deſire of the Citizens, was not removing but the removal of *Lorenzo*, who was the only Enemy he had in the Town. The King's Army had already paſſed the *Tronto*, and the Pope's was in the Country of *Perugia*; and leſt his Temporal Power ſhould be too little, he let looſe his Spiritual Maledictions and Excommunications againſt him. Whereupon the *Florentines* ſeeing themſelves invaded with ſuch formidable Numbers, addreſs'd themſelves to their defence, with all poſſible care. *Lorenzo de Medici* (becauſe the War was pretended only againſt him) preſt very earneſtly, that all the chief Citizens might be invited to the Palace before the *Senate*; and above 300 of them appearing, he ſpake to them in this manner.

The Pope and King of *Naples* make War upon the *Florentines*.

Moſt noble Lords, and you moſt magnificent Citizens,

Lorenzo's Speech to the *Florentines*.

I Do not well know whether I am to congratulate, or condole with you this day for the things which are paſſed; and truly when I conſider with what Malice and Colluſion I was aſſaulted, and my Brother ſlain, I cannot but condole, and my whole Heart and Soul is overwhelmed with the Affliction; when after that I revolve with what promptitude, with what zeal, with what love, with what unanimity and univerſal conſent of the whole City, his Death was revenged, and mine prevented; I cannot but rejoice, nay, even triumph and exult. For as Experience has now taught me, that I had more Enemies in this City, than I ſuſpected; it has convinced me on the other ſide, I had more true Friends than I could have hoped for: ſo that I am to congratulate your Goodneſs, and to condole the Injury and Iniquity of other People, which is the more deplorable, becauſe rare and undeſerved. Think, I beſeech you, moſt noble Citizens, to what point of Infelicity Fortune hath brought our Family, when even among our Friends, our Relations, and in the very

very Church we are in danger. Thoſe who are in diſtreſs, or apprehenſion of Death, are wont to fly to their Friends and Relations for ſhelter; we found ours not only diſpoſed, but armed, and prepared, and impatient to deſtroy us. Thoſe who are under any publick or private Perſecution, have uſually their Refuge and Sanctuary in the Church: where others are protected we are aſſaulted; where Parricides and Murderers are ſecured, the Medici *are murdered themſelves. But God (who has not hitherto deſerted our Family) has preſerved us, and undertaken our defence. What injury have we done any body, that could deſerve ſuch vehement revenge? Sure we our ſelves never offended thoſe Perſons who have been ſo furious againſt us; if we had, we ſhould not have left them in that capacity to revenge themſelves: If it be publick Cenſure or Injury which provoked them (and of that too I know nothing) 'tis you, not we are offended; This Palace, this* Senate, *and the Majeſty of this Government, is aſperſed with undeſerved Decrees againſt the Citizens, in partiality to us, which to my own knowledge is far from being true. We would not have injur'd them if we had been able, and you would not have ſuffered us, had we been willing: Whoever traces the truth to the bottom, will find our Family was not exalted by this Government for nothing; if I may ſpeak it modeſtly, it was their Humanity, their Bounty, their Munificence which conſtrained you to it: if then we have been beneficial to Strangers, how came our Relations to be diſguſted? If their appetite of Dominion prompted them to what they have done (and the ſeeing of this Palace, and filling the* Piazza *with armed Men, is an evident demonſtration it was nothing elſe) the Deſign is ſufficient conviction, and ſhows their Brutality and Ambition. If it were hatred and deteſtation of our Authority, it was you that gave it us, and it is you were injured. But certainly, if any Power or Authority deſerves to be regreted, 'tis that which is uſurped, not that which is acquired by a continued ſtream of Kindneſs and Liberality. I appeal to you, moſt illuſtrious* Senators, *whether any of my Predeceſſors arrived at their Grandeur any way but by the unanimous conſent and promotion of this Court. My Grandfather* Coſimo *returned not from his Baniſhment by violence and force of Arms, but by your invitation. My ancient and infirm Father, was too weak to have ſupported his Authority againſt ſo many Enemies; it was your Bounty, it was your Authority which defended it. When my Father was dead, and I (tho' but a Child) was left to ſucceed him, alas! how could I have maintained the Honour and Dignity of the Family without your favour and inſtruction. Our Houſe never was, nor ever will be able to govern this State, without your cooperation and aſſiſtance. I cannot imagine therefore, what quarrel they ſhould have had againſt us, or what juſt reaſon for their Envy; they ſhould rather have turned their indignation upon their own Anceſtors, who with their Inſolence and Avarice defeated them of that Honour, which ours have gained by their generoſity and goodneſs. But, let us gratifie them ſo far as to grant we had injured them, and that their Combinations againſt us were but reaſonable and juſt; Why muſt they conſpire againſt this Palace? Why muſt they confederate with the Pope and King of* Naples, *againſt the Innocence and Liberty of this Commonwealth? Why muſt all* Italy *be involved in a War? For this they can have no excuſe: if any Man have offended them, they might have offended him again, and not blended and confounded private Injury with publick Revenge. This is it which revives our Calamities, tho' the Authors are extinct. That is it which has brought the Pope and King of* Naples *upon us with their Armies, tho' their Declaration be only againſt me and my Family. I wiſh to God it were true, and that their deſign was no farther: the Remedy would be eaſie, and your Deliverance at hand. I ſhould not be ſo ill a Citizen as to poſtpone the publick to my private Security; no, I would willingly quench your Flames, tho' with my own Blood and Deſtruction: but becauſe the Injuries of great Perſons are always cloathed with ſome plauſible pretence, they have choſen this, to exaſperate you againſt me; if you think I deſerve it, I am now in your hands, to be continued or rejected, as you pleaſe: You are my Fathers; you are my Patrons; whatever you command, I will endeavour to do; and not refuſe with my own Blood to finiſh this War, which is begun with my Brothers.*

The Citizens could not contain from Tears whilſt *Lorenzo* was ſpeaking, and with the ſame pity as they had heard him, he was anſwered by one deputed by the reſt: *That the whole City did acknowledge the Merits both of his Anceſtors and himſelf. That he ſhould be of good cheer; for with the ſame readineſs and devotion as they had revenged his Brothers death, and prevented his, they would preſerve his Perſon and Reputation, and expoſe their whole Country rather than deſert him.* That their Actions might be commenſurate, they appointed him a Guard, to ſecure him againſt domeſtick Deſigns, and paid them out of the publick Treaſure: after which they addreſſed themſelves to the War, and raiſed what Men and Money they were able. They ſent for Aid to the Duke of *Milan* and the *Venetians*, according to the League; and the Pope, more like a Wolf than a Shepherd, being ready to devour them, they tried all ways to

juſtifie themſelves that they could think of, poſſeſs'd all *Italy* with his Treachery againſt their State, remonſtrated his Impieties to all the World; and that he exerciſed his Papacy with as much Injuſtice, as he gained it: for he had ſent thoſe (whom he had advanced to the higheſt degree of Prelacy) in the Company of Traytors and Murderers to commit Treaſon in the Church, in the time of Divine Service, and the Celebration of the Sacrament; and after that (having been unable to kill all the Citizens, alter the Government, and ſack the City) he interdicted it with his Pontifical Maledictions, and threatned to deſtroy it. But if God were juſt, and the violences of Men offenſive to him, he muſt needs be diſpleaſed at the proceeding of his Vicar, and permit that Men (having no other Refuge) might reſort unto him. For which reaſon the *Florentines* not only refuſe his Interdiction, but forced their Prieſts to celebrate Divine Service as before. They called a Council in *Florence*, of all the *Tuſcan* Prelates within their Juriſdiction, and appealed to them concerning their differences with the Pope; againſt which, in juſtification of his Cauſe, it was alledged, that it belong'd properly to the Pope to ſupplant Tyrants, to ſuppreſs ill Men, and to advance good; all which he was to remedy, as opportunity was offered. But that ſecular Princes had no right to impriſon Cardinals; to execute Biſhops; to kill, or diſmember, or drag about the Streets the Bodies of the Prieſts; and to uſe the Innocent and the Nocent without any difference or diſtinction. Nevertheleſs the *Florentines* not at all refuſing his Quarrels and Complaints, diſmiſſed the Cardinal which was in their power, and ſent him back to the Pope; yet the Pope, without any regard to that Civility, cauſed them to be invaded with all his Forces, and the King's: both their Armies (under the Command of *Alfonſo* Duke of *Calabria*, *Ferrando*'s eldeſt Son, and *Federigo Conte d' Urbino*) entred *Chianti*, and by means of the *Sienneſi*, who were of the Enemy's Party, took *Radda*; ſeveral other Caſtles, and plunder'd the whole Country. Next they encamped before *Caſtellina*: the *Florentines* ſeeing themſelves thus fiercely attacked, were in great fear, as having but few Men of their own, and the Aſſiſtance of their Friends coming in very ſlowly; for tho' the Duke indeed had ſent them Supplies, yet the *Venetians* refuſed it, as not thinking themſelves obliged to relieve them in their particular Quarrels; for as, they pretended, private Animoſities were not in reaſon to be defended at a publick Expence. So that the *Florentines*, to diſpoſe the *Venetian* to better things, ſent *Tomaſo Soderini* Ambaſſador to that State, whilſt in the mean time they raiſed what Men they could, and made *Hercules*, Marqueſs of *Ferrara*, their General. Whilſt in this manner they were employ'd in their Preparations, the Enemy had brought *Caſtellina* to ſuch diſtreſs, that, deſpairing of Relief, the Garriſon ſurrender'd, after forty Days ſiege. From hence the Enemy advanced towards *Arezzo*, and ſat down before *Monte S. Semino*. The *Florentine* Army was by this time drawn out, and being marched towards the Enemy, had poſted it ſelf within three Miles of them, and incommoded them ſo, that *Federigo* ſent to *Urbino* to deſire a Truce for ſome few Days; which was granted, but with ſo much diſadvantage to the *Florentines*, that thoſe who requeſted it were amazed when they had obtained it; for without it they muſt have drawn off with diſgrace. But having thoſe Days allowed to recollect themſelves, when the time was expired they went on with their Siege, and took the Town under the very Noſe of our Army. By this time Winter being come, to provide themſelves good Quarters, the Enemy drew his Army into the Country of *Sienna*, the *Florentines* where they thought moſt convenient; and the Marqueſs of *Ferrara* (having done little good to himſelf or other People) returned from whence he came. About this time *Genoa* was in Rebellion gainſt the State of *Milan*, and upon this occaſion, *Galeazzo* being dead, and his Son *Giovan Galeazzo* a Minor, and unfit for the Government, difference aroſe betwixt *Sforza*, *Lodovico*, *Ottaviano*, *Aſcanio*, his Uncles, and *Madona Bona* his Mother; each of them pretending to the Tuition of the Child. In which competition, *Madona Bona* the Dutcheſs Dowager prevailed, by the Councils of *Tomaſo Soderini* (the *Florentine* Ambaſſador in that Court, at that time) and *Cecco Simonetto*, who had been Secretary to the late *Galeazzo*; whereupon *Sforza* flying from *Milan*, *Ottaviano* was drawn, as he was paſſing the *Adda*, and the reſt diſperſed into ſeveral Places. *Roberto de ſan Severino* ran the ſame Fortune, and fled, having forſaken the Dutcheſs in thoſe Diſputes, and joined himſelf with the Uncles. The Troubles falling out not long after in *Tuſcany*, thoſe Princes hoping from new Accidents, or new Succeſs, every one of them attempted what he thought likely to reſtore him to his Country. King *Ferrando* obſerving the only Refuge the *Florentines* had in their Neceſſities, was to the State of *Milan*, determined to give the Dutcheſs ſo much Employment of her own, that ſhe ſhould not be at leiſure to ſend them any Relief; and by means of *Proſpero Adorno*, the *Signore Roberto*, and the *Sforzi* which were baniſhed, he wrought ſo, that *Genoa* rebelled: Nevertheleſs the lit-

The Pope and King invade the Territories of the *Florentines*.

Genoa rebels againſt the State of *Milan*.

tle

tle Caſtle remained firm to the young Duke, and the Dutcheſs ſent Forces to them to recover the Town, but they were overthrown; whereupon conſidering with herſelf the danger which might accrew both to her Son and herſelf, if the War ſhould be continued, all *Tuſcany* being imbroiled, and the *Florentines* in diſtreſs, ſhe reſolved, ſeeing ſhe could not retain *Genoa* as a Subject, that ſhe would have it as a Friend; and agreed with *Battiſtino Fregoſi* (a great Enemy to *Proſpero Adorno*) to deliver him the Caſtle, and make him Prince of *Genoa*, upon condition he would drive out *Proſpero*, and give the *Sforzi* no aſſiſtance nor protection. After all was concluded betwixt them, the Caſtle was ſurrendred, and by the help of that, and his Party, *Battiſtino* reducing *Genoa*, and according to their cuſtom, made himſelf *Doge*; the *Sforzi* and *Signore Roberto* being forced out of the Town, they paſſed with their Followers into *Lunigiana*. The Pope and the King ſeeing the Troubles in *Lombardy* compoſed, took occaſion to infeſt *Tuſcany* on that ſide towards *Piſa*, with thoſe Perſons which were driven out of *Genoa*; ſuppoſing by dividing and diverting their Forces, to weaken the *Florentines*: whereupon the Summer approaching, they prevailed with the *Signore Roberto* to march with his Squadron from *Lunigiana* into the Country of *Piſa*. *Roberto* put the whole Country into confuſion; took ſeveral Caſtles from the *Piſans*, and plundred them, and made his Excurſions to the very Walls of *Piſa* it ſelf. About this time Ambaſſadors arrived at *Florence* from the Emperor, the King of *France*, and the King of *Hungary*; who from their ſeveral Princes being ſent to the Pope, perſuaded the *Florentines* to ſend Ambaſſadors alſo, and promiſed their utmoſt endeavour with him, to conclude all their Differences with an honourable Peace. The *Florentines* conſented, as well to excuſe themſelves to the World, as that they were really deſirous of it. Having ſent therefore their Ambaſſadors, they returned as they went, without any Accommodation: and the *Florentines* finding themſelves abuſed or abandoned by the *Italians*, reſolved to try if they could gain themſelves any Reputation by an Alliance with *France*, to which purpoſe they ſent as their Ambaſſador *Donato Acciaivoli*, a Perſon well skill'd both in the *Greek* and *Latin* Tongues, whoſe Anceſtors had always born great Office in that State; but being arrived at *Milan* in his Journey, he died; and *Florence*, in honour to his Memory, and Remuneration to his Children, buried him magnificently at the publick Charge; gave his Sons conſiderable Exemptions; and his Daughters ſuch Portions as would marry them like themſelves; and ſent *Guid' Antonio Veſpucci* (a Man well verſed in the Imperial and Pontifical Laws) to the King of *France* in his place. The inroad *Signore Roberto* had made into the Country of *Piſa* (as all ſudden and unexpected things do) gave the *Florentines* no little diſtraction. For the War lying heavy upon them in the Country of *Siena*, they could not ſee how they ſhould be able to defend themſelves on the other ſide. However, they ſent Officers, and all other Proviſions to reinforce the City of *Piſa*; and that they might keep the *Luccheſi* from aſſiſting the Enemy, with Money or any thing elſe, they ſent *Gino Capponi* as their Ambaſſador to them; but he was received ſo ill, out of an ancient Enmity to the People of *Florence* (upon former Injuries received, and a conſtant apprehenſion to them, that he was many times in danger of being killed by the Multitude: So that his Journey produced new Quarrels, rather than new Quiet; and thereupon the *Florentines* called back the Marqueſs of *Ferrara*; entertain'd the Marqueſs of *Mantoua* into their Pay; and with great Importunity, deſired of the *Venetians* Count *Carlo* the Son of *Braccio*, and *Deifebo* the Son of Count *Giacopo*, who (after ſeveral Scruples and Demurs) were ſent to them; for having made Peace with the *Turk*, and no pretence left to excuſe themſelves, they were aſhamed to break Faith with the League. *Carlo* therefore, and *Deifebo* being come, with a conſiderable number of Horſe, and joined to what Forces they could conveniently draw out of the Marqueſs of *Ferrara*'s Army (which attended the Duke of *Calabria*) they marched towards *Piſa*, in queſt of *Signore Roberto*, who was poſted with his Army near the River *Serchio*; and thought at firſt he made a ſhow of expecting our Army, yet upon ſecond thoughts he removed, and retired into the Country of *Lunigiana*, to the ſame Quarters where he lay before his Expedition to *Piſa*. Upon his departure, Count *Carlo* repoſſeſs'd himſelf of all the Enemy had taken in that Country; and the *Florentines* being clear on that ſide, drew all their Forces into one Body betwixt *Colle* and *Santo Gimignano*; but upon *Carlo*'s Conjunction there being ſeveral of the *Sforzeſchi*, and the *Bracceſchi* in the Army, the old Feud began to revive, and it was believed, had they ſtayed longer together, they had fallen together by the Ears: to prevent theſe Inconveniences, it was reſolved, to divide the Army; that Count *Carlo* ſhould march with his Forces into the Country of *Perugia*, and the reſt fortifie and intrench themſelves at *Poggibonzi*, to obſtruct the Enemy from entring into the Country of *Florence*. By this Diviſion they ſuppoſed likewiſe the Enemy would be forced to divide; for they thought

The Gratitude of the *Florentines*.

thought that either Count *Carlo* would take *Perugia* (where he had a great Party as they believed) or that the Pope would be conſtrained to ſend a good body of Men to defend it; and to drive his Holineſs into greater neceſſity, they ordered *Nicolo Vitelli* (who had left *Caſtello*, where *Lorenzo* his Enemy, was predominant) with what force he could make to approach the Town, to drive out his Adverſary if he could, and keep it againſt the Pope.

At firſt, Fortune ſeem'd to encline to the *Florentines*, Count *Carlo* advanced ſtrangely in the Country of *Perugia*; *Nicolo Vitelli*, tho' he could not get into the Town of *Caſtello*, yet he was Maſter of the Field, and plundred round about it without any contradiction; and thoſe Forces which were encamped at *Poggibonzi*, made their Excurſions to the very Walls of *Sienna*. But at laſt, all their hopes came to nothing; for firſt, Count *Carlo* died in the very height of their expectations, whoſe Death had nevertheleſs much bettered the Condition of the *Florentines*, had they known how to have improved the Victory which it produced; for no ſooner was the Death of Count *Carlo* known, but the Pope's Army (being all together in *Perugia*) conceiving great hopes of overpowering the *Florentines*, took the Field, and encamped upon the Lake within three Miles of the Enemy: on the other ſide, *Giacopo Guicciardini* (at that time Commiſſary of the Army) by the advice of *Roberto da Rimino* (who ſince the Death of Count *Carlo*, was the chief and beſt reputed Officer among them) knowing what it was that ſet the Enemy agog, they reſolved to attend him; and coming to a Battle not far from the Lake (in the very place where *Hannibal* gave the *Romans* that memorable Defeat) the Pope's Army was routed. The News of this Victory was extreamly welcome in *Florence*, both to the Magiſtrates and People; and it would have been great Honour and Advantage to that Enterprize, had not Diſorders in the Army at *Poggibonzi* ſpoiled all, and the Victory over the one Camp been interrupted by a Mutiny in the other; for that Army having got much plunder in the Country of *Sienna*, when they came to divide, there fell out great difference betwixt the Marqueſs of *Ferrara* and the Marqueſs of *Mantoua*, ſo that they came to blows, and did one another what miſchief they were able.

The Pope's Army defeated.

The *Florentines* finding no good was to be expected from them together, conſented that the Marqueſs of *Ferrara* with his Forces might march home; by which means the Army being weakned without a Head, and very diſorderly, the Duke of *Calabria* being with his Army not far from *Sienna*, took a Reſolution of falling upon them; but the *Florentines* hearing of his advance, not truſting to their Arms, their Numbers (which was much greater than the Enemy) nor the ſituation of their Camp (which were very ſtrong) without expecting their coming, or ſeeing ſo much as the Face of their Enemy, as ſoon as they perceived the Duſt, they fled, and left their Ammunition, and Carriages, and Artillery behind them; and ſo cowardly and poor ſpirited that Army was become, that the turning of a Horſe's Head or Tail, gave either Victory or Defeat. This Rout filled the King's Soldiers with prize, and the *Florentines* with fear; for that City was not only afflicted with War, but with ſo violent a Peſtilence, that moſt of the Inhabitants were forced to leave the Town, and betake themſelves to the Country. This Overthrow was rendred more terrible by Sickneſs, for thoſe Citizens who had Eſtates in the *Val di Piſa*, and the *Val Delſa*, being driven thither, and ſecure; were forced (upon this Rout) to hurry back again to *Florence* as well as they could, and that not only with their Goods and their Children, but with all their Families and Dependants, for every Hour they were afraid the Enemy would have preſented himſelf before the Town. They who had the Adminiſtration of the War, being ſenſible of theſe Diſorders, commanded their Army (which was victorious in *Perugia*) that leaving their Deſigns there, they ſhould march into the *Val Delſa*, and oppoſe themſelves againſt the Enemy, who, ſince their laſt Victory, over-run that whole Country. And tho' that Army had ſo ſtraitned *Perugia*, it was every Hour expected to ſurrender, yet the *Florentines* choſe rather to defend themſelves, than to gain upon any body elſe; and raiſing their Siege they were conducted to S. *Caſſiano*, a Caſtle about eight Miles from *Florence*, as the only place where they might lie ſecure, till the other Army was rallied, and brought to them. The Enemy on the other ſide, being at Liberty in *Perugia*, upon the withdrawing of the *Florentines*, took heart, and made their Inroads daily into the Countries of *Arezzo* and *Cortona*; and the other Army, which under the Command of the Duke of *Calabria*, had routed them at *Poggibonzi*, took *Poggibonzi* and *Vico*, pillaged *Certaldo*, made great ſpoil, and got great Prize in that Country, after they ſat down before *Colle* which (in thoſe Times) was looked upon as extraordinary ſtrong, and being well Mann'd, and provided with all things, it was hoped it might entertain the Enemy, till their Armies could be united.

The *Florentines* having joined all their Forces at S. *Caſſiano*, and the Enemy proceed-

ing

ing very fiercely in their Leaguer; they resolved to march towards them, and post themselves as near them as they could, supposing they should thereby, not only encourage the Garrison to defend themselves, but make the Enemy more cautious in all his Attacks. Hereupon they removed from S. *Cassiano*, and encamped at S. *Giminiano*, about five Miles from *Colle*, from whence with their Horse, and the lightest of their Foot, they daily molested the Duke's Camp: but this was not enough for the Garrison in *Colle*, for wanting all Things that were necessary, they surrendred the 13th of *November*, to the great displeasure of the *Florentines*, but the great joy of the Enemy, especially the *Siennese*, who besides their common hatred to *Florence*, had a particular quarrel against this Town.

Winter was now at the height, the Season unfit for War, and the Pope and King (to give them hopes of Peace, or to enjoy their Victory quietly themselves) offered a Truce for three Months to the *Florentines*, and allowed them ten Days for an Answer; which Proffer was accepted: but as a Wound is more painful when cold, than when 'tis first given, this small Repose gave the *Florentines* greater sense of the Miseries which they had endured; insomuch as they began to talk freely, and upbraid one another by the Miscarriages in the War, charging one another with the greatness of the Expence, and the inequality of their Taxes; and these Exprobations were not only in the Streets, and among the ordinary sort of People, but even in their Conventions and publick Councils, in which one of them took the confidence to tell *Lorenzo* to his face, that the City was weary, and would have no more War, and that therefore he should bethink himself of Peace: upon which *Lorenzo* discerning the necessity, advised with such of his Friends as he judged most faithful and able, and it was concluded by all (that seeing the *Venetians* were cold and uncertain; the Duke young, and imbroiled in new Troubles at home) their best way would be to seek out for new Alliance, and try what that would contribute to their Success. Their great scruple was, into whose Arms they should cast themselves, whether into the Pope's, or the King's of *Naples*; and upon serious debate it was resolved into the King's, as a Person of more stability, and likely to yield them better protection, in regard of the shortness of the Popes Lives, and the changes upon their Successions. For the small fear the Church has of any Prince, and the small regard it has of any body else in all its Resolutions, causes that no secular Prince can repose any intire Confidence, or communicate freely in his Affairs, with any of the Pope's; for he that associates with him in War, and in Dangers, may perhaps have a Companion and a Sharer in his Victories; but in his distress he shall be sure to be alone, his Holiness being still brought off by his spiritual Influence and Authority. It being therefore determined more profitable to reconcile with the King, there could be no way thought of so likely, as by *Lorenzo* himself; for by how much the more that King had tasted of his Liberality, by so much the more they thought it probable he might succeed. *Lorenzo* embracing the Motion, and having prepared for his Journey, committed the City and Government to *Tomaso Soderini* (at that time *Gonfaloniere di Giustitia*) and left *Florence* in the beginning of *December*. Being arrived at *Pisa* in his way, he writ to the *Senate*, and gave them an account of his design; and the *Senate* in honour to him, and that he might treat with more Reputation, made him Ambassador for the People of *Florence*, and gave him Authority to conclude with him, according to his own judgment and discretion. About this time *Signore Roberto da Santo Severino*, joining with *Lodovico* and *Ascanio* (for their Brother *Sforza* was dead) they invaded the State of *Milan*, in hopes to have re-invested themselves; having possess'd themselves of *Tortona* and *Milan*, and the whole State being in Arms, the Dutchess was advised (to compose her civil Dissentions) to restore the *Sforzi*, and receive them into the Government again. Her great Councellor in this, was *Antonio Taffino*, a *Ferrarese*, who, tho' meanly extracted, being come to *Milan*, was preferred to be Chamberlain both to the Duke and the Dutchess. This *Antonio*, for the comliness of his Person, or some other secret Excellence, after the Duke's death, grew into great favour with the Dutchess, and in a manner governed the whole State; which was very unpleasing to *Cecco*, a Man of great prudence, and long experience in publick Affairs, insomuch that he used all his Interest both with the Dutchess and the rest of the Governours, to clip the Wings of his Authority, and remove him. *Antonio* having notice of his design to countermine him, and have some body near which might be able to defend him, he advis'd the Dutchess to restore the *Sforzi*, and the Dutchess following his Persuasion, invited them back again without communicating with *Cecco*: upon which he is reported to have told her, *that she had done a thing which would cost him his Life, and deprive her of the Government.* And so afterwards it fell out, for *Cecco* was put to Death by *Lorenzo*, and *Taffino* turned out of *Milan*, which the Dutchess took in such dudgeon, that she forsook the Town, and left

Antonio Taffino a Favourite of the Dutchess.

Lodovico Sforza Governor of *Milan.*

left the Government of her Son to his Uncle *Lodovico*, which Act of her's, in leaving that whole Dutchy to the Government of *Lodovico*, was the ruin of *Italy*, as shall be shown in its place. *Lorenzo de Medici* was in his Journey towards *Naples*, and the Truce betwixt the Parties in a very fair way, when on a sudden, beyond all expectation, *Lodovico Fregoso* having intelligence in *Serezana*, surprized the Town, and made all Prisoners whom he found any ways affected to the *Florentines*. This Accident was highly resented by the Governors of *Florence*, for they imagined it done by the order of *Ferrando*, and therefore complain'd heavily to the Duke of *Calabria* (who was with his Army at *Sienna*) that whilst they were in Treaty, they should be assaulted so treacherously; but the Duke assured them by Letters, and an Ambassy on purpose, that what had passed was done without either his consent, or his Father's. However, the Affairs of the *Florentines* were judged in a very ill Condition; their Treasure being exhausted; their Prince in the hands of the King; an old War on foot with the Pope and the King; a new War commenced with the *Genoesi*, and no Friends to support them: for they had no hopes of the *Venetian*, and of the State of *Milan* they had more reason to be afraid, it was so various and unstable: the only hope remaining to the *Florentines*, was in *Lorenzo*'s Address to the King.

Lorenzo de Medici arrives at *Naples.*

Lorenzo arrived at *Naples* by Sea, was honourably received both by the King and the whole City; and tho' the War was begun for no other end but to ruin him, yet the greatness of his Enemies did but add to his Grandeur; for being brought to his Audience, he deliver'd himself so handsomly, and discoursed so well of the Condition of *Italy*, of the Humours of all the Princes and People therein, and gave so good Account of what was to be dreaded by War, and what was to be hoped for by Peace, that the King admired the greatness of his Mind, the dexterity of his Wit, the solidity of his Judgement, more now, than he had wondered before, how he could alone sustain so great an Invasion, insomuch that he doubled his Respects towards him, and began to think it his Interest much more to make him his Friend, than to continue him his Enemy. Nevertheless, upon sundry pretences and fetches, he kept him in dispence from *December* to *March*, not only to satisfie himself in a farther experience of *Lorenzo*, but to inform himself of the infidelity of *Florence*; for that City was not without those who would have been glad the King would have kept him, and handled him as *Giacopo Piccinino* was handled. These People began to complain and spake ill of him all over the Town, to oppose themselves publickly in the Councils against any thing that was moved in favour to *Lorenzo*; and gave out generally where-ever they came, that if the King kept him much longer at *Naples*, they would alter the Government: so that the King forbore to dispatch him for some time, in expectation of a Tumult. But finding all quiet, and no likelihood of any such thing, on the 6th of *March*, 1479. he dismiss'd him, having first presented him so nobly, and treated him so honourably, that they had made a perpetual League, and obliged themselves mutually for the preservation of one another's Dominions.

If therefore *Lorenzo* was great when he went from *Florence*, he was much greater when he returned; and was received with a Joy and Acclamation in the City, suitable to his Quality, and the recency of his Deserts, who had ventred his own Life so frankly, to procure Peace to his Country. Two Days after his Arrival, the Articles of Peace were published, by which both the State of *Florence* and King had particularly obliged themselves to a common Defence; that such Towns as were taken from the *Florentines* during the War (if in the King's Power) should be restored; that the *Pazzi*, which were Prisoners at *Volterra*, should be discharged, and a certain Sum of Money paid to the Duke of *Calabria*, for a prefixed time. This Peace was no sooner published, but the Pope and the *Venetians* were infinitely offended, the Pope thinking himself neglected by the King, and the *Venetians* by the *Florentines*, for both one and the other having been Partners in the War, they took it unkindly to be left out of the Peace. Their displeasure being reported and believed at *Florence*, it was presently apprehended that the effect of this Peace, would be a greater War.

New Constitutions.

Hereupon the Governors of the State began to think of contracting the Government, and reducing it into a lesser number of Ministers, appointing a Council of 70 Citizens to transact such Affairs as were of principal importance. This new Constitution settled the minds of those who were desirous of Innovation; and to give it a reputation, the first thing they did, was to ratifie the Peace which *Lorenzo* had made with the King, and they appointed *Antonio Ridolfi* and *Piero Nasi*, Ambassadors to the Pope. Notwithstanding this Peace, the Duke of *Calabria* departed from the Country of *Siena* with his Army, pretending he was retained by the Dissentions of that City, which were so great, that being quartered not far off, he was invited into the Town, and their Differences referred to his Arbitration. The Duke accepted the Overture; fin'd several of

the

the Citizens; impriſoned ſeveral; baniſhed ſome, and ſome he put to death: ſo that he became ſuſpicious, not only to the *Siennefi*, but to the *Florentines* alſo, that his deſign was to make himſelf Prince of that City; nor could they deviſe any remedy, ſeeing they had entred into a League with the King, and thereby made both Pope and *Venetians* their Enemies. And this Suſpicion was not only got into the brains of the Multitude in *Florence* (a ſubtle Interpreter of Affairs) but into the minds alſo of the Governours; ſo that it was generally concluded, the Liberty of that City was never in more danger: but God, who has always had a particular care of it in all its Extremities, averted that Evil, and by an unexpected Accident, gave the King, the Pope, and the *Venetians*, a Diverſion which imported them more than their Advantages in *Tuſcany*.

The Iſle of *Rhodes* aſſaulted by the *Turks*.

Mahomet, the great *Turk*, was with a great Army encamped before *Rhodes*, and had lain before it ſeveral Months: tho' his Forces were numerous, and his Diligence great, yet the Valour of the Beſieged was not to be maſtered, for they defended themſelves ſo bravely, he was forced to draw off, and quit the Siege, with a great deal of diſhonour. Having left *Rhodes*, he ſent part of his Fleet, under the Command of *Giacometto Baſcia* towards *Velona*, and (either upon conſideration of the eaſineſs of the Enterprize, or expreſs command from the Grand *Signore* to that purpoſe) coaſting about *Italy*, on a ſudden he landed 6000 Men, aſſaulted the City of *Otranto*, took it, plundered it, killed all the Inhabitants, and when he had done, fortified both the Town and the Harbour as much as poſſibly he could, and with a good Party of Horſe, ſcoured the whole Country about it. The King being much alarmed at this Invaſion, as knowing how great a Monarch he had to deal with, ſent his Ambaſſadors about to every body, to let them know his Condition, and to beg their Aſſiſtance againſt the common Enemy; beſides which, he preſſed the Duke of *Calabria* with all imaginable Importunity, to leave his deſigns at *Siena*, and come back with all his Forces. This Invaſion, tho' it was very dreadful to the Duke, and all the reſt of *Italy*, yet it was welcome to *Florence* and *Siena*; the one thinking its Liberty moſt miraculouſly preſerved, and the other themſelves as ſtrangely delivered from thoſe Dangers which would of neceſſity have deſtroy'd them. Which opinion was much encreaſed by the unwillingneſs wherewith the Duke departed from *Siena*; complaining and curſing his Fortune, which by ſo unreaſonable and an unexpected Accident, had defeated him of the Dominion of *Tuſcany*. The ſame thing changed the Councils of the Pope; and whereas before he would never admit any Ambaſſador from *Florence*, he was grown now ſo meek, he would hear any body ſpeak of a General Peace; and word was ſent to the *Florentines*, that whenever they found themſelves enclined, ask pardon of the Pope, they would be ſure to have it. The *Florentines* thought not fit to ſlip ſo fair an occaſion, and therefore ſent 12 Ambaſſadors to the Pope, who entertained them with diverſe Practices after they were arrived at *Rome*, before he admitted them to Audience: yet at length it was adjuſted how all Parties ſhould comport for the future, and what every one ſhould contribute in time of Peace, as well as in War; after which the Ambaſſadors were admitted to the feet of the Pope, who was placed in great Pomp, with his Cardinals about him.

The Ambaſſadors to the Pope.

The Ambaſſadors, to extenuate what had paſſed, laid the Fault ſometimes upon their own Neceſſities, ſometimes upon the Malignity of other People; ſometimes upon the popular Fury, ſometimes upon their own juſt Indignation, as being ſo unhappy to be forced either to fight, or to die: and becauſe Death is the moſt terrible of all things, and all things will be tried before that will be embraced, they had endured the War, the Excommunications, and all the ill conſequences which followed, rather than ſuffer their Liberty (which is the Life of a Commonwealth) to be taken from them and extinguiſhed: Nevertheleſs, if their Neceſſity had run them upon the Rocks, and forced them to do any thing which was diſpleaſing to him, they were ready to make him Satisfaction, and did hope, according to the Example of their gracious Redeemer, he would be as ready to receive them into his moſt merciful Arms. To which Excuſes, his Holineſs replied, with great Heat and Indignation, reproaching them by all the Miſchiefs which they had done to the Church; nevertheleſs, to preſerve the Commandments of God, he was contented to grant them their Pardon as they deſired; but intimated withal, that they were to be more obedient for the future, and if again they tranſgreſſed, that Liberty which now they were only like to have loſt, ſhould be then taken wholly, and that juſtly, away, becauſe they who deſerved to be free, were ſuch as practiſed good things, and not bad; and Liberty abuſed, was deſtructive both to themſelves and other People: For to neglect their Duty either to God or his Church, was not the Office of good Men, but of ſuch as were diſſolute and lewd; the Correction of which belongeth not only to Princes, but to all that are Chriſtians: ſo that for what was to be paſſed, they were to lay the fault upon themſelves; who by their ill Deeds had given occaſion of the War, and continued it by their worſe: but now that was at an end,

The Pope replies.

yet it was attributed more to the goodneſs of other People, than any merit in them; after which he gave them his Benediction and the Form of the Agreement, to which he had added (beſides what had been debated and concluded on in Council) that if the *Florentines* expected any Fruit from his Bleſſing, they ſhould furniſh out fifteen Gallies, and keep them in their Pay till the *Turk* was beaten out of *Italy*. The Ambaſſadors complained grievouſly to have an Article of that weight ſuperadded to what was concluded in the Treaty; but by all the Friends they could make, and all the Arts they could uſe, they could not prevail to have it expung'd; whereupon returning to *Florence*, that *Senate*, to perfect the Peace, ſent *Guid' Antonio Veſpucci* (who not long before was returned from *France*) their Ambaſſador to his Holineſs, and by his prudence, he brought the Terms to be tolerable, and as a greater ſign of his Reconciliation, received ſeveral other marks of his Holineſs's favour. The *Florentines* having put an end to all their differences with the Pope; *Siena* being free, they deliver'd from their apprehenſions of the King, by the Duke of *Calabria* drawing away with his Army out of *Tuſcany*; and the War continuing with the *Turks*, they preſſed the King ſo hard to the reſtitution of ſuch Places as the Duke of *Calabria* at his departure had committed to the keeping of the *Saneſi*; that he began to fear the *Florentines* might deſert him, and by making War upon the *Saneſi*, hinder the Aſſiſtance which he expected from the Pope, and the reſt of the Princes of *Italy*; whereupon he cauſed them all to be delivered, and by ſeveral new favours, reobliged the *Florentines* to him: from whence we may obſerve, that it is Intereſt and Neceſſity, not their Hands or their Words, which make Princes keep their Promiſes. Theſe Caſtles being reſtored, and the new League confirmed, *Lorenzo de Medici* gained greater reputation than the War firſt, and after, the Peace (when they were jealous of the King) had taken from him. For at that time there wanted not thoſe who calumniated him openly, as one, who to preſerve himſelf, had ſold his Country, and as by the War they had loſt their Towns, by the Peace they ſhould loſe their Liberty. But when the Towns were reſtored, and honourable Peace concluded with the King, and the City returned to its ancient Reputation, the People (who are generally greedy to talk, and judge of Things more by the Succeſs than the Counſel) changed their Note preſently, and cried up *Lorenzo* to the Skies, as one who had gained more by his management in that Peace, than their ill fortune had got them by the War; and that his Prudence and Judgment had done what all the Armies and Power of their Enemies could not.

This deſcent of the *Turks* deferr'd the War, which the Pope and the *Venetians* upon provocation of that Peace, had deſigned againſt them: But as the beginning of the *Turkiſh* Invaſion was unexpected, and produced much good; ſo the end of it was unlooked for, and the occaſion of much miſchief; for *Mahomet*, the Grand *Signore*, died ſuddenly, and difference ariſing betwixt his Sons, thoſe who were landed in *Puglia*, being abandoned by their Lord, came to an Agreement with the King of *Naples*, and delivered up *Otranto* into his hands. This fear therefore being removed, which kept the Pope and the *Venetians* quiet; every one began to be apprehenſive of new Troubles. On the one ſide, the Pope and the *Venetian* were in League, and with them *Genoeſi*, *Saneſi*, and other leſſer Potentates. On the other ſide, were the *Florentines*, the King of *Naples*, the Duke of *Milan*, and with them the *Bologneſi*, and ſeveral other little States. The *Venetian* had a deſign upon *Ferrara*; they thought they had reaſon enough to attempt it, and hopes enough to carry it. The reaſon was, becauſe the Marqueſs had declared himſelf obliged no longer to receive either their *Viſdomine*, or their Salt; for by Compact after 70 Years, that City was to be exempt both from the one and the other: To which the *Venetians* replied, that ſo long as he retained the *Poleſine*, ſo long he was to receive the *Viſdomine* and the Salt; but the Marqueſs refuſing, they thought they had juſt occaſion to take Arms, and their opportunity was convenient, ſeeing the Pope in ſuch Indignation both againſt the *Florentines* and King: To oblige him the more, Count *Girolamo* being by accident at *Venice*, was honourably treated, made a Gentleman of that City, and had all the Privileges and Immunities of a Citizen conferred upon him; which is a particular favour, and ſhews always the great eſteem they bear to the Perſon which receives it. In preparation for this War, they laid new Taxes upon their Subjects; and for their General, they had choſen *Roberto da San Severino*, who upon ſome difference betwixt him and *Lodovick* Duke of *Milan*, fled to *Tortona*, and having made ſome Tumults there, he got off to *Genoa*, from whence he was invited by the *Venetians*, and made General of their Army. The News of theſe Preparations coming to the Ears of the League, they prepared themſelves accordingly. The Duke of *Milan* choſe *Federigo* Lord of *Urbin*, for his General. The *Florentines*, *Coſtanzo di Peſaro*; and to ſound the Pope, and diſcover whether theſe Proceedings of the *Venetians* were by his conſent, King *Ferrando* ſent the

Duke

Duke of *Calabria* with his Army to quarter upon the *Tronto*, and desired leave of his Holiness, that they might pass thorow his Territories, from thence into *Lombardy* to the relief of the Marquess; which being absolutely denied, the *Florentines* and King thinking that a sufficient declaration of his Mind, resolved to attempt it by force, and try if that they could make him their Friend, or at least give him such Impediments as should hinder his supplying of the *Venetians*, who had already taken the Field, invaded the Marquess, overrun most of the Country, and clap'd down with their Army before *Figarolo*, a Castle of great importance to the Affairs of that Prince. The King and the *Florentines* having in the mean time concluded to fall upon the Pope, *Alfonso* Duke of *Calabria* marched his Army towards *Rome*, and by the help of the *Collennesi* (who were joined with him in opposition to the *Orsini* who sided with the Pope) he committed great Spoils all over that Country. On the other side, the *Florentines*, under the Command of *Nicolo Vitelli*, assaulted the City of *Castello*, took it, turned out *Lorenzo*, who had kept it for the Pope, and gave it to *Nicolo* as Prince. The Pope was at this time in very great Anxiety. *Rome* was full of Factions within, and the Enemy in the Country without. Nevertheless (like a couragious Prince, resolved to overcome, not to yield to his Enemies) he entertained for his General *Roberto da Rimino*, and inviting him to *Rome*, where he had assembled all the Forces he could make, he represented how great an Honour it would be to him, if he could rescue the Church from the Calamities which were upon it; and that not only himself and his Successors, but God Almighty would reward him. *Roberto* having taken a view of his Army, and all the Magazines, he persuaded the Pope to raise him what Foot he could more, which was done with great diligence and expedition. The Duke of *Calabria* was all this while forraging about that Country, and making his Inroads to the very Walls of the City; which nettled and provoked the Citizens so, as many of them came freely and offered their Service to remove them, which *Roberto* with many thanks, and great Expressions of kindness, accepted.

The Duke, understanding their Preparations, thought fit to draw farther off from the City, supposing that *Roberto* would not venture to follow him at any distance from the Town; besides, he had some expectation of his Brother *Federigo*, who was to come to him with fresh Supplies from his Father. *Roberto* finding himself equal in Horse, and superior in Foot, drew his Army out of the Town, and directing towards the Enemy, he encamped within two Miles of him. The Duke finding the Enemy upon his back, quite contrary to his expectation, perceived there was no remedy but he must fight, or run away; so that forced, and constrained, lest otherwise he should do a thing unworthy of a King's Son, he resolved to fight, turned upon the Enemy, and each of them having put their Army into order, according to the Discipline of those Times, they fell to it, and the Battle continued from Morning to Noon, and was fought with more Courage than any in *Italy* for fifty Years before; there dying on the one side and the other above a thousand Men: the end of which Fight was very honourable for the Church; for their Infantry being numerous, so galled the Duke's Horse, that they were forced to turn tail, and the Duke had been taken, had he not been rescued by some *Turks*, which upon the delivery of *Otronto* took pay under him. *Roberto* having gained so absolute a Victory, returned triumphantly to *Rome*; but he enjoyed the pleasure of it but little, for in the heat of the Battle having drunk a great quantity of cold Water, he put himself into a Flux, and died not many days after; his Body being interred by his Holiness with all imaginable Ceremony. The Pope having gained this Victory, he sent the Count towards *Castello* to try if he could recover it for *Lorenzo*, and what he could do upon *Rimina*; for after the death of *Robert*, there being only one Child left in the Tuition of his Lady, he thought it might be no hard matter to get into that Town; and doubtless he had succeeded, had not that Lady been assisted by the *Florentines*, who opposed him so happily, that he could do nothing against *Rimino* nor *Castello*. Whilst these things were in agitation in *Romagna* and *Rome*, the *Venetians* had taken *Figarolo*, and passed the *Po* with their Army; the Duke of *Milan*'s, and the Marquess's Army (being in no small disorder upon the death of the Count *d' Urbino*) who falling ill, was removed to *Bologna*, and died there; so that the Marquess's Affairs began to decline, and the *Venetians* had great hopes of becoming Masters of *Ferrara*. On the other side, the *Florentines* and King of *Naples* used all possible Art to bring the Pope over to their Party; but not being able to do it by force, they threatned him with a Council, which the Emperor had pronounced already should be held at *Basil*. Whereupon, by persuasion of his Ambassadors at *Rome*, and the chief of the Cardinals (who were very desirous of Peace) the Pope was constrained, and began to hearken to the Peace and Tranquillity of *Italy*; and for fear the Grandeur of the *Venetians* should be the ruin of that Country, he became inclinable to the League,

The Duke of *Calabria* defeated.

A new League.

League, and ſent his *Nuncii* to *Naples*, where a Peace was concluded for five Years betwixt the Pope, King of *Naples*, and *Florentines*, reſerving a certain Time for the *Venetians*, if they pleaſed to come in. Which being done, the Pope ſent to the *Venetians* to deſiſt in their War againſt *Ferrara*; but the *Venetians* were ſo far from complying, they reinforced their Army, and purſued it with more eagerneſs than before; for having defeated the Duke's Forces, and the Marqueſe's at *Argenta*, they had advanced in ſuch manner againſt the City, that their Army was encamp'd in the Marqueſe's Park. So that the League, thinking it no dallying any longer, reſolved to aſſault them with all the Forces they could make, and accordingly the Duke of *Calabria* had orders to march thither with their Army. The *Florentines* likewiſe ſent what Men they could ſpare; and for the better Adminiſtration of the War, a Diet was appointed to be held at *Cremona*, where there met the Pope's Legate, Count *Girolamo*, the Duke of *Calabria*, the Signore *Lodovico*, and *Lorenzo de Medici*, with many other Princes of *Italy*, in which Council the method of the future War was debated; and having concluded that *Ferrara* could not any way be relieved more effectually, than by a brisk Diverſion, they deſired *Lodovico*'s permiſſion to attack the *Venetians* thorow the Country of *Milan*: but *Lodovico* would not be perſuaded, as fearing to pull a War upon his back, which he could not be rid off when he pleaſed. Whereupon it was determined, that they ſhould march with their whole Strength for *Ferrara*; and having muſtered 4000 Horſe and 8000 Foot, they advanced againſt the *Venetians*, who were 2200 Horſe, and 6000 Foot. But the firſt thing the League thought fit to attempt, was a Fleet which the *Venetians* had upon the *Po*: and they aſſaulted it ſo ſmartly, that they broke it at *Bondino*, deſtroyed 200 of their Veſſels, and took *Antonio Juſtiniano* (the Proveditor of their Navy) Priſoner.

The *Venetians* ſeeing all *Italy* combined againſt them; to give themſelves greater Reputation, they entertained the Duke of *Reno* into their Pay with 200 good Horſe: and upon News of the defeat of their Fleet, they ſent him with part of the Army to face the Enemy, whilſt *Roberto da San Severino* paſſed the *Adda* with the reſt, and approaching to *Milan*, proclaimed the Duke and Madam *Bona* his Mother; hoping, that *Lodovico* and his Government had been ſo odious in that City, that the very Name of the other would have begot ſome Commotion. This Inroad at firſt produced ſome kind of terror: but the Concluſion was quite contrary to what the *Venetians* had deſigned, for this compelled *Lodovico* to do what he could not be brought to before; and therefore leaving the Marqueſs of *Ferrara* to the defence of his own Country, with 4000 Horſe and 2000 Foot, the Duke of *Calabria* with 12000 Horſe and 5000 Foot, marched into the Countries of *Bergona*, *Breſcia*, and *Verona*, plundring and ſpoiling all about them, before the *Venetians* could ſend them any relief; for *Roberto* and his Army had much ado to ſecure that City. On the other ſide, the Marqueſs of *Ferrara* had recovered a great part of his Loſſes; for the Duke of *Reno* (who was ſent to confront him) having but 2000 Horſe and 1000 Foot, was not able to oppoſe him: ſo that all that Year, 1483, things went on proſperouſly for the League. The next Spring (the Winter having paſſed without any conſiderable Action) both Armies took the Field. The League, for greater expèdition in their deſigns againſt the *Venetians*, had drawn their whole Army together; and (had the War been managed as wiſely as the Year before) had eaſily carried whatever the *Venetians* were poſſeſs'd of in *Lombardy*; for they were reduced to 6000 Horſe and 5000 Foot (whilſt the Enemy conſiſted of 13000 Horſe and 6000 Foot) for the Duke of *Reno* being entertained only for a Year, when his Time was out, was retired. But (as it many times happens where many are in equal Authority) diſſention among the Grandees, gives the Victory to the Enemy; for *Federigo Gonzagua*, Marqueſs of *Mantoua*, being dead (who, whilſt he was living, kept the Duke of *Calabria* and Signore *Lodovico* in good Correſpondence) there grew Exceptions betwixt them, and Jealouſies, by degrees: for *Giovan Galeazzo* being of Age, became capable of the Government, and married to the Daughter of the Duke of *Calabria*, he had a mind his Son-in-Law, and not *Lodovico*, ſhould exerciſe the Government. *Lodovico* ſmelling his deſign, reſolved if poſſible to prevent him. This Inclination of *Lodovico*'s being known to the *Venetians*, they thought it a fair opportunity to gain (as they had done before) by Peace, what by War they had loſt; and making private Overtures to him, in *Auguſt*, 1484. they came to an Agreement, which was no ſooner divulged, but the other Confederates were highly diſpleaſed, eſpecially ſeeing all they had taken from the *Venetians* would be reſtored; the *Venetians* left in the Poſſeſſion of *Rovigo* and *Poliſine* (which they had taken from the Marqueſs of *Ferrara*) and inveſted with all the Prerogatives and Preheminences which they had exerciſed over that City before: for every Man judged they had made a chargeable War; gained ſome Honour indeed in the proſecution of it; but in the concluſion, they had

come

come off with Disgrace; for the Towns which they had taken were restored, but the Towns they had lost were kept by the Enemy: yet the Confederates were glad to accept the Peace, being weary of the War, and unwilling to attempt their Fortune any further with the Defects and Ambition of other People.

Castello besieged by the Army of the Pope.

Whilst in *Lombardy* things were managed at this rate, the Pope, by the Mediation of *Lorenzo*, pressed hard upon the City of *Castello* to turn out *Nicolo Vitelli*, who (to bring over the Pope to their Party) was deserted by the League. Whilst they were intrenched before the Town, those of the Garrison who were Friends to *Vitelli*, sallyed out upon the Enemy, and beat them from the Siege: Hereupon the Pope recalled *Girolomo* from *Lombardy*; caused him to come to *Rome* to recruit his Army, and then sent him to pursue his designs against *Castello*: but judging it better upon second thoughts to reduce *Nicolo* by fair means than foul, he made Peace with him, and reconciled him, as much as in him lay, to his Adversary *Lorenzo*: and to this he was constrained more out of apprehension of new Troubles than any desire to Peace; for he saw ill Humours remaining betwixt the *Colonnesi*, and the *Ursini*.

In the War betwixt the Pope and the King of *Naples*, the King of *Naples* had taken from the *Ursini* the Country of *Pagliacozzo*, and given it to the *Colonnesi*, who followed his Party. When Peace was afterwards made betwixt the Pope and the King, the *Ursini* demanded Restitution by virtue of that Treaty. The Pope many times required the *Colonnesi* to deliver it; but neither the Prayers of the one, nor the Threats of the other being able to prevail, they fell upon the *Ursini* with their old way of Depredation and Plunder. The Pope not enduring that Insolence, drew all his Forces together, and joining them with the *Ursini*, they sacked the Houses of all the *Colonni* in *Rome*; killed those who resisted, and destroyed most of the Castles which they had in those Parts: so that those Tumults were ended, not by Peace, but by the destruction of one of the Parties.

The *Colonni* provoked the Pope, and are ruin'd in *Rome*.

In the mean time, the Affairs in *Genoa* and *Tuscany* were in no better condition; for the *Florentines* kept *Antonio da Marciano*, with his Forces upon the Frontiers of *Serezana*, and with Excursions and Skirmishes, kept the *Serezani* in perpetual Alarm. In *Genoa*, *Battistino Fregoso* Doge of that City, reposing too much confidence in *Paulo Fregoso* the Archbishop, was himself, his Wife and Children, seized by him, and the Archbishop made himself Prince. The *Venetian* Fleet had at that time assaulted the King of *Naples*; possess'd themselves of *Galipoli*, and alarmed all the Towns about it; but upon the Peace in *Lombardy*, all the Differences were composed, except those in *Tuscany* and *Rome*: for the Pope died five days after the Peace was proclaimed, either his Time being then come, or else his Indignation at the Peace (against which he was most obstinately averse) having killed him. However he left all *Italy* quiet when he died, tho' whilst he lived, he kept it constantly imbroiled. Upon his death, *Rome* was immediately in Arms; Count *Girolamo* with his Forces retired to the Castle; the *Ursini* were fearful the *Colonni* would revenge the Injuries they had so lately received; the *Colonni* demanded their Houses and Castles to be made good: so that in a few Days, Murders, Robberies, and burning of Houses, was to be seen in several parts of the City: But the Cardinals having persuaded *Girolamo* to deliver up the Castle into the hands of their College; to retire to his own Government, and free the City from his Forces; hoping thereby to make the next Pope his Friend, he readily obeyed, deliver'd up the Castle to the College, and drew off his Forces to *Imola*. So that the Cardinals being rid of that fear, and the Barons of the assistance they expected from *Girolamo*, they proceeded to the Election of a new Pope, and after some little Disputes, they made choice of *Giovan Battista Cibo* Cardinal *di Malfetta*, a *Genoese*, with the Name of *Innocent* VIII. who by the easiness of his Nature (being a Man of Peace) prevailed with them to lay down their Arms, and once more made all quiet at *Rome*.

Notwithstanding this Peace, the *Florentines* could not be prevail'd with to be quiet; it appearing to them dishonourable, and insufferable, that a private Gentleman should have taken, and keep from them the Castle of *Serazana*; and because it was an Article in the Peace, that not only all that had been lost might be demanded again, but that War might be waged against any that obstructed it, they prepared Men and Money to go on with that Enterprize: whereupon *Agostino Fregoso*, who had surprized *Serazana*, finding himself unable with his private Force to sustain such a War, he resigned it to S. *George*. And seeing we shall many times have occasion to mention S. *George*, and the *Genoesi*, it will not be inconvenient to describe the Orders and Methods of that City, which is one of the principal in *Italy*.

The Company of S. *Georgio*.

When the *Genoesi* had made Peace with the *Venetians*, after the greatest War in which they had ever been engaged, not being able to satisfie certain Citizens who had advanced great Sums of Money for the Service of the Publick, they made over to them the

the Profits of the *Dogana*, appointing that every Man ſhould ſhare of them, according to the proportion of his principal Sum, till his whole Debt ſhould be wrought out; and for their convenience of meeting, and better diſpoſing of their Affairs, they conſigned the Palace to them which was over the Cuſtom-houſe. Theſe Creditors erected a kind of Government among themſelves, created a Council of 100 to deliberate and order all publick Matters, and another of eight Citizens, to put them in execution: their Debts were divided into ſeveral Parts, which they called *Luoghi*, and their whole Body was called S. *Giorgia*. Having eſtabliſhed their Government in this manner, new Exigencies ariſing every day to the Commonwealth, they had recourſe to S. *Giorgio* for Supplies; which being rich and well managed, was able always to relieve them: but the Magiſtrates and Community of the City (having granted them their Cuſtoms before) were forced now, when they borrowed any Money, to make over their Lands to them; and they had done it ſo frequently, that the Neceſſities of the one, and the Supplies of the other had brought things to that paſs, that the greateſt part of the Towns and Cities under the Juriſdiction of *Genoa*, were fallen into their hands, and they governed and diſpoſed of them as they pleaſed, chuſing Annually their *Rettori* or Governors by publick Suffrage, without the leaſt interpoſition or concernment of the Commonwealth. From hence it happened, that the Affection of the People was removed from the Government of the Commonwealth (which they look'd upon as tyrannical) to the Government of S. *Giorgio* (which was well and impartially adminiſtred) and from hence the eaſie and often Changes of the State did proceed; which ſubmitted it ſelf ſometimes to this Citizen, ſometimes to that Stranger, as occaſion invited; and the reaſon was, becauſe it was not S. *Giorgio*, but the Magiſtrates which altered the Government. Therefore, when the Contention was betwixt the *Fregoſi* and *Adorni* for Sovereignty of the City; becauſe the Controverſie was only among the Governors of the Commonwealth, the greateſt part of the Citizens withdrew, and left the State to him that could catch it; the Office of S. *Giorgio* concerning it ſelf no farther, than to ſwear the Perſon advanced, to the conſervation of their Laws, which have not been altered to this very Day; for having Arms, and Money, and Conduct, they cannot be ſubverted without danger of a deſtructive Rebellion. A rare and incomparable Example, not to be followed in all the viſible, or imaginary Commonwealths of the Philoſophers; to behold in the ſame Circle, among the ſame Citizens, Liberty, and Tyranny, Civility, and Corruption, Juſtice, and Rapine to be exerciſed at the ſame time; for that Order alone preſerved that City in its ancient and venerable Cuſtoms. And had it fallen out (as in time doubtleſs it will) that the Government of the Commonwealth had fallen to the management of S. *Giorgio*, no queſtion but before this it would have been greater, and more formidable than the Republick of *Venice*. To this S. *Giorgio*, therefore *Agoſtino Fregoſa* (not being able to keep it himſelf) deliver'd *Serezana*. S. *Giorgio* accepted it readily, undertook to defend it, put out a Fleet immediately to Sea, and ſent Forces to *Pietra Santa*, to intercept any that ſhould go to the *Florentines*, who were already encamped before *Serezana*. The *Florentines* on the other ſide had a Month's mind to *Pietra Santa*, as a Town which, by reaſon of its ſituation betwixt *Piſa* and that, would make *Serezana* inconſiderable, tho' they ſhould take it; and in the mean time interrupt them in their Leaguer, as often as that Garriſon ſhould think it fit to come forth. To bring this about, the *Florentines* ſent a conſiderable quantity of Proviſions and Ammunition, with a ſmall Party to convey them from *Piſa* to their Camp. Suppoſing that the Garriſon of *Pietra Santa* would be tempted to take them, both from the weakneſs of the Convoy, and the greatneſs of the Prize: and their Artifice ſucceeded, for the Garriſon could not ſee ſuch a Booty, and ſuffer it to paſs. This was as the *Florentines* deſired, and gave them a juſt pretence of Hoſtility; whereupon, riſing from *Serezana*, they marched to *Pietra Santa*, and encamped before it; which being well mann'd, defended it ſelf ſtoutly. The *Florentines* having diſpoſed their Artillery in the Plain, they raiſed a new Battery upon the Mountain, intending likewiſe to batter it from thence. *Giacopo Guicardini* was their Commiſſary at that time, and whilſt they were employed at *Pietra Santa* in this manner, the *Genoa* Fleet took and burned the *Rocca di Vada*, and landing ſome Men, overran all the Country thereabouts. Againſt theſe Forces *Bongianni Gianfigliazza* was diſpatched with a Party of Horſe and Foot, who reſtrained their Extravagance, ſo as they did not make their Excurſions as formerly. However the Fleet continued to moleſt the *Florentines*, and accordingly moved to *Ligorn*, where with Bridges and other Military Engines, having got cloſe to the New Tower, they battered it ſmartly for ſeveral Days together; but finding it to no purpoſe, they went off again with ſhame. In the mean time the Siege at *Pietra Santa* went on very ſlowly; inſomuch, that the Enemy was encouraged to attempt upon their Battery, and ſallying out when they ſaw their Advantage, they carried it, much

to

to their own Reputation, and to the diſcouragement of their Enemy, who immediately drew off to about four Miles diſtance; and the Officers conſidering it was *October*, and the Winter far on, were of opinion to put their Army into their Quarters, and reſerve the proſecution of their Siege, till a better Seaſon.

Theſe Diſorders being known at *Florence*, filled all the chief Officers with great Indignation; upon which, to recruit their Camp, and recover their Reputation, they elected *Antonio Pucci*, and *Bernardo del Nero* for their new Commiſſaries; who being ſent with a conſiderable Supply of Money to the Camp, remonſtrated to the chief Officers, the diſpleaſure of the *Senate*, the State and the whole City; their Commands to return their Leaguer with the Army; the Scandal and Infamy it would be, if ſo many great Officers, with ſo great an Army, having nothing to oppoſe them but a pitiful Garriſon, ſhould not be able to carry ſo weak, and ſo contemptible a Town. They repreſented likewiſe, the preſent and future Advantage which they might expect if it were taken; ſo that they were all encouraged to return; and the firſt thing to be attacked, they reſolved ſhould be the Baſtion, out of which they had been forced: in which Action, it was manifeſt, what Courteſie, Affability, kind Uſage, and good Words could produce in the Soldiers; for *Antonio Pucci* perſuading this, promiſing that, aſſiſting a third with his Hand, and embracing the fourth, incited them to the Aſſault with ſuch fury, that they regained the Baſtion in a moment: but they did not take it without Loſs, for the Count *Antonio da Marciano* was ſlain from one of their great Guns. This Succeſs brought ſuch a terror upon the Garriſon, that they began to think of ſurrendring. That things might be tranſacted with greater Reputation, *Lorenzo de Medici* thought good to repair in Perſon to the Camp, where he was no ſooner arrived, but in a few Days the Caſtle ſurrendred. Winter being come, it did not appear to thoſe Officers convenient to proſecute the War, but to attend better Weather; for the Seaſon of the Year, by the malignity of the Air, had infected the Army extreamly; for many of the chief Officers were ſick; and among the reſt, *Antonio Pucci*, and *Bongianni Gianfigliazza*, were not only ſick, but died, to the great regret of all People; ſo much Honour and Eſtimation had *Antonio* acquired by his Conduct at *Pietra Santa*. The *Florentine* had no ſooner taken and ſettled themſelves in *Pietra Santa*, but Ambaſſadors came to them from the *Luccheſi* to demand it, as an Appendix to their Commonwealth; alledging, that among the reſt, there was an expreſs Article, That whatever ſhould be taken either of the one ſide or the other, ſhould be reſtored to the firſt Owners. The *Florentines* did not deny the Agreement, but anſwered, that they could not tell whether in the Peace they were then negotiating with the *Genoeſes*, they might not be obliged to reſtore it, and therefore they could give them no poſitive Reſolution till that was determined; and if it ſhould happen that they ſhould not be obliged, it would be neceſſary for the *Sieneſi* to think of ſome way to ſatisfie for the Expence they had been at, and the Damage they had received by the loſs of ſo many conſiderable Citizens, and when they did ſo, they might be confident they ſhould have it. This whole Winter was conſumed in Negotiations of Peace, betwixt the *Florentines* and the *Genoeſi*, which were tranſacted at *Rome* by the Mediation of the Pope: but nothing being concluded, the *Florentines* would have fallen upon *Serezana* in the Spring, had they not been prevented by *Lorenzo*'s Indiſpoſition, and a new War betwixt *Ferrando* and the Pope. For *Lorenzo* was not only troubled with the Gout (which was his hereditary Diſeaſe) but he had ſo great Pains and Affliction at his Stomach, that he was forced to go to the Baths to be cured. But the chiefeſt occaſion, was the War, which was originally from hence. The City of *Aquila* was ſubject to the Kingdom of *Naples*, but ſo, as in a manner it was free. In that City, the Count *de Mortorio* was a Man of more than ordinary Reputation. The Duke of *Calabria* lying with his Horſe not far from *Tronto*, pretending a deſire to compoſe certain Tumults which had happened betwixt the Peaſants in thoſe Parts (but being really ambitious to reduce that City to a more intire ſubjection to his Father) ſent to the Count to let him know he deſired to ſpeak with him, and take his Advice in the regulation of thoſe Affairs. The Count, not having the leaſt Jealouſie, repaired to him immediately, but he was ſeized as ſoon as he arrived, and ſent Priſoner to *Naples*.

Pietra Santa taken by *Lorenzo*.

This Accident being known in *Aquila*, altered the Affections of the whole City, inſomuch, that the People taking Arms, *Antonio Concinello* (the King's Commiſſary) was ſlain, and with him, ſuch of the Citizens as were known to be affected to the *Neapolitan* Intereſt: and that they might have Friends to defend them in their Rebellion, they ſet up the Banner of the Church, and ſent Ambaſſadors to the Pope, to tender him the Poſſeſſion of their City, and implore his Protection againſt the Tyranny of the King. The Pope was eaſily perſuaded to their Defence, as a Perſon that hated the King, both upon publick and private Accounts; whereupon being informed that *Roberto*

Aquila rebels againſt the King of *Naples*.

The Pope undertakes its Protection.

Roberto da San Severino (a great Enemy to the State of *Milan*) was out of employment, he ſent for him to *Rome* with all ſpeed, made him his General, and ſolicited all the Friends and Relations of the Count *de Mortorio* to riſe in his behalf; ſo that the Princes of *Altemura*, *Salerno*, and *Beſignana*, took up Arms againſt the King. The King ſeeing himſelf engaged ſo unexpectedly in a War, ſent to the *Florentines* and Duke of *Milan* for their Aid: The *Florentines* were very irreſolute what was to be done; they thought it unreaſonable, to leave their own Deſigns, for the promotion of other Peoples; beſides that, the taking up Arms again ſo ſuddenly againſt the Church, muſt needs be very dangerous: nevertheleſs, being in League, and under an Obligation, they preferr'd their Faith before either Intereſt or Danger; took the *Orſini* into their Pay, and ſent their whole Force (under the Count *de Pitigliano*) towards *Rome*, in aſſiſtance of the King. By this means the King had two Camps; that under the Duke of *Calabria*, he ſent towards *Rome*, in conjunction with the *Florentines*, to attend the Motion of the Army of the Church; the other he kept at home, to ſecure his own Country againſt any Commotion by the Barons, and in both Places things occurred with variety of Succeſs: but at length the King remaining in all Places ſuperior, by the Mediation of Ambaſſadors from *Spain*, in *Auguſt* 1486, a Peace was concluded, to which the Pope (being depreſs'd and diſcouraged with his ill Fortune) conſented, and all the Princes of *Italy* with him, only the *Genoeſi* were excepted, as Rebels to the State of *Milan*, and Uſurpers upon the Territories of *Florence*. The Peace being concluded, *Roberto da San. Severino*, having been neither faithful to the Pope, nor terrible to the Enemy, was turned out of *Rome* in diſgrace, and being purſued by the Forces of the *Florentines* and the Duke; when he was paſt *Ceſenna*, finding they gained upon him, and would be preſently upon his Back, he betook himſelf to his Heels, and with about 100 Horſe fled away to *Ravenna*, leaving the reſt of his Party either to be entertained by the Duke, or deſtroyed by the Country. The King having ſigned the Peace, and reconciled himſelf with his Barons, he cauſed *Giovanni Coppola* and *Antonello d' Anverſa*, and their Sons, to be put to Death, as Perſons who had betrayed his Secrets to the Pope in the time of the War. By the experiment of this War, the Pope having obſerved with what diligence and alacrity the *Florentines* preſerve their Alliance, tho' he hated them before for their Affection to the *Genoeſi*, and their Aſſiſtance to the King, he began now to careſs them, and ſhow greater favour to their Ambaſſadors, than formerly he had done: which Inclination being intimated to *Lorenzo*, he improved it with all poſſible Induſtry, as knowing it would gain him great Reputation, if to his Friendſhip with the King, he could add the Amity of the Pope. This Pope had a Son called *Franceſco*, and being deſirous to advance him both in Fortune and Friends (which when he was dead might ſupport him) he could not find a Perſon in all *Italy*, with whom he might more ſafely ally him, than with *Lorenzo de Medici*; and therefore he ordered things ſo, that he married him to a Daughter of *Lorenzo*'s. This Alliance being finiſhed, his Holineſs had a deſire, that the *Genoeſi*, by Agreement, ſhould deliver up *Serezana* to the *Florentines*, and declared to them, that they could not in juſtice retain what *Agoſtino* had ſold them; nor could *Agoſtino* convey that to S. *Giorgio*, which was none of his own; but with all his Arguments he could never prevail: So that whilſt theſe things were in agitation in *Rome*, the *Genoeſi* went on with their Preparations, and rigging out many of their Ships, before they could have any News of it at *Florence*, they landed 3000 Men, and aſſaulted the Caſtle of *Serezanello*, which ſtands upon the *Serezana*, and was Garriſon'd by the *Florentines*; and having ſacked and burned the Town (which lies on one ſide of it) they advanced againſt the Caſtle, and having planted their Guns, they battered it exceedingly. This Attack was new, and unexpected to the *Florentines*, inſomuch, that they drew what Force they were able together, under the Command of *Urginio Urſino*, at *Piſa*, and made their Complaints to the Pope, that whilſt he was in Treaty with them for Peace, the *Genoeſes* had invaded them; after which they ſent *Piero Corſini* to *Lucca*, to preſerve that City in its Allegiance: they ſent likewiſe *Pagocantonio Soderini* their Ambaſſador to *Venice*, to try the Minds of that Commonwealth. They deſired Aid likewiſe of the King of *Naples*, and *Signore Lodovico*, but neither of them ſupplied them, the King pretending apprehenſion of the *Turkiſh* Fleet, and *Lodovico* with other Shifts delayed to relieve them; ſo that the *Florentines* (as they uſually are) were left alone in their Neceſſity, finding no body ſo well diſpoſed to aſſiſt them, as they were to aſſiſt other People. Nevertheleſs (being not ſtrange to them) they were not at all diſcouraged, but raiſing a great Army under the Command of *Giacopo Guicciardini*, and *Pietro Vettori*; they ſent them againſt the Enemy, who had lodged himſelf upon the River *Magra*. In the mean time, *Serazanello* was cloſely beſieged, and what with Mines and Batteries, brought to great danger of being taken. Whereupon a Council being called, it was reſolved

Peace concluded.

to

THE PRINCE,

Together with the

ORIGINAL

OF THE

GUELF and *GHIBILIN*,
Life of *CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI*,
Murther of *VITELLI*, &c. by Duke *VALENTINO*,
State of *FRANCE*,
State of *GERMANY*.

By NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL.

Faithfully Engliſhed.

LONDON:

Printed by *J. Leake*, for A. CHURCHILL, R. BONWICKE, T. GOODWIN, J. WALTHOE, J. WOTTON, S. MANSHIP, R. WILKIN, B. TOOKE, R. SMITH, R. ROBINSON, and T. WARD. M DCC XX.

LONDON:

Printed by J. Leake, for A. Churchill, K. Bonwicke,
T. Goodwin, J. Walthoe, J. Wotton, S. Manship,
R. Wilkin, B. Tooke, R. Smith, R. Robinson, and
T. Ward. MDCCXX.

Faithfully Englished.

By Nicholas Machiavel.

State of GERMANY.
State of FRANCE.
Matters of VENICE, &c. by Duke VALENTINO.
Life of CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI.
GUELF and GHIBELIN.

TO THE

ORIGINAL

Together with the

PRINCE.

to leave it; and the Enemy not at all declining, they came to an Engagement, in which the *Genoeſi* were defeated, *Lodovico dal Fieſco*, and ſeveral of their principal Officers taken Priſoners: yet this Victory could not encline the *Serezaneſi* to ſurrender, they rather prepared more obſtinately for their defence; and the *Florentine* Commiſſaries being as diligent on their ſide, it was couragiouſly both aſſaulted and defended. This Leaguer proving longer than was expected, *Lorenzo de Medici* thought it expedient to go himſelf to the Camp, where his arrival animated his own Soldiers, and diſcouraged the Adverſary; for upon obſervation of the Vigour of the *Florentines*, and the coldneſs of their Supplies from *Genoa*, freely, without any Capitulation, they threw themſelves into the Arms of *Lorenzo*, and (except ſome few who were more eminently active in the Rebellion) they were all courteouſly treated by the *Florentines*. During this Siege, *Signore Lodovico* had ſent his Horſe to *Pontremoli*, in appearance, in our favour; but holding a Correſpondence in *Genoa*, a Party mutinyed againſt the Government, and by the help of thoſe Forces, ſecured the Town for the Duke of *Milan*. About this time, the *Germans* made War upon the *Venetians*, and *Boccelino d' Oſimo Nella Marca* had cauſed *Oſimo* to revolt from the Pope, and made himſelf Lord of it. This *Boccelino*, after many Accidents, was contented (upon the Perſuaſion of *Lorenzo di Medici*) to deliver up that Town again to the Pope, which he did, and coming to *Florence*, he lived there (under *Lorenzo*'s Protection) very honourable, a conſiderable time; but afterwards removing to *Milan*, and not finding the ſame Faith as he had done at *Florence*, he was put to death by *Lodovico*'s Command. The *Venetians* being ſet upon by the *Germans* near the City of *Trento* were utterly defeated, and *Signore Roberto da San Severino* their General was ſlain. After the loſs of this Victory, according to their uſual Fortune, the *Venetians* made a Peace with the *Germans*, but upon Terms as exceedingly honourable, as if they had been the Conquerors.

The *Genoeſe* overthrown.

The *Venetians* defeated.

About the ſame time great Troubles aroſe likewiſe in *Romagna*. *Franceſco d' Orſo* of *Furli* was a Man of great Authority in that City, and falling under the Suſpicion of the Count *Girolamo*, he was many times threatned by him: ſo that *Franceſco* living in perpetual fear, he was adviſed by his Friends and Relations, to be before-hand with the Count; and ſeeing his intention was manifeſtly to take away his Life, he ſhould ſtrike the firſt blow and make ſure of the Count, and ſo by the death of another Perſon, ſecure himſelf. This Counſel being given, and as reſolutely undertaken, they appointed the time to be at the Fair at *Furli*; for ſeveral of their Friends in the Country coming to the Town on courſe that Day, they thought they ſhould have enough of them preſent, without the danger of inviting them. It was in the Month of *May*, in which the greateſt part of the *Italians* have a cuſtom of Supping by Day-light. The Conſpirators thought the beſt time to kill him would be after he had ſupped, when the Servants were gone down to their own, and left him as it were alone in his Chamber. Having agreed upon the time, *Franceſco* went to the Count's Palace, and having left his Accomplices below, and told one of his Servants, that he deſired to ſpeak with the Count, he was admitted, and finding him alone, after ſome previous and pretended Diſcourſe, he took his opportunity and killed him; then calling up his Companions, the Servant was ſlain likewiſe; and then the Captain of the Caſtle coming in by accident with ſome few in his Company to ſpeak with the Count, they fell upon him, and murdered him with the reſt. Having finiſhed their Work, and raiſed a great Hubbub in the Houſe, the Count's Body was thrown out of the Window, a great Cry made of *Liberty* and the *Church*, and the People exhorted to Arm; who abominating the Cruelty and the Avarice of the Count, fell upon his Houſes, plundered them, and made the Counteſs *Catherina* (his Lady) and her Family, Priſoners: and this was done with ſo little Oppoſition, that there was nothing but the Caſtle which hindered the accompliſhment of their Deſigns; but that Captain being obſtinate, and not to be wrought upon by them to ſurrender, they deſired the Counteſs to try if ſhe could perſuade him, which ſhe promiſed to endeavour, if they would let her go to him into the Caſtle, and as Hoſtage for her Fidelity, ſhe would leave them her Children. The Conſpirators believed her, and gave her leave to go to him; but ſhe was no ſooner in the Caſtle, but ſhe began to ſwagger, and threaten them with Death, in revenge of her Husband's; and when they told her they would kill all her Children, ſhe bid them do their worſt, for ſhe knew how to have more. The Conſpirators were not a little diſmayed at this Accident; they ſaw the Pope ſent them no Succours, and hearing that *Lodovico*, the Counteſs's Uncle, was ſending Forces to her Relief, they pack'd up what they could, and away they went to *Caſtello*; ſo that the Counteſs being reſtored, ſhe revenged the Death of her Husband with all poſſible Cruelty. The *Florentines* had News of what happened to the Count, and immediately took occaſion to attempt the Caſtle of *Piancaldoli*, which had been formerly taken from them

Count *Girolamo* murdered.

The Counteſs revenged the Death of her Husband.

by the ſaid Count; and accordingly ſending their Forces thither, they retook it, but with the death of *Ciecco*, a moſt excellent Architect. About the ſame time that this Tumult happened in the City, another of no leſs importance fell out in the Country of *Romagna*. *Galeotto* Lord of *Faenza*, was married to the Daughter of *Giovanni Bentivogli*, Prince of *Bologna*: This Lady being jealous, or upon ſome other ill Uſage from her Husband, or elſe ill-natur'd of herſelf, had her Husband in ſuch contempt, that ſhe contrived to take away both his Authority and Life; and one Day, counterfeiting her ſelf ſick, ſhe laid her ſelf upon the Bed, and having hid ſome of her Comrades in her Chamber, ſhe order'd when *Galeotto* came to viſit her, they ſhould ruſh upon him, and kill him. This Lady had communicated her deſign to her Father, who was well enough contented, hoping when his Son-in-Law was dead, he might ſet up for himſelf. The time agreed upon for the Execution being come, *Galeotto* (as he was accuſtomed) came to ſee his Wife, and having diſcourſed with her a while, the Conſpirators ruſhed forth, and killed him before he could make any defence. Upon his death a great Tumult was raiſed, and the Lady, with one of her little Children called *Aſtorre*, was forced to betake herſelf to the Caſtle. The People took Arms; *Giovan Bentivogli* (with a *Bergameſe*, who had been an Officer under the Duke of *Milan*) having got ſome Forces together, marched into *Faenza*, where *Antonio Boſcoli*, the Commiſſary of *Florence*, was reſident at that time, and having aſſembled all the chief of that Party, they were in great Argument about the Government of the Town: When the Inhabitants of the *Val di Lamona* had taken the Alarm, and being got together in a throng, they fell upon *Giovanni*, and the *Bergameſe*, they cut one of them to pieces, and took the other Priſoner, and calling out upon *Aſtorre* and the *Florentines*, they delivered the City to the Conduct of the Commiſſary. This Accident being known in *Florence*, was highly diſpleaſing to every Body; nevertheleſs, they cauſed *Giovanni* and his Daughter to be ſet at liberty, and took upon themſelves the care of *Aſtorre* and the City, by univerſal conſent of the whole People. After the Wars betwixt the greater Princes were compoſed; beſides theſe, there happened many Tumults in *Romagna la Marca* and *Siena*, which being of no great moment, I think it ſuperfluous to recount them. True it is, Troubles in *Siena* (after the end of the War, and the Duke of *Calabria*'s leaving thoſe Parts in the Year 1488) were more frequent than elſe where, and after ſeveral Variations (ſometimes the People, ſometimes the Nobility having the predominance) at length the Nobility prevail'd, and of them, the Perſons of greateſt Authority were *Pandolfo* and *Giacopo Petrucci*, who, one of them for his Conduct, and the other for his Courage, were made as it were Princes of that City; but the *Florentines*, from the end of the War againſt *Serazana*, to the Year 1492 (in which *Lorenzo* died) lived in great Felicity. For *Lorenzo* having by his great intereſt and prudence, procured Peace all over *Italy*, he applied himſelf to enlarging the Grandeur of the City, and of his own Family; and firſt he married his eldeſt Son *Piero* to *Alfonſina*, the Daughter of *Cavaliere Orſimo*: his ſecond Son, *Giovanni*, he advanced to be a Cardinal, which having no precedent, was the more remarkable; for he was but 13 Years old at the time of his Promotion: for his third Son, *Giuliano* (who was very young) he could make no extraordinary proviſion, becauſe he lived not long after: but his Daughters were diſpoſed of very well: one of them was married to *Giacopo Salvati*; another to *Franceſco Cibo*; a third to *Piero Ridolfi*; the fourth (which he had married to *Giovanni de Medici* to keep his Family united) died. In his private Affairs, eſpecially in Merchandizing, he was very unfortunate; for by reaſon of the exorbitance of his Officers (who all them lived like Princes) much of his Fortune was waſted and ſquandered, inſomuch, that he was conſtrained to be beholding to the State for great Sums of Money. That he might be no longer liable to the malignity of Fortune, he left his trading, and fell a purchaſing Land, as a ſurer and more durable way. In the Countries of *Prato*, *Piſa*, and the Vale, he bought ſuch Poſſeſſions, as for the Revenue, and magnificence of the Houſes, were fitter for a King than a private Perſon. After this he beautified and enlarged the City; and becauſe they were many places uninhabited, he appointed new Streets, and cauſed new Houſes to be erected to fill them: which was not only an Augmentation, but a great Ornament to the City. That he might live quietly at home, and in time of War keep his Enemies at a diſtance, he fortified the Caſtle of *Firezuolo*, which ſtands towards *Bologna* in the middle of the *Alps*. Towards *Siena*, he began to repair *Poggio* Imperial, and make it very ſtrong: towards *Genoa*, he ſecured that paſſage, by the Reducation of *Pietra Santa*, and *Serezana*; with good Stipends and Penſions he conformed his Friends, the *Baglioni* in *Perugia*, the *Vitelli* in the City of *Caſtello*: in *Faenza* he had a particular Government, all which were as ſo many Bulwarks to keep the Enemy from *Florence*. In times of Peace he careſſed the City with Feaſting, and Plays, and Tournaments, and Repreſentations

Galeotto Lord of *Faenza* murdered by his Wife.

Lorenzo de Medici.

of

of ancient Triumphs, to delight and entertain the People: his only deſign being to ſee them pleaſed, the City ſupplied, and the Nobles reſpected. He was a great lover of Artiſts, and favourer of Learned Men, of which *Agnola da Montepulciano*, *Chriſtofano Laudini*, and *Demetrius* the *Greek*, can give ample Teſtimony: the Count *Giovanni della Mirandola* (a Perſon almoſt defied for his Literature) left all the other Parts of *Europe* which he had travelled, and (moved by *Lorenzo*'s Magnificence) fixt his reſidence at *Florence*. In Architecture, Muſick, and Poeſy, he delighted exceedingly. Many Poetical Compoſitions, with ſeveral of his Comments upon them, are ſtill to be ſeen. And that the *Florentine* Youth might be encouraged to ſtudy, he erected an Univerſity in *Piſa*, and hired the beſt Scholars in *Italy* to read to them: he built a Monaſtery not far from *Florence* on purpoſe for Frier *Mariano da Chinazano*, an *Auguſtine* Monk, and one which he eſteemed an excellent Preacher. He was greatly beloved both of God and Fortune, for all his deſigns came to a good end, and all his Enemies miſcarried; for beſides the *Pazzi*, he was ſet upon to have been killed by *Battiſta Freſcobaldi*, in the *Carmine*; and by *Baldinotto da Piſtoia*, at his Country-Houſe: but both of them failed, and were juſtly puniſhed, with all their Confederates. The excellence of his Converſation, the eminence of his Wiſdom, and the happineſs of his Fortune, made him honourable not only in *Italy*, but in all the Courts of the World. *Mathias* King of *Hungary*, gave many Teſtimonies of his Affection: the *Soldan* by his Ambaſſadors and Preſents, viſited and preſented him. The great *Turk* delivered *Bernardo Bandini* into his hands, who had murdered his Brother *Giulian*; all which rendered him highly venerable in *Italy*, and he added to his Reputation every day by his Prudence. In his Diſcourſe he was eloquent, and facetious; in his Reſolutions, wiſe; in his Executions, quick, and couragious; nor can any thing be objected ſufficient to eclipſe theſe Virtues, though he was indeed addicted to Women; took too much pleaſure in the Company of witty and ſatyrical Men; and would play at Boys Play ſometimes, beneath the Dignity of his Office; for he would play many times with his Children at all the moſt idle and Childiſh Recreations they would put him to. So that if the Gravity of his Life be conſidered with its Levity, he will ſeem to be compoſed of two ſeveral Perſons, united by an almoſt impoſſible Conjunction. The laſt part of his Days was full of Sorrow and Diſquiet, occaſioned by the Diſtempers of his Body; for he was ſorely afflicted with intolerable Pains at his Stomach, which brought him ſo low, that in *April*, 1492, he died, in the 43d Year of his Age. Never was there any Man, not only in *Florence*, but *Italy*, who departed with more Reputation for his Wiſdom, nor more Lamentation to his Country; and becauſe upon his Death, many Deſolations were like to enſue, the Heavens themſelves did ſeem to preſage it. The Spire of the Church of S. *Riparata* was ſtruck with Thunder with ſuch fury, that a great part of the Steeple was deſtroyed by it, to the great conſternation of the City. All the Inhabitants of *Florence*, and the Princes of *Italy*, bewailed him, which was particularly manifeſted by their ſeveral Compliments of Condolency; and whether they had reaſon or not, for what they did, the Effects which ſucceeded a while after, did clearly demonſtrate; for being deprived of his Councils, *Italy* could not find any one remaining, able to ſatiate, or reſtrain the Ambition of *Lodovico* Duke of *Milan*; for want of which, after his death, ſuch Seeds of Diſſention brake forth, as have perplexed and embroiled all *Italy* ever ſince.

Lorenzo died.

THE

NICOLO MACHIAVELLI

TO THE

Moſt Illuſtrious LORENZO,

Son of PIERO de MEDICI.

THOSE *who deſire the Favour of a Prince, do commonly introduce themſelves by preſenting him with ſuch Things as he either values much, or does more than ordinarily delight in; for which reaſon he is frequently preſented with Horſes, Arms, Cloth of Gold, Jewels, and ſuch Ornaments as are ſuitable to his Quality and Grandeur. Being ambitious to preſent my ſelf to your Highneſs with ſome Teſtimony of my Devotions towards you, I find in all my Wardrobe I could not find any thing more precious (at leaſt to my ſelf) than the Knowledge of the Actions and Atchievements of Great Men, which I learned by long Converſation in Modern Affairs, and a continual Inveſtigation of Old: After long and diligent Examination, having reduced all into a ſmall Volume, I do preſume to preſent to your Highneſs; and though I cannot think it a Work fit to appear in your Preſence, yet my confidence in your Bounty is ſuch, I hope it may be accepted, conſidering I was not capable of more, than preſenting you with a Faculty of underſtanding in a ſhort time, what for ſeveral Years, with infinite Labour and Hazard, I had been gathering together. Nor have I beautified or adorned it with Rhetorical Ornations, or ſuch outward Imbelliſhments as are uſual in ſuch Deſcriptions. I had rather it ſhould paſs without any Approbation, than owe it to any thing but the Truth and Gravity of the Matter. I would not have it imputed to me as Preſumption, if an inferior Perſon, as I am, pretend not only to treat of, but to preſcribe and regulate the Proceedings of Princes: For, as they who take the Landskip of a Country, to conſider the Mountains, and the Nature of the higher Places, do deſcend*

ordinarily into the Plains, and diſpoſe themſelves upon the Hills, to take the Proſpect of the Valleys, in like manner, to underſtand the Nature of the People, it is neceſſary to be a Prince; and to know the Nature of Princes, 'tis as requiſite to be of the People. May your Highneſs then accept this Book with as much Kindneſs as it is preſented; and if you pleaſe diligently and deliberately to reflect upon it, you will in it find my extreme deſire that your Highneſs may arrive at that Grandeur which Fortune and your Accompliſhments do ſeem to preſage; from which Pinacle of Honour, if your Highneſs vouchſafes at any time to look down upon Things below, you will ſee how unjuſtly, and how continually I have been expoſed to the Malignity of Fortune.



Machiavel's Prince.

CHAP. I.

The ſeveral Sorts of Governments, and after what manner they are obtained.

THERE never was, nor is at this Day any Government in the World, by which one Man has Rule and Dominion over another, but it is either a Commonwealth, or a Monarchy. Monarchies are either hereditary, where the Anceſtors of the Soveraign have been a long time in Poſſeſſion, or where they are but new. The new are either ſo wholly, and entirely (as *Milan* was to *Francis Sforza*) or annex'd to the hereditary Dominions of the Conqueror (as the Kingdom of *Naples*, to the Kingdom of *Spain*.) Theſe Territories thus acquired, are accuſtomed either to be ſubject to ſome Prince, or to live at Liberty and Free, and are ſubdued either by his Auxiliaries, or own Forces, by his good Fortune or Conduct.

CHAP. II.

Of Hereditary Principalities.

I Shall omit ſpeaking of Common-wealths, as having diſcourſed of them largely elſewhere, and write in this Place only of Principalities, and how, according to the foregoing Diviſion, the ſaid Principalities may be governed and maintained. I do affirm then, that Hereditary States, and ſuch as have been accuſtomed to the Family of their Prince, are preſerved with leſs Difficulty than the new, and becauſe it is ſufficient not to tranſgreſs the Examples of their Predeceſſors, and next to comply and frame themſelves to the Accidents that occur. So that if the Prince be a Perſon of competent Induſtry, he will be ſure to keep himſelf in the Throne, unleſs he be ſupplanted by ſome great and more than ordinary Force; and even then, when ſo ſupplanted, Fortune can never turn Tail, or be adverſe to the Uſurper, but he will ſtand fair to be reſtored. Of this, *Italy* affords us an Example in the Duke of *Ferrara*, who ſupported bravely againſt the Invaſion of the *Venetians* in 1484, and afterwards againſt Pope *Julius* X. upon no other Foundation but his Antiquity in that Government; for a natural Prince has not ſo much Occaſion or Neceſſity to oppreſs his Subjects, whereby it follows he muſt be better beloved, and retain more of the Affections of his People, unleſs ſome extraordinary Vices concur to make him odious; ſo that the Succeſſion and Coherence of his Government, takes away the Cauſes and Memory of Innovations; for one new Change leaves always (as in Buildings) a toothing and aptitude of another.

CHAP. III.

Of mix'd Principalities.

BUT the Difficulties conſiſt in Governments lately acquired, eſpecially if not abſolutely new, but as Members annexed to the Territories of the Uſurper, in which caſe ſuch a Government is called mixed. The Tumults and Revolutions in ſuch Monarchies proceed from a natural croſneſs and difficulty in all new Conqueſts; for Men do eaſily part with their Prince, upon hopes of bettering their Condition, and that Hope provokes them to rebel; but moſt commonly they are miſtaken, and Experience tells them their Condition is much worſe.

This proceeds from another natural and ordinary Cauſe, neceſſitating the new Prince to overlay or diſguſt his new Subjects by quartering his Army upon them, Taxes, or a thouſand other Inconveniencies, which are the perpetual conſequents of Conqueſt. So that you make them your Enemies who ſuffer, and are injured by your Uſurpation, but cannot preſerve their Friendſhip who introduced you, becauſe you are neither able to ſatisfy their expectation, or employ ſtrong Remedies againſt them, by reaſon of your Obligations; wherefore tho' an Uſurper be never ſo ſtrong, and his Army never ſo numerous, he muſt have Intelligence with the Natives, if he means to conquer a Province. For theſe Reaſons *Lewis* XII. of *France* quickly ſubdued *Milan*, and loſt it as quickly; for the ſame People which opened him their Gates, finding themſelves deceived in their Hopes, and diſappointed in the future Benefits which they expected, could not brook, nor comport with the Haughtineſs of their new Soveraign: 'Tis very true, Countries that have rebelled, and are conquered the ſecond time, are recovered with more difficulty; for the Defection of the People having taken off all Obligation or Reſpect from the Uſurper, he takes more Liberty to ſecure himſelf by puniſhing Offenders, expoſing the ſuſpected, and fortifying where-ever he finds himſelf weak; ſo that Count *Lodovick* having been able to reſcue *Milan* out of the Hands of the *French* the firſt time, only by harraſſing and infeſting its Borders, the ſecond time he recovered it, it was neceſſary for him to arm and confederate the whole World againſt the ſaid King, and that his Army ſhould be beaten, and driven out of *Italy*; And this happened from the aforeſaid Occaſions: Nevertheleſs the *French* were twice diſpoſſeſs'd. The general Reaſons of the firſt we have already diſcourſed, it remains now that we take a proſpect of the ſecond, and declare what Remedies the ſaid King *Lewis* had, or what another may have in his Condition, to preſerve himſelf better in his new Conqueſts than the King of *France* did before him. I ſay then that Provinces newly acquir'd, and joyn'd to the ancient Territory of him who conquer'd them, are either of the ſame Country, or Language, or otherwiſe. In the firſt caſe, they are eaſily kept, eſpecially if the People have not been too much accuſtomed to Liberty; and to ſecure the Poſſeſſion, there needs no more than to extirpate the Family of the Prince which governed before; for in other things maintaining to them their old Condition, there being no diſcrepancy in their Cuſtoms, Men do acquieſce and live quietly, as has been ſeen in the Caſes of *Burgundy*, *Bretagne*, *Gaſcogne* and *Normandy*, which have continued ſo long under the Government of *France*; for tho' there be ſome Difference in their Language, nevertheleſs their Laws and Cuſtoms being alike, they do eaſily conſiſt. He therefore who acquires any thing, and deſires to preſerve it, is obliged to have a care of two things more particularly; one is, that the Family of the former Prince be extinguiſhed; the other, that no Law or Taxes be impoſed; whereby it will come to paſs, that in a ſhort time it may be annexed and conſolidated with his old Principality. But where Conqueſt is made in a Country differing in Language, Cuſtoms, and Laws, there is the great Difficulty, their good Fortune and great Induſtry is requiſite to keep it; and one of the beſt and moſt efficacious Expedients to do it, would be for the Uſurper to live there himſelf, which would render his Poſſeſſion more ſecure and durable, as the great Turk has done in *Greece*, who, in deſpight of all his Practices and Policies to keep it in Subjection, had he not fixed his Imperial Reſidence there, would never have been able to have effected it. For being preſent in Perſon, Diſorders are diſcovered in the bud and prevented; but being at a diſtance in ſome remote Part, they come only by hear-ſay, and that, when they are got to a head, are commonly incurable. Beſides, the Province is not ſubject to be pillaged by Officers, by reaſon of the nearneſs and acceſſibleneſs of their Prince, which diſpoſes thoſe to love him who are good, and thoſe to dread him who are otherwiſe; and if any Foreigner Attacks it, he muſt do it with more care and circumſpection, in reſpect that the Prince's Reſidence being there, it will be harder for him to loſe it.

There

There is another Remedy, rather better than worſe, and that is, to plant Colonies in one or two places, which may be as it were the Keys of that State, and either that muſt be done of Neceſſity, or an Army of Horſe and Foot be maintained in thoſe Parts, which is much worſe; for Colonies are of no great expence; the Prince ſends and maintains them at very little charge, and intrenches only upon ſuch as he is conſtrain'd to diſpoſſeſs of their Houſes and Land, for the ſubſiſtance and accommodation of the new Inhabitants, who are but few, and a ſmall part of the State; they alſo who are injur'd and offended, living diſpers'd and in Poverty, cannot do any Miſchief, and the reſt being quiet and undiſturb'd, will not ſtir, leſt they ſhould miſtake, and run themſelves into the ſame Condition with their Neighbours.

I conclude likewiſe, that thoſe Colonies which are leaſt chargeable, are moſt faithful and inoffenſive, and thoſe few who are offended are too poor, and diſpers'd, to do any hurt, as I ſaid before; and it is to be obſerv'd, Men are either to be flatter'd and indulged, or utterly deſtroyed; becauſe for ſmall Offences they do uſually revenge themſelves, but for great ones they cannot; ſo that Injury is to be done in ſuch a manner, as not to fear any Revenge. But if in ſtead of Colonies, an Army be kept on foot, it will be much more expenſive, and the whole Revenue of that Province being conſumed in the keeping it, the Acquiſition will be a Loſs, and rather a Prejudice than otherwiſe, by removing the Camp up and down the Country, and changing their Quarters, which is an inconveniency every Man will reſent, and be ready to revenge, and they are the moſt dangerous and implacable Enemies who are provoked by Inſolences committed againſt them in their own Houſes. In all reſpects therefore, this kind of guard is unprofitable, whereas on the other ſide Colonies are uſeful. Moreover, he who is in a Province of a different Conſtitution (as is ſaid before) ought to make himſelf Head, and Protector of his inferior Neighbours, and endeavour with all Diligence to weaken and debilitate ſuch as are more powerful, and to have a particular care that no Stranger enters into the ſaid Province, with as much Power as he; for it will always happen that ſome body or other will be invited by the Malecontents, either out of Ambition or Fear. This is viſible in the *Etolians*, who brought the *Romans* into *Greece*, who were never admitted into any Province, but by the Temptation of the Natives. The common Method in ſuch Caſes is this; as ſoon as a foreign Potentate enters into a Province, thoſe who are weaker or diſobliged join themſelves with him, out of Emulation and Animoſity to thoſe who are above them, inſomuch that in reſpect of theſe inferior Lords, no pains is to be omitted that may gain them; and when gained, they will readily and unanimouſly fall into one Maſs with the State that is conquered. Only the Conqueror is to take ſpecial care they grow not too ſtrong, nor be intruſted with too much Authority, and then he can eaſily with his own Forces and their Aſſiſtance keep down the greatneſs of his Neighbours, and make himſelf abſolute Arbiter in that Province. And he who acts not this Part prudently, ſhall quickly loſe what he has got, and even whilſt he enjoys it, be obnoxious to many Troubles and Inconveniencies. The *Romans* in their new Conqueſts obſerved this Courſe, they planted their Colonies, entertained the inferior Lords into their Protection without increaſing their Power; they kept under ſuch as were more potent, and would not ſuffer any Foreign Prince to have Intereſt among them. I will ſet down only *Greece* for an Example. The *Etolians* and *Achaians* were protected, the Kingdom of the *Macedonians* was depreſs'd and *Antiochus* driven out; yet the Merits and Fidelity of the *Achaians* and *Etolians* could never procure them any increaſe of Authority, nor the Perſuaſions and Applications of *Philip* induce the *Romans* to be his Friends till he was overcome, nor the Power of *Antiochus* prevail with them to conſent that he ſhould retain any Sovereignty in that Province: For the *Romans* acted in that caſe as all wiſe Princes ought to do, who are to have an Eye not only upon preſent but future incommodities, and to redreſs them with all poſſible induſtry; for Dangers that are ſeen afar off are eaſily prevented, but protracting till they are at hand, the Remedies grow unſeaſonable, and the Malady incurable. And it falls out in this caſe, as the Phyſicians ſay of an Hectick Fever, that at firſt it is eaſily cur'd and hard to be known, but in proceſs of time, not being obſerved or reſiſted in the beginning, it becomes eaſie to be known but very difficult to be cured: So it is in Matters of State, things which are diſcovered at a diſtance (which is done only by prudent Men) produce little Miſchief, but what is eaſily averted: But when thro' ignorance or inadvertency, they come to that height that every one diſcerns them, there is no room for any Remedy, and the Diſeaſe is incurable: The *Romans* therefore foreſeeing their Troubles afar off, oppos'd themſelves in time, and never ſwallow'd any Injury to put off a War, for they knew that War was not avoided but deferr'd thereby, and commonly with Advantage to the Enemy; wherefore they choſe rather to make War upon

on *Philip*, and *Antiochus* in *Greece*, than ſuffer them to invade *Italy*; and yet at that time there was no Neceſſity of either, they might have avoided them both, but they thought it not fit; for they could never reliſh the Saying that is ſo frequent in the Mouths of our new Politicians, *To enjoy the preſent Benefit of Time*, but preferr'd the Exerciſe of their Courage and Wiſdom, for Time carries all things along with it, and may bring good as well as evil, and ill as well as good. But let us return to *France*, and examine if what was there done was conformable to what is preſcribed here; and to this purpoſe I ſhall not ſpeak of *Charles* VIII. but of *Lewis* XII. as of a Prince whoſe Conduct and Affairs (by reaſon his Poſſeſſion was longer in *Italy*) were more conſpicuous, and you ſhall ſee how contrary he acted in every thing that was neceſſary for the keeping of ſo different a State. This *Lewis* was invited into *Italy* by the *Venetians*, who had an Ambition to have got half *Lombardy* by his coming: I will not condemn the Expedition, nor blame the Counſels of that King for being deſirous of footing in *Italy*, and having no Allies left in that Country, but all Doors ſhut againſt him (upon the ill Treatment which his Predeceſſor *Charles* had uſed towards them) he was conſtrained to take his Friends where he could find them, and that Reſolution would have been lucky enough had he not miſcarried in his other Adminiſtration; for he had no ſooner ſubdued *Lombardy*, but he recover'd all the Reputation and Dignity that was loſt by King *Charles*: *Genoa* ſubmitted, *Florence* courted his Friendſhip, the Marquis of *Mantoua*, the Duke of *Ferrara*, *Bentivoglio*, *Madam de Furli*, the Lords of *Faenza*, *Peſoro*, *Rimini*, *Camerino*, *Piombino*; the *Luccheſi*, *Piſani*, *Saneſi*, all of them addreſs themſelves to him for his Alliance and Amity; then the *Venetians* began to conſider and reflect upon their indiſcretion, who, to gain two Towns in *Lombardy*, had made the King of *France* Maſter of two thirds of all *Italy*. Let any one now think with how little Difficulty the ſaid King might have kept up his Reputation in that Country, if he had obſerved the Rules aboveſaid, and protected his Friends, who being numerous, and yet weak and fearful, (ſome of the *Pope*, and ſome of the *Venetians*) were always under a Neceſſity of ſtanding by him, and with their Aſſiſtance he might eaſily have ſecured himſelf againſt any Competitor whatever. But he was no ſooner in *Milan*, but he began to prevaricate and ſend Supplies to Pope *Alexander*, to put him in Poſſeſſion of *Romagna*, not conſidering that thereby he weakened himſelf, and diſobliged his Friends who had thrown themſelves into his Arms, and agrandized the Church by adding to its Spiritual Authority (which was ſo formidable before) ſo great a proportion of temporal, and having committed one Error, he was forc'd to proceed ſo far, as to put a ſtop to the Ambition of Pope *Alexander*, and hinder his making himſelf Maſter of *Tuſcany*; the ſaid *Lewis* was forced into *Italy* again. Nor was it enough for him to have advanced the Intereſt of the Church, and deſerted his Friends, but out of an ardent deſire to the Kingdom of *Naples*, he ſhared it with the King of *Spain*; ſo that whereas before he was ſole Umpire in *Italy*, he now entertained a Partner, to whom the Ambitious of that Province, and his own Malecontents might repair upon Occaſion; and whereas the King of that Kingdom might have been made his Penſioner, he turn'd out him, to put in another that might be able to turn out himſelf.

It is very obvious, and no more than Natural, for Princes to deſire to extend their Dominion, and when they attempt nothing but what they are able to atchieve, they are applauded, at leaſt not upbraided thereby; but when they are unable to compaſs it, and yet will be doing, then they are condemned, and indeed not unworthily.

If *France* then with its own Forces alone, had been able to have enterpriz'd upon *Naples*, it ought to have been done; but if her own private Strength was too weak, it ought not to have been divided: and if the Diviſion of *Lombardy*, to which he conſented with the *Venetian*, was excuſable; it was, becauſe done to get footing in *Italy*; but this Partition of *Naples* with the King of *Spain* is extremely to be condemned, becauſe not preſs'd or quicken'd by ſuch Neceſſity as the former. *Lewis* therefore committed five Faults in this Expedition: He ruin'd the inferior Lords; he augmented the Dominion of a Neighbour Prince; he call'd in a Foreigner as puiſſant as himſelf; he neglected to continue there in Perſon; and planted no Colonies: All which Errors might have been no Inconvenience whilſt he had lived, had he not been guilty of a ſixth, and that was depreſſing the Power of the *Venetian*: If indeed he had not ſided with the Church, nor brought the *Spaniards* into *Italy*, it had been but reaſonable for him to have taken down the Pride of the *Venetian*, but purſuing his firſt Reſolutions, he ought not to have ſuffer'd them to be ruined, becauſe whilſt the *Venetian* Strength was entire, they would have kept off other People from attempting upon *Lombardy*, to which the *Venetian* would never have conſented, unleſs upon Condition it might have been deliver'd to them, and the others would not in Probability have forced it from *France* to have given it to them: and to have contended with them both, no body would have had the Courage. If it be

urged

urged, that King *Lewis* gave up *Romagna* to the Pope, and the Kingdom of *Naples* to the King of *Spain*, to evade a War, I anſwer, as before, That a preſent Miſchief is not to be ſuffered to prevent a War, for the War is not averted, but protracted, and will follow with greater diſadvantage.

If the King's Faith and Engagements to the Pope to undertake this Enterprize for him, be objected, and that he did it to recompence the Diſſolution of his Marriage, and the Cap which at his Interceſſion his Holineſs had conferr'd upon the Legate of *Amboiſe*, I refer them for an Anſwer, to what I ſhall ſay hereafter about the Faith of a Prince, how far it obliges. So then King *Lewis* loſt *Lombardy*, becauſe he did not obſerve one of thoſe Rules, which others have followed with ſucceſs in the Conqueſt of Provinces, and in their deſire to keep them: Nor is it an extraordinary thing, but what happens every day, and not without reaſon. To this purpoſe I remember I was once in Diſcourſe with the Cardinal *d'Amboiſe* at *Nantes*, at the time when *Valentino* (for ſo *Ceſar Borgia*, Pope *Alexander*'s Son, was commonly called) poſſeſs'd himſelf of *Romagna:* In the heat of our Conference, the Cardinal telling me, that the *Italians* were ignorant of the Art of War; I reply'd, that the *French* had as little skill in Matters of State; for if they had had the leaſt Policy in the world, they would never have ſuffer'd the *Church* to have come to that height and elevation. And it has been found ſince by Experience, that the Grandeur of the *Church* and the *Spaniard* in *Italy*, is derived from *France*, and that they in requital have been the Ruin and Expulſion of the *French*.

From hence a general Rule may be deduc'd, and ſuch a one as ſeldom or never is ſubject to exception, viz. *That whoever is the occaſion of another's Advancement, is the cauſe of his own Diminution*; becauſe that Advancement is founded either upon the Conduct or Power of the Donor, either of which become ſuſpicious at length to the Perſon preferr'd.

CHAP. IV.

Why the Kingdom of Darius, *uſurped by* Alexander, *did not rebel againſt his Succeſſors, after* Alexander *was dead.*

THE Difficulties encountred in the keeping of a new Conqueſt being conſider'd, it may well be admired how it came to paſs that *Alexander* the Great, having in a few Years made himſelf Maſter of *Aſia*, and died as ſoon as he had done, that State could be kept from Rebellion: Yet his Succeſſors enjoy'd it a long time peaceably, without any Troubles or Concuſſions, but what ſprung from their own Avarice and Ambition. I anſwer, that all Monarchies of which we have any Record, were governed after two ſeveral manners; either by a Prince and his Servants, whom he vouchſafes out of his meer Grace to conſtitute his Miniſters, and admits of their Aſſiſtance in the Government of his Kingdom; or elſe by a Prince and his Barons, who were Perſons advanc'd to that Quality, not by Favour or Conceſſion of the Prince, but by the Ancientneſs and Nobility of their Extraction. Theſe Barons have their proper Juriſdictions and Subjects, who own their Authority, and pay them a natural Reſpect. Thoſe States which are govern'd by the Prince and his Servants, have their Prince more arbitrary and abſolute, becauſe his Supremacy is acknowledged by every body; and if another be obeyed, it is only as his Miniſter and Subſtitute, without any affection to the Man. Examples of theſe different Governments, we may find in our Time in the Perſons of the *Grand Signore* and the King of *France*. The whole *Turkiſh* Monarchy is governed by a ſingle Perſon, the reſt are but his Servants and Slaves; for diſtinguiſhing his whole Monarchy into Provinces and Governments (which they call *Sangiacchi*) he ſends when and what Officers he thinks fit, and changes them as he pleaſes. But the King of *France* is eſtabliſhed in the middle (as it were) of ſeveral great Lords, whoſe Sovereignty having been owned, and Families beloved a long time by their Subjects, they keep their Preheminence; nor is it in the King's Power to deprive them, without inevitable danger to himſelf. He therefore who conſiders the one with the other, will find the *Turkiſh* Empire harder to be ſubdued; but when once conquered, more eaſie to be kept: The reaſon of the difficulty is, becauſe the Uſurper cannot be call'd in by the Grandees of the Empire; nor hope any aſſiſtance from the great Officers, to facilitate his Enterprize, which proceeds from the Reaſons aboveſaid; for being all Slaves, and under Obligation, they are not eaſily corrupted; and if they could, little good was to be expected from them, being unable for the aforeſaid Reaſons, to bring them any Party: So that whoever invades the *Turk*, muſt expect to find him entire and united, and is to depend more upon his own proper force, than any Diſorders among them; but having once conquered them, and beaten their Army beyond the poſſibility

possibility of a Recruit, the danger is at an end; for there is no body remaining to be afraid of, but the Family of the Emperor, which being once extinguished, no body else has any Interest with the People, and they are as little to be apprehended after the Victory, as they were to be relied upon before. But in Kingdoms that are governed according to the Model of *France*, it happens quite contrary, because having gained some of the Barons to your side (and some of them will always be discontent, and desirous of change) you may readily enter: They can (as I said before) give you easie Admission, and contribute to your Victory. But to defend, and make good what you have got, brings a long train of Troubles and Calamities with it, as well upon your Friends, as your Foes. Nor will it suffice to exterminate the Race of the King; forasmuch as other Princes will remain, who, upon occasion, will make themselves Heads of any Commotion, and they being neither to be satisfied nor extinguished, you must of necessity be expell'd upon the first Insurrection.

Now if it be considered what was the Nature of *Darius*'s Government, it will be found to have been very like the *Turks*, and therefore *Alexander* was obliged to fight them, and having conquered them, and *Darius* dying after the Victory, the Empire of the *Persians* remained quietly to *Alexander* for the Reasons aboveſaid; and his Successors, had they continued united, might have enjoy'd it in Peace, for in that whole Empire no Tumults succeeded, but what were raised by themselves. But in Kingdoms that are constituted like *France*, it is otherwise, and impossible to possess them in quiet. From hence sprung the many Defections of *Spain*, *France*, and *Greece*, from the *Romans*, by reason of the many little Principalities in those several Kingdoms, of which, whilst there remain'd any memory, the *Romans* enjoyed their Possession, in a great deal of Incertainty; but when their Memory was extinct, by Power and Diuturnity of Empire, they grew secure in their Possessions, and quarrelling afterwards among themselves, every Officer of the *Romans* was able to bring a Party into the Field, according to the Latitude and Extent of his Command in the said Provinces; and the reason was, because the Race of their old Princes being extirpate, there was no body left for them to acknowledge, but the *Romans*. These things therefore being considered, it is not to be wondred that *Alexander* had the good Fortune to keep the Empire of *Asia*, whilst the rest, as *Pyrrhus* and others, found such difficulty to retain what they had got; for it came not to pass from the small, or great Vertue of the Victor, but from the difference and variety of the Subject.

CHAP. V.

How such Cities and Principalities are to be Govern'd, who lived under their own Laws, before they were subdued.

WHEN States that are newly conquered, have been accustomed to their Liberty, and lived under their own Laws, to keep them three ways are to be observed: The first, is utterly to ruin them; the second, to live personally among them; the third, is (contenting your self with a Pension from them) to permit them to enjoy their old Privileges and Laws, erecting a kind of Council of State, to consist of a few, which may have a care of your Interest, and keep the People in Amity and Obedience. And that Council being set up by you, and knowing that it subsists only by your Favour and Authority, will not omit any thing that may propagate and enlarge them. A Town that has been anciently free, cannot more easily be kept in Subjection, than by employing its own Citizens, as may be seen by the Example of the *Spartans* and *Romans*. The *Spartans* had got possession of *Athens* and *Thebes*, and settled an Oligarchy according to their fancy; and yet they lost them again. The *Romans* to keep *Capua*, *Carthage*, and *Numantia*, ordered them to be destroyed, and they kept them by that means. Thinking afterwards to preserve *Greece*, as the *Spartans* had done, by allowing them their Liberty, and indulging their old Laws, they found themselves mistaken; so that they were forced to subvert many Cities in that Province, before they could keep it; and certainly that is the safest way which I know: For whoever conquers a free Town, and does not demolish it, commits a great Error, and may expect to be ruin'd himself; because whenever the Citizens are disposed to revolt, they betake themselves of course to that blessed name of Liberty, and the Laws of their Ancestors, which no length of time, nor kind usage whatever will be able to irradicate; and let all possible care and provision be made to the contrary, unless they be divided some way or other, or the Inhabitants dispersed, the thought of their old Privileges will never out of their heads, but upon all occasions they will endeavour to recover them, as *Pisa* did, after it had continued so many Years in subjection to the *Florentines*. But it falls out quite contrary,

contrary, where the Cities or Provinces have been us'd to a Prince whose Race is extirpated and gone; for being on the one side accustomed to obey, and on the other, at a loss for their old Family, they can never agree to set up another, and will never know how to live freely without; so that they are not easily to be tempted to rebel, and the Prince may oblige them with less difficulty, and be secure of them when he hath done. But in a Commonwealth their Hatred is more inveterate, their Revenge more insatiable; nor does the memory of their ancient Liberty ever suffer, or ever can suffer them to be quiet: So that the most secure way is either to ruin them quite, or make your residence among them.

CHAP. VI.

Of Principalities acquired by one's own proper Conduct and Arms.

LET no Man think it strange, if in speaking of new Governments, either by Princes or States, I introduce great and eminent Examples; forasmuch as Men in their Actions follow commonly the Ways that are beaten, and when they would do any generous thing, they propose to themselves some pattern of that Nature; nevertheless, being impossible to come up exactly to that, or to acquire that Vertue in perfection which you desire to imitate; a wise Man ought always to set before him for his Example the Actions of Great Men, who have excell'd in the Atchievement of some great Exploit, to the end that tho' his Vertue and Power arrives not at that perfection, it may at least come as near as is possible, and receive some tincture thereby: Like experienc'd Archers, who observing the Mark to be at great distance, and knowing the strength of their Bow, and how far it will carry, they fix their Aim somewhat higher than the Mark, not with design to shoot at that heighth, but that by mounting their Arrow to a certain proportion, they may come the nearer to the Mark they intend. I say then, that Principalities newly acquired by an upstart Prince, are more or less difficult to maintain, as he is more or less provident that gains them. And because the happiness of rising from a private Person to be a Prince, presupposes great Vertue or Fortune, where both of them concur, they do much facilitate the conservation of the Conquest: yet he who has committed least to Fortune, has continued the longest. It prevents much trouble likewise, when the Prince (having no better Residence elsewhere) is constrained to live Personally among them. But to speak of such who by their Vertue, rather than Fortune, have advanced themselves to that Dignity, I say, that the most renowned and excellent, are *Moses*, *Cyrus*, *Romulus*, *Theseus*, and the like: And tho' *Moses* might be reasonably excepted, as being only the Executioner of God's immediate Commands, yet he deserves to be mention'd, if it were only for that Grace, which render'd him capable of Communication with God. But if we consider *Cyrus*, and the rest of the Conquerors and Founders of Monarchies, we shall find them extraordinary; and examining their Lives and Exploits, they will appear not much different from *Moses*, who had so incomparable a Master; for by their Conversations and Successes, they do not seem to have received any thing from Fortune, but Occasion and Opportunity, in introducing what Forms of Government they pleas'd; and as without that occasion, the greatness of their Courage had never been known, so had not they been magnanimous, and taken hold of it, that occasion had happen'd in vain. It was necessary therefore for *Moses*, that the People of *Israel* should be in Captivity in *Egypt*, that to free themselves from Bondage they might be dispos'd to follow him. It was convenient that *Romulus* should be turned out of *Alba*, and exposed to the wild Beasts when he was young, that he might afterwards be made King of *Rome*, and Founder of that great Empire. It was not unnecessary likewise, that *Cyrus* should find the *Persians* mutining at the Tyranny of the *Medes*, and that the *Medes* should be grown soft and effeminate with their long Peace. *Theseus* could never have given proof of his Vertue and Generosity, had not the *Athenians* been in great Troubles and Confusion. These great Advantages made those great Persons eminent, and their great Wisdom knew how to improve them to the reputation and enlargement of their Country. They then who become Great by the ways of Vertue (as the Princes abovesaid) do meet with many difficulties, before they arrive at their ends, but having compass'd them once, they easily keep them: The difficulties in the Acquisition, arise in part from new Laws and Customs which they are forc'd to introduce for the Establishment and Security of their own Dominion; and this is to be considered, that there is nothing more difficult to undertake, more uncertain to succeed, and more dangerous to manage, than to make one's self Prince, and prescribe new Laws: Because he who innovates in that manner, has for his Enemies all those who made any advantage by the old Laws; and those who expect benefit by the new, will be but cool and luke-warm in his defence; which luke-warmness proceeds from

from a certain Awe for their Adversaries who have their old Laws on their side, and partly from a natural Incredulity in Mankind, which gives credit but slowly to any new thing, unless recommended first by the experiment of Success. Hence it proceeds, that the first time the Adversary has opportunity to make an attempt, he does it with great briskness and vigour, but the Defence is so trepid and faint, that for the most part the new Prince and his Adherents perish together. Wherefore for better discussion of this Case, it is necessary to inquire, whether these Innovators do stand upon their own feet, or depend upon other People; that is to say, whether in the Conduct of their Affairs, they do make more use of their Rhetorick than their Arms. In the first case, they commonly miscarry, and their Designs seldom succeed; but when their Expections are only from themselves, and they have Power in their own hands to make themselves obeyed, they run little or no hazard, and do frequently prevail. For further eviction, the Scripture shows us that those of the Prophets whose Arms were in their hands, and had power to compel, succeeded better in the Reformations which they designed; whereas those who came only with Exhortation and good Language, suffer'd Martyrdom and Banishment, because (besides the Reasons aboveſaid) the People are unconstant, and susceptible of any new Doctrine at first, but not easily brought to retain it: so that things are to be order'd in such manner, that when their Faith begins to stagger, they may be forc'd to persist. *Moses*, *Cyrus*, *Theseus*, and *Romulus*, could never have made their Laws to have been long observed, had they not had power to have compelled it, as in our Days it happen'd to Frier *Jerome Savanorola*, who ruin'd himself by his new Institutions, as soon as the People of *Florence* began to desert him; for he had no means to confirm them who had been of his Opinion, nor to constrain such as dissented. Wherefore such Persons meet with great difficulty in their Affairs; all their Dangers are still by the way, which they can hardly overcome, but by some extraordinary Vertue and Excellence: nevertheless, when once they have surmounted them, and arrived at any degree of Veneration, having supplanted those who envy'd their Advancement, they remain puissant, and firm, and honourable, and happy. I will add to these great Examples, another, perhaps not so conspicuous, but one that will bear a proportion and resemblance with the rest, and shall satisfy me for all others of that Nature. It is of *Hiero* of *Syracuse*, who of a private Person was made Prince of that City, for which he was beholding to Fortune no further than for the occasion, because the *Syracusans* being under oppression, chose him for their Captain, in which Command he behav'd himself so well, he deserved to be made their Prince, for he was a Person of so great Vertue and Excellence, that those who have writ of him, have given him this Character, that even in his private Condition, he wanted nothing but a Kingdom to make him an admirable King. This *Hiero* subdued the old Militia, established a new, renounced the old Allies, confederated with others, and having Friends and Forces of his own, he was able upon such a Foundation to erect what Fabrick he pleas'd; so that tho' the Acquisition cost him much trouble, he maintain'd it with little.

CHAP. VII.

Of new Principalities acquired by accident, and the Supplies of other People.

THEY who from private Condition ascend to be Princes, and meerly by the indulgence of Fortune, arrive without much trouble at their Dignity, tho' it costs them dear to maintain it, meet but little difficulty in their passage, being hurried as it were with Wings, yet when they come to settle and establish, then begins their Misery. These kind of Persons are such as attain their Dignity by Bribes, or Concession of some other great Prince, as it happen'd to several in *Greece*, in the Cities of *Ionia*, and upon the *Hellespont*; where they were invested with that Power by *Darius* for his greater Security and Glory, and to those Emperors who arriv'd at the Empire by the Corruption of the Soldiers. These Persons, I say, subsist wholly upon the Pleasure and Fortune of those who advanced them, which being two things very valuable and uncertain, they have neither Knowledge nor Power to continue long in that Degree; know not, because unless he be a Man of extraordinary Qualities and Vertue, it is not reasonable to think he can know how to command other People, who before lived always in a private Condition himself; cannot, because they have no Forces upon whose Friendship and Fidelity they can rely. Moreover, States which are suddenly conquered (as all things else in Nature whose Rise and Increase is so speedy) can have no Root or Foundation, but what will be shaken and supplanted by the first Gust of Adversity,

verſity, unleſs they who have been ſo ſuddenly exalted, be ſo wiſe as to prepare prudently in time for the conſervation of what Fortune threw ſo luckily into their Lap, and eſtabliſh afterwards ſuch Fundamentals for their duration, as others (which I mentioned before) have done in the like Caſes. About the Arrival at this Authority either by Vertue, or good Fortune, I ſhall Inſtance in two Examples that are freſh in our memory; one is *Francis Sforza*, the other *Cæſar Borgio*; *Sforza*, by juſt means, and extraordinary Vertue, made himſelf Duke of *Milan*, and enjoyed it in great Peace, tho gained with much trouble. *Borgia* on the other ſide (called commonly Duke of *Valentine*) got ſeveral fair Territories by the Fortune of his Father Pope *Alexander*, and loſt them all after his Death, tho' he uſed all his Induſtry, and employed all the Arts which a wiſe and brave Prince ought to do to fix himſelf in the Sphere, where the Arms and Fortune of other People had placed him: For he (as I ſaid before) who laid not his Foundation in time, may yet raiſe his Superſtructure, but with great trouble to the Architect, and great danger to the Building. If therefore the whole progreſs of the ſaid Duke be conſidered, it will be found what ſolid Foundations he had laid for his future Dominion, of which progreſs I think it not ſuperfluous to diſcourſe, becauſe I know not what better Precepts to diſplay before a new Prince, than the Example of his Actions; and tho' his own Orders and Methods did him no good, it was not ſo much his fault, as the malignity of his Fortune.

Pope *Alexander* the Sixth had a deſire to make his Son Duke *Valentine* great, but he ſaw many Blocks and Impediments in the way, both for the preſent and future. Firſt, he could not ſee any way to advance him to any Territory that depended not upon the Church, and to thoſe in his Gift, he was ſure the Duke of *Milan* and the *Venetians* would never conſent; for *Faenza* and *Riminum* had already put themſelves under the *Venetian* protection. He was likewiſe ſenſible, that the Forces of *Italy*, eſpecially thoſe who were capable of aſſiſting him, were in the Hands of thoſe who ought to apprehend the Greatneſs of the Pope, as the *Urſini*, *Colonneſi*, and their Followers, and therefore could not repoſe any great confidence in them: beſides, the Laws and Alliances of all the States in *Italy* muſt of neceſſity be diſturbed, before he could make himſelf Maſter of any Part, which was no hard matter to do, finding the *Venetians* upon ſome private Intereſt of their own, inviting the *French* to another Expedition into *Italy*, which his Holineſs was ſo far from oppoſing, that he promoted it by diſſolution of King *Lewis*'s former Marriage. *Lewis* therefore paſſed the *Alps* by the Aſſiſtance of the *Venetians*, and *Alexander*'s conſent, and was no ſooner in *Milan*, but he ſent Forces to aſſiſt the Pope in his Enterprize againſt *Romagna*, which was immediately ſurrendred upon the King's Reputation. *Romagna* being in this manner reduc'd by the Duke, and the *Colonneſi* defeated, being ambitious not only to keep what he had got, but to advance in his Conqueſts, two things obſtructed; one was the Infidelity of his own Army; the other, the Averſion of the *French*: for he was jealous of the Forces of the *Urſini*, who were in his Service; ſuſpected they would fail him in his Need, and either hinder his Conqueſt, or take it from him when he had done; and the ſame Fears he had of the *French*; and his jealouſie of the *Urſini* was much increaſed, when after the expugnation of *Faenza*, aſſaulting *Bologna*, he found them very cold and backward in the Attack: and the King's Inclination he diſcover'd, when having poſſeſs'd himſelf of the Dutchy of *Urbin*, he invaded *Tuſcany*, and was by him requir'd to deſiſt. Whereupon the Duke reſolv'd to depend no longer upon Fortune and foreign Aſſiſtance, and the firſt courſe he took, was to weaken the Party of the *Urſini* and *Colonni* in *Rome*, which he effected very neatly by debauching ſuch of their Adherents as were Gentlemen, taking them into his own Service, and giving them honourable Penſions, and Governments, and Commands, according to their reſpective Qualities; ſo that in a few Months, their Paſſion for that Faction evaporated, and they turn'd all for the Duke. After this he attended an opportunity of ſupplanting the *Urſini*, as he had done the Family of the *Colonni* before; which happened very luckily, and was as luckily improved: for the *Urſini* conſidering too late, that the Greatneſs of the Duke and the Church tended to their ruin, held a Council at a place called *Magione* in *Perugia*, which occaſioned the Rebellion of *Urbin*, the Tumults in *Romagna*, and a thouſand Dangers to the Duke beſides; but tho' he overcame them all by the Aſſiſtance of the *French*, and recovered his Reputation, yet he grew weary of his foreign Allies, as having nothing further to oblige them, and betook himſelf to his Artifice, which he managed ſo dexterouſly, that the *Urſini* reconciled themſelves to him, by the Mediation of *Seignor Paulo*, with whom for his ſecurity he comported ſo handſomly by preſenting with Money, rich Stuffs, and Horſes, that being convinced of his Integrity, he conducted them to *Sinigaglia*, and deliver'd them into the Duke's hands. Having by

this means exterminated the chief of his Adverſaries, and reduc'd their Friends, the Duke had laid a fair Foundation for his Greatneſs, having gain'd *Romagna* and the Dutchy of *Urbin*, and inſinuated with the People by giving them a guſt of their future Felicity. And becauſe this part is not unworthy to be known for Imitation ſake, I will not paſs it in ſilence. When the Duke had poſſeſs'd himſelf of *Romagna*, finding it had been governed by poor and inferior Lords, who had rather robbed than corrected their Subjects, and given them more occaſion of Diſcord than Unity, inſomuch as that Province was full of Robberies, Riots, and all manner of Inſolencies; to reduce them to Unanimity and Subjection to Monarchy, he thought it neceſſary to provide them a good Governour, and thereupon he conferr'd that Charge upon *Remiro d'Orco*, with abſolute Power, tho' he was a cruel and a paſſionate Man. *Orco* was not long before he had ſettled it in Peace, with no ſmall Reputation to himſelf. Afterwards the Duke apprehending ſo large a Power might grow odious to the People, he erected a Court of Judicature in the middle of the Province, in which every City had its Advocate, and an excellent Perſon was appointed to preſide. And becauſe he diſcover'd that his paſs'd Severity had created him many Enemies; to remove that ill Opinion, and recover the Affections of the People, he had a mind to ſhow, that if any Cruelty had been exerciſed, it proceeded not from him, but from the Arrogance of his Miniſter; and for their further confirmation, he cauſed the ſaid Governour to be apprehended, and his Head chopt off one Morning in the Market-place at *Ceſena*, with a wooden Dagger on one ſide of him, and a bloody Knife on the other; the ferocity of which Spectacle not only appeas'd, but amaz'd the People for a while. But reaſſuming our Diſcourſe, I ſay, the Duke finding himſelf powerful enough, and ſecure againſt preſent Danger, being himſelf as ſtrong as he deſired, and his Neighbours in a manner reduced to an Incapacity of hurting him, being willing to go on with his Conqueſts, there remaining nothing but a jealouſie of *France*, and not without cauſe, for he knew that King had found his Error at laſt, and would be ſure to obſtruct him. Hereupon he began to look abroad for new Allies, and to heſitate and ſtagger towards *France*, as appeared when the *French* Army advanced into the Kingdom of *Naples* againſt the *Spaniards*, who had beſieged *Cajeta*; his great deſign was to ſecure himſelf againſt the *French*, and he had doubtleſs done it, if *Alexander* had lived. Theſe were his Proviſions againſt the Dangers that were imminent; but thoſe that were remote, were more doubtful and uncertain. The firſt thing he feared was, leſt the next Pope ſhould be his Enemy, and reaſſume all that *Alexander* had given him, to prevent which he propoſed four ſeveral ways: The firſt was, by deſtroying the whole Line of thoſe Lords whom he had diſpoſſeſs'd, that his Holineſs might have no occaſion to reſtore them. The ſecond was to cajole the Nobility in *Rome*, and draw them over to his Party, that thereby he might put an awe and reſtraint upon the Pope. The third was, if poſſible, to make the College his Friends. The fourth was, to make himſelf ſo ſtrong before the Death of his Father, as to be able to ſtand upon his own Legs, and repel the firſt Violence that ſhould be practiſed againſt him. Three of theſe four Expedients he had tried before *Alexander* died, and was in a fair way for the fourth; all the diſſeized Lords which came into his Clutches, he put to death, and left few of them remaining: he had inſinuated with the Nobility of *Rome* and got a great Party in the College of Cardinals; and as to his own corroboration, he had deſign'd to make himſelf Maſter of *Tuſcany*, had got Poſſeſſion of *Perugia* and *Piombino* already, and taken *Piſa* into his protection: And having now farther regard of the *French* (who were beaten out of the Kingdom of *Naples* by the *Spaniard*, and both of them reduc'd to neceſſity of ſeeking his Amity) he leap'd bluntly into *Piſa*, after which *Lucca* and *Sienna* ſubmitted without much trouble, partly in hatred to the *Florentines*, and partly for fear; and the *Florentines* were grown deſperate, and without any hopes of relief: ſo that had theſe things happened before, as they did the ſame Year in which *Alexander* died, doubtleſs he had gain'd ſo much ſtrength and reputation, that he would have ſtood firm by himſelf, upon the Baſis of his own Power and Conduct, without depending upon Fortune or any foreign Supplies. But his Father died five Years after his Son had taken up Arms, and left him nothing ſolid and in certainty, but *Romagna* only, and the reſt were *in nubibus*, infeſted with two formidable Armies, and himſelf mortally ſick. This Duke was a Man of that Magnanimity, and Prudence, underſtood ſo well which way Men were to be wheedled, or deſtroyed, and ſuch were the Foundations that he had laid in a ſhort time, that had he not had thoſe two great Armies upon his back, and a fierce Diſtemper upon his body, he had overcome all Difficulties, and brought his Deſigns to perfection. That the Foundations which he had laid were plauſible, appear'd by the patience of his Subjects in *Romagna*, who held out for him a compleat Month, tho' they knew he was at Death's door, and unlikely ever to come

out

out of *Rome*: to which Place tho' the *Baglioni*, the *Vitelli*, and the *Urſini* return'd, ſeeing there was no likelihood of his Recovery, yet they could not gain any of his Party, nor debauch them to their ſide. 'Tis poſſible he was not able to put who he pleas'd into the Pontifical Chair, yet he had power enough to keep any Man out who he thought was his Enemy: but had it been his fortune to have been well when his Father *Alexander* died, all things had ſucceeded to his mind. He told me himſelf, about the time that *Julius* XI. was created, that he had conſidered well the Accidents that might befal him upon the death of his Father, and provided againſt them all, only he did not imagine that at his death, he ſhould be ſo near it himſelf. Upon ſerious Examination therefore of the whole Conduct of Duke *Valentine*, I ſee nothing to be reprehended; it ſeems rather proper to me to propoſe him (as I have done) as an Example for the imitation of all ſuch as by the favour of Fortune, or the ſupplies of other Princes, have got into the Saddle; for his Mind being ſo large, and his Intentions ſo high, he could not do otherwiſe, and nothing could have oppoſed the greatneſs and wiſdom of his Deſigns, but his own Infirmity, and the Death of his Father. He therefore who thinks it neceſſary in the minority of his Dominion to ſecure himſelf againſt his Enemies; to gain himſelf Friends; to overcome, whether by Force or by Fraud; to make himſelf belov'd or fear'd by his People; to be followed and reverenced by his Soldiers; to deſtroy and exterminate ſuch as would do him injury; to repeal and ſuppreſs old Laws, and introduce new; to be ſevere, grateful, magnanimous, liberal, caſhier and disband ſuch of his Army as were unfaithful, and put new in their places; manage himſelf ſo in his Alliances with Kings and Princes, that all of them ſhould be either obliged to requite him, or afraid to offend him; He, I ſay, cannot find a freſher or better Model than the Actions of this Prince. If in any thing he be to be condemned, it is in ſuffering the Election of *Julius* XI. which was much to his prejudice; for tho' (as is ſaid before) he might be unable to make the Pope as he pleaſed; yet it was in his power to have put any one by, and he ought never to have conſented to the Election of any of the Cardinals whom he had formerly offended, or who after their promotion were like to be jealous of him; for Men are as miſchievous for fear, as for hatred. Thoſe Cardinals which he had diſobliged, were, among others, the Cardinals of St. *Peter ad Vincula*, *Collonno* St. *George*, and *Aſcanius*. The reſt, if any of them were advanc'd to the Papacy, might well be afraid of him, except the *Spaniſh* Cardinals, and the Cardinal of *Roan*; the *Spaniards*, by reaſon of their Obligations and Alliance; and the other, by reaſon of his Intereſt in the Kingdom of *France*. Wherefore, above all things, the Duke ſhould have made a *Spaniſh* Cardinal Pope; and if that could not have been done, he ſhould rather have conſented to the Election of *Roan*, than St. *Peter ad Vincula*; for 'tis weakneſs to believe, that among great Perſons, new Obligations can obliterate old Injuries and Diſguſts. So that in the Election of this *Julius* XI. Duke *Valentine* committed an Error that was the cauſe of his utter deſtruction.

CHAP. VIII.

Of ſuch as have arriv'd at their Dominion, by wicked and injuſtifiable Means.

NOW becauſe there are two ways from a private Perſon to become a Prince, which ways are not altogether to be attributed either to Fortune or Management, I think it not convenient to pretermit them, tho' of one of them I may ſpeak more largely where occaſion is offer'd to treat more particularly of Republicks. One of the ways is, when one is advanced to the Sovereignty by any illegal nefarious means: The other, when a Citizen by the favour and partiality of his Fellow-Citizens is made Prince of his Country. I ſhall ſpeak of the firſt in this Chapter, and juſtifie what I ſay by two Examples, one Ancient, the other Modern, without entring farther into the merits of the Cauſe, as judging them ſufficient for any Man who is neceſſitated to follow them. *Agathocles* the *Sicilian*, not only from a private, but from a vile and abject Condition, was made King of *Syracuſe*; and being but the Son of a Potter, he continued the diſſoluteneſs of his Life through all the degrees of his Fortune: Nevertheleſs, his Vices were accompanied with ſuch Courage and Activity, that he apply'd himſelf to the Wars, by which, and his great Induſtry, he came at length to the Pretor of *Syracuſe*. Being ſettled in that Dignity, and having concluded to make himſelf Prince, and hold that by violence, without obligation to any body, which was conferred upon him by conſent, he ſettled an Intelligence with *Amilcar* the *Carthaginian*, who was then at the head of an Army in *Sicily*, and calling the People and Senate of *Syracuſe* together one Morning, as if he had been to conſult them in ſome Matter of importance to the State, upon a Signal appointed, he caus'd all his Soldiers to kill all the Senators, and the moſt wealthy

of the People; after whoſe death, he uſurped and poſſeſſed the Dominion of that City, without any obſtruction: and tho' afterwards he loſt two great Battles to the *Carthaginians*, and at length was beſieg'd, yet he was not only able to defend that City, but leaving part of his Forces for the ſecurity of that, with the reſt he tranſported into *Africk*, and order'd things ſo, that in a ſhort time he reliev'd *Syracuſe*, and reduced the *Carthaginians* into ſuch extream neceſſity, that they were glad to make Peace with him, and contenting themſelves with *Africk*, leave *Sicily* to *Agathocles*. He then who examines the Exploits and Conduct of *Agathocles*, will find little or nothing that may be attributed to Fortune, ſeeing he roſe not (as is ſaid before) by the favour of any Man, but by the ſteps and gradations of War; with a thouſand Difficulties and Dangers having gotten that Government, which he maintained afterwards with as many noble Atchievements. Nevertheleſs it cannot be called Vertue in him to kill his fellow-Citizens, betray his Friends, to be without Faith, without Pity, or Religion; theſe are ways may get a Man Empire, but no Glory or Reputation: Yet if the Wiſdom of *Agathocles* be conſidered; his Dexterity in encountring and overcoming of Dangers; his Courage in ſupporting and ſurmounting his Misfortunes; I do not ſee why he ſhould be held inferior to the beſt Captains of his time. But his unbounded Cruelty, and barbarous Inhumanity, added to a million of other Vices, will not permit that he be numbred amongſt the moſt excellent Men. So then, that which he performed cannot juſtly be attributed to either Fortune or Vertue, for he did all himſelf, without either the one or the other. In our Days, under the Papacy of *Alexander* VI. *Oliverotto da Fermo* being left young many Years ſince by his Parents, was brought up by his Uncle by the Mother's ſide, call'd *John Togliani*, and in his Youth liſted a Soldier under *Paulo Vitelli*, that having improved himſelf by his Diſcipline, he might be capable of ſome eminent Command. *Paulo* being dead, he ſerved under *Vitellezzo* his Brother, and in a ſhort time by the acuteneſs of his Parts, and the briskneſs of his Courage, became one of the beſt Officers in his Army. But thinking it beneath him to continue in any Man's Service, he conſpir'd with ſome of his fellow-Citizens of *Fermo* (to whom the Servitude of their Country was more agreeable than its Liberty) by the help of *Vitelleſco* to ſeize upon *Fermo*: In order to which, he writ a Letter to his Uncle *John Fogliano*, importing, That having been abſent many Years, he had thoughts of viſiting him and *Fermo*, and taking ſome little diverſion in the place where he was born, and becauſe the deſign of his Service had been only the gaining of Honour, that his fellow-Citizens might ſee his time had not been ill ſpent, he deſired admiſſion for a hundred Horſe of his Friends, and his Equipage, and beg'd of him that he would take care they might be honourably received, which would redound not only to his Honour, but his Uncle's, who had had the bringing him up. *John* was not wanting in any Office to his Nephew, and having caus'd him to be nobly receiv'd, he lodged him in his own Houſe, where he continued ſome Days, preparing in the mean time what was neceſſary to the Execution of his wicked Deſign. He made a great Entertainment, to which he invited *John Fogliani*, and all the chief Citizens in the Town. About the end of the Treatment, when they were entertaining one another, as is uſual at ſuch times, *Oliverotto* very ſubtilly promoted certain grave Diſcourſes about the greatneſs of Pope *Alexander*, and *Ceſar* his Son, and of their Deſigns; *John* and the reſt replying freely to what was ſaid, *Oliverotto* ſmil'd, and told them thoſe were Points to be argued more privately, and thereupon removing into a Chamber, his Uncle, and the reſt of his fellow-Citizens followed. They were ſcarce ſat down, before Soldiers (which were conceal'd about the room) came forth, and killed all of them, and the Uncle among the reſt. After the Murder was committed, *Oliverotto* mounted on Horſeback, rode about, and rummaged the whole Town, having beſieged the chief Magiſtrate in his Palace; ſo that for fear, all People ſubmitted, and he eſtabliſhed a Government of which he made himſelf Head. Having put ſuch to death as were diſcontented, and in any capacity of doing him hurt, he fortified himſelf with new Laws, both Military and Civil, inſomuch as in a Year's time he had not only fix'd himſelf in *Fermo*, but was become terrible to all that were about him; and he would have been as hard as *Agathocles* to be ſupplanted, had he not ſuffered himſelf to have been circumvented by *Ceſar Borgia*, when at *Singalia* (as aforeſaid) he took the *Urſini* and *Vitelli*; where alſo he himſelf was taken a Year after his Parricide was committed, and ſtrangled with his Maſter *Vitellozzo*, from whom he had learned all his good Qualities, and evil.

It may ſeem wonderful to ſome People how it ſhould come to paſs that *Agathocles*, and ſuch as he, after ſo many Treacheries and Acts of Inhumanity, ſhould live quietly in their own Country ſo long, defend themſelves ſo well againſt foreign Enemies, and none of their Subjects conſpire againſt them at home; ſeeing ſeveral others, by reaſon of their Cruelty, have not been able, even in times of Peace, as well as War, to defend

their

their Government. I conceive it fell out according as their Cruelty was well or ill applied: I say well applied (if that word may be added to an ill Action) and it may be called so, when committed but once, and that of necessity for one's own Preservation, but never repeated afterwards, and even then converted as much as possible to the benefit of the Subjects. Ill applyed, are such Cruelties as are but few in the beginning, but in time do rather multiply than decrease. Those who are guilty of the first, do receive assistance sometimes both from God and Man, and *Agathocles* is an Instance. But the others cannot possibly subsist long. From whence it is to be observed, that he who usurps the Government of any State, is to execute and put in practice all the Cruelties which he thinks material at once, that he may have no occasion to renew them often, but that by his discontinuance he may mollifie the People, and by his Benefits bring them over to his side: He who does otherwise, whether for Fear, or ill Counsel, is obliged to be always ready with his Knife in his hand, for he can never repose any Confidence in his Subjects, whilst they, by reason of his fresh and continued Inhumanities, cannot be secure against him: So then Injuries are to be committed all at once, that the last being the less, the distaste may be likewise the less; but Benefits should be distilled by drops, that the relish may be the greater. Above all, a Prince is so to behave himself towards his Subjects, that neither good Fortune or bad should be able to alter him; for being once assaulted with Adversity, you have no time to do mischief; and the good which you do, does you no good, being looked upon as forced, and so no thanks to be due for it.

CHAP. IX.

Of Civil Principality.

I Shall speak now of the other way, when a principal Citizen, not by wicked contrivance, or intolerable violence is made Sovereign of his Country, which may be called a Civil Principality, and is not to be attained by either Vertue or Fortune alone, but by a lucky sort of craft; this Man, I say, arrives at the Government by the favour of the People or Nobility; for in all Cities the meaner and the better sort of Citizens are of different humours, and it proceeds from hence that the common People are not willing to be commanded and oppressed by the Great ones, and the Great ones are not to be satisfied without it: From this diversity of Appetite, one of these three Effects do arise, Principality, Liberty, or Licentiousness. Principality is caused either by the People, or the Great ones, as either the one or the other has occasion: The Great ones finding themselves unable to resist the popular Torrent, do many times unanimously confer their whole Authority upon one Person, and create him Prince, that under his protection they may be quiet and secure. The People on the other side, when over-power'd by their Adversaries, do the same thing, transmitting their Power to a single Person, who is made King for their better defence. He who arrives at the Sovereignty by the assistance of the Great ones, preserves it with more difficulty than he who is advanced by the People, because he has about him many of his old Associates, who thinking themselves his Equals, are not to be directed and managed as he would have them. But he that is preferred by the People, stands alone without Equals, and has no body, or very few about him, but what are ready to obey: Moreover, the Grandees are hardly to be satisfied without injury to others, which is otherwise with the People, because their Designs are more reasonable than the Design of the Great ones, which are fixt upon commanding and oppressing altogether, whilst the People endeavour only to defend and secure themselves. Moreover, where the People is adverse, the Prince can never be safe, by reason of their Numbers; whereas the Great ones are but few, and by consequence not so dangerous. The worst that a Prince can expect from an injured and incensed People, is to be deserted; but if the Great ones be provoked, he is not only to fear Abandoning, but Conspiracy, and banding against him; for the greater Sort being more provident and cunning, they look out in time to their own Safety, and make their Interest with the Person who they hope will overcome. Besides, the Prince is obliged to live always with one and the same People; but with the Grandees he is under no such obligation, for he may create and degrade, advance and remove them as he pleases. But for the better Explication of this part, I say, that these Great Men are to be considered two ways especially; that is, whether in the manner of their Administration they do wholly follow the Fortune and Interest of the Prince, or whether they do otherwise. Those who devote themselves entirely to his Business, and are not rapacious, are to be valued and preferred. Those who are more remiss, and will not stick to their Prince, do it commonly upon two Motives, either out of Laziness or Fear (and in those Cases they may be employed, especially if they be wise and of good Counsel,

ſel, becauſe if Affairs proſper, thou gaineſt Honour thereby; if they miſcarry, thou needeſt not to fear them) or upon Ambition and Deſign, and that is a token that their Thoughts are more intent upon their own Advantage than thine. Of theſe a Prince ought always to have a more than ordinary care, and order them as if they were Enemies profeſſed: for in his diſtreſs they will be ſure to ſet him forwards, and do what they can to deſtroy him. He therefore who comes to be Prince by the Favour and Suffrage of the People, is obliged to keep them his Friends, which (their deſire being nothing but freedom from Oppreſſion) may be eaſily done. But he that is preferred by the Intereſt of the Nobles againſt the minds of the Commons, is above all things to endeavour to ingratiate with the People, which will be as the other if he undertakes their Protection: And Men receiving good Offices, where they expected ill, are indear'd by the Surprize, and become better affected to their Benefactor, than perhaps they would have been, had he been made Prince by their immediate favour. There are many ways of inſinuating with the People, of which no certain Rule can be given, becauſe they vary according to the diverſity of the Subject, and therefore I ſhall paſs them at this time; concluding with this Aſſertion, that it is neceſſary above all things, that a Prince preſerves the Affections of his People, otherwiſe in any Exigence he has no refuge nor remedy. *Nabides*, Prince of the *Spartans*, ſuſtained all *Greece*, and a Victorious Army of the *Romans*, and defended the Government and Country againſt them all; and to do that great Action, it was ſufficient for him to ſecure himſelf againſt the Machinations of a few; whereas if the People had been his Enemy, that would not have done it. Let no Man impugn my Opinion with that old Saying, *he that builds upon the People, builds upon the Sand.* That is true indeed when a Citizen of private Condition relies upon the People, and perſuades himſelf that when the Magiſtrate, or his Adverſary, goes about to oppreſs him, they will bring him off; in which caſe many Precedents may be produced, and particularly the *Gracchi* in *Rome*, and *Georgio Scali* in *Florence*. But if the Prince that builds upon them, knows how to command, and be a Man of Courage, not dejected in Adverſity, nor deficient in his other Preparations, but keeps up the Spirits of his People by his own Valour and Conduct, he ſhall never be deſerted by them, nor find his Foundations laid in a wrong place.

Theſe kind of Governments are moſt tottering and uncertain, when the Prince ſtrains of a ſudden, and paſſes (as at one leap) from a Civil to an Abſolute Power; and the reaſon is, becauſe they either command and act by themſelves, or by the Miniſtry and Mediation of the Magiſtrate: In this laſt caſe their Authority is weaker and more tickliſh, becauſe it depends much upon the pleaſure and concurrence of the Chief Officers, who (in time of Adverſity eſpecially) can remove them eaſily, either by neglecting, or reſiſting their Commands: nor is there any way for ſuch a Prince, in the perplexity of his Affairs, to eſtabliſh a Tyranny, becauſe thoſe Citizens and Subjects who uſed to exerciſe the Magiſtracy, retain ſtill ſuch Power and Influence upon the People, that they will not infringe the Laws, to obey his; and in time of Danger he ſhall always want ſuch as he can truſt. So that a Prince is not to take his Meaſures according to what he ſees in times of Peace, when of the Subjects (having nothing to do but to be governed) every one runs, every one promiſes, and every one dies for him, when Death is at a diſtance: but when Times are tempeſtuous, and the Ship of the State has need of the help and aſſiſtance of the Subject, there are but few will expoſe themſelves: And this Experiment is the more dangerous, becauſe it can be practiſed but once. So then, a Prince who is provident and wiſe, ought to carry himſelf ſo, that in all Places, Times, and Occaſions, the People may have need of his Adminiſtration and Regiment, and ever after they ſhall be faithful and true.

CHAP. X.

How the Strength of all Principalities is to be computed.

TO any Man that examines the Nature of Principalities, it is worthy his conſideration, whether a Prince has Power and Territory enough to ſubſiſt by himſelf, or whether he needs the Aſſiſtance and Protection of other People. To clear the Point a little better; I think thoſe Princes capable of Ruling, who are able either by the numbers of their Men, or the greatneſs of their Wealth, to raiſe a compleat Army, and bid Battle to any that ſhall invade them; and thoſe I think depend upon others, who of themſelves dare not meet their Enemy in the Field, but are forced to keep within their Bounds, and defend them as well as they can. Of the firſt we have ſpoken already, and ſhall ſay more as occaſion is preſented. Of the ſecond no more can be ſaid, but

to

to adviſe ſuch Princes to ſtrengthen and fortifie the Capital Town in their Dominions, and not to trouble himſelf with the whole Country; and whoever ſhall do that, and in other things manage himſelf with the Subjects as I have deſcribed, and perhaps ſhall do hereafter, ſhall with great Caution be invaded; for Men are generally wary and tender of enterprizing any thing that is difficult, and no great eaſineſs is to be found in attacking a Town well fortified and provided, where the Prince is not hated by the People.

The Towns in *Germany* are many of them free; tho' their Country and Diſtrict be but ſmall, yet they obey the Emperor but when they pleaſe, and are in no Awe either of him, or any other Prince of the Empire, becauſe they are all ſo well fortified: Every one looks upon the taking of any one of them as a Work of great difficulty and time, their Walls being ſo ſtrong, their Ditches ſo deep, their Works ſo regular, and well provided with Cannon, and their Stores and Magazines always furniſh'd for a Twelvemonth. Beſides which, for the Aliment and Suſtenance of the People, and that they may be no burthen to the Publick, they have Work-houſes where for a Year together the Poor may be employ'd in ſuch things as are the Nerves and Life of that City, and ſuſtain themſelves by their Labour. Military Diſcipline and Exerciſes are likewiſe in much requeſt there, and many Laws and good Cuſtoms they have to maintain them.

A Prince then who has a City well fortified, and the Affections of his People, is not eaſily to be moleſted, and he that does moleſt him, is like to repent it; for the Affairs of this World are ſo various, it is almoſt impoſſible for any Army to lie quietly a whole Year before a Town, without Interruption. If any objects that the People having Houſes and Poſſeſſions out of the Town, will not have patience to ſee them plundered and burned; and that Charity to themſelves will make them forget their Prince; I anſwer, that a wiſe and dexterous Prince will eaſily evade thoſe difficulties, by encouraging his Subjects and perſuading them, ſometimes their Troubles will not be long; ſometimes inculcating and poſſeſſing them with the Cruelty of the Enemy; and ſometimes by correcting and ſecuring himſelf nimbly of ſuch as appear too turbulent and audacious. Moreover the uſual practice is for the Enemy to plunder and ſet the Country on fire at their firſt coming, whilſt every Man's Spirits is high, and fixed upon defence; ſo that the Prince needs not concern himſelf, nor be fearful of that, for thoſe Miſchiefs are paſs'd, and Inconveniencies received, and when the People in three or four Days time begin to be cool, and conſider things ſoberly, they will find there is no Remedy, and join more cordially with the Prince, looking upon him as under an Obligation to them, for having ſacrificed their Houſes and Eſtates in his defence. And the Nature of Man is ſuch, to take as much pleaſure in having obliged another, as in being obliged himſelf. Wherefore all things fairly conſidered, it is no ſuch hard matter for a Prince not only to gain, but to retain the Affection of his Subjects, and make them patient of a long Siege, if he be wiſe and provident, and takes care they want nothing, either for their Livelihood or Defence.

CHAP. XI.

Of Eccleſiaſtical Principalities.

THERE remains nothing of this Nature to be diſcourſed, but of Eccleſiaſtical Principalities; about which, the greateſt difficulty is to get into Poſſeſſion, becauſe they are gained either by Fortune or Vertue, but kept without either, being ſupported by ancient Statutes univerſally received in the Chriſtian Church, which are of ſuch Power and Authority, they do keep their Prince in his Dignity, let his Converſation or Conduct be what it will. Theſe are the only Perſons who have Lands and do not defend them; Subjects, and do not govern them; and yet their Lands are not taken from them, tho' they never defend them; nor their Subjects diſſatisfied, tho' they never regard them: So that theſe Principalities are the happieſt and moſt ſecure in the World; by being managed by a ſupernatural Power, above the Wiſdom and Contrivance of Man. I ſhall ſpeak no more of them; for being ſet up and continued by God himſelf, it would be great preſumption in any Man who ſhould undertake to diſpute them. Nevertheleſs, if it ſhould be queſtioned how it came to paſs that in Temporal Things the Church is arrived at that height, ſeeing that before *Alexander*'s Time, the *Italian* Princes, not only ſuch as were Sovereigns, but every Baron and Lord, how inconſiderable ſoever in Temporal Affairs, eſteemed of them but little; yet ſince it has been able not only to ſtartle and confront the King of *France*, but to drive him out of *Italy*, and to ruin the *Venetians*; the reaſon of which, tho' already well known, I think it not ſuperfluous to revive in ſome meaſure.

Before

Before *Charles* King of *France* paſſed himſelf into *Italy*, that Province was under the Empire of the Pope, the *Venetians*, the King of *Naples*, Duke of *Milan*, and the *Florentines*. It was the Intereſt of theſe Potentates, to have a care, ſome of them that no foreign Prince ſhould come with an Army into *Italy*, and ſome that none among themſelves ſhould uſurp upon the other. Thoſe of whom the reſt were concern'd to be moſt jealous, were the Pope and the *Venetian*: to reſtrain the *Venetians*, all the reſt were us'd to confederate, as in the defence of *Ferrara*. To keep under the Pope, the *Roman* Barons contributed much, who being divided into two Factions (the *Urſini* and *Colonneſi* in perpetual Contention, with their Arms conſtantly in their hands under the very Noſe of the Pope) they kept the Pontifical Power very low and infirm: and altho' now and then there happen'd a couragious Pope (as *Sextus*) yet neither his Courage, Wiſdom, nor Fortune was able to diſintangle him from thoſe Incommodities, and the ſhortneſs of their Reign was the reaſon thereof; for ten Years time (which was as much as any of them reign'd) was ſcarce ſufficient for the ſuppreſſion of either of the Parties; and when the *Colonneſi*, as a Man may ſay, were almoſt extinct, a new Enemy ſprang up againſt the *Urſini*, which revived the *Colonneſi*, and reeſtabliſhed them again. This Emulation and Animoſity at home, was the cauſe the Pope was no more formidable in *Italy*; after this, *Alexander* VI. was advanced to the Papacy, who more than all that had ever been before him, demonſtrated what a Pope with Money and Power was able to do; having taken advantage of the *French* Invaſion, by the Miniſtry and Conduct of Duke *Valentine*, he performed all that I have mentioned elſewhere among the Actions of the ſaid Duke. And tho' his deſign was not ſo much to advantage the Church, as to aggrandize the Duke, yet what he did for the one, turned afterwards to the benefit of the other, for the Pope being dead, and *Valentine* extinct, what both of them had got, devolv'd upon the Church: after him *Julius* ſucceeded, and found the Church in a flouriſhing Condition; *Romagna* was wholly in its poſſeſſion, the Barons of *Rome* exterminated and gone, and their Factions ſuppreſſed by Pope *Alexander*, and beſides, a way opened for raiſing and hoarding of Money never practiſed before; which way *Julius* improving rather than otherwiſe, he began to entertain thoughts, not only of conquering *Bologna*, but maſtering the *Venetians*, and forcing the *French* out of *Italy*. All which great Enterprizes ſucceeding, it added much to his Honour that he impropriated nothing, but gave all to the Church. He maintained alſo the *Colonneſi* and *Urſini* in the ſame Condition as he found them; and tho' in caſe of Sedition there were thoſe ready on both ſides to have headed them, yet there were two Conſiderations which kept them at Peace: One was the greatneſs of the Church which kept them in awe; the other was their want of Cardinals, which indeed was the Original of their Diſcontents, and will never ceaſe till ſome of them be advanced to that Dignity; for by them the Parties in *Rome* and without, are maintained, and the Barons oblig'd to defend them: So that the Ambition of the Prelates is the cauſe of all the Diſſention and Tumults among the Barons.

His preſent Holineſs Pope *Leo* had the happineſs to be elected at a time when it was moſt powerful, and it is hop'd, if they made the Church great by their Arms, he by the integrity of his Converſation, and a thouſand other Vertues, will enlarge it much more, and make it more venerable and auguſt.

CHAP. XII.

How many Forms there are of Military Diſcipline, and of thoſe Soldiers which are called Mercenary.

HAving ſpoken particularly of the ſeveral ſorts of Principalities, as I propoſed in the beginning, conſidered in part the reaſons of their Conſtitution and their Evil, and the ways which many have taken to acquire, and preſerve them; it remains that I proceed now in a general way upon ſuch things as may conduce to the offence or defence of either of them.

We have declared before, that it is not only expedient, but neceſſary for a Prince to take care his Foundations be good, otherwiſe his Fabrick will be ſure to fail.

The principal Foundations of all States (new, old, or mixt) are good Laws, and good Arms; and becauſe there cannot be good Laws where there are not good Arms, and where the Arms are good, there muſt be good Laws, I ſhall paſs by the Laws, and diſcourſe of the Arms.

I ſay, the Arms then with which a Prince defends his State, are his own, Mercenary, Auxiliary.

ry or mixt. The Mercenary, and Auxiliary are unprofitable, and dangerous, and that Prince who founds the duration of his Government upon his Mercenary forces, shall never be firm nor secure, for they are divided, ambitious, undisciplin'd, unfaithful, insolent to their friends, abject to their enemies, without fear of God, or faith to Men; so the ruine of that person who trusts to them is no longer protracted, than the attempt is deferr'd; in time of peace they divorce you, in time of War they desert you, and the reason is, because it is not love, nor any principle of honor that keeps them in the field, 'tis only their pay, and that is not a consideration strong enough to prevail with 'em to die for you; whilst you have no service to imploy 'em in, they are excellent Soldiers; but tell 'em of an engagement, and they will either disband before, or run away in the battel.

And to evince this, would require no great pains; seeing the ruin of *Italy* proceeded from no other cause, than that for several years together it had repos'd it self upon Mercenary Arms; which forces 'tis possible may have formerly done service to some particular person, and behav'd themselves well enough among one another; but no sooner were they attackt by a powerful foreigner, but they discover'd themselves, and shew'd what they were to the World: Hence it was that *Charles* VIII. chalk'd out his own way into *Italy*; and that person was in the right, who affirm'd our own faults were the cause of our miseries; but it was not those faults he believ'd, but those I have mention'd, which being committed most eminently by Princes, they suffer'd most remarkably in the punishment. But to come closer to the point, and give you a clearer prospect of the imperfection and infelicity of those forces. The great officers of these *mercenaries*, are men of great courage, or otherwise; if the first, you can never be safe, for they always aspire to make themselves great, either by supplanting of you who is their Master, or oppressing of other People, whom you desir'd to have preserv'd; and on the other side, if the Commanders be not couragious you are ruin'd again; if it should be urged that all Generals will do the same, whether Mercenaries or others, I would answer, that all War is managed either by a Prince or Republick: The Prince is oblig'd to go in person, and perform the office of General himself: The Republick must depute some one of her choice Citizens, who is to be chang'd, if he carries himself ill; if he behaves himself well, he is to be continu'd, but so straitned and circumscrib'd by his Commission, that he may not transgress: And indeed experience tells us, that Princes alone, and Commonwealths alone with their own private forces have perform'd great things, whereas *Mercenaries* do nothing but hurt. Besides, a martial Commonwealth that stands upon its own legs, and maintains it self by its own prowess, is not easily usurp'd, and falls not so readily under the obedience of one of their fellow-Citizens, as where all the forces are foreign. *Rome*, and *Sparta* maintain'd their own liberty for many years together by their own forces and arms: The *Swisses* are more martial than their Neighbours, and by consequence more free. Of the danger of *Mercenary* forces, we have an ancient example in the *Carthaginians*, who after the end of their first War with the *Romans*, had like to have been ruin'd, and over-run by their own *Mercenaries*, tho' their own Citizens commanded them.

After the death of *Epaminondas* the *Thebans* made *Philip of Macedon* their General, who defeated their Enemies, and enslav'd themselves. Upon the death of Duke *Philip*, the *Milaneſi* entertain'd *Francesco Sforza* against the *Venetians*, and *Francesco*, having worsted the Enemy at *Caravaggio*, joyned himself with him, with design to have master'd his Masters. *Francesco*'s Father was formerly in the service of *Joan* Queen of *Naples*, and on a sudden marched away from her with his Army, and left her utterly destitute, so that she was constrain'd to throw herself under the protection of the King of *Arragon*, and though the *Venetians*, and *Florentines* both, have lately enlarged their Dominion by employing these forces, and their Generals have rather advanced than enslav'd them; I answer that the *Florentines* may impute it to their good fortune, because, of such of their Generals as they might have rationally feared, some had no Victories to encourage them, others were obstructed, and others turned their ambition another way; he that was not victorious was *Giovanni Acuto*, whose fidelity could not be known, because he had no opportunity to break it, but every body knows, had he succeeded, the *Florentines* had been all at his mercy: *Sforza* had always the *Braccheschi* in opposition, and they were reciprocally an impediment the one to the other. *Francesco* turned his ambition upon *Lombardy*, *Braccio* upon the Church, and the Kingdom of *Naples*. But to speak of more modern occurrences. The *Florentines* made *Paul Vitelli* their General, a wise Man, and one who from a private fortune had raised himself to a great reputation: Had *Paul* taken *Pisa*, no body can be insensible how the *Florentines* must have comported with him; for should he have quitted their service, and taken pay of their Enemy, they had been lost without remedy, and to

have continued him in that power, had been in time to have made him their Master. If the progreſs of the *Venetians* be conſidered, they will be found to have acted ſecurely, and honourably whilſt their affairs were managed by their own forces (which was before they attempted any thing upon the *terra firma*) then all was done by the Gentlemen and Common People of that City, and they did very great things; but when they began to enterprize at land, they began to abate of their old reputation and diſcipline, and to degenerate into the cuſtoms of *Italy*; and when they began to conquer firſt upon the Continent, having no great territory, and their reputation being formidable abroad, there was no occaſion that they ſhould be much afraid of their officers; but afterwards when they began to extend their Empire, under the command of *Carmignola*, then it was they became ſenſible of their error; for having found him to be a great Captain by their Victories (under his conduct) againſt the Duke of *Milan*, perceiving him afterwards grow cool and remiſs in their ſervice, they concluded, no more great things were to be expected from him; and being neither willing, nor indeed able to take away his commiſſion, for fear of loſing what they had got, they were conſtrain'd for their own ſecurity to put him to Death. Their Generals after him were *Bartolomeo da Bergamo*, *Roberto da San. Severino*, and the *Conte de Pitigliano*, and ſuch as they, under whoſe conduct the *Venetians* were more like to loſe than to gain, as it happened not long after at *Vaila*, where in one Battel they loſt as much as they had been gaining eight hundred years with incredible labour and difficulty; which is not ſtrange, if it be conſidered that by thoſe kind of forces the conqueſts are ſlow, and tedious, and weak; but their loſſes are rapid and wonderful. And becauſe I am come with my examples into *Italy*, where for many years all things have been manag'd by mercenary Armies, I ſhall lay my diſcourſe a little higher, that their Original and Progreſs being rendred more plain, they may with more eaſe be regulated and corrected. You muſt underſtand that in latter times when the *Roman* Empire began to decline in *Italy*, and the *Pope* to take upon him authority in Temporal affairs, *Italy* became divided into ſeveral States: For many of the great Cities took Arms againſt their Nobility, who having been formerly favoured by the Emperours, kept the People under oppreſſion, againſt which the Church oppoſed, to gain to it ſelf a reputation and intereſt in temporal affairs: other Cities were ſubdued by their Citizens who made themſelves Princes; ſo that *Italy* (upon the tranſlation of the Empire) being fallen into the hands of the Pope and ſome other Commonwealths; and thoſe *Prieſts* and *Citizens* unacquainted with the uſe and exerciſe of Arms; they began to take foreigners into their pay: the firſt Man who gave reputation to theſe kind of forces was *Alberigo da Como* of *Romagna*: among the reſt *Braccio* and *Sforza* (the two great Arbiters of *Italy* in their time) were brought up under his diſcipline, after whom ſucceeded the reſt who commanded the Armies in *Italy* to our days: and the end of their great diſcipline and conduct was, that *Italy* was over-run by *Charles*, pillaged by *Lewis*, violated by *Ferrand*, and defamed by the *Swizzers*. The order which they obſerv'd, was firſt to take away the reputation from the Foot, and appropriate it to themſelves; and this they did, becauſe their dominion being but ſmall, and to be maintain'd by their own induſtry, a few foot could not do their buſineſs, and a great body they could not maintain; hereupon they changed their *Militia* into horſe, which being digeſted into Troops they ſuſtain'd and rewarded themſelves with the commands, and by degrees this way of *Cavalry* was grown ſo much in faſhion, that in an Army of 20000 Men, there were ſcarce 2000 Foot to be found. Beſides they endeavour'd with all poſſible induſtry to prevent trouble or fear, either to themſelves or their Soldiers, and their way was by killing no body in fight, only taking one another Priſoners, and diſmiſſing them afterwards without either prejudice or ranſom. When they were in Leaguer before a Town, they ſhot not rudely amongſt them in the night, nor did they in the Town diſturb them with any ſallies in their Camp; no approaches or intrenchments were made at unſeaſonable hours, and nothing of lying in the field when Winter came on; and all theſe things did not happen by any negligence in their Officers, but were part of their diſcipline, and introduc'd (as is ſaid before) to eaſe the poor Soldier both of labour and danger, by which practices they have brought *Italy* both into ſlavery, and contempt.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Auxiliaries, mix'd, and Natural Soldiers.

AUxiliaries (which are another ſort of unprofitable Soldiers) are when ſome potent Prince is called in to your aſſiſtance and defence; as was done not long ſince by Pope *Julius*, who in his Enterprize of *Ferrara* having ſeen the ſad experience of his Mercenary Army, betook himſelf to auxiliaries, and capitulated with *Ferrand* King of *Spain*, that he ſhould come with his Forces to his relief. Theſe Armies may do well enough for themſelves, but he who invites them, is ſure to be a ſufferer; for if they be beaten, he is ſure to be a loſer, if they ſucceed, he is left at their diſcretion; and though ancient Hiſtories are full of examples of this kind, yet I ſhall keep to that of Pope *Julius* XI. as one ſtill freſh in our Memory, whoſe Expedition againſt *Ferrara* was very raſh and inconſiderate, in that he put all into the hands of a ſtranger; but his good fortune preſented him with a third accident, which prevented his reaping the fruit of his imprudent Election; for his ſubſidiary Troops being broke at *Ravenna*, and the *Swizzers* coming in, and beating off the Victors, beyond all expectation he eſcaped being a Priſoner to his Enemies, becauſe they alſo were defeated, and to his Auxiliary friends, becauſe he had conquered by other peoples Arms. The *Florentines* being deſtitute of Soldiers, hired 10000 *French* for the reduction of *Piſa*, by which Counſel they ran themſelves into greater danger, than ever they had done in all their troubles before. The Emperor of *Conſtantinople* in oppoſition to his Neighbors, ſent 10000 *Turks* into *Greece*, which could not be got out again when the War was at an end, but gave the firſt beginning to the ſervitude and captivity which thoſe infidels brought upon that Country. He then who has no mind to overcome, may make uſe of theſe Forces, for they are much more dangerous than the *Mercenary*, and will ruin you out of hand, becauſe they are always unanimous, and at the command of other people, whereas the *Mercenaries* after they have gotten a Victory, muſt have longer time, and more occaſion before they can do you a miſchief, in reſpect they are not one body, but made up out of ſeveral Countries entertain'd into your pay, to which if you add a General of your own, they cannot ſuddenly aſſume ſo much Authority as will be able to do you any prejudice, In ſhort, it is Cowardize and ſloth that is to be feared in the *Mercenaries*, and courage and activity in the Auxiliaries. A wiſe Prince therefore never made uſe of theſe Forces, but committed himſelf to his own; chooſing rather to be overcome with them, than to conquer with the other, becauſe, he cannot think that a Victory, which is obtain'd by other peoples Arms. I ſhall make no ſcruple to produce *Cæſar Borgia* for an Example. This Duke invaded *Romagna* with an Army of Auxiliaries, conſiſting wholly of *French*, by whoſe aſſiſtance he took *Imola*, and *Furli*: But finding them afterwards to totter in their faith, and himſelf inſecure, he betook himſelf to *Mercenaries*, as the leſs dangerous of the two, and entertained the *Urſini* and *Vitelli* into his pay; finding them alſo irreſolute, unfaithful, and dangerous, he diſmiſs'd them, and for the future employed none but his own. From hence we may collect the difference betwixt theſe two ſorts of Forces, if we conſider the difference in the *Dukes* reputation when the *Urſini* and *Vitelli* were in his Service, and when he had no Soldiers but his own: When he began to ſtand upon his own Legs, his renown began to increaſe, and indeed, before, his eſteem was not ſo great, till every body found him abſolute Maſter of his own Army.

Having begun my Examples in *Italy*, I am unwilling to leave it, eſpecially whil'ſt it ſupplies us with ſuch as are freſh in our memory; yet I cannot paſs by *Hiero of Syracuſe*, whom I have mentioned before. This perſon being made General of the *Syracuſan* Army, quickly diſcover'd the *Mercenary* Militia was not to be relied upon, their Officers being qualifi'd like ours in *Italy*, and finding that he could neither continue, nor diſcharge them ſecurely, he ordered things ſo, that they were all cut to pieces, and then proſecuted the War with his own Forces alone, without any foreign aſſiſtance. To this purpoſe the old Teſtament affords us a figure not altogether improper. When *David* preſented himſelf to *Saul*, and offered his Service againſt *Goliah* the Champion of the *Philiſtins*, *Saul* to encourage him, accoutred him in his own Arms, but *David* having tryed them on, excuſed himſelf, pretending they were unfit, and that with them he ſhould not be able to manage himſelf; wherefore he deſired he might go forth againſt the Enemy with his own Arms only, which were his Sling and his Sword. The ſum of all is, the Arms of other people are commonly unfit; and either too wide, or too ſtrait, or too cumberſome.

CHARLES VII. the Father of *Lewis* XI. having by his Fortune and Courage redeem'd his Country out of the hands of the *Engliſh*, began to underſtand the Neceſſity of having Soldiers of his own, and erected a Militia at home to conſiſt of Horſe as well as Foot, after which, his Son King *Lewis* caſhier'd his own Foot, and took the *Swiſſers* into his Pay, which Error being followed by his Succeſſors, (as is viſible to this day) is the occaſion of all the Dangers to which that Kingdom of *France* is ſtill obnoxious; for having advanced the Reputation of the *Swiſſers*, he vilified his own People, by disbanding the Foot entirely, and accuſtoming his Horſe ſo much to engage with other Soldiers, that fighting ſtill in Conjunction with the *Swiſſers*, they began to believe they could do nothing without them; Hence it proceeds, that the *French* are not able to do any thing againſt the *Swiſſes*, and without them they will venture upon nothing: So that the *French* Army is mix'd, conſiſts of Mercenaries, and Natives, and is much better than either *Mercenaries* or *Auxiliaries* alone, but much worſe than if it were entirely Natural, as this Example teſtifies abundantly; for doubtleſs *France* would be inſuperable, if *Charles* his Eſtabliſhment was made uſe of, and improv'd: But the Imprudence of Man begins many things, which ſavouring of preſent Good, conceal the Poiſon that is latent, (as I ſaid before of the Hectick Feaver) wherefore if he who is rais'd to any Soveraignty, foreſees not a Miſchief till it falls upon his Head, he is not to be reckon'd a wiſe Prince, and truly that is a particular Bleſſing of God, beſtowed upon few People: If we reflect upon the firſt Cauſe of the Ruine of the *Roman* Empire, it will be found to begin at their entertaining the *Goths* into their Service, for thereby they weakened and enervated their own native Courage, and (as it were) transfuſed it into them.

I conclude therefore, that without having proper and peculiar Forces of his own, no Prince is ſecure, but depends wholly upon Fortune, as having no Natural and Intrinſick Strength to ſuſtain him in Adverſity: And it was always the Opinion, and Poſition of wiſe Men, that nothing is ſo infirm and unſtable as the Name of Power, not founded upon Forces of its own; thoſe Forces are compoſed of your Subjects, your Citizens, or Servants, all the reſt are either *Mercenaries*, or *Auxiliaries*, and as to the manner of ordering and diſciplining theſe Domeſticks, it will not be hard, if the Orders which I have preſcribed be peruſed, and the Way conſidered which *Philip* the Father of *Alexander* the Great, and many other Princes and Republicks have uſed in the like Caſes, to which Orders and Eſtabliſhments I do wholly refer you.

CHAP. XIV.

The Duty of a Prince in relation to his Militia.

A Prince then is to have no other Deſign, nor Thought, nor Study, but War, and the Arts and Diſciplines of it; for indeed that is the only Profeſſion worthy of a Prince, and is of ſo much Importance, that it not only preſerves thoſe are born Princes in their Patrimonies, but advances Men of private Condition to that honorable Degree. On the other ſide it is frequently ſeen when Princes have addicted themſelves more to Delicacy and Softneſs, than to Arms, they have loſt all, and been driven out of their States; for the principal things which deprives or gains a Man Authority, is the Neglect or profeſſion of that Art: *Franceſco Sforza* by his Experience in War, of a private Perſon made himſelf Duke of *Milan*, and his Children, ſeeking to avoid the Fatigues and Incommodities thereof, of *Dukes* became private Men; for among other Evils and Inconveniencies which attend when you are ignorant in War, it makes you contemptible, which is a Scandal a Prince ought with all Diligence to avoid, for Reaſons I ſhall name hereafter; beſides betwixt a potent, and an impotent, a vigilant and a negligent Prince there is no Proportion, it being unreaſonable that a martial and generous Perſon ſhould be ſubject willingly to one that is weak and remiſs; or that thoſe who are careleſs and effeminate, ſhould be ſafe amongſt thoſe who are Military and Active; for the One is too inſolent, and the Other too captious, ever to do any thing well together; ſo that a Prince unacquainted with the Diſcipline of War, beſides other Infelicities to which he is expoſed, cannot be beloved by, nor confident in his Armies. He never therefore ought to relax his Thoughts from the Exerciſes of War, not ſo much as in time of Peace, and indeed then he ſhould employ his Thoughts more ſtudiouſly therein, than in War itſelf, which may be done two ways, by the Application of the Body, and the Mind. As to his bodily Application, or Matter of Action, beſides that he is obliged to keep his Armies in good Diſcipline and Exerciſe, he ought to inure himſelf to Sports, and by

Hunting

Hunting and Hawking, and ſuch like Recreation, accuſtom his Body to Hardſhip, and Hunger, and Thirſt, and at the ſame time inform himſelf of the Coaſts and Situation of the Country, the Bigneſs and Elevation of the Mountains, the Largeneſs and Avenues of the Vallies, the Extent of the Plains, the Nature of the Rivers and Fens, which is to be done with great Curioſity; and this Knowledge is uſeful two ways; for hereby he not only learns to know his own Country, and to provide better for its Defence, but it prepares and adapts him, by obſerving their Situations, to comprehend the Situations of other Countries, which will perhaps be neceſſary for him to diſcover: For the Hills, the Vales, the Plains, the Rivers, and the Marſhes (for Example) in *Tuſcany*, have a certain Similitude and Reſemblance with thoſe in other Provinces; ſo that by the Knowledge of one, we may eaſily imagine the reſt: and that Prince who is defective in this, wants the moſt neceſſary Qualification of a General; for by knowing the Country, he knows how to beat up his Enemy; take up his quarters; March his Armies; Draw up his Men; and beſiege a Town with Advantage. In the Character which Hiſtorians give of *Philopomenes* Prince of *Achaia*, one of his great Commendations is, that in time of Peace he thought of nothing but Military Affairs, and when he was in Company with his Friends in the Country, he would many times ſtop ſuddenly, and Expoſtulate with them; if the Enemy were upon that Hill, and our Army where we are, which would have the Advantage of the Ground? How could we come at them with moſt Security? if we would draw off, how might we do it beſt? Or if they would retreat, how might we follow? ſo that as he was travelling, he would propoſe all the Accidents to which an Army was ſubject; he would hear their Opinion, give them his own, and reinforce it with Arguments; and this he did ſo frequently, that by continual Practice, and a conſtant Intention of his Thoughts upon that Buſineſs, he brought himſelf to that Perfection, no Accident could happen, no Inconvenience could occur to an Army, but he could preſently redreſs it. But as to the Exerciſe of the Mind, a Prince is to do that by Diligence in Hiſtory, and ſolemn Conſideration of the Actions of the moſt excellent Men; by obſerving how they demean'd themſelves in the Wars, examining the Grounds and Reaſons of their Victories and Loſſes, that he may be able to avoid the One, and imitate the Other; and above all, to keep cloſe to the Example of ſome great Captain of old (if any ſuch occurs in his reading) and not only to make him his Pattern, but to have all his Actions perpetually in his mind, as it was ſaid *Alexander* did by *Achilles*; *Cæſar* by *Alexander*, *Scipio* by *Cyrus*. And whoever reads the Life of *Cyrus* written by *Xenophon*, will find how much *Scipio* advantaged his Renown by that Imitation, and how much in Modeſty, Affability, Humanity, and Liberality he fram'd himſelf to the Deſcription which *Xenophon* had given him. A wiſe Prince therefore is to obſerve all theſe Rules, and never be idle in time of Peace, but employ himſelf therein with all his Induſtry, that in his Adverſity he may reap the Fruit of it, and when Fortune frowns, be ready to defie her.

CHAP. XV.

Of ſuch things as render Men (eſpecially Princes) worthy of Blame or Applauſe.

IT remains now that we ſee in what manner a Prince ought to comport with his Subjects and Friends: and becauſe many have writ of this Subject before, it may perhaps ſeem arrogant in me, eſpecially conſidering that in my Diſcourſe I ſhall deviate from the Opinion of other Men. But my Intention being to write for the Benefit and Advantage of him who underſtands, I thought it more convenient to reſpect the Eſſential verity, than the Imagination of the Thing (and many have fram'd imaginary Commonwealths and Governments to themſelves which never were ſeen, nor had any real exiſtence) for the preſent manner of living is ſo different from the way that ought to be taken, that he who neglects what is done, to follow what ought to be done, will ſooner learn how to ruin, than how to preſerve himſelf; for a tender Man, and one that deſires to be Honeſt in every thing, muſt needs run a great Hazard among ſo many of a contrary Principle. Wherefore it is neceſſary for a Prince that is willing to ſubſiſt, to harden himſelf, and learn to be good or otherwiſe according to the Exigence of his Affairs. Laying aſide therefore all imaginable Notions of a *Prince*, and diſcourſing of nothing but what is actually true, I ſay that all Men when they are ſpoken of, eſpecially Princes (who are in a higher and more eminent ſtation) are remarkable for ſome Quality or other that makes them either honorable or contemptible. Hence it is that ſome are counted liberal, others miſerable (according to the

Propriety

Propriety of the *Tuscan* word *Misero*, for *Quaro* in our language is one that desires to acquire by rapine, or any other way; *Misero* is he that abstains too much from making use of his own) some munificent, others rapacious, some cruel, others merciful; some faithless, others precise. One poor-spirited and effeminate, another fierce and ambitious; one courteous, another haughty; one modest, another libidinous; one sincere, another cunning; one rugged and morose, another accessible and easie; one grave, another giddy; one a Devout, another an Atheist. No man (I am sure) will deny but that it would be an admirable thing, and highly to be commended to have a Prince endued with all the good qualities aboveſaid; but because it is impossible to have, much less to exercise them all, by reason of the frailty and crosness of our Nature, it is convenient that he be so well instructed as to know how to avoid the scandal of those Vices which may deprive him of his State, and be very cautious of the rest, tho' their consequence be not so pernicious, but where they are unavoidable, he need trouble himself the less. Again, he is not to concern himself, if run under the infamy of those Vices without which his Dominion was not to be preserved; for if we consider things impartially, we shall find some things in appearance are virtuous, and yet if pursu'd, would bring certain destruction; and others on the contrary that are seemingly bad, which if followed by a *Prince*, procure his peace and security.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Liberality, and Parsimony.

TO begin then with the first of the above-mentioned qualities, I say, it would be advantagious to be accounted liberal; nevertheless liberality so used as not to render you formidable, does but injure you; for if it be used virtuously, and as it ought to be, it will not be known, nor secure you from the imputation of its contrary: To keep up therefore the name of liberal amongst men, it is necessary that no kind of luxury be omitted, so that a Prince of that disposition will consume his revenue in those kind of expences, and he be obliged at last, if he would preserve that reputation, to become grievous, and a great exactor upon the people, and do whatever is practicable for the getting of Money, which will cause him to be hated of his Subjects, and despised by every body else, when he once comes to be poor; so that offending many with his liberality, and rewarding but few, he becomes sensible of the first disaster, and runs great hazard of being ruin'd the first time he is in danger; which when afterwards he discovers, and desires to remedy, he runs into the other extream, and grows as odious for his avarice. So then if a Prince cannot exercise this virtue of liberality, so as to be publickly known, without detriment to himself, he ought if he be wise, not to dread the imputation of being covetous, for in time he shall be esteemed liberal when it is discovered that by his parsimony he has increased his revenue to a Condition of defending him against any Invasion, and to enterprize upon other people, without oppressing of them; so that he shall be accounted Noble to all from whom he takes nothing away, which are an infinite number; and near and parsimonious only to such few as he gives nothing to.

In our days we have seen no great action done, but by those who were accounted miserable, the other have been always undone. Pope *Julius* XI. made use of his bounty to get into the Chair, but (to enable himself to make War with the King of *France*) he never practised it after, and by his frugality he maintain'd several wars without any tax or imposition upon the people, his long parsimony having furnish'd him for his extraordinary expences. The present King of *Spain*, if he had affected to be thought liberal, could never have undertaken so many great designs, nor obtain'd so many great Victories. A Prince therefore ought not so much to concern himself (so he exacts not upon his Subjects, so he be able to defend himself, so he becomes not poor and despicable, nor commits rapine upon his people) though he be accounted covetous, for that is one of those Vices which fortifies his Dominion. If any one objects that *Cæsar* by his liberality made his way to the Empire, and many others upon the same score of reputation have made themselves great; I answer, That you are actually a *Prince*, or in a fair way to be made one. In the first case liberality is hurtful; in the second, 'tis necessary, and *Cæsar* was one of those who design'd upon the Empire: But when he was arrived at that dignity, if he had lived, and not retrenched his Expences, he would have ruined that Empire. If any replies, Many have been Princes, and with their Armies performed great matters, who have been reputed liberal, I rejoyn, that a Prince spends either of his own, or his Subjects, or other peoples. In the first case,

he

he is to be frugal: In the ſecond he may be as profuſe as he pleaſes, and baulk no point of liberality. But that Prince whoſe Army is to be maintained with free quarter, and plunder, and exactions from other people, is obliged to be liberal, or his Army will deſert him; and well he may be prodigal of what neither belongs to him, nor his Subjects, as was the caſe with *Cæſar*, and *Cyrus* and *Alexander*; for to ſpend upon anothers Stock, rather adds to, than ſubſtracts from his reputation; 'tis ſpending of his own, that is ſo mortal, and pernicious. Nor is there any thing that deſtroys it ſelf like liberality; for in the uſe of it, taking away the faculty of uſing it, thou becomeſt poor and contemptible, or to avoid that poverty, thou makeſt thy ſelf odious and a Tyrant; and there is nothing of ſo much importance to a Prince to prevent, as to be either contemptible or odious, both which depend much upon the prudent exerciſe of your liberality. Upon theſe conſiderations it is more wiſdom to lie under the ſcandal of being miſerable, which is an imputation rather infamous, than odious, than to be thought liberal, and run your ſelf into a neceſſity of playing the Tyrant, which is infamous and odious both.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Cruelty, and Clemency, and whether it is beſt for a Prince to be beloved, or feared.

TO come now to the other qualities propoſed, I ſay every Prince is to deſire to be eſteemed rather merciful than cruel, but with great caution that his mercy be not abuſed; *Cæſar Borgia* was counted cruel, yet that cruelty reduced *Romagna*, united it, ſetled it in peace, and rendered it faithful: ſo that if well conſidered, he will appear much more merciful than the *Florentines*, who rather than be thought cruel, ſuffered *Piſtoia* to be deſtroyed: A Prince therefore is not to regard the ſcandal of being cruel, if thereby he keeps his Subjects in their Allegiance, and united, ſeeing by ſome few examples of Juſtice you may be more merciful, than they who by an univerſal exerciſe of pity, permit ſeveral diſorders to follow, which occaſion Rapine and Murder; and the reaſon is, becauſe that exorbitant mercy has an ill effect upon the whole univerſality, whereas particular Executions extend only to particular perſons. But among all Princes, a new Prince has the hardeſt task to avoid the ſcandal of being cruel, by reaſon of the newneſs of his Government, and the dangers which attend it: Hence *Virgil* in the perſon of *Dido* excuſed the inhoſpitality of her Government.

Res dura, & regni novitas, me talia cogunt
Moliri, & late fines Cuſtode tueri.

My new Dominion, and my harder fate
Conſtrains me to't, and I muſt guard my State.

Nevertheleſs he is not to be too credulous of reports, too haſty in his motions, nor create fears and jealouſies to himſelf, but ſo to temper his adminiſtrations with prudence and humanity, that neither too much confidence may make him careleſs, nor too much diffidence intolerable. And from hence ariſes a new queſtion, *Whether it be better to be belov'd than fear'd, or fear'd than belov'd?* It is anſwer'd, Both would be convenient, but becauſe that is hard to attain, it is better and more ſecure (if one muſt be wanting) to be fear'd than belov'd; for in the general, Men are ingrateful, inconſtant, hypocritical, fearful of danger, and covetous of gain; whil'ſt they receive any benefit by you, and the danger is at a diſtance, they are abſolutely yours, their Blood, their Eſtates, their Lives, and their Children (as I ſaid before) are all at your Service; but when miſchief is at hand, and you have preſent need of their help, they make no ſcruple to revolt: And that Prince who leaves himſelf naked of other preparations, and relies wholly upon their profeſſions, is ſure to be ruined; for amity contracted by price, and not by the greatneſs and generoſity of the mind, may ſeem a good pennyworth; yet when you have occaſion to make uſe of it, you will find no ſuch thing. Moreover Men do with leſs remorſe offend againſt thoſe who deſire to be beloved, than againſt thoſe who are ambitious of being feared, and the reaſon is becauſe Love is faſten'd only by a ligament of obligation, which the ill Nature of Mankind breaks upon every occaſion that is preſented to his profit; But fear depends upon an apprehenſion of puniſhment, which is never to be diſpell'd. Yet a Prince is to render himſelf awful in ſuch ſort, that if he gains not his Subjects love, he may eſchew their hatred; for to be feared and not

hated,

hated, are compatible enough, and he may be always in that condition, if he offers no violence to their Eſtates, nor attempts any thing upon the honour of their Wifes, as alſo when he has occaſion to take away any Man's life, if he takes his time when the cauſe is manifeſt, and he has good matter for his juſtification: But above all things, he is to have a care of intrenching upon their Eſtates, for men do ſooner forget the death of their Father, than the loſs of their Patrimony: Beſides occaſions of confiſcation never fail, and he that gives once way to that humour of rapine, ſhall never want temptation to ruine his Neighbour. But on the contrary, provocations to blood, are more rare, and do ſooner evaporate: But when a Prince is at the head of his Army, and has a multitude of Soldiers to govern, then it is abſolutely neceſſary not to value the Epithet of cruel, for without that, no Army can be kept in unity, nor in diſpoſition for any great act.

Among the ſeveral inſtances of *Hannibal*'s great Conduct, it is one, That having a vaſt Army, conſtituted out of ſeveral Nations, and conducted to make War in an Enemies country, there never hapned any Sedition among them, or any Mutiny againſt their General, either in his adverſity or proſperity: Which can proceed from nothing ſo probably as his great cruelty, which, added to his infinite Virtues, rendered him both aweful, and terrible to his Soldiers, and without that, all his Virtues would have ſignified nothing. Some Writers there are (but of little conſideration) who admire his great Exploits, and condemn the true cauſes of them. But to prove that his other Virtues would never have carried him thorow, let us reflect upon *Scipio*, a perſon Honorable not only in his own time, but in all Hiſtory whatever; nevertheleſs his Army mutined in *Spain*, and the true cauſe of it was, his too much gentleneſs and lenity, which gave his Soldiers more liberty than was ſutable or conſiſtent with Military Diſcipline. *Fabius Maximus* upbraided him by it in the Senate, and call'd him *Corrupter of the Roman Militia*; The Inhabitants of *Locris* having been plundered and deſtroyed by one of *Scipio*'s Lieutenants, they were never redreſſed, nor the Legat's inſolence corrected, all proceeding from the mildneſs of *Scipio*'s Nature, which was ſo eminent in him, that a perſon undertaking to excuſe him in the Senate, declared, that there were many who knew better how to avoid doing ill themſelves, than to puniſh it in other people. Which temper would doubtleſs in time have eclipſed the glory and reputation of *Scipio*, had that authority been continued in him; but receiving Orders, and living under the direction of the Senate, that ill quality was not only not diſcovered in him, but turned to his renown. I conclude therefore according to what I have ſaid about being feared, or beloved; That foraſmuch as men do love at their own diſcretion, but fear at their Prince's, a wiſe Prince is oblig'd to lay his foundation upon that which is in his own power, not that which depends on other people, but (as I ſaid before) with great caution that he does not make himſelf odious.

CHAP. XVIII.

How far a Prince is obliged by his Promiſe.

HOW honourable it is for a Prince to keep his word, and act rather with integrity than colluſion, I ſuppoſe every body underſtands: Nevertheleſs Experience has ſhown in our times, That thoſe Princes who have not pinn'd themſelves up to that punctuality and preciſeneſs, have done great things, and by their cunning and ſubtilty not only circumvented, and darted the brains of thoſe with whom they had to deal, but have overcome, and been too hard for thoſe who have been ſo ſuperſtitiouſly exact. For further explanation, you muſt underſtand there are two ways of contending, by Law, and by Force: The firſt is proper to Men; the ſecond to Beaſts; but becauſe many times the firſt is inſufficient, recourſe muſt be had to the ſecond. It belongs therefore to a Prince to underſtand both, when to make uſe of the rational, and when of the brutal way; and this is recommended to Princes (tho' abſtruſely) by ancient Writers, who tell them how *Achilles* and ſeveral other Princes were committed to the Education of *Chiron* the Centaur, who was to keep them under his Diſcipline, chooſing them a Maſter, half Man and half Beaſt, for no other reaſon but to ſhow how neceſſary it is for a Prince to be acquainted with both, for that one without the other will be of little duration. Seeing therefore it is of ſuch importance to a Prince to take upon him the nature and diſpoſition of a Beaſt, of all the whole flock, he ought to imitate the Lyon and the Fox; for the Lyon is in danger of toils and ſnares, and the Fox of the Wolf: So that he muſt be a Fox to find out the ſnares, and a Lyon to fright

fright away the Wolves, but they who keep wholly to the Lyon, have no true notion of themſelves. A Prince therefore that is wiſe and prudent, cannot, or ought not to keep his *parole*, when the keeping of it is to his prejudice, and the cauſes for which he promiſed, removed. Were men all good, this Doctrine was not to be taught; but becauſe they are wicked, and not likely to be punctual with you, you are not obliged to any ſuch ſtrictneſs with them: Nor was there ever any Prince that wanted lawful pretence to juſtifie his breach of promiſe. I might inſtance in many modern Examples, and ſhew how many Confederations, and Peaces, and Promiſes have been broken by the infidelity of Princes, and how he that beſt perſonated the Fox, had the better ſucceſs. Nevertheleſs it is of great conſequence to diſguiſe your inclination, and to play the Hypocrite well; and men are ſo ſimple in their temper, and ſo ſubmiſſive to their preſent neceſſities, that he that is neat and cleanly in his colluſions, ſhall never want people to practiſe them upon. I cannot forbear one Example which is ſtill freſh in our memory. *Alexander* VI. never did, nor thought of any thing but cheating, and never wanted matter to work upon; and tho' no man promiſed a thing with greater aſſeveration, nor confirm'd it with more oaths and imprecations, and obſerv'd them leſs; yet underſtanding the world well, he never miſcarried.

A Prince therefore is not oblig'd to have all the forementioned good qualities in reality, but it is neceſſary he have them in appearance; nay, I will be bold to affirm, that having them actually, and employing them upon all occaſions, they are extreamly prejudicial, whereas having them only in appearance, they turn to better accompt; it is honorable to ſeem mild, and merciful, and courteous, and religious, and ſincere, and indeed to be ſo, provided your mind be ſo rectifi'd and prepar'd that you can act quite contrary upon occaſion. And this muſt be premis'd, that a Prince, eſpecially if come but lately to the throne, cannot obſerve all thoſe things exactly which make men be eſteemed virtuous, being oftentimes neceſſitated for the preſervation of his State to do things inhuman, uncharitable, and irreligious; and therefore it is convenient his mind be at his command, and flexible to all the puffs and variations of fortune: Not forbearing to be good, whilſt it is in his choice, but knowing how to be evil when there is a neceſſity. A Prince then is to have particular care that nothing falls from his mouth, but what is full of the five qualities aforeſaid, and that to ſee, and to hear him, he appears all goodneſs, integrity, humanity, and religion, which laſt he ought to pretend to more than ordinarily, becauſe more men do judge by the eye, than by the touch; for every body ſees, but few underſtand; every body ſees how you appear, but few know what in reality you are, and thoſe few dare not oppoſe the opinion of the multitude who have the Majeſty of their Prince to defend them; and in the actions of all men, eſpecially Princes, where no man has power to judge, every one looks to the end. Let a Prince therefore do what he can to preſerve his life, and continue his Supremacy, the means which he uſes ſhall be thought honourable, and be commended by every body; becauſe the people are always taken with the appearance and event of things, and the greateſt part of the world conſiſts of the people: Thoſe few who are wiſe, taking place when the multitude has nothing elſe to rely upon. There is a Prince at this time in being (but his name I ſhall conceal) who has nothing in his mouth but fidelity and peace; and yet had he exerciſed either the one or the other, they had robbed him before this both of his power and reputation.

CHAP. XIX.

That Princes ought to be cautious of becoming either odious or contemptible.

AND becauſe in our diſcourſe of the qualifications of a Prince, we have hitherto ſpoken only of thoſe which are of greateſt importance, we ſhall now ſpeak briefly of the reſt under theſe general Heads. That a Prince make it his buſineſs (as is partly hinted before) to avoid ſuch things as may make him odious or contemptible: And as often as he does that, he plays his part very well, and ſhall meet no danger or inconveniences by the reſt of his Vices: Nothing (as I ſaid before) makes a Prince ſo inſufferably odious, as uſurping his Subjects Eſtates, and debauching their Wives, which are two things he ought ſtudiouſly to forbear; for whilſt the generality of the world live quietly upon their Eſtates, and unprejudiced in their Honor, they live peaceably enough, and all his contention is only with the pride and ambition of ſome few perſons who are many ways, and with great eaſe to be reſtrain'd. But a Prince is contemptible when he is counted effeminate, light, unconſtant, puſillanimous, and irreſolute; and of this he ought to be as careful, as of a Rock in the Sea, and

ſtrive that in all his actions there may appear magnanimity, courage, gravity, and fortitude, deſiring that in the private affairs of his Subjects, his ſentence and determination may be irrevocable, and himſelf to ſtand ſo in their opinion, that none may think it poſſible either to delude or divert him. The Prince who cauſes himſelf to be eſteem'd in that manner, ſhall be highly redoubted, and if he be feared, people will not eaſily conſpire againſt him, nor readily invade him, becauſe he is known to be an excellent Perſon and formidable to his Subjects; for a Prince ought to be terrible in two places, at home to his Subjects, and abroad to his Equals; from whom he defends himſelf by good Arms, and good Allies; for if his power be good, his friends will not be wanting, and while his affairs are fix'd at home, there will be no danger from abroad, unleſs they be diſturb'd by ſome former conſpiracy, and upon any Commotion *ab extrâ*, if he be compos'd at home, has liv'd as I preſcribe, and not deſerted himſelf, he will be able to bear up againſt any impreſſion according to the example of *Nabis* the *Spartan*. When things are well abroad, his affairs at home will be ſafe enough, unleſs they be perplex'd by ſome ſecret Conſpiracy, againſt which the Prince ſufficiently provides, if he keeps himſelf from being hated or deſpiſed, and the people remain ſatisfied of him, which is a thing very neceſſary, as I have largely inculcated before. And one of the beſt Remedies a Prince can uſe againſt conſpiracy, is to keep himſelf from being hated or deſpiſed by the multitude; for no body plots, but expects by the death of the Prince, to gratifie the people, and the thought of offending them will deter him from any ſuch Enterprize; becauſe in conſpiracies the difficulties are infinite. By experience we find that many conjurations have been on foot, but few have ſucceeded, becauſe no man can conſpire alone; nor chooſe a Confederate but out of thoſe who are diſcontented, and no ſooner ſhall you impart your mind to a Male-content, but you give him opportunity to reconcile himſelf; becauſe there is nothing he propoſes to himſelf, but he may expect from the diſcovery. So that the gain being certain on that ſide, and hazardous and uncertain on the other; he muſt be either an extraordinary friend to you, or an implacable Enemy to the Prince if he does not betray you: In ſhort, on the ſide of the Conſpirators there is nothing but fear, and jealouſie, and apprehenſion of puniſhment, but on the Prince's ſide there is the Majeſty of the Government, the Laws, the Aſſiſtance of his Friends and State, which defend him ſo effectually, that if the affections of the people be added to them, no man can be ſo raſh and precipitate as to conſpire; for if before the execution of his deſign, the Conſpirator has reaſon to be afraid, in this caſe he has much more afterwards, having offended the people in the Execution, and left himſelf no refuge to fly to. Of this many Examples may be produced, but I ſhall content my ſelf with one which happen'd in the memory of our Fathers. *Hanibal Bentivogli* (Grandfather to this preſent *Hanibal*) was Prince of *Bolonia*, and kill'd by the *Canneſchi* who conſpir'd againſt him; none of his race being left behind but *John*, who was then in his Cradle: The Murther was no ſooner committed, but the people took Arms, and ſlew all the *Canneſchi*, which proceeded only from the affection that the Houſe of the *Bentivogli* had at that time among the populacy in *Bolonia*, which was then ſo great, that when *Hanibal* was dead, there being none of that Family remaining, in a capacity for the Government of the State, upon information that at *Florence* there was a Natural Son of the ſaid *Bentivogli*'s (who till that time had paſſed only for the Son of a Smith) they ſent Embaſſadors for him, and having conducted him honorably to that City, they gave him the Government, which he executed very well, till the ſaid *John* came of Age. I conclude therefore a Prince need not be much apprehenſive of Conſpiracies, whilſt the people are his friends; but when they are diſſatisfied, and have taken prejudice againſt him, there is nothing, nor no perſon which he ought not to fear. And it has been the conſtant care of all wiſe Princes, and all well-govern'd States, not to reduce the Nobility to deſpair, nor the people to diſcontent, which is one of the moſt material things a Prince is to prevent. Among the beſt order'd Monarchies of our times, *France* is one, in which there are many good Laws and Conſtitutions tending to the liberty and preſervation of the King: The firſt of 'em is the Parliament, and the Authority wherewith it is veſted; for he who was the founder of that Monarchy, being ſenſible of the ambition and inſolence of the *Nobles*, and judging it convenient to have them bridled and reſtrain'd; and knowing on the other ſide the hatred of the people againſt the Nobility, and that it proceeded from fear (being willing to ſecure them) to exempt the King from the diſpleaſure of the Nobles, if he ſided with the Commons, or from the malice of the Commons, if he inclin'd to the Nobles, he erected a third judge, which (without any reflexion upon the King) ſhould keep the Nobility under, and protect the people; nor could there be a better order, wiſer, nor of greater ſecurity to the King and the Kingdom; from whence we may deduce another obſervation, *That Princes are to leave things of injuſtice and envy to the Miniſtry and Execution of others, but acts of favour and grace are to be perform'd by themſelves.* To conclude, a Prince is to value his Grandees, but ſo as not to make the people hate him.

Contem-

Contemplating the lives and deaths of ſeveral of the *Roman* Emperors, it is poſſible many would think to find plenty of Examples quite contrary to my opinion, foraſmuch as ſome of them whoſe Conduct was remarkable, and Magnanimity obvious to every body, were turn'd out of their Authority, or murther'd by the Conſpiracy of their ſubjects. To give a punctual anſwer, I ſhould inquire into the qualities and converſations of the ſaid Emperors, and in ſo doing I ſhould find the reaſon of their ruine to be the ſame, or very conſonant to what I have oppoſed. And in part I will repreſent ſuch things as are moſt notable, to the conſideration of him that reads the actions of our times, and I ſhall content my ſelf with the examples of all the Emperors which ſucceeded in the Empire from *Marcus* the Philoſopher, to *Maximinus*, and they were, *Marcus*, his Son *Commodus*, *Pertinax*, *Julian*, *Severus*, *Antoninus*, his Son *Caracalla*, *Macrinus*, *Heliogabalus*, *Alexander*, and *Maximinus*.

It is firſt to be conſider'd, That whereas in other Governments there was nothing to contend with, but the ambition of the Nobles, and the inſolence of the people, the *Roman* Emperors had a third inconvenience, to ſupport againſt the avarice and cruelty of the Soldiers, which was a thing of ſuch difficult practice, that it was the occaſion of the deſtruction of many of them, it being very uneaſie to pleaſe the Subject and the Soldier together; for the Subject loves Peace, and chooſes therefore a Prince that is gentle and mild; whereas the Soldier prefers a Martial Prince, and one that is haughty, and rigid, and rapacious, which good qualities they are deſirous he ſhould exerciſe upon the people, that their pay might be encreaſed; and their covetouſneſs and cruelty ſatiated upon them. Hence it is, that thoſe Emperors, who neither by Art, or Nature are endued with that addreſs, and reputation as is neceſſary for the reſtraining both of the one and the other, do always miſcarry; and of them the greateſt part (eſpecially if but lately advanced to the Empire) underſtanding the inconſiſtency of their two humours, incline to ſatisfie the Soldiers, without regarding how far the people are diſobliged. Which Council is no more than is neceſſary; for ſeeing it cannot be avoided but Princes muſt fall under the hatred of ſomebody, they ought diligently to contend that it be not of the multitude; If that be not to be obtain'd, their next great care is to be, that they incur not the odium of ſuch as are moſt potent among them: And therefore thoſe Emperors who were new, and had need of extraordinary ſupport, adher'd more readily to the Soldiers than to the people, which turn'd to their detriment or advantage, as the Prince knew how to preſerve his reputation with them: From the cauſes aforeſaid, it happen'd that *Marcus Aurelius*, *Pertinax*, and *Alexander* being Princes of more than ordinary Modeſty, lovers of Juſtice, Enemies of cruelty, courteous, and bountiful, came all of them (except *Marcus*) to unfortunate ends. *Marcus* indeed lived and died in great honour, becauſe he came to the Empire by way of inheritance and ſucceſſion, without being beholden either to Soldiers or people, and being afterwards endu'd with many good qualities which recommended him, and made him venerable among them, he kept 'em both in ſuch order whilſt he liv'd, and held 'em ſo ſtrictly to their bounds, that he was never either hated or deſpiſed. But *Pertinax* was choſen Emperor againſt the Will of the Soldiers, who being us'd to live licentiouſly under *Commodus*, they could not brook that regularity to which *Pertinax* endeavour'd to bring them; ſo that having contracted the *Odium* of the Soldiers, and a certain diſreſpect and neglect by reaſon of his Age, he was ruin'd in the very beginning of his reign; from whence it is obſervable, that hatred is obtained two ways, by good works and bad; and therefore a Prince (as I ſaid before) being willing to retain his juriſdiction, is oftentimes compell'd to be bad. For if the chief party, (whether it be people, or army, or Nobility) which you think moſt uſeful, and of moſt conſequence to you for the conſervation of your dignity, be corrupt, you muſt follow their humour and indulge them; and in that caſe honeſty and virtue are pernicious.

But let us come to *Alexander* who was a Prince of ſuch great equity and goodneſs, it is reckon'd among his praiſes, that in the 14 years of his Empire, there was no man put to death without a fair Tryal: Nevertheleſs being accounted effeminate, and one that ſuffer'd himſelf to be manag'd by his Mother, and falling by that means into diſgrace, the Army conſpir'd and kill'd him. Examining on the other ſide the Conduct of *Commodus*, *Severus*, *Antoninus*, *Caracalla*, and *Maximinus*, you will find 'em cruel and rapacious, and ſuch as to ſatisfie the Soldiers, omitted no kind of injury that could be exerciſed againſt the people, and all of 'em but *Severus* were unfortunate in their ends: For *Severus* was a Prince of ſo great courage and magnanimity, that preſerving the friendſhip of the Army (tho' the people were oppreſs'd) he made his whole Reign happy, his virtues having repreſented him ſo admirable both to the Soldiers and people, that theſe remain'd in a manner ſtupid, and aſtoniſh'd, and the other obedient and contented. And becauſe the actions of *Severus* were great in a new Prince, I ſhall ſhew in brief how he perſonated the

Fox and the *Lyon*, whoſe natures and properties are (as I ſaid before) neceſſary for the imitation of a Prince. *Severus* therefore, knowing the lazineſs and inactivity of *Julian* the Emperor, perſuaded the Army under his Command in *Sclavonia* to go to *Rome*, and revenge the death of *Pertinax* who was murther'd by the Imperial Guards; and under that colour, without the leaſt pretence to the Empire, he march'd his Army towards *Rome*, and was in *Italy* before any thing of his motion was known: Being arriv'd at *Rome*, the Senate were afraid of him, kill'd *Julian*, and elected *Severus*. After which beginning, there remained two difficulties to be remov'd before he could be Maſter of the whole Empire; the One was in *Aſia*, where *Niger*, General of the *Aſiatick* Army, had proclaimed himſelf Emperor: The Other, in the Weſt, where *Albinus* the General aſpired to the ſame: And thinking it hazardous to declare againſt both, he reſolved to oppoſe himſelf againſt *Niger*, and cajole and wheedle *Albinus*, to whom he writ word, That being choſen Emperor by the Senate, he was willing to receive him to a participation of that dignity, gave him the Title of *Cæſar*, and by conſent of the Senate admitted him his Collegue; which *Albinus* embrac'd very willingly, and thought him in earneſt; but when *Severus* had overcome *Niger*, put him to death, and ſetled the affairs of the Eaſt, being return'd to *Rome*, he complain'd in the Senate againſt *Albinus*, as a perſon, who contrary to his obligations for the benefits receiv'd from him, had endeavour'd treacherouſly to murther him, told them that he was oblig'd to march againſt him to puniſh his ingratitude, and afterwards following him into *France*, he executed his deſign, depriv'd him of his Command, and put him to death. He then who ſtrictly examines the Actions of this Prince, will find him fierce as a Lyon, ſubtile as a Fox, feared and reverenced by every body, and no way odious to his Army: Nor will it ſeem ſtrange that he (tho' newly advanc'd to the Empire) was able to defend it, ſeeing his great reputation protected him againſt the hatred which his people might have conceiv'd againſt him by reaſon of his Rapine. But his Son *Antoninus* was an excellent perſon likewiſe endued with tranſcendent parts, which render'd him admirable to the people, and grateful to the Soldiers; for he was Martial in his Nature, patient of labour and hardſhip, and a great deſpiſer of all ſenſuality and ſoftneſs, which recommended him highly to his Armies. Nevertheleſs his fury and cruelty was ſo immoderately great (having upon ſeveral private and particular occaſions, put a great part of the people of *Rome*, and all the Inhabitants of *Alexandria*, to death) that he fell into the hatred of the whole world, and began to be fear'd by his Confidents that were about him; ſo that he was kill'd by one of his Captains in the middle of his Camp. From whence it may be obſerv'd, That theſe kind of Aſſaſſinations which follow upon a deliberate and obſtinate reſolution, cannot be prevented by a Prince; for he who values not his own life, can commit them when he pleaſes; but they are to be feared the leſs, becauſe they happen but ſeldom, he is only to have a care of doing any great injury to thoſe that are about him, of which error *Antoninus* was too guilty, having put the Brother of the ſaid Captain to an ignominious death, threatned the Captain daily, and yet continu'd him in his Guards, which was a raſh and pernicious act, and prov'd ſo in the end. But to come to *Commodus*, who had no hard task to preſerve his Empire, ſucceeding to it by way of inheritance, as Son to *Marcus*, for that to ſatisfie the people, and oblige the Soldiers, he had no more to do, but to follow the footſteps of his Father. But being of a brutiſh and cruel diſpoſition, to exerciſe his rapacity upon the people, he indulged his Army, and allowed them in all manner of licentiouſneſs. Beſides, proſtituting his Dignity, by deſcending many times upon the Theater to fight with the Gladiators, and committing many other acts which were vile, and unworthy the Majeſty of an Emperor, he became contemptible to the Soldiers, and growing odious to one party, and deſpicable to the other, they conſpired and murthered him. *Maximinus* was likewiſe a martial Prince, and addicted to the Wars, and the Army being weary of the Effeminacy of *Alexander* (whom I have mention'd before) having ſlain him, they made *Maximinus* Emperor; but he poſſeſs'd it not long; for two things contributed to make him odious, and deſpiſed. One was the meanneſs of his extraction, having kept ſheep formerly in *Thrace*, which was known to all the world, and made him univerſally contemptible. The other was, that at his firſt coming to the Empire, by not repairing immediately to *Rome*, and putting himſelf into poſſeſſion of his Imperial ſeat, he had contracted the imputation of being cruel, having exercis'd more than ordinary ſeverity by his Prefects in *Rome*, and his Lieutenants in all the reſt of the Empire; ſo that the whole world being provoked, by the vileneſs of his birth, and deteſtation of his cruelty, in apprehenſion of his fury, *Africa*, the Senate and all the people both in *Italy* and *Rome*, conſpired againſt him, and his own Army joyning themſelves with them, in their Leaguer before *Aquileia* finding it difficult to be taken, weary of his cruelties, and encourag'd by the multitude of his Enemies, they ſet upon him, and ſlew him.

I will not trouble my ſelf with *Heliogabalus*, *Macrinus*, nor *Julian*, who being all effeminate and contemptible, were quickly extinguiſh'd. But I ſhall conclude this diſcourſe, and ſay that the Princes of our times are not oblig'd to ſatisfie the Soldiers in their reſpective Governments by ſuch extraordinary ways; for tho' they are not altogether to be neglected, yet the remedy and reſolution is eaſie, becauſe none of theſe Princes have entire Armies, brought up, and inveterated in their ſeveral Governments and Provinces, as the Armies under the *Roman Empire* were. If therefore at that time it was neceſſary to ſatisfie the Soldiers rather than the people, it was becauſe the Soldiers were more potent. At preſent it is more the intereſt of all Princes (except the great *Turk* and the *Soldan*) to comply with the people, becauſe they are more conſiderable than the Soldiers. I except the *Turk*, becauſe he has in his Guards 12000 Foot, and 15000 Horſe conſtantly about him, upon whom the ſtrength and ſecurity of his Empire depends, and it is neceſſary (poſtponing all other reſpect to the people) they be continu'd his friends. It is the ſame caſe with the *Soldan*, who being wholly in the power of the Soldiers, it is convenient that he alſo wave the people, and inſinuate with the Army. And here it is to be noted, that this Government of the *Soldans* is different from all other Monarchies, for it is not unlike the Papacy in Chriſtendom, which can neither be call'd a new, or an hereditary Principality; becauſe the Children of the deceaſed Prince, are neither Heirs to his Eſtate, nor Lords of his Empire, but he who is choſen to ſucceed, by thoſe who have the faculty of Election; which Cuſtom being of old, the Government cannot be call'd new, and by conſequence is not ſubject to any of the difficulties wherewith a new one is infeſted; becauſe though the perſon of the Prince be new, and perhaps the Title; yet the Laws and Orders of State are old, and diſpoſed to receive him as if he were hereditary Lord. But to return to our buſineſs, I ſay, That whoever conſiders the aforeſaid diſcourſe, ſhall find either hatred or contempt the perpetual cauſe of the ruine of thoſe Emperors; and be able to judge how it came about that part of them taking one way in their adminiſtrations, and part of 'em another, in both parties ſome were happy, and ſome unhappy at laſt. *Pertinax* and *Alexander* being but Upſtart-Princes, it was not only vain, but dangerous for 'em to imitate *Marcus*, who was Emperor by right of Succeſſion. Again, it was no leſs pernicious for *Caracalla*, *Commodus*, and *Maximinus* to make *Severus* their pattern, not having force nor vertue enough to follow his footſteps. So then if a new Prince cannot imitate the actions of *Marcus*; (and to regulate by the example of *Severus*, is unneceſſary) he is only to take that part from *Severus* that is neceſſary to the foundation of his State, and from *Marcus*, what is convenient to keep and defend it gloriouſly, when 'tis once eſtabliſhed and firm.

CHAP. XX.

Whether Citadels, and other things which Princes many times do, be profitable, or dangerous?

SOME Princes for the greater ſecurity of their Dominion, have diſarm'd their Subjects; others have cantonized their Countries; others have fomented factions and animoſity among 'em; ſome have applyed themſelves to flatter and inſinuate with thoſe who were ſuſpicious in the beginning of their Government: Some have built Caſtles, others have demoliſh'd them; and tho' in all theſe caſes, no certain or determin'd rule can be preſcribed, unleſs we come to a particular conſideration of the State where it is to be uſed; yet I ſhall ſpeak of them all, as the matter it ſelf will endure. A wiſe Prince therefore was never known to diſarm his Subjects; rather finding them unfurniſhed, he put Arms into their hands; for by arming them, and inuring them to warlike Exerciſe, thoſe Arms are ſurely your own; they who were ſuſpicious to you, become faithful; they who are faithful, are confirm'd; and all your Subjects become of your party; and becauſe the whole multitude which ſubmits to your Government is not capable of being armed, if you be beneficial and obliging to thoſe you do arm, you may make the bolder with the reſt; for the difference of your behaviour to the Soldier, binds him more firmly to your Service; and the reſt will excuſe you, as judging them moſt worthy of reward, who are moſt liable to danger. But when you diſarm, you diſguſt them, and imply a diffidence in them, either for cowardize, or Treachery, and the one or the other is ſufficient to give them an impreſſion of hatred againſt you. And becauſe you cannot ſubſiſt without Soldiers, you will be forced to entertain Mercenaries, whom I have formerly deſcribed, and if it were poſſible for the ſaid Mercenaries to be good, they could not be able to defend you againſt powerful Adverſaries,

ſaries, and Subjects diſobliged. Wherefore (as I have ſaid) a new Prince in his new Government, puts his Subjects always into Arms, as appears by ſeveral Examples in Hiſtory. But when a Prince conquers a new State, and annexes it (as a Member) to his old, then it is neceſſary your Subjects be diſarmed, all but ſuch as appeared for you in the Conqueſt, and they are to be mollified by degrees, and brought into ſuch a condition of lazineſs and effeminacy, that in time your whole ſtrength may devolve upon your own Natural Militia, which were trained up in your ancient Dominion, and are to be always about you. Our Anceſtors (and they were eſteemed wiſe men) were wont to ſay, That it was neceſſary to keep *Piſtoia* by factions, and *Piſa* by fortreſſes, and accordingly in ſeveral Towns under their Subjection, they created, and fomented factions and animoſities, to keep them with more eaſe. This, at a time when *Italy* was unſetled, and in a certain kind of ſuſpence, might be well enough done, but I do not take it at this time for any precept for us, being clearly in opinion that the making of factions, never does good, but that where the Enemy approaches, and the City is divided, it muſt neceſſarily, and that ſuddenly be loſt, becauſe the weaker party will always fall off to the Enemy, and the other cannot be able to defend it. The *Venetians*, (as I gueſs) upon the ſame grounds nouriſhed the factions of the *Guelfs* and the *Ghibilins* in the Cities under their juriſdiction; and though they kept them from blood; yet they encouraged their diſſentions, to the end that the Citizens being employed among themſelves, ſhould have no time to conſpire againſt them; which as appeared afterwards, did not anſwer expectation; for being defeated at *Valia*, one of the ſaid factions took Arms, and turned the *Venetians* out of their State. Such methods therefore as theſe, do argue weakneſs in the Prince; for no Government of any ſtrength or conſiſtence will ſuffer ſuch diviſions, becauſe they are uſeful only in time of Peace, when perhaps they may contribute to the more eaſie management of their Subjects, but when War comes, the fallacy of thoſe Counſels are quickly diſcovered. Without doubt, Princes grow great when they overcome the difficulties and impediments which are given them; and therefore Fortune, eſpecially when ſhe has a mind to exalt a new Prince (who has greater need of reputation than a Prince that is old and Hereditary) raiſes him up Enemies, and encourages enterprizes againſt him, that he may have opportunity to conquer them, and advance himſelf by ſuch ſteps as his Enemies had prepared. For which reaſon many have thought that a wiſe Prince when opportunity offers, ought (but with great cunning and addreſs) to maintain ſome enmity againſt himſelf, that when time ſerves to deſtroy them, his own greatneſs may be encreas'd.

Princes, and particularly thoſe who are not of long ſtanding, have found more fidelity and aſſiſtance from thoſe whom they ſuſpected at the beginning of their Reign, than from them who at firſt were their greateſt confidents. *Pandolfus Petrucci* Prince of *Sienna* govern'd his State rather by thoſe who were ſuſpected, than others. But this is not to be treated of largely, becauſe it varies according to the ſubjects; I ſhall only ſay this, That thoſe Men who in the beginning of his Government, oppoſed him (if they be of ſuch quality as to want the ſupport of other people) are eaſily wrought over to the Prince, and more ſtrictly engaged to be faithful; becauſe they knew that it muſt be their good carriage for the future that muſt cancel the prejudice that is againſt them; and ſo the Prince comes to receive more benefit by them, than by thoſe who ſerving him more ſecurely, do moſt commonly neglect his affairs.

And ſeeing the matter requires, I will not omit to remind a Prince, who is but newly advanc'd (and that by ſome inward favour and correſpondence in the Country) that he conſiders well what it was that diſpoſed thoſe parties to befriend him; if it be not affection to him, but Pique, and Animoſity to the old Government, it will coſt much trouble and difficulty to keep them his friends, becauſe it will be impoſſible to ſatisfie them: and upon ſerious diſquiſition, Ancient and Modern Examples will give us the reaſon, and we ſhall find it more eaſie to gain ſuch perſons as were ſatisfied with the former Government, and by conſequence his Enemies, than thoſe who being diſobliged, ſided with him, and aſſiſted to ſubvert it.

It has been a Cuſtom among Princes, for the greater ſecurity of their Territories to build Citadels and Fortreſſes to bridle and reſtrain ſuch as would enterprize againſt 'em, and to ſerve as a refuge in times of Rebellion; and I approve the way becauſe anciently practis'd, yet no longer ago than in our days, Mr. *Nicolo Vitelli* was known to diſmantle two Forts in the City of *Caſtello*, to ſecure his Government; *Guidobaldo* Duke of *Urbin* returning to his State from whence *Cæſar Borgia* had driven him, demoliſhed all the ſtrong places in that Province, and thereby thought it more unlikely again to fall into the hands of the Enemy. The *Bentivogli* being return'd to *Bologna*, uſed the ſame courſe: So that Fortreſſes are uſeful, or not uſeful, according to the difference of time, and if in one

place

place they do good, they do as much miſchief in another: And the caſe may be argued thus, That Prince who is more afraid of his Subjects than Neighbours, is to ſuffer them to ſtand: The Family of the *Sforza's*, has and will ſuffer more miſchief by the Caſtle of *Milan* (which was built by *Franceſco Sforza*) than by all its other troubles whatever; ſo that the beſt fortification of all, is not to be hated by the people, for your Fortreſſes will not protect you, if the people have you in deteſtation, becauſe they ſhall no ſooner take Arms, but Strangers will fall in, and ſuſtain them. In our times, there is not one inſtance to be produced, of advantage, which that courſe has brought to any Prince, but to the Counteſs of *Furly*, when upon the Death of *Hieronimo* her Husband, by means of thoſe Caſtles ſhe was able to withſtand the popular fury, and expect till ſupplies came to her from *Milan*, and reſetled her in the Government; and as times then ſtood, the people were not in a Condition to be relieved by any ſtranger. But afterwards they ſtood her in no ſtead when *Cæſar Borgia* invaded her, and the people being encenſed, joyned with her Enemy. Wherefore it had been better for her both then, and at firſt to have poſſeſſed the affections of the people, than all the Caſtles in the Country. Theſe things being conſidered, I approve both of him that builds thoſe Fortreſſes, and of him that neglects them, but muſt needs condemn him who relies ſo much upon them, as to deſpiſe the diſpleaſure of the people.

CHAP. XXI.

How a Prince is to demean himſelf to gain reputation.

NOthing recommends a Prince ſo highly to the world, as great Enterprizes, and noble Expreſſions of his own Valor and Conduct. We have in our days *Ferdinand* King of *Aragon*, the preſent King of *Spain*, who may (and not improperly) be called a new Prince, being of a ſmall and weak King, become for fame, and renown the greateſt Monarch in Chriſtendom; and if his Exploits be conſidered, you will find them all brave, but ſome of them extraordinary. In the beginning of his Reign he invaded the Kingdom of *Granada*, and that Enterprize was the foundation of his Grandeur. He began it leiſurely, and without ſuſpicion of impediment, holding the Barons of *Caſtile* employ'd in that ſervice, and ſo intent upon that War, that they dreamt not of any Innovation, whilſt in the mean time before they were aware, he got reputation, and Authority over them. He found out a way of maintaining his Army at the expence of the Church, and the people, and by the length of that War, to eſtabliſh ſuch Order and Diſcipline among his Soldiers, that afterwards they gained him many honourable Victories. Beſide this, to adapt him for greater Enterprizes, (always making Religion his pretence) by a kind of devote cruelty, he deſtroyed and exterminated the Jews call'd *Marrani*, than which nothing could be more ſtrange, or deplorable. Under the ſame Cloak of Religion, he invaded *Affrica*, made his Expedition into *Italy*, aſſaulted *France* and began many great things which always kept the minds of his Subjects in admiration and ſuſpence, expecting what the event of his Machinations would be. And theſe his Enterprizes had ſo ſudden a ſpring and reſult one from the other, that they gave no leiſure to any man to be at quiet, or to continue any thing againſt him. It is likewiſe of great advantage to a Prince to give ſome rare Example of his own adminiſtration at home (ſuch is reported of *Meſſer Bernardo da Milano*) when there is occaſion for ſome body to perform any thing Extraordinary in the Civil Government, whether it be good or bad, and to find out ſuch a way either to reward or puniſh him, as may make him much talk'd of in the world. Above all, a Prince is to have a care in all his actions to behave himſelf ſo as may give him the reputation of being excellent as well as great. A Prince is likewiſe much eſteemed when he ſhews himſelf a ſincere friend, or a generous Enemy, That is when without any heſitation he declares himſelf in favour of one againſt another, which as it is more frank and Princely, ſo it is more profitable than to ſtand neuter; for if two of your potent Neighbours be at Wars, they are either of ſuch condition that you are to be afraid of the Victor or not: In either of which caſes it will be always more for your benefit to diſcover your ſelf freely, and make a fair War: For in the firſt cauſe, if you do not declare, you ſhall be a prey to him who overcomes, and it will be a pleaſure, and ſatisfaction to him that is conquer'd to ſee you his Fellow-ſufferer, nor will any body either defend, or receive you, and the reaſon is, becauſe the Conqueror will never underſtand 'em to be his Friends, who would not aſſiſt him in his diſtreſs; and he that is worſted will not receive you, becauſe you neglected to run his fortune with your Arms in your hands. *Antiochus*, upon the invitation of the *Etolians*, paſſed into *Greece*, to repel the *Romans*: *Antiochus* ſent Embaſſadors,

dors to the *Achaians* (who were in amity with the *Romans*) to perſuade them to a Neutrality, and the *Romans* ſent to them to aſſociate with them. The buſineſs coming to be debated in the Council of the *Achaians*, and *Antiochus*, his Embaſſador preſſing them to be Neuters; The *Roman* Embaſſador replyed, *As to what he has remonſtrated, That it is moſt uſeful and moſt conſiſtent with the intereſt of your State, not to engage your ſelves in our War, there is nothing more contrary and pernicious; for if you do not concern your ſelves, you will aſſuredly become a prey to the Conqueror without any thanks or reputation; and it will always be, that he who has leaſt kindneſs for you, will tempt you to be Neuters, but they that are your friends will invite you to take up Arms.* And thoſe Princes who are ill adviſed, to avoid ſome preſent danger follow the Neutral way, are moſt commonly ruin'd: But when a Prince diſcovers himſelf courageouſly, in favour of one party, if he with whom you joyn overcome, though he be very powerful, and you ſeem to remain at his diſcretion, yet he is obliged to you, and muſt needs have a reſpect for you, and Men are not ſo wicked, with ſuch ſignal and exemplary ingratitude to oppreſs you. Beſides Victories are never ſo clear and compleat, as to leave the Conqueror without all ſparks of reflexion, and eſpecially upon what is juſt. But if your Confederate comes by the worſt, you are received by him, and aſſiſted whilſt he is able, and becomeſt a Companion of his fortune, which may poſſibly reſtore thee. In the ſecond place, if they who contend be of ſuch condition, that they have no occaſion to fear, let which will overcome; you are in prudence to declare your ſelf the ſooner, becauſe by aſſiſting the one, you contribute to the ruine of the other, (whom, if your Confederate had been wiſe, he ought rather to have preſerved) ſo that he overcoming, remains wholly at your diſcretion, and by your aſſiſtance, he muſt of neceſſity overcome. And here it is to be noted (if he can avoid it) a Prince is never to league himſelf with another more powerful than himſelf, in an offenſive War: becauſe in that caſe, if he overcomes, you remain at his mercy, and Princes ought to be as cautious as poſſible, of falling under the diſcretion of other people. The *Venetians* (when there was no neceſſity for it) aſſociated with *France* againſt the Duke of *Milan*, and that aſſociation was the cauſe of their ruin: But where it is not to be avoided (as hapned to the *Florentines* when the *Pope* and the *Spaniard* ſent their Armies againſt *Lombardy*) there a Prince is to adhere for the reaſons aforeſaid. Nor is any Prince or Government to imagine that in thoſe caſes any certain counſel can be taken, becauſe the affairs of this world are ſo ordered, that in avoiding one miſchief, we fall commonly into another. But a Man's wiſdom is moſt conſpicuous where he is able to diſtinguiſh of dangers, and make choice of the leaſt. Moreover a Prince to ſhow himſelf a *Virtuoſo*, and Honourer of all that is excellent in any Art whatſoever. He is likewiſe to encourage and aſſure his Subjects that they may live quietly in peace and exerciſe themſelves in their ſeveral Vocations whether Merchandize, Agriculture, or any other employment whatever, to the end that one may not forbear improving or imbelliſhing his Eſtate for fear it ſhould be taken from him, nor another advancing his Trade in apprehenſion of taxes; but the Prince is rather to excite them by propoſitions of reward, and immunities to all ſuch as ſhall any way amplifie his Territory, or powers. He is obliged likewiſe, at convenient times in the year to entertain the people by Feaſtings and Plays, and Spectacles of Recreation; and becauſe all Cities are divided into Companies or Wards, he ought to have reſpect to thoſe Societies, be merry with them ſometimes, and give them ſome inſtance of his humanity and magnificence, but always retaining the Majeſty of his degree, which is never to be debaſed in any caſe whatever.

CHAP. XXII.

Of the Secretaries of Princes.

THE Election of his Miniſters, is of no ſmall importance to a Prince; for the firſt judgment that is made of him, or his parts, is from the perſons he has about him; when they are wiſe and faithful, be ſure the Prince is diſcreet himſelf, who as he knew how to chooſe them able at firſt, ſo he has known how to oblige them to be faithful; but when his Miniſters are otherwiſe, it reflects ſhrewdly upon the Prince; for commonly the firſt error he commits, is in the Election of his Servants. No Man knew *Antonia da Venafro* to be Secretary to *Pandolfo Petrucci* Prince of *Sienna* but he could judge *Pandolfo* to be a prudent Man for chooſing ſuch a one to his Miniſter. In the capacities and parts of Men, there are three ſorts of degrees; one Man underſtands of himſelf; another underſtands what is explained; and a third underſtands neither of himſelf, nor by any Explanation: The firſt is excellent, the ſecond commendable, the third

third altogether unprofitable. If therefore *Pandolfus* was not in the firſt rank, he might be concluded in the ſecond; for whenever a Prince has the judgment to know the good, and the bad of what is ſpoken or done, though his own invention be not excellent, he can diſtinguiſh a good ſervant from a bad, and exalt the one, and correct the other, and the Miniſter deſpairing of deluding him, remains good in ſpight of his teeth. But the buſineſs is how a Prince may underſtand his Miniſter, and the rule for that is infallible: When you obſerve your Officer more careful of himſelf, than of you, and all his actions and deſigns pointing at his own intereſt and advantage, that Man will never be a good Miniſter, nor ought you ever to repoſe any confidence in him; for he who has the affairs of his Prince in his hand, ought to lay aſide all thoughts of himſelf, and regard nothing but what is for the profit of his Maſter. And on the other ſide, to keep him faithful, the Prince is as much concerned to do for him, by honouring him, enriching him, giving him good Offices and Preferments, that the wealth and honour conferred by his Maſter, may keep him from looking out for himſelf, and the plenty and goodneſs of his Offices, make him afraid of a change, knowing that without his Princes favour he can never ſubſiſt. When therefore the Prince, and the Miniſter are qualified in this manner, they may depend one upon the other: But when 'tis otherwiſe with them, the end muſt be bad; and one of them will be undone.

CHAP. XXIII.

How flatterers are to be avoided.

I Will not paſs by a thing of great conſequence, being an error againſt which Princes do hardly defend themſelves, unleſs they be very wiſe, and their judgment very good. And that is about Flatterers, of which kind of Cattle all Hiſtories are full; for Men are generally ſo fond of their own actions, and ſo eaſily miſtaken in them, that it is not without difficulty they defend themſelves againſt thoſe ſort of people, and he that goes about to defend himſelf, runs a great hazard of being deſpiſed: For there is no other remedy againſt Flatterers, than to let every body underſtand you are not diſobliged by telling the truth; yet if you ſuffer every body to tell it, you injure your ſelf, and leſſen your reverence. Wherefore a wiſe Prince ought to go a third way, and ſelect out of his State certain diſcreet men, to whom only he is to commit that liberty of ſpeaking truth, and that of ſuch things as he demands, and nothing elſe; but then he is to enquire of every thing, hear their opinions, and reſolve afterwards, as he pleaſes, and behave himſelf towards them in ſuch ſort, that every one may find with how much the more freedom he ſpeaks, with ſo much the more kindneſs he is accepted; That beſides them, he will hearken to no body; That he conſiders well before he reſolves; and that his reſolutions once taken, are never to be alter'd: He that does otherwiſe, ſhall either precipitate his affairs by means of his Flatterers; or by variety of advices, often change his deſigns, which will leſſen his eſteem, and render him contemptible. To this purpoſe I ſhall inſtance in one Modern Example.

Father *Lucas*, a Servant to *Maximilian* the preſent Emperor, giving a Character of His Majeſty, declared him a perſon that never conſulted any body, and yet never acted according to his own judgment and inclination; and the reaſon was, becauſe he proceeded contrary to the preſcriptions aforeſaid, for the Emperor is a cloſe Man, communicates his ſecrets with no body, nor takes any man's advice; but when his determinations are to be executed, and begin to be known in the world, thoſe who are about him begin to diſcourage and diſſuade him, and he being good-natur'd does preſently deſiſt: Hence it comes to paſs that his reſolutions of one day, are diſſolved in the next, no man knows what he deſires or deſigns; nor no man can depend upon his reſolutions. A Prince therefore is always to conſult; but at his own, not other peoples pleaſure, and rather to deter people from giving their advice undemanded; but he ought not to be ſparing in his demands, nor when he has demanded, impatient of hearing the truth; but if he underſtands that any ſuppreſſed it, and forbore to ſpeak out, for fear of diſpleaſing, then, and not till then, he is to ſhew his diſpleaſure. And becauſe there are thoſe who believe that a Prince which creates an opinion of his prudence in the people, does it not by any excellence in his own Nature, but by the Counſels of thoſe who are about him; without doubt they are deceived; for this is a general and infallible rule, *That that Prince who has no Wiſdom of his own, can never be well adviſed*; unleſs by accident he commits all to the Government and Adminiſtration of ſome honeſt and diſcreet man: In this caſe 'tis poſſible things may be well ordered for a while,

but they can never continue; for his Minister or Vicegerent in a short time will set up for himself; but if a Prince who has no great judgment of his own, consults with more than one; their Counsels will never agree, nor he have ever the cunning to unite them; Every man will advise according to his own interest, or Capriccio, and he not have the parts either to correct or discover it: And other Counsellors are not to be found, for men will always prove bad, unless by necessity they are compelled to be good. So then it is clear, *That good Counsels (from whomsoever they come) proceed rather from the Wisdom of the Prince, than the Princes Wisdom from the goodness of his Counsels.*

CHAP. XXIV.

How it came to pass that the Princes of Italy *have most of them lost their Dominions.*

THE Qualities aforesaid being observed; they make a new Prince appear in the number of the more Ancient, and render him presently more firm and secure in his Government, than if he had descended to it by right of inheritance; for the Actions of a new Prince are liable to stricter observation, than if he were Hereditary, and when they are known to be vertuous, gain more upon people, and oblige them farther than antiquity of Blood; because Men are more affected with present than pass'd things, and when in their present condition they find themselves well, they content themselves with it, without looking out any where else, employing themselves wholly in defence of their Prince, unless in other things he be defective to himself: So that thereby he will have double honor, in having laid the foundation of a new Principality, and embellished and fortified it, with good Laws, good Force, good Friends, and good Example: whereas he multiplies his disgrace, who being born Prince, loses his inheritance by his own ill management and imprudence. And if the Soveraign Princes in *Italy*, who in our time have lost their Dominions, be considered, as the King of *Naples*, the Duke of *Milan*, and others, there will be found in their beginning one common defect as to the management of their Arms, for the reasons largely discoursed of before: besides some of them will appear to have been hated by the people, or if they have had so much prudence as to preserve a friendship with them, they have been ignorant how to secure themselves against the Grandees; for without these errors no States are lost that have Money and strength enough to bring an Army into the Field. *Philip of Macedon* (not *Alexander* the Great's Father, but he who was overcome by *Titus Quintus*) had no great force in comparison of the *Romans* and the *Grecians* which invaded him; yet, being a Martial Man, and one that understood how to insinuate with the People, and oblige the Nobility, he maintained War several years against both of them, and though at last he lost some Towns, yet he kept his Kingdom in spight of them. Those therefore of our Princes who for many years together were settled in their Principalities, if they lost them afterwards, they cannot accuse fortune, but their own negligence and indiscretion, for not having in quiet times considered they might change (and it is the common infirmity of Mankind in a calm to make no reckoning of a Tempest) when adversity approached, they thought more of making their escape than defence, resting their whole hopes upon this, that when the people were weary of the insolence of the Conqueror, they would recal them again. Which resolution is tolerable indeed, when others are wanting, but to neglect all other remedies, and trust only to that, is much to be condemned, for a man would never throw himself down, that another might take him up; besides, that may not happen, or if it does, not with your security, because that kind of defence is poor, and depends not on your self, and no defences are good, certain, and lasting, which proceed not from the Princes own Courage and Virtue.

CHAP. XXV.

How far in human affairs Fortune may avail, and in what manner she may be resisted.

I Am not ignorant that it is, and has been of old the opinion of many people, that the affairs of the world are so govern'd by Fortune and Divine Providence, that Man cannot by his Wisdom correct them, or apply any remedy at all; from whence they would infer that we are not to labour and sweat, but to leave every thing to its own tendency and event. This opinion has obtained more in our days, by the many and frequent revolutions, which have been, and are still seen beyond all humane conjecture. And when I think of it seriously sometimes, I am in some measure inclined to it my self; nevertheless that our own free will may not utterly be exploded, I conceive it may be true that fortune may have the arbitrement of one half of our actions, but that she leaves the other half (or little less) to be governed by our selves. Fortune I do resemble to a rapid and impetuous River, which when swelled and enraged, overwhelms the Plains, subverts the Trees, and the Houses, forces away the Earth from one place, and carries it to another, every body fears, every body shuns, but no body knows how to resist it; Yet though it be thus furious sometimes, it does not follow but when it is quiet and calm, men may by banks, and fences, and other provisions correct it in such manner, that when it swells again, it may be carried off by some Canal, or the violence thereof rendered less licentious and destructive. So it is with Fortune, which shows her power where there is no prediſposed virtue to resist it, and turns all her force and impetuosity, where she knows there is no banks, no fences to restrain her: If you consider *Italy* (the seat of all these revolutions) and what it was that caus'd them, you will find it an open field, without any bounds or Ramparts to secure it; and that, had it been defended by the Courage of their Ancestors, as *Germany*, and *Spain*, and *France* have been, those inundations had never hapned, or never made such devastation as they have done. And this I hold sufficient to have spoken in general against Fortune. But restraining my self a little more to particulars, I say it is ordinary to see a Prince happy one day, and ruined the next, without discerning any difference in his humor or Government; and this I impute to the reasons of which I have discoursed largely before; and one of them is, because that Prince which relies wholly upon Fortune, being subject to her Variations, must of necessity be ruined. I believe again, that Prince may be happy, whose manner of proceeding concerts with the times, and he unhappy who cannot accommodate to them: For in things leading to the end of their designs (which every man has in his eye, and they are riches and honour) we see men have various methods of proceeding. Some with circumspection, others with heat; some with violence, others with cunning; some with patience, and others with fury, and every one (notwithstanding the diversity of their ways) may possibly attain them. Again we see two persons equally cautious, one of them prospers, and the other miscarries, and on the other side, two equally happy by different measures, one being deliberate, and the other as hasty; and this proceeds from nothing but the condition of the times which suits, or does not suit, with the manner of their proceedings. From hence arises what I have said, That two persons by different operations do attain the same end, whilst two others steer the same Course, and one of them succeeds, and the other is ruined. From hence likewise may be reduced the Vicissitudes of good; for if to one who manages with deliberation and patience, the times and conjuncture of affairs come about so favourably that his Conduct be in fashion, he must needs be happy; but if the face of affairs, and the times change, and he changes not with them, he is certainly ruined. Nor is there any man to be found so wise, that knows how to accommodate, or frame himself to all these varieties, both because he cannot deviate from that to which Nature has inclined him; as likewise because if a man has constantly prospered in one way, it is no easie matter to persuade him to another; and he that is so cautious, being at a loss when time requires he should be vigorous, must of necessity be destroyed; whereas if he could turn with the times, his fortune would never betray him. Pope *Julius* XI. in all his Enterprizes, acted with passion and vehemence, and the times and accident of affairs were so suitable to his manner of proceeding, that he prospered in whatever he undertook. Consider his Expedition of *Bologna* in the days of Messer *Giovanni Bentivogli*; the *Venetians* were against it, and the Kings of *Spain* and *France* were in treaty, and had a mind to it themselves; yet he with his promptitude and fury, undertook it personally himself, and that activity of his, kept both *Spaniard* and *Venetian* in suspence (the *Venetians* for fear; the *Spaniards*, in hopes to recover the whole Kingdom of *Naples*) and

the King of *France* came over to his side; for seeing him in motion, and desirous to make him his friend, and thereby to correct the insolence of the *Venetian*, he thought he could not deny him his assistance, without manifest injustice; so that *Julius* with his rashness and hussing, did that which never any other Pope could have done with all his cunning and insinuation: For had he deferr'd his departure from *Rome*, till all things had been put into exact order, and his whole progress concluded (as any other Pope would have done) he could never have succeeded; The King of *France* would have pretended a thousand excuses, and others would have suggested twice as many fears; I will pass by the rest of his Enterprizes, which were all alike, and prosper'd as well, and the shortness of his life secur'd him against change: for had the times fallen out so, that he had been forced to proceed with accurate circumspection, he would have certainly been ruined, for he could never have left those ways to which his Nature inclin'd him. I conclude then, That whilst the obstinacy of Princes consists with the motion of fortune, 'tis possible they may be happy; but when once they disagree, the poor Prince comes certainly to the ground. I am of opinion likewise, that 'tis better to be hot and precipitate, than cautious and apprehensive; for Fortune is a Woman, and must be hector'd to keep her under; and 'tis visible every day she suffers her self to be manag'd by those who are brisk and audacious, rather than by those who are cold and phlegmatick in their Motions, and therefore (like a Woman) she is always a friend to those who are young; because being less circumspect, they attack her with more security and boldness.

CHAP. XXVI.

An Exhortation to deliver Italy *from the Barbarians.*

HAving weigh'd therefore all that is said before, and consider'd seriously with my self whether in this juncture of affairs in *Italy*, the times were dispos'd for the advancement of a new Prince, and whether there was competent matter that could give occasion to a virtuous and wise person to introduce such a form as would bring reputation to him, and benefit to all his Subjects; it seems to me that at this present so many things concur to the exaltation of a new Prince, that I do not know any time that has been more proper than this: And if (as I said before) for the Manifestation of the courage of *Moses*, it was necessary that the *Israelites* should be Captives in *Egypt*; for discovery of the Magnanimity of *Cyrus*, that the *Persians* should be oppressed by the *Medes*; and for the illustration of the excellence of *Theseus*, that the *Athenians* should be banish'd and dispers'd; so to evince and demonstrate the courage of an *Italian* spirit, it was necessary that *Italy* should be reduced to its present condition; That it should be in greater bondage than the *Jews*; in greater servitude than the *Persians*, and in greater dispersion than the *Athenians*, without Head, without Order, harrass'd, spoil'd, overcome, over-run, and over-flown with all kind of Calamity: And though formerly some sparks of vertue have appeared in some Persons, that might give it hopes that God had ordained them for its redemption; yet it was found afterwards that in the very height and career of their exploits, they were check'd, and forsaken by Fortune, and poor *Italy* left half dead, expecting who would be her *Samaritan* to bind up her wounds, put an end to the Sackings and devastations in *Lombardy*, the Taxes and Expilations in the Kingdom of *Naples*, and *Tuscany*, and cure her sores, which length of time had fester'd and impostthumated. 'Tis manifest how she prays to God daily to send some person who may redeem her from the cruelty and insolence of the Barbarians. 'Tis manifest how prone and ready she is to follow the Banner that any man will take up; nor is it at present to be discerned where she can repose her hopes with more probability, than in your illustrious Family, which by its own courage and interest, and the favour of God and the Church (of which it is now chief) may be induced to make it self Head in her redemption: Which will be no hard matter to be effected, if you lay before you the lives and actions of the persons above-named; who though they were rare, and wonderful, were yet but men, and not accommodated with so fair circumstances as you. Their Enterprize was not more just, nor easie, nor God Almighty more their friend than yours. You have Justice on your side; for that War is just which is necessary, and 'tis piety to fight, where no hope is left in any thing else. The people are universally dispos'd, and where the disposition is so great, the opposition can be but small, especially you taking your rules from those persons which I have propos'd to you for a Model. Besides, many things that they did were super-natural, and by God's immediate Conduct, the Sea open'd, a cloud directed, a rock afforded water,

it

it rained *Manna*, all theſe things are recompenced in your Grandeur, and the reſt remains to be executed by you: God will not do every thing immediately, becauſe he will not deprive us of our freewill, and the honour that devolves upon us. Nor is it any wonder if none of the fore-named *Italians* have been able to do that which may be hoped for from your illuſtrious Family: and if in ſo many revolutions in *Italy*, and ſo long continuation of War, their Military Virtue ſeems ſpent and extinguiſhed; the reaſon is, their old Diſcipline was not good, and no body was able to direct a better. Nothing makes ſo much to the honour of a new Prince, as new Laws, and new Orders invented by him, which if they be well founded, and carry any thing of Grandeur along with them, do render him venerable, and wonderful; and *Italy* is ſuſceptible enough of any new form. Their courage is great enough in the Soldier, if it be not wanting in the Officer, witneſs the Duels, and Combats, in which the *Italians* have generally the better by their force, and dexterity, and ſtratagem; but come to their Battels, and they have oftner the worſt, and all from the inexperience of their Commanders; for thoſe who pretend to have Skill, will never obey, and every one thinks he has Skill, there having been no body to this very day, raiſed by his virtue and fortune to that height of reputation, as to prevail with others to obey him. Hence it came, that in ſo long time, in the many Wars during the laſt twenty years, when ever an Army conſiſted wholly of *Italians*, it was certainly beaten; and this may be teſtified by *Taro*, *Alexandria*, *Capua*, *Genoa*, *Vaila*, *Bologna*, and *Meſtri*. If therefore your illuſtrious Family be inclined to follow the examples of thoſe excellent perſons who redeemed their Countries, it is neceſſary as a true fundamental of all great Enterprizes, to provide your ſelves with Forces of your own Subjects, for you cannot have more faithful, nor better Soldiers than they. And though all of them be good, yet altogether they will be much better, when they find themſelves not only commanded, but preferred, and careſſed by a Prince of their own. It is neceſſary therefore to be furniſh'd with theſe Forces, before you can be able with *Italian* virtue to vindicate your Country from the oppreſſion of Strangers: And tho' the *Swiſs* and *Spaniſh* Infantry be counted terrible, they have both of 'em their defects: And a third ſort may be compoſed that may not only encounter, but be confident to beat them; for the *Spaniſh* Foot cannot deal with Horſe, and the *Swiſs* are not invincible when they meet with Foot as obſtinate as themſelves. It has been ſeen by experience, and would be ſo again; the *Spaniards* cannot ſuſtain the fury of the *French* Cavalry, and the *Swiſſes* have been overthrown by the Infantry of *Spain*. And tho' of this laſt we have ſeen no perfect Experiment; yet we had a competent Eſſay at the Battel of *Ravenna*, where the *Spaniſh* Foot being engaged with the *German* Battalions (which obſerve the ſame Order and Diſcipline with the *Swiſſes*) the *Spaniards* by the agility of their Bodies, and the protection of their Bucklers, broke in under their Pikes, and kill'd them ſecurely, while the poor *Germans* were uncapable to defend themſelves; and had not the *Spaniards* been charg'd by the Horſe, the *German* Foot had been certainly cut off. 'Tis poſſible therefore (the defect of both thoſe Foot being known) to inſtitute a third, which may buckle with the Horſe, and be in no fear of their Foot; which will be effected, not by the variation of their Arms, but by changing their Diſcipline. And theſe are ſome of thoſe things which being newly reform'd, give great grandeur and reputation to any new Prince. This opportunity therefore is by no means to be ſlip'd, that *Italy*, after ſo long expectation, may ſee ſome hopes of delivetance: Nor can it be expreſſed with what joy, with what impatience of revenge, with what fidelity, with what compaſſion, with what tears, ſuch a Champion would be receiv'd into all the Provinces that have ſuffered by thoſe barbarous inundations: What Gates would be ſhut againſt him? What people would deny him obedience? What malice would oppoſe him? What true *Italian* would refuſe to follow him? There is not, there is not any body but abhors and nauſeates this barbarous domination. Let your illuſtrious Family then addreſs it ſelf to the work, with as much Courage and Confidence as juſt Enterprizes are undertaken; that under their Enſigns our Country may be recover'd, and under their Conduct, *Petrarch*'s Propheſie may be fulfill'd, who has promiſed that,

Virtù contr' al furore
Prenderà l'arme, and fia il combatter Corto.
Che l'antico valore
Ne' gl' Italici curi' non è ancor morto.

Virtue ſhall arm 'gainſt rage, and in ſhort fight
Prove the *Roman* Valour's not extinguiſh'd quite.

The

The Original of the Words Guelf *and* Ghibilin, *ſo much mentioned in Hiſtory.*

THESE two Factions ſo famous in Hiſtory, were eminent in *Italy* two ages before *Caſtruccio* was born. *Machiavel* in his Treatiſe of the Wars of that Country, affirms that *Piſtoia* was the firſt place where thoſe names of diſtinction were uſed, but the account wherewith the publick Libraries ſupply me, runs thus: Theſe two words, *Guelf* and *Ghibilin*, deduce their original from a ſchiſm which moleſted the Church in the year 1130. by the competition of two Popes, *Innocent* II. and *Anaclet*: The greateſt part of Chriſtendom acknowledg'd *Innocent*, who was particularly ſupported by the Emperors of the Weſt. *Anaclet* the anti-pope had perſuaded into his intereſts, *Roger Comte de Naples* and *Sicily*, a martial Prince, and deſcended from the *Normans*, who had conquer'd that Country. The pretence of this double Election having kept a War on foot eight years together, which was ſtill favourable to *Roger*, the Emperor *Conrad* III. march'd himſelf at the head of an Army of *Germans*, into *Italy*, leaving his Grand-ſon Prince *Henry* to come after. *Roger*, to oppoſe him with men of his own Nation, allured to the defence of his Countries *Guelf* Duke of *Bavaria*. During the courſe of this War, which began in the year 1139. it happen'd ſometimes that the Emperor's Army was commanded by the ſaid Prince *Henry*, who was brought up in a Village in *Germany* called *Ghibilin*, whoſe ſituation being very pleaſant, made the very name of it dear to him. One day the Armies being drawn up, and ready to engage, the *Bavarians* to encourage their Comrades, cryed out in their language, a *Guelf*, a *Guelf*; and the Emperor's Troops (being at the ſame time as well diſpoſed to their General) to comply with the kindneſs he had for that place, cryed out on the other ſide, a *Ghibilin*, a *Ghibilin*. Theſe words ſeem'd barbarous to the *Italians* that were with *Roger*, who came to *Guelf* to know what they meant: He told them the Pope's Party were intended by the word *Guelf*, and the Emperor's by the word *Ghibilin*: From that time thoſe names grew ſo common in both Armies, that by them they anſwered their *Who goes there?* And they were given to the *Italians* according to their ſeveral ſides. 'Tis true, at firſt they were uſed to diſcriminate only *Anaclet*'s Party from the Emperor's; but afterwards *Roger* having vanquiſhed and taken priſoner Pope *Innocent*; as the price of his liberty he oblig'd him to erect the Countries of *Naples* and *Sicily* into Kingdoms, by which treaty *Roger* being taken off from the intereſt of the anti-Pope, and engaging entirely with the Church, he affix'd the name of *Guelf* to the Pope's Party, and confirm'd the name *Ghibilin* to the Faction of the Emperor.

The *Italians* would fain have the credit of the Etymology themſelves, and by a certain gingling of words, (and that mightily ſtrain'd) would have *Guelf* deriv'd from *Guardatori di fe*, becauſe (forſooth) 'tis they who defend the Faith of the Church: And that by corruption the word *Ghibilin* was form'd from *Guida belli*, that is *Guidatori di Bataglia*, a great Title, and ſutable to the Majeſty of the Empire.

Be it which way it will, theſe two Factions were in the height of their emulation two hundred years after, that is to ſay, about the year 1320. which was very near the time that *Caſtruccio* was in his proſperity. And in *Europe* the face of affairs ſtood thus.

The Popes (driven from *Rome* by the violence of the Emperors of the Weſt) had transferr'd the Holy Chair to *Avignon* in *France*. In the year 1320. it was poſſeſs'd by *John* XXII. a Prince of himſelf firm and entire, but one who by the precipitate counſels of other people had excommunicated the Emperor *Lewis* of the houſe of *Bavaria*, and been too buſie with his fulminations againſt five more Princes of *Italy*, who (being treated by him like Tyrants) confederated againſt him; their names were *Caſtruccio* Sovereign of *Lucca*; *Scaliger*, Lord of *Verona*; the Marqueſs *d'Eſti*, Lord of *Ferrara* and *Viſconti*; and *Gonzague*, the firſt Sovereign of *Milan*, and the other of *Mantoua*: Which created troubles to *Italy*.

The Empire of the Eaſt was at that time torn, and diſtracted by the ambition of the *Paliologi* and others, whilſt in the mean time the Sultan *Orchan* ſon of *Ottoman* ſwept away *Lycaonia*, *Phrygia*, and all the Coaſt of the *Helleſpont* from the *Greeks*.

The

The Empire of the West was then in dispute betwixt *Frederick* of *Austria*, and *Lewis* of *Bavaria*, (whom *Machiavel*, by mistake or inadvertency, has called *Frederick*) *Lewis* after long and bloody Wars overcame his Competitor, and made several Voyages into *Italy* to invigorate and reinforce *Castruccio* and the *Ghibilins*.

France was govern'd by *Philip le Long*, who at the solicitation of Pope *John* pass'd an Army into *Italy* to the relief of the *Guelfs*, which Army was commanded by *Philip de Valois* afterwards King; but his Expedition did not answer expectation; for either the cunning or bribes of the *Ghibilins* had dispell'd the storm which our preparations threatned upon *Lombardy*; or our Forces were recall'd upon some secret apprehension of a fourth War with the *English*, or by the vast projects of a fifth Expedition to the Holy Land.

Spain was divided into five Kingdoms, each of which had its peculiar King; four of 'em were Christians, and one a *Mahumetan*.

Navar had the same King with *France*. *Philip the Long* [illegible] a way to extend the *Salick* Law into that Country, and defeat his Niece *Jane* [illegible] Daughter of *Lewis Hutin*, of both Kingdoms at once.

Alphonso XI. as *Mariana* calls him, (the XII. as *Garibay*) had at that time the Scepter of *Castile*, but his minority transferr'd the Conduct of Affairs into the hands of the two *Infanti*, *Don Pedro*, and *Don John*, insomuch as by the jealousie and division betwixt the two Regents, that Kingdom was exposed to such disorders as are inseparable from the minority of a Prince. At length the two *Infanti* were slain in the year 1320. in a Fight which their rashness caus'd them to lose to the *Mores* under the walls of *Granada*.

Arragon was in obedience to *Don Jacques* the second of that name; He was Brother to *Fredrick*, who reigned in *Sicily* to the prejudice of *Robert*, a Prince of the House of *Anjou*. This *Robert* was King of *Naples*, sided with the *Güelfs*, and leagued himself sundry times with the *Florentines* against *Castructio*. *James*, King of *Aragon*, designing to establish himself in *Italy*, and judging that the Conquests which he meditated upon the Isles of *Corsica* and *Sardinia*, depended much upon the Concord of his Subjects at home; he caused a General Assembly of his Estates to be held in the year 1320. in which was concluded the Union of the Kingdoms of *Aragon* and *Valentia*, with the Principality of *Catalonia*.

Don Denis reigned in *Portugal*, a person eminent among his Subjects for magnificent Building, and in great veneration for his Piety and Justice. But the felicity of his Reign was disturbed by domestick broils which he had with his Son, the Infant *Don Alphonso*, who succeeded him in the Crown. *Don Denis* instituted the Order of *Christ*, in the year 1320.

The *Moor*, *Ismael*, first of that name, had the Monarchy of *Granada*; the Battel which he gained in 1320. against the two *Infanti* of *Castile*, reviv'd the affairs of that Nation, which were in their declension before, and gave new alarms to all *Spain*.

The King and Kingdom of *England* were both governed by favourites at that time. *Edward* II. gave his authority and confidence, one while to *Gaveston*, and then to the two *Spencers*; and this weakness and imprudence of his created so many discontents, and render'd him so odious to the people, that after much trouble to quit himself of an Impostor who pretended to the Crown, he was forced to go thorow a cruel War against the Nobility, and another no less dangerous against *Robert Bruce* King of *Scotland*. These great stirs and commotions could not but give some jealousies to *France*, which seeing the Provinces that the *English* had on that side the Sea perpetually in Arms, was obliged to keep upon so strong a Guard, as was little different from an open War.

It is not then to be admired, the affairs of *Europe* being in this confusion, if *Italy* was left in prey to the *Guelfs* and the *Ghibilins*, and gave opportunity to the laying the foundation of so many Principalities, that the most part of them are still in existence. But it is certain, that neither *Paulus Jovius*, *Girolamo Briani*, *il Biondo*, nor the rest of the Historians, who have written of the Wars and Concussions of these two Factions, have left any thing comparable to the adventures of *Castruccio*, they have lent me indeed some circumstances for the illustration and ornament of this History, and I have been forced to paraphrase upon five or six of the sayings of *Castruccio* to give them their true Grace, and make them intelligible, I know not whether I have followed the just temperament that is to be observed in a translation. 'Tis vicious to assume such liberty as the History will not bear, but on the other, to tye ones self up to the same, and same quantity of words, is as disingenuous and servile. 'Tis true, the same comma's and stops were by no means to be neglected, were all treatises that are translated, like the fallacious answer of a Divine to *Braccio Montone* Sovereign of *Perusia*, which *Braccio* being a *Ghibilin* as well as *Castruccio*, departed for the Siege of *Aquila* a Town in the Kingdom of *Naples*, and being impatient to know his success, upon

upon application to an Aſtrologer, he receiv'd this anſwer, *Ibis redibis non morieris in bella*: Which, if punctuated thus, *Ibis, redibis non, morieris in bello*, threatned the ſaid *Braccio* with the unfortunateneſs of his Expedition; whereas, altering it thus, *Ibis, redibis, non morieris in bello*, portended quite contrary. An ambiguity like this was ſent alſo to *Manfred* King of *Sicily*, not long before he was defeated by *Charles* of *Anjou*. *NO CARLO SARA VITORIOSI DEL RE MANFREDO*, and ought to be interpreted with great exactneſs and accuracy, the miſtake of a comma being as much as a man's life is worth. There is another kind of Tyranny likewiſe, and that is when the Text of the Author is to regulate in a point of Religion: but here we are not under any ſuch neceſſities, and he who in a quarrelſom capriccio, to defame my tranſlation, would compare every line, and put the *Engliſh* words all along under the *Italian*, would make a new and pleaſant kind of Dictionary, and the beauties which are peculiar to each language, would be excellently preſented.

THE

THE LIFE OF CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA,

Written by Nicolo Machiavelli, *and dedicated to* Zanobi Buonbelmonti *and* Luigi Alamani, *his particular Friends.*

IT seems (most Excellent Friends) to those who consider it, very strange, that all, or the greatest part of them, who in this world have perform'd any thing extraordinary, and raised themselves above the pitch of their Contemporaries, have had their births and beginnings mean and obscure, or else infested and perplexed with all the difficulties that fortune could present. For all of them having been exposed to wild beasts when they were young, or being descended from base Parentage, and ashamed of their Extraction, they have declared themselves Sons of *Jupiter*, or some other Deity, of which sort the number being so great, and their story so well known, to repeat them would be both superfluous and troublesome. The reason I suppose to be, that fortune willing to demonstrate to the world, that 'tis not any ones prudence, but she that raises men to be great, begins to shew and exercise her power at a time in which prudence can pretend to no share in us; that all our successes may be acknowledged to her. *Castruccio Castracani* of *Lucca* was one of this sort, who in respect of the times in which he lived, and the place in which he was born, performed great things; for in his beginning he was neither more happy or more eminent than the rest, as you shall understand in my description of his Life, which I have thought good to transmit to Posterity, having observed many things in it (both for virtue and event) of extraordinary example; and to you it seemed most proper to direct it, as persons more delighted with honourable and heroick actions, than any I know besides.

I say then, the Family of the *Castracani* is reckoned among the most Illustrious Families in the City of *Lucca*, though at present (according to the fatality of all worldly things) it seems to be extinct. Out of this house there was born in former times one *Antonio*, who entring himself into Orders, was made a Canon of Saint *Michel* in *Lucca*, and in token of Honour called *Messer Antoio*: He had no kindred but one Sister, who was married long before to one *Buonaccorso Ginami*; *Buonaccorso* being dead, and she being a Widow, she lived with her Brother, with resolution to marry no more. Behind the house in which he dwelt, Master *Antonio* had a Vineyard, which bordering upon several Gardens, was accessible from several parts, and without much difficulty. It hapned that one morning about Sun-rise, *Madam Diamira* (for that was the Sisters Name) walking out into the Vineyard to gather herbs for a Salad (as women frequently do), she heard a rustling under the leaves, and turning towards it, she fancied it cryed; advancing up towards it, she saw the hands and face of a child, which tumbling up and down in the leaves, seemed to call for relief: *Madam Diamira*, partly astonished, and partly afraid, took it up very tenderly, carry'd it home,

home, waſh'd it, and having put it in clean clouts, ſhe preſented it to Maſter *Antony*, who underſtanding the caſe, and ſeeing the Infant, was no leſs affected with wonder and compaſſion than his Siſter before him. Debating with themſelves what courſe was to be taken, it was concluded to bring it up, *Anthony* being a Prieſt, and ſhe having no children. They chriſtened it *Caſtruccio*, by the name of their Father, and look'd to it as carefully as it had been their own. *Caſtruccio*'s graces encreaſed with his years, and his wit was ſo pregnant, they put him to nothing but he took it very well. *Anthony* deſign'd him for a Prieſt, and to reſign his Canonſhip and other Benefices one day, and according to that deſign he gave him education; but he could not find that *Caſtruccio* had inclination to that kind of life; on the contrary, he perceiv'd his natural diſpoſition tending quite another way.

In ſhort, *Caſtruccio* was ſcarce 14 years old, but abating by little and little of his awe and reſpects to *Antonio* and *Dianora*, he began to neglect his Studies, to devote himſelf to Arms, and taking great delight in wreſtling, and running, and ſuch violent exerciſes, his mettle was ſo well ſuted with the ſtrength of his body, that none of his companions were able to cope with him. He troubled himſelf very little with reading, unleſs it were ſuch things as might inſtruct him for War, or acquaint him with the great actions of ſome eminent Commander, which did not only diſquiet *Antonio*, but afflicted him.

There was at that time in *Lucca* a Gentleman call'd *Franciſco*, of the Houſe of the *Guinigi*, a handſom man, very rich, and remarkable for many good qualities, which recommended him to one of the firſt ranks in the Town. He had born Arms all his life long, and for the moſt part under the *Viſconti*, Dukes of *Milan*. He had with them engaged for the *Ghibilins*, and the City of *Lucca* look'd upon him as the very life of their party. It was at the time when these two great Factions (the *Guelfs* and the *Ghibilins*) ſhared all *Italy* betwixt 'em, divided the Popes and the Emperors, engag'd in their different intereſts the Inhabitants of the ſame Town, and the members of the ſame Family. *Franciſco* accompanied uſually by perſons of Quality of his Cabal, walk'd often before the place of St. *Michael*, not far from the Palace of the *Podeſtat* or Governor. In that Market-place he took notice of *Caſtruccio*, who was often times playing there amongſt his School-fellows and Comrades. He obſerv'd the youth always preſcribed ſuch ſports to the reſt, as he had choſen on purpoſe to prepare him for the War. *Franciſco* could eaſily perceive how much the agility of *Caſtruccio* advanced him above his Companions, and he as eaſily perceiv'd that he aſſumed an authority over them, and they on their part paid him a reverence, and ſuch a one as was accompanied with kindneſs and zeal. *Franciſco* took a great fancy to the boy, enquired what he was, and being informed by ſome who were by, he had a months mind to have him himſelf; calling him to him one day, he ask'd him if he did not prefer a Gentleman's Family, where he might learn to ride the great Horſe, and exerciſe his Arms, before the Cloiſter of a Church man, where he muſt ſpin out his days in idleneſs and melancholy. He no ſooner mentioned Horſes and Arms, but *Caſtruccio* was ready to have leap'd out of his skin; but recollecting himſelf, a ſentiment of modeſty kept him from anſwering, till the fine words of *Franciſco* having given him more confidence, he told him, that if he had the liberty of chooſing, he had rather a thouſand times be employed as a Gentleman, than in the way for which he was deſign'd. His reſolution was ſo pleaſing to *Franciſco*, that not long after he made a viſit to *Antonio*, and begg'd *Caſtruccio* of him, in ſo preſſing, and yet ſo civil a manner, that *Antonio* finding it impoſſible to maſter the natural inclinations of the youth, deliver'd him to *Franciſco*.

By this means *Caſtruccio* changed his Education, and 'tis not to be believed with what eaſineſs he improv'd in thoſe exerciſes which are fit for a Gentleman to learn. It was to be admired with what addreſs and vigor he mounted his horſe, with what grace he managed his launce, and with what comelineſs his ſword; and this his dexterity diſtinguiſh'd him ſo highly from the croud of his companions, that it would have been imprudence in any one of them to have contended with him, either at the *Barriers* or *Juſt*. To all theſe advantages he had an engaging way with him, that obliged wherever he came; his actions and his words ſeemed premeditate and ſtudied, ſo careful, and ſo regular he was leſt he ſhould ſay or do any thing that might any ways offend. He carried himſelf always with reſpect to his ſuperiors, with modeſty to his equals, and with civility and complaiſance to thoſe who were beneath him; ſo that theſe good qualities did not only gain him the affection of *Franciſco*'s whole Family, but the love and eſteem of the whole City of *Lucca*.

He was eighteen years old when the Faction of the *Guelfs* drove the *Ghibilins* out of *Pavia*. *Viſconti* Prince of *Milan*, a zealous Partizan of the *Ghibilins*, ſolicited Succours from *Franciſco Guinigi*, who caſting his eyes upon *Caſtruccio*, as the firſt mark of his affection, made him Lieutenant of a Company of Foot, and marched with him to *Viſconti*.

The

The first *Campania* this new Lieutenant made, put him into such reputation, that he eclipsed the glory of all the rest who served in that War: He gave so great and so many testimonies both of his courage and conduct, that his fame was spread all over *Lombardy*. When also he came back to *Lucca*, and observed the Town had doubled the respect which they had for him before, he apply'd himself to make new friendships, and to that purpose made use of all the courtesie and insinuation that is necessary in that case.

Not long after *Francesco Guinigi* fell sick, and finding himself near his end, having but one Son of about 13 years of age, call'd *Pagolo*, he sent for *Castruccio*, and committed the tuition of his Son, and the management of his Estate into his hands, and having gently remembred *Castruccio* that he was the Person who rais'd him, he begg'd that he would shew the same generosity towards *Pagolo* as he had done towards him; and if any thing was due to the bounty of the Father, to return it upon his Son. He fancied he discerned in the Countenance of *Castruccio* all the marks and indications of a generous mind, and died without being disturbed with the least suspicion of his ingratitude.

The trust, and his administration of so great an Estate made *Castruccio* more considerable than before, but they created him likewise some enemies, and lessened the affection which some had had for him: for knowing him to be of an enterprizing spirit, many began to fancy his designs were tyrannical, and to oppress the liberty of his Country. The *Signeur Giorgio Opizi* (chief of the *Guelfs* Faction in *Lucca*) was the most to be apprehended of all those that accused *Castruccio* with that abominable ambition. *Opizi* was of opinion that the death of *Francesco Guinigi*, head of the adverse party, would leave him Master of the Town, but he quickly found that the single reputation of *Castruccio* would be a new impediment to his usurpation; so that thinking to rob him of the affections of the people, he spread false reports, and aspers'd him where-ever he came. At first these calumniations troubled *Castruccio* but little, but at length they alarm'd him to the purpose; for he suspected that *Opizi* would not fail to set him at odds with the Lieutenant which *Robert* King of *Naples* had settled in *Lucca*, and that if that Governor was his enemy, he should in a short time be turned out of the Town. And against so great danger, his provision was this.

The Town of *Pisa* was then under the Government of *Huguccione de Fagivola*, originally of the Town of *Arrezzo*; being chosen Captain by the *Pisans*, he had made himself their Sovereign, and having given protection to certain *Ghibilins* who were banished from *Lucca*, *Castruccio* entred into secret intelligence by the privity of *Huguccione*, and being assured of his assistance he resolved the poor Exiles should be restored. To this effect he agreed with his friends in *Lucca*, who were of his Counsel, and jealous as himself of the power of the *Opizi*. All necessary measures were taken by the Conspirators. *Castruccio* had the care of fortifying privately a Tower in the City, called the Tower of Honour. He furnish'd it with Ammunition, in case he should be forced to defend it; and having appointed the night for the execution of their design, *Huguccione* failed not at the precise hour to be at the *Rendezvous* betwixt *Lucca* and the neighbouring Mountains. Upon a signal given to *Castruccio* he advanced towards the Gate of St. *Peter*, and set fire to the Antiport next the fields, whilst *Castruccio* broke down another on the other side of the Town. In the mean time his associates cryed out, *To your Arms*, to excite the people to rise, and thereby put all things into confusion. *Huguccione* enter'd with his Troops, and having seized upon the Town, he caused all the *Opizi* to be murdered, and all the rest of their party which fell into their hands. The Governor, for the King of *Naples* was turn'd out, and the Government of the Town alter'd, as *Huguccione* directed, who, to complete the desolations of *Lucca*, banished no less than a hundred of the best Families that belonged to it. The miserable Exiles fled part to *Florence* and part to *Pistoia*, two Towns of the Faction of the *Guelfs*, and for that reason enemies to *Huguccione*, and the prevailing party in *Lucca*.

The *Florentines* and whole Faction of the *Guelfs*, apprehending his great success would hazard to re-establish the power of the *Ghibilins* in *Tuscany*, they entred into consultation which way those Exiles might be restored. They set out a considerable Army, and encamped at *Monte Carlo* to open themselves a passage to *Lucca*. *Huguccione* on his side drew the *Lucca* Troops together, and put them under the Command of *Castruccio*, and then joyning with his own from *Pisa*, and reinforcing them with a Squadron of *German* Horse which he got out of *Lombardy*, he marched out to encounter the *Florentines*. Whereupon the *Florentines* quitted their Post at *Monte Carlo* and entrenching betwixt *Monte-Catino* and *Pescia*, *Huguccione* possessed himself of the quarter which they had left. Their Armies being within two miles distance one from the other, their Horse met daily and skirmished, and they had come certainly to a peremptory Battel, had not *Huguccione* fallen ill just in the

nick. His indiſpoſition forcing him from the camp to look out for better accommodation in *Monte carlo*, he left the command of the Army to *Caſtruccio*. His retirement, which diſcouraged his own men, and made them think of protracting the Battel, animated the *Florentines*, but brought no great advantage to their affairs. In ſhort, the *Florentines* perceiving their Enemies without a General, began to deſpiſe 'em, and *Caſtruccio* obſerving how much they were elated, endeavour'd to augment it. He pretended great conſternation, and to make his fear the more credible, he gave orders that his Troops ſhould be drawn up within the Lines, but with politive inhibition for any of them to go forth, tho' not a moment paſſed but the *Florentines* provoked them; but all to no purpoſe. Beſides that, this pretended terror in *Caſtruccio* redoubled the raſhneſs of the Enemy, and perfectly blinded 'em, he drew another advantage from it, which was to diſcover exactly the diſpoſition of their army and the order of their march. When he had well obſerv'd 'em, and tempted their temerity as much as he thought fit, he reſolv'd to fight 'em the next *Bravado* they made, and omitting nothing that might encourage his Soldiers, he aſſur'd em of Victory if they follow'd his Commands. He had obſerv'd that the weakeſt and worſt arm'd of their Soldiers were diſpos'd ſtill in their wings, and their beſt placed in the body. *Caſtruccio* drew up in the ſame order, but diſtributed his Soldiers quite contrary,; for the worſt and moſt unſerviceable he placed in the body, and his beſt men in the wings. In this poſture he drew out of the Trenches, and had ſcarce form'd his Battalia, before the Enemy appear'd, and with his uſual inſolence. *Caſtruccio* commanded that the body ſhould march ſlowly, but the two wings were to advance as faſt as they could; ſo that when they came to engage, there was only the wings that could fight; for *Caſtruccio*'s body having lagg'd by Command, the *Florentine* body had too far to march before they could charge 'em, ſo as they remain'd idle, being neither able to do any thing againſt the main body that was deſign'd to oppoſe 'em, nor ſuſtain thoſe who were engag'd in the wings; ſo it happen'd that the *Florentine* wings (compos'd of the refuſe of their Soldiers,) were eaſily broken by *Caſtruccio*'s, which conſiſted of his beſt, and when the wings of the Enemy (which were drawn up before their body; ſo as the whole Army was rang'd in the figure of a Half-moon) were routed, they turn'd tail, ran among their own body which was marching behind them, and put all into confuſion.

The loſs was very great to the *Florentines*, they left above 10000 men dead upon the place; their beſt Officers, and the braveſt of the *Guelfs* periſh'd there unfortunarely, and to make the defeat the more lamentable, there were ſeveral Reformades which died there, of extraordinary quality. Among the reſt, *Piero* Brother to *Robert* King of *Naples*; *Carlo* Nephew to the ſaid King; *Philip* Lord of *Tarentum*, who were all come, in Gallantry, to make that *Campania* with the *Florentines*. But that which made all the more wonderful was, that *Caſtruccio* loſt not above 300 men, tho' unhappily one of *Huguccione*'s Sons were of that number, his name was *Franceſco*, who fighting briskly at the head of the Voluntiers, for want of good conduct, was ſlain at the very firſt charge. So eminent a victory as this, muſt needs put *Caſtruccio* into a reputation beyond expreſſion; but *Huguccione* had like to have died, with meer jealouſie, he foreſaw that nothing of all this would redound to him, but the vain honour of commanding in chief, and that the real advantage would all fall to his Lieutenant; ſo that to uſe him at that rate, was to rob him of his Sovereignty; whereupon, nettled exceedingly, in great envy of his Fortune, he reſolv'd he ſhould die. Whilſt he was in this black reſolution, and attended nothing but ſome ſpecious pretence to get *Caſtruccio* to him, and ſo draw him into his Net, it happen'd that *Agnolo Michali* (a perſon of great alliance as any in *Lucca*) was murther'd by one who took ſanctuary in *Caſtruccio*'s houſe, and was protected: *Huguccione*'s Officers purſu'd, and demanded the Criminal; but *Caſtruccio* deny'd 'em, and ſuffer'd him to eſcape. *Huguccione* (who was then at *Piſa*) unwilling to loſe ſo fair an opportunity to revenge himſelf, ſent for one of his Sons call'd *Nerli* (whom he put before into poſſeſſion of the Sovereignty of *Lucca*) commands him to repair thither with all ſpeed, and get *Caſtruccio* to his houſe, under pretence of ſupping with ſome of the moſt eminent in the Town; and private Orders were given for the making him away. *Nerli* laid his ambuſh for *Caſtruccio* very handſomly; for ſuſpecting nothing, he came to the Feaſt, and was arreſted before he went out of the Palace. But *Nerli* (being over circumſpect, and imagining it might work ſome alteration in the Spirits of the People, if he kill'd him bluntly without any formality) writ to his Father to know how he ſhould diſpoſe of him. *Huguccione*, mad at his unſeaſonable prudence, departed from *Piſa* at the head of 400 Horſe, to go himſelf in perſon to diſpatch *Caſtruccio*; but, *Huguccione* was ſcarce got to *Bagni*, before the *Piſans* revolted, cut his Deputy's throat, and ſlew all his Family that were left behind; and that he might be ſure they were in earneſt, they choſe the *Conte de Guerardeſca*, and made him their Go-

vernor

vernour. Though he had news of this Rebellion before his arrival at *Lucca*, yet he thought it inconvenient to return; on the contrary, he made all the haſt thither that he could, to be there (if poſſible) before the report, leſt if the news got before him, it might have ill effect upon the *Lucchefes*, and prevail with them to exclude him their City. But the *Lucchefes* had heard it before, had ſuch deſigns of their own, and the liberty of *Caſtruccio* was the thing they were to pretend. *Huguccione* was admitted, but his preſence was not ſufficient to keep them in their duties: They began to aſſemble in parties, to whiſper and ſpeak ſlightly of him in private, then to murmur, then to tumultuate, and taking Arms by degrees, they came boldly, and demanded *Caſtruccio* ſhould be enlarged, and this they did in ſo poſitive and audacious a manner, that *Huguccione* apprehending the conſequences, delivered him to them. *Caſtruccio* not contented with that, conceiving vaſter deſigns than formerly, and egg'd on by an equal impulſe of honour and revenge, he aſſembled his friends, and taking the benefit of the favourable diſpoſition of the People, he reſolved to oppoſe himſelf againſt *Huguccione*, and forcing of him out of *Lucca* with all his party, *Huguccione* retired into *Lombardy* to the Lords of *Scala* where not long after he died very poor.

This was a happy turn for *Caſtruccio*, from the incommodities of a Priſon, to the Supremacy of a Prince; and yet this was not enough. Finding himſelf accompanied by a great number of his Friends which encouraged him, and by the whole body of the people, which flattered his ambition, he cauſed himſelf to be choſen Captain General of all their Forces for a Twelve-month; and reſolving to perform ſome Eminent action that might juſtifie their choice, he undertook the reduction of ſeveral places which had revolted from that City in favour of *Huguccione*. Having to this purpoſe entered into ſtrict alliance with the City of *Piſa*, they ſent him ſupplies, and he marched with them to beſiege *Serezane*. But the place being very ſtrong; before he could carry it, he was obliged to build a Fortreſs as near it as he could. This new Poſt in two months time, render'd him Maſter of the whole Country, and is the ſame Fort that at this day is called *Serezanello*, repaired ſince, and much enlarged by the *Florentines*. Supported by the credit of ſo glorious an exploit, he reduced *Maſſa*, *Carrara*, and *Lavenza*, very eaſily: he ſeized likewiſe upon the whole Country of *Lunigiana*, and to ſecure his Communication with *Lombardy*, he took *Pont Remoli* by force, and drove out *Anaſtaſio Palavicini* the Sovereign: So that full of glory he returned to *Lucca*, where the People thronged to meet him, and received him with all poſſible demonſtrations of Joy.

This was the happieſt conjuncture for *Caſtruccio* in the world, for having been ſo diſcreet before to make his intereſt with the moſt conſiderable of the *Lucchefes*, and among the reſt *Poggio*, *Portico*, *Buocanſachi*, and *Cecco Guinigi*, the favour of theſe great men, concurring with the inclination of the people, and every thing elſe contributing to his happineſs, he was ſolemnly choſen their Soveraign Prince.

About this time *Frederick de Baviere*, King of the *Romans* paſſed out of *Germany* into *Italy*, to be crown'd Emperor there. *Caſtruccio* who had already wrought himſelf in ſome meaſure into his favour, put himſelf at the head of 500 Horſe, and went to wait upon him, having left as his Deputy in *Lucca*, *Pagolo Guinigi*, his Pupil, whom he had treated all along, as he had been his own Son, in conſideration of the benefits he had received from his Father. *Frederick* received *Caſtruccio* with much kindneſs, and having done him ſeveral honours, and granted him many prerogatives, he made him his Lieutenant in the whole province of *Tuſcany*; beſides all this, the inhabitants of *Piſa* (at the ſame time mutining againſt their Governor *Gerardeſca*, and driving him out of the Town) to defend themſelves againſt his reſentment, addreſſed to *Frederick* for protection, and he gave the Soveraignty of that Town to *Caſtruccio*. His choice was not unpleaſing to the Inhabitants who knew not where to find a better ſupport againſt the Faction of the *Guelfs*, and particularly againſt the attempts of the *Florentines*.

After this, *Frederick* return'd into *Germany*, having made a Lieutenant General of all *Italy*, and left him in *Rome*. There was not at that time either in *Lombardy* or *Tuſcany*, any of the *Ghibilins* of the Emperor's party, but look'd upon *Caſtruccio* as the true head of their Faction. Thoſe who were baniſh'd their Country upon that ſcore, fled to him for protection, and promis'd unanimouſly that if he could reſtore 'em to their Eſtates, they would ſerve him ſo effectually, that the Soveraignty of their Country ſhould be the recompence of his kindneſs. The chief of them were the *Guidi*, *Scolari*, *Uberti*, *Geronzi*, *Nardi*, and *Buonoccorſi*, all Exiles of *Florence*: So that, flattered by their promiſes, and encourag'd by the ſtrength of his own force, he entertain'd a deſign of making himſelf Maſter of *Tuſcany*, and to give more reputation to his affairs, he entred into a League with *Matteo Viſconti* Prince of *Milan*. He put out a Proclamation afterwards, that all his Subjects which were capable to bear Arms, ſhould be ready at a certain warning to put themſelves

themſelves into Service; and for the better order of the Muſter Roll, by which his Militia was to be regulated, the City of *Lucca* having five Gates, he divided the whole Country into five parts, and diſpoſed every Soldier under his officer with ſo much exactneſs, that in a ſhort time he could march with 20000 Men, beſides what he could draw out of *Piſa*.

Whilſt he was fortifying himſelf with Soldiers and Friends; it fell out, that the *Guelfs* in *Plaiſanſa* having driven out the *Ghibilins*, and received conſiderable ſuccours from *Florence*, and the King of *Naples* came thundering down upon the Territories of the Prince of *Milan*. The Prince deſired *Caſtruccio* to give the *Florentines* diverſion; to carry the War into their Country, to withdraw them from *Lombardy*, and thereby to put them upon the defenſive, *Caſtruccio* deſired no more, and fell with a flying Army into the Valley of *Arno*, took *Fucecchio* and *San Miniato*, and ravaged the Country ſo effectually, that the *Florentines* were conſtrained to call back their Troops out of *Lombardy*; but the neceſſity of another diverſion called back *Caſtruccio* to the recovery of *Lucca*. In his abſence, the Family of the *Poggi*, which had been always his friends, and contributed more to his Elevation, than any of the reſt, regreting that they had not been rewarded, according to the merits of their Services, conſpired with ſeveral others of the Inhabitants to bring the City to revolt. They began the tumult one morning, and having put themſelves in Arms, they killed the Chief Officer which *Caſtruccio* had eſtabliſhed for the adminiſtration of juſtice. But whilſt they were diſpoſing themſelves to puſh on their Sedition, *Stephen Poggio*, an old Man, of a peaceable temper, and one who had not medled at all in the Conſpiracy of his Relations, made uſe of the authority he had with them, cauſed them to lay down their Arms, and offered his interceſſion to *Caſtruccio* that they might obtain their demands. Upon the firſt notice of this Commotion, *Caſtruccio* drew a party out of his Army, and leaving the reſt under the Command of *Pagolo Guinigi*, he marched with all diligence back to *Lucca*, where finding things quieter than he expected, he knew very well how to make his advantage of ſo temperate a ſubmiſſion, and diſpoſed his Troops and his Friends in all the Poſts that might make him Maſter of the Town. *Stephano Poggio*, who thought in this juncture he had highly obliged *Caſtruccio*, came to make him a viſit, and judged it unneceſſary to beg any thing of him; all that he requeſted was, that he would pardon his Family, allow ſomething to their ancient Services, and give ſome little Indulgence to the tranſports of their youth. *Caſtruccio* received him with much affection, and told him that he was more pleaſed to find thoſe troubles appeaſed, than he had been offended at the news of their Commotion; and having preſſed him to bring the Male-contents to him, he added, that he thank'd his ſtars for giving him ſuch an opportunity of ſignalizing his Clemency. Upon *Stephano*'s importunity, and *Caſtruccio*'s promiſe, they came all to attend him; but *Caſtruccio* apprehending that this new Service of *Stephano* might ſome time or other be reproached to him again, he reſolved to make a ſignal Example; and accordingly regulating himſelf by the ſevere politicks of Uſurpers who upon ſuch nice and critical occaſions make no bones to ſacrifice the innocence of a particular man, to the conſervation of the multitude, he commanded that the Mutineers and *Stephano* with them ſhould be conducted to Priſon, and from thence to Execution.

Whilſt he was thus employed, the *Florentines* recovered *San Miniato*, and *Caſtruccio* holding it imprudence to keep in the Field whilſt he was inſecure in the Town, reſolved to give ſome relaxation to his Arms: He endeavour'd privately to feel how the *Florentines* ſtood diſpoſed to a Truce, and (the War having exhauſted their Coffers) he found them ſo coming, that it was concluded for two years, upon condition that either party ſhould retain what was then in their poſſeſſion.

Caſtruccio being diſintangled from his foreign Embarraſments, applyed himſelf wholly to his ſecurity at home, and under ſeveral pretences, to quit himſelf of all thoſe who were likely to diſpute his Soveraignty of *Lucca*, not ſparing his Confiſcations, and Proſcriptions againſt the Exiles, nor the Executions of any who were under his hands. To excuſe himſelf he gave out that he had too much Experience already of the infidelity of thoſe people, to truſt them again; But a ſtrong Citadel which he erected in the City, was the true way to continue his Authority; and to give the more terror to the Citizens, he cauſed the houſes of his adverſaries to be demoliſhed, and the Citadel to be built of their Materials. His peace with the *Florentines*, and his Fortifications at *Lucca*, employ'd him not ſo much, as to leſſen his thoughts how he might make himſelf greater; being unwilling again to come to an open War, he entertain'd private correſpondencies, both on one ſide and the other. He had an ardent deſire to make himſelf Maſter of the Town of *Piſtoia*, perſuading himſelf it would give him footing in *Florence*; and in this proſpect he held a ſecret Commerce of amity with the different

ferent parties, which were predominant in *Pistoia*. This double intelligence was manag'd with that slyness and delicacy, that each of 'em believ'd they were particularly in his Confidence. It was a long time that these two opposite Cabals had divided, or rather distracted that City. The one call'd the Faction of the *Bianchi*, had *Bastiano da Possente* for its head; and the other call'd the *Neri*, was commanded by *Jacopo de Gia*. Each of 'em boiling with desire to supplant its competitor, repos'd much upon the promises of *Castruccio*: And these two Heads of the Factions who had long been suspected to one another, took Arms at length both at a time. *Jacopo* posted himself towards the Gate that goes to *Florence*, and *Bastiano* towards that which leads to *Lucca*. At first it was in debate severally by each of 'em, whether they should call in the *Florentines*; but finding *Castruccio* more active, and his Forces better Soldiers, each of 'em sent privately to him to solicit his assistance: *Castruccio* carried it very demurely, and promised succour to both. He told *Jacopo*, that in person he would relieve him; and to *Bastiano* he sent word he would do it by *Pagolo Guinigi* his Lieutenant-General, and the person of the world he lov'd best; for he regarded him as his Son. Having acquainted 'em both that they should expect their supplies about midnight, he agreed with *Pagolo*, and causing him to march with part of his Troops to join with *Bastiano* at one Gate, he with the rest advanced the common Road towards *Jacopo*. At both Gates they were admitted as Friends; but no sooner were they entered, but upon a signal given, *Bastiano* was kill'd on one side with all his chief friends, and *Jacopo* and his friends scap'd no better on the other; the rest of their parties betaking to their heels, the whole Town was left at *Castruccio*'s devoting. He came in person to reassure the Magistrates, and brought them out of the Palace whither they had fled to secure themselves; Having called the people together, he promised to cancel all the old debts, did many acts of Grace, lessened their imposts, and prevailed upon them to be obedient, by the force of his caresses, and new priviledges which he gave them. This profuseness of kindness, had coax'd likewise the Inhabitants of the Country, they came in great throngs to salute and recognize their new Prince, who sent 'em all home again in peace, all mightily taken with his Vertues, and possess'd with hopes of his extraordinary benefits.

There was about this time some Mutinies in *Rome*, by reason of the dearness of provisions. The scarcity that was suffered, proceeded from the absence of the Popes, who kept then their Pontifical residence at *Avignon*, and it added much to the revolt, that the *Romans* could not endure to be govern'd by a *German*. This National animosity was the occasion of frequent Murthers, and perpetual disorder. *Errico* the Emperor's Lieutenant General found himself too weak to apply any remedy, and apprehending (not without cause) that the *Romans* had private intelligence with the King of *Naples*, that if their Forces should joyn, he should be forced out of *Rome*, and the Pope be restored. He concluded therefore his safest recourse would be to *Castruccio*; so that he sent to him for supplies, and begg'd of him that he would come along with them in person. *Castruccio* made no scruple of the Voyage, being equally transported to be able to do a meritorious piece of service to the Emperor, and put himself in a condition to be regarded at *Rome*, and look'd upon as the Moderator of their affairs whenever the Emperor should be absent. Leaving therefore the care of *Lucca* to the charge of *Pagolo Guinigi*, and contenting himself only with a Convoy of two hundred Horse, he came to *Rome*, and was received by *Errico* with all possible honour. His presence having received the Authority of the Emperor, he took a gentle way to pacifie the people. The first thing he did, was to provide plenty of all things, causing store of Corn to be brought thither from *Pisa*, to take off the pretence of their revolt: After which mingling very discreetly his favours and his chastisements, he reduced all the chief Citizens to their obedience to *Errico*; In acknowledgment of which *Castruccio* was made Senator of *Rome*, and several Honours conferred upon him with more than ordinary Ceremony. The day of his promotion, he came forth in a Habit suitable to his Dignity, but enriched with a delicate Embroidery, with two devices wrought in artificially, one before and the other behind; The first was before, and in these words, (as devout, as common) *HE IS AS IT PLEASES GOD*; and behind in these, *AND SHALL BE WHAT GOD WILL HAVE HIM.*

Whilst these things were in Transaction, the *Florentines* incensed that to the prejudice of their Truce, *Castruccio* had surprised the Town of *Pistoia*; resolved to recover it by force, and thought it not likely to be difficult, if they took the opportunity of his absence. Among the Fugitives from *Pistoia* who had saved themselves in *Florence*, there were two principally considerable, *Cecchi*, and *Baldini*. They were Men in Action, and had always retain'd a private correspondence with their Friends in *Pistoia*; and they managed all things so dexterously for a revolt, that they caused a good party of *Florentines* to enter one night into the Town, who restored them their liberty, with the

This news being brought to *Rome*, touched *Castruccio* to the quick, who taking leave of *Errita*, with large Journeys came directly to *Lucca*.

The *Florentines* had notice of his return, and resolved stoutly to begin the War upon him, that he might not have leisure to prepare; wherefore having obliged all that (like themselves) were favourers of the *Guelfish* Faction, to put themselves forward in some extraordinary manner, they raised a strong Army, and marched with all diligence to possess themselves first of the Valley of *Nievole* to facilitate their Communication with *Pistoia*; *Castruccio* on his side with what Forces he could get together, marched directly for *Monte Carlo*, and having intelligence where the Enemy was encamped, and how numerous their Army, he judged the danger would be as great should he go and confront them in the plain of *Pistoia*, as to attend them in the Valley of *Pescia*. He concluded therefore to draw them (if he could) into the streights of *Seravalle*, for narrow passes, and rough and difficult ways were convenient for a small Army as his was, which consisted of not above 12000 Men, and would be a disadvantage to the *Florentines*, who were 40000 complete. Wherefore, though he was well enough satisfied of the Courage of his Army, and understood the worth of every common Soldier, yet he thought good to withdraw out of that Champagn Country, lest he should suffer himself to be overwhelmed with the multitudes of his Enemies.

Seravalle, is a Castle betwixt *Pescia*, and *Pistoia*, situate upon a hill which on that side puts a stop to the Valley of *Nievole*. This Castle stands not upon the Road, but is about two flight shot higher, and the passage down into the Valley, is rather strait than steep; for the declension is very gradual to the place where the waters divide, and pass to discharge themselves into the Lake of *Fucchio*, and that passage is so streight, that twenty Men in Front take up the whole breadth. There it was that *Castruccio* designed to engage the Enemy, as well to give the advantage of the streight to the smallness of his own Army; as to keep them from being sensible of the vast numbers of the *Florentines*; and prevent the terror which they might inspire. The Castle of *Seravalle* belong'd to the *Signor Manfredi* a *German*, who had made himself Lord of it, long before *Castruccio* had seized upon *Pistoia*, and kept it by common consent both of the Inhabitants of *Pistoia* and *Lucca*; either because he kept his Neutrality very strictly with both, or because the Castle was so strong of it self it needed to fear neither. *Castruccio* knowing the importance of that place from the beginning, found a way to gain intelligence with a person who liv'd in the Castle. The night before the day of the Battel, by the ministry of this Man, *Castruccio* caused Four hundred of his Soldiers to enter, who cut the Throat of *Manfredi*, and seized on the Castle. Having secur'd so considerable a Post without noise, he endeavour'd to persuade the Enemy that he would not stir from *Monte Carlo*, thereby to draw them into his Clutches, and make 'em hast with all speed to gain the avenues to the *Val de Nievole*, and this plot of his jump'd exactly with the *Florentine* design. For they having no mind that *Pistoia* should be the Theatre of the War, and being willing to remove it into the Vale, they encamp'd above *Seravalle*, with intention to have passed the Streights the next day, not imagining in the least that the Castle was surpriz'd. *Castruccio* having notice of their motion, about midnight drew his Army out of their quarters, and stole privately before break of day to the foot of *Seravalle*. The accident was odd, for as he march'd up the Hill on one side, the Enemy march'd up on the other: caus'd his Foot to advance by the way of the common Road, but he drew out a party of Four hundred Horse, and commanded them towards the left, on that side towards the Castle. There were Four hundred of the Enemies Horse, that were a Forlorn to their Army, and the whole Infantry followed them, but their Scouts were no sooner at top of the Hill, when on a sudden they fell foul upon the Troops of *Castruccio*. They were strangely surpriz'd; for knowing nothing of the taking of the Castle, they could not imagine the Enemy would come to meet them: Insomuch that before they had leisure to put themselvs into posture, they were constrain'd to engage tumultuously with those Troops which were drawn up in good Order, but they in confusion; Not but some of the *Florentine* Cavaliers behaved themselves gallantly, but the noise of so unexpected an Encounter, put them presently to a stand, and being defused in the Army, it put all into great disorder and fear. The Horse and the Foot fell foul upon one another, and both upon the baggage: Want of ground render'd the Experience of the Officers of no use, and the streightness of the pass confounded all their Military cunning. The first Troops that *Castruccio* charged upon the top of the Hill, were immediately routed, and the small resistance they made was not so much the defect of their courage as the effect of the place, with the incommodity of which, and the strangeness of the surprize, they were constrain'd to give ground. There was no way left for 'em to run; on their Flanks the Mountains were inaccessible, their Enemies were in the Front, and their own Army in

the

the Reer. In the mean time, as this charge of *Caſtruccio* was not ſufficient to ſtagger the enemies Battel, he drew out a party of Foot, and ſent 'em to joyn with the Horſe in the Caſtle of *Seravalle*: This body in reſerve having poſſeſſion of the Hills, and falling upon the flank of the *Florentines*, forced them to give ground, and yield to the wild incommodity of the place, and the violence and herceneſs of the enemy. The Reer-guard ran, and having got into the plain that looks towards *Piſtoia*, every man ſhifted as well as he could.

This defeat was bloody and great; among the multitude of priſoners, there were many of the principal Officers; among the reſt three Noble *Florentines*, *Bandino di Roſſi*, *Franceſco Brunilleſchi*, and *Giovanni della Toſa*, without mentioning ſeveral conſiderable *Tuſcans*, and many of the King of *Naples* his Subjects, who, by their Prince's order, were in the ſervice of the *Florentine*. Upon the firſt tidings of their defeat, the *Piſtoians* turned the *Guelfs* Faction out of Town, and came with their keys and preſented them to *Caſtruccio*, who purſuing his Victory, carried *Prato* and all the Towns in that plain, as well beyond as on this ſide the *Arno*: After which he encamped with his Army in the plain of *Peretola*, two miles from *Florence*, where he continued braving the City, and paſſed ſeveral days in the enjoyment of his good fortune, parting the ſpoil, and coining of mony, thereby exerciſing with great oſtentation a kind of Sovereign right over their Territory; and releaſing ſomething of the rigour of his diſcipline, he gave his Soldiers liberty to inſult as they pleas'd over the conquer'd; and to make his triumph the more remarkable, nothing could ſerve the turn, but naked women muſt run Courſes on horſe-back under the very walls of the City. But this gallantry and oſtentation entertained him but lightly, or rather ſerved but as a colour to hide his greater deſigns; for in the mean time he found a way to corrupt *Lupacci*, *Freſcobaldi*, and ſome certain other Gentlemen in the Town, who were to have deliver'd him a Gate, and brought him into *Florence* in the night, had not their Conſpiracy been diſcover'd, and defeated afterward by the puniſhment of the accomplices.

This great Town being ſo ſtreightned and ſo long block'd up, that the Inhabitants ſeeing no other way of preſerving their liberty, than by engaging it to the King of *Naples*, ſent Embaſſadors to that Prince, and offer'd to throw themſelves into his arms. It was not only for his honour to accept of their proffer, but for the general intereſt of the whole Faction of the *Guelfs*, which without that could ſubſiſt no longer in *Tuſcany*. The terms being agreed, the treaty concluded, and the *Florentines* to pay him annually two hundred thouſand *Florens*, he ſent them four thouſand Horſe under the Command of Prince *Carlo* his Son.

During this negotiation, an unexpected accident hapned, which put *Caſtruccio* into a cooler temper, and made him give the *Florentines* breath in ſpight of his teeth: There was a new Conſpiracy againſt him at *Piſa*, not to be ſuppreſs'd by his preſence: *Benedetto Lanfranchi*, one of the chief Citizens in the Town, was the author of it: *Benedetto* troubled to ſee his Country ſubject to the tyranny of a *Luccheſe*, undertook to ſurprize the Citadel, force out the Gariſon, and cut the throats of all that were friends to *Caſtruccio*. But as in thoſe kind of conjurations, if a ſmall number be able to keep things ſecret, it is not ſufficient to put them in execution; and therefore whilſt *Lanfranchi* was endeavouring to hook in more aſſociates, he met with thoſe who were falſe, and diſcover'd all to *Caſtruccio*. Two Noble *Florentines*, *Cecchi* and *Guidi*, who were fled to *Piſa*, were ſuſpected to be the Traitors; and the ſuſpicion of that perfidy left an ill ſtain upon their reputation; which way ſoever it was, *Caſtruccio* put *Lanfranchi* to death, baniſhed his whole Family, and ſeveral of the chief *Piſans* were left ſhorter by the head.

This plot diſcovering to *Caſtruccio* that the fidelity of the Towns of *Piſtoia* and *Piſa* would be always eaſily ſhaken; he put all things in practice that cunning or open force could ſuggeſt to keep them in their duties: But whilſt his thoughts were upon the tenters about ſo important a care, the *Florentines* had ſome reſpit to recover their Senſes, and expect the *Neapolitan* Succours, which being at length arrived under the Conduct of Prince *Carlo*, a general Council was held of the whole Faction of the *Guelfs*. Upon the reſolution taken there, an Army was raiſed, the ſtrongeſt that ever had been ſet out by that party, for it amounted to 30000 Foot, and 10000 Horſe. When their Forces were ready, it was debated in the Council of War, whether they ſhould begin with the Siege of *Piſtoia* or *Piſa*. The latter carried it; for it was fancied the Conſpiracy of the *Piſans* was ſo recent, that in probability it had left ſome ſeeds for a ſecond revolt; beſides the Conqueſt of *Piſa* would bring *Piſtoia* along with it.

This great Army open'd their Campagn in the beginning of *May* 1328. *Laſtra*, *Signia*, *Monte Lago* and *Empoli* were taken immediately, and it advanc'd afterwards to beſiege *San-Miniato*. But *Caſtruccio* without diſcompoſure, either by the greatneſs of their force, or

the ſwiftneſs of their progreſs, believed rather that the favourable inſtant was arriv'd in which fortune was to put into his hands the ſupreme authority of *Tuſcany*; and therefore judging this effort of the enemy at *Piſa* would ſucceed no better than their deſigns at *Seravalle*, he came and entrenched at *Fucecbia* with 20000 Foot, and 4000 Horſe, having put 5000 Foot in *Piſa* under the Command of *Pagolo Guinigi*.

Fucecbio is a Caſtle ſeated ſo advantageouſly, that there is not a better Poſt in all the plain of *Piſa*; for it ſtands upon a little eminence equally diſtant from the two Rivers *Arno* and *Guſciana*. The place of their encampment could have been no where better choſen; for unleſs the enemy divided, and came upon them in two Bodies, (which muſt needs weaken 'em much) they could not cut off the proviſions which came to *Caſtruccio* both from *Lucca* and *Piſa*. To come and face 'em in their trenches, would be raſhly to engage themſelves betwixt his Army and *Pagolo's*. To turn towards *Piſa*, they muſt paſs the River *Arno*, and leave the enemy upon their backs, which was an attempt as dangerous as the other. *Caſtruccio's* deſign was to make 'em pitch upon the laſt; and to invite 'em the better to paſs over the River, inſtead of bringing down his Line to the bank, (as he might very well have done) he turned it off ſhort towards the walls of *Fucecbio*, not ſo much to ſhelter himſelf under the ſaid walls, but cunningly to leave the enemy ſuch a ſpace free, as might tempt them to paſs the River. And in the whole art of War there is nothing ſo ſubtil as the election of Poſts and Encampments, and that was *Caſtruccio's* maſter-piece.

The enemy having taken *San. Miniato*, conſulted for ſome time whether they ſhould fall upon *Piſa*, or *Caſtruccio* in his Camp: At length, all things well conſider'd, it was concluded to march ſtraight toward him. The River *Arno* was at that time ſo low, it was fordable, but with trouble; for the Horſe paſs'd up to the ſaddle, and the Foot with proportion. At laſt on the 10th of *June* in the morning, the *Florentines* put themſelves into Battalia, and began to paſs the River with a party of their Horſe, and a body of 10000 Foot. *Caſtruccio* having deliberated all things, and provided for more than one Event, commanded a thouſand Foot along the River, above the paſſage where the enemy appeared, and ſent a thouſand more to poſt themſelves below it; and then advancing himſelf at the head of five thouſand Foot and three thouſand Horſe, he came on courageouſly againſt the enemy, as half of 'em were paſſed. The *Florentine* Foot, tired with the incommodity of their paſſage, and the weight of their Arms, advanced but faintly againſt him; and for their Horſe, they that paſs'd firſt had made the bottom ſo looſe, and ſo ſlippery, that there was no paſs for thoſe who were to follow: On the contrary, their Horſes either ſtuck faſt in the mud, or their legs came up, and they threw their Riders into the water, where many of them were drowned. So that the *Florentines* perceiving their attempt there was not like to ſucceed, he recovered the bank, and marching a little higher, they ſearch'd for a better place: But where-ever they made their point, and endeavour'd to go over, *Caſtruccio* oppos'd 'em with the Infantry he had drawn out, which being arm'd lightly with Targets and Darts, were every where immediately, charged the enemy both in the Front and the Flank, and ſetting up at the ſame time moſt hideous ſhouts, the *Florentines* Horſe being frighted with noiſe, and wounded with Darts, either run back, or threw their Riders under their feet. As to the *Florentines* who had paſſed firſt, they maintain'd their ground with a great deal of Gallantry, and till then the loſs was equal on both ſides; for if *Caſtruccio* doubled his endeavours to force back the enemy into the River, the enemy was no leſs zealous to gain as much ground as might ſerve for drawing up their Army when it ſhould get over. Both Generals were very buſie in the encouragement of their Soldiers, both with exhortation and example. *Caſtruccio*, to vilifie the enemy, remonſtrated to his Army, that they were the ſame people they had beat before at *Seravalle*; the *Florentines* repreſented to their Troops how infamous it would be for ſo numerous an Army as theirs to be worſted by a handful of men. But *Caſtruccio*, obſerving the Battel grew tedious, and his own men began to be as weary as the enemy, and that there were as many wounded and dead on the one ſide as the other, he caus'd another Body of five thouſand Foot to advance; as ſoon as they were got up to the reer of their companions, thoſe who had been fighting all the while, and were then in the front, were commanded to open to the right and left, and wheel off into the reer, whilſt the other advanced into the ground they had forſaken; but whilſt this was in agitation, the *Florentines* gained ſomething upon them, but they enjoyed it not long; for being to deal with freſh men, they were quickly diſordered, and followed with that vigour, they threw themſelves into the River. As to the Horſe both of the one ſide and the other, no advantage was to be obſerved. *Caſtruccio* being ſenſible that in number his was much inferior to the enemy, had commanded his Troops to entertain their Horſe with ſlight skirmiſhing, only to gain time; for believing his Foot able to beat the

enemies, he intended afterwards to join them with his Horſe, and fall both together upon the Cavalry of the *Florentines*. The *Florentines* tried another paſſage above the firſt, thinking thereby to have flank'd *Caſtruccio* afterwards; but the bank on the other ſide being bad, and defended by the enemies Foot, they were repulſed again, and in as great diſorder as before. Then *Caſtruccio* came up to them, and charg'd them ſo ſmartly in all parts, that they were totally defeated; ſo that of ſo vaſt an Army, ſcarce a third part were ſaved, and ſeveral of their chief Officers taken. Prince *Carlo* ſaved himſelf at *Empoli* with *Michael Falconi*, and *Thadeo Albizi*, Commiſſaries General of the *Florentine* Army; one may eaſily imagin the plunder was great, and the ſlaughter no leſs. In ſhort, according to the exacteſt computation, there were ſlain on the *Florentine* ſide 20231 men; on the ſide of *Caſtruccio* but 1570.

Here it was that Fortune began to be weary of the great actions of *Caſtruccio*, and (inconſtant as ſhe was) inſtead of giving him long life that might have crown'd his felicity as if ſhe had been jealous of his glory, ſhe interpoſed with the only obſtacle that was able to interrupt the proſperity of ſo incomparable a man.

This illuſtrious Hero tired with the fatigues of a Battel, as painful as glorious; coming out of the Fight with his imagination full of great things that might follow, and running over in his mind the probability of his good fortune, believing no hopes were left for the enemies loſs, nor no bounds for his victory, he march'd directly for the Gate of *Fucchio*. It having been always his principle to be firſt on horſeback, and laſt that came out of the field; he reſted there ſome time, not out of oſtentation, but to thank and careſs the Soldiers as they return'd from the purſuit, and withal to be ready, in caſe the enemy ſhould rally. Whilſt he was ſtanding there, cover'd with ſweat, his heart panting, and out of breath, an unlucky cold wind came from the other ſide of the *Arno*, and with a peſtiferous quality ſo affected his blood, that he fell immediately into the cold fit of an Ague: At firſt he neglected it, though he found a general alteration, as believing himſelf ſufficiently hardned againſt the injuries of the air; but this negligence was very pernicious. The next night his Fit increaſed, and his Fever was ſo violent, his Phyſicians gave him over.

The univerſal ſadneſs of the Soldiers made his triumphant Troops look as melancholy as if they had been beaten. All his Officers ſtood about him with tears in their eyes, but having taken them particularly by the hand, and deſir'd 'em to withdraw, he caus'd *Pagolo Guinigi* to be call'd, took him in his arms, and with a feeble but affectionate voice, he ſpake to him as follows. 'Had I imagin'd (dear Son) that fortune would have ſtop'd 'my courſe in the midſt of the way that conducted me to Glory, and ſo ſoon interrup-'ted the felicity of my Arms, I would have better enjoy'd the fruit of my pains. 'Tis 'poſſible I ſhould not have left your Territory ſo large, but I ſhould have endeavour'd 'to have left it more quiet, by creating fewer enemies to my ſelf, and leſs envy to you. 'I ſhould have contented my ſelf (dear Son) with the Sovereignty of *Lucca* and *Piſa*, 'and inſtead of intending the Conqueſt of *Piſtoia*, and contracting the hatred of the '*Florentines* by ſo many affronts, I ſhould have endeavour'd by all means poſſible to 'have gain'd their affection: By ſo doing, if I had not lengthened my days, I ſhould 'have made them at leaſt more happy, and left you more quiet and ſecure. But for-'tune (who will have the ordering of all human affairs) gave me not ſo much judg-'ment as was neceſſary to know her, nor ſo much time as was requiſite to maſter her. 'You have heard (for every body has told you, and I never denied it) how I came 'into your Father's houſe, young, inconſiderable, without hopes of advancement; in 'a word, in ſo mean a condition, that without his kindneſs I could never have ſatisfi'd 'the ambition of my nature. Your Father brought me up with the ſame care and ten-'derneſs as if I had been his own; and I do acknowledg, if ever I gave any teſtimonies 'of Valour and Magnanimity, they were but the effects of thoſe great examples which 'he ſet me; and the fair education I had from him, conducted me to that height which, 'not only you, but all the World has admir'd. When he came to die, he committed to 'my care and faith both your perſon and intereſt; have I betraid his confidence in a-'ny thing? Can you complain that my generoſity has not been anſwerable to his? 'My heart does not reproach me by any ingratitude. I have not only preſerv'd to you 'the fortune of your Father; but to leave you the fruit of my labours and ſucceſs, I 'have declin'd all overtures of Marriage, leſt happening to have children of my own, my 'natural affection for 'em ſhould have deſtroy'd my friendſhip for you; and leſſen'd the 'acknowledgment which I ow'd to his bounty. It touches, it touches, dear Charge, when 'we ſpeak of theſe things. You cannot comprehend the ſatisfaction I receive, to leave 'you maſter of ſo puiſſant a State; nor can you imagin how it troubles me to leave it 'ſo unſetled and perplex'd. The City of *Lucca* is under your ſubjection, but be ſure 'tis not pleas'd with its condition: *Piſa* likewiſe is yours, but you know the natu-

'ral inconſtancy of that people. Tho' it has been often ſubdued, and paſſed from one 'ſervitude to another, yet it will always diſdain to pay obedience to any native of *Luc-* 'ca, and have a care how you regulate your Politicks in relation to this jealouſie, 'which is unſeparable from perſons of different Countries. The Town of *Piſtoia* is a 'place that ought always to leave upon your ſpirit ſome ſuſpicion and umbrage of 'their fidelity. Beſides, that it is divided within it ſelf, the ill treatment which it has 'receiv'd from us will moſt ſenſibly excite it againſt our Family. But the worſt of all 'is, the *Florentines* are your neighbours, and you know mortally offended, as having 'been worſted by me perpetually: But that is not ſufficient to ſuppreſs them. They 'will be now overjoy'd, and inſult more upon the news of my death, than if they had 'conquer'd all *Tuſcany*. As to the Succours, you are to expect I will not diſſemble with 'you: You can hope for none but from the Emperor, or Princes of *Milan*, and you 'will be deceiv'd if you expect any from them; they are either too ſlow, or too bu- 'ſie, or too remote. Depend not therefore upon any thing but your own Conduct, 'upon the memory of my Atchievements, and the conſternation which my Victory 'has brought upon our enemy. It will be no little advantage to you if you can allure 'the *Florentines* to an accommodation, and their fear, without doubt, ſufficiently inclines 'em. Let your comportment with them for the future be different from mine; and as 'I have always provok'd them, and believ'd nothing could ſo much contribute to my 'happineſs, as to deal with 'em as enemies, let it be your care to deſire their amity, and 'found not your repoſe upon any thing ſo much as an alliance with them. Nothing in 'this life imports us ſo deep as the knowledge of our own tempers, and how to employ 'em; but this Science belongs moſt properly to thoſe who would govern; and it is 'neceſſary for ſuch to ſpin out their lives in the luxuries of Peace, when they find 'themſelves unfit for warlike executions: My advice therefore (dear Charge) is, that 'you would live in repoſe, and if you will make the advantage of the troubles of my 'life to ſweeten your own, you will remember to follow it. Farewel, I am going, and 'with this double ſatisfaction, that as I have left you the poſſeſſion of a large Empire, 'ſo I have left you ſuch precepts as will ſecure it to you.

Caſtruccio ended this paſſionate diſcourſe by griping *Pagolo* by the hand, who heard him all the while with tears in his eyes: And as the laſt inſtance of his gratitude, this great perſon call'd for all the brave and faithful Officers of his Army, whether of *Luc-ca*, *Piſa*, or *Piſtoia*; and having recommended to them the intereſts of *Pagolo*, he obli-ged them to an oath of Allegiance, and as that Oath was ſolemnly taken, the great Conqueror ſurrendred his Soul. Never was victorious Army ſo ſad, never any Prince ſo lamented, nor any memory ſo venerable. His exequies were honourably celebra-ted, and his body buried in the Church of St. *Francis* in *Lucca*. *Pagolo* ſucceeded, but not with the virtue and fortune of his predeceſſor; for not long after he loſt *Piſtoia*, and then *Piſa*, and much ado he had to keep the Sovereignty of *Lucca*, yet that con-tinued in his Family to the fourth Generation.

Theſe great actions do ſufficiently prove that *Caſtruccio* was not only a man rare in his own age, but would have been the ſame in any former. His ſtature was higher, and his proportions better than ordinary: His aſpect was charming, and he had ſo much grace and goodneſs in his accoſt, that never man went unſatisfied from his con-verſation: His hair was inclining to red, and he wore it ſhort above his ears: Where-ever he went, ſnow, hail, or rain, let the weather be what it would, his head was always uncover'd. He had all the qualities that make a man great: Grateful to his friends, terrible to his enemies, juſt with his ſubjects, crafty with ſtrangers, and where fraud would do the buſineſs, he never troubled himſelf to conquer by force. No man was more forward to encounter with danger, nor no man more careful to get off. He uſed to ſay that men ought to try all things, and be terrified at nothing; for it was clear, God Almighty was a lover of Courage, becauſe he made valiant men the Miniſters of his Judgments, and corrected the poor-ſpirited by them. He had a ſtrange preſence of wit, and made his repartees with admirable quickneſs; he would rally ve-ry handſomly; ſometimes he would be very pleaſant and innocent, and ſometimes as bitter and poinant. When occaſion offer'd fairly, as he never ſpared any body, ſo he was never offended when he was bitten himſelf. We have ſome of his anſwers which he gave with much wit, and others of other peoples which he heard with as much patience.

He cauſed a Bird to be bought one day, and gave a Ducat for it; one of his acquain-tance blaming him for giving ſo much: you (ſays *Caſtruccio*) would have given a penny for it your ſelf? The other anſwering yes; *then* (ſays *Caſtruccio*) *you would have paid dearer than I, for a Ducat is not ſo much with me.*

Having a Flatterer about him who plagu'd him with perpetual requeſts, in great ſcorn

Caſtruccio ſpit upon his Clothes: The Flatterer reply'd wittily, *a Fiſherman to get a pitiful little fiſh, is dabbled up to the neck, and ſhall I be afraid of a little ſpittle, that am catching a Whale.* *Caſtruccio* was pleaſed with his anſwer, and rewarded him for it.

A certain Hypocrite who loved his gut as well as he, reproached *Caſtruccio* one day, by the Luxury and Extravagance of his Table. *If that were a ſin* (replyed *Caſtruccio*) *there would not be ſo much feaſting upon Holy days.*

Paſſing one day thorow a ſtreet, where there lodg'd certain Women of but indifferent reputation, and ſeeing a young Man come from them who bluſh'd, and was in mighty confuſion that *Caſtruccio* had ſeen him; *Friend, ſays* Caſtruccio, *you ſhould not be aſhamed when you come out, but when you go in.*

He was always of an opinion that a Conqueror ought not to give too much liberty to his new Subjects, which upon a time he explain'd very ſubtilly to ſome who underſtood him. Having a knot given him that was veryfaſt tyed, he was deſir'd to undo it, and having try'd a good while to no purpoſe, *My friend,* (ſaid he aloud) *if a thing that is tyed can give me ſo much trouble, I ſhall be much worſe when once it is looſed.*

He was often troubled with the aſſiduities of a perſon who pretended to be a Philoſopher, and was always moleſting his Entertainments with his admonitions and Morals; *Caſtruccio,* weary of his inſolence at his Table, told him, *You Philoſophers are like Dogs, you never go any where but where you may have ſomething to bite.* The Philoſopher reply'd, *No, Sir, we are more like Phyſicians, and go only to thoſe who have extraordinary need of us.*

Paſſing one day from *Piſa* to *Leghorn* by water, a great tempeſt aroſe on a ſudden, and put *Caſtruccio* into ſome apprehenſion, which one of the Company obſerved, and told him by way of reproach, that he wondered ſuch a man as *Caſtruccio* ſhould be frighted, when he found no ſuch paſſion in himſelf. *Caſtruccio* reply'd, *You have no reaſon Sir to be afraid; for every man values his life according to its worth.*

One asked him one time what he ſhould do to make himſelf eſteem'd; he replyed, *when you'r invited to a Feaſt, have a care you do not ſet a wooden Statue upon a joyn'd ſtool.*

A fellow boaſting to him one day how many Books he had read, *Caſtruccio* told him, *It would have been more credit to have remembred half of them.*

A great Drinker, who was always debauching, uſed to value himſelf very much upon this ſcore, That though his Belly was always full of Wine, he never was drunk. *Caſtruccio* told him, *a Quart pot was the ſame.*

A Friend of his ſeeing him engaged in an amour with a pretty young Laſs, blam'd him very ſeriouſly that he ſuffered himſelf to be ſo taken by a Woman, *you are deceiv'd Sir,* ſaid he, *ſhe is taken by me.*

One found fault with him exceedingly for being ſo delicate and ſo expenſive in his dyet; *You would not* (ſaid *Caſtruccio*) *ſpend half ſo much in yours?* and being anſwered no, *Then* (replyed *Caſtruccio*) *you are a greater Miſer, than I am an Epicure.*

He was invited one evening to Supper by *Faddeo Bernardi,* a *Lacheſe,* a very rich and ſumptuous Citizen; being arrived at the houſe, and conducted by *Faddeo* into a Room, exceedingly well hung, the Pavement of Moſaique work, wrought curiouſly into Flowers, and Leaves, and Branches, which yielded a moſt excellent verdure. *Caſtruccio* admir'd it exceedingly, and pretending to have occaſion to ſpit, he turn'd about this way and that way, and at laſt ſpit in *Faddeo*'s face; *Faddeo* was much troubled, but *Caſtruccio* excuſed it, and told him, *He thought he could have ſpit no where to have offended him leſs.*

One asking very ſeriouſly how *Cæſar* died? He anſwered as ſeriouſly, *Would I might die like him.*

One of his Courtiers having an ambition to regale him, made a ball one night, and invited him to it; *Caſtruccio* came, entertained himſelf among the Ladies, and being in a good humour, fell a dancing and ſolacing among them, and doing ſome impertinencies which did not ſtand with the gravity of his rank, being admoniſhed by one of his Friends that it would detract from his eſteem; He told him, *I thank you Sir for your caution, but he that is counted wiſe all day, will never be thought a fool at night.*

One coming to him to beg a boon that *Caſtruccio* was unwilling to grant, *Caſtruccio* declined him, and would not ſeem for to hear; whereupon the Petitioner threw himſelf upon the ground, and put his head to *Caſtruccio*'s feet; *Caſtruccio* reproving him, the other reply'd, *You your ſelf are the cauſe, you heard ſo little when I ſtood up, I had a mind to ſee whether your Ears were upon your Toes.* Which anſwer got him more than he deſired.

He was wont to ſay, *The way to Hell was very eaſie, for Men went thither upon their backs, and could find it with their eyes ſhut.*

Another deſiring a favour of him, with a thouſand impertinent and ſuperfluous words: *Hark you Friend,* ſays *Caſtruccio, when you would have any thing with me for the future, ſend another Man to beg it.*

Another

Another great talker having tired him with a tedious diſcourſe, excuſed himſelf at laſt, and told him he was afraid he had wearied him, *No indeed Sir*, reply'd *Caſtruccio*, *for I did not mind one word that you ſaid.*

He uſed to Droll upon a perſon, who having been a handſom boy, proved as handſom a Man, *His ſpight* ſaid he *) has been always againſt Married people: when he was a boy he debauched Men from their Wives, and now he debauches Women from their Husbands.*

He ſaw an envious man laugh, and asked him, *Do you laugh*, ſaid he, *That things go well with your ſelf, or ill with other people.*

When he was under the Tutelage of *Franceſco Guinigi*, one of his Comerades asking him merrily, what he ſhould give him for a box at his Ear, *Caſtruccio* anſwered immediately, *a Helmet if you pleaſe.*

He was forced to put a Citizen of *Lucca* to death, who formerly had been a great inſtrument of his advancement; and being reproached by ſome body, for dealing ſo ſeverely with an old friend; *No*, ſays he, *you are miſtaken, it was with a new foe.*

Caſtruccio compared the prudence of thoſe perſons, who though they pretended to Marry, would never be brought to't, to the diſcretion of thoſe people, who though they talk'd much of going to Sea, kept conſtantly at Land.

He uſed to ſay, he wondred much at one Cuſtom among men: when they buy any thing curious, either of Chriſtal or Glaſs, they ſound it, and employ all their ſenſes to be ſure it be good; but in chooſing of a Wife, they uſe nothing but their ſight, as if ſhe was taken only to be look'd upon.

He was of opinion that after his Death there would be a general alteration; and being asked when he came to die, how he would be buried, he replyed, *With my face downward, for I am ſure in a ſhort time this Country will be turned topſie turvey, and then I ſhall be in the ſame poſture with other men.*

Whilſt he was in controverſie with *Huguccione*, but had him in great veneration for his bravery and Conduct; being asked in diſcourſe whether for the ſalvation of his Soul, he never had any thoughts of turning Monk, he anſwered no, for to him it ſeemed very ſtrange if Frier *Lazarone* ſhould go to Paradiſe, and *Huguccione de Faggivola* to Hell.

Being asked what time was moſt proper for a Man to eat, to keep himſelf in health, he anſwered, *The rich when they are hungry, and the poor when they can.*

Seeing a Friend of his make uſe of his Servant to put up his Breeches, he told him, *I hope e're long, you'l have one to feed you.*

Seeing over the door of a certain perſon this Inſcription in Latin, *God keep this Houſe from ill people*; He cryed, *Then the Maſter muſt never come in to't.*

Paſſing by a little Houſe with a great Gate, he ſaid, *If they have not a care, this Houſe will run away thorow the Gate.*

Being in diſcourſe with the Ambaſſador of the King of *Naples* about the ſettlement of their Frontiers; upon ſome controverſie betwixt them, the Ambaſſador ask'd him in a huff, *Why then Sir you are not afraid of our King? Caſtruccio* replyed gently, *is your King a good man, or a bad?* being anſwered, *a Good; Why then, ſaid* Caſtruccio, *would you have me afraid of a good man?*

We might add many other anſwers of his, all full of weight, as well as wit; but theſe ſhall ſuffice. He dyed in the 44*th* year of his Age, and from the time he came firſt to appear in the world, in his good and his bad fortune he expreſſed always an equality and ſteddineſs of ſpirit; and as he left ſeveral Monuments of his proſperity and good fortune behind him; ſo he was not aſhamed to leave ſome memorials of his adverſity: When he was delivered from *Huguccione's* impriſonment, he cauſed the Irons with which he was manacled, to be hung in the publickeſt place in his Palace, where they are to be ſeen to this day, being willing that poſterity might know, that how fortunate ſoever he was in the main, he was not totally exempt from diſtreſs.

That which is ſtill remarkable is, that having equalled the great actions of *Scipio* and *Philip* the Father of *Alexander*, he died as they did in the 44*th.* year of his Age, and doubtleſs he would have ſurpaſſed them both, had he found as favourable diſpoſitions at *Lucca*, as one of them did in *Macedon*, and the other in *Rome*.

A Narrative of the Murther of Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliveretto da Fermo, *Signor* Pagolo, *and the Duke* de Graviana, *(all of the Family of the* Urſini) *the one committed by Duke* Valentine, *and the other compoſed by* Nicolo Machiavelli.

DUke *Valentine* was return'd from *Lombardy*, whither he had gone to excuſe himſelf in relation to certain Calumnies objected againſt him by the *Florentines* about the revolt of *Arezzo*, and other Towns in the *Vale de Chiana*, and being come to *Imola*, upon conſultation with his Friends, he concluded upon his expedition againſt *Giovanni Bentivogli* Sovereign of *Bolonia*, becauſe Duke *Valentine* had a mind to reduce that City, and make it chief of his Dutchy of *Romagna*; of which the *Vitelli*, *Orſini*, and their followers having notice, it appeared to them all, that the ſaid Duke *Valentine* grew too potent, and that upon the taking *Bologna*, it was to be feared, he would endeavour to exterminate them, and make himſelf the only great man in *Italy*. Hereupon a Dyet was held at *Magione* in *Perugia*, where there met the Cardinal *Pagolo*, the Duke *de Gravina Orſini*, *Vitellozzo Vitelli*, *Oliveretto da Fermo*, *Gianpagolo Baglioni*, Sovereign of *Perugia*, and *Antonio da Venafro* ſent from *Pandolfo Petrucci*, as head of *Sienna*. Upon ſerious deliberation about the greatneſs and diſpoſition of the Duke, it was concluded very neceſſary to reſtrain him in time; otherwiſe there was great danger of a General deſtruction. Reſolving therefore to deſire aid of the *Florentines*, and to continue their amity with the *Bentivogli*, they ſent Embaſſadors to both; promiſing their aſſiſtance to the one, and begging the aſſiſtance of the other againſt the Common Enemy. This Dyet was quickly nois'd all over *Italy*, and ſuch of Duke *Valentine*'s Subjects as were diſcontented (among whom were the *Urbinati*) began to hold up their heads, and hope for a revolution. While the people were in this ſuſpence, certain of the Inhabitants of *Urbino*, laid a plot to ſurprize the Caſtle of *San Leo*, which at that time was kept for the Duke, and the manner was thus; The Governour of the Caſtle was buſie in repairing it, and mending the fortifications, to which purpoſe having commanded great quantities of Timber to be brought in, the Conſpirators contrived that certain of the biggeſt pieces ſhould be laid (as by accident) upon the bridge, which they knew could not be craned up without a great deal of difficulty; whilſt the Guards were employ'd in hoyſting the Timber, they took their opportunity, ſeized upon the Bridge, and then upon the Caſtle, which was no ſooner known to be taken, but the whole Country revolted and called in their old Duke; yet, not ſo much upon the ſurprize of that Caſtle, as their expectations from the Dyet at *Magione*, by means of which they did not queſtion to be protected. The Dyet underſtanding the revolt of *Urbino*, concluded no time was to be loſt, and having drawn their Forces together, they advanced, if any Town was remaining to the Duke, to reduce it immediately. They ſent a new Embaſſy to the *Florentines* to ſolicite their Concurrence againſt the common Enemy; to remonſtrate their ſucceſs, and to convince them that ſuch an opportunity being loſt, was not to be expected again. But the *Florentines* had an old pique to the *Vitelli* and *Urſini* upon ſeveral accompts, ſo that they did not only not joyn with them, but they ſent their Secretary *Nicolo Machiavelli* to the Duke to offer him reception or aſſiſtance which he pleaſed to elect. The Duke was at *Imola* at that time in great conſternation; for unexpectedly on a ſudden, when he dream'd nothing of it, his Soldiers revolted, and left him with a War at his Doors, and no force to repel it: But taking heart upon the *Florentine* Complement, he reſolved with the few Forces he had left, to protract, and ſpin out the War, and by propoſitions and practices of agreement, gain time till he could provide himſelf better, which he did two ways, by ſending to the King of *France*, and by giving advance Mony to all Men at Arms and Cavalry that would come in. Notwithſtanding all this, the *Urſini* proceeded, and marched on towards *Foſſombrone*, where being faced by a party of the Dukes, they charged them, and beat them: The news of that defeat, put the Duke upon new Counſels, to try if he

could

could ſtop that humour by any practice of accord; and being excellent at diſſembling, he omitted nothing that might perſuade them that they were the Aggreſſors and had taken up Arms firſt againſt him: That what was in his hands, he would willingly ſurrender; that the Name of Prince was enough for him, and if they pleaſed, the Principality ſhould be theirs; and he deluded them ſo far, that they ſent Signor *Pagolo* to him to treat about a Peace, and in the mean time granted a Ceſſation of Arms: However the Duke put no ſtop to his recruits, but reinforced himſelf dayly with all poſſible diligence; and that his ſupplies mght not be diſcovered, he diſpers'd them as they came, all over *Romagna*: Whilſt theſe things were in tranſaction, a ſupply of 500 Lances arrived to him from *France*; and though by their help he found himſelf ſtrong enough to confront his Enemy in the field, yet he judged it more ſecure and profitable to go on with the cheat, and not break off the Capitulation that then was on foot: and he acted it ſo well, that a Peace was concluded; their old Penſions confirmed, 4000 Duckats paid down, a ſolemn engagement given not to diſturb the *Bentivogli*; He made an alliance with *Giovanni*, and declared that he could not, and had no power to conſtrain any of them to come perſonally to him, unleſs they pleaſed to do it themſelves. They promiſed on their part to reſtore the Dutchy of *Urbino*, and whatever elſe they had taken from him; to ſerve him in all his Enterprizes: not to make War without his leave; nor hire themſelves to any body elſe. Theſe Articles being ſign'd, *Guid' Ubaldo* Duke of *Urbin* fled again to *Venice*, having diſmantled all the Caſtles and ſtrong holds in his Dutchy before he departed; for having a confidence in the people, he would not that thoſe places which he could not defend himſelf, ſhould be poſſeſſed by the Enemy, and made uſe of to keep his friends in ſubjection.

But Duke *Valentine* having finiſhed the agreement, and diſpoſed his Army into quarters all over *Romagna*, about the end of *November*, removed from *Imola* to *Ceſena*, where he continued ſeveral days in conſultation with certain Commiſſioners ſent from the *Vitelli*, and *Urſini* (who were then with their Troops in the Dutchy of *Urbino*) about what new Enterprize they were next to undertake; and becauſe nothing was concluded, *Oliverotto da Fermo* was ſent to propoſe to him, if he thought good, an expedition into *Tuſcany*; if not, that they might joyn, and ſet down before *Sinigaglia*. The Duke reply'd, that the *Florentines* were his Friends, and he could not with honour carry the War into *Tuſcany*, but their propoſal for *Sinigaglia*, he embraced very willingly. Having beleaguer'd the Town, it was not long before they had News it was taken, but the Caſtle held out; for the Governour refuſed to ſurrender to any body but the *Duke*, whereupon they intreated him to come. The Duke thought this a fair opportunity, and the better becauſe he went not of himſelf, but upon their invitation: and to make 'em the more ſecure; he diſmiſſed his *French*, and ſent them back into *Lombardy* (only he retain'd a hundred Lances under the Command of his Kinſman *Monſieur de Candale*.) Departing about the end of *December* from *Ceſena*, he went to *Fano*, where with all the cunning and artifice he could uſe, he perſuaded the *Vitelli* and *Urſini* to ſtay with the Army till he came; remonſtrating to them that ſuch jealouſies and ſuſpicions as thoſe muſt needs weaken their alliance, and render it undurable; and that for his part he was a man who deſired to make uſe as well of the Counſels, as the Arms of his Friends. And though *Vitellozzo* oppoſed it very much, (for by the death of his Brother he had been taught how unwiſe it was to offend a Prince firſt, and then put himſelf in his hands) nevertheleſs perſuaded by *Paulo Urſino* (who underhand was corrupted by preſents and promiſes from the Duke) he conſented to ſtay. Hereupon the Duke upon his departure the 30*th* of *Decemb.* 1502. imparted his deſign to Eight of his principal intimates (amongſt whom *Don Michael*, and *Monſignor d' Euna* were two) and appointed, that when *Vitellozzo*, *Pagolo Urſini*, the Duke *de Gravina*, and *Oliverotto*, ſhould come to meet him, two of his Favourites ſhould be ſure to order it ſo, as to get one of the *Urſini* betwixt them, (aſſigning every couple his man) and entertain them till they came to *Sinigaglia*; with expreſs injunction not to part with them upon any terms till they were brought to the Dukes Lodgings, and taken into Cuſtody. After this he ordered his whole Army, Horſe and Foot (which conſiſted of Two thouſand of the firſt, and One thouſand of the latter) to be ready drawn up, upon the banks of the *Metauro*, about five miles diſtant from *Fano*, and to expect his arrival. Being come up to them upon the *Metauro*, he commanded out two hundred Horſe as a Forlorn, and then cauſing the Foot to march, he brought up the Reer himſelf with the remainder.

Fano, and *Sinigaglia*, are two Cities in *la Marca*, ſeated upon the bank of the *Adriatick* Sea, diſtant one from the other about 15 miles; ſo that travelling up towards *Sinigaglia*, the bottom of the Mountains on the right hand are ſo near the Sea, they are almoſt waſh'd by the water, and at the greateſt diſtance they are not above two miles. The

City

from theſe Mountains is not above a flight ſhot, and the Tide comes up within leſs than a Mile. By the ſide of this Town there is a little River, which runs cloſe by the wall next *Fano*, and is in ſight of the Road: So that he who comes to *Sinigaglia*, paſſes a long way under the Mountains, and being come to the River which runs by *Sinigaglia*, turns on the left hand upon the bank, which within a bow ſhot, brings him to a Bridge over the ſaid River, almoſt right againſt the Gate; Before the Gate there is a little Bourg with a Market-place, one ſide of which is ſhoulder'd up by the bank of the River. The *Vitelli*, and *Urſini*, having concluded to attend the Duke themſelves, and to pay their perſonal reſpects, to make room for his Men had drawn off their own, and diſpoſed them into certain Caſtles at the diſtance of ſix miles, only they had left in *Sinigaglia Oliveretto* with a party of about 1000 Foot, and 150 Horſe which were quarter'd in the ſaid Bourg. Things being in this order, Duke *Valentine* approached; but when his Horſe in the Van came up to the Bridge, they did not paſs, but opening to the right and left, and wheeling away, they made room for the Foot, who marched immediately into the Town. *Vitellozzo*, *Pagolo*, and the Duke *de Gravina*, advanced upon their Mules to wait upon Duke *Valentine*; *Vitellozzo* was unarm'd in a Cap lin'd with green, very ſad and melancholy, as if he had ſome foreſight of his deſtiny, which conſidering his former courage and exploits, was admired by every body: And it is ſaid, that when he came from his houſe, in order to meeting Duke *Valentine* at *Sinigaglia*, he took his laſt leave very ſolemnly of every body. He recommended his Family and its fortunes, to the chief of his Officers, and admoniſhed his Grand-children, not ſo much to commemorate the fortune, as the magnanimity of their Anceſtors. Theſe three Princes being arrived in the preſence of Duke *Valentine*, ſaluted him with great civility, and were as civilly received; and each of them, (as ſoon as they were well obſerved by the perſons appointed to ſecure them) were ſingled, and diſpoſed betwixt two of them. But the Duke perceiving that *Oliveretto* was wanting (who was left behind with his Regiment, and had drawn it up in the Market-place for the greater formality) he wink'd upon *Don Michael* (to whom the care of *Oliveretto* was aſſign'd) that he ſhould be ſure to provide he might not eſcape. Upon this intimation, *Don Michael* clap'd ſpurs to his Horſe, and rid before; and being come up to *Oliveretto*, he told him it was inconvenient to keep his Men to their Arms; for unleſs they were ſent preſently to their quarters, they would be taken up for the Dukes; wherefore he perſuaded him to diſmiſs them, and go with him to the Duke: *Oliveretto* following his Counſel, went along with him to the Duke, who no ſooner ſaw him, but he call'd him to him, and *Oliveretto* having paid his Ceremony fell in with the reſt. Being come into the Town, and come up to the Duke's Quarters, they all diſmounted, and attended him up, where being carried by him into a private Chamber, they were inſtantly arreſted and made Priſoners. The Duke immediately mounted, and commanded their Soldiers ſhould be all of them diſarm'd; *Oliveretto*'s Regiment being ſo near at hand, were plunder'd into the bargain. The Brigades which belong'd to *Vitelli* and *Urſini* being at greater diſtance, and having notice what had hapned to their Generals, had time to unite; and remembring the Diſcipline and Courage of their Maſters, they kept cloſe together, and march'd away in ſpight both of the Country people, and their Enemies. But Duke *Valentine*'s Soldiers, not content with the pillage of *Oliveretto*'s Soldiers, fell foul upon the Town, and had not the Duke by the death of ſeveral of them, repreſſed their inſolence, *Sinigaglia* had been ruined. The night coming on, and the tumults appeaſed, the Duke began to think of his Priſoners, reſolved *Vitellozzo* and *Oliveretto* ſhould die; and having caus'd them to be guarded into a convenient place, he commanded they ſhould be ſtrangled; but they ſaid nothing at their deaths that was anſwerable to their lives; for *Vitellozzo* begged only that the *Pope* might be ſupplicated in his behalf for a plenary indulgence. *Oliveretto* impeach'd *Vitellozzo*, and laid all upon his back. *Pagolo* and the Duke *de Gravina* were continu'd alive, till the Duke had information that his Holineſs at *Rome* had ſeiz'd upon the Cardinal *Orſino*, the Arch-biſhop of *Florence*, and Meſſer *Jacopo da Santa Croce*; upon which News, on the 18*th* of *January*, they alſo were both ſtrangled in the Caſtle of *Piene* after the ſame manner.

THE STATE OF FRANCE,

In an ABRIDGMENT

Written by

Nicolo Machiavelli, Secretary of *FLORENCE*.

THE Kings and Kingdom of *France* are at this time more rich and more powerful than ever, and for these following Reasons: First,

The Crown passing by succession of Blood is become rich; because in case where the King has no Sons to succeed him in his paternal Estate, it falls all to the Crown; and this having many times hapned, has been a great corroboration, as particularly in the Dutchy of *Anjou*; and at present the same is like to fall out to this King, who having no Sons, the Dutchy of *Orleans*, and State of *Milan* (his hereditary Countries) are like to devolve upon the Crown: So that at this day most of the good Towns in *France* are in the Crown, and few remaining to particular persons.

A second great Reason of the strength of that King is, That whereas heretofore *France* was not entire, but subject to several great Barons, who were able not only to expostulate, but to contend with the King (as the Dukes of *Guienn* and *Burbon* did formerly) the said Barons are now most obsequious and dutiful.

A third reason is, because formerly all the neighbouring Princes were ready upon every occasion to invade the Kingdom of *France*; the Dukes of *Burgundy*, *Britannie*, *Guienne*, or *Flanders*, being always tempting them thereunto, and giving them access, passage, and reception, as it hapned when the *English* had Wars with *France*, by their Confederacy with the Duke of *Britagne*, they got admission into that Country, and gave the King of *France* his hands full: And in like manner the Duke of *Burgundy* was as troublesom, by means of the Duke of *Bourbon*. But now *Britagne*, *Guienne*, the *Bourbonois*, and greatest part of *Burgundy* being united to that Crown, and very loyal and faithful; those neighbouring Princes do not only want their old Confederates to invite and assist them, but they have them for their Enemies; so that the King of *France* is more strong, and his Adversaries more weak.

Another reason may be, That at this day the richest and most potent of the Barons are of the Blood Royal; so that upon defect of those who are before them, the Crown may come to them, upon which score they are firm to it, hoping that some time or other it may fall either to them or their posterity; whereas to mutiny or oppose it, might prejudice their succession, as it hapned to this King *Lewis* when he was taken in the Battel of *Britagne*, where in favour of the Duke of *Britagne*, he was personally in Service against the *French*. Upon the death of King *Charles*, the Crown being legally in *Lewis*, it was disputed whether that fault and defection of his should not be a bar to his succession, and had it not been that he was very rich, by means of his frugality, and able to bear the Port of that Dignity at his own expence, and the next Heir *Monsigneur d'Angolisme* an Infant, he had lost it; but for these Reasons, and some favour which he had besides, *Lewis* was created King.

The

The laſt reaſon is, becauſe the States of the Barons in *France* are not divided among the Heirs, (as in *Germany*, and ſeveral parts of *Italy*) but deſcend ſtill to the eldeſt Sons who are the right Heirs; and the younger Sons are left, by ſome little aſſiſtance from their elder Brothers to ſhift for themſelves; whereupon they betake themſelves generally to the Wars, endeavouring to advance themſelves that way, and raiſe themſelves fortunes: And hence it is the *Frenchmen* at arms are better at this day, and ſtand fair for preferment.

The *French* Infantry cannot be good; for it being long ſince they had any War, they muſt needs want experience. Beſides in the Country, the Towns are full of Tradeſmen and Mechanicks, all of them ſo curb'd and cow'd by the Nobleſs, that they are grown puſillanimous and baſe; and therefore the King of *France* having found them unfit, makes no uſe of them in his Wars, unleſs it be of his *Gaſcoigns*, who are ſomething better than the reſt, and the reaſon is, becauſe bordering upon the *Spaniards*, they are conſtantly upon duty, or communicate ſomething of their Nature: But for ſome years ſince they have ſhewn themſelves better Thieves than Soldiers; nevertheleſs, in defending and aſſaulting of Towns they do well enough, but in the Field they are but indifferent, quite contrary to the *Germans* and *Swizzers*, who are not to be dealt with in the field, but in ſtorming or defending a Town, they are good for nothing; and I ſuppoſe it proceeds from hence that they cannot in both caſes keep the ſame order which they obſerve in the field. Wherefore the King of *France* makes uſe of *Switzers*, and *Lanzknights*, becauſe his men at Arms dare not rely upon his *Gaſcoigns* in time of Service. And if his Foot were as good as his Men at Arms, no doubt but the King of *France* would be able to defend himſelf againſt all the Princes in *Europe*.

The *French* are naturally more fierce and hot, than dexterous and ſtrong, and if reſiſted handſomly in their firſt charge, they ſlacken and cool, and grow as timorous as Women. They are likewiſe impatient of diſtreſs or incommodity, and grow ſo careleſs by degrees, that 'tis no hard matter, finding them in diſorder, to maſter and overcome them.

And of this, Experience has been many times had in the Kingdom of *Naples*, and laſt of all at *Farigliano*, where they were twice as many as the *Spaniards*, and it was expected every hour when they ſhould have ſwallow'd them up: Nevertheleſs, becauſe winter came on, and the weather grew bad, they began to ſtraggle into the Neighbouring Towns, where they might be at more eaſe, and thereby leaving their Camp weak, and out of order, the *Spaniards* fell upon them, and beat them beyond all expectation. And it would have been the ſame with the *Venetians*, who had never loſt the Battel of *Vaila*, had they forborn following the *French* example but for ten days: But the fury of *Bartolomeo d'Alviano* was too hot for them. The ſame happned again to the *Spaniards* at *Ravenna*, who might have certainly ruined the *French* in reſpect of their ill Government, and want of proviſions which were intercepted on that ſide towards *Ferrara* by the *Venetians*, and towards *Bologna*, by the *Spaniards* themſelves; but by the raſhneſs of ſome, and the indiſcretion of others, the *French* got the Victory; and though as it was, it was bloody enough, yet it had been much more, had the ſtrength of their Army conſiſted in the ſame kind of men; but the *French* force lying in his Men at Arms, and the *Spaniards* force in their Foot, the ſlaughter was the leſs. He therefore who would conquer the *French*, muſt be ſure to preſerve himſelf againſt their firſt *impetus* and attack, and in ſo doing he ſhall be ſure to prevail; for *Cæſar*'s character of 'em is true, *At firſt they are more than Men, at laſt leſs than Women.*

France, in reſpect of its greatneſs, and the convenience of its Rivers, is opulent and rich; for their commodities and labour are worth little or nothing, by reaſon of the ſcarcity of Money among the people, which is ſo great, it is with difficulty that they are able to raiſe ſo much as will pay the impoſitions of their Lords, tho' they are generally but ſmall; the reaſon is, becauſe every body gathers to ſell as he has occaſion, and no body can ſtay to finiſh his harveſt as it ſhould be. So that if there ſhould be any body (which is ſeldom ſeen) ſo rich as to be a buſhel of Corn beforehand, every body having of their own, there would be no body to buy it: And the Gentlemen of what they receive of their Tenants, except it be for cloths, ſpend little or nothing; for Cattle, and Poultry, and Fiſh, and Veniſon, they have enough of their own: So that all the Money comes into the hands of the Lords, and doubtleſs at this time they are exceedingly rich; for the people are ſo poor, he that has but a *Florin* believes himſelf a Prince.

The Prelates of *France* carry away $\frac{2}{3}$ of the Revenue of that Kingdom, becauſe there are ſeveral Biſhops who have temporal as well as Spiritual Revenues, who having proviſions enough of their own to keep their houſes, ſpend not a farthing of their income, but hoard it up according to the natural covetouſneſs of the Prelates and religious; and that which accrues to the Chapters and Colleges, it is laid out in Plate, and Jewels, and Ornaments,

for the decoration of their Chappels; ſo that betwixt what is laid out upon their Churches, and what is laid up by the Prelates, their money and their moveables is of an immenſe value.

In all Counſels for the Government and Adminiſtration of the Affairs of that Kingdom, the Prelates are always the greateſt number, the other Lords not regarding it ſo much, as knowing the execution muſt come thorow their hands: So that both ſides are contented, one to ordain, the other to execute, though there are many times ſome of the ancienter and more experienced Soldiers taken in to direct the Prelates in ſuch things as are out of their ſphere.

The Benefices in *France* (by virtue of a Cuſtom and Law derived anciently from the Popes) are conferred by the Colleges; inſomuch as the *Canons*, when their Arch-Biſhop, or Biſhop dies, calling an Aſſembly, to diſpoſe of their Benefices to them that are thought moſt worthy, whence it comes that they are frequently divided among themſelves; becauſe as many are prefer'd by favour and bribery, as by piety and worth: And it is the ſame with the Monks in the election of their Abbots. The other inferior Benefices are in the Gift of the Biſhops. If the King at any time would intrench upon this Law, and chooſe a Biſhop at his own pleaſure, he muſt do it by force; for they will deny him poſſeſſion; and tho' perhaps it be forc'd, that King is no ſooner dead, but his Biſhop ſhall be ſure to be diſpoſſeſs'd, and another put in his place.

The *French* are naturally covetous, and deſirous of other peoples goods, which they will laviſh and ſquander as prodigally as their own: A French man ſhall cheat and rob you, and in a breath meet, and eat, and ſpend it as merrily with you as you could have done your ſelf; which is contrary to the humour of the *Spaniard*; for if he gets any thing of you, you muſt look for nothing again.

The *French* are in great fear of the *Engliſh*, for the great inroads and devaſtations which they have made anciently in that Kingdom; inſomuch, that among the common people the name of *Engliſh* is terrible to this day; thoſe poor wretches not being able to diſtinguiſh that the *French* are otherwiſe conſtituted now than they were then; for that now they are Armed, good Soldiers, and united, having poſſeſſion of thoſe States upon which the *Engliſh* did formerly rely; as the Dutchy of *Burgundy*, and the Dutchy of *Britagne*; and on the other ſide the *Engliſh* are not ſo well diſciplined; for 'tis ſo long ſince they had any War, there is not a man of them who ever look'd an enemy in the face; and beſides, there is no body left to joyn with them, if they ſhould land, but only the Arch-Duke.

They are afraid likewiſe of the *Spaniards*, by reaſon of their ſagacity and vigilance. But when-ever that King invades *France*, he does it with great diſadvantage; for from the place from whence he muſt march, to that part of the *Pirenæans* by which he muſt paſs into *France*, the diſtance is ſo great, and the Country ſo barren, that every time the *Spaniards* attempt any ſuch thing, either by the way of *Perpignan*, or *Gebenna*, they muſt needs be much incommoded, not only for want of ſupplies, but for want of victuals to ſuſtain them in ſo tedious a march; becauſe the Country behind them is ſcarce habitable for its fertility, and that which is inhabited has ſcarce wherewithal for the Inhabitants; ſo that in theſe reſpects, towards the *Pirenæans*, the *French* are in little apprehenſion of the *Spaniard*.

Of the *Flemmings* the *French* likewiſe are in no fear; for, by reaſon of the coldneſs of their Country, they do not gather enough for their own ſubſiſtance, eſpecially of Corn and Wine, with which they are forced to ſupply themſelves out of *Burgundy*, *Picardy*, and other places in *France*. Moreover, the people of *Flanders* live generally of their own manufacture, which they vend at the Fairs in *France*, that is, at *Paris* and *Lyons*; for towards the Sea-ſide they have no utterance for any thing, and towards *Germany* 'tis the ſame; for there are more of their Commodities made than in *Flanders*: So that whenever their Commerce with the *French* is cut off, they will have no where to put off their Commodities, nor no where to ſupply themſelves with victuals: So that without irreſiſtable neceſſity the *Flemmings* will never have any controverſie with the *French*.

But of the *Swizzers* the *French* are in no little fear, by reaſon of their vicinity, and the ſudden incurſions to which they are ſubject from 'em, againſt which it is impoſſible to make any competent proviſion in time, becauſe they make their depredations and incurſions with more eaſe and dexterity than other Nations, in reſpect that they have neither Artillery nor Horſe; but tho' the *French* have Towns and Countries very near 'em, yet being well fortified and man'd the *Swizzers* never make any great progreſs. Beſides, the diſpoſition of the *Swiſs* is apter to battel and fighting in the field, than to the ſtorming or defending of Towns; and it is very unwillingly (if ever) the *French* come to cope with 'em upon the Frontiers; for having no foot that is able to bear up with the *Swizzers*, their Men at Arms without Foot can do nothing: Moreover, the Country is ſo qualifi'd,

that there is not room enough for the Men at Arms and Cavalry to draw up, and manage to advantage, and the *Swizzers* are not eaſily tempted from their borders into the plain, nor to leave ſuch ſtrong and well provided Towns (as I mentioned before) upon their backs, leſt by them their ſupplies ſhould be intercepted, and perhaps their retreat be obſtructed.

On the ſide towards *Italy* they are in no fear, in reſpect of the *Apennine* Mountains, and the ſtrong places which they have at the foot of them: ſo that who ever invades the Dominion of *France* in thoſe parts, muſt be ſure to overcome, or by reaſon of the barrenneſs of the Country about, he will hazard to be famiſhed, or compelled to leave thoſe Towns behind him which would be madneſs, or to attaque them at diſadvantage, which would be worſe: ſo that on the ſide of *Italy* they are in no danger, for the reaſons aboveſaid; and moreover, there is not a Prince in *Italy* able to undertake him, nor are the *Italians* now in ſuch unity as in the days of the *Romans*.

Towards the South, the Kingdom of *France* is in no apprehenſion, becauſe it is waſhed by the Sea on that ſide, and accommodated with Ports always full of Ships, (partly of the Kings, and partly of other petty Princes,) ſufficient to defend their Coaſts from any ſudden impreſſion; and againſt any thing premeditated, they will have time enough to prepare; for it requires time to make a ſolemn invaſion, and the preparation will be diſcovered by ſome body; beſides, for further ſecurity, there are always parties of Men at Arms ſcowring upon the Coaſts.

Their expence in keeping of their Towns is not ſo great; for the *French* Subjects are very dutiful, and the fortreſſes are not kept at the charge of the Kingdom, and on the borders (where Gariſons, and by conſequence, expence would be more neceſſary) thoſe flying bodies of Men at Arms ſave them that charge: for againſt any extraordinary inſult, there will be time enough to provide, for that requires time to be fitted, and more to be executed.

The people of *France* are very humble and obedient, and have their King in mighty veneration. They live at very little expence, by reaſon of their great plenty, and every body hath ſomething of his own: their cloathing is courſe, of very cheap ſtuff, and they uſe no kind of Silks, neither the men nor the women; for if they ſhould, they ſhould be obnoxious to the Gentry, who would certainly be even with them.

The Biſhopricks in *France*, according to modern computation, are 146, and the Arch Biſhopricks 18.

The Pariſhes are reckoned a million and 700, and the Abbies 740. Of the Priories there is no account.

Of the Ordinary and extraordinary Entries of the Crown, I could get no exact account. I inquired of ſeveral, and all told me they were as the King pleaſed to require. Yet ſome perſons told me that that part of his ordinary Revenue which ariſes out of his Gabels upon wine, and bread, and fleſh, and the like, amounts to a million and ſeven hundred thouſand Crowns: and his extraordinary, by Taxes, amounts as he pleaſes: but in caſe they fall ſhort, he has another ſtring to his bow, and that is by way of loans, which are ſeldom repaid. The Letters to that purpoſe do commonly run thus: Sir, *The King recommends himſelf to you; and having at this time preſſing occaſion for money, He deſires you would furniſh him with the ſum contained in this Letter*; which ſums are paid in to the next Receiver, and there are of them in every Town who receive all the profits and revenue accrewing to the Kings by Gabels, Taxes, Loans, or otherwiſe.

Thoſe Towns which are ſubject to the Crown, have no rules or orders but what His Majeſty is pleaſed to ſet them for raiſing of mony either by Taxes or otherwiſe.

The authority of the Barons over their Subjects, and half their Revenues conſiſts in bread, and wine, and fleſh, as aboveſaid, and ſo much a year for hearth-mony, but it muſt not exceed ſix pence or eight pence a hearth, to be paid every three months. Taxes and Loans they cannot require without the conſent of the King, which he grants very rarely.

The Crown receives no other advantage from them than in the revenue for ſalt, and never taxes them but upon extraordinary occaſion.

The King's order in his extraordinary expences both in War and Peace is to command the Treaſurers to pay the Soldiers, which they do by tickets of aſſignment. The Penſioners and Gentlemen repair to the Generals with their tickets from month to month, where they are entred, and having received a new policy from three months to three months, the Penſioners and Gentlemen go then to the Receivers of the reſpective Provinces where they live, and are paid immediately.

The Gentlemen belonging to the King are 200, their pay 20 Crowns a month; and paid as aboveſaid; each hundred has a Captain.

The

The Penſioners are no ſet number, and their Penſions are as uncertain, being more or leſs as it pleaſes the King: They are in a way of preferment, and therefore there is no exact rules for them.

The office of the Receivers General of *France*, is, to receive ſo much for fire, and ſo much for taxes by conſent of the King; and to take care that both ordinary and extraordinary expences be paid at the time, and diſcharges given as aforeſaid.

The Treaſurers have the keeping of the mony, and pay it according to their orders from the Generals.

The office of the Grand Chancellor is judicial and definitive, he can pardon and condemn as he pleaſes, and that even in Capital Cauſes, without the conſent of the King. In Cauſes where the Clients are contumaciouſly litigious, He can prefix them a day for the determination of their Suit: He can confer Benefices, but that muſt be with the King's conſent, for thoſe grants are paſſed by the King's Letters under the Broad-Seal, wherefore that Seal is kept by the ſaid Chancellor. His Salary is Ten Thouſand Franks *per an.* and Eleven Thouſand more for his Table, which Table is intended for the repaſt and entertainment of ſuch Gentlemen, Lawyers and Councellors as follow in his train, when they think fit either to dine or ſup with him.

The ſum which the King of *England* received annually from the King of *France* was fifty thouſand Franks, in conſideration of certain diſburſements by the preſent King of *England*'s Father in the *Dutchy* of *Britagne*, but the time of that payment is expired.

At preſent there is in *France* but one Grand Seneſchal, when there are more, (I do not mean Grand Seneſchals, for there is never but one) their authority is over the Militia both in Ordinary and Extraordinary, whom for the dignity of their Office they are obliged to obey.

The Governors of the Provinces are as many as the King pleaſes, and have their Commiſſion for life or years, and their Salaries great or little, as he thinks good to appoint: the other Governors, to the very inferior Officers in every little Town, have all their Commiſſions from the King, for you muſt know there is no office in that Kingdom, but is either given or ſold by that King.

Of the quantity of diſtributions for the Gentlemen and the Penſioners, there is no certain account, but as to them, the King's warrant is ſufficient, for they are not liable to the Chamber of Accounts.

The Office of the Chamber of Accounts is to view and audit the accounts of all ſuch as have any thing to do in the King's Moneys, as the Generals, the Treaſurers, and the Receivers.

The Univerſity of *Paris* is paid out of the Rents of the Foundations of the Colledges, but very narrowly.

The Parliaments are five, of *Paris*, of *Roan*, of *Tholoſe*, *Burdeaux* and *Dauphine*, from either of which there is no appeal.

The Univerſities at firſt were but four, at *Paris*, *Orleans*, *Bourgi*, and *Poictiers*, to which theſe at *Tours* and *Angiers* have been added ſince, but they are very inconſiderable.

The ſtanding Army is as great (both for number of Men and Artillery) as the King pleaſes, and are quartered and diſpoſed according to orders from him. Yet every great Town upon the Frontiers have Artillery and Ammunition of their own, and within theſe two years ſeveral more have been caſt in ſeveral places of the ſaid Kingdom, at the charge of the Town where they were made, and to re-imburſe themſelves, they are allowed a *Toll* of a penny an head for all Cattel, and as much for every buſhel of Corn, whilſt the Kingdom is under no danger of invaſion. The ſtanding Force is divided into four Bodies, which are diſpoſed into four ſeveral Poſts for the ſecurity of the Country, that is to ſay, into *Guienna*, *Piccardy*, *Burgundy*, and *Provence*, but no preciſe number is obſerved in any, for they are leſſened, or encreaſed, and removed from one place to another, as they have occaſion to ſuſpect.

I have with ſome diligence inquired what moneys were aſſigned every year for the charges of the King's Houſhold, and his privy Purſe, and I find it is what he pleaſes himſelf.

His Archers are four hundred, deſign'd for the Guard of his Perſon, among which there are two Scotch. Their Salary is three hundred Franks a man every year, and a Coat of the King's Livery. But there are 24 conſtantly at the King's elbow, and their Salary is 400 Franks *per an.*

His *German* Foot-Guards conſiſted formerly of three hundred men, with each of them a Penſion of ten Franks a month, and two Suits of Apparel a year, that is, Coats and Shoos, one for Summer, and the other for Winter; but of theſe Foot there were 100

more

more particularly near the King, their Salary being 12 Franks *per menſ.* and their Coats of Silk, which was begun in the time of King *Charles*.

The Harbingers are thoſe who are ſent before to take up Lodgings for the Court, they are 32 in number, and each of them has a Salary of three hundred Franks every year, and a Coat of the King's Livery. Their Marſhals or chief Officers are four, and have each of them 600 Franks *per ann.* In taking up their Lodgings, their method is, they divide themſelves into four parties, one Marſhal (or his Lieutenant, in caſe he cannot wait himſelf) ſtays where the Court departed, to ſee all things rectified betwixt the followers of the Court, and the Maſters of the Houſes: Another of them goes along with the Court: A third where the King lies that night: And the fourth where he lies the next; by which means they keep ſo exact an order, that they are no ſooner arriv'd, but every man knows his Lodging, and is furniſh'd with every thing got ready to his hand.

The *Provoſt del Hoſtel* is a perſon who follows always the perſon of the King, and his office is judiciary: Where-ever the Court goes, his Bench is the firſt, and in all Towns where he comes the people may appeal to him as to their Lieutenant. His ordinary Salary is 6000 Franks. He has under him two Judges in Civil Cauſes, paid by the King, each of them 600 Franks *per ann.* he has likewiſe under him a Lieutenant-Criminal, and 30 Archers paid as abovoſaid. Thoſe who are taken by this *Provoſt* upon any criminal account, cannot appeal to the Parliament. He diſpatches all both in Civil and Criminal affairs, and if the Plaintiff and Defendant appear once before him, it is enough, their buſineſs is determined.

The Maſters of the King's Houſhold are eight, but there is no certain rule for their Salary, for ſome have 100 Franks *per an.* ſome more, ſome leſs, as it pleaſes the King, over whom there is a *Grand Maſter* with a Salary of 11000 Franks *per an.* and his authority is only over the reſt.

The juriſdiction of the Admiral of *France* is over all the Fleet, and Ships and Ports belonging to that Kingdom: He can ſeize, and make what Ships he pleaſes, and diſpoſe of them as he thinks good when he has done. His Salary is 10000 Franks.

The Knights of the King's Order have no certain number, depending wholly upon the King's pleaſure. When they are created they ſwear to defend the Crown, and never upon any terms to be engaged againſt it: they can never be degraded or deprived of their Dignity but by death. The higheſt of their Penſions is 4000 Franks *per an.* ſome have leſs, for all are not equal.

The Chamberlains office is to wait upon the King, to ſee to his Chamber, and to adviſe him: and indeed his Chamberlains are perſons of the principal reputation in his Kiugdom: their Penſions are ſix, eight, and ten thouſand Franks *per an.* and ſometimes nothing, for the King does often confer thoſe Places upon ſome great and rich ſtranger, whom he has a mind to oblige: but though they have no Penſions, they are exempted from all Gabels, and have their diet in Court at the next Table to the King's.

The Maſter of the Horſe is to be always about the King; his authority is over the 12 Querries, and the ſame that the Grand Seneſchal, the Grand Maſter, and the Grand Chamberlains is over thoſe who are under them. He has the care of the King's Horſes, and Harneſs, helps him up and down, and carries the Sword before him.

The Lords of the King's Council have Penſions of betwixt ſix and eight thouſand Franks *per an.* at the pleaſure of his Majeſty; their names at preſent are, *Monſeigneur di Parigi*, *Monſ. di Buonaglia*, the Baylif of *Amiens*, *Monſ. du Ruſſi*, and the Grand Chancellor; but *Rubertet*, and *Monſ. di Parigi* govern all.

There is no Table kept for them ſince the death of the Cardinal of *Roan*, for when the Grand Chancellor is abſent, *Parigi* does that office for him, and takes them with him.

The Title which the King of *France* pretends to the State of *Milan*, is this; His Grandfather married a Daughter of the Duke of *Milan*, who died without Heir males.

Duke *Giovanni Galeazzo* had two Daughters women grown, and I know not how many Sons. Of the Ladies, one was called *Madona Valentina*, and was married to *Lewis* Duke of *Orleans*, Grand-father to this preſent King, deſcended lineally from King *Pippin*. Duke *John Galeazzo* being dead, his Son *Philip* ſucceeded him, who died without legitimate iſſue, leaving only one natural Daughter behind him. Afterwards that State was uſurped illegally by the *Sforzeſchi*, as is reported, becauſe they pretend it fell to the Heirs of the ſaid *Madona Valentina*, and that from the very day in which the Duke of *Orleans* married with the Houſe of *Milan*, he added to the three Lillies in his Coat of Arms, the Snake, which is to be ſeen at this day.

In every Pariſh in *France* there is a perſon called a *Frank Archer*, who is paid by the Pariſh, and is obliged to be always ready with a good Horſe and Arms to wait upon

the

the King when ever they are required, whether abroad in time of War, or at home upon any other occaſion: they are bound likewiſe to ride up and down for the ſecurity of ſuch places as are liable to in-roads, or any ways ſuſpected; and, according to the number of the Pariſhes, they are 1700000 men.

Their Lodgings are appointed by the Harbingers according to every mans office, and uſually the richeſt men quarter the greateſt Courtiers; and that neither the Lodger nor Landlord may have reaſon to complain, the Court has appointed a rate or rule to be obſerved generally for all people, and that is a *ſous* or penny a day for their Chamber; in which there is to be bed, and chairs, and ſtools, and all things that are neceſſary.

There is an allowance likewiſe of two pence a day to every man for linen, (as towels and napkins) and for vinegar and verjuice; their linen is to be changed at leaſt twice every week, but there being great plenty in that Country, they change oftner, as Lodgers deſire it; beſides which, they are obliged to keep their beds made, and their chambers ſwept and clean.

There is allowance likewiſe of two pence a day for the ſtanding of every man's horſe; they are not bound to provide any thing for them, only to keep their ſtalls clean, and carry out the dung.

Some there are who pay leſs, as their Landlords are good natured, or they can make any ſhift: but this is the ordinary rule of the Court.

The Engliſh Title to the Crown of *France*, upon my beſt inquiry, I find to be thus: *Charles* the ſixth of *France* married his lawful Daughter *Katharine* to *Henry* the fifth, Son and Heir to *Henry* the fourth, King of *England*: In the articles of Marriage, (no notice being taken of *Charles* the 7th, who was afterwards King of *France*) beſides the Dower that was given with *Katharine*, *Charles* the ſixth, Father to the ſaid *Katharine* inſtituted *Henry* the fifth of *England* (his Son in Law, and to be married to the ſaid *Katharine*) Heir to that Kingdom of *France*: and in caſe the ſaid *Henry* ſhould die before the ſaid *Charles*, and the ſaid *Henry* leave Sons that were legitimate behind him, that then the Sons of the ſaid King *Henry* ſhould ſucceed to the ſaid Kingdom of *France*, upon the death of the ſaid *Charles* the ſixth; which was contrary to Law, becauſe *Charles* the ſeventh was prejudiced thereby, and was afterwards of no validity or effect; againſt which the *Engliſh* pretend that *Charles* the ſeventh was illegitimate.

The Arch-Biſhopricks in *England* are two.
The Biſhopricks two and twenty, and
The Pariſhes 52000.

THE

THE STATE OF GERMANY, In an ABRIDGMENT

Written by

Nicolo Machiavelli, Secretary of *FLORENCE*.

OF the power of *Germany* no body can doubt, becauſe it abounds ſo exceedingly in Men, and Money, and Arms. As to its wealth, there is not a Free Town in the whole Country, but has a publick ſtock aforehand of its own; and ſome ſay *Argentina (Strasburg)* alone has a Million of Florens conſtantly in bank. The reaſon of their opulence is becauſe they have nothing to exhauſt them, but their Fortifications, and furniſhing their Magazines (for reparations, and recruits coſt 'em but little.) In the latter they have a very good way; for they have always in their publick Stores, Meat and Drink, and Firing for a Twelve-month: Beſides, to entertain the induſtry of their people, they have wherewithal to ſet the poor on work, in caſe of any Siege, a compleat year together, ſo as they may ſubſiſt upon their own labour, without being burthenſom to the Town. Their Soldiers are but little expence to 'em; for they are always well arm'd, and well exerciſed; and on their Feſtival days, inſtead of the common recreations, one takes his Musket, another his Pike, one one ſort of Arms, another another, and practiſing among themſelves, they grow very ready and dexterous; and after they are arriv'd at ſome degree of perfection, they have certain Honours and Salaries conferred upon them, which is the greateſt part of their charge. So that in every free Town the publick Treaſury is rich.

The reaſon likewiſe why the private perſons are rich, is this, becauſe they live with great parſimony, and indeed little better than if they were poor; for they are at no expence in their Clothes, their Buildings, nor the furniſhing of their Houſes. If they have bread, and fleſh, and any thing to keep them from the cold, they are well enough; and he that wants them, is contented, and makes ſome ſhift or other without them. Two Florens will ſerve them in Clothes ten years; and according to his degree every man lives at this rate; they do not trouble themſelves for every thing they want, but only for thoſe things that are abſolutely neceſſary, and by that means their neceſſities are much fewer than ours: The reſult of which Cuſtom is this, their Mony goes not out of their Country, they contenting themſelves with their own native Productions, whilſt in the mean time every man is permitted to bring in what Treaſure he pleaſes into *Germany*, to purchaſe their Commodities and Manufactures which in a manner ſupplies all *Italy*; and their gain is ſo much the more, by how much a ſmall part of the profit of their labours, recruits them with Materials for new.

Thus do they live at liberty, and enjoy their own humors; for which reaſon they will not be got to the Wars, but upon extraordinary pay, and that will not do it neither, unleſs they be commanded by their own Magiſtrates; wherefore an Emperor has need of more Mony than another Prince; becauſe, if men be in a good condition already, they are not eaſily allured to the Wars.

As things ſtand now, the free States muſt unite with the Princes, before any great exploit can be undertaken by the Emperor; or elſe they muſt enterprize it themſelves; which they would be able to do. But neither the one or the other deſires the greatneſs of the Emperor; for if ever he ſhould get thoſe Free States into his hands, he ſhould be ſtrong enough to overpower the Princes, and reduce 'em to ſuch a degree of ſubjection, that he would manage them as he pleaſed himſelf, as the Kings of *France* have done formerly in that Country, and particularly King *Lewis*, who by force of Arms, and the cutting off ſome few Perſons brought 'em to their preſent obedience. The ſame thing would happen to the States, if the Princes ſhould be cajoled; they would loſe their freedoms, be wholly at the diſpoſition of the Emperor, and be forced to be ſatisfied with what he would vouchſafe to afford them. The diſtance and diviſion betwixt the free States and the Princes, is ſuppoſed to proceed from the different humours in that Country, which in general are two; The *Swiſſers* are become Enemies to all *Germany*, and the Princes to the Emperor. It may ſeem ſtrange, perhaps, that the *Swiſſers*, and free States ſhould be at variance and enmity, ſeeing the preſervation of their liberty, and ſecuring themſelves againſt the Princes, is the common intereſt of both; But their diſcord is from this, that the *Swiſſers* are not only Enemies to the Princes, but to all Gentlemen whatever, and in their Country, they have neither the one, nor the other; but live without diſtinction of perſons (unleſs in their Magiſtrates) in the moſt levelling liberty in the world. This practice of the *Swiſſers* makes all the Gentlemen which are remaining in any of the free Towns afraid of them; ſo that they employ their whole induſtry in keeping their States at a diſtance with them, and preventing any intelligence betwixt them. Moreover all of thoſe States who have been Soldiers, and had their Education in the Wars, are mortally their Enemies; moved thereunto by Emulation and Envy; becauſe they themſelves are not ſo famous abroad, and their animoſity is ſo great, that they never meet in the field (let their numbers be ſmall, or great) but they fall together by the Ears.

As to the Enmity betwixt the Princes and the free Towns, and the *Swiſſers*, I need ſay no more, it being ſo generally known; as likewiſe of the jealouſies betwixt the Emperor and the Princes. You muſt underſtand, that the Emperor's principal apprehenſion is of the Princes, and not being able to correct them alone, he has made uſe of the aſſiſtance of theſe free States, and not long ſince, entertained the *Swiſſers* into his allyance, by whoſe means he thought himſelf in a very good condition. So that theſe common diſſentions being conſider'd, and the particular piques and ſuſpicions betwixt one Prince and one State and another, it is no eaſie matter to unite the Empire; and yet it is neceſſary it ſhould be united, before any great thing can be performed by the Emperor. And tho' he who believes *Germany* in a condition to do great things, becauſe there is viſibly no Prince who has the power, or indeed the courage to oppoſe the deſigns of the Emperor, as formerly has been done, yet he muſt know that it is a great impediment to an Emperor not to be aſſiſted by thoſe Princes; for though perhaps a Prince dares not contend with him, he dares deny him his aſſiſtance; and if he dares not deny him that, he dares break his promiſe upon occaſion; and if he dares not do that, will at leaſt make ſo bold to defer and delay the performance ſo long, that when his ſupplies do come, they ſhall do the Emperor no good; all which things do infinitely diſturb and embarraſs his deſigns. And this was found to be true, when the Emperor would the firſt time have paſſed into *Italy*, in ſpight both of the *French* and the *Venetian*; in a Dyet held at that time in *Conſtance*, he was promis'd by the ſeveral Free States in *Germany* a ſupply of -----thouſand Foot, and 3000 Horſe, yet he could never get of 'em together above 5000; and that becauſe by that time the Forces of one State came up, another was ready to depart, their time being expired; and ſome ſent Mony in lieu; upon which ſcore that Enterprize was loſt.

The ſtrength of *Germany* conſiſts in the free Towns, rather than in the Princes; for the Princes are of two ſorts, Temporal and Spiritual. The Temporal Princes are brought very low, partly by themſelves (every Principality being cantoniz'd and diſtributed to ſeveral Princes by conſtitution of their inheritances, which are obſerv'd very ſtrictly in thoſe Countries) and partly having been much weakned by the Emperor and his aſſiſtance from the ſaid States; ſo that now the amity of the Temporal Princes is of little importance. There are likewiſe Spiritual Princes, whoſe Territories, if not cantoniz'd and divided by thoſe Hereditary Cuſtoms, are yet ſo weakned and enervated by the ambition of their own free Towns, and the favour that the Emperor ſhews 'em, that the Electoral Archbiſhops, and the reſt have little or no power in the great and chief Towns of their own Dominions; from whence it comes to paſs, that being divided at home, they cannot favour the Enterprizes of the Emperor, tho' they would themſelves. But to come to the Free and the Imperial Towns, which are the ſtrength of that Coutry, as being rich,

rich, and well-govern'd. Thoſe Towns for ſeveral reaſons, are grown cooler in the aſſertion of their Liberties, and much more in the acquiſition of new, and that which they do not deſire for themſelves, they do not care another ſhould have. Beſides they are ſo many; and every one to be commanded by a General of their own, that their ſupplies, when they are diſpoſed to ſend them, come but very ſlow, and when they do come, are not ſo uſeful as they ſhould be, and of this we have an Example not many years ſince. The *Swiſſers* invaded the State of *Maximilian*, and *Suevia*: The Emperor contracted with the Free Towns to repel them, and they oblig'd themſelves to aſſiſt him with an Army of 14000 Men, but he never got half of 'em, and the reaſon was as aboveſaid, when the Forces of one Town came up, another marched off. inſomuch that the Emperor deſpairing of ſucceſs, came to an agreement with the *Swiſſers*, and left *Baſil* in their poſſeſſion. And if in this caſe, where their own intereſt was concern'd, they have acted at this rate, it may be gueſſed how they will behave themſelves in the concerns of other men; ſo that all theſe things laid together, though their power be great, yet it can turn but to little accompt to the Emperor. And the *Venetians* by their Converſation and Commerce with the Merchants of *Germany*, in all their Tranſactions hitherto with the Emperor, have underſtood him better than any body elſe, and dealt more honourably by him; for had they been in any apprehenſion of his power, they would have inſiſted upon ſome caution, either by way of Mony or Towns; and if they had ſeen any poſſibility of uniting the whole power of the Empire, they would never have oppos'd it. But knowing that to be impoſſible, it made them the more confident, and gave them hopes of ſucceſs. If therefore in a ſingle City, the affairs of the multitude are negligently manag'd, in a Province they will be much worſe. Moreover thoſe little States are ſenſible, that an acquiſition in *Italy*, or elſewhere, would fall to the Princes, and not to them, becauſe they might enjoy them perſonally, which could not be done by a Common-wealth; and where the reward is like to be unequal people will not willingly be at an equal expence. Their power therefore is great, but of little importance, and he who peruſes what has been ſaid before, and conſiders what was been done for ſeveral years paſt, will find how little it is to be rely'd upon.

The *German* Men at Arms are well mounted, and many of them well enough arm'd, but their Horſes are heavy and unactive, and it is to be obſerved that in their Encounters with the *Italians* or *French*, they can do nothing at all, not for any fault in the Men, but the accoutrement of their Horſes, for their Saddles being little, and weak, and without bows, every little joſtle tumbles them upon the ground: and another of their great diſadvantages is, that the lower part of their bodies are never arm'd; whereby not being able to defend againſt the firſt impreſſion (in which the excellence of thoſe Soldiers conſiſt) they lie expoſed (upon the cloſe) to the ſhort Swords of the Enemy, and may be wounded both themſelves and Horſes in thoſe diſarmed places, and it is in the power of every Foot man to pull them off their Horſes, and rip their Guts out when they have done, and then as to the manage of their Horſes they are too heavy to do any thing at all.

Their Foot are very good, and very perſonable men, contrary to the *Swiſs*, who are but ſmall, rough hewn, and not handſom at all: But they arm themſelves (unleſs it be ſome few) only with a Pike and a Sword, that they might be the more dexterous, and nimble, and light; and their ſaying uſed to be, that they arm themſelves no better, becauſe they feared nothing but the Artillery; againſt which no Breaſt-plate, or Croſlet, or Gorget would ſecure them: other weapons they deſpiſe; for it is ſaid their order is ſo good, and they ſtand ſo firm to one another 'tis impoſſible to break into 'em, nor come near them if their Pikes be long enough. They are excellent in a Field fight, but for the ſtorming of a Town they are good for nothing; and but little to defend one: and generally where the Men cannot keep their old orders and manage themſelves with room enough, they are worth but little: Of this experience has been ſeen where they have been engaged with the *Italians*, or aſſaulted any Town, as at *Padua* where they came off very ill, though on the other ſide, in the Field they had done well enough. For in the Battel of *Ravenna*, betwixt the *French* and the *Spaniards*, if it had not been for their Lanceknights, the *French* had been beaten; for whilſt the Men at Arms were confronted, and engaged with one another, the *Spaniſh* had the better of the *French*, and had diſordered their *Gaſcoigns*, ſo that had not the *Germans* came in and relieved them, they had been utterly broken: aud the ſame was ſeen lately when the *Spaniſh* King made War upon the *French* in *Guienna*, the *Spaniards* were more fearful of a Body of 10000 *German* Foot, which the King of *France* had in his Service, than all the reſt of his Army, therefore they declined coming to a Battel with all the Art they could uſe.

THE

DISCOURSES

OF

Nicholas Machiavel,

UPON THE

FIRST DECADE

OF

TITUS LIVIUS.

Faithfully Engliſhed.

LONDON:

Printed for *A. Churchill, R. Bonwick, T. Goodwin, J. Walthoe, M. Wotton, S. Manſhip, B. Tooke, R. Wilkin, R. Smith, R. Robinſon,* and *T. Ward,* 1720.

TITUS LIVIUS

OF

THE FIRST DECADE

UPON THE

NICOLAS MACHIAVEL

OF

DISCOURSES

THE

NICOLO MACHIAVELLI

TO

Zanobi Buondelmonti *and* Coſimo Rucellai.

I Send you a Preſent, which (tho' not anſwerable to my Obligations) is doubtleſs the greateſt that Nicolo Machiavelli *was able to ſend, having expreſs'd in it whatever I know or have learned by a long Practice, and continued reading of the Affairs of this World, than which, neither you nor any body elſe being to expect more; I am not to be blamed if my Preſent be no better. You may complain indeed of the Poverty of my Parts, my Narrations being ſo poor; and of the Weakneſs of my Judgment, having perhaps miſtaken in many places of my Diſcourſes: If ſo, I know not which of us is leſs obliged to the other, I to you, for having forced me to write againſt my own Inclination, or you to me, for having perform'd it no more to your Satisfaction. Accept it then in the ſame manner as things are accepted from Friends, among whom the Intention of the Giver is always more conſider'd than the Quality of the Gift; and believe, that as oft as I think of it, I am ſatisfied in this, that however I have been miſtaken in many other Circumſtances, I have done wiſely in this, having choſen You, above all others, for the Dedication of my Diſcourſes, both becauſe in not doing it, I ſhould have ſhewn my ſelf in ſome meaſure ingrateful for the Benefits receiv'd; and in doing it, I have tranſgreſs'd the common Cuſtom of Authors, who for the moſt part direct their Works to ſome Prince, and (blinded with Ambition and Avarice) applaud and magnifie him for all the virtuous Qualities, when perchance they ought rather to have reproach'd him with all the Vices imaginable. To avoid that Error, I have made choice, not of thoſe who are actually Princes, but of ſuch as by their infinite good Parts do merit to be ſo; not of thoſe who are actually able to advance me to Honours, Employments, and Wealth, but to thoſe, who though unable, would do it if they could: For, to judge right, Men are rather to eſteem thoſe in whoſe Nature, than thoſe in whoſe Power it is to be liberal, and thoſe who underſtand how to govern a Kingdom, than thoſe who do govern it without that Underſtanding. Accordingly Authors do commend* Hiero *the* Syracuſan, *tho' but a private Perſon, above* Perſeus *of* Macedon, *tho' a great King; becauſe to* Hiero *there was nothing wanting to be an Excellent Prince, but a Principality; and* Perſeus *had nothing but a Kingdom to recommend him to be King. Accept then (whether it be good or bad) what you commanded your ſelves; and if you be ſo far in an Error as to approve my Opinions, I ſhall not fail to purſue the reſt of my Hiſtory, as I promis'd in the Beginning. Farewel.*

THE

THE

DISCOURSES

OF

NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL,

Citizen and Secretary of *Florence*,

Upon the FIRST DECADE of

TITUS LIVIUS

TO

Zanobius Bon de montus and *Cosimus Rucellaius.*

LIBER I.

CONsidering with my self what honour is given to Antiquity, and how many times (passing by variety of instances) the fragment of an old Statue has been purchas'd at an high rate by many people, out of curiosity to keep it by them, as an ornament to their house, or as a pattern for the imitation of such as delight in that art; and with what industry and pains they endeavour afterwards to have it represented in all their buildings. On the other side, observing the most honourable and heroick actions (describ'd in History, perform'd by Kingdoms and ancient Common-wealths; by Kings, great Captains, Citizens, Legislators, and others, which have not only tir'd, but spent themselves in the service of their Country) are rather admir'd than imitated, and indeed so far shun'd and declin'd, in all places, there is scarce any impression or shadow to be seen in this age of the virtue of our ancestors; I could not at the same time but admire, and lament it; and the more, by how much I observ'd in all civil and personal controversies, in all diseases incident to mankind, recourse is continually had to such judgments and remedies as have been deriv'd to us by our predecessors; for to speak truth, the Civil Law is nothing but the sentence and determination of their fore-Fathers, which reduced into order, do shew and instruct our present Lawyers which way to decide; nor is the art of the Physician any thing more than ancient experience handed down to our times, upon which the Practiser of our age founds all his method and doctrine. Nevertheless, in the ordering of Commonwealths, in the conservation of their several

members, in the Government of Kingdoms, in the regiment of armies, in the management of War, in the adminiſtration of Juſtice, in the enlargement and propagation of Empire, there is not to be found either Prince, Republick, great Captain or Citizen, which repairs to Antiquity for example; which perſuaded me it proceeded not ſo much from niceneſs and effeminacy our preſent Education has introduced upon the world, nor from the miſchief which turbulent and ſeditious idleneſs has brought forth in many Provinces and Cities in Chriſtendom, as from our ignorance or inadvertency in Hiſtory, not taking the ſenſe of what we read, or not minding the reliſh and poinancy with which it is many times impregnated; from whence it comes to paſs, that many who read are much pleaſed and delighted with the variety of accidents contain'd in Hiſtory, but never think them intended for their imitation, that being a thing, in their judgments, not only difficult, but impoſſible; as if the Heaven, the Sun, the Elements and Mankind were altered and diſpoſſeſſed of the motion, order and power with which they were primitively inveſted. Being deſirous to reduce ſuch as ſhall fall into this error, I have judged it neceſſary to write upon all thoſe Books of *Titus Livius*, (which, by the malignity of time, have not been intercepted) what I (according to ancient and modern opinion) ſhall think uſeful for their further explanation; to the end, that they which ſhall peruſe theſe my diſcourſes, may extract ſuch advantage and document as is neceſſary for their proficiency and improvement by Hiſtory; and though my enterprize appears to be difficult, yet by the aſſiſtance of thoſe who put me upon it, I do not deſpair but to diſcharge my ſelf ſo, as to leave the way much more eaſie and ſhort to any man that ſhall deſire to come after me.

CHAP. I.

What have been generally the principles of all Cities, and particularly of Rome.

THoſe who ſhall read the Original of the City of *Rome*, by what Legiſlators advanced and by what Government order'd, will not wonder it ſhall remain firm and entire for ſo many ages, afterwards ſo vaſt an Empire ſpring out of it as that Commonwealth arrived to. Being to diſcourſe firſt of its Original, it is convenient to premiſe, that all Cities are built either by natives born in the Country where they were erected, or by ſtrangers. The firſt happens when, to the Inhabitants diſperſed in many and little parties, it appears their habitation is inſecure, not being able apart (by reaſon of their diſtance, or ſmalneſs of their numbers) to reſiſt an invaſion, (if any Enemy ſhould fall upon them) or to unite ſuddenly for their defence, without leaving their Houſes and Families expoſed, which by conſequence would be certain prey to the enemy. Whereupon, to evade thoſe dangers, moved either by their own impulſe, or the ſuggeſtions of ſome perſon among them of more than ordinary authority, they oblige themſelves to live together in ſome place to be choſen by them for convenience of proviſion, and eaſineſs of defence. Of this ſort, among many others, *Athens* and *Venice* were two: the firſt that built under the authority of *Theſeus*, upon occaſion of the like diſtance and diſperſion of the natives. The other (there being many people driven together into certain little Iſlands in that point of the *Adriatick* Sea, to avoid the War which every day, by the acceſs and irruption of new Armies of *Barbarians* after the declenſion of the Roman Empire grew intolerable in *Italy*) began by degrees among themſelves without the aſſiſtance or any encouragement of any Prince, to treat and ſubmit to ſuch Laws as appeared moſt likely to preſerve them: and it ſucceeded to their deſire by the long reſpite and tranquillity their ſituation afforded them; that Sea having no paſſage at that end, and the *Barbarians* no ſhips to diſturb them; ſo that the leaſt beginning imaginable was ſufficient to exalt them to their preſent authority and grandeur.

The ſecond caſe, when a City is raiſed by ſtrangers, it is done by people that are free, or depending (as Colonies) or elſe by ſome Prince or Republick to eaſe and diſburthen themſelves of their exuberance, or to defend ſome Territory, which being newly acquir'd, they deſire with more ſafety and leſs expence to maintain (of which ſort ſeveral were by the people of *Rome* all over their Empire) otherwiſe they are ſometimes erected by ſome Prince, not for his reſidence ſo much as for his glory and renown (as *Alexandria* by *Alexander* the great). But theſe Cities not being free in their Original, ſeldom ariſe to any extraordinary height more than to be reckon'd the heads or chief of ſome Kingdom. Of this ſort was *Florence*, for (whether built by the Soldiers of *Silla*, or perchance by the Inhabi-

Inhabitants of the Mountain *di Fieſole*, who preſuming upon, and being encouraged by the long Peace under the Reign of *Auguſtus*, deſcended from their Mountain to inhabit the plain upon the River *Arnus*) it was built under the Roman Empire, and could not upon thoſe principles exalt it ſelf higher than the courteſie of the Prince would permit. The Founders of Cities are free, when by themſelves, or the Command of their Soveraign they are conſtrain'd upon occaſion of ſickneſs, famine, or war, to abandon their own, in queſt of new Countries: and theſe do either poſſeſs themſelves of ſuch Towns as they find ready built in their Conqueſts, (as *Moſes* did), or they build 'em *de novo*, as *Æneas*. In this caſe the power of the builder, and the fortune of the building is conſpicuous and honourable, according as the courſe from whence it derives its Original is more or leſs eminent. His virtue and prudence is diſcernible two ways, by the election of the Seat, and inſtitution of the Laws; and becauſe men build as often by neceſſity as choice, and the judgment and wiſdom of the builder is greater where there is leſs room and latitude for his election; it is worthy our conſideration whether it is more advantagious building in barren and unfruitful places, to the end that the people being conſtrain'd to be induſtrious, and leſs obnoxious to idleneſs, might live in more unity, the poverty of the ſoil giving them leſs opportunity of diſſention. Thus it fell out in *Raugia* and ſeveral other Cities built in ſuch places; and that kind of election would doubtleſs be moſt prudent and profitable, if men could be content to live quietly of what they had, whithout an ambitious deſire of Command. But there being no ſecurity againſt that, but power, it is neceſſary to avoid that ſterility, and build in the fruitfulleſt places can be found, where their numbers encreaſing by the plentifulneſs of the ſoil, they may be able not only to defend themſelves againſt an aſſault, but repel any oppoſition ſhall be made to their grandeur; and as to that idleneſs to which the richneſs of the ſituation diſpoſes, it may be provided againſt by Laws and convenient exerciſe enjoyn'd, according to the example of ſeveral wiſe men, who having inhabited Countries, pleaſant, fruitful, and apt to produce ſuch lazy people improper for ſervice, to prevent the inconvenience which might follow thereupon, enjoyn'd ſuch a neceſſity of exerciſe to ſuch as were intended for the Wars, that by degrees they became better Souldiers than thoſe Countries which were mountainous and barren could any where produce. Among whom may be reckon'd the Kingdom of *Egypt*, which, notwithſtanding that it was extreamly pleaſant and plentiful, by the virtue and efficacy of its Laws produc'd excellent men, and perhaps ſuch as, had not their names been extinguiſh'd with time, might have deſerv'd as much honour as *Alexander* the Great, and many other great Captains, whoſe memories are ſo freſh, and ſo venerable among us. And who-ever would conſider the Government of the *Soldan*, the diſcipline of the *Mamalukes*, and the reſt of their Militia before they were extirpated by *Selimus* the *Turk*, might find their great prudence and caution in exerciſing their Souldiers, and preventing that ſoftneſs and effeminacy to which the felicity of their ſoil did ſo naturally incline them.

For theſe reaſons I conceive beſt to build in a fruitful place, if the ill conſequences of that fertility be averted by convenient Laws. *Alexander* the Great being deſirous to build a City to perpetuate his name, *Dinocrates* an Architect came to him, and undertook to build him one upon the Mountain *Athos*, and to recommend and inforce his propoſal, (beſides the goodneſs of the ſoil) he perſuaded him it ſhould be made in the ſhape and figure of a man (a thing which would be new, wonderful, and ſuitable to his greatneſs). But when *Alexander* enquired whence it was to be ſupply'd, the Architect reply'd, he had not conſider'd of that; at which anſwer *Alexander* laugh'd very heartily, and leaving him and his mountain to themſelves, he built *Alexandria*, where people might be tempted to plant by the richneſs of the Soil, the nearneſs of the Sea, and convenience of the River *Nile*. Again, if we examine the Original of *Rome*, and admit *Æneas* for the firſt Founder, it will fall in the number of thoſe Cities built by foreigners: if *Romulus*, among ſuch as were erected by the natives; either way it was originally free, without any dependance. It will appear likewiſe (as ſhall be ſhewn more particularly hereafter) by what Laws *Romulus*, *Numa* and others fortified and ſecur'd it; inſomuch that neither the fertility of the Soil, the commodity of the Sea, the frequency of their Victories, nor the largneſs of its Empire were able to debauch or corrupt it; but it remain'd for ſeveral ages for piety and virtue more exemplary than any other Commonwealth either ſince or before it. And becauſe the great things acted under that Government, and tranſmitted to us by *Titus Livius*, were performed by publick or private Counſel within or without the City, I ſhall begin with what occour'd in the Town, and was manag'd by publick debate, (as judging that moſt worthy our annotation) ſuper-adding what-ever depended thereupon; and with theſe diſcourſes I intend this firſt Book, (or rather Part) ſhall conclude.

CHAP. II.

The ſeveral kinds of Commonwealths, and under which kind the Roman *is comprehended.*

WAving the diſcourſe of thoſe Cities which in their beginning have been dependant, I ſhall ſpeak of ſuch as were originally free, and governed themſelves according to their own fancies, Common wealths or Principalities, as their own inclinations lead them. Of theſe (according to the diverſity of their principles) their Laws and Orders were divers. Some of them at their firſt foundation received their Laws at one time from a ſingle perſon, as the *Spartans* from *Lycurgus*. Others received them by chance, at ſeveral times, upon variety of accidents, as *Rome*; and that Common wealth is doubtleſly happy, whoſe good fortune it is to have a perſon ſo wiſe as to conſtitute and diſpoſe its Laws in ſuch manner at firſt, that it may ſubſiſt ſafely and ſecurely by them, whithout neceſſity of new modelling or correction. Of this ſort was *Sparta*, which for more than 800 years was obſerved to remain entire and incorrupt, without any dangerous commotion. On the other ſide, that City muſt needs be in ſome meaſure unhappy, which, not having ſubmitted to, or comply'd with the prudence of a ſingle founder, is neceſſitated of it ſelf to remodel and reform. Of theſe kinds, that is moſt unhappy whoſe principles were at firſt remote and devious from the right way which might have conducted to perfection; and indeed thoſe Common-wealths which are in this degree, are almoſt impoſſible to be eſtabliſh'd by any accident whatſoever. But others (whoſe Commencements are good, and capable of improvement, though perhaps not exquiſitely perfect) may become perfect afterwards by the concurrence of accidents, yet not without danger, foraſmuch as moſt men are averſe, and will not eaſily admit of any new Law which introduces new Orders and Cuſtoms into a City, without great appearance of neceſſity, and that neceſſity ariſing neceſſarily from ſome danger impending, it many times falls out the Commonwealth periſhes before remedy can be applyed. Of this the Commonwealth of *Florence* is inſtance ſufficient, which in the commotion of *Aretz* was the 11th. time reform'd, and the 12th time confounded by the ſedition of *Prato*.

But being now to diſcourſe of the State of the Roman Commonwealth, and what were the accidents and orders which advanced it to that perfection, it is convenient to premiſe (what has been aſſerted by ſeveral Authors) that there are but three ſorts of Governments *Monarchy*, *Ariſtocracy*, and *Democracy*, to either of which who-ever intends to erect a Government, may apply as he pleaſes. Others (of no leſs reputation) are of opinion the forms of Government are ſix, of which three are bad, and three good of themſelves, but ſo eaſily corrupted, even they become fatal and pernicious. Thoſe which are good are the three before mention'd, thoſe which are evil are three others depending upon the three former; and carrying ſo near a reſemblance, they many times interfere, and fall one into the other, as Monarchy into Tyranny, Ariſtocracy into Oligarchy, and Democracy into Anarchy and Confuſion: inſomuch, that who-ever forms his Government of one of the three former, forms it for no long time, becauſe no care nor remedy can prevent, but it will degenerate into its contrary, by reaſon of the ſimilitude betwixt virtue and vice: and theſe changes and variations of Government happened by accident amongſt men; for at the beginning of the World the Inhabitants being few, they lived diſperſed after the manner of beaſts: afterwards, as they multiply'd, they began to unite, and, for their better defence, to look out for ſuch as were more ſtrong, robuſt, and valiant, that they might chooſe one out of them to make him their head, and pay him obedience; from hence the firſt diſtinction betwixt honeſt and diſhoneſt did ariſe: for obſerving that if any injur'd his Benefactor, it immediately created an hatred and compaſſion among the reſt, all people abhorring him that was ungrateful, and commiſerating him that was injur'd; leſt the ſame injuſtice might happen to themſelves, they began to make Laws, and ordain puniſhments for offenders; and this was the firſt appearance of juſtice in the World; after which being to make an Election of their Prince, they did not ſo much reſpect the ability of his body as the qualifications of his mind, chooſing him that was moſt prudent and juſt; but by degrees their Government coming to be Hereditary, and not by Election, according to their former way, thoſe which inherited degenerated from their Anceſtors, and neglecting all virtuous actions, began to believe that Princes were exalted for no other end but to diſcriminate themſelves from their ſubjects by their pomp, luxury, and all other effeminate qualities, by which means they fell into the hatred of the people, and by conſequence became afraid of them, and that fear encreaſing

creaſing, they began to meditate revenge, oppreſſing ſome, and diſobliging others till inſenſibly the Government alter'd, and fell into Tyranny. And theſe were the firſt grounds of ruine, the firſt occaſion of Conjuration and Conſpiracy againſt Princes, not ſo much in the puſillanimous and poor, as in thoſe whoſe generoſity, ſpirit and riches would not ſuffer 'em to ſubmit to ſo diſhonourable adminiſtrations. The multitude following the authority of the Nobles, took up Arms againſt their Prince, and having conquer'd and extirpated that Government, they ſubjected themſelves to the Nobility which had freed 'em; and deteſting the name of a ſingle perſon, they took the Government upon themſelves, and at firſt (reflecting upon the late Tyranny) govern'd according to new Laws devis'd by themſelves, poſtponing particular profit to publick advantage; ſo that both the one and the other were preſerv'd and manag'd with great diligence and exactneſs. But their authority afterwards deſcending upon their Sons, (who being ignorant of the variations of fortune, as not having experimented her inconſtancy) and not contenting themſelves with a civil equality, but falling into rapine, oppreſſion, ambition, and adulteries, they changed the Government again, and brought it from an Optimacy to be govern'd by few, without any reſpect or conſideration of Juſtice or Civility; ſo that in a ſhort time it happen'd to them as to the Tyrant; for the multitude being weary of their Government, were ready to aſſiſt any body that would attempt to remove it, by which means in a ſhort time it was extinguiſh'd.

And foraſmuch as the tyranny of their Prince, and the inſolence of their Nobles were freſh in their memory, they reſolv'd to reſtore neither the one nor the other, but conclude upon a popular State, which was regulated ſo as neither Prince nor Noble ſhould have any authority: And there being no States but are reverenced at firſt, this Populacy continu'd for ſome time, but not long, (eſpecially after its Founders) for it fell immediately into an irreſiſtible licentiouſneſs, contemning all authority both publick and private; and every man living after his own mind, a thouſand injuries were daily committed; ſo that forced by neceſſity, by the ſuggeſtions of ſome good man, or for avoiding the like enormities, they return'd to their primitive Kingſhip, and from thence by degrees relaps'd again in the manner, and upon the occaſions aforeſaid. And this is the Sphear and Circle in which all Republicks have, and do move; but it ſeldom or never happens that they return to the ſame circumſtances of Government again; becauſe it is ſcarce poſſible for any of them to be ſo long liv'd, as to paſs many times thorow the ſame mutations and remain upon its legs. It ſometimes comes to paſs likewiſe, that in the conflicts and troubles of a State, being deſtitute both of counſel and force, it becomes a prey to ſome neighbouring Commonwealth that is better govern'd than it: But admitting that could not be, Governments would fall from one another, and make an infinite circulation. For theſe reaſons all the foreſaid forms of Government are in judgment infirm and unſtable; the three good ones from the ſhortneſs of man's life, and the three bad ones from their proper imperfections. Whereupon, the wiſeſt Legiſlators finding this defect, and avoiding every one of thoſe kinds, they fram'd a Government which ſhould conſiſt of them all, believing it to be more permanent and ſtable, becauſe, Prince, Nobles, and People living in the ſame City and communicating in the ſame Government, they would be all of them in ſight of one another, and more capable of correction. The perſon which in this kind has merited moſt praiſe was *Lycurgus*, who order'd his Laws in *Sparta* in ſuch manner, that giving King, Nobility, and People, each of them their portion, he erected a Government that continu'd for more than eight hundred years, to his great honour, and that City's repoſe.

To *Solon* it hapned clear otherwiſe (who was the *Athenian* Legiſlator) whoſe aiming only at a popular Government, was the cauſe it was ſo ſhort liv'd, that before he died he ſaw the tyranny of *Piſiſtratus* ſpring out of it; and though forty years after the Tyrant's Heirs were expelled, and *Athens* reſtored to its liberty, yet reſuming the old model which *Solon* had recommended, it could not continue above an hundred years, notwithſtanding many new laws were ſuper-added to reſtrain the inſolence of the Nobility, and the looſeneſs of the Commons. But there being no mixture and temperament of Principality and Optimacy with the other, in reſpect of *Sparta*, *Athens* was but of little duration. But to return to *Rome*, though it had not a *Lycurgus* to obſtetricate at its birth, and ſupply it with ſuch Laws as might preſerve its freedom ſo long.

Nevertheleſs, the accidents which hapned upon the diſſention betwixt the people and the Senate produc'd that in ſome meaſure which was defective at its foundation; or tho' in its beginning its Laws and Orders were imperfect, yet it did not altogether deflect from the right way which was to conduct it to perfection, *Romulus*, *Numa*, and all the reſt of its Kings making many good Laws conformable to its freedom. But their ultimate deſign being to perpetuate their Monarchy, tho' that City remain'd free,

there

there were many things omitted by thoſe Princes which were neceſſary for its conſervation. And tho' it fell out their Kings loſt their Dominion upon the aboveſaid occaſions, yet thoſe who expulſed them, creating two Conſuls in their ſtead, they rather drove the name than the authority of Kingſhip out of the City. After which, the Government reſiding in the Conſuls and Senate, it conſiſted only of two of the three ſorts, Monarchy and Ariſtocracy: It remained now to give place only to a popular Government, and the *Roman* Nobility being grown inſolent, upon occaſions which ſhall be mention'd hereafter, the people tumultuated, took up Arms againſt 'em, and prevail'd ſo far, that (leſt otherwiſe they might loſe all) it was conſented the people ſhould have their ſhare, and yet the Senate and Conſuls on the other hand retain ſo much of their former authority as to keep up their degrees as before: And this was the beginning of the *Tribunes* of the people, after the creation of which, that State became better eſtabliſhed, every one of the three ſorts having a ſhare in the Government; and Fortune was very favourable; and tho' it ſuffer'd many mutations, and paſſed from a Monarchy to an Ariſtocracy, and from that to the people by the ſame gradations, and the ſame occaſions I have mention'd; nevertheleſs, the power was not taken from their Kings to transfer it upon the Nobles, nor from the Nobility to give it wholly to the people; but remaining mixt and compounded of all three, that Republick grew in time to be perfect, to which perfection the difference and jealouſies betwixt the Senate and people contributed exceedingly, as ſhall be largely demonſtrated in the two following Chapters.

CHAP. III.

Upon what Accidents and Tumults in Rome *the Tribune of the People was created, by which the Commonwealth became more perfect.*

ACcording to the judgment of all Authors who have written of Civil Government, and the examples of all Hiſtory, it is neceſſary to whoever will eſtabliſh a Government, and preſcribe Laws to it, to preſuppoſe all men naturally bad, and that they will ſhew and exert that natural malignity as often as they have occaſion to do it ſecurely; for tho' it may poſſibly lie conceal'd for ſome time, it is for ſome ſecret reaſon which want of precedent and experience renders inviſible; but Time diſcovers it afterwards, and is therefore juſtly called the *Father of Truth.*

After the expulſion of the *Tarquins* there appear'd in *Rome* a very great union betwixt the Senate and people; the Senate ſeemed to have depoſited their old arrogance, and taken up a gentleneſs and humility that rendred them grateful even to the meaneſt mechanick: In this manner they curb'd and conſtrain'd their evil deſigns as having no hopes of ſucceſs while the *Tarquins* were living, who were formidable to the Nobility of themſelves, and would be much more, if the people by any ill uſage ſhould be animated to joyn with them, and this was the true ground of their Hypocriſie. But no ſooner were the *Tarquins* dead, and the Nobility diſcharged of their fear, but they began to expectorate, and ſpit out the venom had lain ſo long in their ſtomachs againſt the people, uſing 'em with all imaginable injury and contempt, which carriage of theirs gives good teſtimony to my aſſertion, that man is naturally wicked, never does well but upon neceſſity; and when at any time it is his choice, and he may follow his own genius with freedom, all things run immediately into diſorder and confuſion; and that ſaying is not without reaſon, *That Reputation and Poverty make men induſtrious, but it is Laws which make them good:* Otherwiſe, if people did well of themſelves, Laws would be uſeleſs; but where that is not to be expected, Laws become neceſſary. No ſooner were the *Tarquins* removed, and the authority and terror wherewith they kept the Senate in awe; but it was thought fit to find out ſome new invention that might reſtrain the Nobility, and keep them in the ſame circle of humanity and juſtice as the *Tarquins* had done whilſt they were alive: At length, after many ſquabbles and contentions betwixt the people and them, all was accommodated by the creation of a *Tribune* for the ſecurity of the people; which *Tribune* was to be inveſted with ſuch authority and priviledge as might enable him to become afterwards an Arbitrator betwixt them, and a ſtop for the future to the inſolence of the Nobility.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

The Diſſentions betwixt the Senate and the People of Rome, *were the occaſion that Commonwealth became ſo powerful and free.*

I Cannot in ſilence paſs over the tumults and commotions which hapned in *Rome* betwixt the death of the *Tarquins*, and the creation of thoſe *Tribunes*. Nor can I forbear ſaying ſomething againſt the opinion of many who will needs have *Rome* to have been a tumultuous Republick, ſo full of mutiny and confuſion, that had not its good fortune and valour ſupplied for its defects, it would have been inferior to any other Commonwealth whatſoever. I cannot deny but fortune and valour were the occaſions of the *Roman* Empire; but, in my judgment, they do not conſider, that where the Soldier is good, the diſcipline is good; and where the diſcipline is good, there is commonly good fortune: But to return to the other particulars in that City, I ſay, thoſe who object againſt the tumults betwixt the Nobles and the People, do in my opinion condemn thoſe very things which were the firſt occaſion of its freedom, regarding the noiſe and clamours which do uſually follow ſuch commotions, more than the good effects they do commonly produce, not conſidering that in all Commonwealths there are two oppoſite humours, one of the People, the other of the Nobles; and that all Laws which are made in favour of liberty, proceed from the differences betwixt 'em, as may eaſily be ſeen in the revolutions of *Rome*: For from the time of the *Tarquins* to the *Gracchi*, (which was more than three hundred years) in all the tumults in *Rome* ſeldom any body was baniſh'd, and ſeldomer put to death: So that it is not reaſonable to eſteem thoſe popular tumults ſo dangerous and horrible, nor to pronounce that a ſeditious a bloody Commonwealth, which in ſo long time, among all their heats and animoſities ſent not above eight or ten perſons into baniſhment, executed but few, and condemned not many to any pecuniary mulct. Nor can it be called reaſonably diſorderly and irregular, which produced ſo many examples of all ſorts of virtue; for good examples proceed from good Education, and good Education from good Laws, and good Laws from thoſe tumults which many people do ſo inconſiderately condemn, and whoever examines their ſucceſs, will not find they have produced any Laws or Violence to the prejudice of the Common intereſt, but rather on the contrary. And if any ſhould object their ways were wild and unuſual, to hear the people roaring againſt the Senate, and the Senate railing againſt the people. To ſee them running tumultuouſly about the ſtreets, ſhutting up their ſhops, and leaving the Town: I anſwer, that all Cities ought to be allow'd ſome ways of vent and evacuation for their paſſions, and eſpecially thoſe who expect aſſiſtance from their people in time of exigence and danger; in which number the City of *Rome* was one, and had this cuſtom, that when the Commons had a mind to a new Law, they either committed ſome of the aforeſaid outrages, or elſe refus'd to liſt themſelves for the Wars; ſo that to appeaſe, it was in ſome meaſure neceſſary to comply with them; and the deſires of a free people are ſeldom or never deſtructive or prejudicial to liberty, becauſe they commonly ſpring from actual oppreſſion, or an apprehenſion of it; and if perhaps that apprehenſion ſhould be vain and ill-grounded, there is the remedy of Conventions, in which ſome honeſt man or gohd Orator may remonſtrate their miſtake: And the people, tho' (as *Tully* ſays) they may be ignorant, yet they are capable enough of the truth, and do eaſily ſubmit to it, when deliver'd to 'em by any perſon they think credible, and to be believ'd. So that it is an obligation upon us to judge more moderately of the *Roman* Government, and to conſider that ſo many good effects as proceeded from that Republick, could not have been produced but from ſuitable cauſes: And if their tumults were the occaſion of the creation of the *Tribunes*, they were more laudable than otherwiſe; for beſides that they ſecur'd a ſhare of the Government to the people, they were conſtituted as Guardians and Conſervators of the *Roman* liberty, as ſhall be ſhewn in the Chapter enſuing.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Where the Guardianſhip of Liberty may be moſt ſecurely depoſited, whether among the People or Nobility: And which has greater occaſion to tumultuate, he that would acquire more, or he that would defend and keep what he has.

THEY who have given us the wiſeſt and moſt judicious ſcheme of a Commonwealth, have laid down the conſervation of liberty as a neceſſary fundamental, and according as that is more or leſs ſecured, the Government is like to be more or leſs durable. But foraſmuch as all Commonwealths conſiſt of Nobility and Populacy, the queſtion ariſes, In whoſe hands that liberty is depoſited moſt ſafely. In old times among the *Lacedemonians*, and in our times among the *Venetians*, it was intruſted with the Nobility; but among the *Romans* with the Common-people; for which reaſon it is to be examined which of them made the better elections.

If we look back to their Originals, there are arguments on both ſides; but if we regard only their fate and concluſion, the Nobility muſt carry it, in reſpect that the liberty of the *Spartans* and *Venetians* have been much longer liv'd. But on the other ſide, (to juſtifie the *Romans*) freedom is (I conceive) moſt properly committed to their cuſtody who have leaſt appetite to uſurp. And doubtleſs, if the ends and deſigns both of the Nobility and Commons be conſider'd, it will be found the Nobility are ambitious of Dominion, while the Commons have no other thoughts but to defend themſelves againſt it; and, by conſequence, having leſs hopes to uſurp, they have more inclination to live free: So that the conſervation of their liberty being committed to the people, it is but reaſonable to believe they will be more careful to preſerve it; and by how much they are leſs likely to uſurp upon it themſelves, with the more vigilance will they ſecure it againſt the incroachments of others. On the other ſide, he that defends the *Spartan* and *Venetian* conſtitution, alledges, that by putting that power into the hands of the Nobility, two excellent things are perform'd. One is, that thereby they ſatisfie their ambition who have the greateſt intereſt in the Commonwealth. The other, that they take from the people all opportunity of exerting their natural turbulency and unquietneſs, which has not only been the occaſion of infinite diſſentions, but is apt likewiſe to enforce the Nobility upon ſuch deſperate courſes as may in time produce unremediable effects. Of this, *Rome* it ſelf is propoſed as an example, where the Tribunes being inveſted with that authority, it was not ſufficient to have one Plebeian Conſul, but the people muſt have both, and not content with that neither, they would have the *Cenſor*, *Prætor*, and the other great Magiſtrates of the City choſen out of the people. Nor was this enough, but carried on with the ſame exorbitant fury, they began by degrees to adoreſuch men as they ſaw likely to confront and beard the Nobility, which humour was the riſe of *Marius* his greatneſs, and his greatneſs the deſtruction of *Rome*. All this conſider'd, it is no eaſie matter, upon impartial deliberation on both ſides, to pronounce which of the two is moſt ſafely to be truſted with the liberty; becauſe it is no leſs difficult to determine which is moſt pernicious to a Commonwealth, he that (not ſatisfied with what he has) is ambitious of more, or he that is content, and would ſecure what he has got. He that ſhall examin it critically, will conclude thus; either you argue for a Republick, whoſe aim is to extend and propagate its Empire, as *Rome*; Or one whoſe deſigns reach no further than to preſerve what they have got. In the firſt caſe 'tis neceſſary in all things to follow the example of *Rome*; in the ſecond, *Venice* and *Sparta* are rather to be imitated for the reaſons aforeſaid, which ſhall be reinforced in the following Chapter. But to return from whence we have ſtragled, and diſcourſe of what men are moſt nocent in a Commonwealth, they that are impatient to get, or they that are only fearful to loſe; I ſay, that when *Marcus Menenius* was made Dictator, and *Marcus Fulvius* Maſter of the Horſe, (both of 'em Plebeians) to enquire into certain Conſpiracies that were entred into at *Capua*, againſt the City of *Rome*, authority was given them at the ſame time to examine and take cogniſance of ſuch perſons as, by bribery, or any other unlawful means, deſign'd upon the Conſulſhip, or any other of the great offices in *Rome*: By which the Nobility being highly provoked, (as ſuſpecting it to be done in oppoſition to them) cauſed it to be ſpread abroad, that the Nobility did not by any ambitious or irregular ways affect or deſign upon thoſe great places; but the Commons, who not daring to truſt their preferment to their extraction or virtue, took all extraordinary courſes to advance themſelves to them. In particular they accuſed the Dictator, and that with ſo much vehemence and ſucceſs, he was glad to call a Council, and (having complained very much of the calumniations of the

the Nobility) to lay down his Dictatorſhip, and ſubmit himſelf to the judgment of the people, by whom the Cauſe being heard, he was fairly acquitted. There it was diſputed very hard which was moſt ambitious; He that would get, or He that would preſerve; for a violent appetite either in the one or the other, may be the occaſion of great diſturbances, which in my judgment are oftner caus'd by them that are in poſſeſſion; becauſe the apprehenſion of loſing what they have got, produces the ſame eagerneſs and paſſion, as deſire of acquiſition does in the other, foraſmuch as they ſeldom think themſelves ſafe in what they have, but by new accumulation; beſides, the more wealth or territory they have, the more power or capacity they have to uſurp as they ſee occaſion: To which may be added, that their incorrigible and ambitious deportments, do provoke and kindle a deſire in ſuch as have not thoſe dignities, to compaſs them if they can, and that for two reaſons, to revenge themſelves upon them, by ſtripping 'em of all, and to enrich themſelves into the bargain by the wealth and honour which they ſee others manage ſo ill.

CHAP. VI.

Whether in Rome *ſuch a Form of Government could be eſtabliſhed, as ſhould take away the Animoſities betwixt the Senate and the People.*

WHAT the continu'd jealouſies betwixt the Senate and the People did produce, we have already diſcourſed; but becauſe the effects of them remain'd till the time of the *Gracchi*, and were the occaſion of the deſtruction of their liberty, it may be demanded whether *Rome* might not have attain'd that height of Authority and Grandeur under another form of Government that might have prevented thoſe animoſities. To reſolve this Queſtion, it is neceſſary to look back upon thoſe Republicks whoſe Fortune it has been to retain their liberty a long time without thoſe inconveniencies, to examine what was their form, and whether it was practicable in *Rome*. As Examples, we may produce *Sparta* and *Venice*, the firſt Ancient, the latter modern, both mention'd before *Sparta* was govern'd by a King, and a ſmall Senate; *Venice* did not divide the Government into diſtinct Names; but all who were admitted to the adminiſtration were call'd *Gentlemen* under one common appellation; and that, more by accident, than any prudence in the Legiſlator; for when to thoſe Rocks upon which that City is now ſeated, many people did repair for the reaſons aboveſaid, in proceſs of time their number encreaſing ſo faſt, that they could not live peaceably without Laws, they reſolv'd to put themſelves under ſome form, and meeting often together to deliberate upon that, when they found they were numerous enough to ſubſiſt by themſelves, they made a Law to preclude all new comers from the Government: And finding afterwards their numbers increaſe, and that there were multitudes of inhabitants incapable of publick adminiſtration; in honour to the Governors they call'd them *Gentlemen* of *Venice*, and the others but *Citizens*; and this diſtinction might not only be inſtituted, but continu'd without tumult; becauſe, when firſt introduc'd, all the Inhabitants participating of the Government, no body could complain; and they who came after, finding it firm and eſtabliſh'd, had no reaſon nor opportunity to diſturb it: They had no reaſon, becauſe no injury was done 'em; they had no opportunity, becauſe the Government reſtrain'd 'em, and they were not employed in any thing that might furniſh them with authority; beſides, thoſe who came after were not in number diſproportionable to the Governors, the latter being equally, if not more numerous than they; for which reaſons the *Venetians* were able not only to erect, but maintain their Government a long time without any revolution.

Sparta being (as I ſaid before) govern'd by a King and a ſmall Senate, might likewiſe preſerve its Model a long time, by reaſon the Inhabitants were but few, ſtrangers excluded, and the Laws of *Lycurgus* eſtabliſh'd with great veneration; ſo that living by thoſe Laws, all occaſion of tumult was taken away, and they might continue united a long time; for tho' the Offices and Commands were conferr'd upon a few, yet the revenue of the Country being equally diſtributed, the people were not ſeditious, tho' they were kept at a diſtance; nor did the Nobility provoke them by any inſolence or oppreſſion; and this proceeded from the condition of their Kings, who being environed by the Nobility, had no ſafer way to ſecure their dignity, than by protecting the people from injuſtice and violence, by which means the fear, and the deſire of Command being taken from the people, the Emulations betwixt them and the Nobility and the occaſion of tumultuating ceaſed; ſo that it was not hard for 'em to enjoy their tranquillity ſeveral

Ages; of the length of their tranquillity, there were two principal cauſes; Firſt, The number of the *Spartans* being ſmall, there was no neceſſity that their Governors ſhould be many; and next, no ſtrangers being admitted, they were not liable to be corrupted, nor to encreaſe to ſuch a number, as might grow inſupportable to thoſe few who were under their government. Theſe things being conſider'd, it is plain that the *Roman* Legiſlators could not have inſtituted a Commonwealth that ſhould be free from Sedition and Mutiny, any other way, than by imitating the *Venetians* and *Spartans*, that is by not employing the people in their Wars, like the *Venetians*, nor entertaining Foreigners into their City, as the *Spartans*. But the *Roman* Legiſlators tranſgreſſing in both, the people grew ſtrong, and by conſequence tumultuous; and if any way the Government were to be render'd more quiet, this inconvenience would follow, it would be render'd alſo more weak, and all means be taken away that might conduct it to that height of grandeur and authority, at which afterwards it arriv'd; ſo that thoſe applications which prevented the tumults in *Rome*, prevented its enlargement, and the extent of its Empire, as it happens in moſt human affairs, the removal of one inconvenience is the contracting of another. For if you arm, and adapt a numerous people for the War, by their means to enlarge your Territory; you put 'em into a condition of being unmanageable afterwards, and not to be kept down to your Diſcipline and Government; whereas if you keep 'em diſarm'd, and their number but few; tho' you make your ſelf arbitrary, you can never continue it; for your ſubjects will grow ſo poor-ſpirited and vile, you will become a prey to the firſt man that invades you. In all deliberations therefore, the inconveniences are to be conſider'd, and that reſolution preferr'd in which there are fewеſt; for none can be taken that are abſolutely free. The *Romans* then in imitation of the *Spartans*, might have ſet up a King for his life, and appointed a little Senate; but by ſo doing, they could never have laid the foundation of ſo vaſt an Empire; for an Elective King, and a ſmall Senate would have contributed but little to their unity and peace. He then who would ſet up a new Commonwealth, ſhould conſider whether he would have it (like *Rome*) extend its Dominion and Sovereignty; or keep it ſelf within its own bounds without any dilatation. In the firſt caſe it is neceſſary to imitate the *Romans*, and give way to the tumults and publick diſſentions as well as he can; for without his Citizens be numerous, and well diſciplin'd and arm'd, he can never extend his Dominion; and if he could, it would be impoſſible to keep it. In the ſecond, he is to frame to the Model of the *Spartans* and *Venetians*; but becauſe augmentation of Empire is commonly the deſtruction of ſuch Commonwealths, he is by all poſſible means to prohibit new acquiſitions; becauſe, depending upon weak Commonwealths, they are always deſtructive and pernicious, as experience has ſhown in the Examples of *Sparta* and *Venice*. The firſt having ſubdu'd moſt part of *Greece*, diſcover'd, upon a ſlight accident, the weakneſs of its foundation; for the *Thebans* revolting at the inſtigation of *Pelipodas*, gave opportunity to other Cities, and quite ruined the Government. In like manner *Venice* having conquer'd the greateſt part of *Italy*, more by their Mony and Artifice, than Arms, preſuming too much upon their force, and coming to a battel, they were worſted, and in one day loſt all which they got. I ſhould think therefore a Commonwealth that would ſtand a long time, ſhould model it ſelf within according to the Example of *Sparta*, and like *Venice*, ſeat it ſelf in ſo ſtrong and inexpugnable a place, that it might not apprehend any ſudden inſult; nor make it ſelf ſo great on the other ſide as to become formidable to its Neighbors; for the common Motives that excite people to make War upon a Commonwealth, are two; either to conquer it themſelves, or to ſecure themſelves againſt it, and by the aforeſaid expedient, thoſe two ways are totally fruſtrated; for if it be hard of acceſs, and well-diſpoſed to defend itſelf, it will ſeldom or never happen that any body will attempt it. If it keeps within its own bounds, and by experience be found free from ambition, no body will fear it, nor will any body offend it; and queſtionleſs it would be the more ſafe, if by the Laws and Conſtitutions it was forbidden to extend; for I am clearly of opinion, that keeping things in this ballance and *Equilibrium*, the Government would be more civil, and the Peace of the City more certain. But the affairs of man being mutable, and nothing in 'em that is durable and firm; there is a neceſſity that they either encreaſe or diminiſh, and that neceſſity does many times conſtrain us to what in reaſon we ſhould rather decline. Whence it happens, That if a Government be erected apt to defend it ſelf in peace and ſecurity without extending its bounds, and neceſſity enforces it to enlarge, that enlargement takes away its foundation, and ruines it the ſooner. So on the other ſide, when the Stars are ſo benign to a Commonwealth, as to place it in peace, without any occaſion of War, that peace begets idleneſs, and idleneſs effeminacy or faction, which two things (and indeed either of them alone) will be ſufficient to ſubvert it. Wherefore, it being impoſſible, as I conceive, to keep things in this balance and mediocrity; in

the

the conſtitution of all republicks, particular care is to be had to what is moſt honorable; and things are to be ſo ordered, that if neceſſity ſhould compel them to inlarge, they might do it in ſuch manner as to be ſure to keep it. But to return, a Commonwealth, in my judgment, is better fram'd to the example of *Rome*, than either to the *Venetian* or *Spartan*, it being ſo hard to hit the exact way between the one and the other; and for the emulations betwixt the Nobility and the People they are to be born as inconveniences, but ſuch as are neceſſary for a people that would riſe to the Grandeur of the *Romans*; againſt which nevertheleſs (as I have ſhewn before) the authority of the *Tribunes* will be ſome remedy, if inveſted with the power of impeaching, which was given to the *Tribunes* in other States, as I ſhall ſhew in my next Chapter.

CHAP. VII.

How neceſſary it is for the conſervation of a State, that any Citizen be ſecurely accuſed.

THere is nothing of more importance to the ſafety of a State, than that permiſſion be given to ſuch as are ſet up for the conſervation of its liberty, to accuſe ſuch perſons to the People, the Senate, or other Magiſtrates, as ſhall any way offend againſt the Conſtitutions thereof; and this practice has two effects very profitable for the Commonwealth: the firſt is, the Citizens, for fear of being accus'd, do not attempt any thing to the prejudice of the State; and if they do, they are eaſily and readily ſuppreſs'd; the other is, that thereby a way is open'd for the evacuation of ſuch humors as are too frequent among the Citizens of every great City; which humours, without ſome legal vent, do uſually recur to extraordinary ways that are abſolutely pernicious: wherefore there is nothing renders a Commonwealth more ſtable and firm, than the proviſion of ſome legal courſe for the evaporation of thoſe humors which indanger it. This may be demonſtrated by ſeveral examples, but eſpecially by that which is mentioned by *Titus Livius* in his diſcourſe of *Coriolanus*. He tells us, that the Nobility of *Rome* being exaſperated againſt the people, for that they thought their authority too much encreaſed upon the creation of their *Tribunes*; and it hapning at that time, that in reſpect of the great ſcarcity of proviſions, the State had ſent into *Sicily* for ſupplies; *Coriolanus* being a great adverſary to the popular Faction, adviſed that this was a fair time to chaſtiſe the licentiouſneſs of the people, and to take from them that power which they had aſſumed to the prejudice of the Nobility, to which purpoſe he perſuaded the Senate againſt diſtributing the corn. This counſel coming to the ears of the people, they were ſo highly incenſed, that they ſet upon him tumultuouſly as he came out of the Senate, and had certainly killed him, had not the *Tribunes* interpoſed, and cited him to appear before them in order to his defence. By which accident it is plain how much it is for the intereſt of a Commonwealth, that a legal way be provided to diſcharge the choller of the people, which otherwiſe will be apt to fly to extraordinary courſes, and without doubt produce more miſchievous effects: For if a ſingle Citizen be cut off, (tho' poſſibly unjuſtly) it begets little or no diſorder in the Commonwealth, becauſe execution is done without private force, or foreign aſſiſtance, (which are mortal things to a free State) and what is done by courſe of Law, and publick authority, is neither deſtructive nor dangerous. And as to ancient examples, I think this of *Coriolanus* ſufficient; from whence every man may gather what miſchief would have reſulted to the Commonwealth of *Rome*, had he been cut in peices by the fury of the people; it would have created private diſguſts; thoſe diſguſts jealouſies; thoſe jealouſies proviſion of defence; that combinations; combinations parties; and parties deſtruction: but by the interpoſition of publick authority, all theſe evils were prevented. We have ſeen in our time what inconveniences followed in *Florence*, becauſe the multitude had not a legal way of ſpending their indignations againſt one of their Citizens. *Franceſco Valori* was Prince of that City, ſuſpected by many people, as if he deſigned to make himſelf abſolute; and by his haughtineſs and pride to exceed thoſe limits which the Laws had preſcribed: There being in that Commonwealth no way to prevent it, but by ſetting up a faction in oppoſition to his, he began to look out himſelf, and to make a party that might defend him. The people on the other ſide having no legal way to ſuppreſs them, betook themſelves to their Arms. And whereas, if any ordinary way had been open to have oppoſed him, his deſigns had been obviated by his ſingle deſtruction; being forced upon an extraordinary, it was effected not only by his, but by the ruine of many other eminent Citizens. To confirm what we have ſaid,

another

another inſtance might be produced in the City in the caſe of *Peter Soderini*, which happened for want of a Law whereby they might impeach any Citizen that aſpir'd to the Government. There were eight judges only in that Commonwealth, which are not enough to adminiſter juſtice againſt a powerful man: In States that are well conſtituted, 'tis neceſſary there be more; for where there are ſo few, their diſpatch is but ſmall, and they are corrupted with more eaſe than where there are many. If therefore there had been any ſuch way allowed, upon his ill Government, the Citizens would have formally impeach'd him, without calling in an Army of *Spaniards*; and if his Government had been well, they durſt not have accuſed him, leſt he ſhould have accus'd them again; and by that means that emulation would have been prevented which was the cauſe of ſo much miſchief: From whence it may be concluded, whenever foreign aſſiſtance is called in by any party in a City, that it proceeds from the ill conſtitution of that Government, and that there is no legal way of purging thoſe humours which are ſo natural to men; againſt all which, no remedy is more properly applicable, than by authorizing ſeveral perſons of quality and intereſt to receive informations: which practice was ſo well followed in *Rome*, that in all diſſentions betwixt the Senate and the people, it was never known that either Senate, or people, or any private Citizen what-ever had recourſe to foreign aſſiſtance; for having juſtice at home, what need of fetching it from abroad? To theſe Examples aforeſaid, we may add another out of *Titus Livius*, who tells us, that in *Cluſia* the chief City of the *Tuſcans*, *Lucumon* having vitiated a Siſter of one *Aruns*, and *Aruns* being unable to vindicate her, by reaſon of the power of the delinquent, he addreſſed to the *French*, who at that time had the Government of *Lombardy*, and poſſeſſing them with the profitableneſs of the Expedition, he prevailed with them to bring an Army to revenge him of that outrage and injury which his Siſter had received: and doubtleſs he would never have betaken himſelf to the relief of a foreigner, could he have hoped for reparation at home. But as liberty of juſt accuſation is great ſecurity to a State, ſo toleration of calumny is as dangerous on the other ſide, which we ſhall evince in the following Chapter.

CHAP. VIII.

Unjuſt calumnies are no leſs pernicious to a Commonwealth, than legal accuſations are profitable and good.

THough the valour of *Furius Camillus* (after he had raiſed their Siege, and driven the *French* from their Leaguer before *Rome*) was ſo univerſally venerable, that none of the *Romans* thought it diminution either to their reputation or dignity to give him precedence; yet *Manlius Capitolinus* could not brook that ſo much honour ſhould be given him, ſeeing, in his judgment, he had done as much towards the preſervation of the City, and deſerved as well, in ſaving the Capital, as *Camillus* had done in the other; and in military experience he thought himſelf no way inferior: ſo that full of envy, and unable to bear the greatneſs of his Competitor, finding he could make no impreſſion upon the Senators, he turned himſelf to the people, and ſpread abroad ſeveral falſe reports againſt him. Among other things, he puts it into their heads, that the Treaſure which was raiſed for payment of the *French* had not been given, but was continued in the hands of private Citizens; which mony, if reaſſumed, might be applyed to publick uſe, and either leſſen the duties, or diſcharge the debts of the people. Theſe pretences had great influence upon the people, inſomuch as they began to talk, to murmur, to meet, to poſt themſelves tumultuouſly in many places in the City, which being obſerved, and thought very dangerous by the Senate, they created a Dictator to take cogniſance of the buſineſs, and reſtrain the fury of *Manlius*. The Dictator cited *Manlius*, and appointed him a day; *Manlius* appeared, and being environed by the people as the Dictator was by the Senate, ſilence being made, the Dictator asked *Manlius* in whoſe hands that great Treaſure he ſpake of was detained, for he did aſſure him the Senators were as deſirous to diſcover it as the people: to which *Manlius* made no poſitive anſwer, but by way of evaſion, replyed it was unneceſſary (he thought) to tell them what they knew already as well as he; upon which inſolence, the Dictator commanded him to priſon; from whence it may be obſerved how deteſtable ſuch calumniations ought to be, not only in every free City, but in every civil Society, and with what care and ſeverity they are to be ſuppreſſed; and that is done moſt commodiouſly, by allowing freedom of accuſation; for as calumny is pernicious, information is beneficial to a State.

Accuſa-

Accuſation and calumny differ in this point, that any man may calumniate another where and when he pleaſes, without bringing teſtimony, or any other circumſtance to prove it: but in caſe of accuſation 'tis quite another thing, a man muſt bring his proofs, his witneſſes, and other circumſtances to make good his charge. People are legally accuſed no where but before the Senates, the Magiſtrates, or the People: but they are calumniated every where, within doors and without, in the ſtreets and the market-place, and there moſt where there is leaſt accuſation, and the Cities leaſt diſpoſed to receive 'em. Wherefore he who would lay the foundation of a State, ought principally to provide that all perſons might have liberty to inform againſt any one, without ſuſpicion or fear; which being ſolemnly provided, and faithfully obſerved, his next buſineſs is to ſecure them againſt ſcandals, and the calumniator can have no reaſon to complain if he be puniſhed, when there are publick places appointed to receive the accuſations of ſuch as are abuſed; and if in theſe things particular care be not taken, great miſchiefs will follow; for theſe kind of aſperſions do not correct, but provoke their fellow Citizens, and thoſe who are accuſed are not ſo much apt to fear the diſgrace, as to hate the authors of the reports. In theſe caſes the *Romans* had very good Laws, and they ſtood 'em in good ſtead; but we in *Florence* having neglected 'em, have ſuffer'd much by it, and he who peruſes the Hiſtory of our City, will ſee how ſubject to calumniations in all times thoſe Citizens have been, who have been employed in its moſt important affairs. One is charged with embezling the publick treaſure; another for being corrupted, and betraying ſome publick enterprize; a third for ambition, and committing one inſolence or another, from whence feuds and animoſitys do ariſe on all hands; and from thence diviſions; from diviſions parties; and from parties deſtruction. Whereas, if in *Florence* authority had been allowed for the accuſations of Citizens, many miſchiefs had been prevented, which followed for want of it; for thoſe Citizens who were accuſed (whether condemned or abſolved) would have not been able to have moleſted the State; and the impeachments would have been fewer than the calumnations, becauſe more people would have been calumniated than accuſed, in reſpect that the firſt was ſo much the more eaſie (as is ſaid before) than the other. And theſe calumnies have advanced ſome Citizens to great dignity; for having great adverſaries that oppoſed their deſigns, they joyned themſelves with the people, and making them their friends, confirm'd the ill opinion which they had of their adverſaries before. Several examples might be produced to this purpoſe, but I ſhall only inſtance in one.

The *Florentine* Army was encamped before *Lucca* under the Command of *Giovanni Guiccardini* their Commiſſary. By his ill fortune or conduct the Town was not taken; which of the two ſoever it was, *Giovanni* was aſperſed, as having been brib'd by the *Luccheſes*, which calumny being propagated by his enemies, netled *Giovanni*, and almoſt brought him to deſpair; and though, in order to his juſtification, he offered to put himſelf into the hands of the Captain, yet all was to no purpoſe; for in that Commonwealth there was no body qualified to clear him: from hence aroſe great contentions betwixt *Guiccardin*'s friends, (who were the greateſt part of the Grandees in that City) and thoſe who ſtudied novelty, which contentions, and others of the like nature, encreaſing daily upon their hands, brought that poor Commonwealth into a moſt deplorable condition. *Manlius* therefore ſpreading theſe falſe reports of the Senators about *Rome*, was a calumniator, not an accuſer; and the *Romans* in his caſe gave manifeſt inſtruction how ſuch people are to be puniſhed, that is, that they be obliged publickly to accuſe, and when their charge is made good, that they be rewarded or encouraged; but when it cannot be proved, that they be puniſhed like *Manlius*.

CHAP. IX.

How much a ſingle perſon is neceſſary for the eſtabliſhment of a new commonwealth, or the reformation of an old.

IT may ſeem to ſome, that I have run too far into the Roman Hiſtory, having made no mention of the Founders of that Commonwealth, nor of the Orders which they obſerved either in matters of Religion, or War. To eaſe them therefore of their ſuſpence, who are deſirous to hear ſomething to that purpoſe, I ſay, that many perhaps may think it of ill example for the Founder of a State, as *Romulus* was, to kill his own Brother, and afterwards conſent to the death of *Titus Tatius Sabinus*, who was choſen his companion in the Government, ſuppoſing that according to that preſident, any of his

Citizens that were ambitious of Command, might make away their adverſaries or competitors, and remove any obſtacle that oppoſed them; and it were reaſonable enough, were it not to be conſidered to what end, and upon what motives that murder was committed.

This is to be taken for a maxim, and general rule, that it is impoſſible for any Government either to be well founded at firſt, or well reformed afterwards, unleſs by a ſingle perſon, by whoſe direction all Orders, all Laws are to be made and promulged. He therefore who is the founder of a Commonwealth, if he be an honeſt man, and aims not at his own intereſt, and the raiſing of his Family, more than the advancement of his Country, muſt endeavour to get the power into his ſingle hands, nor will any wiſe man ever accuſe him for any action extraordinary that he ſhall do in order thereunto; or if the fact be to be blamed, the effect will excuſe it, eſpecially if it be good, as it was in *Romulus* his caſe, for it is deſtructive and pernicious violence that is to be reprehended, not that which tends to ſettlement and reformation. He is alſo to be ſo prudent and virtuous, as not to leave the authority which he aſſumed in inheritance to another, becauſe men being more prone to evil than good, his ſucceſſor may employ that power to the prejudice of the State, which he in his wiſdom made uſe of to its benefit and advantage.

Moreover, though one be fitteſt to make Laws, yet when once made, they cannot hold long, if left upon the ſhoulders of a ſingle perſon, but when the care and execution of them is transfer'd upon many, and many are concerned to maintain them, it is much better; for though many be not ſo proper in laying the foundations of a Government, becauſe their diverſity of opinions keeps them from diſcerning what is abſolutely for its good; yet when things are once ſetled, and they have found it, that very diverſity will be a means to preſerve it. And that *Romulus* was excuſable for what he did to his Brother and Companion, and that what he did was more for the common good than his own private ambition or revenge, appears by this; that he had no ſooner made them away, but he conſtituted a Senate, by whoſe advice he acted in every thing, reſerving to himſelf only the power of calling them together, and commanding the Armies when they ſhould reſolve of a War: And of this we cannot have better evidence than that which follow'd after the expulſion of the *Tarquins*, there being nothing innovated or alter'd by the *Romans*, only inſtead of one perpetual King, they created two annual Conſuls; which ſhews that *Romulus* in his firſt Inſtitutions aimed rather at the election of a civil and a free, than an abſolute and tyrannical State. Many more examples might be produced to fortifie what is ſaid, as thoſe of *Moſes*, *Lycurgus*, *Solon*, and other Founders of Kingdoms and Commonwealths, who, by aſſuming a Monarchical Authority, were able to frame and impoſe ſuch Laws as were for the benefit of the Publick; but being ſo well known, it would be ſuperfluous. I ſhall add only one, not ſo famous perhaps, yet worthy to be conſider'd by thoſe who are deſirous to be good Legiſlators; and it is this, *Agis* King of *Sparta* obſerving his Citizens had loſt much of their ancient virtue, and by conſequence were decayed both in their power and Empire, imputing it in part to their deviation from the Laws of *Lycurgus*, deſired very earneſtly to reduce them again; but before he could bring it to perfection he was ſlain by the *Spartan Ephori*, as one who deſigned to make himſelf abſolute; but *Cleomenes* ſucceeding him in the Government, having the ſame inclination, and perceiving by ſome Records and Writings which *Agis* had left behind, what was his intention, he found that he could not do his Country that ſervice any way, but by making himſelf abſolute: For by the ambition of ſome perſons, he found that he could not do the good which he deſign'd to the generality, by reaſon of the malevolence of a few; wherefore he cauſed the *Ephori*, and whoever elſe he thought likely to obſtruct him, to be kill'd, and revived the Laws of *Lycurgus*, which noble act might have recover'd that State, and have made *Cleomenes* as venerable as *Lycurgus* himſelf, had it not been for the power of *Macedon*, and the weakneſs of other Commonwealths; for not long after that reformation, being invaded by the *Macedonians*, it proved unable to defend it ſelf, and having no body to ſuſtain it, was overcome; and that juſt and honourable deſign was unhappily laid aſide. Conſidering therefore what has been ſaid, I conclude, that a ſingle perſon is beſt for the inſtitution or regulating of any ſort of Government, and that for the death of *Remus* and *Tatius*, *Romulus* was not to be blamed.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

As they are to be praiſed who lay the foundations of any Republick or Kingdom, ſo they are to be condemn'd who ſet up a Tyranny.

AMong all excellent and illuſtrious Men, they are moſt praiſe-worthy who have been the chief eſtabliſhers of Religion and Divine Worſhip: In the ſecond place are they who have laid the foundations of any Kingdom or Commonwealth; in the third, thoſe who having the Command of great Armies have enlarg'd their own, or the Dominion of their Country: In the next, learned Men of all Sciences according to their ſeveral ſtudies and degrees; and laſt of all (as being infinitely the greateſt number) come the Artificers and Mechanicks; all to be commended as they are ingenious or skilful in their Profeſſions. On the other ſide, they are infamous and deteſtable, who are contemners of Religion, ſubverters of Governments, Enemies of Virtue, of Learning, of Art, and in ſhort, of every thing that is uſeful and honourable to mankind; and of this ſort, are the prophane, the ſeditious, the ignorant, the idle, the debauched, and the vile. And although Nature has ſo order'd it, that there is neither wiſe man nor fool, nor good man nor bad, who if it were propoſed to him which he would chooſe of theſe two ſorts of people, would not prefer that which was to be preferr'd, and condemn the other; yet the generality of mankind deluded by a falſe impreſſion of good, and a vain notion of glory, leaving thoſe ways which are excellent and commendable, either wilfully or ignorantly wander into thoſe paths which will lead them to diſhonour; and whereas, to their immortal honour they might eſtabliſh a Commonwealth or Kingdom as they pleaſe, they run head-long into a Tyranny, not conſidering what fame, what glory, what affection, what ſecurity, what quiet and ſatisfaction of mind they part with, nor what reproach, ſcandal, hatred, danger and diſquiet they incur. It is impoſſible but all people (whether of private condition in the Commonwealth, or ſuch as by their Fortune or Virtue have arriv'd to be Princes) if they have any knowledge in Hiſtory, and the paſſages of old, would rather chooſe (if private perſons) to be *Scipio*'s than *Cæſar*'s; and (if Princes) to be *Ageſilaus*, *Timoleon* and *Dion*, than *Nabis*, *Phalaris*, or *Dionyſius*; becauſe they muſt find the one highly celebrated and admired, and the other as much abhor'd and condemn'd; they muſt find *Timoleon*, and the reſt to have as much intereſt and authority in their Countries, as *Dionyſius* or *Phalaris* had in theirs, and much more ſecurity. Nor let any man deceive himſelf with *Cæſar*'s reputation, finding him ſo exceedingly eminent in Hiſtory; for thoſe who have cryed him up, were either corrupted by his fortune, or terrified by his power; for whil'ſt the Empire continued, it was never permitted that any man ſhould ſpeak any thing againſt him, and doubtleſs had Writers had their liberty, they could have ſaid as much of him as of *Cataline*; and *Cæſar* is ſo much the worſe of the two, by how much it is worſe to effect and perpetrate an ill thing, than to deſign it; and this they might judge by what is ſaid of his adverſary *Brutus*. for not daring to ſpeak downright of *Cæſar*, by reaſon of his power, by kind of reverſe, they magnified his Enemy: After *Rome* alſo was grown to be an Empire, and the Government in the hands of a ſingle perſon, it may be obſerved how much more happy and ſecure thoſe Emperors were who liv'd like good Princes, according to the dictate of the Laws, than thoſe who lived otherwiſe; for *Titus*, *Nerva*, *Trajanus*, *Adrianus*, *Antoninus*, and *Marcus*, had no need of Prætorian bands, nor multitude of Legions to defend them, their own excellent deportment, the benevolence of the people, and the affection of the Senate, ſaved them that charge: It will appear likewiſe how to *Caligula*, *Nero*, *Vitellius*, and ſeveral other Tyrannical Emperors, their Eaſtern and Weſtern Armies were not ſufficient to ſecure them againſt the Enemies, which their irregularity and ill manners had contracted; The Hiſtory of which perſons, if well conſidered, would enable any Prince to diſtinguiſh betwixt the ways of Honour and Infamy, of Security and Fear: For of XXVI Emperors betwixt *Cæſar* and *Maximinus*, XVI were murdered, and but X died in their beds; and though ſome of thoſe who were ſlain might poſſibly be good, (as *Pertinax*, and *Galba*) yet they were murdered by reaſon of the corruption and ill diſcipline which their Predeceſſors had left in the Army; and if among thoſe who died naturally, there were any Tyrannical, (as *Severus*) it is to be imputed to his great Courage and Fortune, which are two things very ſeldom concomitant in one man, it is legible likewiſe in the ſame Hiſtory upon what Baſis and foundation a Monarchy muſt be built, to make it ſolid, and permanent; for all thoſe Emperors who ſucceeded by hereditary right were ill men, except *Titus* only, and thoſe who came in by Election were good, as

Nerva

Nerva and the four which ſucceeded him; but when the Empire became wholly hereditary, it ran furiouſly to deſtruction. Let the times therefore from *Nerva* to *Marcus* be diſplayed before your Prince, and let him compare them which went before with thoſe which came after, and then make his choice when they would have been born, or when he would have been Sovereign. He will find when good men were at the Helm, the Prince ſafe in the ſecurity of his Subjects; Peace and Juſtice flouriſhing in the world; the Senate in Authority; the Magiſtrates in eſteem; rich men enjoying their eſtates; Nobility and Virtue exalted; and all things quiet and well; no rancour; no licentiouſneſs; no corruption; no ambition to be found; the times were golden; every man enjoy'd his opinion, and defended it as he pleaſed: In a word, he will find the world triumphing in felicity; the Prince happy in the reverence and affection of the people; and the people ſafe in the generoſity of their Prince. If then the Reigns of the other Emperors be contemplated, they will appear full of commotion, diſcord, and ſedition, aſſaſſinations in Peace; cruelty in War; many Princes murther'd; many foreign, many domeſtick embroilments; all *Italy* afflicted; and all its Cities deſtroyed; *Rome* burnt; the Capitol by its own inhabitants demoliſhed; the ancient Temples deſolate; religious Ceremonies prophaned; and the whole City full of Adulteries; the Sea cover'd with exiles, and the Rocks with blood; infinite Cruelties and Barbariſms committed daily in the City; and Nobility, Riches, Honour, and eſpecially Virtue, grown to be capital offences. Informers and Calumniators will be found to be rewarded; Servants inſtigated againſt their Maſters; Children againſt their Parents; and thoſe few who were ſo unhappy as to have no Enemies, to be deſtroy'd by their Friends; then it will appear what mighty obligations *Rome* and *Italy*, and the whole world had to *Cæſar*; and doubtleſs, if the Prince be endu'd with the leaſt ſpark of humanity or good nature, he will deteſt the imitation of the bad, and be inflamed with an ardent propenſity to the good. All which things conſider'd, that Prince certainly which aims at glory and reputation in the world, ſhould deſire a Government where the manners of his Subjects are corrupted and depraved, not to ſubvert and deſtroy it like *Cæſar*, but to rectifie and reſtore it like *Romulus*, than which the Heavens cannot confer, nor man propoſe to himſelf a greater honour. And if a Prince who would regulate and reform a City, cannot do it without depoſiting his Authority: In that caſe he is excuſable in ſome meaſure, if he diſpenſes; but where he can retain the one, and accompliſh the other, he is altogether unpardonable; they therefore to whom the Heavens are ſo propitious as to preſent ſuch an opportunity, are to conſider that they have two ways before 'em, one leading to ſecurity whil'ſt they live, and an honourable memory when they are dead, the other to continual troubles here, and perpetual infamy hereafter.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Religion and Ceremonies of the Romans.

THough *Rome* ſhould have been founded by *Romulus*, and owe him (as his Daughter) for her Birth and Education; yet the Heavens foreſeeing that the Conſtitutions of *Romulus* would not be ſufficient for ſo great an Empire, put it into the heart of the *Roman* Senate, to create *Numa Pompilius* for his Succeſſor, to the end that what was left defective by the firſt, might be compleated by the latter. *Numa* finding the people martial and fierce, and being deſirous by the Arts of Peace to reduce 'em to civil obedience, he betook himſelf to Religion, as a thing abſolutely neceſſary to the maintenance of civil policy; and he order'd things ſo, that for many ages together never was the fear of God ſo eminently conſpicuous as in that Commonwealth, which was a great promotion to whatever was deſign'd either by the Senate or Princes. And he who ſhall peruſe the infinite actions of that City collectively, or of ſeveral *Romans* in particular, will find thoſe Citizens more tender of falſifying an Oath than of violating the Laws, judging an offence againſt God more heinous than an offence againſt men, and God more able to puniſh it: Of this we have manifeſt evidence in the examples of *Scipio* and *Manlius Torquatus*; for after the defeat which *Hanibal* had given to the *Romans* at *Cannas*, the people tumultuating, and many of 'em aſſembling in great fear to conſider of their condition, they reſolv'd among themſelves to leave *Italy*, and tranſplant into *Sicily*: *Scipio* having notice, repair'd to 'em immediately, and coming in ſuddenly among 'em with his Sword drawn, he forc'd them to recant,

recant, and take a peremptory Oath not to abandon their Country. *Lucius Manlius* Father to *Titus Manlius* (who was afterwards called *Torquatus*) was impeached by *Marcus Pomponius* a *Tribune* of the people. Before the day arrived for the hearing of the Father, the Son coming to the Tribune and threatning to kill him, unleſs he would ſwear to withdraw his accuſation, he forced him to his Oath, and he perſormed as he had ſworn; and ſo thoſe Citizens who could not be retained by either the love of their Country, or Laws; were kept at home by an Oath which they took upon force: And the Tribune laid by his hatred to the Father, paſſed by the inſolence of the Son, and neglected the reflection it would have upon his own honour, to be punctual in his Oath; which proceeded from nothing but thoſe principles of Religion which *Numa* had diffuſed. And ſurely it will be found by whoever conſiders the *Roman* Hiſtory, how uſeful a thing Religion was to the governing of Armies, to the uniting of the people, to the keeping men good, and to the deterring them from being bad; ſo that ſhould it fall into diſpute whether *Rome* was moſt obliged to *Romulus* or *Numa*, I am of opinion, *Numa* would have the preheminence; becauſe where Religion is fixed, Military Diſcipline is eaſily introduced; but where Religion is wanting, Diſcipline may be brought in with difficulty, but never in perfection. It is to be ſeen likewiſe, that for the conſtituting a Senate, and eſtabliſhing of Laws both Military and Civil, *Romulus* had no need to pretend Divine Authority; but with *Numa* it was otherwiſe he was of neceſſity to pretend to it, and thereupon gave out that he had private Conference with a Nymph, who dictated to him what he was to preſcribe to the people, and all was, becauſe he had a mind to introduce new Laws and Cuſtoms in that City, which he thought his own private authority would never effect. And certainly never any man brought in new Laws, or ſet up any Doctrine extraordinary, but with pretence of Religion; becauſe otherwiſe they would never have been admitted; for a man may be wiſe and know many things are good, and yet want reaſons and arguments to convince other people; wherefore to remove that difficulty, prudent men do make that always their pretence, and *Solon*, *Lycurgus*, and ſeveral others who had the ſame deſign, practiſed the ſame. The people (then) admiring the goodneſs and wiſdom of *Numa*, ſubmitted in all things: True it is, the devotion of the age and ignorance of the people contributed much, for thereby he was able to impreſs them with what new form he thought good; and queſtionleſs, he that would eſtabliſh a Commonwealth at this day, would find it more eaſie among the rude people of the Mountains who have not been acquainted with Civility, than among ſuch as have been educated in Cities, where their civility was corrupted; like rude unpoliſh'd Marble which is more readily carv'd into a Statue, than what has been mangled already by ſome bungling workman. So that all things conſider'd, I conclude, That the Religion introduced by *Numa*, was one of the firſt cauſes of that City's felicity; becauſe Religion produced good Laws, good Laws good Fortune, and good Fortune a good End in whatever they undertook. And as ſtrictneſs in Divine Worſhip, and Conſcience of Oaths, are great helps to the advancement of a State; ſo contempt of the one, and neglect of the other, are great means of its deſtruction. Take away Religion, and take away the foundation of Government; for tho' perhaps the goodneſs and fear of their Prince may ſuſtain it for ſome time, and ſupply the want of Religion in his ſubjects; yet, becauſe he is mortal and poſſibly but very ſhort-liv'd, that Kingdom can hardly out-live the virtue of its Governor: Wherefore thoſe States which depend only upon the piety of their Princes, are of little duration; for commonly one dies with the other, and the virtue of the Father ſeldom revives in the Son, as *Dante* has ſaid very wiſely,

Rade volte diſcende per li rami
L' tunn ana probitate, et queſto vuole
Quel che la da, perche da lui ſi chiami.

Virtue's but ſeldom to the branches ſpread,
He who beſtows't, has in his wiſdom ſaid,
Let him that wants, come to the fountain-head.

Things being thus, it is not ſufficient for a Commonwealth or Kingdom to have a Prince who governs it wiſely whil'ſt he lives; but he muſt lay his foundation ſo, as it may out-live him, and flouriſh when he is in his grave; and tho' rude and uncultivated people are more ſuſceptible of new Laws or new Doctrines; yet men that are civil, and preſume more upon their education are not altogether impenetrable. The people of *Florence* thought themſelves no fools, and they had a good opinion of their breeding; nevertheleſs they ſuffer'd themſelves to be deluded by Friar *Girolamo Savonarola* into

perſuaſion that he had Conference with God. A perſon of his gravity is not to be mentioned but with reverence, and therefore whether true, or not true, I will not determine, only this I ſhall ſay, many believed him, who never ſaw any thing extraordinary to induce 'em; his Life, his Doctrine, the ſubject of his diſcourſing being in their thoughts enough to convince them. Let no man deſpair of what another man has attained, for men (as I ſaid in my Preface) are born, live, and dye, in the ſame method as formerly.

CHAP. XII.

How neceſſary for the preſervation of a State it is, that Religion be in eſteem, and how much Italy *has ſuffered for want of it, by means of the Church of* Rome.

THoſe Princes and Commonwealths who would keep their Governments entire and incorrupt, are above all things to have a care of Religion and its Ceremonies, and preſerve them in due veneration, for in the whole world there is not a greater ſign of imminent ruine, than when God and his Worſhip are deſpiſed. This is eaſily underſtood by obſerving upon what foundation the Religion is placed where every man is born. The Religion of the *Gentiles* ran much upon the anſwers of Oracles, upon Divinations, and Soothſaying, upon which all the reſt of their Sacrifices, Rights, and Ceremonies did depend; for they did not doubt but the ſame thing that could preſage your fortune (be it good, or be it bad) could as eaſily confer it; and therefore they built their Temples, they made their Sacrifices, they offer'd up their prayers, and uſed all other Ceremonies that might ſignifie their veneration; for the Oracles of *Delos*, the Temple of *Jupiter Ammon*, and ſuch other things had a ſtrange influence upon people, and kept them in moſt wonderful devotion; but afterwards when they began to ſpeak according to the intereſt or directions of great perſons, and their partiality began to be diſcovered; the people grew incredulous, and prone to all kind of diſturbance: A Prince therefore or Commonwealth ought moſt accurately to regard, that his Religion be well-founded, and then his Government will laſt; for there is no ſurer way than to keep that good and united. Whatever therefore occurs that may any way be extended to the advantage and reputation of the Religion which they deſign to eſtabliſh (how uncertain or frivolous ſoever it may ſeem to themſelves) yet by all means they are to be propagated and encouraged, and the wiſer the Prince, the more ſure it is to be done: This courſe having been obſerved by wiſe men, has produced the opinion of Miracles, which are celebrated even in thoſe Religions which are falſe: For let their Original be as idle as they pleaſe, a wiſe Prince will be ſure to ſet them forward, and the Princes authority recommends them to every body elſe. Of theſe miracles, there were many in *Rome*, as at the ſacking of *Urii*, ſome of the *Roman* Soldiers entring into the Temple of *Juno*, accoſting her Image, and asking it *Vis venire* Romam, *Will you come to* Rome? To ſome of them ſhe ſeemed to beckon by way of conſent, and, others fancied ſhe ſaid *Yes*; For thoſe men being more than ordinary religious (as *Titus Livius* infers from the devotion, and reverence, and quietneſs wherewith they entred) they fancied they heard that anſwer, which 'tis poſſible they expected before; and *Camillus* and the other Magiſtrates of the City promoted their belief: And if this diligent care in Divine Worſhip were regarded by Chriſtian Princes according to the Precepts and Inſtructions of him that gave it at firſt, the States and Commonwealths of Chriſtendom would be much more happy and firm: Nor can any thing portend the ruine of our Church with more certainty, than that thoſe who are neareſt the Church of *Rome*, (which is the head of our Religion) ſhould have leſs Religion than other people: And he who ſhould conſider the preſent practice, with the primitive foundation, would find that either utter deſtruction, or ſome great judgment was hanging over our heads. And foraſmuch as ſome are of opinion, that the felicity and welfare of *Italy* depends upon the Church of *Rome*, I ſhall ſet down ſome few reaſons to the contrary, which I have fram'd to my ſelf, two of which are in my judgment unanſwerable: One is that by the corrupt example of that Court, that Province has loſt all its Religion, and all its Devotion, which has been followed by many inconveniences and diſorders; for as the Religiouſneſs of the people preſuppoſe all well, ſo where they are wicked, it betokens the contrary; ſo then, we *Italians* have this Obligation to the Church and its Miniſters, that by their means we are become Heathenish and Irreligious; beſides another (little leſs pernicious) and that is, that we are grown divided and factious, which muſt of neceſſity be our ruine; becauſe never was any Province happy

or

or united, unleſs under the obedience of one Commonwealth, or one Prince, as *France* and *Spain* at this time: And the reaſon is, becauſe *Italy* is not upon the ſame terms, as having no one Republick or Commonwealth to govern it, but the Church; and though the Pope has aſſumed a Temporal as well as Spiritual juriſdiction, yet he was never ſo couragious or powerful as to poſſeſs himſelf of all, and make himſelf Prince; nor was he ever ſo weak, but upon any apprehenſion of loſing his Temporal Dominion, he could call in ſome Foreign Potentate to defend him againſt any man who was grown too formidable; and this has been ſeen anciently in many Examples; as when by aſſiſtance of *Charles* the Great, he repell'd the *Lombards*, who in a manner had made themſelves Maſters of all *Italy*; and when again in our days he retrenched the power of the *Venetians* by the help of the *French*, after which he drove out the *French* by the ſuccour of the *Swizzers*. The *Church* therefore being neither ſo ſtrong as to conquer all *Italy*, nor ſo weak as to ſuffer it to be over-run by any body elſe, has been the occaſion that it never fell into the hands of one perſon, but has been cantoniz'd into ſeveral Principalities, by which means it has been ſo weak and diſunited, that it has been not only expoſed as a prey to the power of the *Barbarians*, but to every one that thought good to invade it, which is an unhappineſs we *Italians* owe only to the Church: If any man ſuſpects what is ſaid, and would by experience inform himſelf of the truth, it would be neceſſary he ſhould be ſo potent as to tranſplant the Court of *Rome* and all its Authority in *Italy* into the Territories of the *Swizzers*, who are the only people at this day which live either as to their Eccleſiaſtical or Military, Diſcipline, according to the Model of the Ancients, and then he would quickly find that the wickedneſs and depravity of that Court, would produce more confuſion and diſorder in that Country than ever befel it by any accident before.

CHAP. XXIII.

How the Romans *pretended Religion many times to regulate their City, to proſecute their Wars, and to pacifie their Tumults.*

AND I hold it not extravagant to produce two or three Examples in which the *Romans* made uſe of their Religion, both in the regulation of their City, and the proſecution of their Wars; and although in *Titus Livius* they be very frequent, yet I ſhall content my ſelf with theſe.

After the people of *Rome* had created their Tribunes with conſular power, and all of them (except one) from among the *Plebeans*; there hapning that year a furious Plague, a deſperate Famine, and other Prodigies beſides, the Nobility in the next creation of Tribunes took advantage of that occaſion, and pretended that the Gods were incenſed againſt the people, for that they had debaſed the Majeſty of the Empire, and that there was no remedy to appeaſe them but to reduce the Election of the Tribunes to its primitive inſtitution; upon which the people were ſo frighted, they choſe all their Tribunes that year out of the *Patricii*. It was the ſame caſe in the taking of *Veii*. The *Romans* had been before it ten years, and no great likelihood of carrying it; but the Tenth, the Lake of *Albin* being miraculouſly ſwell'd, ſo as to drown a good part of the Country, the great Officers of the Army obſerving their Soldiers weary of the Siege, and impatient to be at home; feigning to have conſulted the Oracles, they pretended that they had receiv'd this anſwer, That *Veii* ſhould be taken that year that *Albin* overflowed; which anſwer reflecting upon their Devotion, the Soldiers reaſſumed their Courage, continued the Siege, and (*Camillus* being choſen Dictator) carried the Town: And thus you may ſee how the *Romans* made uſe of their Religion to encourage their Army againſt the fatigues and dangers of a tedious Leaguer, and to fright the people from entrenching upon the priviledges of the Nobility in the Election of their Tribunes; without which pretence it would have been a hard matter to have perſuaded either the one or the other. There was another example to the ſame purpoſe, *Terentillus* a *Tribune* of the people, would needs make a Law (which was call'd *Lex Terentilla*, and ſhall be mention'd hereafter) contrary to the intereſt, and inclination of the Senate. The Senate reſolv'd to oppoſe it, and the beſt means they could think of, was pretence of Religion; of which they made uſe two ways; they ordered the Books of the *Sybils* to be look'd over, and this anſwer to be returned, That that very year the City would be in great danger of looſing its liberty, unleſs civil Sedition was prevented; which artifice, (notwithſtanding is was diſcovered by the Tribunes) put the people into ſuch a fright, they grew cool in the buſineſs, and refus'd to ſtand by them. After this, they made uſe of the ſame pretence another time; *Appius Hendonius* having

having got together of Slaves and Exiles to the number of Four thouſand men, ſeized upon the Capitol in the night, and brought ſuch a terror upon the City, it might very well be feared if the *Æqui* and the *Volſci* (perpetual Enemies to the *Romans*) had taken their opportunity and marched to *Rome*, they would have gone near to have maſter'd it: However the Tribunes perſiſted, and nothing cou'd ſerve their turns, but the *Lex Terentilla* muſt be promulged; for they affirmed the Stories of being invaded, were but ſuggeſtions and fallacies, and not one word of them true; Hereupon *Publius Rubetius* (a grave Citizen, and of good authority among them) came forth of the Senate, and partly by fair words and partly by foul, remonſtrating the danger of the City, and the unſeaſonableneſs of their demands, he play'd his part ſo well, that he conſtrained the people to take an Oath of fidelity to the Conſul; and in teſtimony of their integrity, the people ran to their Arms, and recovered the Capitol from *Herdonius*; but *Publius Valerius* their Conſul being ſlain in the Conflict, *Titus Quintius* was choſen immediately in his place; who to keep the populace employed, and leave them no time to think of their Law *Terentilla*, commanded them out of Town forthwith againſt the *Volſci*, alledging that the Oath which they had taken to be true to the Conſul, obliged them to follow him; and though the Tribunes oppoſed it, and objected that that Oath extended no further than to the Conſul that was dead; nevertheleſs *Livy* tells us, that ſuch was the peoples tenderneſs and veneration for Religion, that they choſe rather to follow the Conſul, than to ſtrain and preſume upon their Conſciences, giving this reaſon for it.

Nondum hæc, quæ nunc tenet ſeculum, negligentia deûm venerat, nec interpretando ſibi quiſque injuravadum, & leges aptas faciebat.

The neglect of the Gods, which has overſpread this Age, was not then come to that height, nor did every man interpret his Oaths, and accommodate his Laws, to his own intereſt and advantage.

Upon which the Tribunes perceiving their danger, and that if they did perſiſt, they ſhould run a hazard of being utterly extinguiſhed; they came to an agreement with the Conſul, received his Orders, obliged themſelves not to inſiſt upon the *Lex Terentilla* for a Twelve-month, in caſe the Conſuls for the ſame time would forbear drawing out the people. And thus you ſee how by pretence of Religion, the Senate overcame a difficulty, which without it, it could never have done.

CHAP. XIV.

The Romans *were wont to interpret their* Auſpices *with accommodation to their own pleaſures and deſigns; and when at any time they were forced to tranſgreſs, they managed it wiſely, and pretended to be very preciſe; and if any body raſhly deſpiſed them he was ſure to be puniſhed.*

AMong the *Gentiles*, *Auguries* were a great part of their Religion (as I have ſaid elſewhere) and they contributed not a little to the well being of the *Roman* Commonwealth; for which reaſon the *Romans* had them in particular care above any other Ordinance, and made uſe of them in the creation of Conſuls, in the undertaking of Enterprizes, in drawing out their Armies, in their Battels and Engagements, and in every other buſineſs of importance, whether Military or Civil; nor would they ever begin an Expedition, till they had poſſeſſed the Soldiers that the Gods had promiſed them ſucceſs; Among the ſeveral Orders of *Auſpices*, they had one called the *Pullarii*, who were to give their preſages before ever they fought with their Enemy: If the Pullen, over which they had inſpection, Eat, it was a good Omen, that they might with confidence engage; if they did not Eat, It was an ill ſign, and they were obliged to forbear: Nevertheleſs, when reaſon told them their Enterprizes were practicable, they went roundly about them, though perhaps their *Auſpices* were averſe, but acted with great nicety and cunning, that it might not ſeem done in defiance of Religion: This was practiſed by *Papirius* the Conſul before his Battel with the *Samnites* after which they never recovered. For being drawn up with his Army againſt the *Samnites*, with all viſible advantage, and being willing to fall on, he commanded the *Pullarii* to try their Experiment; the Chickens refuſing to peck, was a great trouble to the chief of the *Pullarii*, who obſerv'd the great alacrity of the Soldiers, and the great confidence of the General; that an occaſion therefore of ſo ſignal a Victory might not be taken from the Army, he returned anſwer to the Conſul that the Omen was good. *Papirius* put his Men immediately into Battalia, and advanced againſt the Enemy; but ſome of the *Pullarii* having told it up and down among the Soldiers, that the Pullets did not

eat,

eat; it came to the ears of *Spurius Papirius*, Nephew to the Conſul, who in great haſt advertiſing his Unkle, receiv'd this anſwer, Spurius, *be you diligent, and obſerve your Orders; to my ſelf and my Army the* Auſpicia *are good; if the* Pullarius *has told me falſe, the misfortune will be to him*; and that the event might correſpond to his Prognoſtick, he commanded the *Pullarii* to be plac'd in the front of the Battel; his Commands being executed, it happned by accident as they were advancing to the fight, the chief of the *Pullarii* was kill'd by a dart from one of the *Roman* Soldiers, which being told the Conſul, *Now* (ſaid he) *all will be well, the Gods are appeaſed, and the blood of the Author has atton'd for his lye*; and ſo by a diſcreet accommodation of his deſigns to the *Auſpices*, he went on to the Combat, his Army taking no notice that he had violated their Religion. Had *Appius Pulcher* been ſo ingenious in *Sicily* in the firſt *Punick* War, it had fared better with him when he came home; but being to fight the *Carthaginian* Army, he conſulted the *Pullarii*, who informing him that the Pullen would not eat, *We will ſee then* (ſaid he) *if they will drink*, and cauſed them to be thrown into the Sea: And coming afterwards to an Engagement, his Army was defeated, himſelf condemn'd at his return, and *Papirius* advanced, not ſo much becauſe one had prevailed, and the other was beaten, as becauſe one had prudently evaded the Omen, and the other raſhly defyed it: And theſe *Auguries* were invented for no other end, but that the Soldiers might go to fight with more confidence and alacrity; for their alacrity was obſerved to contribute much to their ſucceſs; and this practice was ſo fortunate to the *Romans*, that foreign Governments began to make uſe of it; as I ſhall ſhew by one Example in the following Chapter.

CHAP. XV.

How the Samnites, *in the extremity of their Affairs, as their laſt Refuge, had recourſe to Religion.*

THE *Samnites* had long War with the *Romans*, fought ſeveral Battels with them, and in the laſt fight in *Tuſcany*, were ſo utterly broken, that their Army was deſtroyed, their chief Officers ſlain, and the *Tuſcans*, *Gauls*, and *Umbri*, (their Allies) uncapable of giving them any further aſſiſtance; ſo that *Livy* tells us, *Nec ſuis, nec externis viribus jam ſtare poterant, tamen bello non abſtinebant, adeo ne infeliciter quidem defenſæ libertatis tædebat & vinci, quam non tentare victoriam malebant.* That though they were reduced to ſuch a condition, *That they could neither ſupport themſelves by their own ſtrength, nor the ſupplies of their Friends, yet they continued the War; ſo that the unhappineſs of their defence could not diſcourage them, but they choſe rather to be conquer'd, than to try for the Victory.* Hereupon knowing that no Victory is to be expected, where the Soldier is diffident; and that nothing enhanſes them like a religious opinion; as their laſt effort, they concluded (by the Miniſtry of *Ovius Paccius* their Prieſt) to revive an old Ceremony, which they did in this manner; Altars being erected, and ſolemn Sacrifice made, betwixt the flaming Altar and the Bones of the Victims, the Officers having firſt ſworn never upon any diſtreſs whatſoever to abandon the fight; the Soldiers were call'd over one by one, and in the ſame place (before ſeveral Centurions with their naked Swords in their hands appointed to that purpoſe) required to ſwear, firſt, that they would not deride any thing that they ſhould either hear or ſee; after which, with execrable words, and verſes full of horror, they caus'd 'em to take their Oaths to be ready at the Command of their Generals, never to fly, and to kill any of their fellows that offer'd to turn his back: And if ever they broke them, they imprecated a judgment upon themſelves and their race. Some of 'em being ſcrupulous, and unwilling to ſwear, were kill'd upon the place; which ſtruck ſuch terror into the reſt, that none of them refus'd. And that this Ceremony might be perform'd with more magnificence, there being 40000 Men in the field, half of them were clothed in white, with Plumes of feathers upon their Helmets, in which poſture they encamped not far from *Aquilonia*; *Papirius* was ſent againſt 'em, and in his Speech to his Soldiers, he had this Expreſſion, *Non enim criſtæ vulnera facere, & picta, atque aurata ſcuta, tranſire* Romanum *pilum. For their feathers made no wounds, nor could the paint or glittering of their Shields protect them againſt the darts of the* Romans. And to take off the opinion from his Soldiers, that the ſolemnity and nature of their Oath, might make the Enemy deſperate; he told 'em, That that would be rather a terror, than an encouragement to 'em, when they came to conſider that by their own folly they had brought themſelves in danger of the Gods, the *Romans*, and their Comerades. In ſhort the *Samnites* were beaten, the

Roman

Roman virtue, and the memory of their own frequent misfortunes prevailing againſt all the forc'd courage which either their Oath or their Religion could give 'em. Nevertheleſs their ſence of it was viſible, ſeeing they made uſe of it as their laſt remedy, when they had no other hopes to recover their ſpirits.

This might poſſibly have been better brought in among my foreign diſcourſes, but depending upon one of the ancienteſt and moſt important Ceremonies of the *Roman* Commonwealth, leſt I ſhould divide my matter, and give too much occaſion to look back, I thought it not improper to inſert it in this place.

CHAP. XVI.

A People accuſtomed to the Dominion of a Prince, though by accident they may acquire their Liberty, yet it is with great difficulty, if they maintain it.

IF the Records of ancient Hiſtory will ſerve our turn, it is manifeſt by many examples, that a people born and bred up in ſubjection to a Prince, cannot without great difficulty preſerve its liberty, if by any accident it attains it, as the *Romans* did upon the expulſion of the *Tarquins*, and not without reaſon; for the people is like a wild beaſt (which, tho' naturally fierce, diſpos'd to live in the woods, and to find out dens and coverts to conceal it ſelf) yet having been always brought up as it were in priſon and ſervitude, if by accident it breaks its bonds and eſcapes out into the field, it is in a maze, knows not whither to run, where to ſuſtain, or where to conceal it ſelf, as having been accuſtom'd to bondage and confinement; by which means, if worth the looking after, it is eaſily recover'd. It is the ſame with a people which has liv'd always in ſubjection, who, underſtanding nothing of publick offence or defence, and knowing as little of Princes as Princes do of them, are with the greateſt eaſe imaginable reduc'd to a yoke which is commonly more grievous than what they eſcap'd from before; and this happens to 'em where they are not totally debauch'd (for where the Maſs is corrupted, they cannot ſubſiſt a moment): I ſpeak now of thoſe where the malignity is not ſo diffuſed, but that there are ſtill left more good men than bad; in which caſe another difficulty does likewiſe occur, and that is, when-ever the yoke of tyranny is ſhaken off, and liberty ſet up, it follows continually that many enemies are created, whoſe intereſt is to ſubvert it, and no friends made that ſhall have any advantage by ſupporting it. By enemies I mean all thoſe *privado*'s and favourites of Princes who have enjoy'd the preferments and wealth of their Maſter, and cannot but be diſguſted to find themſelves diſpoſſeſs'd; wherefore they are conſtantly ready to take any occaſion of reſtoring their old Prince, that they themſelves might be reſtor'd to their authority and employment. And for friends whoſe intereſt it is that (upon the ſhaking off their Tyrant) their liberty ſhould be preſerved, they are not to be expected; becauſe in free States, Honours, and Offices are confer'd upon ſuch as by their virtue, ſome great atchievement for the benefit of the Commonwealth, or ſome other honourable action have ſeem'd to deſerve 'em; and when a man receives no more than what he thinks he has deſerv'd, he aſcribes it to his own merits rather than to the liberality of the State, and holds himſelf not obliged. Beſides, the common utility reſulting from a free State, though it be in their power, it is not at all in their knowledge; for who is it that conſiders, or takes care that every man enjoys quietly what God has given him; that their wives be not diſhonour'd, their children abuſed, nor their fellows oppreſſed? For who is it that will think himſelf bound to any man for doing him no wrong? And things being ſo, a free State newly acquired, never creates ſuch friends as will be half ſo ſolicitous for its conſervation, as thoſe enemies who have been diſpoſſeſſed of their fortunes and preferment, will be to undermine it, and reſtore their old Maſter again: And if it be enquired what courſe is to be taken againſt the inconveniences and diſorders which follow thereupon; there is not a more efficacious, ſafer, and more neceſſary remedy, than to kill the Sons of *Brutus*, who (as Hiſtory tells us) entred into a conſpiracy againſt the State, with other young Gentlemen of *Rome*, for no other reaſon but becauſe they could not be ſo looſe and licentious under the Conſuls as under the Kings; as if their freedoms were incompatible, and the liberty of the people was ſervitude to 'em: Wherefore he who propoſes to govern a people, whether by the way of Monarchy or Republick, and does not ſecure himſelf of thoſe who are adverſe to the change, muſt never think to effect, or at leaſt to enjoy it long: And on the other ſide, it is convenient he ſhould know the infelicity of thoſe Princes who cannot ſecure their Dominion without murder and blood; by which means the multitude is incens'd, and become mortally their enemies: He who

who has but few enemies may ſecure it the better; but where the multitude is provoked, no ſecurity is to be had; and the more cruelty is uſed, the weaker the Government; ſo that when all's done the ſureſt remedy is to indulge the people, and make them your friends. And now (though I may ſeem ſomething confuſed and immethodical in ſpeaking ſometimes of a Prince, and then of a Republick) I ſhall take the liberty to do it here briefly, that I may have no occaſion hereafter. A Prince therefore who, by uſurping upon the liberties of the people, has made them his enemies (if he deſires to reconcile himſelf) is above all things to conſider what the people affect, and he ſhall find it to conſiſt principally in two things; one is, revenge upon thoſe who have been inſtrumental in their ſlavery; and the other is reſtitution of their liberty. In the firſt the Prince may gratifie 'em fully, in the ſecond but in part. Of the firſt we have an exact inſtance: *Clearchus*, Governour of *Heraclia*, being baniſh'd for his tyranny, a controverſie betwixt the Nobility and the Commons hapning afterwards in that Town, it fell out, that the Nobility finding themſelves the weaker, addreſs'd to *Clearchus*, and having entred into confederacy with him, they gave him admiſſion, and overcoming the people, he took away their liberties. But *Clearchus* perceiving himſelf in the clutches of the Nobility, and not only ſubject to their inſolence (which was neither to be ſatiated nor corrected) but to the rage and fury of the multitude, which could by no means digeſt his encroachments upon their liberty, he reſolved at one blow to rid himſelf of his Grandees, and reconcile himſelf to the people, and taking his opportunity, he cut off all his Nobility with great ſatisfaction to the reſt. The other thing which they deſire with ſo much favour, is reſtitution of their liberty, in which the Prince cannot totally comply without degrading himſelf: He is therefore to examine upon what grounds the people are ſo fond of it, and he will find that ſome few indeed are zealous for their liberty, in hopes of office and preferment; but the greateſt part deſire it only to be ſecure againſt oppreſſion, and to live comfortably, and at eaſe. For in all Governments, whether Republick or Monarchical, forty or fifty men go away with all the commands and offices of importance, which number being ſmall, it is no hard matter for a Prince to ſecure himſelf againſt them, by cutting them off, or by ſuch addition to their former advantages as may in ſome meaſure oblige them.

The reſt, whoſe aim is only to live quietly, are eaſily ſatisfied by conſtituting ſuch Laws and Ordinances as may make the power of the Prince conſiſtent with the ſecurity of the people. If a Prince does this, and be obſerv'd upon no accident whatever to violate their Laws, the people will quickly be contented, and believe themſelves ſafe. And of this the Kingdom of *France* is an example; being quiet, and at peace, becauſe the Kings are bound by innumerable Laws, which comprehend the ſecurity of the Subject; for by the firſt inſtitution of that Monarchy, the Kings have the diſpoſition of their Revenue, and the management of their Armies, but in every thing elſe they are circumſcribed by the Laws. That Prince therefore, or Commonwealth, which at its firſt erection ſecures not it ſelf, is obliged to do it at the firſt opportunity, as the *Romans* did when they murder'd the Sons of *Brutus*, and he that ſlips it will repent when 'tis too late: For the people of *Rome* (not yet entirely corrupted) having recover'd their liberty, it was ſufficient to maintain it, that they made away the *Bruti*, and extinguiſhed the *Tarquins*, which otherwiſe was not to have been done, had the whole maſs and body of the people been debauched, as I ſhall ſhew in the following Chapter.

CHAP. XVII.

A people wholly corrupted in their Manners, may poſſibly recover their Liberty, but they will find inſuperable Difficulty to maintain it.

HAD not Kings been expell'd as they were in *Rome*, that City, in my opinion, muſt of neceſſity have declined, and its ancient virtue and the authority been loſt; for if the corruption of thoſe Kings be conſider'd, had it been propagated but to the third ſucceſſion, it would eaſily have diffuſed it among the people; and that being infected, nothing could have preſerv'd the City, much leſs have reſtor'd it to its former vigour and reputation; but the trunk being entire, and the diſtemper only in the head; by taking off that, the members were capable of being preſerv'd, and their liberty recover'd. And this may be laid down as a poſitive truth, that a City accuſtom'd to the dominion of a Prince (if the manners of the people be corrupted) can never make it ſelf free, tho' the Prince and his whole race be extinguiſh'd; for ſome new Lord or other

ther will always ſpring up, unleſs by accident the courage and fortune of ſome good Citizens concurs to its preſervation; and even then its liberty will be continued no longer than the life of that perſon; as it hapned in *Syracuſe*, which remained free during the lives of *Dion* and *Timoleon*, (though in different times) but when they were dead, it relapſed, and fell under the ſame tyranny as before: but the moſt evident example of all was in *Rome*; which City having turned out the *Tarquins*, found out a way of ſetting up, and maintaining their liberty a long time; yet when *Cæſar* was ſlain, and *Caligula*, and *Nero*: and the whole race of the *Cæſars* extirpated; the *Romans* were ſo far from maintaining it, that they could not ſo much as introduce the leaſt form or appearance of liberty; and the reaſon of that diverſity in the ſame City was no other, but becauſe in the time of the *Tarquins* the people were not generally ſo vitious as afterwards in the reign of *Caligula* and *Nero*: for at the expulſion of the *Tarquins*, to poſſeſs the people then againſt tyranny, it was ſufficient to tender them an oath, by which they engaged never to admit a ſingle perſon again in *Rome*: whereas afterwards, upon the death of *Cæſar* and the reſt, neither the authority nor rigour of *Brutus*, with all his Legions in the Eaſt was able to diſpoſe the people to the aſſertion of that liberty which ſo happily had been ſet up by the firſt of *Brutus* his name. So ſtrangely had the Faction of *Marius* diffuſed their poiſon among the Commons, of which *Cæſar* being head, he had opportunity of blinding the people, and coaxing them into ſervitude ſo ſlily, they could not perceive the yoke into which they were thruſting their necks. Though this example of the *Romans* be pregnant enough, yet it is not brought in for any want in our own times. For in *Naples* and *Milan* the manners of the people being totally debauched, nothing could do, no opportunity could reſtore them to a condition of liberty: 'Tis true, upon the death of *Philip Viſconti*, the *Milaneſes* attempted, but they could never effect it. For which reaſon it was very happy for the *Romans* that their Kings diſcover'd their depravity ſo ſoon; for by that means they were driven out before their wickedneſs could dilate, and ſpread it ſelf among the people; which if it had done, the troubles and tumults which ſucceeded thereupon had never had ſo good end, as to make rather for the advantage than prejudice of the City: from whence it may be infer'd, that where the multitude is not corrupt, tumults and diſorders do no very great miſchief; where it is corrupt, Laws may be well conſtituted and provided, and yet do no good, unleſs executed by ſome perſon ſo ſeverely, that the people are compelled to obſerve 'em, and by ſtrict obſervation to become good; which is a thing I can neither ſay has hapned hitherto, or promiſe it ever will. For it is clear, (as I ſaid before) that a City declining, upon the corruption of the Maſs, can never recover, unleſs it be by the virtue and magnanimity of ſome active Citizen, who takes the adminiſtration of Juſtice into his own hands, and ſees every thing faithfully perform'd, and even then, that good man is no ſooner in his grave, but the people are in their old ſervitude again. Thus it fell out with the *Thebans*; *Epaminondas*, by his virtue and conduct, enabled them to keep up a form of a Commonwealth whilſt he was alive, but, alas, at his death it was quickly diſſolved; the reaſon is, becauſe no man is ſufficiently long lived, to reclaim a City that has been long accuſtomed to licentiouſneſs, and to reduce it to be good. So that though it happens to have ſuch a good man among them, and he lives a long time; nay, though there be two ſucceſſions of good men, if the third (as I ſaid before) be defective, all goes to wrack, it muſt neceſſarily be ruin'd, unleſs by many dangers, and great effuſion of blood it happens to be preſerv'd; becauſe that corruption which renders it ſo unapt and indiſpos'd to a free life, proceeds from the great inequality in that City; and to reduce things to an equality, extraordinary ways muſt be uſed which few people know, and fewer will take, as ſhall be ſhewn more particularly in another place.

CHAP. XVIII.

A corrupt City having made it ſelf free, how its liberty may be maintained; and not having made it ſelf, how its liberty may be procured.

I Think I ſhall not be extravagant, if to what has been ſaid already, I add another query; Whether, in a corrupt City, a free State may be maintained (if by any accident it be ſet up); or, if there be no ſuch thing already, how it is to be obtained? I anſwer, both of them are hard; and though a certain rule cannot be preſcribed, (unleſs we knew the degrees of its corruption); nevertheleſs, it being good that every thing be fairly diſcuſt, this queſtion ſhall not be ſuffered to paſs.

I ſhall

I ſhall preſuppoſe, that the City of which I ſpeak is corrupt in extremity, and in that caſe the difficulty encreaſes with proportion; for no Laws nor Cuſtoms can reſtrain an univerſal depravity; becauſe, as good Cuſtoms cannot ſubſiſt without good Laws, ſo good Laws cannot be executed without good Cuſtoms: Beſides, the Laws which are made in the minority and innocence of a Commonwealth, are not ſutable or efficacious when it is grown wicked and robuſt; for the Laws of a City do vary upon ſeveral accidents and emergencies; but the Statutes and fundamental Orders are ſeldom or never changed, for which reaſon new Laws are not ſo neceſſary afterwards, as good Statutes at firſt. But to illuſtrate it farther: By ancient Statute and Cuſtom time out of mind, the Commonwealth of *Rome* was divided betwixt the Senate and the People, and all authority was derived either from the People, or Senate, or Tribunes, or Conſuls; as alſo their creation of Magiſtrates, and enacting of Laws: theſe Cuſtoms were little (if at all) changed in all the revolutions of that State; but the Laws for puniſhing malefactors and regulating enormities, were enacted or repealed, as the exorbitance of the people did fluctuate and require, as the ſumptuary Laws, the Law againſt adultery, ambition, and ſeveral others, inſtituted from time, as the Citizens grew corrupter. But the old cuſtoms of State being retain'd, (though tainted, and ſharing in the corruption of the people) the reviving of old Laws, or introducing of new, was not ſufficient to keep the Citizens good, but it would have contributed much, had the old Cuſtoms been reform'd when thoſe new Laws were introduced, and a new form of Government ſet up: For that thoſe ancient Cuſtoms are of no uſe or advantage where a City is overflown with ſuch a deluge of corruption, is apparent by their methods in the creation of Magiſtrates, and the exhibition of Laws. The Conſulſhip, nor any other office or dignity was never conſer'd by the people of *Rome* upon any body by formal application, which Cuſtom was originally very good, becauſe none ſought for 'em who was conſcious of being unfit; foraſmuch as to be repulſed was a diſhonourable thing, and to make himſelf fit, every man choſe to be virtuous. But afterwards the manners of the people growing ſo fatally corrupt, this Cuſtom loſt its primitive convenience, and became not only uſeleſs but pernicious; for they who had moſt power, not they who had moſt virtue and capacity pretended to the Magiſtracy; the poor and the virtuous not daring to appear for fear of an ignominious repulſe: But this inconvenience (like the City it ſelf) was not the product of a day, it ſtole into the Commonwealth, lay conceal'd, encreaſed and exerted it ſelf by degrees, as all other inconveniencies do. For having conquer'd *Africa* and *Aſia*, and reduced the greateſt part of *Greece*, the *Romans* began to hug themſelves in their liberty, as not knowing any enemy they ought in reaſon to fear: This ſecurity and unhappy ſcarcity of enemies was the occaſion that in the creation of Conſuls the people of *Rome* began to regard riches and favour more than ability and virtue; preferring ſuch perſons as could entertain and treat people handſomly, before ſuch as were grave, and could only conquer their enemies; afterwards, from thoſe who were moſt plauſible, they came down, and created ſuch as were moſt powerful; ſo that perſons of virtue and capacity were totally excluded. In the making of Laws, a *Tribune* and any one Citizen had power to propoſe any thing to the people which they thought of importance to the Publick, before whom it was canvas'd and diſcuſs'd, every man having free liberty to object or promote it (as his judgment directed) before it could paſs.

And this Cuſtom was good likewiſe whilſt the Citizens were ſo too; for it was always, and is ſtill convenient, that if any man be wiſer than the reſt, and can contrive any thing for the ſecurity or benefit of the Publick, that he have liberty to propoſe it; and it is as uſeful on the other ſide, every man have the ſame freedom to ventilate and examine it; that all being well argued, and every man's opinion heard, the beſt may be choſen. But as the Citizens grew corrupt, this Cuſtom grew incommodious: None but great men propoſed any thing to the people, and what they did was not for the common, but their own private intereſt, and which was worſe, no man had the liberty to diſpute it; ſo that the people were either circumvented, or forced to conſent to their own ruine and deſtruction. So then, to have maintained *Rome* free in ſuch an age of corruption, it was neceſſary, as they altered their Laws according to the prevalence of each vice, ſo they ſhould have alter'd their fundamentals, in the making of Laws, and creation of Magiſtrates; for the ſame Cuſtoms are not equally convenient where the people are not equally good, no more than the forms can be alike where the matter is contrary. But 'tis worth our inquiry whether theſe Cuſtoms be to be reform'd at a blow, as ſoon as their inconvenience is deſcried, or by degrees, before every body obſerves 'em. I ſay both of 'em are almoſt impoſſible: For to alter 'em by degrees, requires ſome wiſe and ſagacious Citizen, that can foreſee the dangers at a diſtance, and trace them to their firſt cauſes; but of ſuch perſons perhaps a City may never ſee one,

or if it does, how hard is it for him to perſuade other people: For people accuſtom'd to a way are not eaſily got out of it, eſpecially when the miſchief is rather in probability than proſpect. And when theſe old Cuſtoms are to be reform'd, (as appearing unprofitable and dangerous for the Commonwealth) tho' they be eaſily diſcover'd, they are hard to be remov'd, eſpecially at once; becauſe the common maſs being infected, common ways are too weak; and recourſe muſt be had to extraordinary, as violence and arms; for before the fabrick of the Government can be changed and modell'd to your deſire, 'tis neceſſary above all things to make your ſelf Maſter of the City, and to be able to diſpoſe of it at your pleaſure: And becauſe to reform a State, and reduce it to a Civil Regiment, preſuppoſes a good man; and to uſurp, and make one ſelf Prince by violence, preſuppoſes an ill; therefore it ſeldom falls out that a good man makes himſelf Prince by unjuſt means, be his ends never ſo good; nor will an ill man, who has made himſelf Prince, ever do good: It never falls into his thoughts to imploy that authority well which he has unjuſtly acquir'd. From the cauſes aforeſaid therefore ariſes the difficulty (or rather impoſſibility) in a corrupt City, to maintain a free State, much leſs to erect one; and if there ſhould be any way found out to effect it, it would (in my judgment) be neceſſary to frame it rather according to a Regal than a Popular State; that thoſe perſons whoſe inſolence is incorrigible by the Laws, may be bridled and reſtrain'd by ſome ſupreme Magiſtrate in the nature of a King; and to attempt any other way, muſt be either vain and temerarious, or exorbitantly cruel. For tho' *Cleomenes* (being a ſingle perſon) kill'd the *Ephori*, (as is ſaid before) and *Romulus*, his Brother and *Titus Tatius*, and afterwards imploy'd their authority to the advantage of the Publick; yet it is to be conſider'd, that the ſubjects neither of the one or the other were ſo vitious or depraved as thoſe of whom we have treated in this Chapter; and therefore they were able to do what they pleaſed, and excuſe it when it was done.

CHAP. XIX.

Though a weak Prince ſucceeds an excellent, the Government may ſtand; but if one weak Prince ſucceeds another, 'tis impoſſible.

IF the virtue and conduct of *Romulus*, *Numa*, and *Tullius* (the three firſt Kings of *Rome*) be conſider'd, it will be found to have been much more for the advantage of that City to have its firſt King martial and fierce; the ſecond King, quiet and religious; and the third (like the firſt) active, and war-like again. For, as after the firſt inſtitution, it was neceſſary there ſhould be ſomebody to diſpoſe the people to ways of Religion, and civil converſation; ſo it was neceſſary again after that, that the next Kings ſhould reaſſume the vigour and magnanimity of their predeceſſor; otherwiſe the minds of the Citizens would have grown effeminate, and the City have become a prey to any of its neighbours. Wherefore it is to be conſider'd, that a Prince not altogether ſo valiant and enterprizing, may maintain the Government upon the ſcore of his predeceſſor, and injoy the fruits of his courage and labour; but if it happens to be long liv'd, and that he is not ſucceeded by a martial Prince to revive the activity of the Founder, the Government muſt neceſſarily be ruin'd. On the other ſide, if two Princes immediately ſucceeding, are martial and heroick, they are obſerv'd to do great things, and to advance the Government exceedingly: *David*, without doubt, was a perſon no leſs excellent in military experience than in learning and wiſdom; and ſo great was his courage, that he left his Kingdom to his Son *Solomon* in quiet and peace, who by arts of peace rather than war injoyed it happily his time upon account of his Father; but he could not leave it to *Reboboam* as he had receiv'd it of his Father: For *Reboboam* being neither like his Grandfather in courage, nor his Father in wiſdom, ſucceeded ſcarcely to the ſixth part of his Empire. *Bajazet* the *Turkiſh* Scholar, tho' more ſtudious of peace than of war, injoyed the labours of *Mahomet* his Father, who having (like *David*) ſubdued all his Neighbours, left him a Kingdom entire, that might be peaceably maintain'd; but had (*Bajazet*'s Son) *Selimus* now reigning, taken after his Father, and not his Grandfather, that Empire had been ruin'd; but he outgoes the glory of his Grandfather.

From hence may be obſerv'd, that after an excellent and magnificent Prince, a puſillanimous may ſucceed, and the Government ſtand; but if one poor-ſpirited Prince ſucceeds another immediately, 'tis impoſſible it ſhould ſubſiſt, unleſs (like *France*) it be ſupported by its old Cuſtoms and Laws: I call thoſe Princes weak and puſillanimous, who are not converſant, nor addicted to the exerciſe of Arms, and do conclude, that the tranquillity of *Numa*'s Reign (which continu'd for many years) was to be attributed to the cou-

rage

rage and activity of *Romulus*, which was reviv'd again in *Tullus* the third King, after whom follow'd *Ancus*, a Prince of ſo excellent a temper, that he knew how to comport as well in the calms of peace as the tempeſts of war. His firſt practice was gentle, and by methods of peace; but finding he was look'd upon as effeminate, and grew contemptible to his neighbours, he perceiv'd the way to preſerve his dignity was, to betake himſelf to martial courſes, and manage his affairs rather like *Romulus* than *Numa*. From hence an uſeful example for Princes may be taken; and it may be obſerv'd, that whoever is in the poſſeſſion of a State, and follows the example of *Numa*, may either keep it or loſe it, according to the different circumſtances of fortune or time. But he who imitates *Romulus*, and is arm'd with wiſdom and proweſs, ſhall be ſure to keep it, unleſs ſome extraordinary and irreſiſtible power intervenes to ſupplant him. And 'tis in probability to be thought, that had not the third King of *Rome* prov'd a martial Prince, and one who knew by his Arms to recover his declining reputation, he could never (or with great difficulty) have regained it, or performed thoſe exploits which he did afterwards: So that whilſt *Rome* was a Monarchy, and under the Government of Kings, it was under a double danger of deſtruction, either by the mildneſs or the tyranny of its Prince.

CHAP. XX.

Two good Princes, immediately ſucceeding, may do great things; and well-grounded Commonwealths having always a virtuous Succeſſion, their Conqueſts and Acquiſitions muſt of neceſſity be according.

WHEN Monarchy was baniſh'd by the *Romans*, their dangers were baniſh'd with them, and they lay under no fear of either weak Prince or Tyrant; for the command of the Empire was put into the hands of the Conſuls, who came to that authority, not by inheritance, or any indirect or violent ambition, but by the ſuffrage of the people, and were always excellent perſons. The City of *Rome* enjoying from time to time the benefit of their fortune and virtue, might without much difficulty arrive at the higheſt top of greatneſs and dignity, (as it did) in the ſame number of years as it was under the Government of Kings. For we ſee in the examples of *Philip* of *Macedon*, and his Son *Alexander* the Great, that a ſucceſſion of two martial Princes (without a peaceable interpoſed) is ſufficient to conquer the World. And if it were poſſible in a Monarchy, 'tis eaſie in a Commonwealth, in whoſe power it is to elect, not only two, but an infinite and continued ſucceſſion of virtuous perſons; ſo that in a well-order'd Commonwealth, the ſucceſſion is conſtantly good.

CHAP. XXI.

How much that Prince or Commonwealth is to be condemned, which neglects to train up Soldiers of its own.

THE Princes and Commonwealths of our times, if to defend themſelves, or offend their enemy, (as occaſion ſerves) they be unable to bring Soldiers of their own into the Field, they may thank themſelves, and acknowledge (with *Tullus*) that 'tis not ſo much want of capacity in their ſubjects, as want of wiſdom in them for neglecting to train them: For when *Tullus* came to the Crown, *Rome* had been forty years together in peace, (during all *Numa*'s Reign) and there was not a man to be found who had ever ſeen the face of an enemy; nevertheleſs his own deſigns being martial, he reſolv'd to make no uſe of the *Samnites* or *Tuſcans*, or any other Mercenary, but as a wiſe Prince, to diſcipline his own; and his art and experience was ſuch, that in a ſhort time he made 'em excellent Soldiers; and there is nothing more certain, than that where men are unapt for war, the fault is not in the ſituation or nature of the place, but in the careleſneſs or defect of the Magiſtrate; of which we have a freſh and memorable example. There is ſcarce any body ignorant, that of late years the *Engliſh* invaded *France*, and entertain'd no Soldiers but their own; and yet, tho' *England* had had no wars of thirty years before, and had neither Officer nor Soldier who had ever ſeen a battel, they ventur'd to attack a Kingdom where the Officers were excellent, the Soldiers very good, having been trained up for ſeveral years together in the

Italian wars. This proceeded from the prudence of the Prince, and the excellence of that Government, in which (tho' in times of peace) the exercile of Arms is not intermitted; *Pelopidas* and *Epaminondas* having reliev'd *Thebes*, and reſcu'd it from the tyranny of the *Spartans*, finding themſelves in the middle of a ſervile and effeminate people, they ſo order'd it by their virtue and diſcipline, that they brought 'em to the uſe of Arms, took the field with 'em againſt the *Spartans*, and overthrew 'em. From whence that Hiſtorian infers, that there are Soldiers not only in *Lacedemon*, but where-ever there are men, if there be any body to exerciſe and train them; which *Tullus* performed moſt exquiſitely among the *Romans*, and is moſt excellently expreſſed by *Virgil*, in theſe words:

——*Deſideſque movebit*
Tullus *in arma viros.*

No ſoft unactive people *Tullus* knows,
But trains up all promiſcuouſly to blows.

CHAP. XXII.

What is to be obſerved from the Combat betwixt the three Roman Horatii, *and the three Alban* Curiatii.

BY Articles betwixt *Tullus* King of *Rome*, and *Metius* King of *Alba*, it was agreed, that whichſoever of the two ſides ſhould overcome, that King ſhould have the dominion of the other. The *Curiatii* were all kill'd; but one of the *Horatii* being left, *Metius* and his *Albans* fell into ſubjection to the *Romans*.

Horatius returning in great triumph into the City, and meeting a Siſter of his (who was married to one of the *Curiatii*) lamenting the loſs of her Husband, in a great paſſion he kill'd her; for which inhumanity being brought to his trial, he was, after many arguments, diſcharged, but more upon his Fathers interceſſion than his own merits. In which accident there were three things conſiderable; that we are never to venture our whole fortune upon the ſucceſs of a Party; another is, that offences and deſerts are not equally rewarded in a well-order'd City; the third, that no compact is well made, where the performance is or ought to be ſuſpected. For to become ſervile, and in ſubjection to another City, is a thing of ſuch moment and importance, that it is not to be believed that any Prince or State whatſoever ſhould be content that their liberty ſhould be expoſed to the ſucceſs or courage of three of their Citizens; and this was evident in *Metius*; for tho' upon the Victory of the *Romans* he ſeem'd to acquieſce, and promis'd obedience, as by Articles was agreed; yet in the firſt Expedition the *Romans* took againſt the *Veientes*, 'tis manifeſt he would have deceived *Tullus*, as one who repented of the covenants which he had made: But becauſe of the third we have ſpoken largely already, in the next two Chapters we ſhall ſpeak only of the other two.

CHAP. XXIII.

That our whole Fortune is not to be ventured upon part of our Force, and that for that reaſon the keeping of Paſſes is many times dangerous.

IT was never thought diſcretion to put your whole fortune in danger, unleſs your whole force was ready to defend it. This error is committed ſeveral ways; one is when, like *Tullus* and *Metius*, they commit the fortune and virtue of ſo many men as either of 'em had in their Army, to the fortune and virtue of three particular perſons, which was but a pitiful part of either of their ſtrength, not conſidering how, by that agreement, all the pains which their Predeceſſors had taken to eſtabliſh their liberty, and enable their Fellow-citizens to defend it, was rendred vain and ineffectual, by putting it into the power of three perſons to deſtroy it; than which (in my judgment) thoſe two Kings could not have done worſe. Another great error is, when, upon an enemy's approach, we truſt all to the keeping of an avenue, or defence of a paſs, unleſs it may be done with our whole force: In that caſe indeed the reſolution is good; but if the paſſage be

be narrow, and not room enough for your whole power, is is uncertain and dangerous; and that which perſuades me to be of that opinion, is the example of ſuch as having been invaded by a potent Enemy, tho' their Country was environ'd with Mountains and Rocks, yet they would not attend, and engage the Enemy upon the paſſes or mountains, but march'd out of their holds to encounter him; or elſe (which is as bad) they forſook their advantages, and expected him in ſome plain or convenient place within: And the reaſon is, (as aforeſaid) becauſe many men cannot be brought to defend ſuch places as are rocky, for want of ſubſiſtance; and the paſſage being ſtreight, it can receive but few people, and by conſequence is not able to ſuſtain the inſult of a very great Army, and the Enemy may bring as many as he pleaſes to attack it, becauſe his buſineſs is not to fix there, but to paſs thorow and be gone: Whereas he who is to defend it, cannot be in any conſiderable Body, being (by reaſon of the uncertainty of the Enemy's approach) to lie there continually, tho' (as I ſaid before) the places are both barren and ſtreight. Having therefore loſt that paſs which you imagin'd to keep, and upon which your Army and People did wholly rely, the remainder of your Army and Subjects are poſſeſs'd with ſuch a fear, that you can have no farther trial of their courage, but all goes to wrack, and your whole fortune loſt, but with part of your Army. With what difficulty *Hannibal* paſſed the *Alps* betwixt *France* and *Lombardy*, and betwixt *Lombardy* and *Tuſcany*, there is no body ignorant; nevertheleſs the *Romans* choſe rather to attend him him upon the *Teſin*, and afterwards in the plain of *Arezzo*, where the danger was equal both to the Enemy and them, than to carry their Army up into the clouds upon the Rocks and the Snow, to be conſumed by the incommodity of the place, before the Enemy came at them. And whoſoever ſhall read Hiſtory deliberately, ſhall find few great Captains that would coop themſelves up in ſuch paſſes and ſtreights, not only for the reaſons aboveſaid, but becauſe all of 'em cannot be ſtop'd, the Mountains in that reſpect being like the fields, having not only the Roads and High-ways, but By-paths and paſſages, which tho' not obſerv'd by Strangers, are well enough known to the Inhabitants, who will be always ready to conduct the Enemy, to remove them farther off who lie conſtantly upon 'em. Of this a late Example may be brought, in the year 1515. when *Francis* King of *France* deſign'd to paſs into *Italy* for the recovery of *Lombardy*, the great objection by thoſe who were againſt the Expedition, was, That the *Swizzers* would obſtruct his paſſage over the Mountains; which argument was found idle afterwards, for the King of *France* waving two or three places which they had guarded, paſſed by a private and unknown way, and was upon their backs in *Italy*, before they perceiv'd him; ſo that being mightily ſurprized, the Enemy quitted his Poſts and retired into *Italy*, and all the *Lombards* ſubmitted to the *French*; they being deceived in their opinion, who thought the *French* were with more Eaſe and Convenience to be obſtructed in the Mountains.

CHAP. XXIV.

In well Ordered Governments, offence and deſert are never ſet one againſt the other, but he who does well, is rewarded, and he who does otherwiſe, is puniſhed.

THE merits of *Horatius* were very great, having by his own ſingle valour and conduct, overcome the *Curiatii*; after which he committed a moſt abominable act, in killing his own Siſter: which Murther was ſo hainous in the Eyes of the *Romans*, that he was brought to a Trial for his life, though his deſerts were ſo freſh and conſiderable; which at firſt ſight ſeems ingrateful in the people; but he who examines it ſtrictly, and weighs how neceſſary and ſacred a thing Juſtice ought to be in every Common-wealth, will find them more blameable for diſcharging, than they would have been for condemning him; and the reaſon is, becauſe in a well conſtituted State no man's good actions ſhould indemnifie him for doing ill; for puniſhment being as due to ill actions, as rewards are to good, having rewarded a man for doing well, he is ſatisfied for what he did, and the obligation diſcharged; ſo as if afterwards he commits a Crime, he is to be puniſhed ſeverely according to the Nature of his offence; by the obſervation of which Orders, a City may continue free a long time, which otherwiſe will quickly go to ruine. For if a Citizen having perform'd any great Exploit for his Country, ſhould expect not only honour and reward for what he has done, but priviledge and impunity for any miſchief he ſhould do afterwards, his inſolence would in a ſhort time grow inſupportable, and inconſiſtent with Civil Government. So then

it

it is very neceſſary for diſcouragement from ill actions, to recompence good, which was the practice in *Rome*, and tho' where a Common-wealth is poor, her rewards cannot be great; yet even out of that ſmall ſtock, ſhe is to be punctually grateful, for a thing (how little ſoever) given in acknowledgment of ones good Service (let it be never ſo great) is look'd upon as Honorable, and receiv'd as a Magnificent reward. The Stories of *Horatius Cocles*, and *Mutius Scævola* are generally famous. *Cocles* with incomparable courage maintained fight againſt a great body of the Enemy upon the Bridge over *Tiber*, till it was cut behind him, and their paſſage obſtructed: The other deſigning againſt the life of *Porſenna* King of *Tuſcany*, and killing his Secretary by miſtake, being apprehended and brought before the King, to ſhow the courage and conſtancy of the *Romans*, he thruſt his own hand into the fire, and burnt it off before his face; and how were they gratified? marry each of them had two *Staiora*'s, which is as much ground as can be ſown with two Buſhels of Corn. The Hiſtory of *Manlius Capitolinus* is no leſs remarkable; Having reliev'd the Capitol (which the *French* had ſurpriz'd in the night) and beaten them out again, his Comrades in requital gave him a certain meaſure of Flower, which (as times went then) was a mighty reward, and eſteemed ſo adequate to the Service, that *Manlius* afterwards either out of ambition or ill nature, cauſing a tumult in *Rome*, and endeavouring to debauch the people, (his former exploits being as they thought amply rewarded) without farther regard to him, they threw him headlong down that *Capitol*, which he had ſo glorioufly preſerved.

CHAP. XXV.

Though it is many times convenient to reform the old Fundamental Cuſtoms of a free City, yet it is convenient ſtill to retain ſome ſhadow and appearance of their ancient ways.

HE who deſires to ſet up a new form of Government in a Common-wealth, that ſhall be laſting, and acceptable to the people, is with great caution to preſerve at leaſt ſome ſhadow and reſemblance of the old, That the people may (if poſſible) be inſenſible of the innovation; for the generality of Mankind do not penetrate ſo far into things, but that outward appearance is as acceptable to them as verity it ſelf. For this cauſe the *Romans* at the beginning of their liberty, when their Kings were expelled, thought it expedient to create two Conſuls inſtead of one King, aſſigning them only XII Lictors, that their number might not exceed what attended upon the King. Beſides this, there was an anniverſary Sacrifice in *Rome*, in which the Miniſtry of the King was of neceſſity required: To ſalve that defect, the *Romans* created a chief of the ſaid Sacrifice with the Title of Royal Prieſt (but with ſubordination to the High-Prieſt) by which Artifice the people were ſatisfied with their Sacrifice, and took no occaſion to complain for the expulſion of their King. He therefore who deſires to reform the policy of a State, and to introduce a new, is to diſguiſe it to the people by the retention (at leaſt in appearance) of ſome of the ancient Cuſtoms, that may keep 'em from diſcerning it; and if at any time by accident there be a neceſſity of changing the power, the number and duration of the Magiſtrates, it will be convenient to continue the Name. This (as I ſaid before) is to be obſerved by any one who would eſtabliſh an abſolute power either in a Republick or Monarchical way; but he who would erect ſuch an abſolute power, as by Authors is call'd Tyrannies, muſt unravel the whole bottom, and innovate all.

CHAP. XXVI.

A new Prince in a new Conqueſt, is to make every thing new.

WHoever makes himſelf Lord of a City or State (and eſpecially if he finds himſelf weak, and ſuſpects his ability to keep it) if he intends not to continue the Government in the old way, either by Kingſhip or Common-wealth, the beſt courſe he can take is to ſubvert all, to turn every thing topſie turvy; and make all things as new as himſelf. To alter the Magiſtracy, create new Titles, elect new perſons, confer new Authorities, advance the Poor, and impoveriſh the Rich, that what is ſaid of *David*, may be ſaid of him, *Eſurientes implevit bonis, & divites dimiſit inanes. He filled the hungry with*

good

good things, and the rich be ſent empty away. Beſides it is his intereſt to build new Cities, to erect new Corporations; to demoliſh and uncharter the old; to ſhift the Inhabitants from one place to another; in a word, ſo to toſs and tranſpoſe every thing, that there be no honor, nor wealth, nor preferment in the whole Province, but what is ownable to him. And for this he need go no farther than *Philip* of *Macedon* (Father to *Alexander* the Great) for his pattern, who by this practice, of a ſmall Prince, made himſelf Monarch of all *Greece*, of whom it is ſaid, *That he removed his people, as a Shepheard did his fold.* Thoſe ways are cruel, and contrary not only to all civil, but to all Chriſtian, and indeed human converſation; for which reaſon they are to be rejected by every body, for certainly 'tis better to remain a private perſon, than to make ones ſelf King, by the calamity and deſtruction of his people. Nevertheleſs, he who neglects to take the firſt good way, if he will preſerve himſelf, muſt make uſe of this bad; for though many Princes take a middle way betwixt both, yet they find it extream difficult and dangerous; for being neither good nor bad, they are neither fear'd nor belov'd, and ſo unlikely to proſper.

CHAP. XXVII.

Men are as ſeldom perfectly bad, as they are perfectly good.

IN the year 1505. Pope *Julius* II. marched his Army into *Bologna* to drive the Family of the *Bentivogli* out of that State, where they had commanded with Supremacy a hundred years. In the ſame Expedition he reſolved to remove *John Pagolo Baglione* out of *Perugia* (where he had Uſurped) and in a word, all ſuch Tyrants as had got any Church Lands into their poſſeſſion. Coming to the Town with the deſire and reſolution aforeſaid, he attended not till he could march in with his Army; but enter'd as it were naked and diſarmed (though *John Pagolo* was in perſon in the City, and many of his party which were got together to defend him) ſo that tranſported with the uſual vehemence wherewith he managed all his affairs, he put himſelf (with his bare guards) into the hands of his Enemy; yet he ſucceeded ſo well, that he carried *Pagolo* off with him, and put in another Governour in behalf of the Church. Wiſemen who were then about his Holineſs, admiring the temerity of the one, as much as the puſillanimity of the other, could not imagine how it ſhould come to paſs, that *Pagolo* having his Enemy as it were naked in his hands, and by conſequence an opportunity (with perpetual glory to himſelf) to have ſecured him, and pillaged his Equipage (for all the Cardinals were then with him, with the moſt precious of their Jewels) ſhould ſo ſtrangely neglect it; eſpecially when they conſidered that it was neither Conſcience nor good nature which reſtrained him; for neither of thoſe were to be ſuppoſed in a man who had been naught with his own Siſter, and murther'd ſeveral of his Relations, to make his way to the Government; wherefore it was concluded to happen, becauſe it is ſo provided by providence, that no man can be exquiſitely wicked, no more than good in perfection; for where there is any thing great and magnificent in a miſchief, they know not how to commit it: So *John Pagolo* who made no bones of either Parricide or Inceſt, could not (or to ſpeak more properly) durſt not make uſe of his opportunity to perpetrate a thing, which would have filled the world with admiration of his courage, and made his memory venerable to poſterity; for he would have been the firſt who had given his Cardinals to underſtand how little it is to their reputation to lord it, and luxuriate as they do; and the greatneſs of the Fact would have leſſened the Scandal, and prevented any danger that might enſue.

CHAP. XXVIII.

For what reaſons the Romans *were leſs ingrateful to their Citizens, than the* Athenians.

WHoever reads and obſerves the paſſages in Commonwealths, will find a touch of ingratitude towards their Citizens in them all, but leſs in *Rome* than in *Athens*, and perhaps in any other Republick whatever. The reaſon (I ſuppoſe) was, becauſe *Rome* had not that occaſion of Jealouſie as *Athens* had: For in *Rome*, from the expulſion of the Kings, to the time of *Silla* and *Marius*, the liberty of the City was never diſturb'd by any man

man within it; ſo that there being no reaſon to apprehend, there was no reaſon to perſecute. In *Athens* it was otherwiſe; for their liberty being invaded and taken away by *Piſiſtratus* when it was moſt flouriſhing and compleat; and that by a pretence of advancing it; they no ſooner recover'd it, but remembring the injuries which they had received, and their paſſed ſervitude, they flew into ſuch an exorbitancy of revenge, that they puniſhed not only the faults of their Fellow-Citizens, but the leaſt umbrage, and appearances of 'em, from whence follow'd the Baniſhment and Execution of ſo many excellent perſons: Hence came the *Oſtraciſm* Laws, and all the reſt of the outrages committed afterwards upon the chief of their City; for, as Writers of Politicks obſerve very well, the people are more cruel and vindicative who have loſt and recover'd their liberty, than they who have preſerv'd it as it was left 'em by their Fathers. He therefore who conſiders what is ſaid, will neither condemn *Athens*, nor magnifie *Rome*; but impute all to neceſſity upon the diverſity of accidents which hapned in each City. And certainly, if it be ſeriouſly conſider'd, it will appear, that if the liberty of the *Romans* had been oppreſſed, as the liberty of the *Athenians* was, *Rome* would have been no better-natur'd, or ſhewn more compaſſion to its Fellow-Citizens than *Athens* did: And this may be infallibly deduced by what hapned (after the expulſion of the Kings) againſt *Collatinus* and *P. Valerius*; for *Collatinus* (tho' he had been very active in aſſerting their liberty) was baniſh'd for bearing only the Name of *Tarquin*; and the other had like to have ran the ſame deſtiny, for building a houſe only upon the top of Mount *Celius*, which they ſuſpected was to command the City. So that it may probably be preſumed (by its ſuſpicion and ſeverity in the two caſes aforeſaid) that *Rome* would have exerciſed the ſame ingratitude, had it been injured in its minority, as *Athens* had been. And that I may have no occaſion to diſcourſe of ingratitude hereafter; I ſhall ſpeak of it more largely in the following Chapter.

CHAP. XXIX.

Whether the Prince or the People is the moſt ſubject to be ingrateful.

AND becauſe we have undertaken to enlarge upon this ſubject, I think not amiſs to examine which are moſt frequently guilty of ingratitude, the Prince, or the People: For better explication, I ſay, That men are ingrateful, either out of ſuſpicion, or avarice. For if a Prince, or Republick ſend out any of their great Captains upon ſome important Expedition, which the ſaid Captain atchieves, and gains honor to himſelf, and reputation to his Maſter, in this caſe the Prince, or State, is obliged to reward him; but if inſtead of rewarding, they caſheer, or diſgrace him, or out of covetous principle, deny him his pay, the ingratitude is inexcuſable: and leaves a ſcandal behind it that can never be worn out, and yet many Princes are too guilty of it; *Cornelius Tacitus* gives us the reaſon in this Sentence, *Proclivius eſt injuriæ, quam beneficio vicem exolvere, quia gratia oneri, ultio in quæſtu habetur. 'Tis more natural to return an injury, than a courteſie, becauſe courteſies are burthenſom, but revenge is ſweet.* But if this ingratitude either in Prince or People, proceeds not ſo much from avarice, as ſuſpicion, in that caſe it is ſomewhat excuſable, and of that kind we read of good ſtore, as when a General has conquered a Province or Empire for his Maſter, when he has exterminated his Enemies, enriched his Army, and gain'd himſelf a great Name, 'tis impoſſible but he muſt be ſo acceptable to his own Soldiers, and ſo dreadful to his Enemies, as muſt beget a jealouſie in the Prince; for the Nature of man being jealous and ambitious, and not to be confined within the bounds of his fortune, it cannot be but if the Prince has taken a fancy that the glory of his General is a diminution to his, the General muſt by ſome vain-glorious, or diſcontented action, eſtabliſh and confirm it; and then what has the Prince to do? but to ſecure himſelf either by cauſing him to be murthered, by taking away his Command, leſſening his reputation with the Soldiers and People, and, by all ways of induſtry, poſſeſſing them that the Victory was not obtained by any Conduct of his, byt by the kindneſs of Fortune, vileneſs of the Enemy, or prudence and good management of the reſt of the Officers.

After *Veſpaſian* (being in *Judea*) was declared Emperor by his Army, *Antonius Primus* being at the ſame time in *Illyria* with another Army, declar'd for the Emperor, and march'd into *Italy* againſt *Vitellius* who was then Paramount in *Rome*; and having beaten him in two pitch'd Battels, he enter'd the City in the Name of *Veſpaſian*: So that *Mutianus* being ſent againſt *Vitellius* by *Veſpaſian*, he found the Enemy broken, the Town taken,

and

and all things done by *Antonius* to his hand. And how was he requited? Why *Mutianus* took away his Commiſſion, remov'd him from the Army, and by degrees ſo leſſen'd his Authority in *Rome*, that *Antonius* going into *Aſia* to make his Complaints to *Veſpaſian*, war receiv'd ſo coldly, that in a ſhort time he was ſtript of all kind of authority, and died very miſerable: And of this nature examples are very frequent in Hiſtory; every body knows how in our times *Gonſalvo Ferrante*, being the King of *Arragon*'s General in the Kingdom of *Naples* againſt the *French*, behav'd himſelf ſo well, that by his ſingular Conduct he conquer'd it, and put it wholly under the obedience of his Maſter, who coming afterwards to *Naples* himſelf, took from him the Command of his Army, diſpoſſeſſed him of many ſtrong places which he held in that Country, and carried him with him into *Spain*, where, not long after, he died in obſcurity. But there is no remedy; theſe kind of jealouſies are ſo natural to Princes, that it is almoſt impoſſible for them to be grateful to any man, who has performed any great thing for them. And if it be ſo with Kings, no wonder if it be ſo with the people; for in a free State they have always two principal ends, one is to enlarge their Dominions, the other to keep what they have got; and their eagerneſs to both theſe, makes them ſo often guilty of ingratitude. As to the firſt point, we ſhall ſpeak elſewhere; the errors in preſerving their liberty; to diſguſt ſuch perſons as ought to be rewarded, and to ſuſpect ſuch as ought to be truſted; and though ſuch practices are the occaſion of great miſchiefs in a corrupt Commonwealth, and Tyranny does many times enſue (as in *Rome* by *Cæſar*, who took that by force which the ingratitude of the people denied to his merits,) yet in a Town that is entire and incorrupt, they do very well, and add much to the duration of their liberty, to enforce great and ambitious men for fear of puniſhment to comport themſelves better. In my judgment of all the Commonwealths that ever had Empire, *Rome* was the leaſt ingrateful for the reaſons aboveſaid, there being never an Example of its ingratitude but in the caſe of *Scipio*: For *Coriolanus* and *Camillus* were baniſh'd for their injuries to the people; and tho' one of them remaining obſtinate was never recall'd, yet the other was not only recall'd, but ſo reſtor'd to the affections of the people, that all his life after they ador'd him as a Prince. But their jealouſie of *Scipio* was of ſuch a ſort, as had never been known before, proceeding from the Ornaments of his body and the endowments of his mind; his youth, his wiſdom, his excellent qualifications, had render'd him too admirable; the powerfulneſs of his Enemy, the danger and tediouſneſs of the War (which he had concluded in a very ſhort time) his deliberation in reſolving, and his quickneſs in execution, had gain'd him a greater reputation than was ever got by any General before him; inſomuch as the Senators, Pretors, and all the chief Magiſtrates in the City began to fear and reſpect him. This was no pleaſing ſight to the graver ſort, becauſe it had not been formerly the Cuſtom in *Rome*; whereupon *Cato* (a man of great eſteem for his piety and juſtice) took up the cudgels againſt him, and complained publickly that the City could not be call'd free, whilſt the Magiſtrates were in awe of any particular Citizen; if then in a thing ſo nearly importing their liberty, the people followed the opinion of *Cato*, in my judgment they were in ſome meaſure to be excuſed. In ſhort, my opinion is, as I ſaid before, that it is avarice and ſuſpicion which makes men ingrateful: To the firſt of which the people are not naturally addicted; and to the laſt, with much leſs propenſity than Princes, as having leſs occaſion, which ſhall be proved hereafter.

CHAP. XXX.

What Rules are to be obſerved by a Prince or Commonwealth to avoid this Vice of Ingratitude, and how a General or great Citizen is to demean himſelf to elude it.

TO avoid the neceſſity of living always in ſuſpicion, and being ingrateful to his Miniſters, a Prince ought to go perſonally with his Armies, as was done at firſt by the Emperors of *Rome*, as the great *Turk* does now, and as all they do and have done that are valiant and couragious; for in ſo doing, the honour and profit of their Victories accrues to themſelves; but where they are not preſent at their Conqueſts themſelves, the honour redounds upon their Officers, and they have not any compleat enjoyment of their ſucceſſes, till they eclips'd, if not extinguiſh'd that glory in other people, which they durſt not venture for themſelves; ſo that their ingratitude, and injuſtice to their Officers, does 'em more miſchief, than their Conqueſts do them good. But

when out of negligence or imprudence, they lie at home idle themſelves, and ſend their Generals in their ſtead, know no better precept to give 'em, than what they know already themſelves. As to the General, if he finds that jealouſie inevitable, he has his choice of two things. As ſoon as the War is ended, he is voluntarily to lay down his Commiſſion, and to preſent it to his Maſter, before he has occaſion to demand it, uſing great care that none of his actions diſcover him to be either inſolent or ambitious, that his Prince having no cauſe to ſuſpect him, may have the greater obligation to reward him. If this way does not pleaſe, the other is quite contrary; and that is, to declare himſelf boldly, and try always to ſet up for himſelf, cajoling and ſweetning his Soldiers and Subjects, making new alliances with his Neighbours, ſeizing upon the ſtrong Towns, corrupting the Officers, and where they will not be corrupted, ſecuring them ſome other way; and by doing thus, he ſhall be even with his Lord for his ingratitude deſigned: And beſides theſe two ways, there is none that I know. But (as I ſaid before) becauſe men can neither be good nor bad in extremity, it happens that great men are unwilling to quit their Commands, and retire after the gaining of a Victory; behave themſelves modeſtly they cannot; and to uſe rigour in an honourable way is impoſſible. So that whilſt they are in ſuſpence, and uncertain which courſe to ſteer, they are many times deſtroyed. As to a Commonwealth that would preſerve and exempt it ſelf from this deteſtable vice of ingratitude, the ſame remedy cannot be preſcribed as was preſcribed to a Prince; for not being able to manage its Wars in perſon as a Prince may do, the command of their Forces muſt of neceſſity be committed to ſome of their Subjects. The beſt way they can take, is to follow the Example of *Rome*, and that will render them leſs ingrateful than their Neigbours. In the wars of the *Romans*, by ancient Cuſtom all people were employed, as well Nobles as others, and from thence it came that they were always well furniſhed with Generals and Officers of all ſorts, which kept them from being jealous of any one, having ſo many of equal merit to oppoſe him: Beſides which, there were expreſs Laws againſt ambition, and all people ſo narrowly obſerved, that no man durſt diſcover the leaſt deſign or inclination that way; and in the creation of Dictators, he was commonly prefer'd, who debas'd himſelf moſt, or diſcovered leaſt deſire to obtain it; by which means preventing the occaſion of ſuſpicion, they prevented the ingratitude. That State therefore which would avoid the guilt of ingratitude, is to imitate *Rome*, and that perſon who would avoid the effects, muſt obſerve how the *Romans* defended themſelves.

CHAP. XXXI.

That the Romans *uſed no extraordinary puniſhments towards their great Captains, when they committed an Error of ignorance, or malice, provided the Government was not damnified by it.*

THE *Romans* (as I ſaid before) were not only leſs unthankful, than their Neighbors but they were more human and gentle in the puniſhment of their Generals, than any other State; if their miſcarriage was malicious, they puniſhed it not ſeverely; but if it was by ignorance or miſtake, inſtead of revenging, they did many times reward it; and this they did upon very great conſideration, for the *Romans* underſtood the charge of an Army to be ſo great a care, and of ſuch tranſcendent importance, that whoever undertook it, ought to have his mind free and indiſturbed by any other reſpects or troubles whatſoever, for his thoughts being with his troubles, he would never mind his Army, nor take any advantage. For Example, an Army is ſent into *Greece* againſt *Philip* of *Macedon*, or into *Italy* againſt *Hannibal*, or thoſe people upon the Frontiers, which had been conquered before, and the Captain who has the General Command, is loaden with all the cares which do commonly attend great and extraordinary Enterprizes. Now if to thoſe neceſſary cares for his Army, there ſhould be ſuperadded a fear, and apprehenſion of being puniſhed at his return (if things went otherwiſe than well) and perpetual reflexion upon thoſe who have been abuſed and put to death upon the ſame ſcore, it muſt needs diſturb the tranquillity of his mind, and make him unfit for any great action. The wiſe *Romans* thought the infamy and diſhonour of loſing a Battel, puniſhment enough, without heaping one affliction upon another. And as to thoſe whoſe errors proceed rather from malice than ignorance, we have another Example. *Sergius*, and *Virginius* had each of them an Army, and were encamped before *Veii*: *Sergius* was poſted againſt the *Tuſcans*, and *Virginius* on the other ſide againſt any body elſe. It hapned the *Faliſci* having joyned with ſeveral

of

of their neighbours, came to fall upon *Sergius*. *Sergius* had notice, and found himſelf too weak; yet rather than ſend to his Companion for ſupplies, he choſe to be routed; and *Virginius* on the other ſide, though he knew his diſtreſs, would by no means relieve him, unleſs he deſired it; ſo that that *Roman* Army was cut off by the ambition and emulation of their Generals; a thing of very ill example, had it been ſuffered to paſs without puniſhment.

Nevertheleſs, whereas other States would have puniſhed them with death, *Rome* inflicted only a pecuniary mulct, but their crime deſerved ſharper correction, but the *Romans* were unwilling to do any thing againſt cuſtom, which (as is ſaid before) is very ſacred with them. As to the errors of ignorance, we have another example in *Varro*, by whoſe folly and raſhneſs the *Romans* having loſt the Battel of *Cannas* againſt *Hanibal*, and brought their whole Government in danger, had *Hannibal* known how to uſe, as well as gain a Victory; yet his offence having in it more of ignorance than malice, when he came back, the Senate went out to meet him in their Formalities, and not being able to congratulate his ſucceſs, they gave him thanks for his return, and that *De ſalute reipublicæ non deſperaſſet, That he did not deſpair of their affairs.* When *Papirius Curſor* the Dictator would needs put *Fabius* to death, becauſe contrary to orders he had fought with the *Samnites*, among other reaſons which the Father of *Fabius* urged againſt that ſentence, this was one, that the people of *Rome* had till that time never been ſo ſevere upon any of their Commanders for the loſs of a Battel, as *Papirius* would now be upon the Victor for gaining one.

CHAP. XXXII.

A Commonwealth or Prince is not to defer his beneficence till the neceſſity of the object requires it.

THE liberality of the *Romans* to the people ſucceeded very well when *Porſenna* invaded *Rome* in behalf of the *Tarquins*; for the Senate apprehending the people might be brought to reſtore the Kings rather than endure the war, to oblige 'em, releas'd their gabels upon ſalt, and all their other duties, declaring the people were ſufficient benefactors to the Publick, in providing and bringing up their children: All which was done to cajole 'em into ſuch an humour as might make 'em endure the ſiege, and ſwallow the calamities of the War: But let no man rely upon this example, and defer his indulgence to the people, till the enemy be upon his back; for it ſhall never ſucceed ſo well to him as it did to the *Romans*; becauſe the multitude will think themſelves more obliged to the enemy than to him, and believe, that when the neceſſity is over, they ſhall be as bad as before. The reaſon why this way ſucceeded ſo happily to the *Romans*, was, becauſe their State was but new, and ſcarce ſettled, and the people were ſenſible that ſeveral Laws were made before for their advantage and reputation; as particularly the Law of appeal to the people, ſo as they were able to ſatisfie themſelves that the benefits which were confer'd upon 'em by the Senate, proceeded rather from a diſpoſition in the Senate to do 'em good, than from any apprehenſion of the enemy: Beſides, the injuries and outrages of their Kings lay freſh and heavy upon their memories. But theſe caſes hapning very ſeldom, 'tis but very ſeldom that ſuch remedies ſucceed; wherefore it is better for any Commonwealth or Prince to conſider the worſt before-hand, and what people he is moſt like to have need of in time of adverſity; and to live ſo with 'em in time of proſperity, as that they may be encouraged to relieve him upon any diſtreſs. And he who acts otherwiſe, whether Prince or Commonwealth, (but eſpecially a Prince) and preſumes, when the danger is hanging over his head, that it is time enough to favour the people, will find himſelf miſtaken, and the people readier to contribute to his ruine than defence.

CHAP. XXXIII.

If an inconvenience increaſes either within a State, or againſt it; it is better to temporize and comply, than to endeavour to remove it by violence.

THE *Roman* Commonwealth increaſing in Empire, Reputation and Force, their neighbours not having conſidered it, nor what damage that greatneſs might pull down upon them, began now (when too late) to diſcover their error; and being willing to do that now which had been more eaſie before, forty little States of them confederated againſt *Rome*. The *Romans*, among their uſual proviſions in caſe of imminent danger, created a *Dictator*, who, without any mans advice, might reſolve as he pleaſed, and execute his reſolutions without being called to an account. This Magiſtrate was not only the occaſion of overcoming their enemies at that time, but was very uſeful upon all accidents afterwards when their dominion increaſed. Which may teach us, that when either at home within, or abroad againſt a Commonwealth, an inconvenience ariſes, (whether from an inward or an outward couſe it is not material) 'tis better counſel to comply and temporize, than to endeavour furiouſly to ſuppreſs it; for to reſiſt, is to augment it, and to pull down upon our heads what we were but afraid of before. And theſe kind of accidents fall out in a Commonwealth oftner from intrinſick than extrinſick cauſes, where the power and authority of ſome Citizen is permitted to increaſe too faſt, and more than is convenient for the honour or benefit of the State; or when ſuch Laws are abrogated or neglected as were moſt for the intereſt of their State; which error, if ſuffer'd to run on, will be more dangerous to oppoſe than to comply with; for it is ſo much the harder to find out theſe inconveniencies in the beginning, by how much 'tis natural for all people to favour every thing that is new, eſpecially if introduced by a young man, with the leaſt ſhew or pretence of advantage: for if a young Gentleman appears in a Commonwealth endued with more than ordinary qualities, the eyes of the whole City are immediately upon him, they run unanimouſly to reſpect him, and pay him all the honour than can be imagined; ſo that if he has the leaſt ſpark of ambition or vain-glory, he is preſently puffed up, and inflamed with the contemplation of his own worth, and the affection of the people: and when he is arrived at ſuch an height, as to be as viſible as their error, then 'tis too late; there are but few remedies in the caſe; and when moſt of 'em are applyed, they do but magnifie his power. Many examples might be brought to this purpoſe, but I ſhall only inſtance in one.

Coſimo di Medicis (from whom the famous Family of the *Medici* in our City had their firſt grandeur) was in ſuch reputation for his wiſdom; and his fellow Citizens were ſo ignorant, that he began to be formidable to the State, and the Magiſtrates began to think it difficult to take him down, but deſtructive to let him ſtand. There was at that time in *Florence* a perſon of great experience in matters of State, called *Nicolo da Uzano*, who being well adviſed of the firſt fault which he had committed in not conſidering in time the inconveniencies which might follow upon *Coſimo*'s reputation, reſolved to obviate the ſecond; that is, that no force ſhould be uſed to oppreſs him, as knowing that courſe would be the ruine of the State; and ſo it proved not long after his death. For the Citizens which remain'd, not following his counſel, began to combine, and fortifie againſt *Coſimo*, and indeed forc'd him out of *Rome*. Whereupon, his party being increaſed, in a ſhort time called him home again, and made him their Prince, to whinc dignity he could never have arrived, but by the oppoſition of his enemies.

The ſame hapned to *Julius Cæſar*, whoſe great virtue and excellent qualifications recommended him ſo highly to the favour of *Pompey* and the people, that by degrees he became terrible, and their favour was turn'd into fear; of which *Cicero* complains, when he ſays that *Pompey* began to fear him too late; for when his fear prompted him to look out for a remedy, that remedy haſtned the ruine of the State. I ſay then (when this caſe happens) it is incomparably better to temporize, than to endeavour to repel the miſchief which threatens by violence and force. For many times, by that means, it paſſes as it came, and goes out of it ſelf, or elſe the damage it brings is the longer a coming. In theſe caſes Princes ought to be very vigilant, leſt going about to retrench and leſſen the great power of a neighbour, they give him opportunity to increaſe it, and bring themſelves into greater danger: you are therefore to compare your own ſtrength, and your enemies; and if you find your ſelf the ſtronger, to attaque him couragiouſly; but if weaker, you had better be quiet, leſt it happens to you as it did to thoſe little States who confederated againſt *Rome*, to whom (as appear'd by the event) it had been much better

to

to have ſate ſtill, and endeavour'd their friendſhip, than to have irritated the great power of the *Romans*, and forc'd them to a war; for the *Romans* had never got to that height, if that confederacy had not given 'em occaſion of trying all experiments for their defence, and put 'em among the reſt, upon the creation of Dictators, by which new invention they not only maſter'd all dangers that threatned 'em, but prevented a thouſand miſchiefs into which (without that remedy) the Commonwealth would moſt certainly have fallen.

CHAP. XXXIV.

The Dictatorſhip was uſeful, not hurtful to the Commonwealth of Rome; *and how that Power which is uſurp'd, and illegally aſſumed, is pernicious to a State, not that which is conferred legally by the ſuffrage of the People.*

THERE are thoſe to be found who have ſaid that the Dictatorſhip was the ruine and deſtruction of that Commonwealth, alledging that the firſt Tyrant that was ever in that City, ſet himſelf up, under the title of Dictator, and affirming that *Cæſar* could not under any other name have juſtified his Tyranny.

Thoſe who maintain that opinion did not examine it thorowly, and are not for that reaſon to be believ'd. For it was not the name or dignity of the Dictator which brought *Rome* into ſlavery, but the authority aſſumed by the Citizens upon the perpetuation of that office; and if there had been no ſuch thing as Dictator, *Cæſar* had taken ſome other Title upon him to compaſs his deſigns; for when ones power is abſolute, he can aſſume what name he pleaſes; but 'tis not a great Title that gives any man power. Whilſt the Dictatorſhip was diſpoſed by publick ſuffrage, it was very beneficial; thoſe who attain'd it by ways extraordinary, abus'd it exceedingly; the reſt were never known to have done any injury to the Commonwealth thorow all the Dictatorſhips: The reaſon is probable, becauſe a man muſt be endu'd with many good qualities before he can uſurp ſuch an authority. He muſt be abundantly rich; he muſt know how to inſinuate with every body; he muſt have a great party, and make every man his friend; which is not practicable where the Laws are in force; and if he had all thoſe qualifications, they would render him ſo formidable, that the free voices would ever concur in his election: Beſides, the Dictator was not perpetual, but created only upon particular exigence, and with limited power, extending no farther than the preſent danger, during which he had power to diſpoſe of all things at his pleaſure, and puniſh as he thought good without any appeal; but he could do nothing in diminution to the Government, he could not intrench upon the authority of the Senator or People, abrogate their old Laws, or inſtitute new: So that the ſhortneſs of his Dictatorſhip, the limitation of his authority, and the incorruption of the people, made it impoſſible for him to tranſgreſs, and do any miſchief to the City; and on the contrary, that Office has been always beneficial, and, in my judgment, the principal in *Rome*, and has contributed more than all the reſt to make it Miſtreſs of the World; for, without that, that City had never been able to have obviated ſo many dangers, nor gone thorow ſo many difficulties, againſt which their accuſtomed and ordinary means would have been of little validity, as being too tedious and ſlow; (no one Counſel or Magiſtrate being able to do all things alone, but being in a mutual neceſſity one of the other) for in caſes which require immediate remedy, time paſſes away, and is often loſt whilſt they are in their counſels, and when they come to a reſolution, 'tis too late, and their remedies dangerous.

Wherefore I think it convenient that a Commonwealth have a certain way to be uſed only in caſe of urgent neceſſity, as the *Seignory* of *Venice*, (which at this day is the beſt regulated Commonwealth in the World) that State in time of imminent danger has a reſerv'd power to confer authority upon ſome few of their Citizens, by virtue of which they may order all as they pleaſe, without the conſultation of the reſt; for when a Commonwealth is deſtitute of ſome ſuch cuſtom, it muſt of neceſſity be ruin'd by ſticking to their old, or break 'em to preſerve it ſelf: And it were to be wiſh'd that nothing might happen in a Commonwealth that might give occaſion for theſe extraordinary ways; for tho' thoſe extraordinary ways may ſometimes be good, yet the example is ill, and introduces a cuſtom of breaking old orders for good, which afterwards, under that pretence, will be broken for ill: Wherefore that Commonwealth can never be perfect, that by its Laws has not provided againſt every thing, prepar'd remedies for every accident, and appointed in what manner they ſhall be manag'd; which is to be done no better way than by a Dictator, or ſome ſuch Magiſtrate to be created upon extraordinary occaſion;

occaſion; for without them they muſt certainly be ruin'd: And one thing very remarkable in this order, is, the wiſdom of the *Romans* in the formality of its election: For the Dictators being introduced with ſome diminution to the Conſuls, (who being from heads of the City brought down to obedience like other people, might poſſibly reſent it, and in time be the occaſion of diſſention in the City) they committed their election into the hands of the Conſuls, to the end that upon any extraordinary emergence, when *Rome* ſhould have occaſion of ſo extraordinary a Magiſtrate, the Conſuls ſhould comply the more willingly, becauſe they had the making 'em themſelves; for the wounds which a man gives himſelf ſpontaneouſly, and of his own election, are not ſo grievous as what he is forced to bear. But towards the latter end of their Empire, the *Romans*, inſtead of a Dictator, inveſted their Conſul with an equivalent authority in theſe words, *Videat Conſul, ne Reſpublica quid detrimenti capiat; Let it be the Conſuls care that the Commonwealth receives no prejudice.* So that to return to our matter, I conclude that the neighbouring States conſpiring againſt the *Romans*, and endeavouring to oppreſs them, made 'em contrive better, not only for their defence, but to put themſelves into a poſture, with more vigour, and counſel, and authority to repel their invaſion, and turn their force upon them.

CHAP. XXXV.

How it came to paſs that the Creation of the Decem virat *was prejudicial to the liberty of that State, though it was done freely, and by publick ſuffrage.*

IN the laſt Chapter we have ſhewn that a power legally conferred, and by the ſuffrage of the people, is not dangerous to the State; but that which is uſurp'd, and gotten by force, to which the election of the *Decem viri* may ſeem to be contrary, who were choſen by the people of *Rome* to make their Laws, and reform extravagancies in the Commonwealth, which *Decem-viri* by degrees encroach'd upon their liberties, and made themſelves Tyrants. Wherefore we are to conſider what is ſaid, with limitation and reſtraint; and reſpect both the manner in which ſuch power is confer'd, as likewiſe the time it is to continue, whether for longer or ſhorter: For an abſolute power (though granted but for a year) is very dangerous, and produces ſuch effects as are ſutable to the mind of the perſon to whom it is granted. And the power of the *Decem-viri* (if examin'd) will be found much greater than the power of the Dictators. For notwithſtanding the creation of the Dictator, the majeſty of the Conſuls and Senate remain'd, together with the authority of the Tribunes, which were as bounds to reſtrain and circumſcribe the juriſdiction of the Dictator; and although the Dictator had power to remove any one out of the Conſulſhip, or take from him his Tribunitial Authority; yet he could not vacat or aboliſh the whole Orders of Senators, Conſuls, and Tribunes, make new Laws, or introduce a new form of Government. So that their eyes being always upon him, he was forc'd (as it were) to intend only ſuch things as were for the benefit of the Commonwealth. But in the creation of the *Decem-viri* it was otherwiſe; for the whole power of the people was transfer'd to 'em, the Conſuls and Senate being caſhier'd, and the power of the Tribunes of the people almoſt quite laid aſide; ſo that ſtanding alone in the Government, without Conſuls or Tribunes, or appeal to the people, or any other Magiſtrate to correct or controul 'em; it was no ſtrange thing that the very next year after their creation, they ſhould become intolerable and inſolent, eſpecially being inſtigated by the ambition of *Appius*. And for this reaſon it is to be obſerv'd, that when it is ſaid, a Power confer'd legally, and by the ſuffrage of the people, is never prejudicial to the State; it is to be ſuppos'd to be confer'd with due circumſtances, and for a certain time; but when the people are cheated, and give it imprudently and raſhly, as in this caſe of the *Decem-viri*, things never go better; which is eaſily prov'd by conſidering what it was that kept the Dictators ſo good, and made the *Decem-viri* ſo wicked: And weighing withal the manner which other Republicks that were reputed well-order'd, obſerv'd, in conferring their authority for a long time, as the *Spartans* to their Kings, and the *Venetians* to their Dukes: Both of 'em preſcribing them rules and limits that they were not to exceed, and appointing ſuch guards upon 'em as ſhould be able (tho' they were never ſo ill diſpoſed of themſelves) to keep 'em from employing their power to the detriment of the State.

Nor is it ſufficient if this Power be confer'd upon good men; for men are frail, and eaſily corrupted, and then in a ſhort time he that is abſolute may eaſily corrupt the people, contract friendſhips, make parties, heap up riches, and commit a thouſand extravagancies;

cies; nor can the poverty of their perſons, or the want of relations prevent it, for wealth, and honour, and every thing follows them which are abſolute, as we ſhall ſhow particularly when we ſpeak of the creation of the *Decem-viri.*

CHAP. XXXVI.

Citizens who have executed the greateſt Offices, ought not afterwards to diſdain or ſcruple the leſs.

Marcus Fabius and *Caius Manlius* being Conſuls, the *Romans* obtain'd a glorious Victory over the *Veientes* and the *Etruſci*, in which was ſlain *Quintus Fabius* Brother to the Conſul, who was choſen the year before. From whence occaſion is offered of admiring the excellence of the *Roman* conſtitution; and obſerving how well it was accommodated for the enlargement of their Empire, from whoſe Model the more the Commonwealths of our days do recede, the more do they wander and deviate from the beſt. For though the *Romans* affected glory and command as much as other people, they did not diſdain notwithſtanding to obey in their Armies, the ſame perſons whom they had formerly commanded; and ſerve as private Soldiers where they had formerly been Generals. This is a practice contrary to the opinion and genius of our age ſo much, that in *Venice* it is provided by a publick Law, that a Citizen who has had a greater command, may refuſe to accept of a leſs (and the City allows it) which Law tho' it may be convenient for private perſons, muſt needs be prejudicial to the publick; becauſe the Publick may with more confidence commit an inferior command to a great Officer, than prefer an inferior Officer to a great command: For to a young Soldier, thoſe places of importance are not ſafely entruſted, unleſs perſons of experience and wiſdom be placed about him, by whoſe Counſel he may be directed: And if the *Romans* had done then what the *Venetians* and other Commonwealths do now, and not ſuffer'd any man who had been Conſul to ſerve in any other quality, many things had befallen them that would have endangered their liberty; and again, if any young Officers had been admitted to the ſupreme commands, and no body placed about them to manage and direct them, they would have grown diſſolute and careleſs, and many things have hapned that might have ruin'd the State.

CHAP. XXXVII.

What troubles and offence was created in Rome *by the* Agrarian *Law; and how dangerous it is to make a new Law oppoſite to an old Cuſtom, with too much retroſpection.*

IT is obſerved by moſt ancient Writers, that as men are afflicted in adverſity, ſo they are ſatiated in proſperity; and that joy and grief have the ſame effects: For when men are not neceſſitated to fight, they fight for ambition, which is ſo powerful in our minds, that let us arrive at what height of good fortune we can, we are never contented, but are ſtill labouring for more; and this happens to us, becauſe we are naturally capable of deſiring many things, which we are unable to compaſs; and therefore our deſire being greater than our power to acquire, our minds are never at reſt with what we enjoy. And this is the occaſion of all our varieties of fortune; for when we are always driving at more, and fearful of loſing what is already in our poſſeſſion, we are apt to fall into ſuſpicions, from thence into quarrels, and from thence into Wars, which do uſually bring after them the ruine of their Country. This we have diſcourſed to give you a better contemplation of the People of *Rome*, which by a kind of neceſſity was forced by their Tribunitial power to fortifie themſelves againſt the oppreſſions of the *Patricii*; but when they had obtained what indeed neceſſity impelled them to deſire, being inſtigated by their ambition, they went on further, and contended with the *Patricii* both for Honour and Eſtate; which was the occaſion of the Seditions about the *Agrarian* Law, and by degrees the deſtruction of the Common-wealth. And becauſe it is neceſſary in every well-order'd State, that reſpect be had rather to the enrichment of the Publick, than particular Citizens, the people of *Rome* could not (in what belong'd to this Law) but err againſt the Fundamentals of

of their Government, if they were ſo conſtituted, that proceſs of time could give no occaſion of difference, unleſs we will rather affirm that at firſt all things were ſo well, that it was beyond the power of time to diſorder them: Be it which way it will, it is certain this Law was never mention'd in *Rome*, but with great controverſie and tumult. This Law conſiſted principally in two heads: One was, That no Citizen of *Rome* ſhould be permitted to poſſeſs more than a certain proportion of Land. The other, that what Land ſhould be taken from the Enemy, ſhould be divided equally among the people; both of which Articles were againſt the intereſt of the Nobility; for moſt of them having more Land than was allowed by this Law, their fortunes by it were to be confiſcated, and half of 'em taken away; and then by the diſtribution of what they ſhould take from the Enemy, they ſhould loſe all opportunity of enriching themſelves for the future; which being certainly true, and this Law ſo perfectly pernicious to the intereſt of the Nobility, it was never mention'd by the Tribunes, but the *Patricii* oppoſed it, and with all the eagerneſs imaginable; yet not always by force, but ſometimes by evaſion, either commanding out their Armies upon ſome pretended deſign, or by ſetting up another Tribune in oppoſition to him who propoſed the Law, that thereby they might diſſolve it, or elſe by ſending new Colonies. And ſo it hapned when the Colony was ſent to *Antium* at the time when the difference was ſo high betwixt the *Patricii* and the *Agrarians*, that no other expedient could be found to keep them from blood. *Livy* tells us, That there were very few that would liſt themſelves upon that accompt, to fill up the number of that Colony, ſo much more did the people prefer an allotment about *Rome*, than in any other place. But afterwards the quarrel grew higher, and to appeaſe their Seditions, the *Romans* were glad to ſend their Armies ſometimes to the extreameſt parts of *Italy*, and ſometimes beyond them. But afterwards it falling out that the Lands which they took from the Enemy were remote, at great diſtance from *Rome*, and not to be cultivated with any convenience, the people grew weary, and inſiſted not ſo fiercely on their *Agrarian* Law: They began alſo to be more moderate in thoſe kind of confiſcations, but when any Country was ſeized, they ſent Colonies to plant 'em: With theſe Arts they skin'd over their animoſities till the time of the *Gracchi*, who reviving them again, gave occaſion to the ruine of their Government: For the Nobility having encreaſed their ſtrength, the quarrel advanced ſo far, that they came to blows, and the Magiſtrate being unable to reſtrain them, the fury of the Faction encreaſing, each party began to look out for a Head. The people choſe *Marius*, and made him four times Conſul, (with ſome little interval) which authority he managed ſo well to his own advantage, that by the power and intereſt which he had got in that time, he made himſelf thrice Conſul afterwards. The Nobility having no other remedy againſt ſo growing a Plague, applyed themſelves to *Sylla*, and having made him their Chief, they fell to down right Wars, which were carried on with much blood and variety of fortune, till at laſt the Nobility prevail'd. The ſame faction revived again in the days of *Cæſar* and *Pompey*, and was attended with the deſtruction of the State: For *Cæſar* eſpouſing the *Marian* party, and *Pompey* the *Syllan*; *Cæſar* overcame, and was the firſt that ſet up a Tyranny in *Rome*; after whoſe time that City could never recover its liberty. This was the beginning, and this was the end of the *Agrarian* Law, which may ſeem to contradict what we have ſaid elſewhere. That the diſcords and enmity betwixt the people and Senate of *Rome* conduced to the enlargement of their Empire, and the conſervation of their liberty, by giving opportunity for the making of ſuch Laws, as were great corroboration to their liberties and freedom; but I anſwer, That the effects of the *Agrarian* Law does not hinder, but that what we have ſaid may be true; for ſo great was the ambition of the Nobility, that had it not been curb'd and check'd ſeveral ways, it would have uſurped upon the City, and got the whole power into its hands. And if we obſerve that the *Agrarian* diſpute was three hundred years together in *Rome*, before it could ſubvert it, we may eaſily imagin, the ambition of the *Patricii* would have done it much ſooner, had it not been ballanced and depreſſed by the people with their *Agrarian* Laws, and ſome other inventions. From whence likewiſe we may obſerve, that wealth is more eſtimable among men than honor; for when the *Patricii* were in controverſie with the people about Titles and Honor, they never went ſo high as to give 'em any extraordinary diſguſt: But when their Eſtates and Fortunes were at ſtake, they defended 'em with ſuch zeal, that they choſe rather to put the whole Commonwealth into a flame, than to part with them quickly. The great authors of that Conflagration were the *Gracchi*, whoſe good will and intentions towards the people, was much more to be commended than their wiſdom. For to remove an inveterated inconvenience, and to that purpoſe to make a Law with too much retroſpection, is ill Counſel (as I ſaid before) and haſtens that ruine which it was deſign'd to prevent; but with Patience and compliance

pliance, the miſchief is either delayed, or ſpends it ſelf in time, before it does any great hurt.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

Weak Commonwealths are generally irreſolute, and ill adviſed, taking their Meaſures more from Neceſſity, than Election.

THE *Volſci*, and the *Equi* underſtanding that *Rome* was ſadly viſited with a Contagion, concluded it a fair opportunity to conquer it, and having betwixt 'em raiſed a powerful Army, they invaded the *Latini*, and *Hernici*; over-ran moſt of their Country, and forc'd them to ſend to *Rome* for aſſiſtance. The *Romans* return'd anſwer, that they ſhould put themſelves in Arms, and make as good defence as they could; for the Sickneſs was ſo raging, they could give them no relief. Which ſhews the generoſity and wiſdom of that Senate, That in all conditions, and under the greateſt of their Calamities never receded from its Majeſty and Grandeur; but at all times would have the diſpoſal of the affairs of its Subjects, and when neceſſity requir'd, made no ſcruple to command things contrary to their old ways of proceeding. This I ſay, becauſe formerly the Senate had forbidden them to arm, upon any occaſion whatever; and perhaps another Council would have thought it derogatory to their Grandeur, to permit them to defend themſelves: But this Senate was endued with admirable prudence, underſtood how things were to be taken, and rejected; and of two evils, how to make choice of the leaſt. It troubled them much that they were not in condition to protect them; and it troubled them no leſs, That they would be forced to defend themſelves, upon their own ſcore without ſuccours from *Rome*; yet finding there was a neceſſity of it, the enemy being at their Gates, and threatning them with death, they retained their authority, and with great gravity ſent them word to defend themſelves and raiſe what forces they could. This may ſeem but a common reſolution, and what any other Commonwealths would have taken as well as that; but weak and ill ordered Commonwealths cannot come off with ſo much honour. Duke *Valentine* having taken *Faenza*, and overrun moſt part of *Bologna*, demanded paſſage of the *Florentines* to march his Army to *Rome*. The *Florentine* Council met, and conſulted, and there was not one man who thought it convenient to grant it. This was not according to the diſcretion of the *Romans*; for the Duke being very ſtrong, and the *Florentines* but weak, it had been more for their honour to have granted him paſſage, when they could not obſtruct it; that what they could not reſiſt, might have been imputed to their courteſie. But there is no remedy, 'tis the property of weak States to do every thing amiſs, and never do well but in ſpight of their teeths, for there is no ſuch thing as prudence amongſt them. And this *Florence* has verified in two other caſes.

In the year 1500. when *Lewis* XII. had repoſſeſſed himſelf of *Milan*, he had an inclination to reſtore *Piſa* to the *Florentines* upon the payment of 50000 *Florens*: To this purpoſe he ſent thither his Army under the Command of Mounſieur *de Beaumont*, in whom (though a *French* man) the *Florentines* had great confidence. *Beaumont* came up with his Army betwixt *Caſſina* and *Piſa*, and lodged it conveniently for the battering the Town: having been two or three days before it, and all things ready for the aſſault, Commiſſioners came out, and offered to ſurrender to the *French*, upon condition that he would engage upon the honor of his Maſter that it ſhould not in four months time be delivered to the *Florentines*; to which the *Florentines* not conſenting, the Commiſſioners returned. The cauſe why the *Florentines* refuſed it, was their jealouſie of the King, though they had put themſelves under his protection. They did not conſider that the King could better have put the Town into their hands when he was Maſter of it himſelf (and if he had refuſed it, it would have diſcovered him) than promiſe to do it when he was not in poſſeſſion, and yet they be forced to purchaſe that promiſe at a very great rate. Two years after, *Arezzo* revolted, and the King ſent Seigneur *Jubalt* with ſupplies to the *Florentines*, who had beſieged the Town. *Jubalt* was no ſooner arrived, but the Inhabitants of *Arezzo* made him the ſame proffer, and the *Florentines* could not be brought to conſent: *Jubalt* reſented it, and knowing it to be a great fault, he practiſed privately with the *Aretines*, without Communicating with the *Florentine* Commiſſaries: An agreement was clapped up betwixt them, by virtue of which *Jubalt* entred the Town, and reproached the *Florentins* by their indiſcretion, as people wholly inexperienced in the

affairs of the world. He told them, if they deſired to have it, they ſhould ſignifie it to the King, who would be better able to gratifie them in the Town, than without. The *Florentines* were highly offended, and ſpake very hardly of *Jubalt*, till they conſidered that of *Beaumont* had done the ſame at *Piſa*, they had both as well as one. I ſay therefore, that weak and irreſolute States, do ſeldom take good Counſels, unleſs they be forced; for their weakneſs ſuffers them not to deliberate, where any thing is doubtful; and if that doubt be not removed by a violent neceſſity, they never come to a reſolution, but are always in ſuſpence.

CHAP. XXXIX.

Divers People have many times the ſame accidents.

WHoever compares paſt things with the preſent, will find that in all Ages men have had the ſame humours and appetites as now. So that 'tis an eaſie matter by conſulting what is paſſed, not only (in all commonwealths) to ſee what will follow, but to provide ſuch remedies as their Predeceſſors did apply; or if there be no Preſidents, to invent new remedies according to the ſimilitude of the accidents. But becauſe theſe conſiderations are neglected, Hiſtory not read, or not underſtood at leaſt by him who governs, it comes to paſs that all Ages have their miſcarriages and troubles. The City of *Florence* after the Government had ſtood 94 years having loſt a good part of its Territory, as *Piſa*, and other Towns, was forced to make War upon thoſe who poſſeſſed them; and the Inhabitants being ſtrong, and unwilling to reſtore them, much was ſpent in the War; to very little purpoſe. Their great expence occaſioned great *Taxes*, and their impoſitions upon the people made them mutinous, and unquiet. Theſe affairs were adminiſtred by a Magiſtracy of ten Citizens, who were called the *Dieci della Guerra*: The people began to repine and to complain that the ſaid Counſel was the cauſe of the War, and that they embezled their Money. That the beſt way would be to remove them from that Office, or when their time was expired to chooſe no more, but let the Government fall back into its old channel again. Theſe grave Perſons who had the ſuperintendancy of the War, were no ſooner diſcharged, but things grew worſe and worſe, and inſtead of recovering *Piſa*, and the reſt of the Towns in diſpute, they loſt *Arezzo*, and ſeveral other places. The people finding their miſtake, and that their malady was rather from the Feaver, than the Phyſitian, they reſtored the ten *Commiſſaries*, which before they had caſhier'd. The people of *Rome* had the ſame fancy againſt the Conſuls, and would not believe but they were the cauſes of all their diſtractions, and that to ſettle all things, and preſerve themſelves in peace, the beſt way would be to remove them entirely, and provide that there ſhould never be any more, or elſe to reſtrain and limit their authority in ſuch manner, that they ſhould have no power over them, either within the City or without. They believed that all proceeded from the ambition of the Nobility, who not being able to chaſtiſe the people in the City, becauſe they were protected by their Tribunes, contrived to carry them out of Town under the command of their Conſuls, to correct them where they ſhould not be capable of any redreſs. The firſt man who had the confidence to propoſe it, was *Terentillus* a *Tribune*, who moved that it might be committed to five perſons to conſider the power of the Conſuls, and to appoint limitations. The Nobility oppoſed it, and (it is probable) employed all their intereſt againſt it, for it was no leſs than to debaſe the Majeſty of the Government, and leave themſelves no dignity in the commonwealth. Nevertheleſs the obſtinacy of the Tribunes was ſuch, that the Name of Conſul was laid aſide, and after ſeveral experiments, the people choſe rather to create their Tribunes with Conſular power, than to create new Conſuls again, ſhowing thereby that their quarrel was not ſo much againſt the authority, as Name: But they found their error at length, and reſtored their Conſuls, as the *Florentines* did their Council of ten.

CHAP. XL.

The Creation of the Decem-virat *in* Rome; *what things are moſt remarkable in it; and how far ſuch a Conſtitution may be uſeful or pernicious to a Common-wealth.*

BEfore we diſcourſe of the troubles and commotions which hapned in *Rome* by means of the *Decem-virat*, it will not be amiſs to give a ſhort hiſtory of its Creation, in which there are many things well worthy our remark, as well for the preſervation as deſtruction of a State; and this diſcourſe will remonſtrate the errors both of the Senate and People in prejudice to the liberty, and of *Appius* (chief of the *Decemviri*) againſt that tyranny which he deſign'd to erect. The *Romans* therefore after a long debate betwixt the Nobility and People about the Conſtitution of ſuch Laws as might ſettle and eſtabliſh the liberty of their State, by common conſent, ſent to *Athens Spurius Poſthumus*, with two other perſons, for exemplifications of ſuch Laws as *Solon* had made there, that thereby they might model their own. As ſoon as they were returned they choſe certain learned and grave men to peruſe the ſaid Laws, and ſelect ſuch as they thought convenient for the *Romans*. The perſons created for this office were ten of the principal Citizens (with Commiſſion for a year) among whom, *Appius Claudius* was one, a witty, but a turbulent man. And that they might act freely, without any awe or impediment in their affairs, they laid aſide all the other Magiſtrates (in particular the Tribunes and Conſuls) and forbad all appeal to the people; ſo that this Magiſtracy were compleat Sovereigns in *Rome*. Not long after *Appius* aſſum'd the whole authority of the ten, his Companions paying him a reverence, as their Superior, by reaſon of his intereſt with the people; for he had made himſelf ſo popular on a ſudden, it was almoſt a miracle to conſider how ſoon his nature was changed, and he of their only cruel and fierce adverſary became their greateſt Courter and Favourite.

The firſt year all went very well, and he who preſided marched only with twelve Lictors before him; when any Citizen was to be tried for murder, they framed the Proceſs, but appointing a day, left it to be judged by the people, though their juriſdiction was Soveraign, and without any appeal. They writ their Laws in ten Tables, but before they were ratified they expoſed them to the people, that every man might ſee them at his pleaſure, and approve or object as he ſaw occaſion. When *Appius* perceived the end of his Commiſſion approaching, he cauſed it to be rumoured among the people, that to compleat all, and give perfection to their deſigns, it would be convenient to add two tables more to their Ten, in order to which the common people conſented that the *Decem virat* ſhould be continued for a year; and they did it with the more readineſs, that neither the Conſuls nor Tribunes might be reſtored, but Cauſes be left to their own judgment, as is ſaid before. A day being appointed for a new creation, 'tis not to be imagined how all the Nobility ſtickled, and endeavoured to gain that honour which they had ſo ſtifly impugned by their applications to the people, whom they had ſo highly provoked. But among them all, none was ſo ſolicitous for the continuation of the *Decem-virat*, as *Appius Claudius* who preſſed it of the people with ſo much inſtance and humanity, that he began to be ſuſpected by his aſſociates, *Credebant enim haud gratuitam in tanta ſuperbia Comitatem fore; They could not imagine a perſon of his pride would ſtoop to ſuch flattery without ſome great deſign*: that they might defeat neatly, and with cunning, what they could not do by force; though he was the youngeſt of them all, they committed the nomination of the next ten to him, ſuppoſing he would have obſerved ancient rules, and not named himſelf, which was a practiſe of no uſe nor reputation in *Rome*, *Ille verò impedimentum pro occaſione arripuit*, he ſpoiled their Plot, *made advantage of their impediment*, and named himſelf among the foremoſt, to the amazement and diſpleaſure of all the Nobility.

This Creation was no ſooner over, but both Nobility and People began to be ſenſible of their error; for, as was ſaid of him, *Finem fecit ferendæ alienæ perſonæ*, Appius *began to ſhew himſelf, and lay aſide the diſguiſe he had put on*: he began to act according to his own natural pride, and in a little time had made his Collegues as bad as himſelf. To terrifie the Senate and people both, the firſt day of their Magiſtracy they multiplied their *Lictors* to 120, whereas formerly they had but 12, which were carried before every one of 'em by turns, but now every one of 'em had as many. This terror for ſome time was equally diffuſed, but afterwards they began to favour the Nobility, and inſult upon the people only; and if any of the people that had been injured by any of the *Decem-virat* and had no right done him by the firſt, to whom he addreſſed, if he appeal'd to another, he was

ſure to be worſe; inſomuch as the people finding their error, began in their affliction to look upon the Nobility; *Et inde libertatis captari auram, unde ſervitutem timendo, in eum ſtatum rempublicam adduxerant*; *and from thence hope for their liberty, from whence their apprehenſion of ſervitude had brought their Commonwealth into the condition in which it was.*

And this affliction in the people was no little ſatisfaction to the Nobility, *Ut ipſtædia præſentium, Conſules deſiderarent*; *that the tediouſneſs of their ſufferings might make them reſtore their Conſuls.* By this time their years was expired, and the two Tables to be added to the ten, both ready and wanted nothing but publication; the *Decem-viri* had no mind to lay down, but began to think of continuing their authority by force, to which end they raiſed themſelves Guards out of the young Nobility, and paid them out of the Eſtates of thoſe who were condemned. *Quibus donis juventus corrumpebatur, & malebat licentiam ſuam, quam omnium libertatem*; *by which preferment the youth were debauched, and choſe rather to be licentious themſelves than that their Country ſhould be free.*

Whilſt things were in this poſture, the *Sabini* and the *Volſci* made War upon the *Romans* and invaded them with a great Army. The *Romans* were in great conſternation, and the *Decem-viri* began to find the weakneſs of their Government, for without a Senate they were at a loſs to manage their War; and with it their authority would be ſupplanted. But being neceſſitated at laſt, they came to a reſolution, and reſembled the Senate. Many ſpeeches were made againſt the *Decem-viri*, in particular by *Valerius* and *Horatius*; and doubtleſs their authority had been utterly exploded, but that the Senate, in ſpight to the people, choſe rather to continue them, leſt, if they were depoſed, the people ſhould ſet up their Tribunes, and the Conſuls be quite laid aſide; whereas, if afterwards the *Decem-viri* could be brought fairly to lay down, by degrees the Conſuls might be reſtored, and the Tribunes be caſhiered. Hereupon the Senate ſilently, without further proſecution of them, prepared for the War, and ſent forth the two Armies under the Command of ſeveral of the Ten, but *Appius Claudius* was left behind for the Government of the City. Whilſt his Collegues were abroad, it was his fortune to fall in love with a Plebeian's daughter called *Virginia*, and not being able to perſuade, he would take her away by force; *Virginius* the Father of the Virgin was willing to defend the chaſtity of his Daughter, and knowing no other way to ſecure it, he got *Appius* to be impriſoned: whereupon great tumults ſucceeding in *Rome*, and in the Army, the Souldiers returned, and joining with the people they encamped upon the holy Mountain, where they reſolved to continue till the Ten had reſigned, Tribunes and Conſuls were reſtored, and the Commonwealth had recovered its old liberty and freedom. This is the ſtory of the *Decem-virat*, as ſhortly related as could be, in which it may be obſerved, that the people of *Rome* fell into ſubjection and ſervitude upon the ſame cauſes as other Commonwealths very frequently do; that is, by the too great deſire of the people to be free, and the too great ambition in the Nobility of Command: when theſe two Factions cannot agree, they are forced to refer all to ſome third perſon in whom they confide; and then begins the Tyranny. The *Decem-virat* was erected in *Rome* by conſent both of the Nobility and People, and inveſted with ſo much power, out of a hatred which the Nobility bare to the Tribunitial, and the people to the Conſular authority: as ſoon as the *Decem-viri* were choſen, *Appius* pretended highly for the people, and promiſed to be their Champion, whereupon they favoured him exceedingly. And (be it in what City it will) whenever the people are brought to extol and applaud a perſon, for no other reaſon, but becauſe it is in his power to puniſh their enemies; if that perſon be cunning and induſtrious, their liberty is loſt, and he can uſurp when he pleaſes; for by the aſſiſtance of the people he may maſter the Nobility; and when they are down, it will be no hard matter to ſubdue the people, who will have no body to fly to, nor no body to ſupport them: but before the Nobility be ſuppreſſed, he is by no means to meddle with the people. And this has been the method of all thoſe who have laid the foundation of Tyranny in any Commonwealth; which if *Appius* had followed, he had not loſt his ill-got authority ſo ſoon: but he went quite contrary, and with as much imprudence as was poſſible, ran himſelf into the diſpleaſure of the ſame perſons which advanced him; and ingratiated with thoſe who were againſt his preferment, and were no way able to ſuſtain him, whereby he loſt his old friends who were powerful, and endeavoured to get new that could do him no good. For tho' the Nobility have naturally no averſion to Tyranny; yet that part of the Nobility which ſhares not in the profits is always an enemy to the Tyrant, and their ambition and avarice is ſo great, all the riches and honours in the Tyrants diſpoſal are too little to take them off. Hence it is that the aggreſſor in any enterprize is of neceſſity to be ſtronger than his adverſary; and he who in the eſtabliſhment of a Tyranny makes the people rather than the Nobility his friends, will be ſtronger and more ſecure than he who goes the other way, cajoles with the Nobility, and diſobliges the People,

for the people being always ſtronger in the City, by their friendſhip, a Tyrant may ſubſiſt without any foreign ſupplies. This was viſible in the caſe of *Nabis* the Tyrant of *Sparta*, who having the affections of the people, and ſecured himſelf of ſome of the Nobility, defended himſelf againſt all *Greece*, and the whole power of the *Romans*, which without the hearts of the people he could never have done. But he who makes his intereſt with the Nobility, cannot maintain himſelf without foreign aſſiſtance; for he will want Guards for the ſecurity of his perſon, Soldiers to do the Office of the Militia in the Country, and Confederates and Allies to ſuccour him in his diſtreſs; whereas if he could be ſupplyed in theſe three defects, it might be poſſible for him to ſubſiſt without the friendſhip of the people. But *Appius* failing in theſe, miſcarried in the very beginning of his Tyranny.

In the creation of the *Decem-viri* the Senate and the People were guilty of very great error; for though in our diſcourſe of Dictators we have ſaid before, that thoſe Magiſtrates are only pernicious to the publick liberty, who ſet up themſelves by force, not they who are legally choſen and by the ſuffrage of the people; yet the people are to take ſpecial care in the election of their Magiſtrates, that they may not eaſily uſurp. But the *Romans*, inſtead of placing Guards about their *Decem-viri* that might have kept them in order, they not only took their Guards away, but diſplaced all the reſt of their Magiſtrates, and made them abſolute for that year, and all out of a deſign to countermine one another; the Nobility to ſuppreſs the Tribunes, and the people the Conſuls. So that it hapned to them, as *Ferdinand* King of *Arragon* was wont to ſay it hapned to men that hated one another; that is, that they acted like birds of prey, all of them purſuing the quarry with equal rapacity; but the little birds regarding the greater over their heads, are eaſily interrupted, and made prey themſelves: But we have ſaid enough to demonſtrate the ill Counſel of the *Romans* in thinking to preſerve their liberty by the creation of the *Decem-virii*, and the errors of *Appius* in driving at the Soveraignty, and miſcarrying ſo ſoon.

CHAP. XLI.

For a mean man to grow immediately inſolent, or a meek man immediately cruel, without juſt ſteps of gradation, is both imprudent and unprofitable.

AMong the reſt of *Appius* his faults in the management of his Tyranny, it was of no little conſequence that he changed his humour ſo ſuddenly: his cunning in cajoling the people, and pretending to be of their party, was good: his invention to renew the creation of the Ten was no worſe; his boldneſs in preſenting himſelf contrary to the expectation of the Nobility was well enough, and his creating Collegues for his turn was not amiſs. But having gone thus far, (as is ſaid before) to change his nature in a moment; of a friend, to become an enemy to the people; of an humble and affable man, to ſhew himſelf proud; of a mild man, to become difficult and perverſe; and all this with ſo little circumſtance, that the whole World might ſee it was either the falſneſs or levity of his temper, was high indiſcretion: for he that has ever pretended to be good, and is willing for his advantage to become otherwiſe, muſt not do it at a leap, but by degrees, and upon occaſion, that before the diverſity of his deportment deprives him of his old friends, he may having gained himſelf new, without diminution to his authority; otherwiſe being diſcovered and deſerted, he is certainly ruined.

CHAP. XLII.

How eaſily Mens Manners are corrupted.

IT is remarkable likewiſe in the paſſages of the *Decem-viri*, that men are eaſily corrupted, and become wicked, be their education never ſo good. The youth which *Appius* debauched, and took for his Guards, is ſufficient to prove it; who, tho' of honourable extraction, and brought up with all poſſible advantage, ſuffer'd themſelves to be corrupted by their preferments, became favourers of tyranny, and prefer'd their licentiouſneſs before the liberty of their Country. *Quintus Fabius* did the ſame, who, though an excellent perſon at firſt, and one of the *Decemviri* of the ſecond creation, blinded

blinded with ambition, and enveigled by the cunning of *Appius*, chang'd his good humour into bad, and grew as intolerable as he; which things, if seriously consider'd, should make all Legislators (either in Commonwealths or Kingdoms) the more careful and diligent to restrain the ambition of mankind, and take from 'em all hopes of impunity when they offend in that kind.

CHAP. XLIII.

Those Soldiers which fight for their own Honour are the best, and most to be trusted.

FROM the same History it may be observed how much it imports the prosperity or adversity of affairs, to have the minds of the Soldiers quiet, and ready to engage upon a principle of honour, rather than to have them tumultuous, and dispos'd to fight upon every man's ambition: For whereas the *Roman* Armies were always victorious under the conduct of the Consuls; under the *Decem viri* they were always unfortunate: From hence likewise it may be collected how unsafe it is to commit the defence of our affairs to a mercenary Army, who have nothing to encourage or oblige them but their pitiful pay, which is not considerable enough to make 'em so faithful as to lay down their lives in your quarrel. For in an Army where the Soldier is not bound to the person for whom he fights by some particular obligation, or the expectation of more than ordinary advantage by the Victory; if the enemy be strong, they will make but little resistance; and this kindness and affection of the Soldiers to the General, cannot be but where they are subjects fighting under a good Prince or a lawful Magistrate, in defence of their Posterity and Religion: So that it is necessary for every King or Commonwealth who desires to defend himself well, to train up his own Subjects in Military Discipline, that he may safely depend upon them in time of distress; and it has been the practice of all those who have done any great things. The *Roman* Armies under the *Decem-viri* had doubtless the same courage as under the Consuls: But not being so well affected towards the one as the other, they would not put it forth, nor give such testimonies as formerly: But when the tyranny of the *Decemvirat* extinguished, and their liberty was recover'd, having then the same tenderness and affection to their Country, they fought as well as before, and their enterprizes had the same happy success.

CHAP. XLIV.

A Multitude without an Head is altogether unserviceable; nor is any man to threaten that has any thing to desire.

UPon the accident of *Virginius*, the people having taken Arms, and retir'd to the holy Mount, the Senate sent to them to know upon what account they had abandoned their Officers, and betaken themselves to that Mount: And the authority of the Senate was so venerable among the people, that having no Head among them, there was no body durst return an answer: *Titus Livius* tells us, *Non defuit quid responderetur, deerat qui responsum daret*; *They wanted not what to say, but who to deliver it.* For having no certain Commander, every private person was unwilling to expose himself to their displeasure. From whence we may understand how useless a thing the Multitude is without a Head, which being observed by *Virginius*, he caused twenty Military Tribunes to be made, with power to treat and expostulate with the Senate instead of a Head.

The people insisting to have *Valerius* and *Horatius* sent to them, to whom they would communicate their grievances, *Valerius* and *Horatius* refused to go till the *Decem-viri* had laid down their authority; which being at length obtained with much concertation; *Valerius* and *Horatius* repaired to the people, and understood that they would have new Tribunes to be chosen; they would have appeals from every Magistrate to the people; and they would have the *Decem-viri* to be deliver'd up into their hands, that they might burn them alive: The Embassadors liked the first of their demands, but refused to consent to the last as impious, telling them, *Crudelitatem damnatis, in crudelitatem ruitis*; *You condemn cruelty, and practise it your selves*: And before you will be free,

you

you will tyrannize over your adverſaries; adviſing 'em to lay that Article by, and mention the *Decem-viri* no farther, but to addreſs themſelves to the reaſſumption of their power and authority, after which they would not want ways of receiving ſatisfaction; for then every man's life and fortune would be at their diſpoſing. Hence we may learn how weak and imprudent it is to deſire a thing, and before we receive it, declare to what ill uſes we intend it, eſpecially if we mean to do miſchief, 'tis juſt as you ſhould ſay, pray give me your Sword, that I may run you thorow. 'Tis ſufficient to borrow the Sword, and when you have it, you may do as you pleaſe.

CHAP. XLV.

'Tis a thing of ill Example to break a new Law, eſpecially for the Maker: And 'tis no leſs dangerous to the Governor of a State, to multiply Injuries, and repeat them every day.

THE Commotions about the Tyranny of the *Decem-viri* being compoſed, and *Rome* reſtor'd to its old form of Government again; *Virginius* cited *Appius* before the people, to anſwer what he had attempted upon his Daughter. *Appius* appear'd with his Nobility about him; *Virginius* commanded him to priſon: *Appius* cryed out, He appealed to the People: *Virginius* replyed, That he who had taken away thoſe appeals from the people, ought not to have any benefit by them, nor be permitted to implore their protection, whoſe Laws and Liberties could receive no protection from him. *Appius* inſiſted, that they ought not to violate a thing which they had urged with that eagerneſs, and ordained with that zeal. And though indeed the Life of *Appius* was wicked enough, and there was no puniſhment that he did not deſerve; yet it was inhoſpitable, and contrary to all civil Society, to violate their own Laws, which were but newly made, and paſſed with ſo much importunity: For in my judgment there is nothing ſo indecorous, nor of ſo ill example in a Commonwealth, as the infraction of a new Law, by the Legiſlator himſelf.

When in the year 1494. the State of *Florence* was reſtored by the aſſiſtance of a Friar called *Hieronimo Savonarolo* (whoſe Writings give ſufficient teſtimony of his Learning and Integrity) having among other things for the ſecurity of the Citizens, obtained a Law for appeals to the people in matters of State, both from the Senate and the Council of Eight (which Law he had a long time ſolicited, and got with much difficulty at laſt.) It hapned that not long after, there were five perſons condemn'd to death by the Senate, which perſons endeavouring very earneſtly to appeal to the people, they were denyed that liberty, and could not have the benefit of that Law; which was greater diminution to the reputation of the Friar, than any thing that had ever hapned before: For if that Law was of ſuch importance as he had pretended, it ought to have been obſerved; if not, why was it ſolicited ſo earneſtly? And it was the more remarkable in the Friar; becauſe in his many Sermons and Diſcourſes afterwards to the people, he neither blamed the breaking of that Law, nor went about to excuſe it; for being to his purpoſe, he would not condemn it, and excuſe it he could not, having nothing to ſay; which action having diſcovered the ambition and partiality of his mind, took much off from his repute, and loaded him with ſcandal. It is of great inconvenience likewiſe in a State, to revive and ferment the humors in the minds of the Citizens, by a daily renovation of their injuries upon one perſon or other, as it hapned in *Rome* after the *Decem virat* was diſſolved, and the Tribunitial authority re-eſtabliſhed by the people: For all the *Decem viri*, and ſeveral other conſiderable Citizens were accuſed, and condemned, in ſo much as there was a general conſternation among the Nobility, who thought there would be no end of their condemnation, till they were utterly extinct: Which proceeding and apprehenſion would doubtleſs have produc'd great troubles in the State, had not they been prevented by *Marcus Duellius* the Tribune, who publiſh'd an Edict, That for a twelve-month it ſhould not be lawful either to cite or accuſe any man that was Citizen of *Rome*; by which act of Moderation he ſecured the Nobility. From whence we may diſcern how unſafe it is for any Prince or Commonwealth to keep the minds of their Subjects in perpetual fear and ſuſpence; and without doubt nothing can be more pernicious; for men being inſecure, and jealous of being queſtion'd for ſome capital offence, will look out for protection, and not only ſo, but are provoked to more boldneſs, and become leſs ſcrupulous of doing great miſchiefs. If therefore ſuch Commotions happen, it is better if

poſſible

poſſible to compoſe them without blood; but if Example muſt be made, it is to be done at once, that afterwards the people may be reaſſured, and recover their old ſecurity, and tranquillity of mind.

CHAP. XLVI.

How Men leap from one Paſſion to another, and how they who at firſt aim at nothing but Self-preſervation, when ſecured of that, grow Oppreſſors of other People.

AFter the people of *Rome* had recover'd their liberty, and had by ſo much improved their former condition, by how much they had made many new Laws to fortifie their power, one would have expected they ſhould have been quiet, and after ſo much trouble and embroilment, enjoyed ſome time of repoſe; but it fell out quite contrary, they were more perplexed than before, every day producing ſome new Sedition or Diſturbance: Of which *Livy* giving the reaſons ſo clearly, I do not think it amiſs to inſert them in this place. Theſe two Orders (ſays he) were in perpetual oppoſition; when the people were humble, the Nobility was proud; when the populace was quiet, and contented with their bounds, the young Nobility took their time to be inſolent; and when the Tribunes interpoſed in their behalf, they made little progreſs at firſt, and at length were as much injur'd themſelves. The graver ſort of the Nobility on the other ſide, though they thought their own youth to be too furious and inſolent, yet they had rather, if one ſide muſt tranſgreſs, that it ſhould be their own than the peoples: So that their immoderate deſire of preſerving their priviledge, was the cauſe that when either party was prevalent, it employed its whole power in oppreſſing the other. It is common among men, when they would ſecure themſelves to injure other people; they begin firſt to do miſchief, to revile, or to beat, or what other outrage they are able; as if the injury they would avoid themſelves was to be thrown upon their Neighbour, and there was no Medium betwixt doing and ſuffering of wrong. From hence we may ſee after what manner (among other things) Commonwealths are diſſolved, and how ſuddenly men paſs from one ambition to another, according to that true ſaying which *Saluſt* put into the mouth of *Cæſar*: *Omnia mala exempla bonis initiis orta ſunt. All diſorders and abuſes are good in their beginnings.* The firſt thing an ambitious Citizen endeavours, is ſo to fortifie, that he may defend himſelf not only againſt his private adverſary, but againſt the publick Magiſtrate, if at any time he would offend him; to which end he makes what friends he can, by furniſhing them with Money, or ſupporting them againſt their Oppreſſors; and this ſeeming very honeſt in appearance, people are eaſily deluded, and no body goes about to prevent; ſo that no obſtacle being given, he grows inſenſibly ſo great, that not only the private Citizens, but the Magiſtrate begins to apprehend him; and then there is no reſiſting him without manifeſt danger, for the reaſons (which I have mention'd before) of the dangerous contending with inconvenience that has got that growth and maturity in a City. What is then to be done? Let him alone in his proſperity, and he enſlaves you for ever, unleſs death or ſome other kind accident delivers you: If you think to remove him on a ſudden, you do but add to his power, and haſten your own ruine; for finding himſelf in ſuch a poſture that his Friends, his Enemies, the Magiſtrates, and all people are afraid of him, he will then begin to domineer, and diſpoſe of all things according to his own judgment and pleaſure: If there be any way to prevent it, it is by watching in time, by having a diligent eye over your Citizens, that under colour of doing good, they may not be able to do miſchief; and that they may have as much reputation as may ſerve, not ruine their liberty. But of this more hereafter.

CHAP.

CHAP. XLVII.

Though the people, in things that are diſcours'd in general, are many times miſtaken, yet when they are reduced to particulars, they are more ſenſible and judicious.

THE Name of Conſul (as we ſaid before) being grown odious to the people of *Rome*, they reſolved to have them created for the future out of the Populace; or elſe to limit and circumſcribe their authority with ſuch rulers as they ſhould think fit. The Nobility, to prevent both inconveniencies, took a way betwixt both, and was contented that they ſhould create four Tribunes with conſular authority, to be choſen indifferently out of the people and Senate. The people were well enough ſatisfied, as thinking by that means the Conſulſhip would extinguiſh, and that they ſhould have a ſhare of the ſupream dignity themſelves. But obſerve what followed; when they came to the creation of their Tribunes, and it was not only in their power, butexpected that they ſhould have been all made out of the people, they choſe em all out of the Nobility, which gave occaſion to *Livy* to ſay, *Quorum Comitiorum eventus docuit, alios animos in Contentione libertatis & honoris, alios ſecundum depoſita Certamina in incorrupto judicio eſſe. The ſucceſs of that Election did ſhow, That when their honour and liberty were in controverſie, the people were of one mind; when they were ſecure and free, they were of another.* Conſidering with my ſelf what might be the reaſon, I ſuppoſe it is becauſe men are more apt to be miſtaken in generals than in particulars. The people thought themſelves more worthy of the Conſulſhip than the Nobility; becauſe they had the greateſt intereſt in the City; they underwent the greateſt difficulty in the Wars, and it was their Arms which defended its liberty, and propagated the Empire of *Rome*: According to which argument, their deſires ſeeming but reaſonable, they reſolved they would have them in ſpight of all oppoſition: But when they came to particulars, and to examine their own private Capacities for Government, they found themſelves ſo weak and defective, that though altogether they thought themſelves able enough, yet they could not find one man they judged proper for the employment; aſhamed therefore of their incapacity, they gave their voices for ſuch as they found were more really worthy; which *Titus Livius* admiring, has theſe words, *Hanc modeſtiam, æquitatemque & altitudinem animi ubi nunc in uno inveneris, quæ tunc populi univerſi fuit? Where will you find now a-days, that Modeſty, that Equity, that Magnanimity in one man, that was then obvious in the whole body of the people?* To the ſame purpoſe there hapned another notable Example in *Capua*, after *Hannibal* had defeated the *Romans* at the Battel of *Cannas*. After that defeat, the Inhabitants of *Capua* began to mutiny againſt the Government (as indeed all *Italy* did at that time) the grounds of their diſcontent was an old pique betwixt the people and Senate, which the firſt thought then to improve to the deſtruction of the other. *Pacuvius Calanus* being a very wiſe man, and at the Helm at that time, conſidering with himſelf of what dangerous conſequence a tumult might prove in ſo populous a City, reſolved to find out ſome way to accommodate their difference. To this end he aſſembled the Senate, and in few words remonſtrated to them the implacable hatred which the people had to them; That they were in great danger of being murthered by them, and the City delivered up to *Hanibal*, by reaſon that the condition of *Rome* was become ſo deplorable; and at length he concluded, that if they would commit the whole matter to him, he would find out an expedient to unite 'em; and his expedient was to lock up the Senate in the Palace, and by putting them into the peoples power, to preſerve them. The Senate ſubmitted, were lock'd up in the Caſtle, and having aſſembled the people, he told them, That the hour was now come for redeeming their liberty, and chaſtiſing the inſolence of their Nobility, who had ſo often abus'd them. He told them he had them all lock'd up in his Cuſtody to be diſpos'd of as they pleas'd; but becauſe he could not think it was their deſire to leave the City without a Government, before they proceeded to the execution of the ancient Senators, it would be neceſſary, as he conceiv'd, to think of creating a new one; to that purpoſe he had brought the Names of the old Senators in a Purſe, would draw 'em out one by one, and as they reſolv'd upon another to ſucceed in each place, he would ſee the old one deliver'd out to execution. The people were content, and *Pacuvius* drew one, and nam'd him aloud, upon which a great noiſe was rais'd, ſome ſaid he was cruel, others he was proud, and others that he was arrogant: Then ſays *Pacuvius*, he is unfit to be continued, pray will you make choice of another in his ſtead. Silence was commanded, and one of the people was named; he was nam'd no ſooner, but ſome began to hum,

others to laugh, and all to revile; and ſo proceeding from one to another, they were all concluded unfit for ſo honourable a degree. *Paccucius* taking the occaſion told 'em, ſince you are ſenſible it is unfit that the City ſhould be without a Senate; and ſince you cannot agree about the Election of a new; it would be expedient in my judgment, that you propoſe ſome way of reconciliation; for doubtleſs the fear in which the Senators have been, muſt of neceſſity have ſo humbled them, that that gentleneſs and humanity which you have ſought for elſewhere, may now be found in them. The people began then to diſcover in particular, the fault which they had committed in judging in general, and declared they were ready for any reaſonable reconciliation. And in this manner it is that moſt people deceive themſelves in judging generally of things and their accidents, which upon particular examination they do eaſily diſcover.

After the year 1414. the chief of the *Florentines* being driven out of the City, it was left wholly without order or government, over-whelm'd with licentiouſneſs and ambition, and the intereſt of the Publick running headlong to ruine. Many of the popular party foreſeeing the inevitable deſtruction of the City, and not knowing to what elſe to impute it, they charged it upon the ambition of ſome perſons among the Nobility, which (as they pretended) fomented their diſorders, to take away their liberty, and model the State according to their own fancies and deſigns. And theſe Mutineers were in all places, in the Streets, in the Houſes, in the palaces, declaring publickly, and threatning that if ever they came to the government, they would look farther into the buſineſs, and puniſh all thoſe which they ſhould find conſcious of it. It hapned afterwards that ſome of theſe Citizens were advanced as they deſired; but when they were at that height, and ſaw things nearer than before, they became ſenſible of their error, and found that it was not the ambition of the Nobility, but the malignity of the times which was the occaſion of all their trouble and commotion; ſo as they became new men, and exerciſed a new way of adminiſtration; inſomuch that thoſe who had heard 'em complain and threaten when they were in private capacity, ſeeing them now at the helm, and performing nothing that they had promis'd, did not look upon it as conviction of their judgment ſo much as corruption of their minds. Which thing being frequent among them, gave occaſion to the Proverb, *Coſtoro hanno un animo in Piazza, et uno in Palazzo. They are of one mind in the Town, and another in the Throne.* Thus, by ſerious conſideration of what has been ſaid, we may ſee how to open the eyes of the people, and reduce 'em to a ſence of their errors, if we take them from their general and abſtracted notions, and fix 'em upon particulars; as in the caſe of *Paccucius* in *Capua*, and the Senate in *Rome*. Again, I am of opinion that no wiſe man is to decline the judgment of the people in the diſtribution of Offices and Honours, and ſuch particular affairs; for in thoſe things they are almoſt infallible, and when they do miſtake, it is rather to be attributed to the obſtinacy of ſome few to whom that buſineſs is referred, than to the ignorance of the whole body; which being certainly ſo, I think it not ſuperfluous to ſhew in my next Chapter the Order which the Senate obſerved to over-reach the people in thoſe kind of diſtributions.

CHAP. XLVIII.

To prevent the Advancement of mean people to the Magiſtracy, it is particularly to be contrived that the Competition be betwixt the beſt and moſt noble, and the wickedeſt and moſt abject.

WHEN the Senate began to apprehend, that the Tribunes would be choſen out of the people, and inveſted with Conſular Power, they had two ways, one of which they conſtantly made uſe of. They put the beſt and moſt honorable perſons to ſtand, or elſe by their Mony they foiſted in ſome ſordid and ignoble Plebeian, among thoſe of the better ſort which pretended to the Magiſtracy, and demanded it for him: The laſt way made the people aſhamed to confer it: The firſt made them aſhamed to remove it; which reinforces what I have ſaid ſo often before, that though in generals the people may be miſtaken, in particulars they are provident enough.

CHAP.

CHAP. XLIX.

If thoſe Cities which have been free from their Foundation (as Rome*) have found it difficult to contrive ſuch Laws as might maintain them ſo, thoſe which have been always ſervile, will find it almoſt impoſſible.*

THE Government of *Rome*, and its affairs abroad and at home, do ſufficiently ſhow how hard it is to eſtabliſh ſuch Laws in a Commonwealth as may preſerve it always in a good and quiet Eſtate. It had firſt *Romulus*, then *Numa*, *Tullus Hoſtilius*, *Servius*, and others, who employed their induſtry and capacity to regulate it well, and preſcribe good Laws; after which, ten Citizens were created on purpoſe; and yet difficulties aroſe every day, which requir'd new remedies: One of their great expedients (which indeed contributed much to the incorruption of that City) was the creation of the *Cenſors*, to correct the exorbitances, ſplendor, and ill husbandry of the Citizens; and altho' in the beginning it was with ſome inconſideration decreed that thoſe Officers ſhould be created for five years, yet by the prudence of *Mamercus* the Dictator, that error was afterwards rectifyed, and the time of their continuance reduced to 18 months, which diſguſted the then Cenſors ſo highly, that they found means to turn *Mamercus* out of the Senate, to the great regret both of the Senators and people. And becauſe the Hiſtory does not ſhow how *Mamercus* defended himſelf, it muſt needs be the neglect of the Hiſtorian, or the defect of the Laws; for it is not to be thought that in a perfect Commonwealth, a Citizen ſhould be ſo ill treated for promulging a Law ſo much for the ſecurity of their liberty, and his innocence left without ſanctuary or protection. But to return to my deſign, I ſay, it is not to be admired if Cities conceiv'd, and born, and brought up all along in ſervitude, find ſo much difficulty to regulate, and preſerve themſelves in tranquillity and peace (as was to be ſeen in *Florence*) when *Rome* and other States (which have been free from the beginning) have ſcarce been able to do it. *Florence* was in ſubjection to the *Roman* Empire, and govern'd by other people, ſo long that it had ſcarce any hopes of ever being free. Afterwards having time to breath, it began to look up, and make Laws for it ſelf; but mingling them with their old Laws, which were bad, they did them no good. For two hundred years together their Government was in this manner; ſo that it was ſcarce worthy the name of a Commonwealth. And the ſame inconveniencies have been incident to all Cities whoſe beginnings have been ſervile like that. And tho' the *Florentines* did many times by publick and free ſuffrage tranſfer an Authority upon a few of their principal Citizens, to examine and reform all things; yet thoſe few regarded not ſo much the common intereſt and liberty, as their own private deſign and advantage in the whole manner of their proceedings; which was ſo far from producing any order or ſettlement as was intended, that it augmented the diſorder, and made things worſe than before. To paſs by other things which are likewiſe to be obſerved, I ſay that in every Commonwealth it is particularly to be conſider'd in whoſe hands the Cognizance of capital Offences is placed, and who has the execution of the Sanguinary Laws: This was well order'd in *Rome*, an appeal lying to the people from the Courts and Magiſtrates of the City; and if at any time by that appeal, the delay of execution became dangerous to the State, they had recourſe to the Dictator, who commanded execution immediately; but they never made uſe of their refuge, but in extream neceſſity.

But *Florence*, and other Cities born in ſervitude and ſubjection, had not the benefit of ſuch an Officer, but was governed by ſtrangers upon whom the Prince had tranſfer'd his Authority; which Cuſtom they kept up, after they had made themſelves free, and continued the ſame Authority in a Foreigner, whom they call'd their *Captain*, which was a dangerous thing, conſidering how eaſily he might be corrupted by the better ſort of the Citizens: Afterwards the Cuſtom changed with the revolutions of State; and eight Citizens were created to do the Office of the Captain, which alteration proved much for the worſe; for (as I ſaid before) a few men prefer'd to the government, are alway liable to be careſſed and cajoled by the Nobility, to the prejudice of the people. Againſt which inconvenience, *Venice* provided very well, where there is a Council of Ten, which can puniſh any Citizen whatever without any appeal; yet for fear they ſhould not be ſufficient (tho' they have authority enough) for the puniſhment of perſons of more than ordinary quality, they have conſtituted the *Quarantie* to aſſiſt 'em, and the Council of *Pregui* beſides, which is the higheſt Council of that City; ſo that if any man will accuſe, there are judges enough ready to hear him. If therefore in

Rome which was originally free, and model'd and govern'd by the Counſels of ſo many wiſe men, new faults were daily diſcover'd, and freſh occaſions for new Laws to be made for the preſervation of their liberty; it is not to be admir'd, if in other Cities it was worſe, where their Original was not ſo free, nor ſo many wiſe men to model and inſtruct them.

CHAP. L.

No Magiſtrate or Council ought to have power to check or controul the publick acts of the City.

Titus Quintius Cincinnatus, and *Cneus Julius Mentus* being Conſuls together in *Rome*, but at perpetual odds, the affairs of that State was at a ſtand, their Laws were not executed, their Wars were not proſecuted, nor any thing manag'd as it ſhould be. The Senate obſerving it, perſuaded them to make a Dictator, by whom the State might be reform'd, and their differences compos'd, which had hitherto hinder'd the reformation: But the Conſuls, how contrary ſoever in other things, conſented not to do it, the Senate having no other remedy, addreſſed to the Tribunes, who by the Anthority of the Senate required, and compell'd the Conſuls to the Creation of a Dictator: In which place it is remarkable how beneficial the aſſiſtance of the Tribunitial power was, not only to defend the people againſt the inſolence of the Nobility, but to controul and reſtrain the emulation and difference among themſelves. And here it is carefully to be provided in the ſettlement of a Commonwealth, that it be not in the power of a few perſons to whom the Government is entruſted, to quaſh or obſtruct any Cuſtoms or Acts that are neceſſary to its ſubſiſtance: For Example, If you authorize a Council, or any other perſons to diſtribute Honours, diſpoſe of Offices, or execute any other Commands, you muſt either lay a ſtrict injunction or neceſſity upon 'em to do as you appoint or provide; ſo that if it be neglected by 'em, it may be done by ſome body elſe; otherwiſe things are ill managed, and the order is defective, as is manifeſt by that example in *Rome*, if the perverſeneſs of the Conſuls had not been oppoſed by the Authority of the Tribunes. In the Republick of *Venice*, the grand Council (or Senate) has the diſtribution of Honours, and the Election of Magiſtrates, both abroad and at home; and it hapning one time, that the Senate either upon ſome diſguſt, or falſe ſuggeſtion omitted to create Succeſſors to the Magiſtrates at home, or to their Officers abroad, there follow'd great diſorders immediately; the Territory and City wanting their lawful judges, could have no juſtice in any thing, till the Senate was appeaſed. And this inconvenience would in time have brought the City into an ill condition, had it not been prevented by the wiſdom of ſome Citizens, who taking the opportunity obtain'd a Law, That there ſhould be no vacancy of Officers, either within the City or without, but the old Officers ſhould be continu'd till their Succeſſors were choſen, by which Law they deprived that great Council of a power to interrupt the courſe of Juſtice, which could not have been ſuffered without hazard to the State.

CHAP. LI.

A Prince or Commonwealth that is conſtrained to do a thing, is to ſeem to do it frankly, and without any compulſion.

A Wiſe man orders his affairs ſo, that whatever he does, ſeems rather voluntary and gracious, than done by force and compulſion, be his neceſſity of doing it never ſo great, which point of wiſdom being well obſerv'd by the *Romans*, got them great reputation among the people, eſpecially when they decreed Stipends to the Soldiers out of the publick Treaſury, who before were obliged to ſerve at their own proper charges; for ſeeing their Wars were like to be tedious, and their Armies to be carried into far Countries, before they could be finiſh'd, they found neither the firſt could be continu'd, nor the latter perform'd but at the publick expence; wherefore the Senate was forced and neceſſitated to pay the Soldiers out of the publick Stock; yet they did it ſo ſlyly, and with that artifice, that tho' compell'd by neceſſity, it was receiv'd as grace, and gain'd 'em exceedingly the affections of the people, who had never ſo much as mention'd it by their Tribunes, or thought of it themſelves: So that never any thing

was

was receiv'd with more demonſtration of joy. But the Tribunes were not ſo well ſatisfied, but endeavoured to poſſeſs the people that it was not an act of that grace as they imagined; and that if they looked cloſely into it, it would appear rather a grievance, than a benevolence; for how was this Money to be rais'd, but by Taxes and Impoſitions upon the people? ſo that if the Senators were bountiful, it was out of other mens purſes. But all would not do, let the Tribunes ſay as they pleaſed, the people believed themſelves highly obliged; and then the manner of raiſing the Money made it much the more grateful, for it was done with more than ordinary equity, the greateſt part of it being levyed upon the greateſt men, and the poor favoured as much as poſſible.

CHAP. LII.

The beſt and moſt ſecure way to repreſs the inſolence of an ambitious and powerful State, is to preclude and ſtop up thoſe ways by which he would come to his greatneſs.

BY what has been ſaid before, it appears what affection the Senate conciliated among the people, not only by the frankneſs of their bounty, but by their kindneſs in collecting it; which order, if continued to the people, would have prevented all the tumults which hapned afterward in that City, and deprived the Tribunes of their great credit and authority. And indeed there is not a better or more ſecure way to ſuppreſs the inſolence, or croſs-bite the deſigns of an ambitious Citizen, than to take the ſame ways to prevent, which he takes to advance them; which courſe, if it had been followed by the adverſaries of *Coſimo de Medici* would have been much more for their advantage than to have forc'd him out of the Town. For had they applied themſelves to careſſing and inſinuating with the people, (which was the way he took to fortifie himſelf) they had diſarm'd him without any tumult or violence, and taken from him the only arm, upon which he depended for his defence. About the ſame time *Piero Soderini* by his extraordinary beneficence got himſelf a great intereſt and reputation among the people, and was publickly eſteemed the great Champion and Protector of their liberties: and doubtleſs his adverſaries, who began to grow jealous of his greatneſs, had done much more wiſely, and honourably, and ſafely, to have gone the ſame way to work, and countermin'd him by their indulgence to the people, than to oppoſe themſelves downright, and ruine him and their whole Country together; for could they by any art or inſinuation have gained the affections of the City, they had taken from him the only thing upon which he rely'd, without noiſe or confuſion, and they might have oppos'd him in all his counſels, without fear of the people: If it be urg'd here, that if the Citizens which were enemies to *Piero* committed an error, in not taking the ſame courſe to retain as he had done to debauch the people, *Peter* committed the ſame fault by not making uſe of the ſame inſtruments which his adverſaries employed againſt him; it is anſwered, that *Soderini* indeed might have tryed, but he could have done it neither with honour or eaſe; for the way that his adverſaries took was to ſet up the *Medici*, by whoſe aſſiſtance they bearded him exceedingly, and ruined him at laſt; and it had been diſhonourable for *Soderini* to have deſerted the liberties of the people, which he had undertaken to defend, and gone over to the party of the *Medici*; nor could he have done it ſo ſecretly or ſuddenly, but the people would have ſmelt it, and have turned the violence of their affection into as furious an hatred, which would have made his deſtruction much more eaſy to his enemies, for who ever was but ſuſpected to be a favourer of the *Medici*, was thought, *ipſo facto*, an adverſary to the people. It is neceſſary therefore in all deliberations to weigh all things, to conſider what danger and what advantage every thing will yield, and make choice of what is leaſt dangerous: otherwiſe it will happen to you as it did to *Marcus Tullius*, who raiſed and augmented the greatneſs of *Mark Anthony* by the ſame way which he intended for his deſtruction; for when *Mark Anthony* was declared an enemy by the Senate, having a great Army attending him, and moſt of them of *Cæſar*'s old Soldiers, *Cicero* to draw them off from him, perſuaded the Senate to put *Octavius* at the head of their Army, and ſent him (with the Conſul) againſt *Antonius*, pretending that the very name of *Octavius* (being Nephew to *Cæſar*) would bring over all his Unkle's party to him, whereby *Antonius* would be ſo weakned it would be no hard matter to reduce him. But it hapned quite contrary; for *Antonius* having gain'd *Octavius* to his ſide, they joyned their Forces againſt *Tully* and his Senate, and ruin'd their whole Party. Which might have been eaſily foreſeen; nor ought *Cicero* ſo imprudently to have reviv'd the name of *Cæſar*,

Cæſar, by whom the whole world was brought into ſervitude, and eſpecially *Rome*; nor have perſuaded himſelf that a Tyrant or any of his race would ever reſtore that liberty which his Predeceſſor had ſuppreſſed.

CHAP. LIII.

The people (deceived with a falſe appearance of good) do many times deſire that which turns to their deſtruction; and how great hopes and large promiſes do eaſily debauch them.

AFter the taking of *Veii* by the *Romans*, a report being ſpread of the convenience and pleaſantneſs of the Town, and richneſs of the Country about it, the people of *Rome* began to fancy that it would be much for their advantage to tranſplant one half of their City, and ſend them thither to inhabit, for there were many fair houſes to receive them; and it could be no weakning or diminution to *Rome*, ſeeing the diſtance betwixt the two Cities was ſo ſmall, *Veii* would be taken rather for a member of *Rome*, than a diſtinct and particular City. The Senate and graver ſort of Citizens had ſo little inclination to this deſign, that they reſolved to die before ever they would conſent to it. The people were ſo mad upon it on the other ſide, that when it came to a debate, and it was to be reſolv'd what was to be done, the diſpute was ſo hot, they had proceeded to blows, and the whole Town been engaged in blood, had not the Senate interpoſed certain ancient and eminent men, who by their intereſt and veneration among the people defended the blow, and appeaſed them for that time. In which paſſage there are two things conſiderable: the firſt, that the people being deceived with a falſe imagination of good, do many times ſolicit their own ruine, and run the Commonwealth upon infinite dangers and difficulties, unleſs ſome perſon in whom they have great confidence ſtrikes in to inſtruct them which is the good, and which is the evil; and when by accident it falls out that the people (having been formerly deceived either by perſons or things) cannot repoſe that confidence in any one, then of neceſſity all goes to wrack, and nothing can prevent it: to this purpoſe *Dante* in his diſcourſe about Monarchy, tell us,

Il popolo molte volte grida
Viva la ſua morte, & muoia la ſua vita:

The enraged multitude do often crie
Give us our death, our life we do defie.

This incredulity is many times the occaſion that good counſels are neglected, as it hapned to the *Venetians* when invaded by ſeveral enemies at one time, they could not take off any one of them, by reſtoring what they had taken wrongfully from other people; which was the occaſion of the war, and almoſt of their ruin. From whence we may conſider the eaſineſs and difficulty of perſuading the people, and make this diſtinction, if the affair propoſed be in appearance either magnanimous, or profitable, though at the bottom it be never ſo deſtructive, the people are always eaſie to be perſuaded: on the other ſide, if any thing be offered (how honourable, how uſeful ſoever) with the leaſt ſhew or glance of cowardize or inconvenience, they are never, or with great difficulty to be wrought to it. To confirm this, we have many examples both modern and ancient in *Rome* and other places. From hence ſprang their jealouſies againſt *Fabius Maximus*, who could never beat it into the heads of that City, that it was better for their Common wealth to protract, and ſpin out the war, than to puſh things on, and bring all to the hazard of a Battel; for the people looking upon it as cowardly and baſe counſel, and not diſcerning the utility at the bottom, would by no means admit it; and *Fabius* wanted rhetorick to enforce it upon them: And ſo ſtrangely are they blinded ſometimes with their bravery and courage, that tho' the *Romans* had committed the ſame error once before, and given authority to *Fabius* his Maſter of the Horſe to fight when he ſaw occaſion whether *Fabius* would or not; which authority had like to have ruin'd the whole Army, had not *Fabius* with his prudence prevented it) yet that experiment doing no good, they were guilty again, and inveſted *Varro* with the ſame power, upon no other account, but becauſe he had ſwagger'd up and down the Town, and when ever they qualified him with ſuch a

Com-

Commiſſion, he would fight *Hannibal*, cut him to pieces; they believe what he ſaid, give him authority; and what followed? Why they were beaten at *Cannas*; the Roman Army cut off; and the Roman Empire almoſt extinguiſhed. And not unlike this was the example of *Marcus Centenius Penula*, (a mean perſon, and conſiderable for nothing but ſome ſmall command in the Army) who preſented himſelf one day to the Senate, and offered if they would give him power to raiſe an Army of Voluntiers where he pleaſed all over *Italy*, he would undertake in a ſhort time to beat *Hanibal* out of it. The Senate was ſenſible the propoſition was raſh, yet (conſidering withal that if they ſhould deny him, and report ſhould come of it afterwards to the people, it might diſſatisfie them; beget ſome tumult in the City; and be the occaſion of envy and animoſity to themſelves) they granted his requeſt, chooſing rather to expoſe all thoſe who were ſo ill adviſed as to follow him, than run the hazard of new diſſentions at home. Having got his Commiſſion, and afterwards his Men, with a confuſed and diſorderly Army he marches againſt *Hanibal*, and fought him, but he failed of his promiſe, for he was killed himſelf, and moſt of his Forces. In *Greece* in the City of *Athens*, *Nicias*, a grave and wiſe Citizen, could never perſuade the people againſt an Expedition into *Sicily*; but purſuing it againſt all ſober advice, they miſcarried, and their own Country was ruined. *Scipio*, when he was made Conſul, deſired that he might have *Africk* for his province, and he would undertake to demoliſh *Carthage*, but the Senate being averſe upon the judgment of *Fabius Maximus*, *Scipio* threatned to propoſe it to the people, as knowing very well how grateful it would be to them. We might produce examples of the ſame nature out of our own City of *Florence*, as when *Hercules Bentivogli* General of the *Florentine* Army, with *Antonio Giacomini*, having defeated the Forces of *Bertolomeo* at *San Vincenti*, they went to beſiege *Piſa*, which enterprize was debated and concluded by the people, upon the great promiſes which *Hercules* had made, though indeed the wiſer ſort of Citizens were againſt it; but the multitude were poſſeſſed with great matters that would be done, and nothing could diſſuade them. I ſay then, there is not an eaſier way to ruine a State where the authority is in the people, than to put them upon ſome gallant, but deſperate enterprize; for where there is any thing of magnanimity in their nature, it is ſure to be embraced, and it is not in the wit of men to diſſuade them: but as this is many times the ruine of the State, ſo it is more often and more certainly the deſtruction of thoſe Citizens which promoted and commanded it; for the people full of expectations of victory, when they find they have miſcarried, never impute it to an ill accident or fortune, but throw all upon the ignorance or treachery of their Commanders, which ſeldom eſcape without being baniſhed, impriſoned, or killed; as has hapned to ſeveral of the *Carthaginian* and *Athenian* Captains. Nor does it avail that they have been victorious before; for their preſent misfortune drowns all, as it fell out to *Antonio Giacomini* our General, who not taking *Piſa* as he promiſed, and the people expected, fell into ſo great diſgrace with them, that notwithſtanding the many great things which he had done, he was permitted to live, more by the favour and humanity of the Governours, than by the gratitude or good nature of the people.

CHAP. LIV.

How great the authority of a grave man is, to aſſwage the tumultuouſneſs of the people.

THE ſecond thing remarkable, that was mentioned in my laſt Chapter, is, that there is nothing more certain to appeaſe a popular tumult, and reduce the people to reaſon, than the interpoſition of ſome wiſe perſon of authority among them; as *Virgil* has told us with very good reaſon.

Tum pietate gravem, ac meritis ſi forte virum quem
Conſpexere, ſilent, arrectiſq; auribus adſtant.

If in their tumults, a grave man appears,
All's whiſt, and nothing ſtirring but their ears.

He therefore who commands in a mutinous Army, or in a ſeditious City, and deſires to appeaſe either the one or the other, is in my judgment to preſent himſelf with the moſt grace and advantage that he can; adorn'd with all the ornaments of his dignity, and whatever

ever elſe may make him venerable to the people. Not many years ſince *Florence* was divided into Factions, the *Frateſchi* and the *Arabiati*; and their animoſity was ſo great, they came to blows, and the *Frateſchi* were overthrown, and *Pagolantonio Soderini* ſlain among the reſt, who was as eminent a Citizen as moſt of his time; upon the ſtrength of this Victory the people ran in a tumult to his houſe, with intention to plunder it; but his Brother *Franceſco* (then Biſhop of *Volterra*, and Cardinal now) being accidentally there, as ſoon as he underſtood how things were, and perceived the rabble to encreaſe, he called for the richeſt of his Robes, and having put them on, and his Epiſcopal Rochet over them, he marched out into the croud, and by the Majeſty of his perſon, and the efficacy of his language, prevailed with them to forbear, and to return peaceably to their houſes; which action was ſo grateful to the City, that it was celebrated publickly many days after. I conclude therefore that there is not a ſurer, nor more neceſſary way to compoſe the diſtractions of the people, than the appearance of ſome grave perſon in ſuch a poſture as may make him venerable to them. To return therefore to what we ſaid before, it may be ſeen hence, with what obſtinacy the *Romans* accepted of that propoſition for tranſplanting to *Veii*, becauſe they thought it profitable, and did not perceive the inconvenience that was in it; for as there hapned many tumults thereupon, ſo much more miſchief had followed, had not the Senate and ſome other grave perſons interpoſed, and by good fortune reſtrain'd them.

CHAP. LII.

How eaſily things are managed in a City where the Commons are incorrupt; how hard it is to erect a principality where there is an equality; and where it is not, a Commonwealth is impoſſible.

THough we have declared before what we thought was to be expected from a City whoſe inhabitants were totally corrupt; yet that will not hinder us from conſidering the ſubtilty of the Senate in relation to a vow which *Camillus* had made to conſecrate the tenth part of the ſpoils of the *Veientes* to *Apollo*; which ſpoils being fallen into the clutches of the Common people, the Senate had no way but to publiſh an Edict, requiring all of them at a certain time and place to bring in the tenth part of their gains. 'Tis true, that Proclamation had no great effect, becauſe another expedient was found out to ſatisfie the vow; yet it is remarkable, the confidence the Senate had in the good nature and complyance of the people; and the great opinion that they would punctually bring in what ever they were commanded. On the other ſide it is obſervable, that the people went not about to ſhuffle or defraud the Edict by bringing in leſs than their due; but declared frankly againſt it, as a thing illegally required. Which example, with many others which I have mentioned before, are brought to ſhew the probity and religion wherewith that people was endued, and what good might be expected from them: and certainly where there is not that ſubmiſſion and conformity, no confidence is to be had; as in thoſe Provinces which are corrupted at this day, in *Italy* above all the reſt, and I may ſay in *France* and in *Spain*, which are likewiſe in ſome meaſure under the ſame corruption; for tho they are not perhaps ſubject to ſo many, and ſo dangerous diſorders as we are in *Italy*; yet it proceeds not from the meliority of the people, but from the excellence of their conſtitution, being govern'd by a Monarchy, which keeps 'em united, not only by the virtue and example of their Prince, but by the Laws and Cuſtoms of each Kingdom, which are preſerved to this day. *Germany* is the place of the whole World where the footſteps of the old *Roman* virtue and fidelity is conſpicuous; and that fidelity is the cauſe why ſo many Cities live happily in liberty; for they are ſo careful and ſtudious of their Laws, that that very one thing keeps them from ſervitude, and being over-run by their enemies; and if any inſtance be deſired of this more than ordinary probity in the *Germans*, I ſhall produce one, not unlike that before, betwixt the Senate and the people of *Rome*. It is the cuſtom in thoſe States when they have occaſion for mony upon the publick account, for the Councils and Magiſtrates in authority to lay a tax of one or two *per cent.* upon all the inhabitants under their juriſdiction, according to their reſpective Eſtates; at the day and place appointed for payment, every man appears with his mony, and having taking his oath firſt that the ſum he pays is according to the full of his Eſtate, he throws it into a cheſt provided for that purpoſe; and no notice taken what it is he throws in; from whence we may conclude that there is ſtill ſome ſparks left in that people of their old ingenuity and religion: nor is it to be doubted but every man pays his due, for otherwiſe the ſum would not amount to the impoſition, nor

to

to what they formerly paid; whereby the Fraud would be diſcovered, and they become liable to a new Tax: Which Integrity and Juſtice is the more admirable in our Days, becauſe it is to be found no where but in *Germany*, and the Reaſon (as I conceive) is Twofold; one, becauſe they have had little or no Commerce with their Neighbours, neither trading into foreign Parts, nor admitting Foreigners into theirs; contenting themſelves with their own Diet, and Cloaths, and Commodities, and thereby preventing all Occaſion of evil Converſation, which is the Corruption of good Manners, eſpecially among the *French*, the *Spaniards*, and *Italians*, which are wicked enough to debauch the whole World. The other Reaſon is, becauſe thoſe Commonwealths who have preſerved their Liberties, and kept themſelves incorrupt, do not ſuffer any of their Citizens to live high, and at the Rate of a Gentleman; but they live all in an Equality and Parity, as thoſe few Noblemen or Gentlemen who are there, are very odious to the People; and whenever any of them fall by Accident into their Hands, they die without Mercy, as thoſe who are the Fountain of all their Luxury, and the Occaſion of their Scandal. I call thoſe Gentlemen who live idly and plentifully upon their Eſtates, without any Care or Employment, and they are very pernicious where-ever they are; but above all, they are moſt dangerous, who, beſides their great Revenues, have their *Caſtellanies*, their Juriſdictions, and their Vaſſels, which pay them Fealty and Homage: Of theſe Two Sorts the Kingdom of *Naples*, the Territories of *Rome*, *Romagna*, and *Lombardy* are full; for which Reaſon there is no ſuch Thing as a free State in all thoſe Countries, becauſe the Gentry are mortal Enemies to thoſe Conſtitutions, and it would be impoſſible to erect a Republick where they had the Dominion; if any Alteration be to be wrought, it is by reducing them into a Monarchy; for the Matter being ſo corrupt, that the Laws are become ineffectual to reſtrain them, there is a Neceſſity that Force be applied, and that by a regal Power the Licentiouſneſs and Ambition of the Grandees be reduced into Order: This may be illuſtrated by the Example of *Tuſcany*, which is a ſmall Territory, and yet has Three conſiderable Commonwealths in it, as *Florence*, *Siena*, and *Lucca*; and the reſt of the Cities of that Province, though they depend upon them, yet their Minds and their Laws ſhew a ſtrange Propenſity to Freedom; all which proceeds from the Scarcity of Gentry in thoſe Parts, eſpecially with ſuch Power and Juriſdiction as aforeſaid. On the contrary, there is ſo great an Equality among them, that if a prudent and publick Man ſhould happen among them, who had any Knowledge of that Kind of Government, he might eaſily form them into a ſolid Commonwealth: But hitherto it has been their Misfortune to have no ſuch Man. I conclude therefore, that he who would eſtabliſh a Commonwealth, where the Country conſiſts moſt of Gentlemen, will find it impoſſible, unleſs he ruins them firſt; and on the other Side, he who would ſet up a Monarchy or Principality where the Equality is great, muſt ſelect the moſt conſiderable and unquiet amongſt them; give them Caſtles, and Lands, and Preferments, and any Thing that may oblige them to his Side: By which means they ſhall not only maintain the Power of their Prince, but their own Inſolence and Ambition, and the People be forced to ſubmit to a Yoke, to which nothing elſe could compel them: For whilſt there is a due Proportion betwixt the Prince and the Subject, all Things go well, and every Man enjoys his Eſtate. But to ſettle a Republick in a Country diſpoſed to Monarchy, or to erect a Monarchy where the Condition of the People have a Tendency to a Commonwealth, requires a Perſon of more than ordinary Authority and Brain: Many have tried it, but very few have ſucceeded; the Greatneſs and Difficulty of the Enterprize confounding them ſo at firſt, that they know not where they are, and give over as ſoon as they have begun. But it may be objected, that the Conſtitution of the *Venetian* Government confutes my Poſition, *That no Commonwealth can be eſtabliſhed where the Gentry are conſiderable*; for under that State no Man is admitted to any Office but thoſe who are Gentlemen. I anſwer, that the *Venetian* Gentry are nothing but Name; for their Lands and Poſſeſſions are very few, the principal Part of their Eſtates lying in their Merchandize and Goods: Beſides, none of them have any Seigniors or Juriſdiction over the People, ſo that a Gentleman among them is but a Title of Honour and Preheminence, founded upon none of thoſe Things which in other Places make them ſo conſiderable. For as in other Commonwealths the Citizens are diſtinguiſhed into ſeveral Orders, ſo *Venice* is entirely divided into Two, the Populace and the Gentry; the Gentry having, or being capable of all Honours and Employments, from which the Populace are utterly excluded: Which for the Reaſons aboveſaid, it has produced no Diſturbance in that State. Theſe Things being conſidered, let him who deſires to erect a Government, ſettle a Commonwealth where there is a Parity among the Inhabitants; and a Monarchy where there are many great Men, and the Gentry numerous. Otherwiſe his Government will be incongruous, and of little Duration.

CHAP. LVI.

Great Accidents, before they happen to any City or Province, are commonly prognoſticated by ſome Sign, or predicted by ſome Men.

HOW it comes to paſs, I know not; but by ancient and modern Example it is evident, that no great Accident befals a City or Province, but it is preſaged by Divination, or Prodigy, or Aſtrology, or ſome way or other; and that I may not go far for my Proof, every one knows what was foretold by Fryar *Girolamo Savonarola* before the Expedition of *Charles* VIII. into *Italy*; beſides which, it was reported all over *Tuſcany*, that there were arm'd Men ſeen fighting in the Air over the Town of *Arezzo*, and that the Claſhing of their Arms in the Conflict was heard by the People.

It is generally known in *Florence*, that before the Death of the old *Laurence de Medici*, the *Duomo* or chief Church in that City was ſtruck with Lightning, and the People deſtroyed: And before *Piero Soderini* (who was made *Gonfaloniere* for his Life by the People) was baniſhed and degraded, the Palace was burn'd by Lightning likewiſe. Many other Inſtances might be produced, which I omit for Brevity ſake: I ſhall only add one which is mentioned by *Livy* before the coming of the *French* to *Rome*. *Marcus Ceditius*, a Plebeian, acquainted the Senate, that paſſing one Night about Twelve a-Clock thorough the *Via nova*, he heard a Voice (bigger than a Man's) which adviſed him to let the Senate know, the *French* were upon their march to *Rome*. How theſe Things could be, it is to be diſcourſed by Perſons well verſed in the Cauſes of natural and ſupernatural Events; for my part I will not pretend to underſtand them, unleſs (according to the Opinion of ſome Philoſophers) we may believe, that the Air being full of Intelligences and Spirits, who foreſeeing future Events, and commiſerating the Condition of Mankind, gives them warning by theſe Kind of Intimations, that they may the more timely provide and defend themſelves againſt their Calamities. But whatever is the Cauſe, Experience aſſures us, that after ſuch Denunciations, ſome extraordinary Thing or other does conſtantly happen.

CHAP. LVII.

The Multitude united, is formidable and ſtrong; but ſeparated, is weak and inconſiderable.

THE *Romans* being overthrown, and their Country much waſted, upon the Coming of the *French*; many of them (contrary to an expreſs Order and Edict of the Senate) tranſplanted to *Veii*, and left *Rome*. Whereupon, by a new Proclamation, the Senate commanded, that by a preciſe Day, and upon a certain Penalty, they ſhould return to their old Habitations: When the News of this Proclamation was firſt brought to *Veii*, it was deſpiſed and laugh'd at by every body; but when the Day appointed for their Return arrived, there was not a Man but pack'd up his Goods, and came back as was required, and as *Livy* ſays in the Caſe, *Ex ferocibus univerſis, ſinguli metu ſuo obedientes*; *Not one of them who were ſo contumacious together, but apart began to fear, and that fear made him obedient.* And certainly nothing can give us a more lively Deſcription of the Nature of a Multitude than this Caſe. They are bold, and will ſpeak liberally againſt the Decrees of their Prince; and afterwards when they ſee their Puniſhment before their Faces, every one grows fearful of his Neighbour, ſlips his Neck out of the Collar, and returns to his Obedience. So that it is not much to be conſidered what the People ſay, either of their Princes good Management or bad, ſo they be ſtrong enough to keep them in their good Humour when they are well diſpoſed, and provide, when they are ill, that they do them no Hurt. But this ill Diſpoſition of the People, I mean all ill Diſpoſitions but what ariſe either from the Loſs of their Liberty, or the Loſs of ſome excellent Prince ſtill living, upon whom they had ſettled their Affections. For the evil Diſpoſitions proceeding from theſe Cauſes are tranſcendently dreadful, and ſtrong Remedies are to be applied to reſtrain them.

In other Caſes their Anger is nothing, eſpecially having no body to head them; for as there is nothing ſo terrible as their Fury in one Caſe, ſo there is nothing ſo vain and inconſiderable in the other, becauſe, though they have betaken themſelves to their Arms, they

are

are eaſily reduced, if you can but avoid the firſt Heat of their Fury; for by Degrees they will cool, and every Man conſidering it is his Duty to return, will begin to ſuſpect himſelf, and think of his Security, either by making his Peace, or eſcape. Whenever therefore the Multitude is in a Mutiny, their beſt Way is immediately to chuſe themſelves a Head, who may correct, keep them united, and contrive for their Defence, as the *Romans* did when leaving *Rome* upon the Death of *Virginia*; for their Protection and Security, they created Twenty Tribunes from among themſelves: And if this Courſe be neglected, it happens to them as *Livy* preſaged in the foregoing Sentence, *That as nothing is more courageous than the Multitude united, ſo nothing is more abject when they are ſeparate and divided.*

CHAP. LVIII.

That the Multitude is wiſer, and more conſtant than a Prince.

THAT nothing is more vain and inconſtant than the Multitude, *Titus Livius* and all other Hiſtorians do agree. You ſhall many Times find them condemning a Man to Death, and lamenting him when he is dead, and wiſhing for him again. This happened in the Caſe of *Manlius Capitolinus*, who being ſuſpected to deſign againſt their Liberty, was by the People thrown headlong down the Rock, and in a ſhort Time exceedingly regretted. The Words of our Author are theſe: *Populum brevi, poſteaquam ab eo periculum nullum erat, deſiderium ejus tenuit. When their Fear of him was over, their Affection revived.* And in another Place where he ſhows the Accidents which hapned in *Syracuſe*, after the Death of *Girolamo* Nephew to *Hierone*, he ſays, *Hæc natura multitudinis eſt, aut humiliter ſervit, aut ſuperbe dominatur. The Nature of the Multitude is, to be ſervilely obedient, or inſolently tyrannical.*

Things being thus, I know not whether I ſhall not ſeem too bold, to undertake the Defence of a Thing, which all the World oppoſes; and run my ſelf upon a Neceſſity of either quitting it with Diſgrace, or purſuing it with Scandal; yet methinks, being to maintain it with Arguments not Force, it ſhould not be ſo criminal. I ſay then in behalf of the Multitude, that what they are charged withal by moſt Authors, may be charged upon all private Perſons in the World, and eſpecially upon Princes; for whoever lives irregularly, and is not reſtrained by the Law, is ſubject to the ſame Exorbitancies, and will commit as bad Faults as the moſt diſſolute Multitude in the World: And this may be eaſily known, if it be conſidered how many Princes there have been, and how few of them good, I mean of ſuch Princes as have deſpiſed, and broke thorough thoſe Laws which were intended to reſtrain them. The Kings in *Egypt* were not anciently of this Sort, for they were govern'd by Laws in thoſe Provinces from the very Beginning; and the Kings of *Sparta* were the ſame: Nor need we look back ſo far for Examples; we have the Kings of *France* in our own Days, whoſe Kingdom in my Judgment is at this Time the moſt regular, and beſt govern'd in the World. Thoſe Princes therefore who are born under ſuch Laws and Conſtitutions, and obliged to live by them, are not to be reckoned or compared with the diſſolute and mutinous Multitude; but they are to be conſidered with a Multitude under the ſame Laws and Reſtrictions, as the People of *Rome* were whilſt their Commonwealth was incorrupt, and they were found neither to be inſolent in Authority, nor ſlaviſh in their Subjection; but by their Laws, and their Magiſtrates, they kept up their Dignity with Honour: And if at any Time Neceſſity required that they ſhould appear againſt the Power of any particular Perſon, they did it effectually, as in the Caſes of *Manlius*, the *Decem-viir*, and others who deſigned to enſlave them. On the other Side, when it was for the Intereſt of the Publick, they were as obſequious and dutiful to the *Dictators* and *Conſuls*, as they had been obſtinate before. Nor was their Regret for *Manlius* when he was dead, at all to be admired; it was the Memory of his Virtues that cauſed it, which are commendable even among Enemies. The ſame Thing might have hapned to the beſt of Princes; for all Writers agree, that Virtue is laudable whereſoever it is to be found. And I am of Opinion, that could *Manlius* have been raiſed again, and preſented to them in the Height of their Sadneſs, they would have ſerved him as before, diſcharged him of his Impriſonment, but condemned him to death. Nor are Princes (and thoſe held very wiſe) exempt from this Kind of Inconſtancy. They have put many to death, and lamented them afterwards; as *Alexander* for *Clito*, and other of his Friends, and *Herod* for *Mariamnes*. But what *Titus Livius* ſays of this Subject, is not intended of a Multitude regulated by Laws, as the *Romans* were; but a looſe and diſorderly Multitude like the People of *Syracuſe*, who behaved themſelves

ſelves like Madmen, and committed the ſame Faults that *Herod* and *Alexander* had committed before them. The Multitude therefore is no more to be accuſed of Fury and Inconſtancy than a Prince; for they are both ſubject to Extravagance, when they have no Laws, nor no Rules to reſtrain them. And of this (beſides what I have ſaid) there are many Examples, not only among the *Roman* Emperors, but among other Princes and Tyrants, which have been guilty of more Giddineſs and Inconſtancy, than any Multitude whatever. I conclude therefore againſt the common Opinion, that the People are no more light, ingrateful, nor changeable than Princes; but that both of them are equally faulty, and he that ſhould go about to excuſe the Princes, would be in a very great Error; for a People which governs by Law, and is well ordered, ſhall be as ſtable, as wiſe, and as grateful as a Prince, and perhaps more, though he be never ſo wiſe: And on the other Side, a diſſolute and irregular Prince ſhall be more mutable, imprudent, and ingrateful, than any Multitude whatever, and that not ſo much from any Diverſity in his Nature (for they are much at one, and if there be any Excellence, 'tis on the Side of the People) as from their greater or leſſer Reſpect to the Laws under which they are to live: And he who ſhall conſider the People of *Rome*, will find that for 400 Years together, they hated the very Name of a King, were ambitious of Honour, and ſtudious exceedingly for the Good of their Country, as may be juſtified by many Examples. If it be objected that the *Romans* were ingrateful to *Scipio*, I refer them to what I proved ſo largely before, that the People are leſs ingrateful than Princes. And as to Prudence and Conſtancy, I affirm, They have much the Advantage, and are more wiſe, more ſteddy, and more judicious than Princes; for which Reaſon the Voice of the People is reſembled to the Voice of God, becauſe by ſome occult and ſingular Quality it does often preſage Things that are wonderful, and relating to their own Welfare or Calamity. In giving their Judgment about dubious Things, you ſhall ſeldom find them miſtake, if at any Time Two eminent Orators equally excellent in their Profeſſion, do controvert and diſcourſe a Thing *pro* and *con* before them, they will aſſuredly take the moſt rational Side; which ſhows they are no leſs capable of Truth than other People. And if in matters of Honour or Enterprize, which carry an Appearance of publick Utility, they be ſometimes miſtaken, (as is ſaid before) the Princes are more, by reaſon of their Paſſions, and Perturbations of Mind, to which they are much more obnoxious than the People. In the Election of Magiſtrates they are more dexterous and judicious than Princes, nor ſhall the People be ever perſuaded to advance a corrupt and infamous Man, which among Princes is eaſy and common. If it takes a Diſguſt or Abhorrency to any Thing, 'tis not readily removed, but ſticks by them for ſeveral Ages, which among Princes is not ſo; both which Points may be evicted by the People of *Rome*, who in ſo many hundred Years, and ſo many Elections of Conſuls and Tribunes, never made Four Elections that they repented of afterwards; and for the Name of a King they abhorred it ſo perfectly, that no Virtue, no former Service to his Country could excuſe any Man whom they ſuſpected to aſpire to it. It is evident likewiſe that thoſe Cities which are governed by the People, have enlarged their Territories in a ſhort Time, and extended their Empire farther, than thoſe who have been ſubject to Princes; as *Rome* after the Expulſion of Kings, and *Athens* after they had reſcued themſelves from the Tyranny of *Piſiſtrates*; which can proceed from nothing, but that the Government by a free State is intrinſically better, than the Government by a Prince: Nor can *Livy*'s Expreſſion about the Levity of the *Syracuſans* oppoſe my Opinion; for let all the good and ill Qualities of the Prince and People be compared, and it will be found, That the People are leſs extravagant, and more honourable of the Two. And if in the inſtituting of good Laws, the ordaining of new Statutes, and the making new Orders for civil Converſation and Society, Princes have the better, yet the People preſerving and executing them better than they are doubtleſs as worthy of Praiſe, as the Founders themſelves. To be ſhort, Principalities and Republicks have both of them ſubſiſted ſeveral Years, and both of them had Occaſion to be regulated and reformed; for a Prince that is licentious, and does what he has a mind to, has a mind to that which does him hurt, and is a weak Man for his Pains; and the People which take the ſame Liberty, is as mad on the other Side. And if the Compariſon be made betwixt mix'd Principalities, that are circumſcribed and bounded by Laws, and popular Governments under the ſame Ties and Reſtrictions; the People will be found more virtuous than the Princes; but if it be betwixt looſe and diſſolute Governments both of the one Kind and the other, the Errors on the Side of the Princes will appear more great, more numerous, and more incapable of Redreſs: For in popular Tumults, a ſober Man may interpoſe, and by fair Words reduce them to Reaſon; but to an enraged Prince, who dares intercede, or what Remedy is there to repair to, but Violence, and the Sword? From whence we may judge and diſtinguiſh betwixt the Inconvenience of the one and the other: The People are appeaſed with Gentleneſs, and

good Words; and the Prince not to be prevailed upon, but by Violence and Force; and if it be ſo, who is it that will deny, that the Diſeaſe is more dangerous, where the Cure is moſt difficult? Moreover when the People tumultuate, there is not ſo much fear of any preſent Miſchief that they are likely to commit, as of the Conſequences of it, and that it may end in a Tyranny. But with ill Princes it is quite contrary, the preſent Miſery is the moſt dreadful, becauſe they hope when he dies, their Liberty may be recovered. You ſee then the Difference betwixt them; one is more dangerous at preſent, and the other for the future; the Cruelty of the People extends only to ſuch as (in their Opinion) conſpire againſt the common Good. The Severity of the Prince is more againſt them who deſign againſt his particular Intereſt. But this Opinion of the People goes daily down the Wind; for every Man has Liberty to ſpeak what he pleaſes againſt them (though even the Government be popular:) But againſt a Prince, no Man can talk without a Thouſand Apprehenſions and Dangers. Nor will it ſeem to me incongruous (the Matter having drawn me thus far) in my next Chapter to diſcourſe what Confederacies are moſt ſafe, thoſe which are made with Princes, or thoſe which are made with Commonwealths.

CHAP. LIX.

What Leagues or Confederacies are moſt to be truſted; Thoſe which are made with Princes, or thoſe which are made with Free States.

BEcauſe Princes with Princes, and free States among themſelves, and many times with Princes, do enter into Leagues of Friendſhip and Confederacy, I thought it not amiſs to enquire in this Place, whoſe Faith is the moſt firm, and in whoſe Amity the greateſt Confidence is to be repoſed. Having conſidered it diligently with my ſelf, it ſeems to me that in many Caſes they are alike, and in ſome they differ. And firſt, when Neceſſity of State requires, and there is any viſible Danger of loſing the Government, neither the one nor the other are ſo preciſe, but they will make bold with their Engagements, and behave themſelves ingratefully: *Demetrius Poliorcetes* had obliged the *Athenians* by many good Offices; but his Army being afterwards defeated, and himſelf flying to them for Refuge, as to his Confederates and Friends, he was repulſed, and not admitted into the City, which troubled him more than the Loſs of his Army. *Pompey* being beaten in *Theſſalia* by *Cæſar*, fled likewiſe into *Egypt* to *Ptolomy*, whom he had formerly reſtored to his Kingdom, and was murthered by him for his Confidence. In both theſe Examples the Ingratitude ſeems to be the ſame; yet the Inhumanity was greater on the Princes Side, than on the Commonwealths; but be it as it will, when the State is in Danger, they are neither of them ſcrupulous. And if there be any Prince or Commonwealth ſo punctual as to preſerve their League, though with Deſtruction to themſelves, it may proceed from the ſame Cauſes. It may very well happen that a Prince may Confederate with ſome other great Potentate, (who though unable to defend him at that Time, may give him Hopes notwithſtanding of reſtoring him ſome other) and perſevere in his Confederacy, as thinking that by having made himſelf of that Prince's Party, he has rendered his Accommodation with the Adverſary impoſſible. This was the Caſe of all the *Neopolitan* Princes who ſided with the *French* in their Expedition into thoſe Parts: And as to the free States, they ſuffered of old ſomething in this Nature, as *Saguntum* in *Spain*, which City choſe rather to expoſe its ſelf to Direption, and all the Calamities of War, than forſake its Confederacy with the *Romans*; and in the Year 1512. *Florence* did almoſt the ſame to continue its Amity with the *French*. So that computing every Thing, and conſidering what both Parties have done upon ſuch imminent and irreſiſtible Danger, I believe there is more Conſtancy and firm Friendſhip to be found among Commonwealths than among Princes; for though perhaps they may have the ſame Sentiments and Inclinations as Princes, yet their Motions and Reſolutions being ſlower, they are longer before they violate their Faith. But when their Leagues and Confederacies are to be broken, upon the bare Proſpect of Advantage; in that Caſe your Commonwealths are much more Religious and Severe; and Examples may be brought where a ſmall Gain has tempted a Prince, when a great one could not move a Commonwealth. *Themiſtocles* in an Oration to the *Athenians* told them, that he had ſomething to adviſe that would be infinitely to their Advantage, but durſt not communicate it in Publick, becauſe to publiſh it would hinder the Execution; whereupon the People deputed *Ariſtides* to receive it, and act in it afterwards as he ſhould think convenient. *Themiſtocles* acquainted him, that the whole *Grecian* Fleet, (though under their Paſſport and Parole)

Parole) were in a Place where they might be all taken or deſtroyed, which would make the *Athenians* abſolute Maſters in thoſe Seas; and *Ariſtides* reported to the People, That the Council of *Themiſtocles* was profitable, but would be a great Diſhonour to their State; upon which it was unanimouſly rejected. But had the ſame Occaſion been offered to *Philip* of *Macedon*, or ſome other Princes, they would not have been ſo tender; for it was a Practice among them (and eſpecially with *Philip*) who got more by breaking his Faith, than by all his other Deſigns. As to the Breaches upon the Non-obſervance of Articles, they are ordinary Things, and I have nothing to ſay of them: I ſpeak only of extraordinary Occaſions, and am of Opinion from what I have ſaid, that the People do tranſgreſs leſs in that Nature than Princes, and may therefore with more Confidence be truſted.

CHAP. LX.

How the Conſulſhip, and other Dignities in Rome *were conferred without reſpect of Age.*

IT is manifeſt in the Hiſtory of the *Roman* Commonwealth, that after the People were made capable of the Conſulſhip, the Citizens were promiſcuouſly preferr'd, without reſpect either of Age or Extraction; but any Man was advanced for his Virtue, whether he was a young Man, or an Old: And this was evident in *Valerius Corvinus*, who was created Conſul in the 23d Year of his Age; upon which Conſideration, in one of his Speeches to the Army, he told them that the Conſulſhip was, *Præmium Virtutis, non Sanguinis. The Reward, not of Nobility, but Virtue.* Whether this was prudently done, or not, may admit of Diſpute: But as to the receiving all Sorts of Perſons to that Dignity without Conſideration of their Blood, there was a Neceſſity of that; and the ſame Neceſſity that was in *Rome*, may happen in any other City that deſires to do the ſame great Things which were done in *Rome*, of which we have ſpoken elſewhere. For Men are not to be perſuaded to ſuffer, but in hopes of Reward; and that Hope cannot be taken away without manifeſt Danger. It was but equitable therefore that the People ſhould be capable of the Conſulſhip, that being nouriſhed awhile with only the Hopes, they might at length be ſo happy as to have it in Effect. A City that employs not its People in any great Affair, may order them as it pleaſes; but if it deſigns to extend its Empire, and do as the *Romans* did, there muſt be no Diſtinction. And that no Regard ought to be had of any Man's Age, appears by this, That in the Election of a young Man to a Degree, in which the Wiſdom of an old Man is requiſite, the Multitude being to elect, it is neceſſary that the young Man be recommended by ſome extraordinary Exploit; and when a young Man is ſo happy, as to have made himſelf conſpicuous in the City by ſome honourable Atchievement, it were not only hard, but inconvenient, if the ſaid City might not receive the Benefit of his Virtue immediately, but be forced to attend till his Mind as well as Body was ſuperannuated, and all that Vigor and Promptitude loſt, which at that Time might have been ſo ſerviceable to his Country: At which Age *Valerius Corvinus*, *Scipio*, *Pompey*, and many others did great Things, and were permitted to triumph for their Pains.

THE DISCOURSES OF Nicholas Machiavel, *CITIZEN* and *SECRETARY* OF FLORENCE,

Upon The

First Decade of *LIVY*

TO

ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI,

AND

COSIMO RUCELLAI.

LIBER II.

The PREFACE.

IT is the common Practice of Mankind, to commend the Ancient, and condemn the preſent Times; but in my Judgment not always with Reaſon; for ſo ſtudiouſly are they devoted to Things of Antiquity, that they do not only admire what is tranſmitted by old Authors, but applaud and cry up when they are Old, the Paſſages and Occurrences in their Youth. But my Opinion is, This their way of Computation is many times falſe, and that upon ſeveral Accounts. Firſt, becauſe of ſuch very Ancient Things we can have no abſolute Knowledge; for moſt commonly in the Narrative of Affairs, what is infamous, or ill done, is pretermitted in Silence, whilſt what is well done, and honourable, is related with all the Arts and Amplifications of Rhetorick; for ſo much are Hiſtorians accuſtomed to attribute to the Fortune of the Conqueror, that to increaſe his Praiſe, they do not only expatiate upon his Conduct and Exploits, but they do likewiſe ſo magnify and illuſtrate the very Actions of the Enemy, that they who come after beholding Things at a great Diſtance, have reaſon to admire thoſe Times, and thoſe Men, and by Conſequence to love them. Beſides, it being Envy or Fear which diſpoſes People to Hatred, neither of thoſe Paſſions extending to what cannot poſſibly hurt them, Two great Cauſes are wanting of finding fault with Antiquity; for as Things ſo long paſſed cannot any way prejudice, ſo they cannot

provoke to Envy or Diſcontent: But preſent Things which are obvious to our own Senſe are univerſally known, and no Circumſtance that paſſes (whether good or bad) that can be totally conceal'd; from whence it proceeds, that obſerving with the Excellence and Virtue of our preſent Affairs, whatever is concomitant of Imprudence or Vice, we are in a manner compelled to poſtpone them to Things of Antiquity, where the Good only is diſplayed, and the Bad paſſed by, though perhaps the preſent Things are more worthily glorious. I do not intend any Thing hereby of the Arts and Sciences of our Predeceſſors, ſo highly improved and illuſtrated, that 'tis not in the Power of Time either to add any Thing, or ſubſtract. I only ſpeak of the Manners and civil Converſations of Men; in which indeed we have not ſo many virtuous Examples, as were to be found among our Anceſtors: So that it is not altogether unjuſtly, if Antiquity be preferr'd; yet are not our preſent Tranſactions to be always condemn'd as worſe than the former, as if Antiquity had no Errors at all. Human Affairs are in perpetual Fluctuation, and have their Times of Decreaſe, as well as Advancement. A City or Province founded by ſome excellent Perſon upon good Principles and Laws, not only ſtands, but flouriſhes and increaſes a long Time in Honour, Authority, and Wealth; and thoſe Perſons whoſe Happineſs it is to be born under thoſe Governments whilſt they are glorious, and powerful, are apt to prefer their old Cuſtoms to the Diſparagement of the new; yet they are in an Error, and for the Reaſons aboveſaid. But thoſe who are born when the State is in its Declenſion, do not ſo much tranſgreſs when they commend what is paſs'd, and decry what is preſent; which Things (having ſeriouſly conſidered with my ſelf) I conceive to be cauſed, becauſe the World has been always the ſame, and made up promiſcuouſly of good Things and bad; yet theſe good and bad Things have varied ſometimes, and as it were tranſmigrated from one City, and one Province to another; ſo that in thoſe Places where Virtue has been a long Time predominant, Vice has ſtoln in by Degrees, and ſupplanted it; which is evident by the Revolutions of Kingdoms and Empires, where Virtue and Juſtice has had its Time, and been transfuſed afterwards into other Countries. However the World was the ſame, though its Virtue and Magnanimity was unſtable, removing and ſhifting from the *Aſſyrians* firſt, to the *Medes*, from the *Medes* to the *Perſians*, and from them to the *Romans*; and if after the *Roman* Empire, there has been no Government ſo great as to comprehend and engroſs the Virtue of the whole World; yet the ſame Virtue that was of old among the *Romans* is not extinct, but diſperſed and branched out into ſeveral Kingdoms and Provinces, as the Kingdom of *France*, the Kingdom of the *Turks*, the Kingdom of the *Soldan*, the Empire of the *Germans*, and the Sect of the *Saracens*, which conquered ſo many Provinces and committed ſuch Devaſtations, as were the Ruin of the Empire of the *Eaſt*. In theſe Kingdoms, rent and divided from the Empire of the *Romans*, the old *Roman* Virtue is diffuſed, and retains ſtill ſomething of is Priſtine Luſtre, ſo that it may without Injuſtice be admired in ſome Places: Which being ſo, he who is born in thoſe Provinces where the *Roman* Virtue and Diſcipline is ſtill in Being (but declining) if he applauds his old Countrymen, and blames his Contemporaries, his Error is not great: But he that is born in *Italy*, and is not in his Heart a *Tramontan*; or in *Greece*, and is not a *Turk*, muſt needs bewail his own Times, and cry up his Predeceſſors, in which he will find many Things well worthy his Admiration; whereas in theſe there is nothing but Wickedneſs and Obloquy, no Religion, no Laws, no Diſcipline, but all Things impure and brutiſh, and they are the more deteſtable and deplorable, by how much the ſame Perſons who would be imitated, and are ſet aloft to command all, and correct thoſe that are vicious, are moſt diſſolute, and moſt vicious themſelves.

But to return to our Diſcourſe: I ſay, That though human Judgment is frail, and may be miſtaken in its Character of ſuch Things, as by reaſon of their Antiquity cannot fall ſo perfectly under one's Cognizance; yet that will not excuſe old Men for preferring the Tranſactions in their Youth, becauſe both the one and the other were equally liable to their Knowledge; nor would they be of that Opinion, if Men had the ſame Sentiment and Appetite as long as they lived; but our Affection altering, and our rational Soul being otherwiſe diſpoſed than formerly, we judge otherwiſe of Things, though the Times be the ſame; for how is it poſſible the ſame Things ſhould pleaſe in our Youth and old Age, when their Studies and Delights are ſo different and remote? For (to ſay no more) as the Quickneſs and Vigor of the Body decreaſes in old Men, ſo their Judgment and Prudence increaſes proportionably; and thence it follows, that the ſame Things which ſeemed tolerable in their Youth grow inſupportable when they are Old; ſo that the Fault is more in their Judgment, than the Age, for ſuppoſing thoſe Things to be good, which, being wiſer, by Experience they find to be otherwiſe. To which it may be added, that the Deſires of Mankind are immenſe, and unſatiable; that naturally we are covetous of every Thing, whereas Fortune allows us but little; that from thence it happens that no Man is contented, every Man deſpiſes what he

is

is already poſſeſſed of, commends what is paſſed, condemns what is preſent, and longs for what is to come, though induced by no reaſonable Occaſion. Things being thus, I cannot reſolve my ſelf whether ever I may not be of that Number, who in theſe my Diſcourſes have ſo highly magnified the old Times and Exploits of the *Romans*, to the Diminution of our own: And truly, were not the Virtue of that Age as clear as the Sun, and the Wickedneſs of ours as manifeſt as that, I ſhould have been more moderate, and feared to have run into the ſame Error which I have condemned in other People.

But Things being ſo evident, I may with Boldneſs deliver my Opinion of both Times, to the End that the Minds of ſuch young Perſons, as ſhall peruſe my Conceptions, may be admoniſhed to avoid thoſe Vices which are ſo prevalent now, and prepared to imitate the Virtue of our Anceſtors, whenever Occaſion ſhall be offered. For it is the Office of a good Man to recommend that to other People which he thinks for the Intereſt and Honour of his Country, though perhaps the Adverſity of his Fortune, and the Malignity of the Times will not ſuffer him to practiſe it himſelf; that by his Inſtructions ſo many, at leaſt ſome one may be ſo fortunate as to be able to follow him.

Wherefore having in my firſt Book done with what I propoſed about the original Inſtitution of Government, and what was in my Judgment neceſſary to preſerve them: I ſhall now in this Second, diſcourſe of what the *Romans* did Abroad for the Enlargement and Augmentation of their Empire.

CHAP. I.

Whether the Virtue or Fortune of the Romans *was the Occaſion of the Greatneſs of their Empire.*

MAny have thought, and *Plutarch*, a grave Author, among the reſt, that the People of *Rome* were more beholding to their Fortune than Virtue, in the Acquiſition of their Empire; and among other Reaſons, he infers it from their own ſilent Confeſſion, in having erected more Temples to Fortune than to any of their Gods. *Livy* ſeems to be likewiſe of the ſame Opinion; for he ſeldom introduces a *Roman* ſpeaking any Thing of Virtue, but immediately it is followed with Fortune, with which nevertheleſs I can by no means comply, nor believe it will hold Water; for though no Commonwealth be to be found that has made ſuch Progreſs as the *Roman*, why ſhould it be rather imputed to their good Fortune than the ſolid Conſtitution of their Laws? The Courage of their Armies, and the excellent Conduct of their Emperors, extended their Empire; and then their own juſt Meaſures, and the wiſe Inſtitutions of their firſt Legiſlator preſerved what they got, as we ſhall hereafter more largely diſcover. It is objected, that the *Romans* were never at one Time involved in Two conſiderable Wars, (which is imputed rather to their Fortunes than Wiſdom) for they had no quarrel with the *Latins* till they had ſubdued the *Samnites*, and were forced to make War in their Defence; they had no Controverſy with the *Tuſcans* till they had beaten the *Latins*, and with their frequent Victories almoſt extinguiſhed the *Sabines*, whereas if Two of theſe States had confederated, and joined their powerful Armies againſt them, no doubt but the Affairs of the *Romans* would have been in very great Danger. But be it as it will, this is moſt certain, they never had Two great Wars upon their Hands at a Time; but they began one when they ended the other, or the End of the firſt was the Beginning of the Second; and this may be obſerved in the Series of their Wars, for (to paſs by their Quarrels before *Rome* was taken by the *French*) whilſt the *Æqui* and *Volſci* were powerful and ſtrong, they had no Enemies but they; when they were conquered, their War broke out with the *Samnites*; and though before that was perfectly concluded, the *Latins* rebelled; yet before it could be brought to a War, the *Samnites* had made their Peace, and joined their Army with the *Romans* to reduce the *Latins*. That War being finiſhed, the War with the *Samnites* revived, and was the Occaſion of much Miſchief to the *Samnites*; after which, the *Romans* began with the *Tuſcans*, and that being compoſed, the *Samnites* broke out again upon the Paſſage of *Pyrrhus* into *Italy*, who being repulſed into *Greece*, they had Opportunity for their Wars with the *Carthaginians*; and their firſt War with that State was no ſooner determined, but the *French*, and the Inhabitants on this and the other Side of the *Alps*, conſpired ſo effectually againſt them, that betwixt *Popolonia* and *Piſa* (where the Tower of St. *Vincent* is at this Day to be ſeen) the Confederates were routed with a very great Slaughter.

This War being concluded, for Twenty Years together they had no conſiderable War, for they had no body to fight with but the *Ligures*, and the Relicts of thoſe *French* who were remaining in *Lombardy*. In this Poſture they continued till the ſecond *Punick* War, which laſted Sixteen Years, and perplexed them exceedingly. That War being ended with a great deal of Honour, their next Enterprize was againſt the *Macedonians*; after which their War happened with *Antiochus* in *Aſia*, and when he was overcome, there was not a Prince or State in the whole World, which by it ſelf, or Conjunction with the reſt, was able to contend with the *Romans*. But before this laſt Victory, whoever conſiders the Method of their Wars, and their manner of Proceeding, ſhall find great Virtue and Wiſdom intermixed with their good Fortune, ſo that the Reaſon of their good Fortune is eaſily diſcovered; for this is moſt certain, when a Prince or Commonwealth arrives at that Heighth of Reputation, that no neighbour-Prince or People dares venture to invade him, (unleſs compelled by indiſpenſible Neceſſity) he may do what he pleaſes, 'tis in his Election with whom he will make War, and with whom he will be at Peace; for his Neighbours being afraid of his Power, are all glad to be his Friends; and thoſe Potentates who are fartheſt off, and have no Commerce with them, look on as unconcern'd, as if the Conſequence could have no Reflection on them; and in this Error they do many Times continue till the Calamities be brought Home to their own Doors; and then, when 'tis too late, they have nothing but their own private Force to oppoſe, which is too weak when the Enemy is grown ſo ſtrong. I will not enlarge upon the *Samnites*, nor recount how they ſtood ſtill, and look'd on, while the *Romans* conquered the *Æqui* and the *Volſci*; but to avoid Prolixity, I ſhall paſs to the *Carthaginians*, who were of great Power and Authority when the *Romans* were at War both with the *Samnites* and *Tuſcans*; they had the Command of all *Africk*, and were ſupreme in *Sicily*, *Sardinia*, and great Part of *Spain*. Blinded with their Power, and (as they thought) ſecure in their Diſtance, it never came into their Heads to invade them at that Time, or to give any Aſſiſtance to the *Samnites* or *Tuſcans*; but (according to the Practice of the World with Things that are new, and increaſing) they rather ſided with them, and deſired their Friendſhip, not ſo much as perceiving their Error, till the *Romans* had conquered all the intermediate States, and began to contend with them for the Empire of *Sicily* and *Spain*. And what happened to the *Carthaginians*, happened likewiſe to the *French*, to *Philip* of *Macedon*, and to *Antiochus*; each of them believing (whilſt the *Romans* were employed in their Wars with other People) that they would either be overcome, or that they themſelves ſhould have Time enough to make Peace or War with them, as they ſaw it moſt for their Advantage: ſo that conſidering what is good, I am of Opinion that the ſame Fortune and Proſperity may be expected by any Prince or State which exerciſes the ſame Virtue and Induſtry as the *Romans* have done before them. And here we might very properly diſcourſe of the *Roman* Method in the Invaſion of other Provinces, but we have done that at large in our Treatiſe called, *The Prince*; yet this I ſhall ſay in ſhort, that the *Romans* made always ſure of ſome Friend or other in the Provinces againſt which they deſign'd, that might be a means to admit them, and gave them Entrance, and help afterwards to keep what they had been inſtrumental in getting. So by Intelligence with the *Capuans* they invaded *Samnium*; by the Help of the *Camertines* they got into *Tuſcany*; by the *Mamertines* into *Sicily*; by the *Saguntines* into *Spain*; *Maſſiniſſa* gave them Entrance into *Africk*, the *Ætoli* into *Greece*, *Eumenes* and other Princes into *Aſia*, and the *Maſſilienſes* and *Hedai* into *France*; and as by their Correſpondence they conquered moſt of thoſe Countries, ſo by their Intereſt they preſerved them; which Way, if diligently obſerved by other People, it will be found that their Proſperity depended leſs upon Fortune than thoſe States who obſerved not that Courſe: But to illuſtrate what we have ſaid, and make it ſo plain and perſpicuous that every one may ſee how much more their Virtue than their Fortune contributed to their Empire, in our next Chapter we will conſider what thoſe People were whom the *Romans* ſubdued, and with what Obſtinacy they defended their Liberty.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

With what Nations the Romans *contended, and with what Obſtinacy thoſe Nations reſiſted.*

NOthing made it ſo difficult for the *Romans* to conquer their Neighbours, and ſome other remoter Provinces, as the Love which the People of thoſe Times did bear to their Liberty: For in Defence of that, they were ſo indefatigably ſtudious, that nothing but ſingular and extraordinary Virtue could have ſubdued them: And this is demonſtrable by the many and great Dangers to which they expoſed themſelves, ſometimes to preſerve, and ſometimes to recover it; as alſo by the Severity of their Revenge upon thoſe who had uſurp'd it. 'Tis evident likewiſe in Hiſtory, what Detriment the People and Cities have ſuffered whilſt they were in Servitude and Subjection; and whereas now-a-days there is but one Province which can boaſt of free Cities, in ancient Times there was not one Province but had plenty. In *Italy* from the *Alps* (which divide *Tuſcany* and *Lombardy*) to the extremeſt Part of that Country, there were many free States; as the *Tuſcans*, the *Romans*, the *Samnites*, and others; nor is there mention of any King (but what reigned in *Rome*) beſides *Porſena* King of *Tuſcany*, the Extinction of whoſe Line, though not ſet down in Hiſtory, yet it is manifeſt that *Tuſcany* was free at the Time when the *Romans* encamped before *Veii*; ſo well ſatisfied with their Liberty, and ſo abhorring from the very Name of a King, that the *Veientes* having for their better Defence created one in their own Town, and ſent to the *Tuſcans* to implore their Aſſiſtance againſt the *Romans*, after a grave and ſolemn Debate, it was reſolved, no Aſſiſtance ſhould be ſent whilſt they were under the Dominion of a King; as thinking it unfit to engage in the Defence of a Country that had betray'd it ſelf, and proſtituted to the Dominion of a ſingle Perſon. Nor is this univerſal Affection to Liberty ſo wonderful in the People.

Experience tells us, that no Cities have augmented their Revenues, or enlarged their Territories, but whilſt they were free and at Liberty: And certainly 'tis a prodigious Thing to conſider to what Height and Grandeur in an Hundred Years Time the City of *Athens* arrived, after it had freed it ſelf from the Tyranny of *Piſiſtrates*; but much more to conſider the Greatneſs of *Rome* upon the Expulſion of her Kings; and the Reaſon of all is, becauſe in Commonwealths private Wealth and Emolument is not ſo much aim'd at as the Improvement of the Publick; nor is there any where ſo much Care of the publick as in free States, where whatever is equitable and for the common Advantage, is decreed and executed, without Reſpect to particular Perſons, who may perhaps be Sufferers thereby; whereas in Cities that are governed by a Prince it falls out quite contrary; for there, what makes commonly for the Advantage of the Prince, is prejudice to the publick: So when a free State degenerates into a Tyranny, the leaſt Miſchief that it can expect, is, to make no further Advancement in its Empire; and no farther Increaſe either in Riches or Power; but for the moſt Part it goes backward and declines: And if it ſhould ſo happen, that the Tyrant ſhould be a virtuous Man, and one who by his Courage and military Diſcipline ſhould enlarge his Dominions; yet whatever he took would be converted to his own private Uſe, without any Benefit to the Publick. For he dares not advance any of thoſe Citizens (how worthy and honeſt ſoever) leſt he ſhould have occaſion to ſuſpect them afterwards. Nor can he make thoſe Cities which he ſubdues, dependant or tributary to that where he is abſolute; for 'tis not the Intereſt of a Tyrant to make his Subjects powerful or united; but to keep them low and divided, that every Town, every Province may depend wholly upon himſelf; ſo that the Conqueſts of an Uſurper may turn to his own Profit, but never to the Publick; to which Purpoſe many Things are very handſomely written by *Xenophon* in his Treatiſe of Tyranny; and Things being thus, no body is to admire if our Anceſtors had ſo great a Zeal for their Liberty; and the very Name of a Tyrant was ſo odious to them, that when long ſince News was brought to the Army of the Aſſaſſination of *Hieronymo* the Nephew of *Hiero* of *Syracuſe*, and the whole Camp was in an Uproar againſt the Conſpirators; yet when it was told them that they had proclaimed Liberty, and a free Government, they laid by their Indignation againſt the Tyrannicids, and being pacified with the very Name of Liberty, fell into Conſultation how it was to be preſerved. Nor is it to be wondred at then, if their Revenge be ſo violent and extraordinary upon thoſe who would violate it; of which, though there be many Examples, I ſhall inſtance only in one, but that moſt remarkable and horrid; and happening in *Corcirca* a City in *Greece*: For all *Greece* being divided, and conſiſting of Two Factions, one of them under the Protection of the *Athe-*

nians, and the other of the *Spartans*; and in *Corcira* the Nobility prevailing, and having uſurped upon the Liberty of the People, it happened that the People being reinforced by the Aſſiſtance of the *Athenians*, overpowered the Nobility, and conquered them again. Having reſtored their Liberty, and ſhaked off their Servitude, they clapp'd up all the Nobility in a large Priſon, and bring them forth by Ten at a Time, as if they were to be baniſhed, they put them to death with moſt exquiſite Torments; which Severity coming by Degrees to the Ears of the Remainder, they reſolved to do what was poſſible to defend themſelves againſt it, upon which they ſtood upon their Guard, and would ſuffer none of the Officers to come in; whereupon, in a great Fury, the People ran thither, pull'd off the Covering of the Houſe where they were, and throwing down the Walls, buried them all in the Ruins: And of this Sort of Cruelty there were many other Examples in that Province; for the People are uſually more impetuous in revenging the Loſs of their Liberty, than in defending it.

But it may, not unfitly, be admir'd in this Place, what ſhould be the Cauſe that the Ancients ſhould be more zealous for publick Liberty than we in our Days: If my Opinion may paſs, I think it is for the ſame Reaſon, that in thoſe Times Men were more robuſt and ſtronger than now; which proceedeth much from the Diverſity betwixt their Education, their Religion and ours: For whereas our Religion gives us a juſt Proſpect and Contemplation of Things, and teaches us to deſpiſe the Magnificence and Pomp of the World; the Ethnicks valued them ſo highly, and believing them their chiefeſt Happineſs, it made them more fierce and buſy to defend them. And this may be collected from ſeveral of their Cuſtoms; for if the Sacrifices in their Days be compared with the Sacrifices in ours, theirs will be found magnificent and horrid; ours delicate and neat, but neither ſo magnificent nor cruel. They wanted not Pomp nor Formality in thoſe Ceremonies, and yet to make them the more venerable and ſolemn, they added Blood and Slaughter to them, offering up infinite Numbers of Beaſts, which being ſlain before the People, made them more hard-hearted and cruel. Moreover, the Religion of the *Gentiles* did not place their Beatitude any where but upon ſuch as were full of worldly Glory, and had done ſome great Action for the Benefit of their Country. In our Religion the meek and humble, and ſuch as devote themſelves to the Contemplation of divine Things, are eſteemed more happy than the greateſt Tyrant, and the greateſt Conqueror; and the *ſummum bonum*, which the others placed in the Greatneſs of the Mind, the Strength of the Body, and whatever elſe contributed to make Men active, we have determined to conſiſt in Humility, Abjection, and Contempt of the World; and if our Religion requires any Fortitude, it is rather to enable us to ſuffer than to act. So that it ſeems to me, this way of Living, ſo contrary to the Ancients, has rendred the Chriſtians more weak and effeminate; and left them as a Prey to thoſe who are more wicked, and may order them as they pleaſe, the moſt Part of them thinking more of Paradiſe than Preferment, and of enduring than revenging of Injuries; as if Heaven was to be won rather by Idleneſs than Arms: But that Explication of our Religion is erroneous, and they who made it were poor and puſillanimous, and more given to their Eaſe than any Thing that was great: For if the Chriſtian Religion allows us to defend and exalt our Country, it allows us certainly to love it, and honour it, and prepare our ſelves ſo as we may be able to defend it. But that lazy and unactive Way of Education, and interpreting Things falſly, has been the Cauſe that there are not ſo many Commonwealths as formerly in the World, nor ſo many Lovers and Champions for their Liberty; And yet I believe the Greatneſs of the *Roman* Empire contributed ſomething, by reducing all the free States and Republicks under their Dominion.

Nevertheleſs when that great Empire was broken and diſſolved, very few of thoſe poor States could recover their Liberty: But when it began firſt to increaſe and extend it ſelf, no Country was without them, and where-ever the *Romans* carried their Arms, they found little Commonwealths banding and confederating againſt them, and defending their Liberties with all imaginable Conſtancy; which ſhews that the *Romans* were a People of more than ordinary Courage, or they could never have ſubdued them. The *Samnites* alone will be Example ſufficient, who (as *Livy* reports) were ſo powerful, and ſo hearty Defenders of their Liberty, that for Forty Six Years together they maintained War with the *Romans*; and though they had received many Loſſes, and ſuch Devaſtations had been committed in their Country, yet they could never be wholly reduc'd before the Conſulſhip of *Papyrius Curſor*, the Son of the firſt *Papyrus*. But 'tis a Spectacle worthy of any Man's Pity, to ſee a Country ſo full (formerly) of brave Cities, and brave Men, and all of them free, now deſolate and uninhabited, and ſcarce any body left; to which Condition it could have never been reduced but by the Diſcipline, and Diligence, and Courage of the *Romans*: But all this proceeded from Diverſity of Conſtitution, for all Cities and free States whatſoever, increaſe not only

only in Riches and Authority, but in the Numbers of their Men: For who is it that had not rather procreate and have Children where he may Marry and enrich himſelf freely, than where there is Danger that what he gets painfully, and lays up carefully for his Children, may be raviſhed from them by a Tyrant.

In a free State you may be ſure your Children ſhall be no Slaves, and that if they behave themſelves virtuouſly, they ſhall be ſure of Preferment, and perhaps come to be Princes: Riches increaſe there faſter, and that not only by Tillage and Agriculture, but by Traffick and Arts; and People do naturally throng to thoſe Places where they may get what they lawfully can, and keep ſecurely what they have got. The quite contrary happens in Countries that are Servile, and their Condition is worſe, as their Servitude is greater: But there is no Servitude ſo ſevere, as to depend upon a Commonwealth, and that for Two Reaſons; firſt becauſe it is more durable, and leſs hopes of recovering their Liberty; and Secondly, becauſe it is the Practice of all Commonwealths to impoveriſh and weaken whatever they conquer, to fortify themſelves; which with Princes is not the way, unleſs they be very barbarous indeed, and like the *Eaſtern* Princes, who not only ruin whole Countries, but deſtroy all human Converſation: But where Princes are well inſtituted, they know better Things, and do many times indulge their new Conqueſts as much as their own Territories, leaving them the Exerciſe of their Arts, and the Enjoyment of their Laws; ſo that though they cannot increaſe their Wealth as where they are free, yet they are not ſo ſubject to be ruined as where they are Slaves: I ſpeak now of Servitude to a Foreign Prince, for the Uſurpation of a Citizen I have ſpoken before. All which being conſidered, no wonder if the *Samnites*, whilſt they enjoyed their Liberty, were ſo courageous and ſtrong; and when it was once loſt, grew ſo abject and contemptible. *Titus Livius* tells us in his Hiſtory of the *Punick* War, that the *Samnites* were ſo overlaid and cowed by one ſingle Legion of the *Romans* at *Nola*, that they ſent Ambaſſadors to *Hannibal* to beg his Aſſiſtance; and that the ſaid Ambaſſadors in their Oration to *Hannibal*, the better to move his Compaſſion, had this Expreſſion, *We are the People who for an Hundred Years together waged War with the* Romans *with our own private Forces, and bore up many times againſt Two Armies and Two Conſuls at once; but now our Miſery is ſo great, and our Spirits ſo low, we are unable to defend our ſelves againſt one pitiful* Legion.

CHAP. III.

It contributed much to the Grandeur of the City of Rome, *that they ruined the Neighbouring Cities, and admitted Strangers to their own Dignities and Privileges.*

CReſcit interea Roma, *Albæ ruinis*; *The Ruin of* Alba *was the Riſe of the* Romans. 'Twas the Saying of *Livy*, and 'tis true; for whoever would make any City Great, and apt for Dominion, muſt endeavour with all Induſtry to throng it with Inhabitants, otherwiſe it will be impoſſible to bring it to any great Perfection. And this is done Two Ways, by Love and by Force; the firſt by giving Paſſage and Security to all Perſons that will come and Inhabit there, that every Man ſhall be free; the Second by deſtroying the Neighbour Cities, and forcing the People to come and dwell in yours. The *Romans* obſerved both Ways, and grew ſo numerous upon it, that in the Time of their Sixth King they had 80000 Men in the Town able to bear Arms, proceeding in ſome reſpect like the Countryman, who to make his Plant larger, and more fruitful, cuts off its firſt Shoots, that the Juice and Virtue which otherwiſe would dilate into the Branches, being kept cloſe to the Trunk, might break out with more Vigor afterwards, and make it more Beautiful and Fertile. And that this way is neceſſary for the Propagation of the Strength and Authority of a City, appears by the Example of *Athens* and *Sparta*, which Cities, though they were both free, numerous in Men, and happy in their Laws; yet they could never arrive at the Grandeur of the *Romans*, though *Rome* ſeemed more tumultuous, and not ſo well governed as they, and all for the Reaſon aboveſaid: For *Rome* having by both thoſe ways increaſed the Number of their Citizens, was able to ſet out an Army at one Time of 280000 Men, whereas *Sparta* and *Athens* could never exceed 20000, which is not to be attributed to the Excellence of the Situation of *Rome*, but to the Diverſity of their Conduct; for *Lycurgus* the Founder of the *Spartan* Commonwealth, conceiving nothing could be more pernicious to it, nor more eaſily abrogate his Laws, than intermixing with new Inhabitants, he provided with all poſſible Induſtry that his Citizens ſhould have no Commerce or Converſation with Strangers. To

that End he not only prohibited the Admiſſion of Foreigners, and their marrying with them, but that there might be no Encouragement or Occaſion of Intercourſe betwixt them, he put out a certain Money of Leather, ſo pitifully inconſiderable, that he preſumed no Merchants would trouble themſelves to Import any Foreign Commodities for it; by which Means that City was never in a Capacity of being very populous: And becauſe all human Affairs do hold ſome Proportion and Analogy with Nature; and it is impoſſible that a ſlender Trunk ſhould bear vaſt and ponderous Branches, it is not to be expected that a ſmall Commonwealth, conſiſting of a ſmall Number of Citizens, ſhould ſubdue, or at leaſt keep and maintain greater and more populous States than themſelves; and if it ſhould happen that they ſhould conquer them at any Time, upon every ſlight Accident they would be ſubject to loſe them, like the Tree it would be too weak for its Boughs, and every Puff of Wind apt to blow it down. And thus it fell out with *Sparta*, though it had conquered all *Greece*, made it ſelf abſolute thorough that whole Province; yet *Thebes* no ſooner rebelled, but all the reſt of the Cities revolted, and having loſt its great Empire in a Moment, it remained like a Tree deſtitute of its Branches. But with *Rome* it was otherwiſe, its Root and Trunk was ſtrong enough to ſupport its Branches, how heavy and ſpacious ſoever; and this was the great Cauſe of the Greatneſs of the *Roman* Empire, which *Livy* expreſſed in Two Words, when he ſaid, *Creſcit interea Roma, Alvæ ruinis.*

CHAP. IV.

There are Three ways which Commonwealths have taken to enlarge their Territories.

HE who has read and obſerved the Hiſtory of our Anceſtors muſt find, that Commonwealths had generally Three ways of enlarging their Empire. One is that which was obſerved of the *Tuſcans* of Old, who entred into a League of Confederacy with ſeveral other Commonwealths, with Condition of Equality, that no Particular ſhould have any Degree or Authority above the reſt, and that Comprehenſion ſhould be left for all their new Conqueſts to come in, not much unlike the Practice of the *Swizzers* in our Times, and the *Achaians*, and *Ætolians* of Old. And becauſe the *Romans* had in thoſe Times much Controverſy with the *Tuſcans* and their Confederates, I ſhall enlarge my ſelf ſomething in the Explanation of their Affairs, of which, though there be but little Monument in Hiſtory, yet we are aſſured, that before the Greatneſs of the *Romans*, the *Tuſcans* were very powerful both by Sea, and by Land; of which Power it is no ſmall Argument, their ſending a Colony into the *Mare ſuperum*, to a Place called *Adria*, which grew ſo conſiderable and famous, that it denominated that whole Sea, and it has been called the *Mare Adriaticum* ever ſince. It is known likewiſe that their Empire extended from the *Tyber* to the Foot of the *Alps*, which comprehends the greateſt Part of *Italy* at this Day; though 200 Years before the *Romans* came to any conſiderable Strength, the *Tuſcans* received a great Defeat by the *Gauls*; who under the Command of *Bellovеſus*, either in queſt of new Quarters, or tempted by the Pleaſantneſs of the Country, having paſſed the *Alps*, poſſeſſed themſelves of that Province called *Lombardy*, and gave it the Name of *Gallia Ciſalpina*; after which they turn'd out the Natives, ſettled themſelves there, and built ſeveral Cities, which they enjoyed, till in Proceſs of Time they alſo were ſupplanted by the *Romans*. And this was the Method of the *Tuſcans* Proceeding, and the manner of their confederating with their Neighbours, which was no leſs than Twelve Cities; of which *Cluſium*, *Veii*, *Feſulæ* *Aretium*, and *Volterra* were the Chief; but yet with all their Aſſiſtance they could not exceed the Limits of *Italy*, nor indeed conquer all that, for Reaſons which we ſhall mention hereafter. Another way of extending your Empire, is by aſſociating with ſeveral Cities, but ſo as that the Dignity of the Command, the Seat of the Empire, and the Honour of the Enterprize may remain with you; which was the way obſerved by the *Romans*. The Third is the way of the *Spartans* and *Athenians*, who entertained no Confederates, but whatever Territories they Conquered, they annexed them to their own: Which Way is undoubtedly the worſt of the Three, as appeared by the Two ſaid Republicks, who were ruined upon no other Account, but becauſe they had graſped more Dominion than they were able to hold. For it is a Thing in it ſelf very arduous and difficult, to keep a City in Subjection by a continued Force, eſpecially if ever it was free; wherefore unleſs your Citizens be very numerous, and your Aſſociates very conſiderable, by whoſe Aſſiſtance you may be able to keep what you conquer, it will never be in your Power to enlarge your Dominion very much, and

and the *Spartans* and *Athenians* miſcarrying in their Way, miſcarried likewiſe in their End, and all their great Conqueſt came to nothing: The *Romans* took the ſecond Way, and ſucceeded to that vaſt and extraordinary Power, by aſſociating equally in many Things, with many States, but reſerving always to themſelves the Seat of the Empire, and the chief Command in their Wars, by which means it came to paſs, that their Confederates (e'er they were aware) ſubjected themſelves to the *Romans*, at the Expence of their own Labour and Blood. For after they had carried their Arms out of *Italy*, reduced ſeveral Kingdoms into Provinces, and the Inhabitants being accuſtomed to live in Subjection, without much Difficulty ſubmitted, the *Romans* bearing the Name of the War, and the Nations that were conquered knowing nothing of their Allies, ſubmitted to their Dominion, and would own no body elſe: Whereby it happen'd that their Aſſociates in *Italy* being over-power'd by the Multitude of Provinces which had ſubmitted to the *Romans*, and by the Strength and Populouſneſs of *Rome*, began to find their Error by Degrees, but too late, and when they had no way left to defend themſelves; for if any of them conſpired, they were quickly ſuppreſſed, and made Subjects of Aſſociates. This Way of Adminiſtration, and enlarging their Empire, was peculiar to the *Romans*; no other People obſerved it, and certainly no better is to be found. The next Way of confederating (which was practiſed by the *Tuſcans*, *Achaians*, and *Ætolians* in old Time, and by the *Swizzers* of late) is the beſt way next to that of the *Romans*; for though it cannot arrive at any great Empire, the Confederacy conſiſting of ſo many free Cities, which being all to be conſulted, makes their Reſolutions very tedious; beſides, the Citizens are not ſo vigorous in a War, where the Prize is to be divided into ſo many Parts; yet for theſe Reaſons it has Two Advantages of the Third. Firſt, whatever it gains, it keeps a long Time, and loſes very hardly; and ſecondly, it engages not ſo raſhly in War, but enjoys with more Eaſe and Felicity the Bleſſings of Peace: For they are longer in their Conſultations and Debates, where there is to be a general Diet and Convention, than where Things are to be diſpatched within the Walls of one City. Beſides, Experience tells us, that this Way has certain Bounds, which have not been exceeded by any Example we can find. For after XII or XIV Cities have confederated, they admit no more into the League, as holding themſelves enough, and ſufficient for their Defence, nor are they much ſollicitous of extending their Empire, becauſe they are under no Neceſſity of making themſelves ſtronger; and their Conqueſt would be of little Advantage to every particular State, for they would be forced upon one of theſe Two Rocks, either to incorporate them into their League, and then the Multitude would breed Confuſion, or make them their Subjects which they will hardly continue: When therefore they are got to ſuch a Number in their Aſſociation, as that they ſeem ſafe againſt foreign Invaſion, and ſtrong enough to defend themſelves; they take one of theſe Two Ways, either they receive their Neighbour States or Cities into their Protection (by which means they draw vaſt Sums of Money ſometimes, that are eaſily diſtributed) or elſe they fight for other People, and receive Pay from this or that Prince, as the *Swizzers* do now, and other Nations have done of old. To this Purpoſe *Titus Livius* gives us an Account, That at a Conference betwixt *Philip* of *Macedon*, and *Titus Quintus Flaminius*, an *Ætolian* Prætor being preſent, there happening ſome Words betwixt the ſaid Prætor and King *Philip*, King *Philip* reproached him by the Avarice and Inconſtancy of his Country, as a People that were not aſhamed to take Pay on one Side, and ſend Supplies to the other, by which means it was frequently ſeen that in both Armies the *Ætolian* Colours were diſplayed; from whence we may conclude that this Way of proceeding by League and Confederacies, has been always the ſame, and has had the ſame Effects. The third Way of ſubjecting your Conqueſts, and annexing them to your own Dominion, is very incommodious and inſtable; and if it were ſo to a Commonwealth well conſtituted and armed, it muſt needs be much worſe to a Government that is weak, as moſt of the *Italian* States are at this Day: But the *Roman* Way is the beſt, and moſt to be admired; for there is no Example of any body that made uſe of it before them, nor has any body imitated them ſince; and as to the Practice of the *Tuſcans* and *Ætolians* in their Confederations, there is no body follows it now-a-days, but the *Swizzers*, and the *Suevians*: Which being ſo, and ſo many brave Things performed by the People of *Rome*, as well for the Conſervation, as the Augmentation of their Empire, it is not ſtrange our Affairs ſucceeded no better, and that we have been a Prey to whoever would invade us; for (to ſay nothing of the reſt) it has doubtleſs becom'd the *Tuſcans*, if they could not have imitated the *Roman* Diſcipline, nor followed the Meaſures in extending their Empire, at leaſt to have follow'd the Example of their own Anceſtors, who though they brought not their Empire to that Grandeur and Immenſity as the *Romans*; yet they enlarged it as far as they thought good, and as far as conſiſted with the Nature of their Government; and by doing ſo, they kept it a long Time, with immortal Honour to

their Memory, till they were firſt ſhaken by the *Gauls*, and afterwards ſo totally ruined by the *Romans*, that there is ſcarce the leaſt Token left, that there was ever any ſuch Thing; which having brought it into my Mind to conſider what may be the Cauſes of this Oblivion of Things, I ſhall diſcourſe of them in the following Chapter.

CHAP. V.

The Variation of Religions and Languages, with the Accidents of Deluges and Plagues, have been the Cauſe that many great Things have been forgotten.

IN my Judgment it may be objected to thoſe Philoſophers who hold the World to be Eternal, that if ſo long a Courſe of Antiquity was true, it would be but reaſonable that the Memory of ſome of their Affairs ſhould have laſted above Five Thouſand Years: Yet there may be ſome Reaſons given for that Oblivion of Things, and they ſeem Twofold, partly from the Nature of Man, and partly from the Influence of the Heavens; the Memory of great Things are aboliſhed from the Nature of Man, by the Variation of their Religion, or Language; for when a new Religion is introduced, the firſt Care of him that would propagate it, is to explode and extinguiſh whatever was memorable in the old, to give the greater Credit to his new Innovation; and if it fall out that the Introducers of this new Sect be of a different Language, all goes to Wreck, and whatever was before is eaſily forgotten. And that this is ſo, appears by the Inſtitution of the Chriſtian Religion, whoſe firſt Eſtabliſhers did principally intend the Cancelling and Extirpation of all old Ethnick Cuſtoms, Ceremonies, and Theology; and if there remained any Memory of their Affairs, it was becauſe there was no new Language introduced with it, the Chriſtians being conſtrain'd to explain themſelves in *Latin*; whereas could they have done it in a new Tongue (conſidering their other Perſecutions) we may conclude there would have been no Memory left of their Religion or Worſhip: For ſo diligent and zealous was Saint *Gregory*, and other Moderators of the Chriſtian Religion, in aboliſhing the Superſtitions of the *Gentiles*, that they cauſed the Works of all the Poets and Hiſtorians to be burn'd, which made any Mention of them; they threw down their Images and Idols, and deſtroy'd all that might afford the leaſt Memory of Paganiſm; to which Diligence of theirs, if a new Language had been added, in a ſhort Time all would have been utterly forgotten: What therefore was done by the Chriſtians for the Extirpation of Gentiliſm, it is not improbable but the *Gentiles* might have done of Old for the Extirpation of the Religion before. And becauſe in Five or Six Thouſand Years, Religion may be Twice or Thrice changed, no wonder if what was before be ſo entirely loſt, that if there remains any Thing of it, it is looked upon as fabulous and incredible, as it happened to the Hiſtories of *Diodorus Siculus*, which gives an Account of 40 or 50000 Years, and are not unworthily accounted falſe. As to the Cœleſtial Cauſes from the Influence of the Heavens, they are ſuch as deſtroy Mankind in general, or reduce it to a very ſmall Number, as great Mortalities, Famines, and Inundations of Water, but eſpecially the laſt, becauſe the Miſchief is more univerſal; and if any be ſaved, it is only the Mountaneers, which being commonly barbarous, have no Knowledge of Antiquity, and by Conſequence can convey nothing of it to their Poſterity; and if it ſo happens that among them which are preſerved, ſome one Man may be more learned than ordinary, and have ſome Knowledge of Affairs, to give himſelf a Name and Reputation afterwards, he conceals, perverts, and tranſmits them as he pleaſes; ſo that there remains to Poſterity no more than he thought fit to communicate. Nor do I believe it is doubted but theſe Accidents happen, and Famine and Peſtilence do ſometimes rage in the World, ſeeing all Hiſtories mention them, and this Oblivion of Things is a certain Effect of them: Nor is it unreaſonable to think, that the great Univerſe has its way of Evacuation, as well as the Microcoſm; for as in that, when the Humours are redundant, and the Body unable to digeſt them, Nature exerts, and finds out ſome way to throw them off, without which the Perſon muſt certainly miſcarry; ſo it is in the other, when all Countries are repleat, and no Room left for thoſe that are to come; when the Cunning and Malignity of Mankind is at the Height, there is a Neceſſity the World ſhould be purged by ſome of thoſe Three Ways, that Men being reduced in their Numbers, and humbled under the Conſideration of their Mortality, may (if poſſible) become better: Which being ſo, no wonder if the *Tuſcans*, formerly ſo famous for their Adminiſtration both in War and in Peace, ſo eminent for their Courage, and ſo venerable for their Religion, ſhould be oppreſſed by the *Romans*, and ſo totally aboliſhed, that (as is ſaid before) there remains nothing of them but the Name.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

How the Romans *proceeded in making of War.*

WE have already discourſed of the way of the *Romans* in extending their Empire; we ſhall now ſpeak of their Cuſtoms in the Management of their Wars, by which it will appear with what Wiſdom they deviated from the common Ways of the World, and by what eaſy Methods they arrived at that Supremacy and Grandeur. He who makes War at his own Choice, (and is under no Conſtraint) or elſe by Ambition, has doubtleſs this End; to get what he is able, and to keep it whilſt he can, and rather to Enrich than Impoveriſh his own Country: For ſuch a one it is neceſſary to have regard to his Charge, and to ſee that neither the conquering nor maintaining are more expenſive to him, than will conſiſt with his Revenue. This the *Romans* obſerved very ſtrictly, by coming ſtrong and ſuddenly into the Field; for by that one Practice, all their Wars with the *Latins*, *Samnites*, and *Tuſcans*, were diſpatched in a ſhort Time. And whoever conſiders their Wars from the beginning of *Rome* to the Siege of the *Veientes*, will find that they were determined in a very ſhort Time, ſome in Six, ſome in Ten, and ſome in Twenty Days. For their Cuſtom was, upon the firſt Appearance of a War, immediately to draw out their Army, and ſeeking out the Enemy, they did what they could to bring him to a Battel; having beaten him (by reaſon of the Surprize.) The Enemy (that his Country might not wholly be harraſſed) for the moſt part propoſed an Agreement, in which the *Romans* were ſure to inſiſt upon ſome Part of their Territory; which either they converted to their particular Profit, or conſigned to ſome Colony which was to be placed there for the Security of their Frontiers; by which Means the Wars being ended in a ſhort Time, their Conqueſts were kept without any conſiderable Expence, for the Colony had that Country for their Pay, and the *Romans* had their Colonies for their Security. Nor could there be any way more advantageous and ſafe; for whilſt there was no Enemy in the Field, thoſe Guards were ſufficient; and when any Army was ſet out to diſturb them, the *Romans* were always ready with another in their Defence, and having fought them, they commonly prevailed, forced them to harder Conditions, and returned when they had done: By which Means they gained daily upon the Enemy, and grew more powerful at Home: And in this manner they proceeded till their Leaguer before *Veii*, where they altered their Method, and allowed Pay to their Soldiers for the better Continuation of the War; whereas before that, their Wars being ſhort, there was no Neceſſity of paying their Armies. Nevertheleſs, though they paid their Soldiers from that Time, and maintained War at a greater Diſtance, (whereby they were obliged to continue longer in the Field) yet they left not their old Cuſtom of diſpatching it as ſoon as they could, with reſpect to the Circumſtances of Place and Time; for which Reaſon they continued their Colonies: And beſides their old Cuſtom of ſhortning their Wars as much as they were able, the Ambition of their Conſuls contributed exceedingly; for their Conſulſhips being but for a Year, and Six Months of that to be ſpent in their Employments at Home, they were as diligent and vigorous as poſſible, becauſe they were not capable of triumphing till the War was concluded: And then for continuing their Colonies, the great Advantage and Convenience that reſulted from them was ſufficient to prevail. This Practice therefore was obſerved perpetually among the *Romans* in the Management of their Wars; only they varied ſomething about the Diſtribution of the Prey, in which formerly they were more liberal than in After-times; either becauſe they thought it not ſo neceſſary when the Soldiers were paid; or elſe becauſe their Spoils being greater than before, they thought convenient that the Publick ſhould have its Share; that upon any new Enterprize they might not be conſtrained to lay new Taxes upon the People; and by this way their Coffers were filled in a ſhort Time. So that by theſe Two Ways, by the Diſtribution of their Prey, and the ſettling of Colonies, *Rome* grew Rich by its Wars, whereas other Princes and States (without great Diſcretion) grew Poor: And ſo great was every Man's Ambition of enriching the *Ærarium*, that by Degrees it came to that Paſs, no Conſul was permitted to Triumph, unleſs he returned with a vaſt Quantity of Silver or Gold, or ſome other ineſtimable Commodity, and put it into the Treaſury. So that the Deſigns of the *Romans* tended wholly to this, to finiſh the War quickly, by forcing the Enemy to a Battel; or elſe to Harraſs and Tire them with frequent Excurſions, that thereby compelling them to diſhonourable Conditions, they might make their Advantage, and become more Powerful and Rich.

CHAP. VII.

What Proportion of Land the Romans *allowed to every Man in their Colonies.*

I Think it no eaſy Matter to ſet down the exact Proportion of Land, which the *Romans* aſſigned to every ſingle Perſon in their Colonies; for I believe they gave more or leſs according to the Barrenneſs or Fertility of the Soil; and that in all Places they were ſparing enough. And the firſt Reaſon that induces me, is, that thereby they might ſend more Men, and by Conſequence their Frontiers be better guarded: Another is, becauſe living at Home indigent themſelves, it is not to be ſuppoſed they would ſuffer thoſe whom they ſent Abroad to grow too Opulent and Rich: And in this I am much confirm'd by *Livy*, where he tells us, that upon the taking of *Veii*, the *Romans* ſent a Colony thither, and in the Diſtribution of the Land, allotted every Man no more than Three Acres, and a little more according to our Meaſure.

They might conſider likewiſe that their Wants would not be ſupplied by the Quantity ſo much as the Improvement and Cultivation of their Land. Yet I do not doubt but they had publick Paſtures and Woods to ſuſtain their Cattel, and ſupply themſelves with Firing, without which a Colony could hardly ſubſiſt.

CHAP. VIII.

What it is that diſpoſes ſome People to leave their Native Countries, to diſpoſſeſs other People.

SEeing I have ſpoken already of the Military Diſcipline of the *Romans*, and how the *Tuſcans* were invaded by the *French*; it follows properly enough, that we ſay ſomething of their ſeveral Kinds of War, which are Two: One Sort when commenced upon the Ambition of ſome Prince or Commonwealth, in hopes to extend and enlarge his Empire; as thoſe Wars which were made by *Alexander* the Great, by the *Romans*, and by one Prince againſt another: Which Wars, though dangerous, are not yet ſo pernicious as to ſupplant the Inhabitants, and drive them out of their Country; for the Conqueror contents himſelf with his Victory, and the Submiſſion of the People allows them their own Laws, and many times their Eſtates. The other kind of War is much more dangerous and deſtructive, and that is when an entire Nation, with their Wives and their Children, compelled either by Hunger, or War, leaves its own Country, to fix themſelves ſomewhere elſe, not to extend their Dominion, or exerciſe any Authority, (as in the other) but to kill or expel all the Natives, and poſſeſs themſelves of their Eſtates.

This War indeed is moſt bloody and dreadful, as *Saluſt* ſhews very well in the end of his *Bellum Jugurthinum*, where, after *Jugurtha* was beaten, ſpeaking of the Invaſion of the *Gauls*, he tells us, *Cum cæteris Gentibus a populo Romano de imperio tantum fuiſſe dimicatum, cum Gallis, de ſingulorum hominum ſalute*; *With other Nations the* Romans *fought only for Empire and Dominion, with the* Gauls *they fought for their Country and Lives.* For when a Prince or Commonwealth invades a Country according to the firſt Way, it is ſufficient, if thoſe who were at the Helm be removed or deſtroyed; in this every Man's Life is in Danger; for when a whole Nation tranſplants, and invades a new Province, not only the Colonies, but the Natives muſt be extinguiſhed, that they may fix themſelves upon their Lands, and poſſeſs themſelves of their Goods: And by theſe kind of People the *Romans* were Three times invaded. Firſt by the *Gauls*, who took *Rome*, and (as I ſaid before) drove the *Tuſcans* out of *Lombardy*; of which Invaſion *Titus Livius* gives Two Reaſons: One was the Pleaſantneſs of the Country, and the Delicacy of the Wine, wherewith (being then but ill provided in *France*) they were infinitely taken: The other was, the Country was grown ſo exceedingly populous, that it was not able to ſuſtain its own Natives; whereupon the Princes of thoſe Parts judging it neceſſary to find them new Quarters, they appointed which were to tranſplant, and putting *Belloveſus* and *Sicoveſus*. (Two *French* Princes) at the Head of them, they ſent one Part of them into *Italy*, and the other into *Spain*: It was *Belloveſus*'s Lot to invade *Italy*, and he did it ſo effectually, that he poſſeſſed himſelf of all *Lombardy*, and made the firſt War upon the *Romans* that was ever made upon them by the *French*. The Second Time

Time they were invaded in this Manner was likewiſe by the *French*, and it was after the firſt *Punic* War, in which Invaſion the *Gauls* loſt above 200000 Men betwixt *Piſa* and *Piombino:* The Third and Laſt was by the *Germans* and *Cimbrians*, who having defeated ſeveral Armies of the *Romans*, were at laſt themſelves defeated by *Marius*. From whence we may obſerve the great Courage and Conſtancy of the *Romans* of Old, that they could not only bear up againſt Three ſuch dangerous Invaſions, but overcome them at laſt; whereas afterwards their Courage began to fail, and they were not able to reſiſt the Inundation of thoſe *Barbarians*; for when the *Goths* and the *Vandals* invaded, they poſſeſſed themſelves of the whole *Weſtern* Empire, without any conſiderable Oppoſition. The Reaſons which move theſe Nations to tranſmigrate (as I ſaid before) is Neceſſity, and that Neceſſity proceeds either from Famine, or from Wars and Diſturbances at Home; and when they undertake theſe Expeditions with vaſt and innumerable Numbers, they invade with irreſiſtible Violence, put all the Natives to the Sword; poſſeſs themſelves of their Eſtates, eſtabliſh a new Kingdom, and change the very Name of the Province, as *Moſes* did of Old, and the *Barbarians* ſince, who poſſeſſed themſelves of the *Roman* Empire.

From hence are all the new Names in *Italy* and elſewhere impoſed by their ſeveral Conquerors: *Lombardy* was called anciently *Gallia Ciſalpina*; *Francia*, (from the *Franks*) was called anciently *Gallia trans Alpina*; *Sclavonia* was called *Illyria*; *Hungaria*, *Pannonia*; *Anglia*, *Britannia*. *Moſes* gave the Name of *Judea* to that Part of *Syria* which he conquered; and many other Countries have changed their Names upon the ſame Occaſion, which would be too long to recount. And becauſe I have ſaid before, that ſometimes theſe kinds of People are forc'd out of their Country by inteſtine Troubles and Diſturbances, I ſhall preſent you with one Example of the *Mauruſians*, an Ancient People of *Syria*, who foreſeeing the Invaſion of the *Hebrews*, and knowing themſelves unable to oppoſe them, thought it more Wiſdom to forſake their Country betimes, and preſerve themſelves, than to expect their Coming, and loſe both; whereupon they pack'd up their Goods, and with their Wives and Children removed into *Africk*, where they drove out the Inhabitants, and ſettled in their Country: So that they who were too weak to defend their own Province, were ſtrong enough to force out another People. To this Purpoſe *Procopius*, who writes the Wars of *Belliſarius* againſt the *Vandals* (who had ſettled themſelves in *Africk*) tells us, that upon certain Pillars in the Houſe where theſe *Mauruſians* had lived, he himſelf read theſe Words, *Nos Mauruſii qui fugimus a facie Jeſu latronis filij* Navæ; *We* Mauriſians *fled hither from* Jeſus *the Uſurper, who was the Son of* Navi. By which we may perceive the Occaſion of their Departure out of *Syria*. And certainly theſe Nations forc'd out of their own Country by irreſiſtible Neceſſity, and more than ordinarily dreadful, were not to be oppoſed but by a Potent and well Diſciplin'd People: But when they move in ſmall Numbers, their Danger is not ſo great, becauſe they dare not uſe that Violence, but are put to their Wits, and to poſſeſs themſelves of ſome Quarters by Cunning and Inſinuation, which they are to keep afterwards by ways of Amity and Friendſhip; as *Æneas* did, and *Dido*, the *Meſſilians* and others, who by the Aſſiſtance and Friendſhip of their Neighbours, made good what they had poſſeſſed. But the People that came out of their own Countries the moſt numerous and ſtrong, were the *Scythians*; for their Country being barren and cold, and the Natives too numerous to be ſuſtained in it, they were forced Abroad, as having nothing to preſerve them at Home. And if now for Five Hundred Years and upwards we have not heard of any ſuch Tranſmigration, I conceive the Reaſons may be ſeveral: The firſt may be the great Evacuation in thoſe Countries, from whence the *Roman* Empire was invaded. A Second may be, becauſe *Germany* and *Hungaria* (from whence thoſe Inundations came) is better cultivated and improved, ſo as they can live plentifully at Home, without rambling Abroad: Another Reaſon may be, that the *Germans*, *Poles*, *Cimbrians*, and other Nations which border upon the *Scythians*, being Martial People, and continually at Wars with them, are as it were a Bulwark to theſe Parts, and keep the *Scythians* from all new Invaſions. The *Tartars* likewiſe have been many times upon their March with very great Armies, but they have been always encountred and repulſed by the *Poles* and *Hungarians*; which has given them Occaſion frequently to boaſt, that were it not for their Arms and Reſiſtance, not only *Italy*, but the very *Roman* Church had been many times ſenſible of the Barbarity of the *Tartars*.

CHAP. IX.

What thoſe Occaſions are which do moſt commonly create War among Princes.

THE Occaſion of the War betwixt the *Samnites* and the *Romans*, who had been a long Time in League together, was the common Cauſe betwixt all Princes and Governments, and was either Fortuitous, or deſigned. The War betwixt the *Samnites* and the *Romans* was fortuitous; for when the *Samnites* made War upon the *Sidicins*, and afterwards upon the *Campani*, they intended not any Controverſy with the *Romans*; but the *Campani* being beaten, and betaking themſelves to the *Romans* for Relief, (contrary to the Expectation both of the *Romans* and *Samnites*) the *Romans* being in League with the *Samnites*, could not, without Violence to the ſaid League, give them Protection; upon which (having no other way to ſecure themſelves) the *Campani* ſubmitted to the *Romans*, and made themſelves their Subjects; and the *Romans*, how unjuſt ſoever they thought it before to aſſiſt the *Campani* (whilſt they were but Aſſociates) againſt the *Samnites*, their old Friends; yet now they were become their Subjects, and had incorporated with their State, the Caſe was altered, and they thought it very reaſonable, ſuppoſing, that if they ſhould refuſe to defend them, they ſhould diſcourage all others that had an Inclination to do the like, which would have been contrary to the great Deſign of the *Romans* to propagate their Glory and Empire. The ſame accidental Cauſe gave Occaſion to their firſt War with the *Carthaginians*, upon the *Romans* protecting the *Maſſinenſes* in *Sicily*. But their Second War with the *Carthaginians* was deſigned; for *Hanibal* the *Carthaginian* General fell upon the *Saguntins* in *Spain*, (who were in Alliance with the *Romans*) not ſo much out of Malice to the *Saguntins*, but that the *Romans* being provoked to their Defence, ſhould give the *Carthaginians* Occaſion to tranſport the War into *Italy*.

This way of provoking and hedging in a War, has been always practiſed among Potentates, eſpecially where they had any Faith or Reſpect for other People; for, that the Peace which has been a long Time betwixt them upon Articles of Alliance may ſeem firm and inviolate, they will not meddle with him againſt whom they do principally deſign, but turn their Arms upon ſome of his Friends and Confederates, that he is moſt particularly obliged to receive into his Protection, knowing, that if he appears in their Defence, they muſt have Occaſion to fight him; if he does not, but diſowns his Allies, they publiſh his Weakneſs and Infidelity to the World, and by either of thoſe ways they do their Buſineſs. This Example of the *Campani* is of ſingular Importance, as well to thoſe who would make War upon any Body, as thoſe that are in Diſtreſs; for when you are unable to defend your ſelf, and unwilling to fall into their Hands that invade you, the beſt and moſt ſafe way is to put your ſelf in Subjection to ſome Neighbouring Prince, as the *Campani* did then, and the *Florentines* afterward, when they found themſelves too weak to ſupport againſt the Power of *Caſtruccio* of *Lucca*; for finding that *Robert* King of *Naples* would not protect them as Friends, they threw themſelves into his Arms, to be defended as his Subjects.

CHAP. X.

That according to the common Opinion, Money is not the Sinews of War.

BEcauſe it is eaſy to begin War as a Man pleaſes, but harder to end it; every Prince before he undertakes an Enterprize, is obliged to conſider his own Strength well, and to regulate by it. But then he muſt be ſo wiſe too, as not to make a wrong Judgment; and that he will certainly do as often as he computes it by his Bags, by the Situation of his Towns, or the Affection of his Friends, rather than by his own proper Power and Arms. Money, and Towns, and Friends are all good, when in Conjunction with a ſtrong Army of your own, but without it they do nothing: Without Men, to what Purpoſe is either Money or Towns? and the Affection of your Subjects will hold no longer than you are able to defend them. There is no Mountain, no Lake, no Streight inacceſſible, where there is no Force to defend it. Vaſt Sums of Money are not only incapable of protecting you, but they expoſe you to more Danger; nor can any Thing be more falſe than that old and common Saying, *That Money is the Sinews of the War: Quintus Curtius* was the firſt Author of it in the War betwixt *Antipater* of *Macedon*, and the King of *Sparta*, where he tells us, that for want of Monies the *Spar-*

tans were forced to fight, and were beaten; whereas, could they have protracted but ſome few Days, they had had the News of *Alexander*'s Death, and got the Victory without Fighting a Blow; but wanting Money, and apprehending their Army would moulder, they were conſtrained to come to a Battel, and were defeated; which was the Occaſion of that Apophthegm, *That Money is the Sinews of War*: Which ſaying is now-a-days in every Prince's Mouth, but improperly, in my Judgment: For relying wholly upon that Maxim, they think their Treaſure is ſufficient to defend them, not conſidering that, if that would have done it, *Darius* would have conquered *Alexander*; the *Grecians* the *Romans*; Duke *Charles* the *Switzers*: And of late the Pope and *Florentines* united, would not have found it ſo hard to have maſtered *Franceſco Maria* (Nephew to *Julius* II.) at the Battel of *Urbin*. But theſe whom I have mentioned, preſuming more upon the Multitude of their Bags than the Goodneſs of their Men, were all beaten and overcome. *Græſus* the King of *Lydia* carrying *Solon* into his Treaſury, and ſhewing him an immenſe Quantity of Riches, ask'd him what he thought of his Power; to which *Solon* replied, I think it never the greater for this; for War is carried on, and Battels are fought more with Iron than Gold; and it might happen for ought he knew, that ſome body might come with his Iron and take it all from him. Again, when after the Death of *Alexander* the Great, a great Army of *Gauls* tranſplanted into *Greece*, (from whence they paſſed afterwards into *Aſia*) before they began their March, the *Gauls* ſent Ambaſſadors to the King of *Macedon* to treat an accord; which being almoſt concluded, to make the Ambaſſadors more pliable, the ſaid King ſhews them his Treaſure, which conſiſted of a vaſt Quantity of Silver and Gold, which the Ambaſſadors had no ſooner ſeen, but longing impatiently to be at it, they broke off the Treaty, and brought their Army into his Country; ſo that that very Thing in which he had repoſed his great Confidence and Security proved his Ruin and Deſtruction. The *Venetians* not long ſince had their Coffers well ſtor'd, yet they loſt all, and their Wealth was not able to defend them. So that I do affirm, 'tis not Money, (as the common Opinion will have it) but good Soldiers that is the Sinews of War: For Money cannot find good Soldiers; but good Soldiers will be ſure to find Money. Had not the *Romans* done more in their Wars with their Iron than their Gold, the Treaſure of the whole World would not have been ſufficient for them, conſidering their great Enterprizes Abroad, and their no leſs Difficulties at Home; but fighting with Iron, they had no want of Gold; for thoſe who were afraid of their Armies ſupplied them. And if the King of *Sparta* was forced to run the Hazard of a Battel, and was beaten for want of Monies, it was no more than what has happened to others, and might have happened to him upon other Occaſions: For it falls out many Times, that for want of Proviſions an Army is forc'd either to fight or to ſtarve; in which Caſe there is no General ſo weak but he will chuſe that which is moſt honourable, where Fortune has ſome Power to befriend him. Again, a General having News of Supplies that are coming to the Enemy, conſiders with himſelf whether he had not better engage them as they are, than attend till their Recruits come up, and then fight them with more Diſadvantage. Sometimes likewiſe it falls out, (as it did to *Asdrubal* in the Country of the *Piſeni*, when he was ſurprized by *Claudius Nero*, and the other *Roman* Conſul) that a General is either forc'd to fight or to fly; in which Caſe it is incomparably more ſafe to hazard all in a Battel, than to loſe all in a Flight. Which being ſo, we ſee there are many Cauſes that conſtrain a General to fight upon Diſadvantage; among which, if want of Money be one, there is no more Reaſon we ſhould therefore call that *the Sinews of War*, than any of the reſt which do the ſame Thing: So that Money is not ſo much the Sinews of War, as good Soldiers: 'tis true, Money is requiſite for the carrying on of a War, but not principally, and in the firſt Place; for good Soldiers have many Times been contented without it, though it is but ſeldom they want it; for 'tis as impoſſible for good Soldiers to want Money, as it is for Money alone to make good Soldiers. And this is clear by the Teſtimony of Hiſtorians in a thouſand places. *Pericles* perſuaded the *Athenians* to a War with all *Peloponneſus*, and aſſured them of Succeſs, upon Conſideration of their Induſtry and Riches; the *Athenians* undertook the War, and for ſome Time proſpered with their Induſtry, but at laſt it appeared that the Conduct and Diſcipline of the *Spartans* was too hard for the *Athenians* Induſtry and Treaſure. *Livy* decides this Controverſy the beſt of any Man, where, in his Compariſon of Commanders, enquiring what would have been the Event if *Alexander* the Great had turn'd his Arms againſt the *Romans*, he declares that in War there are three Things fundamentally neceſſary, good Soldiers, good Officers, and good Fortune; and then arguing whether *Alexander* or the *Romans* were more conſiderable in thoſe three Points, he concludes, without the leaſt mention of Money. It is not improbable but the *Campani*, (of whom we have ſpoken in the former Chapter) when they undertook the Aſſiſtance of the *Sidicins* againſt the *Samnites*, meaſured their Power more by their Money than their Men; from whence it happened that being

being defeated in Two Battels, they were forced to ſubmit, and become Tributary to the *Romans*.

CHAP. XI.

'Tis not Diſcretion to enter into ſtrict Amity with a Prince, whoſe Reputation is greater than his Strength.

THE *Sidicins* were in a great Error to deſire the Aſſiſtance of the *Campani* againſt the *Samnites*, as being (by reaſon of their Luxury) unable to aſſiſt them; but the Error of the *Capuans* was greater, in not knowing their own Weakneſs and Incapacity to defend them: Both their Errors *Livy* has very well deſcribed in theſe words, *Campani magis nomen in auxilium Sidicinorum, quam vires ad præſidium attulerunt*; *The* Capuans *made a great Noiſe, but they brought no Force to the Relief of the* Sidicins.

And here it is not unſeaſonable to conſider, that the Leagues which are made with Princes whoſe Diſtance is too great, or Power too little to relieve one, are more honourable than ſafe, and give more Reputation than Security to the Perſon that deſires them. This was experienced by the *Florentines* in the Year 1489, when the Pope and King of *Naples* invaded them; for they were at that Time confederate with the King of *France*, yet they had more Reputation than Aſſiſtance thereby. The ſame would happen likewiſe to ſuch of the *Italian* Princes as ſhould confederate with *Maximilian* the Emperor, and in Confidence of his Alliance, undertake any great Enterprize, becauſe that Alliance would be one of thoſe that bring more Reputation than Relief. So then, as it was a great Error in the *Capuans*, when they were unable to defend themſelves, to undertake the Protection of the *Sidicins*, ſo it is and will be the ſame in whoever follows their Example. It was the ſame caſe with the *Tarentini*, who would needs interpoſe betwixt the *Samnites* and the *Romans* to mediate a Peace: For when both *Romans* and *Samnites* were in the Field, and their Armies preparing for an Engagement, the *Tarentini* ſent Ambaſſadors to the Conſul, to let him know from the Senate of the *Tarentini*, that they would have Peace betwixt them and the *Samnites*, and that they were reſolved to take Arms againſt them which refuſed it. But the Conſul ſmiling at their Imprudence, in the Preſence of the ſaid Ambaſſadors, cauſed a Charge to be ſounded, and immediately marching his Army againſt the Enemy, he let them ſee by his Proceedings what Anſwer they deſerved.

Thus you have ſeen to what Errors Princes are ſubject, who undertake the Protection of other States; I ſhall now in the next Chapter remonſtrate what ways are moſt convenient for their own proper Defence.

CHAP. XII.

Upon an Apprehenſion of being invaded, whether it be better to make War, or expect it.

AMong wiſe Men, and very good Soldiers, I have heard it often diſputed, whether when Two Princes are of equal Strength, and one of them deſigning War (viſibly againſt the other) it be better for that Prince which is like to be invaded, to ſit ſtill, and expect him at Home; or to begin with him, and make the firſt Inroad himſelf? There are Arguments on both Sides; and they who think it beſt to be the Aggreſſor, and fall upon the Enemy firſt, may alledge the Counſel which *Cræſus* gave to *Cyrus*, when being with his Army upon the Frontiers of the *Maſſageti*, *Thomyris* Queen of that Country ſent to him to take his Choice whether ſhe ſhould fight him within her Country, or upon the Frontiers: If he deſired to advance, ſhe would ſtand ſtill and expect him; if he had rather fight where he was, ſhe would be with him immediately: When it came to be debated in Council, *Cræſus*, contrary to the Opinion of the reſt, was for marching to her; and the Reaſon he gave, was, becauſe if ſhe ſhould be beaten at any Diſtance, *Cyrus* would get but little of her Country, for ſhe would have Time to recruit; whereas, if ſhe were beaten at Home, he would be able to ſit ſo cloſe upon her Skirts, that ſhe being never capable of rallying, or bringing another Army into the Field, muſt of Neceſſity loſe her whole Kingdom. *Hanibal* gave the ſame Counſel to *Antiochus*, aſſuring him that if the *Romans* were any Way to be conquered,

conquered, it was by carrying the War into *Italy*, for by ſo doing he might have the Benefit of their Arms, their Wealth, and their Allies; but whilſt the War was Abroad, and *Italy* undiſturbed, he would leave the Man inexhauſtible Magazine that would ſupply them with what and whereſoever they had Occaſion; and at laſt *Hanibal* concluded that *Rome* was to be taken more eaſily than the Empire, and *Italy* it ſelf, than any of its Provinces. *Agathocles* being unable to reſiſt the *Carthaginians* at Home, invaded their Borders, and forc'd them to a Peace; and *Scipio* in the ſame Manner to remove the War out of *Italy*, tranſported it into *Africk*. Thoſe who are on the other Side do argue as ſtiffly, that there can be nothing more dangerous than to hazard an Army in an Enemies Country, at a great Diſtance from their own; and they produce the *Athenians* for an Inſtance, who, whilſt they kept themſelves upon the defenſive Part, and expected their Enemies at Home, were always victorious; but when they began to make War at a Diſtance, and ſend Armies into *Sicily*, they loſt their Liberty, and every Thing elſe. They produce alſo the Fable of *Antius* King of *Lybia*, who being invaded by *Hercules* the *Egyptian*, was invincible whilſt he kept himſelf within his own Borders, but being inveigled out by the Subtilty of his Enemy, he loſt both his Kingdom and Life; upon which Occaſion that Story was raiſed of *Antius*; that being born of the Earth, (as they pretended) ſo oft as he touch'd it, ſo oft he received new Vigor from his Mother, which *Hercules* perceiving, got him up in his Arms, cruſh'd him to death.

They produce likewiſe more modern Examples. Every body knows that *Ferrand* King of *Naples*, was eſteemed a wiſe Prince in his Time, and hearing Two Years before his Death, that King *Charles* the VIIIth of *France* was preparing to invade him, he let him alone; but falling ſick afterwards, as he lay upon his Death-Bed, he called his Son *Alphonſo* to him, and among other Things, charged him that he ſhould expect the King of *France* upon his Frontiers, and fight him there, but that by no means he ſhould be tempted beyond them; and it had been better for *Alphonſo* to have follow'd his Counſel, for neglecting it afterwards, and ſending an Army into *Romagna* he loſt both Army and Kingdom without ſtriking a Blow: But beſides theſe Arguments on both Sides, it is urged in behalf of the Aggreſſor, that he invades with more Confidence and Courage than his Adverſary receives him (which is a great Advantage and Enhancement to his Army;) That he brings many Inconveniences upon the Perſon whom he invades, to which he would not be liable, if he expected him at Home. For when the Enemies Country is waſted, and their Houſes plunder'd, his Subjects are not much to be truſted, nor can any more Taxes be laid upon them, without great Difficulty; by which means (as *Hanibal* ſaid) their Magazines will be ſpent, and their Fountain dried up, that was to ſupply them with all Proviſions for War. Beſides, if your Army be in the Enemies Country, it will be under a greater Neceſſity of Fighting, and by Conſequence will fight more deſperately than at Home. But to this it is anſwered on the other Side, That it is more for your Advantage to attend your Enemy in your own Country, than to ſeek him Abroad; for thereby you may furniſh your ſelf with Victuals and Ammunition, and all other Neceſſaries without any Inconvenience, and diſtreſs him by driving the Country. You may likewiſe with much more Eaſe incommode and fruſtrate his Deſigns, by your better Knowledge of the Country, and what Places are more proper to attack him in; as alſo you may attack him with your whole Force at once, or give him battel as you pleaſe, which out of your own Confines is not to be done: Moreover, if Fortune ſhould be adverſe, and it be your Chance to be beaten; more of your Men will eſcape where their Refuge is ſo near, and you will ſooner rally them again: In ſhort, if you fight at Home, you venture your whole Force, and not your whole Fortune; But if you fight Abroad, you venture your whole Fortune, with but Part of your Force: Others there have been, who with Deſign to weaken the Enemy, and fighting him afterwards with more Eaſe and Advantage, have ſuffered him quietly to march ſeveral Days Journey into their Country, and poſſeſs himſelf of ſeveral Towns; but whether they did well or not, I will not determine, only I think this Diſtinction is to be conſidered, whether my Country be ſtrong in Fortreſſes and Men, as the *Romans* were of old, and as the *Swizzers* at this Day; or whether it be weak and unfortified, as the Territory of the *Carthaginians* formerly, and *France* and *Italy* now. In this Caſe the Enemy is by all means to be kept at a Diſtance, becauſe your chief Strength lying in your Money, and not in your Men, whenever you are interrupted in raiſing or receiving of that, your Buſineſs is done; and nothing interrupts you ſo fatally, as an Enemy in your Country. And of this the *Carthaginians* may be an Example, who whilſt they were free at Home, were able by their Revenue and Taxes to wage War with the *Romans* themſelves; whereas afterwards when they were aſſaulted, they were not able to contend with *Agathocles*. The *Florentines*, when *Caſtruccio* of *Lucca* brought his Arms into their Country, could not ſupport againſt him, but were forced to put themſelves under

der the Dominion of the King of *Naples*, to procure his Protection; but *Castruccio* was no sooner dead, but they were agog again, and had the Confidence to invade the Duke of *Milan*, and to attempt the beating him out of that Province; so courageous were they in their foreign War, and so abject at Home. But when Countries are in a Posture of Defence, and People martial and well disciplin'd (as the *Romans* of old, and the *Swizzers* at this Day) 'tis better to keep off; for the nearer they are to their own Country, they are the harder to overcome, because they can raise more Force to defend themselves, than to invade another People. Nor does the Opinion of *Hanibal* affect me at all; for though he persuaded *Antiochus* to pass into *Italy*, he did it as a Thing that would have been more for his own and the *Carthaginian* than for *Antiochus* his Advantage; for had the *Romans* received those Three great Defeats which they received of *Hanibal* in *Italy*, in the same Space of Time, in *France*, or any where else, they had been ruined irrecoverably, for they could neither have rallied, nor recruited so soon. I do not remember any foreign Expedition by the *Romans* for the Conquest of any Province, in which their Army exceeded the Number of 50000. But upon the Invasion of the *Gauls*, after the first *Punick* War, they brought 118000 Men into the Field for their Defence: Nor could they beat them afterwards in *Lombardy*, as they did at first in *Tuscany*, because it was more remote, and they could not fight them with so much Convenience, nor with so many Men. The *Cimbri* repulsed the *Romans* in *Germany*, but following them into *Italy*, they were defeated, and driven out again themselves; and the reason was, because the *Romans* could bring more Forces against them: The *Swizzers* may without much Difficulty be over-powered Abroad, because they seldom march above 30 or 40000 strong; but to attack and beat them at Home, is much more difficult, where they can bring into the Field 100000 and more. I conclude therefore, that that Prince whose People are in a Posture and provided for War, does wisely if he expects a potent and dangerous Enemy at Home, rather than to invade him in his own Country: But that Prince whose Country is ill provided, and whose Subjects are ill disciplined, does better if he keeps the War as far off as he can: And by so doing, each of them (in his several Degree) will defend himself best.

CHAP. XIII.

That from mean to great Fortune People rise rather by Fraud than by Force.

I Have found it always true, that Men do seldom or never advance themselves from a small Beginning to any great Height, but by Fraud, or by Force (unless they come by it by Donation, or Right of Inheritance). I do not think any Instance is to be found where Force alone brought any Man to that Grandeur, but Fraud and Artifice have done it may Times, as is clear in the Lives of *Philip* of *Macedon*, *Agathocles* the *Sicilian*, and several others, who from mean and inconsiderable Extraction came at length to be Kings. *Xenophon* in his History of *Cyrus*, insinuates the Necessity of Fraud when he represents (in his first Expedition against the King of *Armenia*) how all *Cyrus* his Actions and Negotiations were full of Fallacy and Deceit, and that it was that Way he conquered his Kingdom, and not by Bravery and Force, by which he implies, that no Prince can do any great Matters without that Art of Dissembling. Besides, he represents him juggling and playing of Tricks with his own Uncle by the Mother-side, the King of the *Medes*, and shews that without that Excellence, he had never been King; and indeed I am of Opinion, that from a mean and base Fortune never any Man came to be very great by down-right Generosity and Force; but by Fraud alone there have been many, as particularly *John Galeazzo*, who by that alone wrested the Government of *Lombardy* out of the Hands of *Messer Bernardo* his Uncle. And the same Courses which Princes are forced to in the Beginning of their Authority, the same Courses are taken by Commonwealths at first, till they be settled in their Government, and have Force sufficient to defend themselves. *Rome* (which either by Change or Election took all Ways to make it self great) was not without this; and what greater Cunning or Artifice could it use in the Beginning of its Greatness, than what it did take, and is mentioned before? For by their fair Carriage and Insinuation, they got several Cities into Consideration, and under that Name they subjected them insensibly; and made them their Slaves. The *Latins*, and other neighbouring People, were of this Sort, by whose Arms and Alliance, the *Romans* having conquered their Enemies, they were rendered so powerful, that they began to handle them now, not as Associates, but Subjects; nor could the *Latins*

be convinced of their Servitude, till they saw the *Samnites* Twice overthrown, and forced to accept of their Conditions. Which Victories, though they gain'd the *Romans* great Reputation Abroad, among remote Princes, who understood more of the Name, than the Power of the *Romans*, yet they created Envy and Jealousy among those who were nearer and more sensible of their Greatness; and this Jealousy and Apprehension was so great, that not only the *Latins*, but the Colonies in *Latium* and *Campagnia* (which had been sent thither not long before) confederated against the *Romans*, and resolved to make War upon them. And this War was commenced in the same Manner (as I have said before) most other Wars are commenced. Not by downright Denunciation of War against the *Romans*, but by defending the *Sidicins* against the *Samnites*, who made War by Allowance from the *Romans*. Nor was there any other Reason of their Conspiracy, but because the Confederates began to smell out their Cunning, and to be sensible that under that false Title of Allies, they were in great Danger of being made Slaves, which *Annius Selinus* (a *Latin Prætor*) in an Oration to the Council, expressed very properly in these Words, *Nam si etiam nunc sub umbra fœderis æqui, servitutem pati possumus, quid obest quin proditis* Sidicinis, *non* Romanorum *solum, sed* Samnitium *dictis pareamus? For if even now under the Shadow of an equal Confederacy, we can endure Servitude: What hinders but that we betray the* Sidicins, *and put our Necks under the Feet not only of the* Romans, *but the* Samnites. Which Things being so, it is manifest the *Romans* wanted not at the beginning of their Rise, that Dexterity of cheating that is so necessary to all People that are ambitious of raising themselves to a great Height, from an inconsiderable Beginning; which Artifice is always the less scandalous, by how much he that does practise it, understands better how to disguise it by some honourable Pretence, as the *Romans* did very well.

CHAP. XIV.

Many People are mistaken, who expect with Meekness and Humility to work upon the Proud.

IT falls out many Times that Humility and Modesty towards such as have any Pique or Prejudice to you, is so far from doing Good, that it does a great deal of Mischief; and of this the Debate and Consultation of the *Romans* about the Preservation of their Peace with the *Latins*, is an Example, from whom they were in Expectation of a War. For the *Samnites* complaining to the *Romans* that the *Latins* had invaded them, the *Romans* (unwilling to exasperate them more, who were already too prone to be Quarrelling) return'd this Answer, that by their League with them, the *Latins* were not tied up from making War as they pleas'd. The *Latins* were so far from being satisfied by the Mildness of their Answer, that it made them more Insolent; insomuch that not long after they profess'd themselves their Enemies, as appears by that Speech of the aforesaid *Annius* in the Council aforesaid, where he tells the *Latins*, *Tentâstis patientiam negando militem: Quis dubitat exarsisse eos? Pertulerunt tamen hunc dolorem. Exercitus nos parare adversus* Samnites, *fœderatos suos audiêrunt, nec moverunt se ab urbe. Unde hæc illis tanta modestia, nisi a conscientia virium, & nostrarum, & suarum. You tried their Patience before, in refusing them Supplies; who doubts but they were nettled? Yet they swallow'd it: They had Notice of our Preparations against the* Samnites *their Confederates, and stirred not in their Defence. Whence comes this mighty Modesty, and good Nature? From nothing but a Sense of the Disparity betwixt our Strength, and their own.* From hence it is clear, the Patience and Civility of the *Romans* augmented the Arrogance of the *Latins*: And that it is the Interest of all Princes to be very cautious of condescending from their Dignity, or stooping willingly to any Thing that may give the Enemy an Opinion of his Weakness or Pusillanimity; for it is better to lose any Thing bravely and by open War, than to part with it poorly in hopes to prevent it; and it many times happens that those who part so easily with their Lands or Monies to prevent a War, do rather excite than satisfy the Enemy, whose Nature commonly is such, that upon the Discovery of their Impotence or Fear, his Desires increase, and new Things are successively demanded; nor will your Friends be so ready to assist, if they find you timorous and irresolute. But if as soon as you have Notice of the Designs or Insolence of the Enemy, you immediately prepare to correct him, he will not invade you so boldly, though he be stronger than you, and then your Friends will come in more freely to your Assistance, who, had you abandoned your self, would certainly have forsaken you. This is intended only where you have but one Enemy; where you have more, the best way is to give

and promiſe what you think fit, that if poſſible, you may draw off ſome or other of them from their Confederacy, and ſo break their League by dividing them.

CHAP. XV.

Weak States are irreſolute and uncertain in their Councils, and ſlow Councils are moſt commonly pernicious.

FROM theſe Occaſions and Beginnings of the War betwixt the *Latins* and the *Romans* we may obſerve, that in all Conſultations, it is beſt to come immediately to the Point in Queſtion, and bring Things to a Reſult, without too tedious an Heſitation and Suſpence. And this we may learn from the Council which the ſaid *Latins* took at that Time, when their War with the *Romans* was in Debate. For the *Romans* ſuſpecting the Defection of the *Latins*, for their better Information, and that they might reduce them (if poſſible) without Blows, ſent to them to ſend over Eight of their Principal Citizens to *Rome*, to conſult with them about keeping of the Peace. The *Latins* being conſcious to themſelves of many Things which they had acted againſt the Pleaſure of the *Romans*, call'd a Council to conſider of the Perſons that were to go, and what their Commiſſioners ſhould ſay when they came there. The Council being divided, one Man propoſing one Thing, and another Man another, *Annius* the *Prætor* had this Expreſſion, *Ad ſummam rerum noſtrarum pertinere arbitror, ut cogitetis magis, quid agendum nobis, quam quid loquendum ſit, facile erit explicatis Conſiliis, accommodare rebus verba. I conceive it more pertinent to our Buſineſs, that you conſider rather what is to be done, than what is to be ſaid; for when you are come to a Reſolution, it will be no hard Matter to accommodate your Words.* Which Saying was doubtleſly true, and ought to be regarded by all Princes and Commonwealths. For whilſt we are ambiguous, and uncertain what is to be done, we cannot tell how to adapt and accommodate our Language; but when we are come to a Reſolution, and have decreed what is to be done, it is not ſo difficult. I have inſerted this Paſſage the more willingly, becauſe I my ſelf have known this Irreſolution do much Miſchief, to the Detriment and Diſhonour of our State; and it is a Fault peculiar to all weak and improvident Princes and Governments, to be ſlow and tedious, as well as uncertain in their Councils, which is as dangerous as the other, eſpecially when the Debate is about the Relief or Protection of a Friend; for your Slowneſs does no Good to him, and expoſes your ſelf. Theſe uncertain or tedious Reſolutions proceed either from want of Courage and Force, or from the Croſsneſs and Malevolence of the Counſellors, who carried away by ſome private Paſſion of their own, will rather ruin the State, than not accompliſh their Revenge; ſo that inſtead of expediting and puſhing Things to a Concluſion, they impede and obſtruct whatever is before them. For your good Citizens (though the Vogue of the People runs the more dangerous Way) will never hinder the coming to a Reſult, eſpecially in Things that will not diſpenſe with much Time. *Girolamo*, a Tyrant in *Syracuſe*, being Dead, and the War betwixt the *Romans* and *Carthaginians* very hot, a Council was called by the *Syracuſians*, and it was debated which Side they ſhould take. The Queſtion was canvaſs'd with ſuch Order by both Parties, that it remained *in ambiguo*, and nothing was reſolved; till at length *Appolonides* (one of the Principal in that City) in a grave and prudent Oration remonſtrated, that neither they were to be blamed who had ſpoken for the *Romans*, nor they who adhered to the *Carthaginians*, but the Length and Uncertainty of their Debate; for that Irreſolution would be the Occaſion of certain Ruin; but if they came to a Concluſion, with which Side ſoever they join'd, they might hope for ſome Good. *Titus Livius* could not better have diſplayed the Danger of this Kind of Suſpence, than in this Caſe of the *Latins*; whoſe Aſſiſtance againſt the *Romans* being deſired by the *Lavinians*, they were ſo long in their Debate, that when at laſt they came to a Reſolution, their Supplies were ſcarce gone out of their Gates, before they had News that their Confederates were beaten. Whereupon *Milonius* the *Prætor* ſaid very wittily, This little Ground which we have marched, will coſt us very dear to the *Romans*; and this happened to them for the tediouſneſs of their Councils; for they ſhould either have aſſiſted, or denied them out of hand; had they denied them, the *Romans* had not been diſguſted; had they complied, they might have ſupported their Aſſociates, and have kept them from being ruined; but doing neither, they deſtroyed their Friends, and hazarded themſelves. Had this Precept of bringing Things to a ſpeedy Reſolution been followed by the *Florentines*, they had prevented many Miſchiefs and Damages which they met withal upon the coming

of

of *Lewis* XII into *Italy* againſt the Duke of *Milan*; for the ſaid King *Lewis* having reſolved upon the ſaid Expedition, he propoſed to their Ambaſſadors in his Court, that the *Florentines* ſhould not interpoſe or concern themſelves in the Quarrel; upon which Terms, he would receive them into his Protection, and defend them from any Harm; the Ambaſſadors agreed, and a Month's Time was allowed for Ratification from the City. But the Ratification was deferred (by the Imprudence of ſome Perſons who favoured the Duke of *Milan*'s Intereſt) till the *French* had almoſt conquered all; and being offered then, it was refuſed by the King of *France*, (who knew well enough that the *Florentines* were then forced to what they did; and deſired his Amity more out of Fear, than Affection;) which Piece of Delay coſt the *Florentines* a good round Sum of Money, and might well have been their Ruin; as juſt ſuch an Accident was afterward. And this Indiſcretion of theirs was the greater, becauſe they were no way ſerviceable to the Duke of *Milan*; who, if he had prevailed, would doubtleſs have ſhown himſelf a greater Enemy to them, than the King of *France*. Of this Slowneſs, and Uncertainty of Councils, I have ſpoken before, but new Occaſion preſenting it ſelf, I have Diſcourſed of it again, as a Thing worthy the Obſervation of all Commonwealths, eſpecially like ours.

CHAP. XVI.

How much the Soldiers of our Times do differ from the Diſcipline of the Ancients.

THE Battel which the *Romans* fought with the *Latins*, in the Conſulſhips of *Manlius Torquatus*, and *Decius*, was the greateſt and moſt important that ever they had in any War, with any other Nation. For as the *Latins* loſt all by loſing the Victory, and the *Romans* got the Dominion of them: So the *Romans*, had they loſt the Battel, muſt have loſt their Liberty with it, and turn'd Subjects to the *Latins*. *Livy* tells us the ſame Thing; for (ſays he) the *Latin* Army was in nothing inferior to the *Romans*; their Courage the ſame, their Conſtancy the ſame, and their Numbers the ſame; if the *Romans* had any Advantage, it was in their Generals, which indeed were better than the *Latins*; and it is expreſſed by ſeveral, both *Latins* and *Romans*, who have left an Account of that Battel to Poſterity, that wherever *Manlius* had been, that Side would certainly have conquered. In this Battel there were Two Things very exemplary and remarkable: One of the Conſuls, to keep his Soldiers firm in their Obedience, and preſerve their Military Diſcipline, cauſed his own Son to be ſlain for tranſgreſſing his Orders, though he gain'd the Victory by the Means. The other devoted himſelf freely to Death for the good of his Country; for the Diſpute was like to be very hard, fighting againſt the *Latins*, who (as *Livy* tells us) had the ſame Language, the ſame Cuſtoms, the ſame Arms, the ſame Diſcipline with the *Romans*; the Soldiers, the Captains, the Tribunes both in one Army and the other, had been Comrades, and ſerved formerly together, not only in the ſame Army, or Gariſon, but in the ſame Company and Band. It was neceſſary therefore, being equal in their Numbers, and equal in their Courage, that ſomething extraordinary ſhould be done, that might render the Soldiers fiercer, and more obſtinate to overcome; upon which Fierceneſs and Obſtinacy the whole hopes of the Victory did depend; for whilſt there is any ſuch in the Breaſts of the Soldiers, they never think of running, but preſs ſtill on for Victory and Prize; and becauſe there was more of this Conſtancy and Fortitude in the Breaſts of the *Romans*, than in the Breaſts of the *Latins*, partly the Deſtiny, and partly the Bravery of the Conſuls, effected that for the good Succeſs of their Army, and the Preſervation of their Diſcipline, *Torquatus* killed his Son, and *Decius* himſelf. *Titus Livius*, in his Deſcription of the Equality of their Force, gives us an exact Account of the Orders which they obſerved in their Armies and Fights; and he has done it ſo largely, I need not repeat it all, but ſhall only ſelect what I think moſt particularly remarkable: and what, if obſerved by the Generals of our Days, might have prevented very great Diſorders. I ſay then, that according to *Livy*'s Deſcription, their Armies were divided into Three principal *Schieri* or Squadrons. The firſt conſiſted of their *Haſtati*, which were moſt of them young Men in the flower of their Age, digeſted into *Manipuli* or ſmall Parties, and diſpoſed at a certain Diſtance, with Pikes or Darts in their Hands, from whence they were called *Haſtati*. The Second Squadron was as numerous as the Firſt, and divided into as many *Manipuli*, but their Diſtance was ſomething greater, and it conſiſted of choice Men, from whence they were called *Principes*. The Third and laſt Squadron was the biggeſt of the Three, and had almoſt as many in it as both the other: And

this was made up of the ancienteſt and moſt experienced Soldiers, whom they called *Triarii*. They too had their certain Diſtances, but ſomething greater than in either of the other. In their Battels, the *Haſtati* were in the Van, the *Principes* behind them, and the *Triarii* in the Rear. To every one of theſe Squadrons there was a Body of Horſe, which being drawn up in Two Diviſions, and diſpoſed one of the Right, and the other on the Leſt Hand of the Army, repreſented Two Wings, and were therefore called *Ala*. Theſe Three Squadrons preceded and followed one another exactly, but the *Haſtati* in the firſt Squadron were drawn up cloſer, that, being to receive the firſt *impetus* of the Enemy, they might endure it the better. The *Principes* that followed them was not in ſuch cloſe Order, but were diſpoſed at more Diſtance, to the End that if the *Haſtati* ſhould be forced to retire, they might be received into that Squadron without Diſorder or Confuſion. But the *Triarij* were drawn up with greater Spaces and Intervals than both the other; and for the ſame Reaſon, that if they were repulſed, they might fall back among them, and make an entire Body together. Being drawn up in this Order, the *Haſtati* began the Fight; if they were over-powered by the Enemy, and forced to give Ground, they fall back to the *Principes*, and uniting with them, renewed the Fight in one Body; if they were both of them too weak, and unable to bear up againſt the Enemy, they retreated gradually into the Spaces betwixt the *Triarij*, and then all the Three Squadrons being joined, the whole Army charged in a Body, and if they were beaten, farewel, there was no more Reſerves, but the Battel was loſt; and becauſe whenever the *Triarii* was engaged, the whole Army was in Danger, this Proverb grew very frequent, *Res reducta eſt ad Triarios. Things are now at the Extremity.* The Generals of our Times, having laid aſide all the old Diſcipline of the *Romans*, have neglected this among the reſt, to their no little Prejudice. For he that draws up his Army in a Poſture with Two ſuch Reſerves, muſt be beaten Three Times before he can be utterly defeated; whereas once beating will do the Enemies Buſineſs. But he that truſts only to the firſt Shock (as the Chriſtian Armies do generally now) may eaſily be broken; the leaſt Diſorder, or Relaxation of Courage, putting all to the Rout. And that which is the Reaſon why our Armies are ſo quickly defeated, is, becauſe they have loſt the old way of falling back one body into another, and rallying Three Times. For whoever draws up his Army according to Modern Cuſtom, does it with one of theſe Two Inconveniences, he either draws up his ſeveral Squadrons Shoulder to Shoulder, and by enlarging his Ranks, makes his Files very thin (which weakens his Army very much, by leaving the Diſtance ſo ſmall betwixt the Front and the Rear) or elſe he draws them up deeper, according to the manner of the *Romans*; but then their Files are ſo cloſe, that if the Front be beaten (there being no Spaces in the Battel to receive them) they entangle and confound one another; ſo as the Front being repulſed, falls foul upon the middle Squadron, and both of them upon the Third, whereby they are embaraſſed, and hindred from advancing or receiving the Enemy in any Order, and the whole Battel is loſt. The *Spaniſh* and *French* Armies at the Battel of *Ravenna* (where *Monſieur de Foix*, the *French* General, was ſlain) fought very well, being drawn up according to the Mode of our Times, with their Fronts ſo extended, that their Battalions were much more in Wideneſs than Depth, and this was done in reſpect of the Ground, which in that Place was very Spacious and Large; for being ſenſible that Retreats are more difficult where the Files are too deep, they drew them up large in the Front, to prevent it as much as poſſible: But when they are ſtraightned for Room, they are forced to be contented, and draw up as well as they can, for there is no Remedy. They are ſubject likewiſe to the ſame Diſorders in their Marches and Incurſions into the Enemies Country, whether to Forage, or upon ſome other Deſign. In the War betwixt the *Florentines* and *Piſans* (upon their Rebellion after the King of *France*'s Paſſage into *Italy*) coming to a Battel at *Santo Regolo*, the *Florentines* were defeated by their own Horſe, which being drawn up in the Front of the Army, and charged ſmartly by the Enemy, were put into Diſorder, and forced to fall foul upon their Foot, which broke the whole Army. And I have been many Times aſſured by *Monſieur Griacus de Burgo* (an old Officer of Foot in the *Florentine* Army) that their Foot had not fled that Day, but for the Diſorder of their own Horſe. The *Switzers* (the beſt Soldiers of our Times) when they are drawn up with the *French*, will be ſure to be drawn up in the Flanks, that if their Horſe ſhould be beaten, they may not be driven in among them. And though theſe Things ſeem eaſy to be underſtood, and more eaſy to practiſe, yet there has not been one of our late Generals that has found the way of imitating this old Method, or correcting the New; for though they alſo have their Armies divided into Three Squadrons, which they call the Van-guard, the Body, and the Rear; yet they uſe them only in their Marches, and Incampments; but when they come to a Battel, it is ſeldom ſeen but they are drawn up as aboveſaid, and all together run

the Risk of one Shock, and no more. And becauſe ſome People to excuſe their Ignorance, pretend the Execution of the Cannon will not ſuffer them to make uſe of the old Order, I ſhall examine in the next Chapter whether that can be a juſt Impediment or not.

CHAP. XVII.

How the Armies of our Times are to judge of Artillery, and whether the general Opinion of it be true.

WHen I conſider with my ſelf how many Field Battels were fought by the *Romans* in ſeveral Times, it falls into my Thoughts to examine what many People have believed, that had there been great Guns in thoſe Days, as there are now, the *Romans* could never have over-run Provinces, nor made them triburary ſo eaſily, nor have done ſo many great Things as they did; for by reaſon of the Fire-Arms, Granadoes, and ſuch Kind of Engines, People are ſooner terrified, and cannot ſhew their Valour ſo freely as heretofore; to which it is added, that Armies come with more Difficulty to a Battel, and that their Orders and Ranks are not ſo eaſily kept, ſo that in Time the whole Buſineſs of War will be diſpatched by the Cannon. Not thinking it improper to enquire into theſe Opinions; to examine whether Artillery have added or ſubſtracted from the Strength of our Armies, and taken away, or given more Occaſion to our Captains of doing brave Things; I ſhall begin with their firſt Opinion, that the *Romans* would not have made thoſe vaſt Conqueſts, had there been Artillery in thoſe Days: In anſwer, I ſay, that War is Twofold, Defenſive or Offenſive; and it is firſt to be conſidered, in which of theſe Two Wars it does moſt Miſchief or Good; and though it may be ſaid it does great Miſchief in both, yet I am of Opinion, it is much more prejudicial to him that is upon the defenſive, than him that is upon the offenſive Part. The reaſon is, becauſe he who defends himſelf, is either blocked up in ſome Town, or ſtraightned in his Camp: If in a Town, it is either ſmall (like your Citadels) or large: In the firſt Caſe the Beſieged is loſt; for the Force of thoſe Guns is ſuch, that no Wall is ſo thick, but in a few Days they will beat it down: So that if he has no Retreat, nor Time to ſtop up the Breaches, or throw up new Works within, the Enemy enters Pell-mell at the Breach, and the Cannon of the Town does the Gariſon very little good; for this is a Maxim, where People can fall on in a Crowd, and run head-long in their Fury to a Storm, great Guns do never repel them. Wherefore the fierce Aſſaults of the *Tramontani* are not ſo eaſily ſuſtained, as the Attacks of the *Italians*, who fall not on with that Fury and Impatience as the other, but march up cooly and quietly to the Battel, and do rather skirmiſh than ſtorm. Thoſe who enter a Breach in this Gravity and State are ſure to go to pot, for the Artillery does certain Execution upon them: But thoſe who fall on briskly, and crowd one another into the Breach (if there be no new Works or Retrenchments thrown up within) enter as they pleaſe without any great Prejudice by the Cannon; for though ſome of them may be killed, yet they cannot be ſo many as to hinder the taking of the Town. That this is true, we find by many Inſtances in *Italy*, and among the reſt in the Siege of *Breſcia*, the Town revolted to the *Venetians*, only the Caſtle ſtood firm for the *French*. That the Town might receive no Prejudice from the Caſtle, the *Venetians* fortified the great Street that comes down from the Caſtle with great Guns in the Front, Flanks, and every where, ſo that they thought themſelves ſecure not only from Sallies within, but from Relief without. But Monſieur *de Foix* made no Reckoning of them; for marching thither with a Body of Horſe, he alighted, and charging boldly through the ſaid Street, relieved the Caſtle, without any conſiderable Loſs. So that he who is ſhut up in a ſmall Place, his Walls battered down, and has nothing left but his Artillery to defend him, is in very great Danger, and can hardly eſcape: If the Place you defend be a large Town, where you have Room enough to retire, and throw up new Works; yet your Diſadvantage is great, and the Enemies great Guns ſhall do more Miſchief upon you, than yours upon him. For firſt you muſt be forced to advance your Cannon, and raiſe them to ſome higher Place; for whilſt they are level with the Ground, every blind or ſmall Work that the Enemy throws up, is ſufficient to ſecure him, and being forced to plant them higher, either upon the Top of ſome Wall or Church, or Mount (erected on Purpoſe,) you fall under Two Inconveniences; One is, that you cannot bring ſuch large Guns upon thoſe Places, as he can bring without, becauſe in thoſe little Places, great Guns are not to be managed; The other is, that if you could get them up, they cannot be ſo

eaſily

eaſily ſecur'd, becauſe they cannot have the Convenience of Works or Baskets to defend them as the Enemy has whoſe Guns are planted as he pleaſes. So that it is almoſt impoſſible for him that is beſieged, to keep his Cannon long upon a high Place, without being diſmounted, if the Enemy without has any Store of Artillery; and to keep them upon the Ground, is to have little or no Uſe of them, as I ſaid before: So that when all is done, the beſt Way to defend a Town is as they did of old, by their ſmall Shot, and the Courage of the Soldier: And yet though ſmall Shot be of ſome Uſe to the Beſieged, it cannot countervail the Damage which they receive from the Enemies great Shot, for by them their Walls are battered, and beaten down into the Ditches, ſo that when the Enemy comes to ſtorm (which he may do with more Eaſe when the Ditches are filled up with the Ruins of the Walls) the Beſieged are under great Diſadvantage. Wherefore, as I ſaid before, thoſe Guns are more beneficial to the Beſieger than the Beſieged. And if you do not defend your ſelf either in a great Town or a little, but ſhall chuſe rather ſome ſtrong and convenient Place, where you may encamp and entrench, ſo as not to be forced to an Engagement, but with Advantage to your ſelf; I ſay that in this Caſe you have no better Way now, than the Ancients had of old, and that many Times your great Guns are more inconvenient than otherwiſe; for if the Enemy falls upon your Back, with any Advantage of Ground, as may eaſily happen; that is, if he gains by Accident any Eminence that commands your Camp, or ſurprizes you before your Entrenchments are finiſhed, he quickly diſlodges you, and compels you to fight. This was the Caſe with the *Spaniards* before the Battel of *Ravenna*, who entrenched upon the River *Roncus*, but made their Trenches too low, whereupon the *French* having the Advantage of the Ground, with their great Guns play'd ſo furiouſly over them into their Camp, that the *Spaniards* were glad to diſlodge, and forced afterwards to give them Battel. And if you ſhall chuſe ſuch a Place to entrench in, as commands the whole Country, and fortify it ſo well, that the Enemy dares not attack you, yet the Enemy will have the ſame Ways of provoking and diſlodging you, as were practiſed of old; that is, by making Inroads and plundring your Country; by infeſting your Roads, and intercepting your Convoys, and a Thouſand other Diſtreſſes and Incommodities which he will put upon you, againſt which your Artillery will give but little Relief. So that conſidering what has been ſaid, and that the *Roman* Wars were moſt commonly offenſive; they would have had Advantage by them, and in Probability have augmented their Conqueſts, had there been any Artillery in their Times. As to the ſecond Allegation, that by reaſon of thoſe great Guns, Men could not ſhew their Valour ſo much as in ancient Times; I anſwer, it is true, and the Danger is greater when they come to place their Ladders, and make an Aſſault dully and heavily, and rather one by one than in a Body; their Officers being in the ſame Hazard, and liable to be killed at greater Diſtance, nor can the ſtrongeſt Guards nor choiceſt Men about them ſecure them; yet for all theſe great Dangers no memorable Inſtance can be produced of any great Damage that ever was received. For Towns are not taken uſually by Storm or Aſſault, but by Way of Leaguer as formerly; and in thoſe that are taken by Storm, the Danger is not much greater than it was then; for even in thoſe Times, whoever undertook the Defence of a Town, had his Machines and Inſtruments of War, which though not diſcharged with ſuch Force did the ſame Execution. And as to the Reaching of Commanders at a Diſtance, and killing them in the Midſt of their Reſerves, there have been fewer of them ſlain (ſince great Guns came up) in Twenty Four Years Wars in *Italy*, than there was in any Ten Years in the Time of the *Romans*; for unleſs it were Count *Lodovic della Mirandola* (who was killed in *Ferrara*, when the *Venetians* invaded that State) and the Duke of *Nemours* who was killed at *Cirignuola*, there has not been one great Officer ſlain; for Monſieur *de Foix* at *Ravenna* died by the Sword. So that if Men ſhew themſelves not ſo couragious as formerly, it is from the Weakneſs and ill Order of their Armies rather than the Artillery. And whereas it is ſaid, that theſe great Guns are an Impediment to their Fighting, and that the Deciſion of Battels will by Degrees be left to the Artillery; I reply, That that Opinion is clearly a Miſtake, and has been judged ſo by all thoſe who are for the old Way of Diſcipline. For he that would have his Soldiers good muſt exerciſe them well, and with frequent Alarms (true or falſe, 'tis no Matter) accuſtom them to the Enemy, bring them to handy-ſtrokes, and as it were to take one another by the Beards; by which means they come to a greater Dexterity in handling their Weapons, and grappling with the Enemy; and for the ſame Reaſon, the Foot are rather to be relied upon than the Horſe; for if your Foot be nimble and good, you may fall with more Security upon an Enemy perplexed and embaraſſed with a Train of Artillery, than you could of old when they had their Elephants, their Chariots with Scythes, and ſuch other Devices. And if the *Romans* could find out Remedies daily againſt ſuch daily Inventions, no queſtion but they would have found out ſome or other againſt great Guns; and ſo much

the more eaſily, becauſe the Danger of the Guns is ſooner over, than the Danger of the other: For the Execution which is done by the Cannon, is done before the Engagement begins; the Execution by the Chariots and Elephants, during the whole Fight; beſides the Cannon is eaſily avoided by the Infantry, either by poſting themſelves behind ſome Bank, or clapping down upon their Bellies; and yet of this ſo eaſy and obvious an Evaſion, Experience tells us there is ſeldom any Neceſſity; for it is a hard Matter to point your great Guns ſo exactly, but that either they will be mounted too high and ſhoot over you, or too low, and never come at you: And when the Battel is join'd, 'tis as clear as the Day, that neither great nor ſmall Shot is of any Advantage; for if the Artillery be placed before the Army, 'tis odds but it is taken; if behind, the Execution it does is upon themſelves; and on either Side it can gaul you but little before you get to it, and either cloy or ſecure it; and if an Example be required, we have one ready in the *Switzers*, who at *Navarre* in the Year 1513. without Horſe or Artillery, or any ſuch Thing, fell upon the *French* Camp, and overcame them, though they were as ſtrong as Trenches and Artillery could make them: And another Reaſon is (beſides what has been urged before) becauſe Artillery ought to be guarded (if you would have it to do ſervice) with Walls or Ramparts, or ſome ſuch Thing as may ſecure it from being taken, otherwiſe it will be of no Uſe, as when in Field Fights, it has nothing to defend it, but the Bodies of Men. In the Flanks they are of no Uſe, more than the old *Roman* Engines in thoſe Days, who were placed out of their Squadrons, that they might be managed with more Dexterity, and (whenever overlaid by the Horſe, or any Thing elſe) they were received into their Legions: And if there be any Way of making Advantage of Artillery in a Field-Fight, it is this: He that uſes it otherwiſe, underſtands not very well, and puts his Confidence in that which may eaſily deceive him. The *Turk* indeed by the Help of his great Guns, obtained Two or Three Victories againſt the *Sophy* and the *Soldan*; but it proceeded more from the Novelty of the Noiſe, and the Terror it brought upon their Horſe, than any great Execution they did. I conclude therefore, that Artillery may be good in an Army that is ſtout; but where they are uſed in an Army that is raw and inexperienced, they are of little Advantage, if the Enemy be either courageous or ſtrong.

CHAP. XVIII.

How by the Authority of the Romans, *and the univerſal Diſcipline of the Ancients, the Foot are more ſerviceable than the Horſe.*

BY many Arguments and Examples it may be proved, that the *Romans* in their Military Exploits had greater Eſtimation for their Infantry than their Horſe; and how all their principal Deſigns were executed by their Foot: This appeared in their Wars with the *Latins*, when the *Roman* Army being over-powered, and giving Ground in that great Battel near the Lake of *Regillum*, the *Roman* General cauſed his Cavalry to diſmount, and fight on Foot, and by ſo doing they recovered their Ground, and got the Victory; by which it is manifeſt the *Romans* thought them more ſerviceable on Foot than on Horſe-back, and in that Poſture placed more Confidence in them. The ſame Thing they practiſed in many other Fights, and always with good Succeſs: Nor can the Raillery of *Hanibal* be objected againſt this, who when News was brought him at the Battel of *Cannæ*, that the Conſuls had cauſed all their Horſe to diſmount, reſolving to fight it out on Foot, cried out in Deriſion, *Quam mallem vinctos mihi traderent Equites. They might as well have bound them, and delivered them to me.* Which Expreſſion though coming out of the Mouth of an Excellent Perſon, yet his ſingle Authority is not to be put in the Balance againſt the Judgment of the whole *Roman* Commonwealth, and the Experience of ſo many brave Captains as had been educated under it; and if it were, there are Reaſons to defend it: The Foot can get into ſeveral Places, where the Horſe cannot get: The Foot keep their Ranks better than the Horſe; and in any Diſorder are ſooner rallied, and in a Poſture again; whereas the Horſe are more unmanageable, and when once out of Order, with great Difficulty to be rallied. Beſides, (as it is among Men) ſo it is among Horſes, ſome are high-ſpirited and courageous, others are untoward and dull; and it frequently happens, that a mettled Horſe has a cowardly Rider, or a mettled Rider a dull Horſe; be it which it will, the Diſparity is inconvenient. A Body of Foot well order'd and drawn up, will eaſily be too hard for the ſame Number of Horſe; but the ſame Number of Horſe will have hard Service to break a Body of Foot, if there be any Thing of Proportion betwixt them; and this

Opinion is confirmed not only by ancient and modern Examples, but by the Relations and Conſtitutions of Legiſlators, and whoever elſe have left any Rules and Directions for the Government of an Army; for though they tell us indeed, That at firſt, Horſe were in greateſt Reputation, becauſe the way of ordering of Foot was not known; but as ſoon as the way of managing them was found out, and their Uſefulneſs was diſcovered, they were preferred to the Horſe. Not but that Horſe are very neceſſary in an Army to ſcout Abroad, make Incurſions into the Enemies Country, purſue the Enemy when he runs, and confront their Horſe when they come to a Battel; yet the Hopes and Strength of an Army lies more eſpecially in the Foot, and if any one Error in the Conduct of our *Italian* Princes has contributed to the enſlaving of their Country, it is there neglecting to improve themſelves in the Management of Foot, and addreſſing themſelves wholly to the Horſe. And this Fault proceeded from the Malignity of the Officers, or the Ignorance of thoſe who govern'd the State: For this laſt 25 Years, the Commands of the *Italian* Militia being in the Hands of Reformades and Soldiers of Fortune, who had no ſettled Eſtates, they made it their Deſign to preſerve their Commands by all poſſible means, though with never ſo much Prejudice to their Maſters: And becauſe a great Body of Foot was not like to be long paid (nor would there always be occaſion to uſe them) and a little one would not turn to Account; they applied themſelves wholly to the Diſcipline of Horſe; for 200 or 300 Horſe was a fair Command, and maintained the Officers in a good Reputation; nor was the Charge ſo great, but their Governors could pay them. For the better Inſurance therefore of their Places, they began to undervalue and decry the Foot Service, in ſuch manner, that by Degrees they were almoſt wholly laid aſide; ſo that in the greateſt of their Armies, there were very few Foot: The Unhappineſs of which Practice, with other Irregularities in our Days, has made the *Italian* Militia ſo weak, it has not been able to defend it ſelf againſt the Inſults and Depredations of Foreigners. So then the Foot is with more Confidence to be rely'd upon than the Horſe; and that this was the Judgment of the *Romans*, appears by another Example. The *Romans* were encamped before *Sora*, and a Party of Horſe ſallying out of the Town to beat them from ſome Poſt, was met by a *Roman* Captain at the Head of his Troop, who charging his Adverſary, it was their Fortune both of them to be ſlain. However, their Troops continued the Fight, though their Officers were dead, and the *Romans* to facilitate their Victory, diſmounted in the middle of the Fight, and forced the Enemy to do the ſame, if they had a mind to defend themſelves; ſo that the Nature of the Fight was changed; the Foot Service was preferred, and the *Samnites* were routed. Nothing can be more plain that the Foot were preferred than this Caſe; for though upon other Occaſions the Conſuls many Times diſmounted their Troops, yet it was to reinforce and bring off the Foot, that were over-laid by the Enemy; but here they diſmounted not to relieve their own Foot, or to engage with the Enemies, but fighting Horſe againſt Horſe, and finding their Victory doubtful, they thought, though they could not maſter them on Horſe-back, they might do it on Foot; and accordingly they alighted. I conclude therefore, that a Body of well ordered Foot is very hardly to be broken, but by another Body of the ſame. *Craſſus* and *Marcus Antonius*, with a ſmall Body of Horſe, but a good Army of Foot, over-run and haraſſed the whole Country of the *Parthians* for ſeveral Days together, though the *Parthians* had a vaſt Army of Horſe to defend it. *Craſſus*, 'tis true, miſcarried in the Expedition, but was more by the Falſhood than Gallantry of the Enemy; for relying too much upon their Promiſes, he was reduced to ſuch Diſtreſs for Proviſions, that he and his whole Squadron were loſt; nevertheleſs in the midſt of theſe Exigences, being in an open and champion Country, where there were no Mountains, no Woods, no Rivers to ſhelter or eaſe them, far from all Relief, and nothing left to ſuſtain them, the Foot brought themſelves off under the Command of *M. Anthony*, and behaved themſelves ſo well in the Opinion of the *Parthians* themſelves, that their vaſt Army of Horſe durſt not venture upon them: But to what Purpoſe do we trouble our Reader with Examples ſo remote, we have Teſtimony nearer Home that will do it effectually. We have known in our Time 9000 *Switzers* at *Novara* attack 10000 Horſe, and as many Foot, (being moſt *Gaſcoignes*) they never regarded: After this 26000 *Switzers* ſet upon the King of *France* in *Milan*, who had with him 20000 Horſe, 40000 Foot, and a Hundred Pieces of Artillery; and though they did not vanquiſh him, as at the Battel of *Novara*, yet they fought him bravely for Two Days together, and though worſted at laſt, yet the greateſt Part of them got off. *Marcus Regulus Attilius* placed ſuch Confidence in his Foot, that he not only oppoſed them to the Enemies Horſe, but to their Elephants; and though his Succeſs did not anſwer his Expectation, yet it hindered not, but that as great Matters might have been expected from his Foot. So then whoever would defeat a Body of Foot well ordered, muſt do it with another Body, better ordered than they, or it is never to be done.

In

In the Time of *Philip Visconti*, Duke of *Milan*, 16000 *Switzers* having made a Descent into *Lombardy*, *Carmignuola*, the said Duke's General, marched against them with about 1000 Horse, and some Foot; for not being acquainted with their way of Fighting, he thought they would have been sufficient; but having fallen upon them with his Horse, and been repulsed with Loss, being a wise Man, and one that knew how to frame himself to every Accident, he recruited very well, marched against them again, and coming to an Engagement, caused all his Cuirassiers to Dismount, and at the Head of his Foot, fall on upon the *Switzers*, who were not able to resist them. For the Cuirassiers being compleatly Arm'd, forced their way into the Body of the *Switzers* without any Loss, so as their whole Army was defeated, and cut off, and none left alive, but what were preserved by the Humanity of *Carmignuola*. I do not doubt but many People are well enough satisfied in their Judgments, that Foot are more serviceable than Horse; yet such is the Infelicity of our Times, that neither Ancient nor Modern Examples, nor the Confession of those who have tried them, are sufficient to prevail with our Princes to correct this Error, or to believe that to give Reputation to the Arms of a Province, it is necessary to revive this Order, Countenance their Foot, and see them well paid; and then doubtless they will repay him by their noble Exploits. But they deviate from this Way, as they do from the rest, and therefore no wonder if their Conquests be more to the Detriment, than Augmentation of their State.

CHAP. XIX.

The Conquests of Commonwealths that are ill-governed, and contrary to the Model of the Romans, *do conduce more to the Ruin, than Advancement of their Affairs.*

THESE false Opinions of the Use and Excellence of Horse and Foot, are so rooted in the Minds of Men, and so confirmed with ill Examples, that no body thinks of reforming our late Errors, or restoring the old Discipline of the *Romans*. Thirty Years since, who could have persuaded an *Italian* that 10000 Foot could have assaulted 10000 Horse, and as many Foot, and have beaten them? Yet this was done by the *Switzers* at *Novara*. For though all Histories ring of it, yet none of our People will believe that it is possible to do now, what was anciently done. They object the Excellence of our Horse, and say they are so well arm'd, that they are able to repulse not only a Body of Foot, but even a Mountain or Rock; and by these kind of fallacious Arguments, they deceive themselves; and not considering that *Lucullus* with a few Foot defeated 150000 of *Tigranes* Horse, and yet they had a Sort of Cuirassiers among them like ours. This Exploit of *Lucullus* we have seen acted over again by the *Germans* in *Italy*, as if on Purpose to convince us of our Error. Which if Princes and Commonwealths could be persuaded to believe, they would commit fewer Faults, be more strong against the Insults of the Enemy, and not place all their Hopes in their Heels, as they do at this Day, and those who had the Government of any Civil State, would know better how to conduct and manage themselves, either as to the Enlargement or Conservation of their Dominion, and find, that Leagues and Confederacies, rather than absolute Conquests; sending Colonies into what they had conquered; making publick Funds of the Spoils of the Enemy; to infest and perplex the Enemy rather with Excursions, and Battels, than Sieges; to keep the publick Rich, and the private Poor, and with all possible Caution to keep up the Discipline of the Army, are the ways to make a Commonwealth Formidable and Great. These are the true ways of enlarging an Empire; all the rest are uncertain, or pernicious; and if there be any to whom these Ways are not pleasing, they are by any Means to lay aside all Thoughts of extending their Dominion; to think only of regulating their Laws at Home, and providing for their Defence, like the little States in *Germany*, which by so doing have lived in Peace and Tranquility for many Years together. But how industrious and careful soever we are, in abstaining from Injury, or using Violence to our Neighbours, somebody or other will be injuring us, and it will be impossible to live always in Quiet; from which Provocation will arise, not only a Desire in us, but a Necessity of vindicating our selves, and retaliating upon them; and when this Desire is once kindled, if our Neighbours do not supply us with Occasion, we can find it at Home as will inevitably fall out where Citizens are opulent and strong. And if the Cities of *Germany* have continued free, and at Peace a long Time, it proceeds from a peculiar Disposition in that Country, which is scarce to be found any

where elſe. That Part of *Germany* of which I now ſpeak, (like *France* and *Spain*) was ſubject to the *Empire* of the *Romans:* But when afterwards that Empire began to decline, and the Title of the Empire was removed into that Province, thoſe that were the wealthieſt and moſt powerful of the Cities, (taking Advantage of the Puſilanimity or Diſtreſſes of their Emperors) made themſelves free, paying only a ſmall annual Rent for the Redemption of their Liberties; which being permitted, by Degrees all thoſe Cities which held immediately of the Emperor, and had no Dependance upon any body elſe, redeemed themſelves in that manner. Whilſt theſe Cities were employed in this Traffick with the Emperor, it fell out that ſeveral Corporations that belonged to the Duke of *Auſtria*, rebelled, and having eſtabliſhed their Liberty, they increaſed ſo faſt in Reputation and Wealth, that inſtead of returning to their Subjection to the Duke, they became terrible to all People about them. From hence it is, that in our Days this Province is ſaid to conſiſt of the *Switzers*, the free Towns, the Princes, and the Emperor. And if in the Diverſity of their Conſtitutions, no Wars do ariſe, or at leaſt continue any Time, it is from their univerſal Reſpect and Deference to the Emperor, who, though his Force be not great, has ſuch Reputation among them, that upon any Controverſy betwixt them, he can eaſily compoſe it; and this it is that has kept them quiet ſo long, that in Man's Memory they have had little or no Troubles, but what happened betwixt the *Switzers* and the Houſe of *Auſtria*; and though for many Years paſt, the Title of Emperor has been in the ſaid Houſe, yet has it not been able to reduce the Pertinancy of the *Switzers*, though it has attempted it very ſolemnly. Nor did the reſt of the Princes and free Towns in *Germany* contribute their Aſſiſtance againſt the *Switzers*, partly becauſe they were Favourers of Liberty, and partly becauſe being poor themſelves, they had no mind the Houſe of *Auſtria* ſhould be Rich. *Germany* being conſtituted in this Balance and *Æquilibrium*, it rather reverences than fears the Authority of the Emperor, and is quiet and at Peace, becauſe the particular Princes and States being contented with their own moderate Dominions, and in Awe one of another, do forbear thoſe Injuries and Incroachments which are common in other Places; whereas if its Conſtitution was otherwiſe, the People would certainly think of enlarging as well as their Neighbours, and by Conſequence interrupt that happy Tranquility which at preſent they enjoy. In other Countries where there is not that exact Proportion and Equality of Power betwixt the Princes and free Towns, 'tis not eaſy to preſerve them in Peace; ſo that thoſe Commonwealths which have an Ambition of extending their Empire, muſt do it by Confederation, or by the ways of the *Romans*; and whoever takes any other Courſe, rather ruins, than advantages himſelf; for new Conqueſts are prejudicial a Thouſand Ways, and eſpecially when your Force does not increaſe with your Territory, and you are not able to keep what you conquer; and this happens when the Expence of an Enterprize is greater than the Profit, though it ſucceeds. This was the Caſe with our *Florentines*, and the *Venetians*, who after they had conquered *Lombardy* and *Tuſcany*, were much weaker than before, when one of them was contented with the Dominion of the *Gulf*, and the other with a Territory of Six Miles about. We all think of getting what we can, but take no Care which way we ſhall keep it; which is the more inexcuſable, becauſe we have the *Roman* Example before our Eyes, which we may follow if we pleaſe; whereas they had no ſuch Advantage but wrought all out by their own Induſtry and Wiſdom. But there is another way by which new Conqueſts do a great deal of Miſchief, and eſpecially to a well ordered Commonwealth; and that is when the City or Province that is conquered, is Voluptuous, or Effeminate; as it happened firſt to the *Romans*, and then to *Hanibal*, in the Conqueſt of *Capua*, where the Contagion of their ill Manners ſpread it ſelf ſo ſuddenly among the Soldiers, that had *Capua* been farther off, the Remedies not ſo near, or the *Romans* in the leaſt meaſure corrupted themſelves, that Conqueſt would have been the Ruin of their State: For it was true what *Livy* told us in theſe Words, *Jam tunc minime ſalubris militari diſciplinæ* Capua, *inſtrumentum omnium voluptatum, delinitos militum animos avertit a memoria patriæ.* Capua *at that Time was no Place for Military Diſcipline; for being the Inſtrument and Contriver of all Sorts of Senſuality, it debauched the Minds of the Soldier from the Memory of his Country.* And certainly ſuch Cities and Provinces do revenge themſelves of their Conqueror without Effuſion of Blood; for diffuſing their ill Manners among his People, they become ſo weak and enervated thereby, that they are at the Mercy of whoever aſſails them: Which *Juvenal* has excellently well expreſſed, when he tells us that by their Converſation among Strangers, the *Roman* Manners were ſo changed, that inſtead of their old Temperance and Parſimony, they were given up wholly to Luxury and Exceſs.

——— *Sævior*

Sævior armis
Luxuria incubuit, victumq; ulciſcitur Orbem.

What by the Conquer'd World could never be
Reveng'd by Force, is done by Luxury.

Things being thus, and even the People of *Rome*, notwithſtanding the Excellence of their Conſtitution and Diſcipline, being ſubject to ſuffer, and be corrupted by their new Acquiſitions; what will become of thoſe who have no ſuch Virtue nor Education to defend them? But beſides all the Errors above-mentioned, are guilty of another as dangerous as the reſt; and that is, by making Uſe in their Wars, not of their own Subjects or Soldiers, but of Auxiliaries, and Hirelings.

CHAP. XX.

No Prince or Commonwealth without manifeſt Danger, can employ Foreign Forces, either Auxiliary, or Mercenary.

HAD I not diſcourſed at Large in another Place about the Inconvenience of Auxiliary or Mercenary Forces, in reſpect of one's own, I would have taken this Opportunity to have ſpoken more of it here than I ſhall do now: But having done it already, I ſhall only touch upon it at preſent, which I cannot forbear, upon a new Occaſion which I have met withal in *Livy*. I call thoſe Forces Auxiliaries, which a Prince or Confederate ſends to your Aſſiſtance under his own Officers, and Pay. Of this Sort were the Two Legions, which after the Defeat of the *Samnites*, upon the Importunity of the *Capuans*, were left with them for the Security of their City. But thoſe Legions which were intended for the Defence of that City, languiſhing in Eaſe, and wallowing in Luxury, began to forget the Diſcipline of their Country, and their Reverence to the Senate, and contrive how they might make themſelves Maſters of the Town, conceiving the Inhabitants unworthy to enjoy thoſe Poſſeſſions which they were unable to defend. But this Conſpiracy was diſcovered in Time, and not only prevented, but puniſhed by the *Romans*, as we ſhall ſhew more largely hereafter: At preſent I ſhall only ſay this, that of all Soldiers, none are employed with ſo much Hazard, as your Auxiliaries. For Firſt, neither Soldiers nor Officers receiving Pay from you, but from the Prince or State by whom they are ſent, they have but little Regard either to your Intereſt or Authority; but when the War is done, give themſelves wholly to Pillaging and Miſchief, and that not only with the Enemy, but their Friends; moved ſometimes by their own, and ſometimes by the Avarice of their Prince. The *Romans*, when they left thoſe *Legions* at *Capua*, had no Thoughts of breaking their League, or offering them any Injury; but the Soldiers being depraved by the Licentiouſneſs of the Place, and encouraged by the Puſillanimity of the Inhabitants, took Occaſion to conſpire, and doubtleſly had they not been prevented, had ſeized upon the Town. This we could enforce with ſeveral other Examples, but the Caſe is ſo plain, I ſhall content my ſelf with this, and that of *Regini*, whoſe Inhabitants were not only robb'd and diſpoſſeſs'd, but murther'd by a Legion which the *Romans* ſent to them for their Security. So then in Prudence a Prince or Commonwealth is to take any Courſe, rather than to bring himſelf into a Neceſſity of employing Auxiliaries, eſpecially when he is to rely wholly upon them; for no Treaty or Accommodation can be made with the Enemy, but ſhall be more for his Advantage, than to entertain ſuch Forces. And if old Paſſages be conſulted and conſidered together with the new, it will be found that for one Time in which they ever did Good, there are Hundreds in which they have done Harm: Nor can an ambitious State or Prince have a more commodious Occaſion to poſſeſs himſelf of a City or Province, than when he is invited in this Manner for its Aſſiſtance and Defence. Wherefore, he whoſe Indiſcretion is ſo great as to make Uſe of ſuch Armies, not only for his Defence, but his Conqueſts of other People, take a Courſe that muſt neceſſarily undo him; for he aims at the Acquiſition of what he cannot keep any longer than his Auxiliaries will give him Leave, for they can take it from him when they pleaſe: But ſuch is the Unhappineſs of human Ambition, that fixing their Eyes only upon preſent Satisfaction, they never think of Inconveniencies that will follow, whereas if they would reflect upon ancient Examples, they would find that the leſs injurious they

were to their Neighbours, and the more Generoſity they ſhew towards them, the more ready would they be to throw themſelves into their Arms, as ſhall be ſhewn in the next Chapter, by the Example of the *Capuans*.

CHAP. XXI.

The Firſt Prætor *which the* Romans *ever ſent out of their own City, was to* Capua, *and that was* 400 *Years after they began firſt to make War.*

THE People of *Rome* (as we have ſaid many times before) in the Management of their Wars, and the Enlargement of their Empire, differed much from the Methods of our Times: For the Cities which they conquered (if they did not think fit to demoliſh them) were left free, with the Exerciſe of their own Laws, as before, and that without any other Mark of Subjection, than the ſubſcribing certain Articles of Agreement, and whilſt they kept them, they kept their old Privileges and Dignity. And this Cuſtom they obſerved till they carried their Arms into Foreign Countries, and began to unravel Governments where they conquered, and reduce whole Kingdoms and States into Provinces: This will be clear'd, if we conſider that the firſt *Prætor* which was ever ſent Abroad by the *Romans*, was to *Capua*; not out of any ambitious Deſign, but at the Requeſt of the ſaid *Capuans*, to rectify and compoſe ſome Differences, which they could not do among themſelves. The *Antiates* following the Example of the *Capuans*, and moved by the ſame Neceſſity, deſired a *Prætor* likewiſe, becauſe at that Time, as *Livy* tells us, *Non ſolum arma, ſed jura* Romana *pollebant*; *Not only the Arms, but the Laws of the* Romans *were Victorious*. And this way of Lenity in their Government, contributed exceedingly to the Enlargement of their Empire; for thoſe Cities or States which have been accuſtomed to their own Liberty and Laws, do more eaſily ſubmit to a Dominion that ſeems remote, and at a Diſtance (though indeed it may have ſomething of Servitude in it) than to that which is always before their Eyes, and keeps them in perpetual Apprehenſion of Slavery; and there is this Advantage beſides, that if in the Adminiſtration of Juſtice, or the Management of Publick Affairs, any Thing be acted to the Diſpleaſure of the People, it has leſs infamous Reflection upon the Prince, who leaves them to their own Cuſtoms and Laws, than upon him who ſets up Magiſtrates of his own, and diſpatches all Things by them; and this way takes off a great deal of Hatred and Calumny from the Prince, which would otherwiſe fall heavily upon him. Of the Certainty of this Opinion, we have a freſh Inſtance in *Italy*. Every body knows that *Genoua* was oftentimes in the Poſſeſſion of the *French*, and that that King (excepting of late Years) uſed always to ſend thither a Governor of his own; at preſent, (the Neceſſity of his Affairs requiting it) he has given them the Election of their own Governor, and it is conſtantly a *Genoueſe*. No body queſtions but this way is moſt pleaſing to the City, and by Conſequence their Affections muſt be much enlarged to the King. For it is the Nature of Mankind (and inſeparable from it) to truſt thoſe with more Frankneſs, who are leaſt like to oppreſs them; and to fear thoſe leaſt, who are moſt merciful and human. This Gentleneſs and Familiarity in the *Romans* prevailed ſo far upon the *Capuans*, that they made it their ſolemn Requeſt, that they would ſend them a *Prætor*, which if the *Roman* Auſterity had but pretended to have done, they would not only have refuſed, but uſed all Means to have freed themſelves from them. But what need we go to *Rome* and *Capua* for Examples, when we have them at Home? Every one knows how long it is ſince *Piſtoia* threw it ſelf voluntarily into the Arms of the *Florentines*: Every one knows the Jealouſies and Emulations that were betwixt them and the *Florentines*, *Piſans*, *Lucheſi*, and *Saneſi*: And this Diverſity of Humours proceeded not from any Neglect in the *Piſtoians* of their Affairs, or from any Diſeſteem they had of their Liberty, more than the others; but from an Ancient Experience they had had of the Affection and Tenderneſs of the *Florentines*, and that was the true Cauſe why they threw themſelves under their Protection; whereas carrying themſelves more ſeverely to the reſt, they were ſo far from coming in, and ſubmitting to their Juriſdiction, that they did what they could, and tried all ways poſſible to diſclaim it. And doubtleſs had the *Florentines*, by their Leagues, or Supplies, comported themſelves with more Kindneſs to their Neighbours, and not incenſed them by their Auſterities, they had been Maſters of all *Tuſcany* at this Hour: Not but that Arms and Severity are to be uſed upon Occaſion, but mild Ways are to be tried firſt, and Extremities only in Extremity.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXII.

How uncertain the Judgments of moſt People are, in Things of greateſt Importance.

HOW falſe and erroneous the Opinions of Men are, all Perſons can teſtify who have any Converſation in their Counſels; which unleſs managed by Perſons of more than ordinary Sagacity, are for the moſt Part contrary to the Truth. And becauſe Men of theſe excellent Qualifications, in corrupted States (eſpecially in Times of Peace) by reaſon of the Envy or Ambition of other People, are ſubject to be hated; ſuch Counſels are frequently followed, as the deluded Commons think beſt, or ſuch as are recommended by thoſe who are more ſolicitous of the Favour, than the Benefit of the People: But their Errors being diſcovered in the Time of their Adverſity, Neceſſity directs them to thoſe Perſons whom in the Time of Proſperity they deſpiſed, as ſhall be ſhown at large in a convenient Place. Moreover, human Conſultations are ſubject to certain Accidents by which Men are frequently deluded, unleſs their Experience be more than ordinary; which Accidents are apt by their Likelihood and Probability to perſuade People to whatever they deſire. This I mention, in Conſideration of the Advice of *Numiſius* the Prætor (after the *Latins* were defeated by the *Romans*) and of what was not long ſince generally believed when *Francis* I. of *France* invaded *Milan*, which was defended by the *Switzers*. For *Lewis* XII. being dead, and *Francis d Angoleſme* ſucceeding in that Kingdom, he had a great Deſign of recovering *Milan*, which not many Years before had been taken from them by the *Switzers*, at the Encouragement of *Julius* II. To facilitate his Enterprize, he made it his Buſineſs to gain a Party in *Italy*, and having made ſure of the *Venetians*, he addreſſed himſelf to the *Florentines*; and Pope *Leo* X. conceiving it would be a great Corroboration to his Affairs if he could make them, ſeeing the Forces of the King of *Spain* were in *Lombardy*, and the Emperor's at *Verona*. Pope *Leo* could not be brought to conſent, being perſuaded (as is ſaid) by his Council, that if he kept himſelf Neuter, he ſhould be certain of Victory; for it was not for the Intereſt of the Church, that either the King of *France*, or the *Switzers* ſhould be too potent in *Italy*; but he who would reſtore it to its ancient Liberty, muſt deliver it from the Servitude both of the one and the other: And becauſe both of them together were not to be dealt withal, nor indeed either of them apart, as Things ſtood then; Occaſion was to be expected, and they were to attend till the King of *France* and *Switzers* had fought, and one of them beaten the other; and then before the Conqueror had recruited, or recovered what he had loſt in the Battel, the Pope and his Friends ſhould fall upon him, and ſo both of them be expulſed. It was impoſſible he ſhould ever have a fairer Opportunity; for the Enemy were both of them in the Field, and the Pope's Army ſtrong upon the Borders of *Lombardy* (under Pretence of ſecuring the Territories of the Church) where it might attend the Event of the Battel, which the Vigor and Strength of both Armies portended would be bloody; and when they had deſtroyed one another, and were both of them weaken'd, then might his Army fall ſecurely upon them, poſſeſs it ſelf of *Lombardy*, and govern all *Italy* as he pleaſed himſelf. Theſe were the Counſels which were given his Holineſs, and at firſt they ſeemed ſolid enough, but how vain they prov'd afterwards, the Event did clearly demonſtrate; for the *Switzers*, after a long and bloody Fight, being defeated, the Pope's and the King of *Spain*'s Forces were ſo far from taking that Opportunity of falling upon the *French* (as they had promiſed themſelves) that they prepared to run away; nor would that have ſecured them, had not they been befriended by the Humanity (not to ſay Lazineſs) of the King of *France*, who contenting himſelf with one Victory, never regarded a ſecond, but ſtruck up a Peace with the *Pope*: And truly at a diſtance theſe Counſels ſeem'd not unreaſonable, though in Reality they were irrational and idle; for the Conqueror ſeldom loſes many Men, what he loſes is in the Fight, and the great Part of the Execution is in the Purſuit. But grant a Battel is a long Time before it be decided (which notwithſtanding happens but ſeldom) and that many are ſlain and diſabled of the conquering Side, yet the Reputation of Victory gives the Conqueror ſuch Eſteem, and ſtrikes ſuch Awe and Terror into all People, as tranſcends the Conſideration of any Loſs he can ſuſtain: ſo that he is in an egregious Error, who thinks a victorious Army may be the more eaſily overcome by reaſon of the Prejudice it received in the Fight; for 'tis Madneſs to attempt ſuch an Army with a leſs Number, than you would have engaged it before; becauſe their late Fortune will add to their Courage. This appeared by

the Experience of the *Latins*; by the Counſel of *Numiſius* the *Prætor*; and by the Loſſes of the People who followed it. For the *Romans* having beaten the *Latins* with much ado, and ſuch Slaughter of their own Men, that they ſeemed to have got nothing of a Victory but the Name; *Numiſius* proclaimed it up and down, that then was the Time to recover their Liberty, and that if with new Forces they fell ſuddenly upon the *Romans* before they were recruited, or had any Expectation of being invaded, they would certainly be overthrown: Upon which the *Latins* believing him, raiſed a new Army, and fell upon the *Romans*, but they were preſently defeated, and ſuffered the Inconvenience, to which all People are ſubject that follow ſuch Counſels.

CHAP. XXIII.

How the Romans *upon any Accident which neceſſitated them to give Judgment upon their Subjects, avoided always the mid Way.*

JAM Latio is ſtatus erat rerum, ut neq; bellum neq; pacem pati poſſent. The Latins *were now in ſuch a Condition, that they were neither fit for War nor Peace.* And what *Livy* ſaid of *Latium*, is true every where elſe; That Prince or Commonwealth is at the higheſt Pitch of Unhappineſs, which is in ſuch a Condition, as that he can neither receive Peace, nor maintain War: And this happens, when People are conquered and neceſſitated to ſubmit upon ſuch hard Terms, as in their Hearts they diſdain, or elſe (to go on with the War) are conſtrained to implore their Aſſiſtance, who will make them a Prey. The Ways by which we are brought into ſo ſad a Condition, are commonly ill Counſels, for want of juſt Conſideration of our Affairs, both as to Money and Men. For that Commonwealth or Prince, who takes right Meaſures in thoſe, ſhall very hardly fall into the Diſtreſſes of the *Latins*, who accepted the Condition of the *Romans* when they ſhould have refuſed them; and declared War againſt the *Romans* when they ſhould have deſired a Peace; ſo that as they ordered the Matter, the Enmity and Amity of the *Romans* did equally afflict them. The firſt that overcame them was *Manlius Torquatus*, and after him *Camillus*, who ſeized upon all their Cities, and putting Gariſons in them, return'd to *Rome*, and in his Account to the Senate acquainted them, that the whole Country of the *Latins* was then in their Hands. And becauſe the Sentence and Judgment of the Senate at that Time upon the *Latins* is more than ordinarily remarkable: That it may be readier for the Imitation of Princes when Occaſion is offered, I ſhall ſet down the Words which *Livy* makes *Camillus* ſpeak, which confirm what we have ſaid about the Ways which the *Romans* obſerved in the Enlargement of their Empire; and ſhews, that in their Determinations in Matters of State, they left the middle Ways, and followed only the Extreams. For Government is nothing but keeping Subjects in ſuch a Poſture as that they may have no Will or Power to offend you. And this is done either by taking away all Means from them of doing you any Hurt; or by obliging and indulging them ſo, as they may not in Reaſon hope to better their Fortune; all which will appear, firſt by *Camillus* his Speech to the Senate, and then by their Reſolution upon it. His Words were theſe, *Dii immortales ita vos potentes hujus Conſilii fecerunt, ut ſit Latium, an non ſit, in veſtra manu poſuerint. Itaque pacem vobis, quod ad Latinos attinet, parare in perpetuum, vel ſæviendo, vel ignoſcendo poteſtis. Vultis crudeliter conſulere in debitos victoſq; ? licet delere omne Latium. Vultis exemplo Majorum augere rem Romanam, victos in Civitatem accipiendo ? Materia creſcendi per ſummam gloriam ſuppetit. Certe id firmiſſimum imperium eſt, quo obedientes gaudent. Illorum igitur animos dum Expectatione ſtupent, ſeu pœnâ, ſeu beneficio præoccupari oportet.* The Gods *have put it into the Power of this reverend Council, to determine whether the* Latins *ſhall be a People or not. As to them, your Peace will be perpetual, which Way ſoever you take: Are you diſpoſed to Severity, and will deſtroy thoſe poor People that are conquered, and your Priſoners ?. They are at your Mercy, and you may extinguiſh their very Name. Are you diſpoſed according to the Example of your Anceſtors to propagate your Intereſt by receiving them into your City ? You have an Opportunity of doing it with the higheſt Advantage and Glory. Certainly no Empire is ſo firm, as where Subjects exſult in their Obedience. It will be expedient therefore, whilſt they are in Amazement and Suſpence, to ſettle their Minds one Way, either by Puniſhment or Pardon.* According to the Conſul's Propoſal, the Senate came to an Iſſue, and give Sentence Town by Town, according to the Nature of their Deſerts; but all in Extreams, without any Mediocrity; for ſome they not only pardoned, but loaded them with Benefits, made them free of their own City, and gave them many other Privileges and Exemptions, and thereby

ſecured them not only from rebelling, but from ever conſpiring again. The reſt whom they thought fit to make Examples, were brought Priſoners to *Rome*, puniſh'd with all Kind of Severity, their Houſes deſtroyed, their Lands confiſcated, their Perſons diſperſed, ſo as it was not poſſible for them any way to do any Miſchief for the future. This was the Way the *Romans* took in the Settlement of *Latium*, which ought to be obſerved and imitated by all wiſe Princes and States; and if the *Florentines* had followed it in the Year 1502. when *Arezzo* and the whole Valley of *Chiana* rebelled, they had continued their Authority, augmented their State, and ſupplied themſelves with thoſe Fields which they wanted for their Subſiſtance. But they took the middle Way (betwixt the Extremes of Rigor and Remiſſion) which is always moſt dangerous; they kept the City, removed the Magiſtrates, degraded the great Men, baniſhed ſome, and executed others. If any in their Councils adviſed to have the City demoliſhed, it was anſwered, It could not be done without Diſhonour and Reflection upon their own; as if *Florence* was ſo weak and inconſiderable, it was not able to keep a Gariſon in *Arezzo*. This Argument was of that Sort which carry ſome Appearance, but are not really true. 'Tis much as if we ſhould argue, a Parricide or Felon, or other egregious Malefactor, is not to be put to death, leſt it ſhould be thought the Prince or Republick was too impotent to reſtrain them any other Way. But thoſe who are of that Opinion are to conſider, that when a private Perſon, or a whole City offends ſo highly againſt his Prince or his Government; To make them Examples to other People, and bridle them ſo as they may be ſure to be no more guilty for the future, the ſureſt Way is utterly to deſtroy them; and it is more honourable for a Prince to extirpate them quite at once, than to endeavour to preſerve them with a Thouſand Difficulties and Dangers: For whoever he be that knows not how to puniſh his Delinquents according to the Merits of their Offences, and ſo as to ſecure himſelf for the future, is either a weak or a poor ſpirited Prince. To confirm what is ſaid, we may produce another Example of the *Romans*, in their Sentence upon the *Privernates*; from whence (as *Livy* ſays) Two Things are to be concluded; one is, that Rebels are to be pardoned frankly, and obliged; or utterly extinguiſhed. The other, that Generoſity of Mind, and Steddineſs and Conſtancy in our Anſwers when given to wiſe Men, make ſtrangely for our Advantage. The *Roman* Senate was aſſembled to give Sentence upon the *Privernates* who had been in Rebellion, and being reduced by Force of Arms, had ſent ſeveral of their chief Citizens to implore the Mercy of the *Romans*: Being brought into the Senate (where every body was perſuading according to his Inclination, ſome for Mercy, and ſome for Severity) one of the Senators (before they could come to a Reſolution) ask'd one of the Petitioners, *Quam pœnam meritos Privernates cenſeret? What Puniſhment he thought his Fellow-Citizens deſerved?* To which he replied, *Eam quam merentur qui ſe libertate dignos cenſent. The ſame that they deſerve, who deſire to be free.* The Senator continuing, *Quid ſi pœnam remittimus vobis, qualem nos pacem vobiſcum ſperemus? If we ſhould pardon you this Time, what Peace could we hope for from you?* To which he anſwered, *Si bonam dederitis, & fidelem & perpetuam; ſi malam, haud diuturnam. If it be upon good Terms, it will be firm and perpetual; if upon ill, it will hardly laſt long.* Upon which the better Part of the Senate (though ſome oppoſed it) declared, *Se audiviſſe vocem liberi & viri; nec credi poſſe illum populum aut hominem denique in ea conditione cujus eum pœniteat, diutius quam neceſſe ſit manſurum. Ibi pacem eſſe fidam, ubi voluntarij pacati ſint, neq; eo loco ubi ſervitutem eſſe velint, fidem ſperandam. That he had ſpoke like a Man, and like a Freeman. That it was not to be imagined any People or private Perſon would ſubmit to a Condition that oppreſs'd him, longer than by Neceſſity he was conſtrained. That if any Peace be laſting and inviolable, it is where the Parties do voluntarily ſubſcribe, not where Servitude and Slavery is impoſed.* And thereupon it was decreed, that the *Privernates* ſhould be *Civitate donati*, and enjoy all the Privileges of the *Romans*; concluding, *Eos qui nihil præterquam de libertate cogitant dignos eſſe qui Romani fiant. That they deſerved to be* Romans, *whoſe Liberty was the greateſt Part of their Care.* And this frank and genreous Way of anſwering, took mightily with thoſe grave Men, as knowing that whatever they had ſaid otherwiſe, would not have been from the Heart, but with Compliance and Submiſſion to their Fortune and Diſtreſs. And this is moſt certain, whoever ſpeaks otherwiſe (eſpecially if either he has been or but thought himſelf free) does but equivocate, and he that believes him, takes wrong Counſels, ſuch as are neither good for himſelf, nor ſatisfactory to them; which many Times produces Rebellion, and the Ruin of the State: And Things being ſo, we conclude, according to our Propoſition in the Beginning of our Diſcourſe, That upon any great Sentence to be given againſt a People or City that has been formerly free, the ſureſt Way is, to wave all Moderation, and either to careſs or extinguiſh them. He that proceeds otherwiſe, will find himſelf in an Error, as the *Samnites* were, when having encloſed the Romans *ad Furcas Caudinas*, they neither diſcharged them freely, nor

put them to the Sword, as one of their grave Citizens adviſed; but abuſed them, and pillaged them, and diſmiſſed them *ſub jugum* when they had done. But not long after, they were made ſenſible of their Error, and that the old Citizen was in the right; as we ſhall ſhew more at large hereafter.

CHAP. XXIV.

That in the Generality, Caſtles and Citadels do more miſchief than good.

TO the Stateſmen of our Times, it may perhaps ſeem Indiſcretion or Inadvertency in the *Romans*, that being deſirous to keep *Latium*, and *Privernum* in Subjection, they built neither Caſtles nor Citadels to ſecure them: And indeed they differed exceedingly from our *Florentine* Politicians, who are of Opinion that not only *Piſa* but all other Cities whatever are to be kept under that Way; and ſurely had the *Romans* been like us, they would have been of the ſame Opinion; but differing in their Courage, their Judgment, and their Power, they differed likewiſe in their Reſolutions. Nor during all the Time of their Liberty, were the *Romans* known to build any Caſtle or Citadel to keep any City in awe, or any Province in Peace; only ſome indeed which were fortified before, they gariſoned and continued; which being ſo, and quite contrary to the Sentiment of our Times, I think it not amiſs, if in this Place I enquire whether ſuch Things be profitable or unprofitable to the Perſons who build them. It is therefore to be conſidered, that ſuch Fortreſſes are erected, either to repel an Enemy, or reſtrain a Subject, and keep him in Obedience. In the firſt Caſe I do pronounce them unneceſſary; in the Second dangerous. They are dangerous, and do rather obſtruct than promote Obedience in the Subject; becauſe the great Danger of Rebellion proceeds from Hatred which the People have conceived againſt their Prince; that Hatred proceeds from his Injuſtice to the People, and he is ſaid to be unjuſt when he governs them arbitrarily and by Force, which is never ſo manifeſt, as when he builds ſuch Caſtles and Citadels among them, that no Man might be able in any manner to oppoſe him. Which being ſo, thoſe kind of Fortifications are not only uſeleſs and improper to keep the Subject in Subjection; but dangerous, ſeeing by Preſumption upon them, Princes are encouraged to treat their Subjects worſe than otherwiſe they would do, by which they contract the Odium of the People: And what is the Conſequence? Rebellion and Blood, and Confuſion: Neither when Troubles ariſe, and Wars break out, is there that Defence or Security in them, as is now-a-days imagined; for there are only Two Ways of keeping a conquered People in Obedience; you muſt either have a ſtanding Army (as the *Romans* had) always ready to ſubdue them; or you muſt divide, diſperſe, or deſtroy them in ſuch manner, that they may never get together again to diſturb you: For though you impoveriſh and plunder them never ſo much, *Spoliatis arma ſuperſunt*, *They will find Arms to revenge themſelves*; and if you diſarm them never ſo carefully, *Furor arma miniſtrat*. *Their Fury will ſupply them.* If you cut off their Commanders, like *Hydra's*, others will ſucceed, and do as much Miſchief: If you build theſe Caſtles in Time of Peace, they may be ſerviceable, and make you more bold and ſecure againſt your Subjects; but when War comes, and both your Subjects and Enemies infeſt you, it is impoſſible they ſhould defend you againſt both. And if ever they were uſeleſs, it is now ſince the uſe of Artillery is known, againſt the Fury of which no little Fort (from whence other Guns cannot play with Security again, and where they want Ground for repairing their Breaches, or making new Retrenchments upon Occaſion) can poſſibly ſtand: And being ſo, conſider ſeriouſly with your ſelf, whether theſe Kind of Fortreſſes are like to keep your old Subjects or your new Conqueſts in Obedience? If your Territory be hereditary, and you have received it from your Anceſtors, to build Caſtles to keep your own natural Subjects in Obedience, will be to little Purpoſe, for the Reaſons aboveſaid, ſeeing they will be but a means to make you and your Poſterity the more Tyrannical, and by conſequence expoſe you to the Hatred of the People, againſt which they will be afterwards unable to defend you. So that for theſe Reaſons, that neither he himſelf, nor his Heirs, may have occaſion to entrench too much upon the People, and the People have no Occaſion to abhor him, a wiſe Prince will never build Citadels. And though *Franceſco Sforza*, Duke of *Milan*, was reputed a wiſe Man, and built a Citadel at *Milan* to ſecure his Uſurpations, yet his Wiſdom did not appear in that, for it proved afterwards the Ruin of his Poſterity. For preſuming upon that, they took the more Confidence to oppreſs the People; which incenſed them ſo highly, that they revolted upon the firſt Approach of an Enemy, and turned their Prince out of that Province.

So that that Citadel did him no Good in Time of War againſt the Incurſions of the Enemy; and in Time of Peace, making him more inſolent, it did but expoſe him to the Hatred of the People; whereas, if no Citadel had been built, and yet they had been ſo indiſcreet, as to have behaved themſelves inſolently to their Subjects, ſome or other of them who had been injured, would have remonſtrated to their Prince the Danger of his Courſes, before he had contracted the general Odium; by which there would have been a Poſſibility that he might have reform'd, and reconciled himſelf to his Subjects; and had he done ſo, he would have better defended himſelf againſt the *French*, with the Affections of his People, and no Citadel, than with a Citadel, and no Affections of the People. Beſides, there are many Ways of loſing theſe Citadels; by Force, by Fraud, by corrupting the Governor, by Starving, and by Storm. And if you have loſt a City, which you are in Hopes of Recovering by the Favour of the Citadel, which ſtill holds out for you; it will require an Army as much as if there were no Citadel at all; and ſo much the ſtronger, by how much 'tis probable the People may be more incenſed from the Miſchief which they have received out of the Caſtle, than they would have been, had there been no Caſtle at all. Experience it ſelf has ſince taught us that the Citadel of *Milan* was of no Advantage, either to the Dukes of *Milan*, nor the *French* in Time of their Adverſity; but in Time of Peace did them much Prejudice, by hindring them from taking ſuch Ways as might have obliged the People, and render'd them well affected to their Government. *Guido Ubaldo* Son to *Frederic* Duke of *Urbin*, was a great Captain as any in his Time; being driven out of his Country by *Cæſar Borgia* (Son to *Alexander* VI.) and recovering it afterwards by an Accident, he cauſed all the Fortreſſes in the whole Province to be diſmantled and deſtroyed; as Things which he had found by Experience were more to his Prejudice than Security. For being beloved by the People, he would not do them the Injury to put Gariſons in them; and if he had, upon any Invaſion from the Enemy, he could not have kept them without a Field Army to relieve them. *Julius* the Pope, having driven the *Bentivogli* out of *Bononia*, built a Citadel there, and put in ſuch a Governor as partly by his own ill Nature, and partly by the Inſtructions of his Maſter, killed many of the Citizens, and committed ſeveral Cruelties, which provoked the *Bononians* ſo exceedingly, that they rebelled, and recovered the Citadel, which had the Governor been more moderate, might have been longer in his Power. *Nicolo de Caſtello* Father of the *Vitelli*, (returning into his Country, from whence he had been baniſhed by the Popes) immediately demoliſhed Two Fortreſſes which had been raiſed by *Sixtus* IV. as judging the Hearts of the People more like than thoſe Caſtles to ſecure him. But of all, there is no Example evinces the Unuſefulneſs of theſe Kind of Gariſons, and the Convenience of taking them away, more than that which happened lately at *Genoa*; for the ſaid City revolting from *Lewis* XII. of *France*, in the Year 1507. *Lewis* came with a ſtrong Army into *Italy*, and having reduced it, built a Caſtle of greater Strength and Capacity than any of that Time; for it was built upon a Promontory that commanded the Sea called *Godeſa*, the Harbour and the Town, ſo that by all People it was held inexpugnable. But the *French* being driven out of *Italy* in the Year 1512. *Genoa* rebelled (notwithſtanding the Caſtle) and *Ottavinio Fegoſa* taking the Government upon him, in Sixteen Months brought the Caſtle to ſuch Extremity, that it was forced to ſurrender; whereupon, though he was adviſed to keep it as a Refuge in Caſe of any Diſaſter; yet being a wiſe Man, and knowing well that a Prince is in nothing ſo ſafe, as in the Affections of his Subjects, he cauſed it to be demoliſhed, and he found the Benefit of that Counſel, for by it he has held that Government to this Day; and that ſo ſtrongly, that whereas before, the Appearance of a Thouſand Foot was ſufficient at any Time to have carried it; his Adverſaries aſſaulted it with Ten Thouſand, and could do him no Wrong. So that we ſee the demoliſhing it did *Fegoſa* no Hurt, and the making it did the King of *France* no good; for when he was able to bring an Army into *Italy*, he was able to recover *Genoa* without the Help of the Caſtle: But when he could bring no Army, he could not keep it, though the Caſtle was for him: From whence it follows, that as the Building of it was a great Expence, and the Loſs of it a great Diſhonour to the King of *France*; ſo the taking of it was great Glory to *Ottaviano*, and the ruining of it a great Advantage. And it is the ſame Thing with thoſe who build them in their new Conqueſts, to keep their new Subjects in Obedience; which if the Example of *Genoa* and the *French* ſhould be inſufficient to prove, the Cities of *Florence* and *Piſa* will do it effectually. The *Florentines* built a Citadel at *Piſa*, and ſeveral other Fortreſſes to keep it in awe; not conſidering that a City which had been free, and in continual Emulation of the *Florentine* Greatneſs, was not any other Way to be kept to its Duty, unleſs (according to the Practice of the *Romans*) they made a fair and honourable League with it, or utterly ſubverted it. But how much thoſe Fortreſſes anſwered their Deſigns, appeared when *Charles* VIII. made his Expedition

into *Italy*, to whom they were generally ſurrendred, either through the Fear or Falſehood of their Governors. So that had not they been built, the *Florentines* had never relied ſo much upon them for the keeping of *Piſa*, but had thought of ſome ſafer Way to have ſecured it againſt the King of *France*. I conclude then, that to keep ones own native Country in Subjection, Fortreſſes are dangerous; and to keep new Conqueſts, they are ineffectual: To prove that, the Authority and Practice of the *Romans* ought to be ſufficient, who whenever they had a mind to reſtrain the Power, and bridle the Fury of the People, did it not by erecting new Fortreſſes, but by demoliſhing the old. If it be objected, that *Tarentum* of old, and *Breſcia* of late Years, were recovered by the Fidelity of the Caſtles, when the Towns had revolted. I anſwer, that as to the Recovery of *Tarentum*, the Caſtle contributed nothing, for the Conſul *Quintus Fabius* was ſent thither with an Army ſtrong enough to have retaken it, had there been no Caſtle at all: And, what Advantage was it to the *Romans* that the Caſtle held for them, if the Recovery of the Town required a Conſular Army, and the Preſence of ſo great a Soldier as *Fabius Maximus*; and that they might have retaken it without the Help of the Caſtle, is clear in the Example of *Capua*, which they recovered, when there was no Caſtle to befriend them. In the Caſe of *Breſcia* the Circumſtances were very extraordinary; for it ſeldom happens that when a City revolts, and the Caſtle holds out for you, that the Caſtle has a Field Army hard by, and ready to relieve you. Monſieur *de Foix*, General for the King of *France*, being with his Army at *Bologna*, and underſtanding the Defection of the *Breſcians*, marched immediately to recover it, and in Three Days Time (by the Help of the Caſtle) was Maſter of it again. So that it was not wholly by the Benefit of the Caſtle that *Breſcia* was recovered, but by the Preſence and Dexterity of Monſieur *de Foix* and his Army. And this Example may be ſufficient to balance all others to the contrary; for we ſee daily in our Times, Multitudes of Caſtles taken and retaken, and following the Fate of their Cities, and that with no more Difficulty or variety of Fortune, than when there are none at all; as has been viſible in *Lombardy*, *Romagna*, the Kingdom of *Naples*, and all other Quarters of *Italy*. And as to thoſe Citadels which are built in your new Conqueſts, to defend you from your Enemies abroad; they alſo are abſolutely unneceſſary, where you have an Army in the Field; and where you have none, they are of no Uſe. A good Army without any ſuch Forts is ſufficient to defend you. And this has been found by Experience by all thoſe who have been thought excellent in the Arts of War, or of Peace; and particularly by the *Romans* and *Spartans*: The *Romans* never erected any new Caſtles, and the *Spartans* never ſuffered any old; but what Cities ſoever they conquered, down went their Walls; nay, even in their own Cities they would not permit any Fortification, as believing nothing ſo proper to defend them as the Virtue and Courage of their Citizens. A *Spartan* being demanded by an *Athenian*, *Whether the Walls of* Athens *were not very beautiful? Yes, ſays the* Spartan, *if it was but inhabited by Women.* A Prince therefore who has a good Army in the Field, may have ſome Benefit by his Caſtles, if they be upon the Frontiers of his Country, or in ſome Places upon the Coaſt, where they may retard and entertain an Enemy for ſome Time till the Army can come up: But if the Prince has no Army on Foot, let his Caſtles be where they will, upon the Frontiers or elſewhere, they are either unſerviceable or dangerous: Dangerous, becauſe they are eaſily loſt, and made uſe of by the Enemy againſt you; or if they be too ſtrong to be taken, yet the Enemy marches on, and leaves them unſerviceably behind him. For an Army that has no Enemy in the Field to confront it, takes no Notice of Cities or Caſtles, but paſſing by as it pleaſes, rambles up and down, and ravages the whole Country: as may be obſerved both in ancient Hiſtory and new. *Franceſco Maria* not many Years ſince invaded the Dutchy of *Urbin*, nor concern'd himſelf at all, though he left Ten of his Enemies Cities behind him. Wherefore that Prince who has a good Army, need not ſtand upon Caſtles; and he that has no Caſtles, need not trouble himſelf to build any; all that he is to do, is, to fortify the Town of his own Reſidence as well as he can, and accuſtom the Citizens to Arms, that he may be able to ſuſtain an Enemy, at leaſt for a while, till he can make his Conditions, or procure Relief: All other Deſigns are expenſive in Times of Peace; and unprofitable in Time of War; ſo that he who conſiders what has been ſaid, muſt acknowledge that as the *Romans* were wiſe in every Thing elſe, ſo more particularly in their Affairs with the *Latins* and *Privernates*, in not thinking of Caſtles and Fortreſſes, but of more noble and generous Ways of ſecuring their Allegiance.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXV.

To attempt a City full of inteſtine Diviſions, and to expect to carry it thereby, is uncertain and dangerous.

THE Diviſions in the Commonwealth of *Rome* were ſo great betwixt the People and the Nobility, that the *Veientes* and *Hetruſci*, taking the Opportunity, conſpired its Deſtruction, and having raiſed an Army, and haraſſed their whole Country, the Senate ſent out G. *Manlius*, and *M. Fabius* againſt them; whoſe Army encamping near the Enemy, were ſo provoked by the Inſolence of their Language, that the *Romans* laid aſide their private Animoſities, and coming to a Battel overthrew them; by which we may obſerve how eaſily we err in our Counſels, and how we loſe Things many Times the ſame Way by which we intended to gain them. The *Veientes* thought by aſſaulting the *Romans* whilſt they were embroil'd in their inteſtine Diviſions, they ſhould certainly overcome them; and their invading them at that Time, united the Enemy, and ruined themſelves; and not without Reaſon; for the Occaſion of Diſcord and Faction in a Commonwealth is Idleneſs and Peace; and there is nothing unites like Apprehenſion of War. So that had the *Veientes* been wiſe as they ſhould have been, they ſhould have forborn making War upon them at that Time, and have tried other artificial Ways to have deſtroyed them. The ſureſt Way is to inſinuate, and make your ſelf a Mediator betwixt them, and to take upon your ſelf the Arbitration, rather than they ſhould come to blows. When it is come to that, you are privately and gently to ſupply the weaker Side; to foment and continue the War, till they conſume one another; but be ſure your Supplies be not too great, leſt both Parties begin to ſuſpect you, and believe your Deſign is to ruin them both, and make your ſelf Prince. If this Way be well managed, it will certainly bring you to the End which you deſired; for when both Sides are weary, they will commit themſelves to your Arbitration. By theſe Arts, the City of *Piſtoia* returned to its Dependance upon *Florence*; for labouring under inteſtine Diviſions, the *Florentines* favouring firſt one Side, and then the other (but ſo ſlily that no Occaſion of Jealouſy was given to either) brought them both in a ſhort Time to be weary of their Diſtractions, and throw themſelves unanimouſly into their Arms. The Government of the City of *Siena* had never been changed by their own domeſtick Diſſentions, had not the *Florentines* ſupplied both Parties under-hand, and fomented them that Way; whereas had they appeared openly and above-board, it would have been a means to have united them. I ſhall add one Example more; *Philip Viſconti* Duke of *Milan*, made War many Times upon the *Florentines*, hoping by the Diſſentions of the City to have conquered them the more eaſily, but he never ſucceeded. So that complaining one Time of his Misfortunes, he had this Expreſſion, *The Follies of the* Florentines *have coſt me Two Millions of Money to no Purpoſe.* In ſhort, as the *Veientes* and *Tuſcans* found themſelves in an Error, (when they thought by Help of the Differences in *Rome*, to have maſtered the *Romans*) and were ruined themſelves for their Pains; ſo it will fare with whoever takes that Way to oppreſs or ſubvert any other Government.

CHAP. XXVI.

He who contemns or reproaches another Perſon, incurs his Hatred, without any Advantage to himſelf.

I Look upon it as one of the greateſt Points of Diſcretion in a Man, to forbear Injury and Threatning, eſpecially in Words: Neither of them weakens the Enemy, but Threatning makes him more cautious, and Injury the more inveterate, and induſtrious to revenge it. This is manifeſt by the Example of the *Veienti* (of which I diſcourſed in the foregoing Chapter;) for not contenting themſelves with the Miſchiefs that they brought upon them by the War, they added Contumely and opprobrious Language, which ſo provoked and inflamed the *Roman* Army, that whereas before they were irreſolute, and ſeemed to decline it, they now fell upon them unanimouſly, and overthrew them. So that it ought to be the principal Care in an Officer, that neither himſelf nor his Soldiers do incenſe and exaſperate his Enemy by ill Language; for that makes him but the more ſo, does not at all hinder him from revenging himſelf, but does the Author more Miſchief than the Enemy. And

of this we have a notable Example in *Aſia*. *Gabades* the *Perſian* General having beſieged *Amida* a long Time, without any conſiderable Progreſs; weary of the Tediouſneſs of the Leaguer, and hopeleſs of Succeſs, he reſolved to draw off and be gone; but as he was raiſing his Camp, the Gariſon perceiving it, got all upon the Walls, and with the baſeſt and moſt provoking Circumſtances imaginable upbraided them with Cowardice; which nettled *Gabedes* in ſuch manner, that he changed his Counſels, ſate down again, and ply'd it with that Induſtry and Indignation, that he took it in few Days, and gave it up to the Fury of the Soldiers. The ſame Thing happened to the *Veienti* (as I ſaid before) who not contenting themſelves to make War upon the *Romans*, went up under their very Noſes to reproach them. And what followed? They irritated them ſo, that they ſettled the Courage, and united the Animoſities of the *Roman* Army, and put them into ſo high a Fit of Impatience, that they forced the Conſul to a Battel, in which the *Veientes* received the Reward of their Contumacy. He therefore who is General of an Army, or Governor of a Commonwealth, and commands or governs diſcreetly, takes particular Care that ſuch ill Language be not uſed either in the City or Army, to one another, nor to the Enemy: For to an Enemy, they make him but worſe, unleſs ſuch Remedies be applied, as are practiſed by wiſe Men. The *Romans* having left Two of their Legions at *Capua*, they conſpired againſt the *Capuans* (as ſhall be deſcribed more largely hereafter) which occaſioned a great Sedition; but it was afterwards appeaſed by *Valerius Corvinus*, and among other Things neceſſary in that Juncture, an Act of Oblivion was paſſed, with great Penalty to any Man that ſhould upbraid any of the Soldiers by their Sedition. *Tiberius Grachus* having the Command of a certain Number of Servants (in the Time of *Hanibal*'s Wars) which the Scarcity of Men had forced the *Romans* to Arm, made it no leſs than Death for any Man to reproach them by their Servitude. So mindful were the *Roman* Officers always of preventing ſuch Exprobation, as knowing that nothing provokes and incenſes a Man ſo highly as to have his Imperfections reap'd up, whether in Earneſt or in Jeſt, 'tis the ſame Thing. *Nam facetiæ aſperæ, quando nimium ex vero traxere, acrem ſui memoriam relinquunt*: For biting Raillery, eſpecially with a Tincture of Truth, leaves an ill Impreſſion upon the Memory.

CHAP. XXVII.

Wiſe Princes, and well-governed States, ought to be contented with Victory; for many Times whilſt they think to puſh Things forward, they loſe all.

THAT we uſe our Enemy with rude and diſhonourable Language, proceeds either from Inſolence upon ſome Victory paſt, or extraordinary Confidence of obtaining it, which being falſe, perplexes our Underſtanding, and makes us err not only in our Words, but our Actions. For from the Time that Error ſeizes upon our Judgments, it makes us many Times loſe the Occaſion of a certain Good, in hopes of a better that is but uncertain, which is a Point not unworthy our Conſideration, ſeeing thereby our Reaſon is diſturbed, and our State many Times brought in Danger of Ruin; and this I ſhall demonſtrate by Examples both ancient and modern, becauſe Arguments cannot do it ſo diſtinctly. *Hanibal* after he had defeated the *Romans* at *Cannas*, ſent Meſſengers to *Carthage* with the News of his Victory, and to deſire Supplies. The Senate was a long Time in Counſel what was to be done. *Annon*, a grave and ſolid Citizen being preſent, adviſed them to make wiſe Uſe of their Victory, and think of making Peace with the *Romans*, which they might do upon better Conditions, now they were Conquerors, than they were in reaſon to expect upon any Diſaſter. That the *Carthaginians* had ſatisfied the whole World, that they were able to balance the *Romans*; for they had fought with them, and beaten them; and having gone ſo far with Honour and Succeſs, they ought not (at leaſt in his Judgment) expoſe what they had got, and by hoping for more run a Hazard of loſing all: But this Counſel was not followed, though afterwards, when too late, it was found to be the better.

Alexander the great had conquered all the *Eaſt*, when the Commonwealth of *Tyre* (a great Town ſituate like *Venice* in the Water) amazed at the Grandeur of *Alexander*, ſent Ambaſſadors to him to offer him their Obedience and Subjection upon what Terms he pleaſed, only they were unwilling either himſelf, or any of his Army ſhould come into their Town. *Alexander* diſdaining to be excluded by a private City, to whom the whole World had opened their Gates, rejected their Offers, ſent their Ambaſſadors back, and went immediately to beſiege it. The Town ſtood in the Sea, and was well provided both with

Victual and Ammunition; inſomuch as at Four Months End, *Alexander* began to conſider that that ſingle Town had deprived his Glory of more Time, than many other of his Conqueſts of much greater Importance: Whereupon he reſolved to come to an Agreement with them, and to grant them the Conditions which they demanded at firſt; but the *Tyrians* tranſported with Pride, not only refuſed his Proffers, but put his Meſſengers to death; upon which in a Rage *Alexander* cauſed it to be aſſaulted immediately, and it was done with that Fury, that the Town was taken and ſack'd, and part of the People put to the Sword, and the reſt made Slaves. In the Year 1512. a *Spaniſh* Army came into the Dominions of the *Florentines* to reſtore the *Medici* in *Florence*, and tax the City; and they were called in, and conducted by the Citizens themſelves, who had promiſed, that as ſoon as they had appeared in thoſe Parts, they would take Arms, and declare for them. Being entered in the Plane, and finding no body to join with them, or ſupply them, Scarcity of Proviſions prevailed with the *Spaniard* to think of a Treaty, and propoſe it to the Enemy; but the *Florentines* were too high, and refuſed it, which was the Loſs of *Prato*, and the Ruin of their State. So then a Prince that is attack'd by another Prince more potent than himſelf, cannot be guilty of a greater Error, than to refuſe an Agreement, eſpecially when it is offered; for it can never be ſo bad, but it ſhall have in it ſomething of Advantage for him who accepts it, and perhaps contribute to his Victory. It ought therefore to have ſatisfied the People of *Tyre*, that *Alexander* accepted of the Conditions which he had formerly denied them; and it had been Victory enough for them, that with Arms in their Hands they had forced ſo great a Conqueror to condeſcend. It was the ſame Caſe with the *Florentines*; they ought to have been contented, and thought it honour enough that the *Spaniſh* Army complied, and was reduced to a Condition of granting Part of their Deſires, though they would not gratify them in all; for it was plain, the Deſign of that Army was to change the Government; to break the League with the *French*; and to raiſe what Money upon them they could. Though of theſe Three Points, they had obtained the Two laſt, and the firſt alone had remained entire to the *Florentines* (that is to ſay, the Government of the City) every Citizen (beſides the Security of his Life) would have had ſome Honour and Satisfaction, without concerning themſelves ſo much for the Loſs of the other Two. And though by the Poſture of their Affairs their Succeſs ſeem'd to be certain, yet they ought not to have expoſed Things to the Diſcretion of Fortune, ſeeing their all was at Stake, which no wiſe Man will hazard but upon inevitable Neceſſity. *Hanibal* having left *Italy*, where he had been Sixteen Years together, with a great deal of Honour, being called Home to the Relief of his own Countrey, found *Aſdrubal* and *Siphax* defeated; the Kingdom of *Numidia* loſt; the *Carthaginians* retired, and coop'd up within the Circumference of their own Walls, ſo as they had no Hopes but in *Hanibal* and his Army. *Hanibal* being ſenſible that this was the laſt Caſt, and that if he miſcarried, his Country was quite loſt, reſolved to put nothing to a Hazard, till he had tried all other Ways; and was not aſhamed to make the firſt Overture of a Peace, as knowing that if there were any Hopes left for his Country, it was in that, rather than War; but being refuſed, he reſolved to fight (though with very little Hopes) ſuppoſing he might poſſibly win the Day, or if he did loſe it, it ſhould not be without leaving ſome Teſtimony of his Courage and Generoſity. If then *Hanibal*, a Perſon of that great Experience and Conduct, at the Head of a great Army, choſe rather to have had Things determined by Treaty and Accommodation than Battel; upon the Loſs of which, the Wealth and Liberty of his Country depended: What is he to do, who has not his Courage nor Experience? But Men are ſubject to ſtrange and imaginary Hopes, upon which repoſing with too much Confidence, they take their Meaſures amiſs, and are many times ruined.

CHAP. XXVIII.

How much it is for the Intereſt of all Governments that all Injury be puniſhed, whether againſt the Publick or Particular Perſons.

IT is eaſily known to what Men are often tranſported by Choler and Indignation, by what happened to the *Romans*, when they ſent three *Fabii* Ambaſſadors towards the *Gauls*, who were entered into *Tuſcany*, and had laid Siege to *Cluſium*. For the *Cluſians* being beſieged, ſent to the *Romans* to relieve them, and the *Romans* ſent to the *French* to require them in the Name of the People of *Rome*, to withdraw their Forces out of *Tuſcany*. The *Roman* Ambaſſadors arrived at the Army, but being better Soldiers than Orators, when

when the Armies came to engage, they put themſelves at the Head of the *Cluſians*, to fight againſt the *French*; which being obſerved by the *French*, turn'd all their former Hatred to the *Tuſcans*, upon the *Romans*, which was much increaſed after they had ſent Ambaſſadors to complain of it at *Rome*, and to require that thoſe who had committed that Fault, might be delivered up into their Hands, to make Satisfaction for their Offence. But inſtead of granting their Demands, or puniſhing their Delinquency themſelves, they were created Tribunes with Conſular Authority. Which coming afterwards to the Ears of the *French*, finding thoſe Perſons advanced, who ought rather to have been puniſhed, they interpreted it as done in Affront to them; and being inflamed with Anger and Diſdain, they marched directly to *Rome*, aſſaulted and took it, all but the Capitol; which happened to them for nothing, but that the *Romans*, (when their Ambaſſadors had *contra jus gentium*, fought againſt the *French*) had been ſo far from doing them Juſtice, that the ſaid Ambaſſadors were advanced and preferred. For which Reaſon, a Prince and Commonwealth is to take Care that no ſuch Injury be done, not only to a Nation, or Commonalty, but to any particular Perſon; for if a Man be highly offended either by a State, or private Perſon, and has not the Satisfaction he deſires; if it be in a Republick, he ceaſes not to purſue his Revenge, though with the Ruin of the State: If it be under a Monarchy, and he finds himſelf touched in Point of Honour, if he has the leaſt ſpark of Generoſity in him, he will never be quiet till he be revenged, though with never ſo much Prejudice to himſelf. Of which Caſe we cannot have an apter and truer Example, than in *Philip* of *Macedon*, the Father of *Alexander* the Great. *Philip* had in his Court a young Gentleman of very exquiſite Beauty, called *Pauſanias*, with whom *Attalus* (a great Favourite of the ſaid *Philip*'s) was enamoured; having tempted and ſollicited him many Times to ſatisfy his Paſſion, and found him always averſe, he reſolved to do that by Force or Surprize, which he could not do otherwiſe: To this Purpoſe he made a ſolemn Feaſt, and invited *Pauſanias* and ſeveral other great Perſons: When they had filled themſelves well with their good Cheer, he cauſed *Pauſanias* to be taken from the Table, and carried to a private Place, and not only ſatisfied his own Luſt, but cauſed him to be vitiated by ſeveral others. *Pauſanias* complained heavily to King *Philip*, who having kept him for ſome Time, in hopes of doing him Juſtice, inſtead of performing it, he advanced *Attalus* to the Government of a Province in *Greece*: Which *Pauſanias* reſenting, in great Anger that his Adverſary, againſt whom he had ſo long, and ſo earneſtly ſollicited, ſhould now be preferred, he began to turn his Indignation upon the King, who had refuſed to right him, rather than upon the Perſon who had done him the Wrong: Inſomuch that the very Morning his Daughter was married to *Alexander* of *Epirus*, as *Philip* was going to the Temple to celebrate the Nuptiality with his Son *Alexander* on one Hand of him, and his new Son-in-Law on the other, *Pauſanias* aſſaulted and ſlew him. This Example is much like that of the *Romans*, and is to be obſerved by any Man that governs; who is never to deſpiſe any body ſo as not to believe but he who is injured will revenge himſelf ſome Time or other, though with never ſo much Danger and Detriment to himſelf.

CHAP. XXIX.

Fortune caſts a Miſt before Peoples Eyes, when ſhe would not have them oppoſe her Deſigns.

IF the Courſe of human Affairs be conſidered, it will appear that many Accidents ariſe, againſt which the Heavens do not ſuffer us to provide: And when this happened at *Rome*, where there was ſo much Virtue, and Piety, and Order, well may it happen more frequently in thoſe Cities and Provinces where there is no ſuch Things to be found. And becauſe the Place is remarkable, to ſhow the Influence which the Heavens have upon Human Affairs, *Titus Livius* has diſcourſed of it largely and efficatiouſly, telling us, That the Stars to make us ſenſible of their Power, firſt diſpoſed the ſaid *Fabii* (who were ſent Ambaſſadors to the *French*) to fight as aboveſaid; to the end that upon that Occaſion, they might make War upon *Rome*. In the next Place, they beſotted the *Romans* ſo, as they did nothing worthy of the Name of *Romans* in order to their Defence, having baniſhed *Camillus* (the only Perſon capable of ſtanding them in Stead) to *Ardea*. Again, when the *French* were upon their March towards *Rome*, thoſe who to repel the Inroads of the *Volſci*, and other bordering Enemies, had made Dictators many times, and with very good Succeſs, made none upon the Approach of the *French*. They were ſo ſlow likewiſe, and ſo remiſs in

the raiſing of Men, and ſo tedious in furniſhing them with Arms, that they could ſcarce draw out any conſiderable Force againſt them, till the Enemy was as far as the River *Allia*, which is within Ten Miles of *Rome*; and when their Army was come thither, it was not encamped by the Tribunes with the uſual Diligence and Diſcretion, they having neither choſen a good Place, nor drawn their Line, nor fortified themſelves with Trenches, nor Stoccadoes as formerly, nor done any Thing for their Security, either Human, or Divine: When they came to Fight, they drew up their Men ſo awkwardly and untowardly, that neither Soldier nor Officer did any Thing worthy of the Diſcipline of the *Romans*, ſo that the Battel was loſt without any Effuſion of Blood, the *Romans* running at the very firſt Charge, the greateſt Part of them to *Veii*, the reſt to *Rome*, and in ſuch Conſternation, that they fled directly to the Capitol before they went Home to their Houſes. So that the Senate, without ſo much as thinking to defend their City, any more than the reſt, never cauſed the Gates to be ſhut, but part of them fled away, and part into the Capitol. There, it is true, they began to obſerve better Orders than before, and managed Things with leſs Confuſion: They diſcharged all thoſe that were unſerviceable, and furniſhed themſelves with what Proviſion they could get, that they might be able to hold out. The greateſt Part of thoſe uſeleſs People which were turn'd out of the Capitol, as old Men, Women, and Children, fled into the Neighbouring Cities; the reſt continued in *Rome*, and were a Prey to the *French*. So that if a Man ſhould have read their Exploits in former Times, and compared them with their Actions then, he would not have believed them to be the ſame People; and *Titus Livius* gives the Reaſon, after he had deſcribed all the Diſorders aforeſaid, in theſe Words, *Adeo obcæcat animos fortuna, cum vim ſuam ingruentem refringi non vult. So ſtrangely does Fortune blind other People, when ſhe would not be obſtructed in her Deſigns*; and there can be nothing more true. Wherefore Men are not ſo much to be blamed or commended for their Adverſity or Proſperity; for it is frequently ſeen, ſome are hurried to Ruin, and others advanced to great Honour, by the Swing and Impulſe of their Fate; Wiſdom availing little againſt the Misfortunes of the one, and Folly as little againſt the Felicity of the other. When Fortune deſigns any great Matter, ſhe makes Choice of ſome Man of ſuch Courage and Parts, as is able to diſcern when ſhe preſents him with an Occaſion: And ſo on the other Side, when ſhe intends any great Deſtruction, ſhe has her Inſtruments ready to puſh on the Wheel, and aſſiſt to her Deſigns; and if there be any Man capable of obſtructing them in the leaſt, ſhe either rids him out of the Way, or deprives him of all Authority, and leaves him without any Faculty to do Good. And this is abundantly cleared by this Place, where Fortune, to amplify *Rome*, and bring it to that Grandeur to which it arrived afterwards, thought fit to debaſe it, (as we ſhall ſhow at large in the beginning of our Third Book) but would not utterly deſtroy it: For which Reaſon, though ſhe permitted *Camillus* to be baniſhed, ſhe would not ſuffer him to be killed; though ſhe let *Rome* be taken, ſhe preſerved the Capitol: Though ſhe intimidated the *Romans*, and would ſuffer them to do nothing wiſely for the Safety of the City, yet ſhe left them ſo much Wiſdom as ſecured the Capitol. That *Rome* might be taken, ſhe cauſed the greateſt Part of the Army that was defeated upon the *Allia*, to retire to *Veii*, thereby cutting off all Ways for the Defence of *Rome*: But in the midſt of her Career, when ſhe ſeem'd in ſuch Haſte, and ſo impatient of its Deſtruction, ſhe prepared every Thing that was neceſſary for its Preſervation; having conveyed a good Army to *Veii*, and *Camillus* to *Ardea*, that once again they might make Head under a General, whoſe Reputation was never ſully'd with the Ignominy of ſuch a Loſs, but ſtood clear and entire for the Recovery of his Country. And here we might bring ſtore of modern Examples to prove what is ſaid, were not this ſufficient without them. Yet this I ſhall aſſert again (and by the Occurrences in all Hiſtory there is nothing more true) that Men may ſecond their Fortune, not reſiſt it; and follow the order of her Deſigns, but by no Means defeat them: Nevertheleſs, Men are not wholly to abandon themſelves, becauſe they know not her End; for her Ways being unknown and irregular, may poſſibly be at laſt for our Good; ſo that we are always to hope the beſt, and that Hope is to preſerve us in whatever Troubles or Diſtreſſes we ſhall fall.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXX.

Princes and Republicks that are truly Magnificent, do not make their Leagues and Alliances with Money, but by their Virtue, Reputation, and Force.

THE *Romans* were beſieged in the Capitol, and though they were in Expectation of Relief from *Veii* and *Camillus*, yet Famine conſtraining them, they propoſed a Parley with the *French*, and were to pay a certain Sum of Money for their Liberty: The Articles were ſign'd, all Things concluded, and Commiſſioners ſent in to receive the Money, when on a ſudden *Camillus* appears with his Army, as if Fortune had done it (ſays *Livy*) *Ut Romani auro redempti non viverent. That it might not be ſaid the* Romans *had ever been Ranſom'd:* Which Point is not only obſervable in this Place, but in the whole Progreſs of the Affairs of that Commonwealth; where it may be ſeen that they never got Town, nor never made Peace with their Money; whatever they did, was bravely, and with their Arms; which I think is more than can be ſaid of any other State in the World. One of the great Marks of the Puiſſance of this Commonwealth, was the manner of her living with her Neighbours. When Things are ſo managed in a Government, that the Neighbours purchaſe its Amity, and make themſelves its Penſioners; 'tis a certain Sign of the Potency of that Government: But when the Neighbours on the contrary receive Money from it, 'tis as infallible a Sign of its Weakneſs. If one reads the *Roman* Hiſtory, he ſhall find the *Maſſilians*, the *Edui*, the *Rhodians*, *Hiero* of *Syracuſe*, and *Maſſiniſſa*, as they were Neighbours, ſo they were Tributaries to the *Romans*, contributing to their Expences and Taxes as there was Occaſion, without Expectation of any other Recompence, but Protection. Where a Prince or Commonwealth is weak, it is otherwiſe, as it appeared by our own City of *Florence*, which in former Times, when it was in its greateſt Reputation, paid annual Stipends to moſt of the little Governments in *Romania*, beſides what was received by the *Perugians*, *Caſtellans*, and all their other Neighbours; whereas had it been ſtrong, and well Armed, it would have been quite otherwiſe, and all the reſt would have given *Florence* Money for her Protection. Nor were the *Florentines* ſingular in this Caſe, the *Venetians* did the ſame, and ſo did the King of *France*, who notwithſtanding the Greatneſs of his Kingdom, was tributary to the *Switzers*, and the King of *England*; which proceeded from his having diſarmed the People, and preferring a preſent Opportunity of ſqueezing them, and avoiding an imaginary Danger, before the doing thoſe Things that might have ſecured his State, and made it happy for ever; which Practice, though for ſome Time it may produce Quiet and Repoſe, yet the End is Troubles, and Loſſes, and Ruin without Remedy.

It would be too tedious to recount how often the *Florentines*, the *Venetians*, and the Kingdom of *France*, have bought off their Wars, and ſubmitted to ſuch diſhonourable Terms, as the *Romans* could never be brought to but once. It would be too tedious to recount how many Towns the *Florentines* and the *Venetians* have bought with their Money, which have been the Occaſion of great Diſorders afterwards, and prov'd that what is gotten by Gold, is not to be kept with Iron.

This Point of Generoſity, and this manner of Living, the *Romans* obſerved very punctually whilſt they were free; but after they fell under the Government of Emperors, and thoſe Emperors grew bad, they began to degenerate too, and prefer the Shadow before the Sun. They began to be Penſionaries firſt to the *Parthians*, then to the *Germans*, and by Degrees to all their Neighbours, which was the firſt Step to the Ruin of that great Empire; and all theſe Inconveniencies proceeded from the diſarming of the People, and neglecting to train them up to Military Diſcipline, from whence a greater Miſchief does ariſe; and that is, that the nearer the Enemy approaches, the weaker and more unable he finds you; and therefore, not being ſtrong enough of your ſelf to repel the Enemy from your Borders, you are forced to pay Tribute to your Neighbours to undertake it for you; which being to be raiſed and extorted from your Subjects, renders them more feeble and impotent. By which Means it happens ſometimes that thoſe States which are in this Condition, may perhaps make ſome little Reſiſtance upon the Frontiers; but if the Enemy paſſes that, all is gone without Remedy. But all this is diſorderly, and unnatural; for as Nature in all Animals has fortified the Vital and Principal, and not extreme Parts of the Body, becauſe the Body can ſubſiſt without the one, but not without the other. So 'tis in all Governments, the Heart and Center is to be fortified, rather than the Frontiers: But this was very ill obſerved by the *Florentines*; for whenever an Enemy had paſt our Borders, and took his way towards the City, there was no body in a Condition to oppoſe him. It was the ſame with

with the *Venetians* not many Years ſince, and had not their City been as it were ſwadled with the Sea, it had been certainly deſtroyed. This indeed has not been ſeen ſo frequently in *France*, becauſe it is ſo great a Kingdom, and tòo ſtrong for moſt of its Neighbours; nevertheleſs when in the Year 1513, they were invaded by the *Engliſh*, the whole Kingdom trembled, and the King of *France* himſelf, and many others were of Opinion, that if he loſt one Battel, the whole Kingdom was gone. With the *Romans* it was quite contrary; the nearer the Enemy approached the City, the ſtronger he found it: This was evident in *Hanibal*'s Invaſion: Though he had forc'd his Way into *Italy*, fought Three great Battels with the *Romans*, and beat them in every one; though they had loſt ſo many brave Solders and Officers, yet they were not only able to continue the War, but to conquer them at laſt, and all by fortifying the Heart and Center of their Countrey, and leaving the Extremities to ſhift for themſelves: for the Vitals and Fundamentals of their State was the People of *Rome*, the Country of the *Latins*, the neighbouring Cities that were in League, and their Colonies from whence they drew ſo many Soldiers as were able to fight, and entertain the whole World. And this *Hanno* the *Carthaginian* underſtood very well: For when after the Battel at *Cannæ*, *Hanibal* ſent *Mago* to *Carthage* to give them an Account of the Particulars of the Victory, *Magò* having exceedingly magnified the Exploits of his Brother, and debaſed the Condition of the *Romans*, *Hanno* interrupted him, and enquir'd whether any of the *Roman* Cities, or any of their Confederates had revolted? Whether any of their Senators were come in to *Hanibal*? Or whether they had ſent any Ambaſſadors to him to treat? And when *Mago* denied that any Thing of all this had paſſed, *Hanno* replied, *Hoſtium ergo multum ſupereſt, & bellum tam integrum habemus, atque habuimus qua die* Annibal Italiam *eſt ingreſſus*; *There is work enough behind, and the War is as entire as when* Hanibal *paſſed firſt into* Italy. It is apparent therefore, both by what is ſaid in this Chapter, and what has been ſaid often before, that there is great Difference betwixt the preſent and ancient Methods of the *Romans*; and if we ſeriouſly conſider it, we ſhall not wonder that ſo many Towns are taken and loſt, and ſo many Governments ſubverted, as we have ſeen in our Days: For where Diſcipline is neglected, and military Virtue laid aſide, all Things are committed wholly to Fortune, which being various and unconſtant, produces various Mutations; and this Viciſſitude and Unconſtancy of Affairs will continue till ſome excellent Perſon ariſes to reſtore the ancient Diſcipline, and reſtrain Fortune from giving ſuch Evidences of her Power every Hour of the Day.

CHAP. XXXI.

How dangerous it is to believe Exiles too far.

I Think it not amiſs in this Place to ſhew how much it imports all Perſons not to give too much Credit to thoſe who are baniſhed; for many times they are but the Practices and Stratagems of Princes and States. We have a memorable Example of their Inconſtancy in *Livy*, though ſomething improper. When *Alexander* the Great paſſed into *Aſia* with his Army, *Alexander* of *Epirus*, his Kinſman and Uncle, paſſed with another into *Italy*, invited by the Exiles of *Lucca*, who put him in Hopes that by their means he ſhould be Maſter of that whole Province: But when he was come into *Italy*, inſtead of aſſiſting him, they conſpir'd againſt him, and ſlew him, upon Promiſe of Indemnity, and Reſtitution of their Eſtates. From whence we may learn what Faith is to be given to ſuch as are baniſhed out of their own Country: For as to their Engagements, they are nothing; it is not to be doubted but whenever they can return by any other means, they will leave you, and betake themſelves to any body elſe, notwithſtanding any Promiſe or Engagement to you; and that which makes their Promiſes and Confidence the leſs to be truſted, is, becauſe their extreme Paſſion and Deſire to come Home, make them believe many Things that are impoſſible, and pretend many Things that they do not believe: So that betwixt what they believe, and what they pretend, they feed you with fair Hopes; but if you depend upon them, you are undone, your Expence is all loſt, and your whole Enterprize miſcarries; I ſhall only give you an Inſtance in the aforeſaid *Alexander*, and *Themiſtocles* the *Athenian*; *Themiſtocles* being in Rebellion againſt the *Athenians*, fled into *Aſia* to *Darius*, whom he ſolicited with large Promiſes to an Expedition into *Greece*. *Darius* was perſuaded, and paſſed into *Greece*, but *Themiſtocles* being unable to make his Promiſes good, either for ſhame of what he had done, or fear of Puniſhment for what he had not, he poiſoned himſelf; and if *Themiſtocles*, a Man of that Excellence and Virtue, could delude the King, and promiſe more than he could

perform, how little are they to be truſted, who having no ſuch Thing to reſtrain them, give themſelves up wholly to their Paſſion and Deſires? Princes therefore and States ought to be very tender of undertaking any Enterprize upon the Encouragement of an Exile, for they ſeldom ſucceed. And becauſe it ſeldom happens that Towns are taken by Intelligence within, I ſhall diſcourſe of it in my next Chapter, and add what Variety of Ways the *Romans* uſed to come by their Conqueſts.

CHAP. XXXII.

How many ſeveral Ways the Romans *uſed to conquer their Towns.*

THE *Romans* being a martial People, and given wholly to War, they conſidered every Thing very diligently that might any Ways conduce to the facilitating their Deſigns; whether it was matter of Charge, or any Thing elſe: for this Reaſon they ſeldom attempted any Town by the Way of Siege, becauſe they thought the Expence and Incommodity of that way would be more than could be recompenced by the taking it; ſo as they never tried that whilſt there was any other Hopes; and in all their great Wars, there are but very few Examples of any long Leaguers by them. The Ways which they took were commonly either by Storm, or Surrender: When they took a Town by Storm, it was either by open Force or Stratagem. Open Force was, when they made their Attack without battering the Walls, which they called *Aggredi urbem cum Corona*; *To begirt a Town*, becauſe they drew their whole Army round the Town, and fell on in all Quarters, and in this manner it happened ſometimes that they carried very conſiderable Places at one Storm, as when *Scipio* took new *Carthage* in *Spain*. If this Way was ineffectual, they battered down the Walls with their Rams, and other Engines of War. Sometimes they min'd, and entred the Towns under Ground, as they did at *Veii*; ſometimes that they might fight with the Enemy upon equal Terms, they built wooden Towers, or raiſed Mounts to the Height of the Walls from whence they might plague and moleſt them within their Works. The beſieged were in moſt Danger in the firſt Caſe upon a general Aſſault, for their Walls were to be made good in all Places at once, and it fell out many Times, that there were not Men enough to ſupply and relieve all Parts; or if they had Men enough to do that, they were not all of an equal Courage, and when any gave Ground, the whole Town was like to be loſt, and by this Means that Way was often ſucceſsful. When this Way miſcarried, they ſeldom ſate down before a Town, or went formally to beleaguer it, becauſe it could not be done but with greater Hazard to their Army, for their Quarters being to be extended, and their Guards round about the Town, they muſt of Neceſſity be thinner and weaker in ſome Places, and unable to make any conſiderable Oppoſition, if the Enemy ſhould make any conſiderable Eruption, ſo that the ſudden and briſk Way was preferr'd: When their Walls were battered with their Engines, thoſe who were in the Town defended themſelves much as we do now againſt great Guns, by repairing their Breaches as well as they could. Their way of defeating their Mines was by countermining, and oppoſing themſelves perſonally againſt the Enemy, or diſturbing them with their Inventions, as particularly putting of Feathers and Oils, and other ſtinking Stuff into Barrels of Wood, they ſet them on Fire, and then tumbled them among the Enemy, that what with the Fire, the Smoak, and the Stench, they might not be able to endure them. Their Towers of Wood, they deſtroyed commonly by throwing Fire into them; and then for the Mounts which were raiſed againſt the Walls, their Way was to dig under the Walls, and ſteal away their Earth, or by looſening the Foundations of the Mount, till it all fell to the Ground. But theſe Ways of taking a Town are not long to be tried; if they carried it not quickly, they raiſed their Siege, and ſought out ſome other Way of proſecuting the War, as *Scipio* did when he went over into *Africk*; for having aſſaulted *Utica*, without any Succeſs, he altered his Counſels, raiſed his Siege, and addreſſed himſelf wholly to the bringing the *Carthaginian* Army to an Engagement. Yet ſometimes they continued their Siege, as they did at *Veii*, *Carthage*, and *Jeruſalem*: As to their Way of taking of Towns by Fraud and Intelligence, (as they took *Palæpolis*) the *Romans* and others attempted many Places after that Manner, but they ſeldom ſucceeded; for thoſe ſecret Correſpondencies are eaſily diſcovered, and the leaſt Diſcovery ſpoils the whole Deſign, becauſe the Conſpiracy is commonly diſcovered before it comes to Execution, it either being unpracticable in it ſelf, or betrayed by the Infidelity of ſome of the Conſpirators; there being a Neceſſity of meeting and diſcourſing with ſuch Perſons, as it is not lawful to diſcourſe with, but

upon ſome ſpecious Occaſion. But ſuppoſe it be not diſcovered in the Management, there are ſo many Difficulties in putting it into Action, that it is almoſt impoſſible to overcome them; for if you come too ſoon, or too late, all is ſpoiled: If any Noiſe be made, (as by the Geeſe in the Capitol) the leaſt Diſorder, the leaſt Error or Miſtake deſtroys the whole Enterprize. Beſides, theſe Things being executed in the Night, the Darkneſs ſtrikes a Terror into the Inſtruments, and the more, becauſe they are commonly unacquainted with the Place or People which they are to attack; and therefore every little Noiſe or accident is ſufficient to confound them, and every trifling Imagination will make them turn their Backs; but no body was ſo daring and ſucceſsful in theſe fraudulent and nocturnal Deſigns as *Aratus Sicionius*, though in the Day-time he was but like other Men, which was rather from ſome ſecret Virtue in him, than any Excellence in the way. And as to the taking of Towns by Surrender, they either ſurrender freely, or by force. When they do it freely, it is done out of ſome extrinſick Neceſſity, (as when *Capua* ſurrendred to the *Romans*, for fear of falling into the Hands of the *Samnites*) or elſe out of Deſire to be well governed, as being taken with the Adminiſtration of that Prince to whom they ſurrender; and thus it was with the *Rhodians*, the *Maſſillians*, and other Cities which gave themſelves up to the *Romans* upon no other Inducement, but that they might live more happily under the *Roman* Laws, and be under a better Conſtitution. But there are many Cities which ſurrender by Force, which Force proceeds either from the Fatigues and Calamities of a tedious Siege, or from continual Excurſions and Depredations to which they are ſubject; and againſt which they have no other Way to ſecure themſelves. And then all the Ways we have mentioned, the *Romans* made more uſe of this, carrying on their Wars with their Neighbours Four Hundred and Fifty Years together, in this Manner for the moſt Part; for though they tried all the other, they found this the more profitable and ſafe. In Sieges there is Delay and Loſs of Time, in Storms Hazard and Danger; and Uncertainty in Conſpiracies: But in bringing Things to a Battel, it has been ſeen that by beating the Enemies Army, they have got a whole Kingdom in a Day, whereas an obſtinate Town has coſt them ſeveral Years.

CHAP. XXXIII.

How the Romans, *upon any Epedition, gave their Generals general Commiſſions.*

I Am of Opinion, that to read the Hiſtory of *Livy* with any Profit and Advantage we muſt conſider not only the Actions, but the whole Means and Proceſs both of the People and Senate of *Rome*. Among other Things, it is very remarkable with what Authority they inveſted their Conſuls, Dictators and Generals of their Armies, and it was ſo great, that the Senate reſerved to it ſelf only the Power of making Peace or new Wars, as they ſaw Occaſion; all the reſt was left to the Diſcretion of the Conſul, who might fight or not fight, aſſault this Town or that Town as he pleaſed, without any Contradiction.

This may be proved by many Examples, by more eſpecially by what happened in an Expedition againſt the *Tuſcans*; for *Fabius* the Conſul having defeated the Enemy at *Sutri*, reſolving to paſs the Forreſt of *Gimina* with his Army, and invade *Tuſcany*, he was ſo far from receiving Orders from the Senate, or conſulting them in the Buſineſs, that he gave them not the leaſt Notice, though the War was to be removed into another Country, and like to be very dangerous; which appeared by the Reſolution of the Senate in that very Caſe; for having heard of his Victory at *Sutri*, and apprehending that he might fall upon ſuch Counſels, and paſs his Army into *Tuſcany*, thorough that dangerous Forreſt, they ſent Two Ambaſſadors to him to adviſe him from that Expedition; but they came too late, for he was gone before, and having over-run the whole Country, and routed the Enemy, inſtead of hindering his Deſign, the Ambaſſadors went back with the News of his Victory. This Cuſtom of the *Romans*, if it be ſeriouſly conſidered, will be found to be very ſolid and wiſe. For ſhould the Senate have been conſulted by their Generals upon every particular Occaſion, and have expected all their Orders from them, it would have made their Generals leſs circumſpect and vigorous, becauſe the Honour of the Victory would not accrew totally to them, but they muſt participate with the Senate. Beſides, the Senate underſtood very well that fortune is various, and that many Accidents and Advantages happen, which

cannot be known or improved by any but thoſe who are preſent; ſo that if they ſhould deſire to be conſulted in Things of which they can have no Knowledge, they muſt of Neceſſity err, though they were Perſons of never ſo much Experience and Wiſdom. Wherefore they gave their General abſolute Power of diſpoſing all Things at his own Will, and the whole Honour of the Expedition was to be his, that it might be a Spur to prick on his Diligence, and a bridle to regulate his Raſhneſs. And this I have thought fit to inſert, that I might ſhew how much the famous Commonwealths in our Times do differ from the *Romans*, particularly the *Venetians* and *Florentines*, who are ſo ſtrict with their General, that if a great Gun be but to be planted againſt a Town, the Senate muſt be adviſed, and give order how, and from whence it is to play. But this Cuſtom deſerves Commendation as much as the reſt, which altogether have brought their Affairs into that ſad Condition in which they are at preſent.

THE

THE

DISCOURSES

OF

Nicholas Machiavel,

CITIZEN and *SECRETARY*

OF

FLORENCE,

Upon The

First Decade of *TITUS LIVIUS.*

LIBER III.

CHAP. I.

That a Sect or Commonwealth be Long-liv'd, it is neceſſary to correct it often, and reduce it towards its firſt Principles.

'TIS a certain Truth, That the Things of this World are determined, and a ſet Time appointed for their Duration; but thoſe run thorough the whole Courſe which is aſſigned them by their Stars, who keep their Body in ſuch Order, that it may not alter at all, or if it does, it is for the better. I ſpeak now of mix'd Bodies, as Commonwealths, and Sects, and I ſay, that thoſe Alterations are Salutiferous, which reduce them towards their firſt Principles; and therefore the beſt ordered, and longeſt liv'd, are they, who (by their own Orders) may be often renewed, or elſe by ſome Accident (without the help of the ſaid Orders) may tend to Renovation: 'Tis as clear as the Day, that no Bodies of Men are of long Duration, unleſs they be renewed; and the way to renew them (as is ſaid before) is to reduce them to their Principles. For the Fundamentals of all Sects, Commonwealths and Kingdoms, have always ſomething of Good in them; by Means of which they recover their firſt Reputation and Grandeur. And becauſe in Proceſs of Time that Goodneſs corrupts, that Body muſt of Neceſſity die, unleſs ſomething intervenes that reduces it to its firſt Principles. The Phyſician ſpeaking of the Body of Man, tells us, *Quod quotidie aggregatur aliquid, quod quandoque indiget curatione*; *That there is not a Day paſſes, but it contracts ſomething which afterwards will require to be cured.* 'Tis the ſame with the Body Politick; and as to them, I ſay that they are to be cured, by being renewed; and they are renewed, partly by external Accident, and partly by internal Prudence. The firſt happens as it were by Deſtiny or Fate, as that *Rome* ſhould be taken by the *French*, that thereby it might reaſſume its old Cuſtoms and Virtues, and revive its Ancient Worſhip, Re-

ligion and Juſtice, which were ſuperannuated and decayed, as appears very plain by the Deſcription of their Preparation againſt the *French*, in which it is declared by *Titus Livius*, that upon the marching out of their Army, and inveſting their Tribunes with Conſular Power, they obſerved no Religious Ceremony: At the ſame Time they not only refuſed to correct the Three *Fabii*, who *contra jus gentium* had fought againſt the *French*, but created them Tribunes. And it is eaſily to be preſum'd that they made leſs Account of the good Laws and Conſtitutions ordained by *Romulus*, and other wiſe Princes, than was reaſonable and (perhaps) neceſſary to preſerve the Liberty of their State. This Foreign Invaſion happened to them therefore, that all the obſolete Laws of that City might be revived, and that the People might be taught that it was neceſſary not only to maintain Religion and Juſtice, but to reſpect their good Citizens, and eſteem their Virtue above the Advantages which they ſeemed to want, for want of their Aſſiſtance. And it fell out exactly; for *Rome* was no ſooner taken, but they began to renew the Orders of their old Religion: they puniſhed the *Fabii*, who had fought againſt the Law of Nations, and conceived ſo great a Value for *Camillus*, that the Senate and People both laid aſide their old Animoſity, and plac'd the whole Burden of the Commonwealth upon his ſingle Shoulders. 'Tis neceſſary therefore (as was ſaid before) that Men which live together under a Government, be often reminded by theſe exterior or interior Accidents. The interior way is when there is a Law which takes an Account of all People in that Corporation; or elſe when there is ſome excellent Perſon among them, who by his virtuous Example does the ſame Thing, ſo that this Happineſs reſults to a Commonwealth, either by the Virtue of ſome great Perſon, or the Authority of ſome Law. And as to this laſt, the Orders which reduc'd the Commonwealth towards its firſt Principles, were the Tribunes of the People, the Cenſors, and all the other Laws againſt the Ambition and Inſolence of Man; which Laws have need to be revived and quickned by the Virtue of ſome Citizen, who with great Courage and Generoſity ſhall put them in Execution, in deſpight of all the Power of the Delinquents. The moſt remarkable Executions before the taking of *Rome* by the *French*, were the Death of *Brutus* his Sons, the Puniſhment of the *Decem-viri*, the Execution of *Sp. Melius*: After the City was ſack'd by the *French*, the moſt conſiderable were the Death of *Manlius Capitolinus*, the Death of the Son of *Manlius Torquatus*, the Proſecution of *Papirius Curſor* againſt *Fabius* the Maſter of his Horſe, and the Accuſation againſt *Scipio*; which Things being extraordinary, were the more remarkable, and when ever any of them happened, they reminded the People of their Beginning, and that they were to live according to Law. But when theſe Examples began to be more rare, Men took Occaſion to grow worſe, and their Exorbitancies were with more Danger and Tumult; for if in Ten Years Space no Examples be made, nor no Execution done, People begin to forget and deſpiſe the Laws; and unleſs ſomething happens that may remember them of the Puniſhments, and infuſe ſomething of Fear into them, the Delinquents will grow ſo numerous, that it will be dangerous to puniſh them. To this Purpoſe, they who governed the State of *Florence*, from the Year 1434, to the Year 1494, were wont to ſay, that it was neceſſary every Five Years to review the State; for otherwiſe it would be very hard to maintain it: They call'd *reviewing the State*, reducing the People to the ſame Terror and Awe as they had upon them of Old, when every Man was puniſhed according to his Crime, let his Quality be what it would. But when the Memory of theſe Puniſhments are loſt, and ſuffered to go to Decay, Men take the Confidence to attempt any Thing, and ſpeak Ill of whom they pleaſe; againſt which no Remedy is ſo proper, as reducing them towards their firſt Principles, which is to be done by the Example of ſome excellent Perſon, inciting you to ſuch Executions, without Dependance upon any Law; and they are many times of ſo great Reputation, that good Men deſire to imitate them, and bad Men are aſhamed to live contrary to them. Thoſe who in *Rome* liv'd after this manner, were *Horatius Cocles*, *Scævola*, *Fabritius*, the Two *Decij*, *Regulus Attilius*, and ſome others, whoſe rare and virtuous Example had the ſame Effect in *Rome*, that good Laws and good Cuſtoms would have had; and if every Ten Years ſome of thoſe Examples or Executions aforeſaid had happened in that City, the Minds and Manners of the People could never have been ſo corrupted; but as thoſe virtuous Examples, and heroick Puniſhments grew ſeldom, and ſcarce, ſo Corruption began to multiply; for after *Regulus* his Time, there was not any ſuch Example to be ſeen; and though the Two *Cato*'s ſucceeded, yet there was ſuch great Diſtance betwixt them, that their Examples could do but little Good, eſpecially the laſt of the *Cato*'s, who finding the greateſt Part of the City debauched, could not work any conſiderable Reformation upon them. And ſo much for Civil Governments; as to the Conſervation of Sects, the ſame Renovation is neceſſary, as may appear by the Example of the *Roman Religion*, which would doubtleſs have been loſt before this, had it not been reduced towards its firſt Principle by St. *Francis* and St. *Dominick*, who by their Poverty, and

and Chriſtian-like Examples revived it in the Minds of Men, where it was almoſt effaced; and prevailed that the Looſeneſs and Depravity of the Prelates and Cardinals did not ruin it; for Men ſeeing them live in that Indigence and Poverty; by confeſſing their Sins to them, and hearing them preach, they began to learn Meekneſs, and Charity, and Obedience; not to upbraid People by their Vices, but to leave them to God; whereas their Lives muſt neceſſarily be bad, who neither ſee nor feel what Puniſhment is. So then it is this Renovation and Reduction to its firſt Principles, that has, and does ſtill maintain our Religion. And as to Kingdoms, they as well as Commonwealths have Occaſion to reform, and reduce as the other; which Courſe has been of no ſmall Advantage to the Kingdom of *France*; for that Kingdom living under Laws and Cuſtoms more than any other, the ſaid Laws and Cuſtoms are preſerved and executed by Parliaments, and eſpecially by that of *Paris*, which revives them every Time it makes out Proceſs againſt any great Perſon, or oppoſes the King in its Arreſts: And hitherto it has preſerv'd it ſelf by its Severity againſt Delinquents, without regard to the Greatneſs of their Quality; whereas ſhould they paſs unpuniſhed, they would multiply ſo faſt, that they would become incorrigible in a ſhort Time, and not to be reform'd but with the Diſorder, if not the Diſſolution of the whole Government. We may conclude therefore, that there is no ſafer way of preſerving a Commonwealth, Kingdom, or Sect, than by reforming and reducing them to their Primitive Reputation, which is to be done rather by good Laws, and Examples at Home, than Foreign Force; for though that way be effectual ſometimes, (as it was in *Rome*) yet it is ſo uncertain and dangerous, it is not to be deſired. And to demonſtrate how much particular Examples have conduced to the Grandeur of *Rome*, and what great Effect they have wrought, I ſhall make them the Subject of my Diſcourſe in this Third Book. And although among them ſome great Examples might be produced, which have been exhibited by Kings, yet Hiſtory having ſpoken of them ſo largely, I ſhall paſs them by without ſpeaking any Thing of them but what belongs to their own private Advantage. And begin with *Brutus*, the Father of the Liberty of the *Romans*.

CHAP. II.

'Tis the Part of a wiſe Man ſometimes to pretend himſelf a Fool.

NO Man was ever ſo commendable for his Wiſdom and Prudence, as *Junius Brutus* for counterfeiting the Fool. For though *Livy* gives us but one Reaſon why he did ſo, and that is, that under that Contempt he might live quietly, and enjoy his Patrimony in Peace; yet it is probable by his ways of Proceeding, that he did it, that thereby he might be leſs under the Obſervation of the Kings, and have fairer Advantage of expelling them, and delivering his Country, when Occaſion ſhould be offered. And that this was in his Thoughts, may be preſumed from his Interpretation of the Oracle of *Apollo*, to which when the *Tarquins* repair'd to underſtand which of them ſhould ſucceed in the Government, it being anſwered, that the Government ſhould come to him who firſt kiſſed his Mother, the *Tarquins* thought it not to be accompliſhed till they came to *Rome*; but *Brutus* pretending to ſlip, fell down upon the Ground, and kiſſed it, as the common Mother of us all. And afterwards upon the Death of *Lucretia* in the Preſence of her Father, and Huſband, and Kindred, he was the firſt that drew the Dagger out of the Wound, and conjured all the Standers-by, that for the future they ſhould never ſuffer a King in *Rome*. This Example may be followed by thoſe who are diſguſted with their Prince, but ſo as firſt to conſider their own Power exactly, and if they find it ſufficient, they may profeſs themſelves publickly, and declare open War; and it is the moſt ſafe, and moſt honourable Way: But if their Force be but ſmall, and they find themſelves that way too weak, they are with all Induſtry to endeavour to inſinuate with the Tyrant, ſerving him in his Pleaſures, applauding him in all his Actions and Words, and imitating him in every Thing he does. By this Means you ſhall be ſecure from Danger, enjoy all the Pleaſures and Delights of the Court, and be ready for any Occaſion of effecting your Deſigns. Others are of Opinion that you keep ſuch a Diſtance with the Prince, as that you be neither ſo near him as to be covered with his Ruins, nor ſo remote, but that you may take the Advantage of his Deſtruction to advance your ſelf; and this middle way was certainly the beſt, if it were eaſy to be kept; but becauſe I think it impoſſible, it is neceſſary to take to one of the other Two, and either to remove your ſelf quite, or get in as near him as you can. He who does otherwiſe, is in a great deal of Danger, eſpecially if he be a Man of any Eminence and Eſtate: For it is not

enough

enough to ſay, I expect nothing, I deſire neither Honour nor Preferment, I had rather live at Eaſe, without any Controverſy or Trouble; for thoſe Sayings are oftner heard than believed: Nor can great Men, if they did really deſire it, continue in that Condition, becauſe no body believes them, and no body will ſuffer them. A Man is therefore rather to play the Fool like *Brutus*, and he does it abundantly, that flatters and applauds every thing his Prince ſees, or ſpeaks, or does, how contrary ſoever it be to his own Judgment and Mind. And as *Brutus* was wiſe in pretending that Folly, till Occaſion was offered for the Deliverance of his Country; ſo he was a ſevere Aſſertor of its Liberty, when obtained, of which Severity we ſhall ſpeak in the next Chapter.

CHAP. III.

The Liberty newly acquired, could not have been preſerved, but by the Execution of Brutus *his Sons.*

THE Severity of *Brutus* in maintaining that Liberty which he had procur'd in *Rome*, was no leſs neceſſary than profitable. 'Tis an Example well worthy to be tranſmitted to Poſterity, to ſee a Father ſitting in Judgment upon his Sons, and not only Sentence them to Death, but be preſent, and a Spectator of their Execution. But ſo it is decreed, and it will be found ſo by all that are converſant in Antiquity, that upon any Alteration of Government, (whether from better to worſe, or worſe to better, it is the ſame Thing) it is neceſſary ſevere Examples ſhould be made of ſomebody that oppoſed it, if you deſire the new Form ſhould be preſerved. In ſhort, this I affirm, that whoever ſets up a Tyranny, cannot hope to maintain it, but by cutting off *Brutus*; and whoever ſets up a free State, is as unlike to continue it, but by taking off *Brutus* his Sons; and of this we have Diſcourſed ſo largely before, there is no need of enlarging here. I ſhall add only one Example which happened in our Country and Times. *Piero Soderini* having reſtored the Liberty of *Florence*, believed that by his Patience and Moderation he could have mollified their Minds, who like the Sons of *Brutus* were impatient of reviving the old Tyranny again. But he was highly miſtaken, and ſo much the more to blame, by how much he was a wiſe Man, and knew well enough that there was a Neceſſity of removing ſuch Perſons as by their Ambition oppoſed themſelves againſt him; yet though there was a Neceſſity to do it, and he had ſo fair an Occaſion, he let it paſs, and never made Uſe of it: For beſides that he believed his Patience and good Nature would have wrought upon ſome, and his Munificence and Bounty upon others, (as he often declared among his Friends,) he had an Opinion, that to make a ſtout and vigorous Oppoſition againſt his Enemies, it would be neceſſary for him to take upon him an extraordinary Authority, which would not only be a Breach of the Laws, but of the Civil Equality of the City: And if he ſhould aſſume ſuch a Power, and perhaps exerciſe it well himſelf, yet the People would be ſo terrified thereby, that after his Death they would never agree to the making their *Gonfaloniere* for Life, which Office he thought fit to have augmented and maintained: This Conſideration, though wiſe and good in it ſelf, was not prudent at that Time, becauſe we are never to entertain a preſent Miſchief in hopes of a future Good, eſpecially when, for ought we know, that Good may be oppreſs'd by that Miſchief: He ought rather to have had a Care, that the End of his Intentions might have appeared for the Good and Benefit of his Country, and not out of any particular Ambition; and to have provided that whoever ſucceeded him afterwards in his Dignity, ſhould not be able to employ that Authority to the Ruin of the State, which he was forc'd to take upon him to preſerve it. But the good Man was miſtaken in his firſt Opinion, as not underſtanding that the Malice of Mankind is not to be extinguiſhed with Time, nor appeaſed with Preſents; for could he have imitated the Severity of *Brutus*, he had preſerved his own Dignity, and the Liberty of the State. But as it is a difficult Thing to preſerve the Liberty of a State, ſo it is no leſs difficult to preſerve the Authority of a King, as ſhall be ſhewn in the next Chapter.

CHAP. IV.

A Prince is never ſafe in his new Conqueſts, whilſt they are in Being whom he diſpoſſeſſed.

THE Death of *Tarquinius Priſcus* by the Sons of *Ancus*, and the Death of *Servius Tullius* by *Tarquinius Superbus*, ſhews how dangerous it is to diſpoſſeſs any Man of a Kingdom, and ſuffer him to live, though you endeavour by all means poſſible to careſs him. *Tarquinius Priſcus* thought his Title unqueſtionable, being made King by the People, and confirmed by the Senate; nor could it enter into his Thoughts, that the Malice and Indignation of the Sons of *Ancus* ſhould be ſo great, as to keep them from ſubmitting to that wherewith the whole City of *Rome* was contented. *Servius Tullius* was miſtaken in the ſame Manner, in thinking with new Favours and Obligations to have pacified the Sons of *Tarquin*. So that from the firſt Example, a Prince may take Warning, and not delude himſelf with an Opinion he is ſafe, whilſt any of them are living whom he diſpoſſeſſed; and from the Second he may inform himſelf, that old Injuries are never cancelled by new Favours, eſpecially if the Favours be not equivalent to the Injury. And without doubt *Servius Tullius* was ill adviſed to believe that the Sons of *Tarquin* would be content to be his Sons-in-Law, when it was their Due to be his King. And this Ambition, and Impatience to govern, is ſo great and inſatiable in Mankind, that it not only affects thoſe Perſons who have ſome Right and Expectation to govern, but thoſe likewiſe who in Reaſon can have no ſuch Expectancy; as in the Example of *Tullia*, the Daughter of *Servius*, but married to one of the *Tarquins*: Which *Tullia* was ſo inflamed with a deſire of governing, that not contented with being a King's Daughter, tranſported with Rage, contrary to all filial Duty and Affection, ſhe incited her Huſband againſt her Father, and forc'd him into a Conſpiracy, not only againſt his Kingdom, but Life. Whereas if *Tarquinius Priſcus*, and *Servius Tullius*, had known how to have ſecured themſelves againſt thoſe they had ſupplanted, they had neither loſt their Kingdoms nor Lives. But *Tarquinius Superbus* was expell'd for not obſerving the Laws and Practices of the Ancient Kings his Predeceſſors, as ſhall appear in the next Chapter.

CHAP. V.

How a King may loſe his Kingdom, though he comes to it by Inheritance.

TArquinius Superbus ſeemed to have ſecure Poſſeſſion of the Kingdom upon the Death of *Servius Tullius*, who dying without Heirs, left him nothing of that Trouble and Vexation, which his Predeceſſors encountred. For although the way by which he came to the Government, was irregular and abominable; nevertheleſs, had he followed the Steps of his Predeceſſors, and obſerved their old Rules, he would not have run himſelf ſo fatally into the Diſpleaſure of the Senate and People, nor have provoked them to have been ſo diligent in his Expulſion. Nor is it to be believed that his Son *Sextus* his Deflowring of *Lucretia*, was the chief Cauſe that he loſt his Kingdom, but his Infraction of the Laws, his Tyranny, his Uſurpation upon the Senate, and his ingroſſing all Authority to himſelf: For he had brought Things to that Paſs, that thoſe Affairs which were formerly debated publickly by the Senate, and according to their Sentiment and Order were put in Execution, were now tranſacted and determined privately in his own Palace, with great Diſſatisfaction and Offence; ſo that in a ſhort Time *Rome* was deprived of the Liberty which it enjoyed under other Kings: Nor was it enough for him to diſoblige the Senate, but he run himſelf into the Odium of the People, haraſſing them out by Mechanick and Servile Employments, to which they had never been uſed in the Days of his Predeceſſors; by which cruel and inſolent Actions he had ſo incenſed and inflamed the Minds of the *Romans* againſt him, that they were ready for Rebellion the firſt Opportunity that offered it ſelf; and if that Accident had not happened to *Lucretia*, as ſoon as any other had fallen out, it would have had the ſame Effect. And if *Tarquin* had governed, and lived according to the Example of his Anceſtors, and his Son *Sextus* had committed that Error, *Brutus* and *Collatinus* would have addreſſed themſelves to *Tarquin* (and not to the People of *Rome*) for Juſtice againſt his Son. Let Princes therefore obſerve that they begin to ruin their own Dignity and Power, when

they firſt go about to tranſgreſs and violate the old Laws and Cuſtoms of their Anceſtors: And if after they are removed, and diſpoſſeſſed of their Authority, they ſhould grow ſo wiſe as to underſtand the Felicity of governing a Kingdom with good Counſel, their Loſs would be more inſupportable, and they would condemn themſelves to a greater Puniſhment than any body elſe would condemn them; for 'tis eaſier to be beloved by good People, than bad, and to obey Laws, than to command them. And to underſtand the way by which this is to be done, they have no more to do, but to obſerve the Lives of good Princes, as *Timoleon* the *Corinthian*, *Aratus*, *Sicionius*, and others, in which they will find ſo much Eaſe and Security to him that governs, and them that are governed, that they will be tempted to imitate them, if for nothing but the Eaſineſs of it. For when Men are governed well, they deſire no other Liberty; as it happened to the People who were governed by the Two Perſons above-named, whom they compelled to continue their Princes whilſt they lived, though they endeavoured ſeveral Times to have laid down, and betaken themſelves to a private Condition. And becauſe in this and the Two precedent Chapters, we have diſcourſed of the Hatred contracted againſt Princes, and the Conſpiracy of the Sons of *Brutus* againſt the State, and others againſt *Tarquinius Priſcus*, and *Servius Tullius*, I think it not amiſs to ſpeak of Conſpiracies more largely in my next Chapter, as being a Subject well worth the Obſervation both of Princes and private Perſons.

CHAP. VI.

Of Conſpiracies.

I Did not think it inconvenient in this Place to diſcourſe ſomething of Conſpiracies, ſeeing they are Things of ſuch Conſequence and Danger, both to Princes and private Perſons; for by them more Princes have loſt their States and their Lives, than by open War; and the Reaſon is, becauſe few Perſons are qualified to make War, but every body can conſpire. On the other Side, for a private Perſon, no Enterprize is more dangerous and raſh; for let him manage it as wiſely as he can, it is full of Difficulty and Uncertainty of Succeſs; and from hence it is, that among ſo many Conſpiracies, there are ſo few which arrive at the End that was deſigned. To the end therefore that Princes may learn how to defend themſelves; and private Perſons might be the more cautious of engaging themſelves in them, but may rather be contented to live quietly under the Government where they are placed, I ſhall enlarge upon the Subject, and leave nothing behind that is conſiderable for the Document either of the one or the other. It is a certain Truth, and well ſaid of *Cornelius Tacitus*, that Men are to pay an Honour and Reſpect to Things paſt, and Obedience to Things preſent: That they ought to deſire good Princes, but when they are once in Authority, they are to be endur'd, and thoſe who go about to conſpire againſt them, do moſt commonly ruin themſelves or their Country.

To come therefore to the Point, we are firſt to conſider againſt whom theſe Conſpiracies are made, and we ſhall find them either againſt their Country, or Prince: And of theſe Two Sorts of Conſpiracies we ſhall diſcourſe at preſent; becauſe of thoſe which are entred into, to deliver up a beſieged Town to the Enemy, or upon ſuch Occaſion, we have ſpoken amply before. And firſt of the Conjurations againſt a Prince, and the Occaſions of them, which are many, but one of more Importance than all the reſt, and that is the Hatred of the People: For that Prince who has contracted the univerſal Odium of the People, may with Reaſon believe that ſome of thoſe whom he has offended will ſtudy to revenge themſelves; and they will be the more induſtrious in it, by how much they obſerve the general Diſcontent and Animoſity againſt him. A Prince therefore is by all Means poſſible, to prevent the Hatred of the People, (but having ſpoken of it before, I ſhall not enlarge upon it again.) For by keeping himſelf from the general Hatred, particular Offences will not be able to amount to a War: Firſt, becauſe all Men have not the ſame Reſentment, and will not put themſelves in Danger to revenge an Injury; and then becauſe if the Diſcontented were all of a Mind, and had Power to do it, yet they are diſcouraged by the Affection which they obſerve in the Multitude towards their Prince. The Injury done by the Prince, is either upon the Eſtate, Blood, or Honour of the Subject: Where the Injury extends to Blood, Threatning is very dangerous, and much more than downright Execution; for when a Man is kill'd, he is paſt thinking of Revenge, and thoſe who are alive will quickly forget him; but when a Man is threatned, and finds himſelf under a Neceſſity of ſuffering, or do-

ing ſomething extraordinary, he becomes immediately dangerous, and ought to be regarded by the Prince, as I ſhall ſhew hereafter. Next to this Neceſſity for the Preſervation of one's Life; Honour and Eſtate, are the two tendereſt Points in which Men are ſooneſt offended, and of which the Prince is likewiſe to have a particular Care; for no Man can be pillaged ſo perfectly, but he will have a Knife left to revenge himſelf; nor no Man can be diſhonoured to ſuch a Degree of Debaſement, but he will have Courage enough left to attempt ſomething in Revenge; and in Point of Honour, no Injury goes ſo near a Man, as what reflects upon the Woman; and next to that, is to be deſpiſed. This was it that arm'd *Pauſanias* againſt *Philip* of *Macedon*, and many other Subjects againſt many other Princes. In our Times, *Julius Belanti* had never conſpired againſt *Pandolfus*, Tyrant of *Siena*, had he not firſt given him his Daughter to Wife, and then taken her from him again, as we ſhall ſhew more at large hereafter. The great Motive of the Conjunction of the *Pazzi* againſt the *Medici*, was the Patrimony of *Giovanni Bonromei*, which was given from them by the Award of the *Medici*. But there is another Motive (and that no ſmall one) which makes People conſpire againſt their Prince, and that is a deſire of reſcuing their Country from Tyranny and Uſurpation. This was it which ſet *Brutus* and *Caſſius* at work againſt *Ceſar*. This was it which excited others againſt *Phalaris*, *Dionyſius*, &c. and againſt this there is no Remedy, but depoſiting their Uſurpations; and becauſe there are few will do that, there are but few which eſcape the ill Conſequence.

Ad Generum Cereris, ſine cæde, & ſanguine pauci
Deſcendunt Reges, & ſicca morte Tyranni.

Slaughter and Blood purſues; he ſeldom lies
Dry in his Coffin, that a Tyrant dies.

But in Compiracies, as I ſaid before, the Dangers are ſo great and various, that there is not only a Hazard in the Deſigning, Management, and Execution, but even after the Execution is done. The Conſpirators are either one or more; one cannot properly be called a Conſpiracy, but a firm Reſolution in a ſingle Perſon to make away his Prince; this way of Conſpiracy is more ſecure than the other, becauſe till it comes to Execution, it can never be known, no body being privy to his Secret, and therefore no danger of coming to the Ears of the Prince. Theſe kind of Reſolutions may fall into the Heart of any Man, Great or Small, Noble or Ignoble, Favourites or Strangers: No Man but ſome Time or other may have Acceſs to his Prince, and he that has Opportunity to ſpeak with him, has Opportunity to do worſe. *Pauſanias* murdered *Philip* of *Macedon* as he was going to the Temple, attended with a Thouſand of his Guards, and walking betwixt his own Son and his Son-in-Law; but *Pauſanias* was a Gentleman, and very converſant at Court. But there was a poor contemptible *Spaniard*, who ſtabb'd *Ferdinand* King of *Spain* in the Neck, and though the Wound was not mortal, yet it was enough to ſhew us that there is no Man ſo inconſiderable, but if he has Courage to undertake, he may have Opportunity to do it: *Dervis*, a *Turkiſh* Prieſt, drew his Sword upon *Bajazet*, Father to this preſent Emperor; and though he did not kill him, yet it was not for want either of Courage or Opportunity. Nor is it to be doubted but there are many ill enough diſpoſed, who wiſh from their Hearts to be revenged on their Tyrants, but there are few that dare venture, and ſcarce one of thoſe few but dies in the Attempt; and no Man will expoſe himſelf where there is no hopes to eſcape. But enough of this pertinacious Malevolence in a ſingle Perſon. We will ſpeak now of Conſpiracies betwixt a Number: I ſay that in Hiſtory, all Conſpiracies are found to be acted by great Perſons, and ſuch as have Familiarity with their Prince: For others, unleſs they be Madmen, or Fools, will never attempt it, becauſe People that are weak, and remote from the Court, are deſtitute of all thoſe Hopes and Conveniencies that are requiſite for the Execution of ſuch a Deſign. Firſt, Men of ſlender Fortune, or Intereſt, cannot impart themſelves freely, no body will be true to them, becauſe no Man can concur with them upon any of thoſe Hopes which do uſually encourage Men to the undertaking of any great Danger; ſo that they can hardly communicate to Two or Three Perſons, but one of them is an Informer, and the other are ruined. But if they ſhould be ſo happy as not to be betrayed, the Execution is attended with ſo many Difficulties, by reaſon of the Difficulty of their Acceſs, that it is impoſſible but they muſt miſcarry: And if great Perſons, and ſuch as are very converſant with their Prince, are ſubject to ſuch Hazards, thoſe doubtleſs muſt be much more, who are under none of thoſe Qualifications. Wherefore, when Men of mean Fortune, or little Acceſs at Court, conſider their own Weakneſs and Inability, they are diſcouraged from any ſuch Deſigns; and if at any Time they be offended, and would do their Prince a Miſchief, they content themſelves

with libelling and railing, and expect when Perſons of greater Acceſs and Capacity ſhould revenge them upon his Perſon; and if any of theſe Perſons are ſo far tranſported, as to attempt any Thing of this Nature, their good Will is more to be commended than their Diſcretion. We ſee then, where any great Conſpiracy has been made, it has been by great Perſons, and ſuch as have been familiar with their Prince, and that as often upon the Score of Benefits as Injuries received; ſo it was in the Conſpiracy of *Perennius* againſt *Commodus*, *Plautianus* againſt *Severus*, *Sejanus* againſt *Tiberius*, all of them preferred by their ſeveral Emperors, and advanced to ſuch Honours, Authority and Eſtates, that their Power ſeem'd to want nothing of Perfection, but the Imperial Enſigns; and that they might have them as well as the reſt, they conſpired every one of them againſt their Prince; and their Conſpiracies had ſuch Ends as their Ingratitude deſerved. However, in the Memory of our Fathers the Conſpiracy of *Giacopo d' Apiano* againſt Meſſieur *Piero Gambacorti* Prince of *Piſa* had a better End; for the ſaid *Giacopo* having been brought up, and careſſed, and advanced by the ſaid *Piero*, depoſed his Benefactor, and took away his Government for his Pains. Another of the ſame Nature was that of *Coppola* in our Days againſt *Ferdinand* of *Arragon*, though it had not the ſame Succeſs; for *Coppola* being arrived at that Height of Authority, that there was nothing but the bare Name wanting to make him King, he attempted for that, and loſt his Life in the Buſineſs. And certainly if any Conſpiracy might have ſucceeded, it was his, being a Perſon as powerful as the King himſelf, and ſeconded with all the Conveniences he could deſire: But the ſame Greedineſs of Dominion that blinded him in the Undertaking, blinded him in the Proſecution of his Deſign; for had it been managed with the leaſt Prudence, it would have been impoſſible to have miſcarried.

A Prince therefore who would preſerve himſelf againſt Conſpiracy, is to have an Eye rather upon thoſe he has obliged, than thoſe he has offended; for they that are offended have not thoſe frequent Opportunities that the other have; and for the Diſpoſition, it is much alike, the Deſire of Dominion being as great if not greater than the Deſire of Revenge; ſo then Authority is to be given to his Friends with that Caution, that there be always ſome Space or Interval left betwixt the Preferment of the Favourite, and the Sovereignty of the Prince, leſt if his Ambition ſhould not be ſatisfied, he ſhould aſpire immediately at the Crown. But to return to our Deſign; I ſay, that Conſpirators being to be great Men, and ſuch as have eaſy Acceſs to the Prince, we are now to enquire into the Succeſſes of their Plots, and ſee what have been the Cauſes of their Proſperity or Miſcarriage. And becauſe (as I ſaid before) the Danger is conſiderable in the Management, Execution, and afterwards; for that Reaſon there are very few of them that arrive at their propoſed End. In their Contrivances and Conſultations there is ſuch extraordinary Danger, that unleſs they be carried on with ſingular Caution and Prudence, they will be eaſily diſcovered; and they are diſcovered Two Ways, either by downright Impeachment, or by Conjecture and Preſumption. Impeachment proceeds either from Infidelity or Folly in thoſe Perſons with whom you have communicated; Infidelity is eaſily found out, for you cannot communicate in that Nature but with ſuch of your Confidents as you ſuppoſe will venture their Lives for you; or elſe with ſuch Perſons as are diſſatisfied with the Government: Of ſuch kind of Confidents, one or two may poſſibly be found, but when you begin to multiply them, and commit your Secret to more, you muſt neceſſarily be betrayed; for their Affection to you muſt be very great, if the Apprehenſion of the Danger and the Fear of the Puniſhment do not deter them: Beſides, Men are many Times miſtaken in the Affection of their Friends; for they can never be aſſured of them till they have made Experiment; and to make Experiment in ſuch Ways as this, is exceedingly dangerous; and if perchance you have had trial of them in ſome other Matters of Importance, in which they have behaved themſelves faithfully and well, yet you can take no true Meaſures from that, becauſe this ſurpaſſes all other Dangers whatſoever. If you preſume upon his Diſcontent, Animoſity to his Prince, you may be eaſily deceived, for as ſoon as you have diſcovered your Deſign, you have given him a Power to reconcile himſelf, and his Rancor muſt be very great, or your Influence extraordinary to keep him faithful. Hence it is that many Conſpiracies are diſcovered, and as it were nipp'd in the Bud; and when any of them are kept private where many Perſons are privy, 'tis look'd upon as a Miracle, as that of *Piſo* againſt *Nero*, and in our Times that of the *Pazzi* againſt *Lorenzo*, and *Guiliano de Medici*, in which though Fifty were concerned, it was never diſcovered till it came to Execution. For Diſcoveries by Indiſcretion, they happen when one of the Conſpirators talks careleſly, ſo as ſome Servant or third Perſon picks it out, as it happened to the Sons of *Brutus*, who in their Negotiations with *Tarquin*'s Ambaſſadors, were over-heard, and accuſed by one of the Servants: Another Way is when out of Levity you communicate with ſome Child or Woman that you love, or ſuch other incontinent Perſon, as *Dinus* did, who being (with *Philotas*) entred into a Conſpiracy againſt *Alexander* the Great,

Great, imparted it to a Boy that he loved, called *Ficomachus*, who told it to his Brother *Cbalinus*, and *Cbalinus* diſcovered it to the King. As to Diſcoveries by Circumſtances and Conjecture, we have an Example in the *Piſonian* Conſpiracy againſt *Nero*, in which *Scevinus* one of the Conſpirators having the Day before *Nero* was to have been murther'd, made his Will, ordered *Milichius* his Freeman to furbiſh up his old ruſty Sword, enfranchized all his Slaves, diſtributed Money among them, and cauſed Pledgets and Ligatures to be made to bind up Wounds; he gave Occaſion of Conjecture to *Milichius*, who accuſed him thereupon to *Nero*, and Order being given for his Apprehenſion, *Scevinus* was taken into Cuſtody, and with him *Natalis* another of the Conſpirators, who had been obſerved to have talked privately with him a long Time the Day before, and not agreeing about their Diſcourſe, they contradicted one another, and were forced to confeſs all.

From theſe Occaſions of Diſcovery it is impoſſible to be ſecur'd, but either by Menace, Imprudence, or Inadvertency, all will out whenever the Conſpirators exceed the Number of the Three or Four. For if more than one of them be taken, 'tis impoſſible but they muſt interfere, becauſe Two People cannot hang together ſo exactly in a Story. If there be but one apprehended, and he be a ſtout Man, perhaps he may have that Conſtancy and Reſolution as to conceal his Confederates; but then his Confederates muſt have as much Courage as he, and not diſcover themſelves by their Flight; for whoſe Heart ſoever fails, whether his that is apprehended, or his that is eſcaped, 'tis the ſame Thing, for the Plot is diſcovered. That Example which is mentioned by *Titus Livius* is very rare and unuſual, where in a Conſpiracy againſt *Girolamo* King of *Syracuſe*, he ſpeaks of one of the Conſpirators called *Theodorus*, who being ſeized, concealed his Accomplices with incomparable Conſtancy, and accuſed all the King's Friends; and his Companions were ſo confident in his Courage, that none of them fled, or made the leaſt Diſcovery by Fear. Theſe are the Dangers which are to be paſs'd in the Conduct or Management of an Enterprize, before it comes to Execution; and as there are Dangers, ſo there are Ways of evading them.

The firſt, the ſureſt, and indeed the only Way is not to give your Confederates Time to diſcover you, but to communicate the Buſineſs to them when it is juſt ready for Execution, and not before. Thoſe who take that Courſe, are free from the Danger of Threatnings and Negotiations, and commonly from all the reſt, and have been obſerved frequently to come to good End; and there is no Man that is wiſe, but would carry it ſo if he could. I ſhall give you only Two Examples. *Nelimatus* being unable to endure the Tyranny of *Ariſtotimus* King of *Epirus*, got ſeveral of his Friends and Relations together into his Houſe, and exhorting them to the Deliverance of their Country, ſome of them deſired them to conſider and prepare themſelves; whereupon *Nelimatus* cauſed his Servants to make faſt the Doors, and proteſted to all the whole Company, that they ſhould go immediately about it, or he would deliver them up Priſoners to *Ariſtotimus*; upon which they all took the Oath, and falling incontinently to the Work, they effected their Deſign, as *Nelimatus* had contriv'd it. One of the *Magi* having by Fraud poſſeſſed himſelf of the Kingdom of *Perſia*, and *Orthanus* a great Perſon of that Kingdom having diſcovered the Cheat, he had a Conference with Six others of his own Quality, to contrive how they might reſcue their Country from the Tyranny of that Uſurper, and (as in the Caſe before) when ſome of them deſired Time, *Darius* (one of the Six) ſtood up and declared boldly, That if they would not execute it preſently, he would accuſe them every one; and doing it forthwith, they proſpered accordingly. Not unlike theſe Two, was the Way which the *Ætolians* uſed in the Aſſaſſination of *Nabis* the Tyrant of *Sparta*: They ſent one of their Citizens called *Alexamenes* to him with 30 Horſe, and 200 Foot, under a Pretence of a Supply, commanding the Soldiers to be obedient to the Orders of their chief Officers, but acquainted no body with the deſign but *Alexamenes* himſelf. *Alexamenes* marched to *Sparta* with his Forces, but communicating nothing of his Inſtructions, till they were fit to be executed, he did his Buſineſs, and the Tyrant was ſlain; by which Reſervedneſs they avoided the firſt Dangers of being diſcovered, which are obvious in the Management; and whoever takes the ſame Courſe, ſhall avoid them as well as they. *Piſo* (whom I have mention'd before) was a Man of Honour and Reputation, a great Intimate of *Nero*'s, and one in whom he placed a great deal of Confidence. *Nero* viſited him often, and was many Times treated very magnificently in his Garden: *Piſo* by Virtue of this Intimacy was able to make choice of ſuch Complices as were ſtout and courageous, and diſpoſed to ſuch an Exploit (which for great Men to do, is no difficult Matter;) and when Occaſion was offered, to break the Buſineſs to them ſo ſuddenly, that having no Time either to deliberate or deny him, he muſt neceſſarily ſucceed; and he who examines all the other Examples that are mentioned, will find very few, but have been managed the ſame Way. But Men of little Experience in the Affairs of the World, do many Times commit great Errors, and more, when their Deſigns

are extraordinary, as in this. A Plot then is never to be imparted but upon Neceſſity, and when it is ripe for Execution; and when you do communicate, do it but to one, and that a Perſon of whom you have had long Experience, or one that is prompted by the ſame Intereſt and Provocation as your ſelf; and to find one Perſon ſo, is much eaſier than to find many, and by Conſequence that Way is nothing ſo dangerous. Beſides, if you ſhould be miſtaken in your Confidence, you have more Remedy and Defence, than where the Conſpirators are ſeveral; for I have heard wiſe Men ſay, that to a ſingle Perſon a Man may ſay any Thing; (for if nothing be to be produced under your Hand) your No will be as good as his Yea: But Writing is to be ſhunn'd as a Rock, for nothing is of ſo much Conviction, as a Note under a Man's own Hand. *Plautianus* deſigning to murther *Severus* the Emperor, and his Son *Antoninus*, committed the Execution to *Saturninus* a Tribune, who had more mind to betray than obey him; but ſuſpecting that when he came to accuſe him, *Plautianus* ſhould have more Credit than he, he deſired a Warrant under his Hand to confirm his Commiſſion; which *Plautianus* granted, being blinded with Ambition; whereby it happen'd that he was accuſed, convicted, and condemned; whereas without that Note, and ſome other Circumſtances, *Plautianus* would have been acquitted, and his Accuſer been puniſhed, ſo obſtinately did *Plautianus* deny all. In the *Piſonian* Conſpiracy, there was a Woman called *Epicaris*, who had been formerly one of *Nero*'s Miſſes. This *Epicaris* thinking it of Importance to bring in a Captain of certain Gallies, which *Nero* kept for his Guard, ſhe communicated the Plot, but conceal'd the Conſpirators; and the Captain betraying her, and accuſing her to *Nero*, *Epicaris* maintained the contrary with ſuch Conſtancy, that the Emperor was amaz'd, and diſcharged her. So then, he that communicates a Thing of this Nature to one, runs but theſe Two Dangers, either of being ſpontaneouſly accuſed, and Proof brought to make it good; or elſe being accuſed by Accident and of Force, as when his Confederate is apprehended upon Suſpicion, and impeaches him upon the Rack, in both which Caſes there is ſomething to be ſaid; for in the firſt he may pretend Malice, in the ſecond Fear, and that the Extremity of his Torture conſtrained him to ſay falſe: So that it is great Wiſdom to communicate with no body, till your Deſigns be ripe, but to proceed according to the Examples aforeſaid; but if you muſt communicate, to do it but to one alone, and by himſelf; in which though there be ſome Danger, yet there is much leſs than where you communicate with many. Another Way, and not unlike this, is when the Fury or Violence of a Tyrant neceſſitates you to do that to him, which otherwiſe he would be ſure to do to you; and ſometimes it is ſo ſudden and fierce, it leaves you ſcarce Time to think of ſecuring your ſelf. This is an Exigence and Neceſſity that has moſt commonly a good End; and to prove it, I will produce Two Examples, and no more. *Commodus* the Emperor had Two Captains of his Guards (one of them called *Lettus*, and the other *Elettus*) particularly in his Favour, and *Martia* was the moſt intimate of his Concubines. They having taken the Liberty to admoniſh him of his ill Courſes, and the Reflection his ill Converſation had both upon his Perſon and Government, he reſolved to rid himſelf of his Monitors, and to that End writ down the Names of *Martia*, *Lettus*, *Eletttus*, and others (who he deſigned ſhould be put to Death the next Night) and put the Note under his Pillow. Being gone out into a Bath, a Child that he lov'd exceedingly, being rummaging about the Room, happened upon this Paper, and going out with it in his Hand, *Martia* met him by Accident, took it from him, read it, ſent it immediately to *Lettus* and *Elettus*, who being ſenſible of their Danger, reſolved to prevent him, and without more ado, killed *Commodus* in the Evening.

Antoninus Caracalla the Emperor, was with his Army in *Meſopotamia*, and having made *Macrinus* his General (a better Stateſman than Soldier) it happened (as it does to all Princes that are wicked) that he began to apprehend (what he knew he deſerved) that ſome body conſpired againſt him. To be more certain, he writ privately to a Friend (called *Maternianus*) in *Rome*, to conſult the Aſtrologers, and give him Notice whether any body was contriving againſt the Empire. *Maternianus* writ him Word he had conſulted them, that there were thoſe who did aſpire at the Empire, and that *Macrinus* was the Man. This Letter coming by Accident to the Hands of *Macrinus*, before the Emperor ſaw it, he found the Neceſſity that was upon him either to kill or to be kill'd; and thereupon committed the Execution to a Confident of his call'd *Martialis* (whoſe Brother *Antoninus* had ſlain not many Days before) who kill'd him accordingly. We ſee then that this Neceſſity which allows us no Time, has the ſame Effect in a manner with the Courſe which was taken by *Nelimatus* of *Epirus*, as I have mentioned before. We ſee likewiſe, (as I ſaid in the Beginning of theſe Diſcourſes) that Commination and Threatning does a Prince more Miſchief, and are the Occaſion of more Plots, than Violence it ſelf. A Prince therefore is to have a care of that; to careſs thoſe that are about him, and keep them in their Allegiance

by his Courteſy and Kindneſs; if that will not do, he is to ſecure himſelf otherwiſe as well as he can, but never to bring them into a Condition of thinking themſelves under a Neceſſity of killing or being kill'd. As to the Dangers which attend the Execution of a Plot, they proceed either from a ſudden Alteration of Orders; a ſudden Defection of Courage in him that is to execute; ſome Imprudence in the Attempt; or ſome Imperfection in the Act, as when all are not killed that were intended. And firſt we muſt underſtand, that there is nothing gives ſo much Embaraſment and Diſtraction to the Actions of Men, as new and contradictory Orders, to be executed in an Inſtant, and quite contrary to what was determined before. And if in any Thing this Variation be dangerous, it is in Martial Affairs, and in ſuch Things as we have now ſpoken of; for in thoſe Caſes there is nothing ſo neceſſary as that every Man may known certainly his Part, that before-hand he may contrive with himſelf, and conclude upon all the Circumſtances of the Fact; whereas, if they had fram'd their Deſigns, and fix'd upon their Way, and immediately new Orders are brought repugnant to the former, it diſturbs all, and the whole Plot muſt be ruined; ſo that it is better to execute it according to the firſt Order, though there be ſomething of Inconvenience, than to vary your Orders, with a Thouſand Times more: But this is meant only where the Variation is ſudden; for where you have Time enough, it is not ſo dangerous. The Conſpiracy of the *Pazzi* againſt *Lorenzo* and *Giuliano de Medici* is very well known. Their firſt Orders were, That an Entertainment ſhould be made for the Cardinal of St. *George*, to which the *Medici* ſhould be invited and killed. Every Man's Office was aſſigned him; ſome were to kill them; ſome were to ſecure the Palace; and others to ride up and down the City, and proclaim Liberty to the People: It happened when the *Pazzi*, *Medici*, and Cardinal were all together in the Cathedral in *Florence*, at Divine Service, News was brought that *Julian* would not be at Dinner: Hereupon the Conſpirators conſulting again, it was reſolved to alter the Plot, and do that in the Church, which was deſigned in the Chamber: This ſudden Alteration, diſcompoſed the whole Order; for *Giovan Batiſta da Monteſecco* would not conſent to add Sacrilege to his Murther, and commit it in the Church; upon which they were forced to appoint another in his Place, and ſhift all their Agents from one Office to another; and their Time being too ſhort to fix their Reſolutions, they committed ſo many Errors in the Execution, that all of them miſcarried. And among the Conſpirators, when Things come to be executed, their Heart many Times fails them, either out of ſudden Reverence, or ſudden Fear; for the Preſence and Majeſty of ſome Princes is ſo awful, it either mitigates or frightens the Fury of the Executioner; *Marius* being taken and kept Priſoner by the *Minturnenſes*, they ſent a Servant to kill him; but the poor Slave was ſo terrified at the Sight of his Perſon, and the Memory of his Name, that his Courage fail'd, and he was not able to go thorough. And if the Conſideration of his Quality, and the Majeſty of his Countenance could do ſo much, in a Perſon that was a Priſoner, and in Diſtreſs, how much more are they effectual in a free Prince, magnificently adorn'd, and as nobly attended? Certainly ſuch a Sight is able to ſtrike Terror into the boldeſt Perſon, and work Compaſſion in the moſt cruel Miſcreant.

Some there were who conſpired againſt *Sitalcis*, King of *Thrace*: The Day was appointed for the Execution; they met at the Place where the Prince was; but when the Stroke was to be given, no body durſt venture, they departed as they came, every body blamed one another, but no body knew what was the Impediment, and having attempted it often with the ſame Intimidation, they were diſcovered at laſt, and received Puniſhment for an Offence which they might, but would not put in Execution. *Alfonſo*, Duke of *Ferrara*, had Two Brothers, who conſpired againſt him, and employed *Giannes*, a Prieſt and Chanter in the ſaid Duke's Chapel, to bring the Duke to them, which he did many Times, and it was in their Power to have killed him; but yet not any of them durſt ſtrike him; ſo that at length they alſo were diſcovered, and received their Reward. This Remorſe can proceed from nothing but the Terror of his Preſence, or the Influence of his Behaviour and Humanity, which compels them to Mercy. But the Defects and Diſappointments in theſe Kind of Executions, proceed either from Imprudence or Terror, with either of which, the Minds of the Conſpirators being diſturbed, they become ſo confuſed and diſtracted, they can neither ſay, nor do any Thing as they ſhould. And that Men are ſubject to thoſe Confuſions and Surprizes, cannot be better demonſtrated than by *Livy*'s Deſcription of *Alexamenus* the *Ætolian*, of whom we have ſpoken before: For when the Time was come for the Execution of his Deſign againſt *Nabis* the *Spartan*, having imparted it to his Friends, *Livy* tells us, *Collegit, & ipſe animum, confuſum tantæ cogitatione rei. He recollected his Mind, which was in ſome meaſure confounded with Contemplation of the Enterprize.* For there is no Man, how reſolute and bloody ſoever he be, but muſt be ſurprized and diſcompoſed in ſuch Caſes as thoſe; wherefore for ſuch Exploits, experienced Men, and ſuch as have

been

been uſed to thoſe kind of Affairs, are to be choſen, and no other though never ſo ſtout: For he that has had no Trial of himſelf in that Nature, ought not to preſume barely upon his Courage; nor can he promiſe himſelf any certain Succeſs, by reaſon that the Terror and Perturbation of his Mind is many Times ſo ſtrong, that it makes his Weapon fall out of his Hand, or Words fall from his Mouth, which diſcover the whole Plot. *Lucilla* the Siſter of *Commodus*, ordered *Quintianus* to kill her Brother: *Quintianus* waited for *Commodus* as he came into the Amphitheatre, and meeting him when he came, he ran at him with his naked Sword, crying aloud, *Queſto ti mando il Senato: The Senate ſends you this.* But thoſe Words gave an Alarm, and he was ſeized before he could lift up his Arm to give the Blow. *Meſſer Antonio da Volterra*, deputed (as is ſaid before) to kill *Lorenzo de Medici*; when he advanced to aſſault him, cried out, *Ah Traytor!* But that Exclamation was the Preſervation of *Lorenzo*, and the Ruin of the Conſpirators. But tho' theſe Enterprizes are difficult, when directed only againſt one Perſon, for the Reaſons aboveſaid, yet when they are bent againſt Two, they are much more; becauſe in ſeveral Places it is impoſſible any Deſign ſhould be well executed at once; ſo that to conſpire againſt a Prince in that Way, is a doubtful, dangerous and imprudent Thing. Were it not for the Reverence I bear to the Author, I ſhould ſcarce believe what *Herodian* ſays of *Plautianus*, that he committed to one ſingle Centurion, called *Saturninus*, the Killing of *Severus* and *Antoninus* who lived in ſeveral Places; for 'tis ſo irrational a Thing, that nothing but his Authority could have perſuaded me to it. Certain young Gentlemen of *Athens* conſpired againſt *Diocles* and *Hippias*, Two Tyrants in that City. They killed *Diocles*, but *Hippias* eſcaped, and revenged his Death. *Chiones* and *Leonides* of *Heraclea*, Two of *Plato*'s Diſciples, conſpired againſt *Clearchus* and *Satirus*, Two Tyrants of that Place; *Clearchus* was murthered, but *Satirus* ſurvived and revenged it. The *Pazzi* (whom we have ſo often mentioned) killed only *Julian de Medici*, his Brother eſcaping. So that from theſe Conſpiracies againſt ſeveral Perſons, all wiſe People will abſtain, as Things that are fatal to themſelves, their Country, and every body elſe; for thoſe who eſcape are thereby render'd the more cruel and tyrannical, as appears by the aforeſaid Examples in *Florence*, *Athens*, and *Heraclea*. And therefore the Conſpiracy of *Pelopidas* againſt the Tyrants of *Thebes* was admirable, in reſpect of the Succeſs, ſeeing not only One, but Ten of them were to be murthered; and that he was neither a Favourite, nor had eaſy Acceſs to them; but was a Rebel, and in Baniſhment; yet he overcame all theſe Difficulties, got into *Thebes*, killed the Tyrants, and delivered his Country; but with the Aſſiſtance of *Caron* one of the Tyrant's great Counſellors who gave him Admiſſion, and contributed much to his Succeſs. But let no Man preſume upon this Example, for it is looked upon not only as a rare Thing, but as a Miracle. The Execution of ſuch a Deſign may be interrupted likewiſe by a falſe Imagination, or ſome unexpected Accident happening in the very Act. The very Morning that *Brutus* and his Confederates were to murther *Cæſar*, it happened that he had a long Diſcourſe with *Cn. Popilius Lenas*, one of the Conſpirators, which the reſt of the Accomplices obſerving, concluded that *Popilius* had diſcovered all to *Cæſar*, and was giving him an Account; whereupon it was propoſed to kill *Cæſar* preſently, and not to defer it till he was in the Senate; and doubtleſs they had done it, but that their Diſcourſe broke off, and *Cæſar* went away without any Commotion. Theſe Imaginations are ſometimes very conſiderable, and to be regarded with a great deal of Prudence, and the rather, becauſe they are eaſily taken up; for he who is conſcious to himſelf, is always apt to ſuſpect that they are talking of him; and it may ſo fall out, that a Word ſpoken to another Intent, may gaul and diſturb you as much as if it were ſpoken on Purpoſe, and either force you to fly, or ſo haſten and precipitate the Execution, that you run your ſelf upon many Inconveniences, eſpecially where many are privy to the Plot. As to the Accidents, becauſe they are unexpected and occaſional, no Directions can be given againſt them, but Examples by which Men are to regulate and be cautious. *Julius Belanti* of *Siena* (whom we have mentioned before) being incenſed againſt *Pandolfus*, who had given him his Daughter in Marriage, and taken her from him again, conſpired his Death, and laid his Deſign thus; *Pandolfus* went almoſt every Day to viſit one of his Relations that was ſick; and in his Paſſage went commonly by *Julius* his Houſe: Upon this Conſideration, *Julius* got all his Accomplices together into his Houſe, with Intention to aſſault him as he went by; to which Purpoſe he armed them all, and diſpoſed them into the Porch, that they might be ready upon a Signal to be given from a Window above: It happened that *Pandolfus* being juſt by, the Perſon at the Window gave the Signal, when by Accident in the very Nick of Time *Pandolfus* met a Friend, and ſtopt to ſalute him: Some of his Attendants paſſing on, heard a Noiſe of Arms, took the Alarm, and diſcovered the Ambuſcade; ſo that *Pandolfus* was miraculouſly preſerved, *Julio* and his Companions forced to fly from *Siena*, and all by the Accident of this Rencounter,

counter, which not only hindred the Execution at that Time, but defeated the whole Enterprize.

But againſt theſe Accidents no Remedy can be preſcribed, becauſe they happen ſo rarely; however it is neceſſary to think of as many, and provide againſt them as well as we can. It remains now that we ſay ſomething of thoſe Dangers which we incur after Execution is done, of which Sort there is but one; and that is, when ſomebody is left Alive that may revenge it: As his Children, Brothers, Kinſmen, and ſuch others to whom the Sovereignty may deſcend by Right of Inheritance; and theſe may be left to revenge the Death of their Predeceſſor, either by your Negligence, or by ſome of the Accidents aforeſaid; as it happened to *Giovan-Andrea da Lampognano*, who conſpiring with other Perſons, killed the Duke of *Milan*, but they left Two of his Brothers, and one of his Sons behind, who revenged it in due Time. But in theſe Caſes the Conſpirators are to be excuſed, becauſe there is no Remedy to be provided; but where by their own Imprudence or Negligence they ſuffer any ſuch to eſcape, there it is otherwiſe, and they are highly to be condemned. At *Forum Livii* ſome there were who conſpired againſt Count *Girolamo*, ſlew him, ſeized upon his Wife and Children (which were very Young) and clapp'd them in Priſon: A great Mind they had to the Caſtle, but the Governor was refractory, and would not admit them. The Counteſs (called *Madonna Caterina*) made them a Propoſition, that if they would ſuffer her to go in to him, ſhe would prevail with the Governor to ſurrender, and that in the mean Time her Children ſhould be left as Hoſtages in their Hands. The Conſpirators believed her, and let her go in, but ſhe was no ſooner in the Caſtle, but ſhe began to upbraid them by the Death of her Husband, and threaten them with all poſſible Revenge; and to convince them that her Care and Compaſſion for her Children ſhould not reſtrain her, ſhe ſhew'd them her Genitals through the Windows, to let them know, that if they killed thoſe, ſhe had wherewithal to have more: So that perceiving their Error too late, and being deſtitute of all Counſel, their Indiſcretion was puniſhed with their perpetual Baniſhment. But of all Dangers after the Fact is committed, none is ſo fatal as the Affection of the People to their Prince whom you have ſlain. For their Revenge is not poſſible to be prevented. Of this, the Murder of *Cæſar* may be an Example: For the People of *Rome* being his Friends, his Death was thoroughly revenged upon the Conſpirators, who afterwards (though in ſeveral Times and Places) were all of them ſlain. Conjurations againſt ones Country are not ſo dangerous as Conjurations againſt ones Prince; for in the Contrivance and Management the Dangers are not ſo many; in the Execution they are but the ſame; and after the Fact is committed, they are nothing at all. In the Management and Preparation the Dangers are not ſo many, becauſe a Citizen may make his Party, and put his Affairs in a Poſture without Diſcovery; and if his Orders be not interrupted, bring his Deſigns to a very good End; or if they be interrupted by ſome Law, it is in his Power to adjourn the Execution, or find out ſome other Way that may be more commodious; but all theſe (it is to be underſtood) are to be done only in Commonwealths, where the Manners of the People are beginning to be corrupted; becauſe where the City is incorrupt, ſuch Deſigns will never come into any of their Thoughts; but in a corrupt Republick where the Dangers are not ſo great, there are many Ways for private Citizens to make themſelves Princes; becauſe a Commonwealth is not ſo quick and dextrous as a Prince, their Suſpicion is leſs, and by Conſequence their Caution: Beſides, they are commonly in more Awe of their Grandees, and therefore the Grandees are more bold and courageous againſt them. Every body has read *Catiline*'s Conſpiracy, written by *Saluſt*, and can tell how *Catiline* (after it was detected) not only continued in *Rome*, but came audaciouſly into the Senate, and had the Confidence to talk inſolently both to the Senate and Conſul; ſo great Reverence had that City for its Citizens. And when Things were gone ſo far, that he had left the City, and was got to the Head of an Army, *Lentulus*, and the reſt of the Conſpirators had never been ſeized, had there not been Letters produced againſt them under their own Hands.

Hanno, a great Citizen in *Carthage*, had a Mind to uſurp; and in order thereto, he had contrived at the Wedding of one of his Daughters to poiſon the whole Senate, and then make himſelf Prince: When his Plot was diſcovered, the Senate troubled themſelves with no farther Proviſion againſt it, than by making a Law againſt exorbitant Feaſting upon ſuch Kind of Occaſions: So great was their Reſpect to a Citizen of his Quality! But in a Conſpiracy againſt ones Country, the greateſt Danger lies in the Execution; for it ſeldom happens that a particular Citizen is ſtrong enough to ſubdue a whole Country; and every Man is not General of an Army, as *Cæſar*, *Agathocles*, *Cleomenes* and others were, who had their Armies ready to back their Deſigns. To ſuch the Way is eaſy and ſecure; but they who want thoſe Advantages muſt manage their Buſineſs with more Cunning, or employ foreign Aſſiſtance: This Cunning and Artifice was uſed by *Piſiſtrates* the

Athenian; for having overcome the *Megarenſes*, and thereby got himſelf great Reputation among the People, he came forth of his Houſe one Morning, and ſhew'd himſelf wounded to them, complaining that the Nobility had abuſed him, and deſired that he might be permitted to have a Guard for the Security of his Perſon; which being granted inconſiderately, gave him Opportunity by Degrees to make himſelf abſolute. *Pandolfus Petrucci* (with other Exiles) returned to *Siena*, and by Way of Contempt, was made Keeper of the Place, which was a mechanick Employment that others had refuſed. Yet thoſe few arm'd Men, who were under his Command by virtue of that Place, by Degrees gave him ſuch Reputation, that at length he made himſelf Prince. Others have taken other Ways, and by Time and their Induſtry, arrived at the ſame Dignity without any Danger! But thoſe who have endeavoured to make themſelves Maſters of their Country by their own Force or foreign Supplies, have had various Events, as Fortune was pleaſed to befriend them. *Catiline* was ruined: *Hanno* (of whom we have ſpoken before) failing in his Poiſon, arm'd many Thouſands of his Partiſans, which were all ſlain with him. Certain of the principal Citizens of *Thebes*, by the Help of a *Spartan* Army, made themſelves Maſters of that City, and tyranniz'd over it: So that if all Conſpiracies againſt their Country be examined, there will none, or but very few, be found to have miſcarried in the Management; but the whole Streſs of their good or bad Fortune has lain upon the Execution; which being once paſs'd, they are ſubject to no more Dangers than what depend upon the Nature of the Government; for when a Man uſurps, and makes himſelf a Tyrant, he expoſes himſelf to thoſe natural and inſeparable Dangers which are the Conſequences of Tyranny, againſt which he has no other Remedies than what has been deſcribed before.

This is what I have thought convenient to write upon the Subject of Conſpiracies; and if I have diſcourſed only of thoſe which are executed by the Sword, and not by Poiſon, it is becauſe they have the ſame Orders and Methods. True it is, the Way of Poiſon is the moſt dangerous, as being the more uncertain, becauſe every one has not Convenience, but is forc'd to confer with other People, and the Neceſſity of that Conference is much to be feared. Beſides, many Things happen which makes your Potion ineffectual; as it fell out to thoſe who killed *Commodus*; who having diſgorg'd his Poiſon, forc'd the Conſpirators to ſtrangle him. Princes then have no Enemy to which they are more dangerouſly expoſed, than to theſe Conſpiracies, becauſe they are never undertaken againſt any of them, but they take away his Life or Reputation. If they ſucceed, he dies; if they miſcarry, and the Inſtruments be put to Death, it is look'd upon as a Pretence and Invention of the Prince to ſatiate his Avarice or Cruelty upon the Blood or Fortunes of his Enemies. My Advice therefore is (both to Prince and Commonwealth) that upon the Diſcovery of a Conſpiracy, (before they think of Revenge) ſeriouſly to conſider the Quality of it, and to compare the Condition of the Conſpirators with their own: If they find them potent and ſtrong, till they have furniſhed themſelves with a proportionable Force, no Notice is to be taken; if Notice be taken, they are unable to defend themſelves, and certainly ruined; for the Conſpirators finding themſelves diſcovered, will grow deſperate, and be under a Neceſſity of venturing, let the Succeſs be what it will. The *Romans* may be an Example of this Way of diſſembling; for having (as we ſaid before) left Two of their Legions at *Capua* for the Security of that City againſt the *Samnites*; the Commanders of the ſaid Legions conſpir'd to make themſelves Maſters of the Town. The *Romans* having Notice of their Deſigns, committed the Prevention of it to *Rutilius* their new Conſul, who to lull and delude the Conſpirators, gave out that the Senate had confirmed that Station to thoſe Legions for another Winter; which the Legions believed, and thinking then they ſhould have Time enough, they neglected to haſten their Deſign, till at length obſerving the Conſul to draw them away inſenſibly, and diſpoſe them into other Parts, they began to ſuſpect, and that Suſpicion made them diſcover themſelves, and put their Plot in Execution. Nor can an Example be brought more properly for either Side; for by it we may ſee how cool and remiſs People are when they think they have Time enough; and how ſudden and vigorous when Neceſſity preſſes them. And the Prince or Commonwealth which would defer the Diſcovery of a Plot, cannot do it with more Advantage to himſelf, than by giving the Conſpirators ſome handſome Occaſion to believe that they may execute it with more Eaſe and Security another Time; for thereby the Prince or Commonwealth will have more Leiſure to provide for their Defence: They who have proceeded otherwiſe, have but haſtened their own Ruin, as we have ſeen in the Caſe of the Duke of *Athens*, and *Gulielmo de Puzzi*. The Duke having made himſelf Sovereign in *Florence*, and underſtanding there were Conſpiracies againſt him; without enquiring farther into the Buſineſs, cauſed one of them to be apprehended, which giving an Alarm to the reſt, they immediately took Arms, and turn'd the Duke out of his Supremacy. *Gulielmo* being Commiſſary for that City in the

Val di Chiana in the Year 1501, having News of a great Plot in *Arezzo* in Favour of the *Vitelli*, and that their Design was to renounce the Dominion of the *Florentines*, he marched thither directly, without considering the Power of the Conspirators, or his own, or so much as furnishing himself with what Forces he might have done; and by the Advice of the Bishop his Son, causing one of the Conspirators to be seized, the rest fell presently to their Arms, disclaim'd the *Florentines*, and took their Commissary Prisoner. But when Conspiracies are weak, and in their Infancy, if they be discovered, they are to suppress them out of Hand, without any Suspence, and not to follow the Example either of the Duke of *Athens*, or *Dion* of *Syracuse*, of whom the first caused a Citizen who had discovered a Plot to him, to be put to Death, that the rest observing how unwilling he was to believe any Thing of them, might be the more secure, and hold themselves obliged. *Dion* on the other Side suspecting the Affections of some People, caused one of his Confidents called *Calippus* to pretend a Conspiracy, and see if he could draw them in; but both these Practices succeeded very ill, for by the first, all People were discouraged from making any Discovery, and all Conspirators confirmed; and by the other, a Way was recommended for Murdering of himself; for *Calippus* finding he had an Opportunity to practise without Danger, he did it so effectually, that it cost *Dion* both his Government and Life.

CHAP. VII.

How it comes to pass that in the Changes of State, from Liberty to Servitude, and from Servitude to Liberty, some are very innocent, and others very bloody.

SOME People perhaps may wonder how it should come to pass that Governments should be changed from one Form to another, sometimes easily, and without Blood, and sometimes with great Difficulty and Slaughter, be the Variation as it will, either from Liberty to Tyranny, or from Tyranny to Liberty. And this Diversity of Mutations is so strange, that as History tells us, they happen sometimes with infinite Effusion of Blood, and at other Times without the least Injury to any; as in *Rome*, when the Government was taken from the Kings, and put into the Hands of the Consuls, no body was expulsed, or so much as molested but the *Tarquins*; but in other Alterations it has been otherwise. And the Cause of this Diversity may (in my Judgment) be deduced from the Manner in which that State was acquired; if it was obtained by Force, it could not be without Injury to many People, and then whenever it is destroyed, it will necessarily follow that all those who were injured before, will endeavour to repair and revenge themselves; which is not to be done without great Tumult and Slaughter. But when a Commonwealth is fix'd gradually and by universal Consent of the People, when it comes to be changed there is no Need of disturbing any body else; for the bare removal of those who are then in Authority, will effectually do the Business. Of this Sort was the Revolution at *Rome* upon the Translation of the Government from the Kings to the Consuls; and the Accident at *Florence* in the Year 1494, when the *Medici* were expelled without the least Prejudice to any body else; for they having been advanced by the general Vote of the People, there was no need of doing more than turning them out of the City. Such Mutations are not therefore so dangerous; but those others where many have been injured, and as many are to be revenged, have been so dreadfully destructive, that the very History of their Consequences is enough to terrify the Reader; but all Books being full of them, I shall speak no more of them in this Place.

CHAP. VIII.

He who would change the Form of a Government, is to conſider ſeriouſly upon what Grounds he does it, and the Diſpoſition of the Subject.

IT has been ſaid before, that an evil diſpoſed Citizen can do no great Hurt but in an ill diſpoſed City; which Concluſion (beſides my former Arguments) is much fortified by the Examples of *Spurius Caſſius*, and *Manlius Capitolinus*; *Spurius* was an ambitious Man, and being deſirous to procure to himſelf extraordinary Authority in *Rome*, by favouring the People in the Sale of ſuch Lands as the *Romans* had conquered from the *Hernici*, the Senate diſcovered it, and grew ſo jealous of him, that when in a Speech of his to the People he proffered to give them the Money which had been received for Corn, that the Senate had ſent for out of *Sicily*, the People abſolutely refuſed it; ſuppoſing that *Spurius* intended that their Liberty ſhould make it good: But had the People of *Rome* at that Time been corrupt or ill diſpoſed, they had taken his Money, and opened him a Way to the making himſelf abſolute. But the Example of *Manlius Capitolinus* is greater than this, for by that we may ſee how the Courage and Integrity which he expreſſed to his Country in their Wars againſt the *Gauls*, was afterwards clouded and extinguiſhed by an inſatiable Deſire of Authority, ariſing from an Emulation of *Camillus*, whom the *Romans* had advanced to a greater Degree of Honour; and ſo ſtrangely was he blinded with this Paſſion, that not conſidering the State and Incorruption of the City, or how indiſpoſed the People were to any ſuch Enterprize, he began to make Parties, and raiſe Tumults in *Rome* both againſt the Senate and Laws. In which Paſſage it was evident how well that Government was conſtituted, and how well that People was diſpoſed; for in this Caſe (though the Nobility and he were great Friends, and fierce Defenders of one anothers Intereſt) none of them, nor his very Relations appeared in his Behalf; and whereas at other Trials the Friends of the Criminal uſed to accompany him to the Bar in Mourning, and with all other Circumſtances of Sadneſs that they could think of, to work (if it were poſſible) the Judges to Compaſſion; *Manlius* went alone, without ſo much as one Friend to attend him: The Tribunes of the People who were in other Things always oppoſite to the Nobility, and created on Purpoſe to balance their Power; when they found the Deſign tending to the Ruin of them all, they join'd heartily with them to remove ſo common a Deſtruction: And the People of *Rome*, who were zealous in any Thing that made for their Advantage, and Lovers of any Thing that croſſed the Nobility, (though they alſo had their Kindneſs for *Manlius*;) nevertheleſs when the Tribunes cited him, and referred him to the Judgment of the People, they condemned him to Death, without any Conſideration of his former Services. Wherefore I am of Opinion, that in the whole Tract of this Hiſtory there is not an Example, that with more Efficacy demonſtrates the Juſtice of that Commonwealth in all its Orders and Degrees of Men than this; ſeeing there was not one Citizen appeared in the Defence of *Manlius*, who was a Perſon of known Virtue and Endowments, and had done many honourable Things both in publick and private; and the reaſon was, becauſe the Love to their Country had a greater Influence upon them than any other Reſpect; and the Conſideration of the preſent Danger of their Affairs, being ſtronger than the Memory of his paſt Merits, they choſe to free themſelves by decreeing his Death. *Titus Livius* tells us, *Hunc exitum habuit vir niſi in libera Civitate natus eſſet, memorabilis*: *This was the End of a Man who had been very memorable, had he been born any where but in a free State.* And in his Caſe there are Two Things very remarkable; one, that in a corrupt State Glory and Authority is acquir'd a quite contrary Way, than where they live exactly according to the true Rules of Policy and Juſtice; the other, (not much unlike the former) that Men in their Affairs, eſpecially of greateſt Importance, are to conſider the Times, and accommodate thereunto; and thoſe who by the Unhappineſs of their Election, or their natural Inclination do otherwiſe, live always unfortunately, and are more unſucceſsful in all their Enterprizes, than they who comply with the Times. And doubtleſs, by the fore-mentioned Expreſſion of the Hiſtorian, had *Manlius* been born in the Days of *Marius* and *Sylla*, when the Maſs was corrupt and depraved, and ſuſceptible of any Form his Ambition would have imprinted, he had had the ſame Succeſs that they had, when they aſpired to be abſolute. So again, had *Marius* and *Sylla* come into the World in the Time of *Manlius*, they had miſcarried as he did, and been loſt in their firſt Attempt. For one Man by his ill Cuſtoms and Converſation may indeed give a Touch and Tincture of Corruption to the People, but 'tis impoſſible his Life ſhould be long enough to debauch them ſo totally that he may expect any Advantage of it in his Time; or if he

ſhould be ſo happy, and live long enough to infect a whole City; yet ſo impatient are the Deſires of Man, that they cannot reſtrain their Paſſions, or attend an Opportunity of purſuing them wiſely, but they circumvent and delude themſelves in thoſe very Things of which they are moſt eagerly ambitious; ſo that ſometimes for want of Patience, and ſometimes for want of Judgment, they venture raſhly upon Things before the Matter be prepared, and are ruined in their Deſigns. He therefore who would alter a Government and ſet up himſelf, muſt attend till Time has corrupted the Maſs, and by Degrees brought all into Diſorder; which of Neceſſity muſt follow, when it is not (as we ſaid before) purged and refined by the Examples of good Men, or good Laws, that may reduce it towards its firſt Principles. *Manlius* then had been a great and memorable Perſon, had he been born in a corrupt City; for whoever deſigns any Innovation in a State, whether it be for the Reſtitution of Liberty, or the Erection of Tyranny, is particularly to regard the Manners of the People, and to conſider how far they are diſpoſed to ſubmit to his Ambition; and by ſo doing he may be able to judge of the Succeſs of his Enterprize. For to endeavour to make a People Free, that are Servile in their Nature, is as hard a Matter as to keep them in Servitude, who are diſpoſed to be free. And becauſe we have ſaid before, that in all their Operations, Men are to conſider and proceed according to the Quality of the Times, we ſhall ſpeak of it at Large in the following Chapter.

CHAP. IX.

How he that would ſucceed, muſt accommodate to the Times.

I Have many Times conſidered with my ſelf, that the Occaſion of every Man's good or bad Fortune conſiſts in his Correſpondence and Accommodation with the Times. We ſee ſome People acting furiouſly, and with an *impetus*; others with more Slowneſs and Caution; and becauſe both in the one and the other they are immoderate, and do not obſerve their juſt Terms, therefore both of them do err; but their Error and Misfortune is leaſt, whoſe Cuſtoms ſuit and correſpond with the Times; and who comports himſelf in his Deſigns, according to the Impulſe of his own Nature. Every one can tell how *Fabius Maximus* conducted his Army, and with what Carefulneſs and Caution he proceeded, contrary to the ancient Heat and Boldneſs of the *Romans*, and it happened that grave way was more conformable to thoſe Times. For *Hanibal* coming young and brisk into *Italy*, and being elated with his good Fortune, as having Twice defeated the Armies of the *Romans*, that Commonwealth having loſt moſt of her beſt Soldiers, and remaining in great Fear and Confuſion, nothing could have happened more ſeaſonably to them, than to have ſuch a General, who by his Caution and Cunctation could keep the Enemy at a Bay. Nor could any Times have been more fortunate to his way of Proceeding; for that that ſlow and deliberate way was natural in *Fabius*, and not affected, appeared afterwards, when *Scipio* being deſirous to paſs his Army into *Africk*, to give the finiſhing Blow to the War, *Fabius* oppoſed it moſt earneſtly, as one who could not force or diſſemble his Nature, which was rather to ſupport wiſely againſt the Difficulties that were upon him, than to ſearch out for New. So that had *Fabius* directed, *Hanibal* had continued in *Italy*; and the Reaſon was, becauſe he did not conſider the Times were altered, and the Method of the War was to be changed with them: And if *Fabius* at that Time had been King of *Rome*, he might well have been worſted in the War, as not knowing how to frame his Counſels according to the Variation of the Times. But there being in that Commonwealth ſo many brave Men, and excellent Commanders, of all Sorts of Tempers and Humours, Fortune would have it, That as *Fabius* was ready in hard and difficult Times, to ſuſtain the Enemy, and continue the War; ſo afterwards, when Affairs were in a better Poſture, *Scipio* was preſented to finiſh and conclude it. And hence it is, that an *Ariſtocracy* or free State is longer lived, and generally more fortunate, than a Principality; becauſe in the firſt they are more flexible, and can frame themſelves better to the Diverſity of the Times: For a Prince being accuſtomed to one way, is hardly to be got out of it, though perhaps the Variation of the Times require it very much. *Piero Soderini* (whom I have mentioned before) proceeded with great Gentleneſs and Humanity in all his Actions; and he and his Country proſpered whilſt the Times were according; but when the Times changed, and there was a Neceſſity of laying aſide that Meekneſs and Humility, *Piero* was at a Loſs, and he and his Country were both ruined.

Pope

Pope *Julius* XI. during the whole Time of his Papacy, carried himſelf with great Vigor and Vehemence; and becauſe the Times were agreeable, he proſpered in every Thing; but had the Times altered, and required other Counſels, he had certainly been ruined, becauſe he could never have complied. And the Reaſon why we cannot change ſo eaſily with the Times, is Twofold; firſt, becauſe we cannot readily oppoſe our ſelves againſt what we naturally deſire; and next, becauſe when we have often tried one Way, and have always been proſperous, we can never perſuade our ſelves that we can do ſo well any other; and this is the true Cauſe why a Prince's Fortune varies ſo ſtrangely, becauſe ſhe varies the Times, but he does not alter the way of his Adminiſtrations. And it is the ſame in a Commonwealth; if the Variation of the Times be not obſerved, and their Laws and Cuſtoms altered accordingly, many Miſchiefs muſt follow, and the Government be ruined, as we have largely demonſtrated before; but thoſe Alterations of their Laws are more ſlow in a Commonwealth, becauſe they are not ſo eaſily changed, and there is a Neceſſity of ſuch Times as may ſhake the whole State, to which one Man will not be ſufficient, let him change his Proceedings, and take new Meaſures as he pleaſes. But becauſe we have mentioned *Fabius Maximus*, and how he kept *Hanibal* at a Bay, I think it not amiſs to enquire in the next Chapter, whether a General who is reſolved upon any Terms to engage, can be obſtructed by the Enemy.

CHAP. X.

A General cannot avoid Fighting, when the Enemy is reſolved to engage him upon any Terms.

CNeus *Sulpitius Dictator* (ſays *Livy*) *adverſus Gallos bellum trahebat, nolens ſe fortunæ committere adverſus hoſtem, quem tempus deteriorem indies, & locus alienus, faceret.* Cneus Sulpitius, *the Dictator, declined Fighting with the* French, *becauſe he would not expoſe himſelf unneceſſarily againſt an Enemy, who by the Incommodity of the Seaſon, and Inconvenience of his Station, was every Day in danger to be undone.*

When ſuch a Fault happens as deceives all, or the greateſt Part of Mankind, I think it not improper to apprehend it over and over again; and therefore though I have formerly in ſeveral Places ſhown how much our Actions in great Things, are different from thoſe in ancient Times; yet I think it not ſuperfluous to ſay ſomething of it here.

If in any Thing we deviate from the Practice of the Ancients, it is in our Military Diſcipline, in which we are ſo abſolutely new, that there is ſcarce any thing uſed that was preferred by our Anceſtors; and the Reaſon is, becauſe Commonwealths and Princes, being unwilling to expoſe themſelves to Danger, have ſhifted off that Study and Charge upon other People: And when in our Times any Prince goes in Perſon into the Field, no extraordinary Matter is to be expected, for he takes the Command upon him to ſhow his Grandeur and Magnificence, more than for any thing elſe. Yet they commit fewer Faults (by reviewing their Armies ſometimes, and keeping that Command in their own Hands) than Republicks are wont to do, eſpecially in *Italy*; where truſting all to other People, they underſtand nothing of War themſelves: And on the other Side, in their Counſels and Determinations (which to ſhow their Superiority, they reſerve to themſelves) they commit a Thouſand Times more Errors than in the Field; ſome of which I have mentioned elſewhere; but I ſhall ſpeak here of one them, and that of more than ordinary Importance. When theſe unactive Princes, or effeminate Commonwealths ſend out an Army, the wiſeſt Thing which they think they can give in Command to their General, is to enjoin him from Fighting, and above all Things to have a care of a Battel; ſuppoſing that therein they imitate the Wiſdom of *Fabius Maximus*, who preſerved the State by deferring the Combat; but they are miſtaken, and do not conſider that moſt commonly that Injunction is either idle, or dangerous; for this is moſt certain, a General who deſires to keep the Field, cannot avoid Fighting when the Enemy preſſes, and makes it his Buſineſs to engage him. So that to command a General in that Nature, is as much as to bid him Fight when the Enemy pleaſes, and not when he ſees Occaſion himſelf. For to keep the Field, and avoid Fighting, is to be done no way ſo ſecurely, as by keeping Fifty Miles off, and ſending out ſtore of Spies and Scouts that may give you Notice of the Enemies Approach, and Opportunity to retreat. There is another way likewiſe to ſecure your ſelf, and that is to ſhut your ſelf up in ſome ſtrong Town: But both the one and the other are dangerous. In the firſt Caſe, the Country is expoſed to the Depredations of the Enemy, and a generous Prince will ſooner run the

the Hazard of a Battel, than ſpin out a War with ſo much Detriment to his Subjects. In the Second, your Ruin is evident; for cooping up your Army in a City, the Enemy will block you up, or beſiege you, and then the Multitude of your Men will quickly bring a Scarcity of Proviſions; and Supplies being cut off, you will be forced to ſurrender; ſo that to avoid fighting either of theſe Two Ways, is very Pernicious. *Fabius* his way of ſtanding upon his Guard, and keeping his Army in Places of Advantage, is laudable and good, when your Army is ſo ſtrong, that the Enemy dares not attack you: Nor can it be ſaid, that *Fabius* declined Fighting, but that he deferred till he could do it with Advantage; for had *Hanibal* advanced againſt him, *Fabius* would have kept his Ground, and engaged him, but *Hanibal* was too Cunning for that; ſo that *Hanibal* as well as *Fabius* avoided Fighting; but if either of them would have fought upon Diſadvantage, the other had only Three Remedies, that is, the Two foreſaid, and flying. That this which I ſay is true, is manifeſt by a Thouſand Examples, but more particularly by the War which the *Romans* made upon *Philip* of *Macedon*; *Philip* being invaded by the *Romans*, reſolved not to come to a Battel, and to avoid it, he (as *Fabius* did in *Italy*) encamped his Army upon the top of a Mountain, and entrenched himſelf ſo ſtrongly, that he believed the *Romans* durſt not have ventured to come at him: But they not only adventured, but removed him from the Mountain, forced him to fly with the greateſt Part of his Army; and had it not been for the Unpaſſableneſs of the Country, which hinder'd the Purſuit, the *Macedonians* had all been cut off. *Philip*, then, being unwilling to Fight, and having (as I ſaid before) encamped upon the Mountains, not far from the *Romans*, durſt not truſt himſelf to his Advantages, and having found by Experience that he was not ſecure there, he would not pin himſelf up in a Town, but made Choice of the other Way, and kept himſelf at a Diſtance; ſo as when the *Romans* came into one Province, he would remove into another, and what Place ſoever the *Romans* left, he would be ſure to come to: At length finding this Protraction of the War, made his Affairs but worſe, and that his Subjects were haraſſed by both Armies, he reſolved to try his Fortune, and bring all to the Deciſion of a Battel: But it is convenient to avoid Fighting, when your Army is in the ſame Condition as thoſe of *Fabius*, and *Sulpitius*; that is, when it is ſo conſiderable, that the Enemy fears to attack you in your Entrenchments; and though he has got ſome Footing in your Country, yet not ſo much as is able to ſupply him with Proviſions; in this Caſe 'tis beſt to decline Fighting, and follow the Example of *Sulpitius*, *Nolens ſe fortunæ committere*, &c. But in all other Caſes it is not to be done, but with Diſhonour and Danger; for to fly (as *Philip* did) is as bad as to be routed, and more diſhonourable, becauſe he gave no Proof of his Courage; and tho' he eſcap'd by the Difficulty of the Country, yet whoever follows his Example without that Convenience, may chance to be ruin'd. No Man will deny but *Hanibal* was a great Soldier, and of a more than ordinary Experience; when he went into *Africa* againſt *Scipio*, if he had ſeen it for his Advantage to have protracted the War, he would have done it, and perchance (being a great Captain, and having as good an Army) he would have done it the ſame way as *Fabius* did in *Italy*; but ſeeing he did not do it, it is probable he was diverted by ſome extraordinary Occaſion. For that Prince who has got an Army together, (if he perceives that for want of Pay, or Supplies, he is not likely to keep them long) is ſtark Mad if he tries not his Fortune before his Army diſbands; for by delaying, he is certainly loſt; by Fighting he may poſſibly overcome: And above all Things, whether we are Victorious or Beaten, we are to behave our ſelves honourably; and 'tis more honourable to be overcome by Force, than by ſome Error to run your ſelf into Incommodities, that ruin you afterwards. 'Tis not unlikely but *Hanibal* might be impelled by ſome ſuch Neceſſity; and on the other Side *Scipio* (if *Hanibal* ſhould have deferred Fighting) might have choſe whether he would have attacked him in his Trenches, becauſe he had already conquered *Syphax*, and got ſuch Footing in *Africk* that he was as ſafe, and with as much Commodity as in *Italy*; but it was otherwiſe with *Hanibal*, when he had to do with *Fabius*, and with the *French*, when they had to do with *Sulpitius*. And he who invades an Enemies Country, avoids fighting with more Difficulty, as being obliged (whenever the Enemy appears to obſtruct him) to give him Battel; and if he ſets down before any Town, he is obliged ſo much the more, as in our Times it happen'd to *Charles* Duke of *Burgundy*, who was beat up in his Leaguer before *Morat* by the *Switzers*, and defeated. And the ſame Thing fell out to the *French* at the Siege of *Navarre*, where they were attack'd and beaten by the *Switzers*.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

One Person that has many Enemies upon his Hands, tho he be inferior to them, yet if he can sustain their first Impression, carries commonly the Victory.

THE Power of the Tribunes of the People was great and necessary in the City of *Rome*, to correct the Ambition of the Nobility, who otherwise would have debauch'd the said City much sooner than they did: But as it happens in other Things, so it happened in this; in the best and most beneficial Thing to the Commonwealth, there was an occult and remote Evil that lay snug, which required new Laws, and new Methods to suppress. For the Insolence of the Tribunal Authority grew so great, that it became terrible both to the Senate and People, and had doubtlessly produced some great Mischief to the Commonwealth, had not *Appius Claudius* by his great Wisdom, found out a way to temper and balance their Fury, by the Interceſſion of their Colleagues; and the way was, by chusing out some Person among the Tribunes, whom either out of Fear, or Corruption, or Love to his Country, they could dispose to withstand the Designs of his Brethren, and oppose himself against them, whenever their Resolutions were tending to the Diminution of the Nobility, or Prejudice of the State. Which way of restraining the Petulancy of the Tribunes, was for a long Time of great Advantage to the *Romans*, and may give us Occasion to consider, whether a Combination of several great Persons, against one less powerful than they (whilst united) is like to be successful against him that is alone; or whether the single Person has the Advantage against the Confederacy. I answer, That those whose Forces are united, are many times stronger, but their Performances are seldom so great as the single Persons, though he be nothing so strong; for committing an infinite Number of other Things (in which the single Person has the Advantage) he will be able with a little Industry to break, and divide and enfeeble them: To this Purpose there is no need of going to Antiquity for Examples (where there is Plenty enough,) the Passages of our own Times will furnish us sufficiently. In the Year 1484, all *Italy* confederated against the *Venetians*; who, when they were so over-power'd, and distress'd, that they were unable to keep the Field, found a way to work off Count *Lodovic* (Governor of *Milan*) from their League; by which Means they not only obtained a Peace, and Restitution of what they had lost, but they got a good Part of the Dutchy of *Ferrara*; so that they whose Forces were too weak to appear before the Enemy; when they came to treat, were the greatest Gainers by the War. Not many Years since, the whole Christian World seemed to conspire against *France*; yet before the end of the War, the *Spaniard* fell off from the League, made his Peace with the *French*, and forced the rest of the Confederates, one after one, to do the same. And from hence we may easily collect, that as often as many Princes or States are Confederated together against any single Prince or Commonwealth; if the single Prince and Commonwealth be strong enough to withstand their first Impression, and spin out the War, he will certainly prevail; but if his Force be not sufficient to do that, he is in extraordinary Danger; as it happen'd to the *Venetians*; for had they been able to have sustained their first Shock, and protracted the War, till they had debauched some of the Confederates, the *French* had never done them so much Mischief, and they had preserv'd themselves from Ruin: But their Army being too weak to confront them, and their Time too little to divide them, they were undone; and this is evident by what happen'd afterward; for as soon as the Pope had recovered what he had lost, he reconciled himself, and became their Friend: The *Spaniard* did the same, and both of them would have been glad to have continued *Lombardy* to the *Venetians*, rather than the *French* should have got it, and made himself so considerable in *Italy*. The *Venetians* at that Time might have prevented a great Part of their Calamities, had they given some small Part of their Territory to the Enemy, and thereby have secured the rest; but then they must have given it in Time, and so as it might not have appeared to have been done by Necessity; as they might well have done before the War was commenced; when that was begun, it would have been dishonourable, and perhaps ineffectual. But before those Troubles, there were few of the *Venetian* Citizens that could foresee a Danger; fewer that could remedy it; and none at all that could advise. To conclude therefore this Chapter, I do pronounce, that as the *Roman* Remedy against the Ambition of their Tribunes, was the Multitude of them, out of which they always found some or other, that they could make for the Interest of the Publick; so it is a ready Remedy for any Prince that is engaged against a Confederate Enemy, when he can break their League, and work any of the Confederates to a Separation.

CHAP. XII.

A wiſe General is to put a Neceſſity of Fighting upon his own Army, but to prevent it to his Enemies.

WE have formerly diſcourſed of what Uſe and Importance Neceſſity is in human Exploits, and ſhown how many Men, compelled by Neceſſity, have done glorious Things, and made their Memories immortal. Moral Philoſophers have told us, That the Tongue and the Hands are noble Inſtruments of themſelves; yet they had never brought Things to that Exactneſs and Perfection, had not Neceſſity impelled them. The Generals therefore of old, underſtanding well the Virtue of this Neceſſity; and how much more deſperate and obſtinate their Soldiers were rendered thereby, made it their Care to bring their Soldiers into a Neceſſity of Fighting, and to keep it from their Enemies; to which End, they many Times opened a Paſſage for the Enemies Army, which they might eaſily have obſtructed; and precluded it to their own, when they might as eaſily have paſſed. Whoever therefore, deſires to make his Gariſon ſtout and courageous, and obſtinate for the Defence of a Town, or to render his Army pertinacious in the Field, is above all Things to reduce them into ſuch a Neceſſity, or at leaſt to make them believe it: So that a wiſe General, who deſigns the Beſieging of a Town, judges of the Eaſineſs or Difficulty of the Expugnation, from the Neceſſity which lies upon the Citizens to defend themſelves: If the Neceſſity of their Defence be great, his Enterprize is the more difficult, becauſe the Courage and Obſtinacy of the Beſieged is like to be the greater; but where there is no ſuch Neceſſity, there is no ſuch Danger. Hence it is, that revolted Towns are much harder to be recovered, than they were to be taken at firſt; for at firſt having committed no Fault, they were in Fear of no Puniſhment, and therefore ſurrendered more eaſily: But in the other Caſe having the Guilt of their Defect upon their Spirits, they are fearful of Revenge, and ſo become more obſtinate in their Defence. Theſe are not unuſual, and yet there are other Cauſes which render the Minds of People obſtinate in their Defence, and one of them is the natural Hatred and Animoſity which is frequently betwixt neighbouring Princes and States, which proceeds from an inſatiable Deſire of Dominion in Princes, and as zealous an Inclination to Liberty in Commonwealths, eſpecially if they be conſtituted as in *Tuſcany*, where that Emulation and Jealouſy have made them refractory both on the one Side, and the other. Hence it is, though the *Florentines* have been at greater Charges than the *Venetians*, yet their Acqueſts are not ſo much, becauſe the Towns in *Tuſcany* were moſt of them free, and by Conſequence more difficult to be brought to Subjection; whereas the Towns which the *Venetians* conquered, having been moſt of them under Princes, and accuſtomed to Servitude, it was indifferent to them under whoſe Dominion they were; and they are ſo far from reſiſting a Change, that they do many Times deſire it. So that though the Cities upon the Frontiers of the *Venetian*, were generally ſtronger than thoſe upon the Frontiers of the *Florentine*, yet they were reduced with more Eaſe, becauſe being not ſo free, they were leſs obſtinate in their Defence. When therefore a wiſe General reſolves upon a Siege, he is with all Diligence to take away that Neceſſity from the Citizens which may make them inflexible, either by promiſing Indemnity, if they had deſerved to be puniſhed; or if it be only their Liberty of which they are fearful, by aſſuring them that his Deſigns are not againſt that, but only againſt the Ambition and Exorbitancy of ſome particular Perſons; which Kind of Promiſes have had ſtrange Effects in the facilitating of Enterprizes, and the taking of Towns; for though wiſe Men will eaſily diſcover the Fraud, yet the Multitude are commonly ſo impatient of War, and ſo mad to be at quiet, that they ſhut their Eyes againſt any Thing of Miſchief, that comes to them under Propoſitions of Peace; by which means many Cities have loſt their Liberty, as it happened to *Florence* not long ſince; and to *M. Craſſus* and his Army heretofore, who though he was ſenſible that the Promiſes of the *Parthians* were fraudulent, and made only to keep his Soldiers from that Neceſſity of defending themſelves, yet he could not convince them, nor prevail with them to ſtand bravely upon their Guard, but being blinded with their Overtures of Peace, both Army and General were cut off, as may be ſeen by the Hiſtory. The *Samnites*, put on by the Ambition of ſome of their Citizens, brake their Peace with the *Romans*, and invaded their Country; but being afterwards ſenſible of what they had done, they ſent Ambaſſadors to *Rome*, offering Reſtitution of what they had taken, and to deliver up the Authors of that Counſel into their Hands, to be puniſhed as they pleas'd; but being rejected, and their Ambaſſadors ſent Home without any Hopes of Agreement, *Pontius* their General uſed

it as an Argument to encourage his Men to fight more obſtinately, that the *Romans* having refuſed their fair Overtures of Peace, were reſolved upon War; and therefore there was no other Courſe but of Neceſſity they muſt fight. And (ſays he) *Juſtum eſt bellum, quibus eſt neceſſarium & pia arma, quibus nulla niſi in armis ſpes eſt. That War is juſt that is neceſſary, and Arms are piouſly taken up by him, who has no other Hopes to ſecure himſelf.* Upon which Neceſſity he founded the Hopes of his Victory. *C. Manlius* was at the Head of an Army againſt the *Vejentes*, and Part of the Army of the *Vejentes* being got into his Camp, *Manlius*, to cut off their Retreat, doubled his Guards at the Gates, and fortified all the Paſſes by which they were to return; but the *Vejentes* perceiving they were deſperate, fought with ſo much Courage and Fury, that they killed the Conſul, and had cut off his whole Army, had not one of the Tribunes very wiſely opened them a way to be gone: In which Action we may obſerve, that whilſt the *Vejentes* were under a Neceſſity of Fighting, there was no reſiſting of their Courage; but when a Way was opened for their Retreat, they choſe rather to fly. The *Volſci* and the *Equi* were entered upon the Confines of the *Romans*, who ſent their Conſuls againſt them with an Army; and coming to a Battel, it happened that in the Heat of it, the *Volſci* were incloſed by the *Romans*, and as it were ſhut up in their own Camp. *Vettius Meſcius* their General, finding their Exigence, and that there was a Neceſſity of being killed, or making their Way by the Sword, *Ite mecum* (ſays he to his Soldiers) *non murus, non vallum, armati armatis obſtant, virtute pares, (quæ ultimum & maximum telum eſt) neceſſitate ſuperiores eſtis. Follow me then couragiouſly, you have no Wall, no Rampart, nothing but armed Men to withſtand you; You are equal to them in Valour, and being under Neceſſity, have the ſame Advantage of the Weapon.* For *Livy* calls it in this Place the higheſt and heavieſt of Weapons.

Camillus, one of the Wiſeſt of all the *Roman* Generals (having ſtormed and entred *Veii* with ſome Part of his Army) to facilitate his Victory, and take away from the Enemy that laſt Neceſſity of Fighting, gave Orders (and ſo loud that the *Vejentes* might be ſure to hear) that no Soldier ſhould dare to touch any Man, who had thrown down his Arms; by which Proclamation every Man was encouraged to throw down his Arms, and the City was taken with ſo little Loſs, that ſince that Time, that Stratagem has been uſed by ſeveral Commanders.

CHAP. XIII.

Whether we are more ſafe in a good General with a bad Army, or a good Army with a bad General.

Martius Coriolanus being baniſhed from *Rome*, retired to the *Volſci*, where having got an Army together, he returned to *Rome* to revenge himſelf for the Injury his Fellow-Citizens had done him; and he had done it effectually, had not the Prayers and Piety of his Mother prevailed more upon him, than all the Power of the *Romans*. From which Paſſage *Titus Livius* obſerves, that the *Roman* Commonwealth increaſed more by the Virtue of their Commanders, than by the Excellence of their Soldiers; becauſe though the *Volſci* had been always beaten before, yet when they got a *Roman* General, they were too hard for the *Romans*: But though *Livy* was of that Opinion in that Place, yet in many Parts of his Hiſtory there are Inſtances, where the private Soldiers have done great Things, and ſometimes fought better and in better Order, after their Conſuls were killed, than they had done whilſt they were living. Thus it happened in the Army which the *Romans* had in *Spain*, under the Command of the Two *Scipio*'s,, which when both their Commanders were ſlain, behaved it ſelf ſo well, that it not only defended it ſelf, but defeated the Enemy, and preſerved that Province to the *Romans*. So that in the whole, there are Examples on both Sides where the Soldiers have done bravely, and got the Victory by their Valour, and where the Conduct of the General has done as much as a whole Army; from whence it may be concluded, that they are mutually uſeful, and that the Soldier is as much advantaged by the Excellence of his General, as the General by the Courage of his Army. However, this I think will not be unworthy our Conſideration, whether is moſt formidable, a good Army under a bad Commander, or a good Commander with a bad Army: In the Opinion of *Cæſar* neither of them was conſiderable; for when he went into *Spain* againſt *Afranius* and *Petreius*, who had a good Army under their Command, he went with much Confidence; becauſe, as he ſaid himſelf, *Ibat ad exercitum ſine duce. He went againſt an Army without a Head*; reflecting thereby upon the Inſufficiency of their Generals. Again,

when he went into *Theſſaly* againſt *Pompey*, his Expreſſion was, *Vado ad ducem ſine exercitu. I go now againſt a General without an Army.* It remains now that we conſider whether it be moſt eaſy for a good Captain to make a good Army, or a good Army to make a good Captain. But to this, in my Opinion, it is eaſily anſwered; for many good Men in an Army can ſooner ſelect one out of their Number, and inſtruct him ſo, as that he may be fit to command the reſt, than the beſt General in the World can make an Army expert and ready. *Lucullus* when he was ſent againſt *Mithridates*, was utterly unexperienced in Matters of War, yet being in a good Army, where his inferior Officers were good, he quickly became a good General. The *Romans*, for want of Men, were forced to arm their Servants, and having referred them to be diſciplin'd by *Sempronius Gracchus*, in a ſhort Time he made them excellent Soldiers. *Pelopidas* and *Epominandas* after they had reſcued their Country from the Tyranny of the *Spartans*, in a ſhort Time made their Countrymen ſo good Soldiers, that they were not only able to contend, but to conquer the *Spartans*. So that the Caſe is equal, and which ſoever is good, may make the other ſo too. Nevertheleſs a good Army without a good Commander, grows inſolent and dangerous, as it happened in the *Macedonian* Army after *Alexander* was dead, and as it is in civil Wars among all old Soldiers; ſo that I think if there be more Confidence to be repoſed in the one than in the other, it is to be rather in the General than the Army, eſpecially if he has Time to inſtruct and diſcipline his Men; for an Army without a Head, is inſolent and mutinous. Thoſe Captains therefore are worthy of double Honour, who have not only the Enemy to overcome, but are to inſtruct and prepare their Forces, before they bring them to engage. And in doing ſo, they do highly recommend the Conduct of their General, which is ſo rare a Thing, that if the Trouble were laid upon many, they would be much leſs eſteemed and reſpected than they are now.

CHAP. XIV.

What ſtrange Effects new Inventions have ſometimes in a Battel, and how new Noiſes have the ſame.

WHAT ſtrange Conſequences have ſucceeded from ſudden and unexpected Accidents that have been ſeen or heard in the Heat of the Battel, appears by ſeveral Examples in Hiſtory, but eſpecially in the Conflict betwixt the *Romans* and the *Volſci*, where *Quintius* obſerving one of the Wings of his Army to ſtagger and give Ground, cry'd out to them to ſtand firm, for that in the other Wing the Victory was theirs; with which Words he not only re-encouraged his own Men, but put ſuch a Terror upon the Enemy, that they fled in good Earneſt. And if in a well-ordered Army thoſe unexpected Vociferations have ſuch wonderful Effect, in a tumultuous and ill-governed Army they have much more, where every Thing is more ſubject to the Agitation of ſuch Winds. And of this we have a memorable Example of our Times. The City of *Perugia* not many Years ſince was divided into Two Parts, the *Oddi* and the *Baglioni*. The *Baglioni* prevailing, the *Oddi* were baniſhed. But the *Oddi* having got an Army together, and brought them privately to a Place not far from *Perugia*, by the Favour of their Friends they were let one Night into the Town, and poſſeſſed themſelves as far as the *Piazza*. And becauſe the Streets were chained up from one Side to the other, to hinder the Paſſage of the Horſe, the *Oddeſche* had a Man who went before them with a great Engine of Iron wherewith he brake the Chains, and he had done his Work ſo effectually, that he had broke all the Chains, but what opened into the *Piazza*; the Alarm being taken, and every body crying out, *Arm, Arm*, he who broke down the Chains being preſſed ſo cloſe by the Throng that was behind him, that he had not Room for his Blow, cried out to thoſe that were, *Back, back*, intending only to have made more Room for his Arm: But they who were next him, calling *Back* to thoſe that were behind them, by Degrees the Word went through the whole Army, and they who were in the Rear, not knowing the Reaſon, began to run, and being followed by thoſe who were next, the whole Army retreated by little and little, till at laſt they brake out into an abſolute Flight; by which inconſiderable Accident, the *Oddi* were defeated of their Deſign. So that it is to be conſidered, that in a Battel Order is not only to be taken, that the Army be well drawn up, and put in a good Poſture to fight, but that no ſuch trifling Accident be able to diſcompoſe it: For if for any thing the popular Multitude be unfit for the Wars, it is becauſe every Noiſe, Rumour, or Alarm diſtracts them, and puts them to the Rout. Wherefore it ought to be a principal Care in a good General to appoint ſuch Perſons as are to receive

all Orders and Words of Command, and derive them to the reſt, that by ſo doing the Soldiers being acuſtomed to the Officers, may not receive any ſuch Orders, but from ſuch Perſons as are commiſſioned thereunto; the want of which Cuſtom has many Times produc'd very great Confuſion. As to Apparitions, and ſuch Things as are many Times ſeen, it is the Part of a good General, to contrive and exhibit (in the very Height of the Battel) ſuch Sights as may encourage his own Men, and diſcourage the Enemy; for among many Accidents which conduce to your Victory, this may be eſpecially effectual. To this Purpoſe is that Invention of which *Sulpitius* made uſe againſt the *French*; being drawn up, and ready to engage the Enemy, he cauſed all the Servants and Refuſe of his Army to be armed and mounted upon the Mules and Horſes belonging to the Baggage; and having furniſhed them ſo formally with Colours and Trumpets, that they appeared a compleat Body of Horſe, he diſpoſed them behind a Hill, where they were to continue, till in the Heat of the Fight, they were to come forth and ſhew themſelves to the Enemy; which Stratagem being as well executed as deviſed, ſtruck ſuch a Terror into the *French*, that it loſt them the Day. So that a good General has a double Care upon him, to contrive by theſe new Surprizes to intimidate the Enemy; and to provide that if any ſuch Practices be uſed upon him, he may diſcover and defeat them. Thus an *Indian* King ſerved *Semiramis*, who obſerving the ſaid King to be very ſtrong in the Number of Elephants, to fright and perſuade him that ſhe was as ſtrong as he, ſhe cauſed ſeveral of her Camels to be dreſs'd up, and covered with the Skins of Buffaloes and Bulls, that they might look big, and carry the Repreſentation of Elephants; and having done ſo, ſhe marched them in the Van of her Army; but her Deſign did not take; for the King having Intelligence of it, perverted it into her Prejudice.

The *Fidenates* being beſieged by *Mamorcus* the Dictator, to terrify the *Roman* Army contrived to have ſeveral of the Townſmen in the Heat of the Engagement to come ſuddenly out of the Town with Fire-Works at the End of their Launces, hoping that the Newneſs of the Sight might be a means to diſturb them. And here it is to be noted, That when ſuch Stratagems have more of Reality than Pretence, they may very well be made uſe of, becauſe having ſomething of Solidity in them, their Weakneſs is not ſo ſoon diſcovered; but where they have more of Appearance and Fiction than Truth, it is beſt either not uſe them at all, or if you do, to keep them at ſuch a Diſtance, as that their Falacy may not be diſcerned; as *Sulpitius* did with his Muletiers; for when they are intrinſically weak, their Vanity appears upon their Approach, and they do more Miſchief than Good; as the Elephants of *Semiramis*, and the falſe Fires of the *Fidenates*; which Fires though at firſt they gave ſome Diſturbance to the *Roman* Soldiers, yet the Dictator coming in, and queſtioning them aloud whether they were not aſhamed to be ſmoaked like Bees out of their Huts; encouraging them to turn again, he cried out, *Suis flammis delete Fidenas quos veſtris beneficiis placare non potuiſtis. Go to, deſtroy the* Fidenæ *with their own Fires, ſeeing all your Kindneſſes have not been able to oblige them*; and by ſo doing, he defeated the *Fidenates*, and made their Project unprofitable.

CHAP. XV.

One General is beſt for an Army, and that to govern it by Commiſſioners, is not ſo good.

THE *Fidenates* having rebelled, and cut off that Colony of the *Romans* that was amongſt them, the *Romans* created Four Tribunes, and inveſted them with Conſulary Power; whereof one being left behind for the Security of the City of *Rome*, the other Three were ſent againſt the *Fidenates* and *Veientes*; but diſagreeing among themſelves, they came off with Diſhonour, though their Loſs was not much. That they gain'd no more Honour, they may thank themſelves; that they received no more Loſs, they may thank their good Soldiers. However the *Romans* finding the Inconvenience, returned to their old way of Dictators, that what Three Perſons had diſordered, might be remedied by one. From whence we may diſcern the Inconvenience of many Commanders either in an Army or Town, which *Livy* has expreſſed very clearly in theſe following Words, *Tres Tribuni poteſtate Conſulari. documento fuere, quamplurimum imperium bello inutile eſſet, tenendo ad ſua quiſq; Conſilia, cum alii aliud videretur, apperuerunt ad occaſionem locum hoſti: Theſe Three Tribunes with conſular Power, gave us to underſtand the Uſeleſſneſs of Multiplicity of Commanders; for each of them adhering to his own Counſels, whilſt one was*

for

for one Thing, and another as poſitive for another, nothing was done, and they gave the Enemy an Advantage. And though this be Example enough to prove the Inconvenience of many Commanders, yet for better Illuſtration I ſhall add ſome others both Ancient and Modern. In the Year 1500, King *Lewis* XII of *France* having retaken *Milan*, ſent his Army to *Piſa*, to recover it for the *Florentines*; who to command it, had ſent thither Two Commiſſaries, one of them called *Giovan-battiſta Ridolfi*, and the other *Luca d' Antonio degli Albizzi*. *Giovan-battiſta* was a Perſon of Reputation and Gravity, and being ancienter than *Luca*, *Luca* left the whole Adminiſtration to him; but though he ſhewed no Ambition in oppoſing him, he did it abundantly by his Silence and Sullenneſs; neglecting, and undervaluing every Thing that was done; ſo that he was ſo far from aſſiſting his Colleague either with his Counſel or Perſon, that he appeared as if he had been utterly ignorant in Matters of War: But it proved otherwiſe afterwards, when upon ſome Accident *Giovan-battiſta* was recalled, and *Luca* remained behind with abſolute Command; for then he gave ample Teſtimony both of his Courage and Conduct, which before, whilſt he had a Colleague, no body could have believed. To this Purpoſe I ſhall add another Saying of *Livy*, who giving an Account how *Quintius* and *Agrippa* (his Colleague) being ſent againſt the *Æqui*, *Agrippa* would needs have the whole Management of the War to be committed to *Quintius*, for (ſays he) *Saluberrimum in adminiſtratione magnarum rerum eſt, ſummam imperii apud unum eſſe: In the Adminiſtration of great Affairs, it is beſt that the Sovereign Power be inveſted in one Perſon.* Which is contrary to the preſent Practice of our Princes and States, who do often depute more than one Commander both to their Armies and Towns; which (however they think it for the beſt) muſt needs breed inconceivable Confuſion. And if the Cauſe of the Ruin of ſo many *Italian* and *French* Armies in our Times be enquired into, it will be found to be the Multitude and Emulation of their Commanders; and it may be ſafely concluded, that it is better to ſend a Man of ordinary Prudence and Experience upon any Expedition, than Two of the wiſeſt and beſt Soldiers they have, with equal Commiſſion.

CHAP. XVI.

That in Times of Difficulty, Virtue is in Eſteem; in Times of Eaſe and Luxury, Men of Riches and Alliance are in greateſt Requeſt.

IT always was, and always will be, the Fortune of Perſons of more than ordinary Endowments, to be laid aſide and neglected in times of Peace, eſpecially in a Commonwealth; for that Envy which is contracted by their Virtue, ſets up many Citizens againſt them, who will not only be their Equals, but Superiors. To this Purpoſe *Thucidides* (a *Greek* Author) has a Place in his Hiſtory, where he ſhews how the Republick of *Athens*, having had the better in the *Peloponeſian* War, depreſſed the Pride of the *Spartans*, and ſubdued the greateſt Part of *Greece*, was ſo inhanſed and elated with their Succeſs, that it was propoſed to fall upon *Sicily*.

It was ſeriouſly debated in *Athens*, whether the ſaid Enterprize ſhould be undertaken or not; *Alcibiades*, and other Citizens of his Party promoted it highly, not ſo much in reſpect of the publick Good, as their own private Advantage, expecting that the Management of that War would be placed in their Hands. But *Nicias*, (a Perſon of the greateſt Reputation in *Athens*) diſſuaded it; and his great Argument to make the People believe he ſpake his Judgment, and more for the Benefit of the Commonwealth than any Intereſt of his own, was, that he adviſed rather contrary to his own Advantage, becauſe in time of Peace there were many of his Fellow Citizens before him, but in Time of War he knew he ſhould be the Firſt: By which we may ſee it has been an ancient Infirmity in Commonwealths, not to value Perſons of Worth in Time of Peace; which diſobliges them doubly, to ſee themſelves deprived of their Dignities, and to ſee others preferred to them of leſs Sufficiency than they; which Error has been the Occaſion of much Confuſion; for thoſe Perſons who find themſelves neglected, and know the Reaſon of all is the Tranquility of the Times, make it their Buſineſs to embroil them, and put their Country upon War, though never ſo much to its Prejudice. And thinking ſometimes with my ſelf what Remedies are moſt proper, I could light but on Two; one was, to keep the Citizens from growing too Rich, that Wealth without Virtue might not be ſufficient to advance any Man, or able to corrupt other People, or themſelves; The other, ſo to prepare and adapt themſelves for War, that they may never be ſurprized, but have always Employment for the braveſt of their Citizens, as *Rome* had in the time of her Proſperity. For that City having Armies always Abroad, there was con-

ſtant Exerciſe for the Virtue of their Citizens: Nor could a Man of Worth be degraded, nor an improper Man be preferr'd in his Place; becauſe whenever ſuch a Thing was done, (whether by way of Error or Experiment, it was the ſame) the Diſorders and Dangers which followed, were ſo ſudden and great, that they quickly found their Miſtake, and return'd to their old Method again. But other Cities and States not ſo well conſtituted as that, which make War only in Caſes of Neceſſity, cannot defend themſelves from thoſe Inconveniences, but are always in Trouble and Diſorder, whenever that excellent Citizen which is neglected is vindicative, and hath any Reputation or Part in the City. And though for ſome Time *Rome* kept her ſelf free from theſe Inconveniences, yet after ſhe had conquered *Carthage* and *Antiochus*, (as has been ſaid before) and ſeemed to be paſt all fear of War for the future, ſhe choſe ſeveral Commanders for her Army, not ſo much for their Conduct or Virtue, as for thoſe Qualities which were likely to recommend them to the People. *Paulus Æmilius* ſtood many times for the Conſulſhip, and was repulſed; nor could he ever be made Conſul till the *Macedonian* War, which was committed unanimouſly to his Conduct, becauſe they ſaw it was like to be dangerous and difficult. After the Year 1494, our City of *Florence* being engaged in ſeveral Wars, in which none of our Citizens had perform'd any great Matter, at laſt the City happened upon a Perſon who ſhewed them after what Manner an Army was to be commanded, his Name was *Antonio Giacomini*. Whilſt the War was dangerous, and there was any Trouble or Difficulty to manage it, *Antonio* was free from the Ambition of his Fellow Citizens, and had no Competitor in his Election to be Commiſſary, and General of their Armies: But when thoſe were paſt, and new Wars that were more eaſy and honourable were to be undertaken, he had ſo many Competitors, that when Three Commiſſaries were to be choſen for the Reduction of *Piſa*, *Antonio* could not obtain to be one: And tho' it be not manifeſt what Inconveniences accrued to the Commonwealth by the waving of *Antonio*, yet it may be eaſily conjectured; for the *Piſans* being diſtreſſed for want of Proviſions, and having nothing left wherewithal to defend themſelves, (had *Antonio* been there) would have been forc'd to have ſurrendred at Diſcretion; but being beſieged by ſuch Officers as knew not how to ſtreighten or preſs them, they held out ſo long, that the *Florentines* were glad to buy them out at laſt, whereas they might as well have had them by Force. No queſtion but *Antonio* reſented it highly; and he had need be a good Man and of more than ordinary Patience, not to think of revenging himſelf, tho' with the Subverſion of the whole City, (if he could) and the Ruin of every private Citizen, which is to be carefully prevented by every State, as ſhall be ſhewn in the following Chapter.

CHAP. XVII.

A Man is not to be diſobliged, and employed afterwards in any Matter of Importance.

A Commonwealth is diligently to provide that no Citizen be entruſted in any weighty Affair, who has received any remarkable Injury. *Claudius Nero* (who divided the Army which was deſigned to confront *Hanibal*, and marched away with a ſtrong Party into *la Mara*, to join with the other Conſul, and engage *Aſdrubal* before he got up with his Supplies to *Hanibal*) having formerly commanded the *Roman* Army in *Spain* againſt the ſaid *Aſdrubal*, had come off with Diſhonour; for though he had encloſed *Aſdrubal* and his whole Army, and ſo poſſeſs'd himſelf of all Paſſes, that he muſt either fight with Diſadvantage, or periſh with Hunger, yet he was over-reach'd with the Subtilty of the *Carthaginian* who drill'd him on with pretended Overtures of Peace, till at length in the Night he ſtole his Army thorough the Woods, and got off where he was ſafe. This Paſſage being known in *Rome*, was no ſmall Diminution to *Nero*'s Reputation, both with the Senate and the People: But being afterwards made Conſul, and ſent with an Army againſt *Hanibal*, he ventured upon that deſperate Counſel of dividing the Army; which was a Thing ſo doubtful and uncertain in the Opinion of the *Romans*, that the City was in a ſtrange Anxiety and Suſpenſe, till they had the News of his Victory. It is reported, that when *Claudius Nero* was queſtioned afterwards by his Friends what it was that mov'd him to ſo hazardous an Enterprize, in which, without neceſſary Provocation, he had ventured the whole Liberty of their Country; he anſwered, he had done it, becauſe he knew if he ſucceeded, he ſhould recover that Honour which he had loſt in *Spain*; if he miſcarried, and his Deſign ſhould have a contrary End, he ſhould have had the Satisfaction to have been revenged of the City and Citizens, by whom he had been ſo ungratefully, and ſo indiſcreetly calumniated. And if the Indigna-

Indignation ariſing from theſe kind of Provocations, could work ſo ſtrongly upon a *Roman* Citizen, in thoſe Times when *Rome* was in its Innocence; we may eaſily imagine what prodigious Effects it may have upon Perſons in a City, not ſo well conſtituted as that; and becauſe againſt theſe kind of Diſorders, (to which all Commonwealths are ſubject) no certain Remedy can be preſcrib'd, it follows that no Commonwealth can be poſſibly perpetual, foraſmuch as a Thouſand unexpected Accidents fall in, to haſten its Deſtruction.

CHAP. XVIII.

Nothing is more honourable in a General, than to foreſee the Deſigns of his Enemy.

IT was the Saying of *Epaminondas* the *Theban*, that no one Quality was more uſeful and neceſſary in a General, than to be able to know the Reſolutions and Deſigns of his Enemy, and diſcover that by Conjecture, which he could not do by any certain Intelligence. Nor is it difficult only to underſtand his Deſigns, but his Actions; and of thoſe Actions, not only ſuch as are perform'd privately, or at a Diſtance, but ſuch as are done (as it were) before his Face. For it many times falls out, that when a Battel continues till Night, he who has the better believes he has the worſt; and he who has loſt all, ſuppoſes he has the Victory. Which Miſtakes has put the Generals many times upon pernicious Counſels; as it happened betwixt *Brutus* and *Caſſius*: For *Brutus* having defeated the Enemy with his Wing, *Caſſius* ſuppoſing he had been loſt, and his whole Body diſpers'd, killed himſelf in Deſpair. In our Times, at the Battel of St. *Cikcia* in *Lombardy*, *Francis*, King of *France*, coming to an Engagement with the *Switzers*, the Fight continued till Night: A Body of the *Switzers* remaining entire, and hearing nothing of the Defeat and Execution of their Comrades, concluded the Victory was theirs, which Error was the Occaſion that they marched not off as they might have done, but kept their Ground till the next Morning, at which Time they were charged again, and overthrown.

The ſame Error had almoſt ruined the Armies of the Pope and King of *Spain*, who upon a falſe Alarm of the Victory of the *Switzers*, paſſed the *Po*, and advanced ſo far, that e're they were aware, they had like to have fallen into the Mouths of the Victorious *French*. The like fell out of old in the Camps of the *Romans* and *Æqui*; *Sempronius* the Conſul being commanded out with an Army againſt the Enemy, and forcing him to a Battel, it continued till Night without any viſible Advantage on either Side. Night coming on, and both Armies ſufficiently ſpent, neither of them retir'd to their Camps, but betook themſelves to the Neighbouring Hills, where they believed they ſhould be more ſafe. The *Roman* Army divided into Two Parts, one went with the Conſul, and the other with *Tempanius* the *Centurion*, by whoſe Courage the *Roman* Army was preſerved that Day. The next Morning the Conſul hearing no more of the Enemy, retreated towards *Rome*; the *Æqui* with their Army did the ſame, for both of them tho' they had been beaten, marched away without regarding the Loſs or Plunder of their Camps. It happened that *Tempanius* being behind with his Squadron, and marching off as the reſt, he took certain of the wounded *Æqui* Priſoners, who inform'd him that their Generals were gone out of the Field, and had quitted their Camps. Upon Enquiry finding it to be true, he entred into the *Roman*, and ſecured it, but the Enemies Camp was given in Prey to the Soldiers, after which he returned with Victory to *Rome*; which Victory conſiſted only in having the firſt Intelligence of the Enemies Diſorder. From whence it is obſervable that Two Armies engaged, may be each of them in the ſame Diſtreſs and Deſpair, and that that Army goes away with the Victory which has firſt Notice of the Neceſſities of the other; and of this I ſhall give a pregnant Example of late Days, and at Home. In the Year 1498, the *Florentines* had a great Army in the Country of *Piſa*, and had beſieged that City very cloſe. The *Venetian* having undertaken its Protection, and ſeeing no other way to relieve it; to divert the Enemy, and remove the War, they reſolved to invade the Territory of the *Florentines*, to which Purpoſe they raiſed a ſtrong Army, marched into their Country by the *Val di Lamona*, poſſeſſed themſelves of the Town of *Marradi*, and beſieged the Caſtle of *Caſtiglione*, which ſtands above upon an Hill. The *Florentines* upon the Alarm reſolved to relieve *Marradi*, and yet not weaken their Army before *Piſa*; whereupon they raiſed a new Army both Horſe and Foot, and ſent them thither, under the Command of *Jacobo Quarto Appiano*, (Lord of *Piombino*) and the Count *Rinuccio da Marciano*. The *Florentine* Army being conducted to the Hills, the *Venetian* raiſed his Siege before *Caſtiglione*, and retreated into the

Town:

Town. The Armies being in this Poſture, and facing one another for ſeveral Days, both of them ſuffered exceedingly for want of all manner of Proviſions; at length neither of them being very earneſt to come to a Battel, and each of them being ignorant of the others Diſtreſs, they reſolved the next Morning to break up their Camp, and each of them to retire, the *Venetian* towards *Berzibella* and *Faenza*, and the *Florentine* towards *Caſaglia* and *Mugello*. The Morning being come, and the Baggage ſent away before, a poor Woman happened to come into the *Florentine* Camp, from *Marradi*, to ſee ſome of her Relations who were in the Service of the *Florentine*: By this Woman the *Florentine* Generals had Notice that the *Venetians* were gone; whereupon reaſſuming their Courage, they altered their Counſels, purſued the Enemy, and writ Letters to *Florence*, that they had not only beaten the *Venetians*, but made an end of the War. Which Victory proceeded from nothing but becauſe they had the firſt News of the Retreat of the Enemy, which if it had come to the other Side, as it did to them, the Conſequence would have been the ſame, and the *Florentines* have been beaten.

CHAP. XIX.

Whether for the Government of the Multitude, Obſequiouſneſs and Indulgence be more neceſſary than Puniſhment.

THE *Roman* Commonwealth was perplexed with the Diſſentions betwixt the Nobility, and the People; nevertheleſs, their Foreign Wars requiring it, they ſent forth with their Armies *Quintius*, and *Appius Claudius*: *Appius* being rough and cruel in his Commands, was ſo ill obeyed by his Soldiers, that he was defeated, and fled out of his Province. *Quintius* being more gentle and benign, was better obeyed, and carried the Victory where he was; from whence it appears more conducing to the well-governing of a Multitude, to be rather Obliging than Proud, and Pitiful than Cruel. However, *Cornelius Tacitus* tells us, (and many others are of his Mind) *In multitudine regendâ, plus pœna quam obſequium valet, That to the managing of a Multitude, Severity is more requiſite than Mildneſs.* And I think both may be true to this Diſtinction of Companions and Subjects; if thoſe under your Command be Companions and Fellow Citizens with you, you cannot ſecurely uſe them with that Severity of which *Tacitus* ſpeaks; for the People of *Rome* having equal Authority with the Nobility, was not to be uſed ruggedly by any Man that was put over them for but a While. And it has been many times ſeen, that the *Roman* Generals who behaved themſelves amicably towards their Soldiers, and governed them with Mildneſs, have done greater Things than thoſe who uſed them with Auſterity, and kept them in perpetual Fear, unleſs they were endued with more than ordinary Virtue, like *Manlius Torquatus*. But he whoſe Command is over his Subjects, (of whom *Cornelius* ſpeaks) is to have a Care they grow not Inſolent, and contemn him for his Eaſineſs; and there he is rather to uſe Severity than Gentleneſs with them; yet that is to be done (too) with ſuch Moderation, that they may be kept from abhorring him; for the Hatred of the Subject is never good for a Prince, and the beſt way to prevent it, is by not interrupting the Subject in the quiet Enjoyment of his Eſtate; for Blood (unleſs there be ſome deſign of Rapacity under it) no Prince does deſire it, but upon ſome extraordinary Neceſſity, and that Neceſſity happens but ſeldom. But when Cruelty and Rapine meet together in the Nature of one Perſon, there never wants Deſire, nor Pretences for Cruelty, as I have demonſtrated largely in another Treatiſe upon this Occaſion. *Quintius* therefore deſerved more Praiſe than *Appius* deſerved: And the Saying of *Tacitus* is true enough, with the aforeſaid Reſtriction, but not in the Caſe of *Appius*: And becauſe I have ſpoken of Kindneſs and Severity, I will give you one Example, how Mildneſs prevailed more upon the *Faliſci* than Violence could do.

CHAP. XX.

One Inſtance of Humanity wrought more upon the Faliſci, *than all the Force of the* Romans.

Camillus having beſieged the *Faliſci*, and attempted many Things againſt them, but in vain, a School-Maſter who had the Tuition of ſeveral of the principal young Gentlemen of that City, thinking to gratify *Camillus*, and ingratiate with the People of *Rome*, carrying them out of the Walls, under Pretence of Exerciſe and Recreation, he conveyed them all into the Camp of *Camillus*, and preſented them to him, told him, that by their Means he might become Maſter of the Town: *Camillus* was ſo far from accepting his Preſent, that he cauſed the Pædagogue to be ſtripp'd, and his Hands tied behind him, and then putting a Rod into every one of the young Gentlemen's Hands, he cauſed them to ſcourge him back again into the Town: Which Piece of Humanity and Juſtice when the Citizens underſtood, they reſolved to defend themſelves no longer, and ſo immediately ſurrendred: A great Example doubtleſs, and by which we may learn, that many times Kindneſs and Generoſity moves an Enemy more than all the Force and Artifice of War; for 'tis frequently ſeen that thoſe Provinces and Cities which no Violence or Stratagem have ſubdued, have been melted and wrought upon by one ſingle Act of Pity, Chaſtity, or Liberality: And of this Hiſtory is full of many other Examples beſides. *Pyrrhus* could not be got out of *Italy* by all the Power of the *Romans*; and yet *Fabritius* ſent him packing by one Act of Generoſity, and that was giving him Notice that ſome of his Intimates would poiſon him, and had made Overtures to the *Romans* to that Purpoſe. Again, *Scipio Africanus* got not ſo much Honour by the taking of *Carthage*, as he did by one Act of Chaſtity, when he ſent home a young beautiful Lady (that was taken Priſoner, and preſented to him) untouch'd to her Husband; for at the News of that one Act, all *Spain* was aſtoniſhed, and began to admire the Virtue and Innocence of the *Romans*; which Virtue is a Thing ſo univerſally celebrated, that there are no great Perſons endued with it, but are highly eſteemed by all People, as appears by all Ethicks, Politicks, and Hiſtory; among which, the Hiſtory of *Xenophon* is abundantly copious, in demonſtrating what Honours and what Victories accrued to *Cyrus* upon the bare Account of his Affability and Mildneſs; and how he was never guilty of the leaſt Pride, or Cruelty, or Luxury, or any other Vice that defiles the Converſation of Man. Nevertheleſs, ſeeing *Hannibal* did the ſame Things, and by a contrary Way, it will not be amiſs in the next Chapter to enquire the Reaſon.

CHAP. XXI.

How it came to paſs that Hanibal *by Methods quite contrary to what were practiſed by* Scipio, *did the ſame Things in* Italy *that the other did in* Spain.

I Doubt not but it may ſeem ſtrange to ſome People, that other Captains who have taken a quite contrary Way to what is preſcribed in my laſt Chapter, ſhould notwithſtanding have had the ſame Succeſs; for from thence it ſeems to follow, that Victory does not depend either upon Humanity or Juſtice, when we ſee the ſame Praiſe and Reputation acquir'd by quite contrary Habits: And to prove this, we need not go far for Examples; the ſame *Scipio* whom we mentioned before, being with an Army in *Spain*, carried himſelf with ſo much Piety, and Juſtice, and Liberality to all People, that he got the Love of the whole Province: On the other Side we ſee *Hanibal* in *Italy* acting quite contrary, and with Violence, Cruelty, Rapine, and all Manner of Infidelity perſecuting the People, and yet with the ſame laudable Effects as *Scipio* had in *Spain*. And conſidering with my ſelf what might be the Reaſons, they ſeemed to me to be ſeveral. The Firſt is, becauſe Men are ſtudious of Novelty, and that not only thoſe who are under Slavery or Subjection, but thoſe who are free, and in Peace; for (as is ſaid before) Men are as well ſatiated with Happineſs, as afflicted with Miſery.

This Deſire, therefore, of Change opens a Door to any Man that invades a Province with any conſiderable Force: If he be a Foreigner, they all follow after him; if a Native, they attend him, aſſiſt him, and encourage him: So that let him take which Way he pleaſes, he muſt needs make great Progreſs in thoſe Places. Again, People are generally excited

Two Ways, either by Love, or by Fear; ſo that he that is feared, is oftentimes as readily obeyed as he that is beloved, and ſometimes more. It is not material therefore to a Commander which of theſe Two Ways he takes; for if he be a vertuous Perſon, and of any extraordinary Faculties, he will be admired by the People, as *Hanibal* and *Scipio* were, whoſe great Worth effaced or covered all the Faults that they committed. But in either of theſe Two Ways, great Inconveniences may ariſe, and ſuch as may ruin a Prince. For he who deſires to be beloved, upon the leaſt Exceſs or Immoderation in his Courtſhip, is ſubject to be deſpiſed; and he on the other Side who affects to be feared, upon the leaſt Extravagance makes himſelf odious: And to keep the middle Way exactly, is not poſſible to our Nature; wherefore it is neceſſary to thoſe who exceed in either Kind, to attone for it with ſome extraordinary Virtue; as *Hanibal* and *Scipio* did, who though Perſons of great Prudence and Conduct, yet it appeared that both of them ſuffered by their Manner of Living, as well as they were advanced. Their Advancement is mentioned before; their Sufferings (as to *Scipio*) was the Rebellion of his Army, and Part of his Friends in *Spain*, which proceeded from nothing but want of being feared; for Men are naturally ſo unquiet, that every little Door that is opened to their Ambition ſets them agog, and aboliſhes all that Love which they ow'd to their Prince for his Humanity towards them; as in this Example of the Friends and Army of *Scipio*; wherefore *Scipio* was conſtrained to make uſe of that Severity in ſome Meaſure, which he had always declined. As to *Hanibal*, there is not any particular Example where his Cruelty or Infidelity did him hurt; only it may be ſuppoſed that they were the Occaſion why *Naples* and ſeveral other Towns ſtood ſo firm to the *Romans*. It is plain likewiſe that his Bloodineſs and Impiety made him more odious to the People of *Rome*, than all the Enemies that ever that City had: For whereas when *Pyrrhus* was with a great Army in *Italy*, they gave him Notice of a Deſign on foot to have poiſoned him, they were ſo inveterate againſt *Hanibal*, that they never forgave him, but when they had defeated and diſarm'd him, they purſued him to the Death. And theſe ſad Inconveniences hap'ned to *Hanibal* from no other Cauſes, but becauſe he was impious, unfaithful, and cruel. But then on the other Side he had the Advantage of being admired of all Writers for keeping his Army without any Mutiny or Diſſention either againſt him, or among themſelves, though it conſiſted of ſo many different Nations, which could be derived from nothing but the Awe and Terror of his Perſon; which Terror was ſo great, (conſidered with the Reputation and Authority that he received from his Valour) that thereby he kept his Soldiers united and quiet. I conclude therefore, it imports not much which Way a General takes, ſo there be any great Excellence in him to recommend it; for (as is ſaid before) both in the one and the other there is danger and defect, if there be not ſome extraordinary Virtue to balance it. And if *Hanibal* and *Scipio*, one by laudable, and the other by ignominious and deteſtable Ways arrived at the ſame End, and had the ſame Effects, I think it convenient in my next Chapter to diſcourſe of Two *Roman* Citizens, who by divers Ways (but both honourable) arrived at the ſame Pitch of Glory and Renown.

CHAP. XXII.

How the Auſterity of Manlius Torquatus, *and the Humanity of* Valerius Corvinus, *gain'd each of them the ſame Honour and Reputation.*

THere were two famous Captains contemporary in *Rome*, *Manlius Torquatus*, and *Valerius Corvinus*, both of them equal in Courage, equal in their Triumphs, and each of them (as to the Enemy) acquir'd all with equal Virtue and Terror; but as to their own Armies, and manner of Diſcipline, it was quite different. *Manlius* commanded with all Kind of Severity, excuſed his Soldiers from no Labour, nor no Puniſhment. *Valerius* on the other Side uſed them with as much Gentleneſs and Familiarity: *Manlius* to keep his Soldiers ſtrictly to their Diſcipline, executed his own Son; which *Valerius* was ſo far from imitating, that he never offended any Man: Yet in this great Diverſity of Conduct, the Effects were the ſame, both as to the Enemy, the Commonwealth, and themſelves; for none of their Soldiers ever declin'd Fighting; none of them rebelled, or ſo much as diſputed their Commands; though the Diſcipline of *Manlius* was ſo ſevere, that afterwards all exceſſive and extravagant Commands were called *Manliana imperia*: In which Place it is not amiſs to enquire how it came to paſs that *Manlius* was conſtrained to ſo rigorous a Method; what it was that made *Valerius* comport himſelf ſo mildly: How it was that this different Way of proceeding ſhould have the ſame Effect; and laſt of all, which of the Two is the moſt worthy

thy to be imitated. If *Manlius* be conſidered as he is repreſented by the Hiſtorian, he will be found to be very Valiant, carrying himſelf with great Piety to his Father, and Country, and with great Reverence to his Superiors; which appeared by his Defence of his Father, with the Hazard of his own Life, againſt a Tribune who accuſed him; and by his fighting with the *Gaul* in the behalf of his Country, which notwithſtanding he would not undertake without Orders from the Conſul; for when he ſaw a vaſt Man, of a prodigious Proportion, marching forth upon the Bridge, and challenging any of the *Romans*, he went modeſtly to the Conſul for Leave, and told him, *Injuſſu tuo adverſus hoſtem nunquam pugnabo, non ſi certam victoriam videam: Without your Permiſſion I will never engage with the Enemy, though I was ſure to overcome:* And the Conſul giving him Leave, he conquered his Enemy. When therefore a Man of his Conſtitution arrives at ſuch a Command, he deſires all Men may be as punctual as himſelf; and being naturally brave, he commands brave Things, and when they are once commanded, requires that they be executed exactly; and this is a certain Rule, when great Things are commanded, ſtrict Obedience muſt be expected, otherwiſe your Enterprize muſt fail. That therefore thoſe under your Command may be the more obedient to your Commands, it is neceſſary that you command aright; and he commands right, who compares his own Quality and Condition with the Quality and Condition of thoſe they Command; if he finds them proportionable, then he may Command, if otherwiſe, he is to forbear; and therefore that Saying was not amiſs, that to keep a Commonwealth in Subjection by Violence, it was convenient that there ſhould be a Proportion betwixt the Perſons forced, and forcing; and whilſt that Proportion laſted, the Violence might laſt too: But when that Proportion was diſſolved, and he that was forced grew ſtronger than he that offered it, it was to be doubted much his Authority would not hold long. But to return; great Things therefore, and magnificent, are not to be commanded but by a Man that is great and magnificent himſelf; and he who is ſo conſtituted, having once commanded them, cannot expect, that Mildneſs or Gentleneſs will prevail with his Subjects to execute them: But he that is not of this Greatneſs and Magnificence of Mind, is by no Means to command extraordinary Things; and if his Commands be but ordinary, his Humanity may do well enough, for ordinary Puniſhments are not imputed to the Prince, but to the Laws and Cuſtoms of the Place: So that we may conclude *Manlius* was conſtrained to that Severity by his natural Temper and Complexion; and ſuch Perſons are many times of great Importance to a Commonwealth, becauſe by the Exactneſs of their own Lives, and the Strictneſs of their Diſcipline, they revive the old Laws, and reduce every Thing towards its firſt Principles.

And if a State could be ſo happy to have ſuch Perſons ſucceeding one another in any reaſonable Time, as by their Examples would not only renew the Laws, reſtrain Vice, and remove every Thing that tended to its Ruin or Corruption, that State would be Immortal. So that *Manlius* was a ſevere Man, and kept up the *Roman* Diſcipline exactly, prompted firſt by his own Nature, and then by a ſtrong Deſire to have that obeyed, which his own Inclination had conſtrained him to Command. *Valerius Corvius* on the other Side might exerciſe his Gentleneſs without Inconvenience, becauſe he commanded nothing extraordinary, or contrary to the Cuſtoms of the *Romans* at that Time; which Cuſtom, being good, was ſufficient to honour him, and not very troubleſome to obſerve; whereby it happened that *Valerius* was not neceſſitated to puniſh Offenders, becauſe there were but very few of that Sort; and when there were any, their Puniſhment (as is ſaid before) was imputed to the Laws, and not to the Cruelty of the Prince; by which it fell out that *Valerius* had an Opportunity by his Gentleneſs to gain both Affection and Authority in the Army; which was the Cauſe that the Soldiers being equally obedient to the one as well as the other, though their Humours and Diſcipline were different, yet they might do the ſame Things, and their Actions have the ſame Effects. If any are deſirous to imitate either of them, they will do well to have a Care of running into the ſame Errors as *Scipio* and *Hannibal* did before, which is not to be prevented any other way, but by ſingular Virtue and Induſtry. Theſe Things being ſo, it remains now that we enquire which of theſe Two Ways are moſt laudable to follow; and it is the harder to reſolve, becauſe I find Authors are ſtrangely divided, ſome for one Way, and others for the other. Nevertheleſs, they who pretend to write how a Prince is to govern, are more inclinable to *Valerius* than *Manlius*; and *Xenophon* in his Character of *Cyrus*, jumps exactly with *Livy*'s Deſcription of *Valerius*, eſpecially in his Expedition againſt the *Samnites* when he was Conſul: For the Morning before the Fight he made a Speech to his Soldiers with that Mildneſs and Humanity, that the Hiſtorian tells us, *Non aliàs militi familiarior dux fuit, inter infimos militum omnia haud gravatè munia obeundo. In ludo præterea militari cum velocitatis, viriumque inter ſe æquales certamina ineunt, comiter facilis vincere, ac vinci, vultu eodem; nec quenquam aſpernari parem qui ſe offerret; factis benignus*

pro re; dictis, haud minus liberatis alienæ quam ſuæ dignitatis memor, & (quo nihil popularius eſt) quibus artibus petierat Magiſtratum, iiſdem gerebat. No General was ever more familiar with his Soldiers; no Soldier too mean for him to converſe with, no Office too baſe for him to undertake. In their Military Recreations when they ran, or wreſtled for a Prize, he would not only Run or Wreſtle, but win or loſe, be overcome, or conquer, with the ſame Evenneſs, and Unconcernment; nor did he ever diſdain or refuſe any Man that challenged him. In his Actions, he was bountiful, as Occaſion was offered; in his Words, he was as mindful of other Peoples Liberty, as of his own Dignity, and (which is the moſt grateful Thing to the People in the World) the ſame Arts which he uſed in the obtaining, the ſame he exerciſed in the Management of his Magiſtracy.

Livy ſpeaks likewiſe very honourably of *Manlius*, acknowledging that his Severity upon his Son, made the whole Army ſo obedient, and diligent, that it was the Occaſion of their Victory againſt the *Latins*: And he goes ſo far in his Praiſe, that after he has given an exact Account of the Battel and Victory, and deſcribed all the Dangers and Difficulties to which the *Romans* were expoſed; he concludes, that it was only the Conduct and Courage of *Manlius* that got the Victory that Day; and afterwards comparing the Strength of both Armies, he does not ſcruple to ſay, that on which Side ſoever *Manlius* had been, that Side would certainly have had the Day. Which being ſo, makes my Queſtion very hard to determine; nevertheleſs, that it may not be altogether unreſolved, I conceive that in a Citizen brought up under the Strictneſs of a Commonwealth, the way of *Manlius* would be beſt, and leaſt ſubject to Danger, becauſe it ſeems moſt for the Intereſt of the Public, and not at all proceeding from private Ambition; beſides, to carry ones ſelf ſeverely to every Body, and purſue nothing but the Benefit of the Public, is not a way to make Parties, or Friends, without which there can be no Troubles in a State. So that he who proceeds in that Manner, muſt needs be very uſeful, and not at all ſuſpicious to the State. But the way of *Valerius* is quite contrary; for though the Commonwealth reaps the ſame Fruits as in the other; yet Jealouſies will ariſe, and People will be fearful that in the End his great Favour among the Soldiers will be employed to ſet up himſelf with very ill Conſequences upon their Liberty. And if in *Publicola*'s Time theſe ill Effects did not happen, it was becauſe as then the Minds of the *Romans* were not corrupt, nor had he been long enough in Authority. But if we conſider a *Prince*, as *Xenophon* did, in that Caſe we muſt leave *Manlius*, and follow *Valerius* clearly; becauſe a Prince is by all means to endeavour the Obedience of his Subjects and Soldiers by ways of Amity and Kindneſs. They will be Obedient, if they find him Virtuous, and a ſtrict Obſerver of his Laws; they will love him, if they ſee him courteous, and affable, and merciful, and endued with all the good Qualities which were in *Valerius*, and which *Xenophon* attributes to *Cyrus*. For to be particularly beloved, and have an Army true to his Intereſt, is *inſtar omnium*, and anſwers to all other Policies of State. But it is otherwiſe when an Army is commanded by one who is a Citizen of the ſame City with the reſt of his Army; for he is ſubject to the ſame Laws and Magiſtrates as well as they. In the Annals of *Venice* we read, that in former Times the *Venetian* Gallies returning from ſome Expedition, and lying near the Town, there happened a Quarrel betwixt the Citizens and the Seamen, which proceeded ſo far, that it came to a Tumult; both Sides betook themſelves to their Arms, and neither the Power of their Officers, the Reverence of the Citizens, nor the Authority of the Magiſtrate was able to quiet them: But as ſoon as a certain Gentleman appeared, who had commanded them the Year before, remembring with what Courteſy he had behaved himſelf, their Kindneſs to him prevail'd above all other Courſes, and they gave over the Combat, and retir'd; but that Affection, and ready Obedience to his Commands, coſt the poor Gentleman very dear; for thereby he became ſo obnoxious to the Senate, that not long after they ſecured themſelves againſt him, either by Impriſonment or Death. I conclude then, that a Prince may better follow the Example of *Valerius*; but to a Citizen, it is dangerous both to himſelf and the State: To the State, becauſe that way leads directly to Tyranny; to himſelf, becauſe (let his Intentions be never ſo innocent) he will certainly be ſuſpected, and bring himſelf in Danger. So on the other Side, the Severity of *Manlius* is as pernicious in a Prince, but in a Citizen it is convenient, and particularly for the State; for it never does hurt, if the Hatred which follows your Severity be not increaſed by a Jealouſy of your great Virtue and Reputation, as it happen'd to *Camillus*.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIII.

Upon what Occaſion Camillus *was baniſhed from* Rome.

WE have concluded in the Chapter before, that to imitate *Valerius* may prejudice your Country, and your ſelf; and that to imitate *Manlius* may be convenient for your ſelf, and prejudicial to your Country; which Opinion is much confirmed by the Caſe of *Camillus*, whoſe Proceedings were more like *Manlius*, than *Valerius*; for which Reaſon, *Livy* ſpeaking of him tells us, *Ejus virtutem Milites oderant, & mirabantur. His Virtue was both odious, and admirable to his Soldiers.* That which made him admired was his Diligence, Prudence, Magnanimity and Conduct: That which made him hated was, that he was more Severe in Puniſhing, than Liberal in Rewarding. And of this Hatred *Livy* gives theſe following Reaſons: Firſt, becauſe he cauſed the Money which was made of the Goods of the *Veientes* to be applied to public Uſe, and not diſtributed with the reſt of the Prey: Next, becauſe in his Triumphal Chariot he cauſed himſelf to be drawn by Four white Horſes, which was accounted ſo great a Piece of Arrogance, that it was thought he did it to equalize the Sun. A third was, that he had devoted a tenth Part of the Spoils of the *Veientes* to *Apollo*, which (to keep his Vow) was to be taken back again from the Soldiers who had got it in their Clutches. From whence it may be obſerved, that nothing makes a Prince more odious to the People, than to deprive them of their Poſſeſſions, which is a Thing of ſo great Importance, that it is never forgotten, becauſe upon every little Want, it comes freſh into their Memories; and Men being daily ſubject to thoſe Wants, will daily remember it; and next to this is being Inſolent and Proud, which is likewiſe extreamly odious to the People, eſpecially if they be free. And although perhaps no Detriment accrues to them from his Pride, yet they are obſerved always to deteſt him that uſes it. So that a great Perſon is to avoid it as a Rock, becauſe it begets Hatred, and that without any Advantage, which makes it a very raſh, and imprudent Thing.

CHAP. XXIV.

The Prolongation of Commiſſions brought Rome *firſt into Servitude.*

IF the Diſſolution of the *Roman* Commonwealth be accurately conſidered, it will be found to proceed partly from the Differences about the *Agrarian* Law, and partly from the Prorogation of their Magiſtrates; which Errors, had they been known in Time, and due Remedies applied, would not have been ſo pernicious, but *Rome* might have enjoyed her Freedom longer, and perhaps with more quiet. For though from the Prolongation of Offices, there were no Tumults nor Seditions to be ſeen in that City; yet it was clear that thoſe Magiſtrates which were continued took much upon them, and by Degrees their Power and Authority became a great Prejudice to the Liberty of the State. Had all the Citizens who were continued, been wiſe and honeſt, like *L. Quintius*, they would not have incurred this Inconvenience. The Goodneſs of *Quintius* appeared in one Thing very remarkably; a Meeting being appointed for Accommodation of the Differences betwixt the Nobility, and the People; the People continued their Authority to their Tribunes another Year, as believing them very proper to reſiſt the Ambition of the Nobles: The Senate to retaliate upon the People, and ſhew themſelves as conſiderable as they, continued the Conſulſhip to *Quintius*: But *Quintius* refuſed it abſolutely, alledging that ill Examples were to be ſtifled, and not increaſed by others that were worſe, and therefore preſſed them to the Election of new Conſuls, and prevailed with much Importunity and Contention. Had the reſt of the *Roman* Citizens imitated this Perſon, they had never admitted that Cuſtom of proroguing of Magiſtrates, and then the Prolongation of their Commands in the Army had never been introduced, which very Thing was at length the Ruin of that Commonwealth. The firſt Perſon whoſe Commiſſion was continued in *Rome*, was *P. Philo*, who having beſieged *Palepolis*, and by the Time his Conſulſhip was to expire, reduced it to ſuch Extremity, that the Victory ſeemed already in his Hands; the Senate would not ſend another to ſucceed him, but continued his Authority with the Title of *Proconſul*. Which Thing (though done then upon grave Conſideration, and for the Benefit of the Public) proved afterwards of ſuch

ill Conſequence, that it brought that City in Servitude and Slavery: For by how much their Wars were more remote, by ſo much they thought theſe Prorogations convenient; from whence it happened, that fewer of the *Romans* were prepared for Military Commands, and the Glory of their Victories redounded but to few: And beſides, he whoſe Commiſſion was renew'd, and had been a long Time accuſtomed to the Army, might inſinuate ſo, and gain ſuch an Intereſt in it, as might make it diſclaim the Senate, and acknowledge no Head but their General. This it was that enabled *Marius* and *Sylla* to debauch the Army; this was it that enabled *Cæſar* to conquer his Native Country; which Miſeries had never hapned, had not that Cuſtom of continuing Magiſtrates and Commanders been introduced. If it be objected, that their great Affairs could not have been managed at ſo great a Diſtance, without that Prorogation of Commands; I anſwer, that 'tis poſſible their Empire might have been longer before it came to that Height; but then it would have been more laſting, for the Adverſary would never have been able to have erected a Monarchy, and deſtroyed their Liberty ſo ſoon.

CHAP. XXV.

Of the Poverty of Cincinnatus *and ſeveral other Citizens of* Rome.

WE have ſaid elſewhere, That nothing is of more Importance to the Conſervation of the Liberty of a State, than to keep the Citizens low, and from being too wealthy. Whether there was any Law to that Purpoſe, or what that Law was, I muſt acknowledge my Ignorance, (eſpecially when I conſider with what Zeal and Paſſion the *Agrarian* was oppoſed); yet 'tis clear by Experience, that for 400 Years after the Building of *Rome*, that City was in very great Poverty: And it is probable the great Cauſe of it was, that Poverty was no Impediment to Preferment: Virtue was the only Thing required in the Election of Magiſtrates, and the Diſtribution of Offices; and wherever it was found, let the Perſon or Family be never ſo Poor, it was ſure to be advanced; which Manner of Living, made Riches contemptible: And this is manifeſt by the following Example. *Minutius* the Conſul being circumvented, and he and his whole Army, as it were, block'd up by the *Æqui*, the *Romans* were ſo poſſeſs'd with the Danger of their Army, that they betook themſelves to the Creation of a Dictator, which is their laſt Remedy in their greateſt Afflictions: They concluded upon *L. Quintius Cincinnatus*, who was then (when they ſent for him) in a little Country Farm at Plough, which *Livy* magnifies exceedingly, and ſays; *Operæ pretium eſt audire, qui omnia præ divitiis humana ſpernunt, neque honori magno locum, neque virtuti putant eſſe, niſi effusè affluant opes: It is pleaſant to hear ſome People talk of Riches, as if nothing in this World were comparable to them; as if all Honour and Virtue depended only upon the Eſtate.* *Cincinnatus* (as I ſaid before) was at Plough in his Farm, (which conſiſted only of Four Acres of Ground) when the Ambaſſadors came to him from the Senate to ſalute him Dictator, and to remonſtrate their Diſtreſs. Having received their Meſſage, he made no Delay, but called immediately for his Robe, came directly for *Rome*, rais'd his Army, and marched away for the Relief of *Minutius*: Having defeated the Enemy, and pillaged their Camp, he would not ſuffer the Army of *Minutius* to participate in the Prize, telling him, *I do not think it reaſonable that you ſhould have Share in the Prey, who was ſo near being a Prey your ſelf.* After which he degraded *Minutius* of his Conſulſhip, and made him only a Legate, with this Expreſſion; *You ſhall continue here in this Station, till you learn to behave your ſelf more like a Conſul.* The ſame Dictator, in the ſame Expedition, made *L. Tarquinius* the Maſter of his Horſe, though he had none to be Maſter of his own, for his Poverty was ſuch he was forced to ſerve on Foot. 'Tis remarkable how in thoſe Days Poverty and Honour were not ſo Inconſiſtent as now, and that to an excellent and worthy Perſon as *Cincinnatus* was, Four Acres of Land was a ſufficient Eſtate. In the Days of *Attilius Regulus*, Poverty was in the ſame Reputation; for being at the Head of an Army in *Africa*, and having conquered the *Carthaginians*, he made it his Requeſt to the Senate that he might be permitted to come Home, and husband his own Farm, which his Servants had neglected. And this Frugality of the *Romans* is exceedingly wonderful; for looking for nothing but Praiſe and Honour from their Victories, they brought all their Prizes into the Public Treaſury: And doubtleſs had *Regulus* propoſed any Thing of Advantage to himſelf by that War, he could never have been concerned to have had his Four Acres neglected by his Servants. Nor was the Modeſty and Magnanimity of the *Romans* leſs remarkable, who put into Command, and placed at the Head of an Army, thought

themſelves above any Prince; no King, no Commonwealth was able to diſmay them: But when their Commiſſions expired, and they were returned privately to their Houſes; no body ſo frugal, no body ſo humble, no body ſo laborious, ſo obedient to the Magiſtrates, or reſpectful to their Superiors as they; inſomuch that one would have thought it impoſſible the ſame Minds ſhould have been capable of ſuch ſtrange Alterations. And this Poverty continued till the Time of *Paulus Emilius* (which was the laſt Age of that Commonwealths Happineſs,) for though he by his Triumph enriched the whole City, yet not regarding his own Fortunes, he continued poor himſelf, and Poverty was in that Eſteem, that *Paulus*, to gratify and encourage one of his Sons-in-Law, who had behaved himſelf bravely in thoſe Wars, gave him a Silver Cup, which was the firſt piece of Plate that was ever ſeen in his Family. And here I have a fair Occaſion to enlarge upon Poverty, and ſhow how much more uſeful it is to Mankind than Riches, and how many excellent Arts it has produced and improved, which Riches and Luxury have deſtroyed: But this having been treated of ſo amply by other People before, I ſhall mention it no farther at this Time.

CHAP. XXVI.

Women are many times the Deſtruction of States.

IN the City of *Ardea* there was a great Controverſy betwixt the *Patricii* and the People, about the Marriage of a young Lady; who being a great Fortune, had a great many Servants, but more eſpecially Two, one of them a *Patrician*, the other a *Plebeian*. Her Father being dead, her Guardian would needs beſtow her upon the *Plebeian*; her Mother was for the Nobleman; not agreeing among themſelves, it came to a Tumult, and by degrees to Blows; inſomuch as the whole Nobility appeared in Arms for the one, and all the People for the other. The Reſult was, the People being beaten out of the Town, and ſending to the *Volſci* for Aid, the Nobles ſent to *Rome*. The *Volſci* were readieſt, and coming firſt to the Aſſiſtance of the *Plebeians*, they clapp'd down before the Town. They had not entrench'd themſelves long, but the *Roman* Army came upon their Backs, and ſhut them up betwixt the Town and them; inſomuch that they were quickly diſtreſſed, and forced to ſurrender at Diſcretion. The *Romans* entred the Town, killed all that were acceſſary to the Sedition, and ſettled their Affairs. In which Paſſage there are many obſervable Things. Firſt, we ſee Women have been the Occaſion of much Deſolation, Prejudice and Diſſention: The Rape of *Lucrece* loſt the *Tarquins* their Government; the Attempt upon *Virginia*, was the Ruin of the *Decemviri*. And *Ariſtotle* in his Politicks, imputes the Abomination of Tyranny to the Injuries they do to People upon the Account of Women, by their Debauchments, their Violences, or Adulteries, as we have ſhow'd at large in our Chapter about Conſpiracies. So that in the Government of any Kingdom or Commonwealth, thoſe Things are not to be reckon'd as Trifles, but as the Occaſions of much Miſchief, and are by all Means to be prevented before the Rancour has taken too deep Root, and is not to be cured, but by the Deſtruction of the State: As it happened to the *Ardeates*, who let it go ſo long among their Fellow Citizens, that at laſt they came to an abſolute Diviſion, not to be compoſed nor ſettled, but by Foreign Aſſiſtance, which is always the Forerunner of Servitude and Slavery.

CHAP. XXVII.

How the Civil Diſcords in a City, are to be compoſed, and of the Falſity of that Opinion, That the beſt way to keep a City in Subjection, is to keep it divided.

IN the Reconciliation of a City that is labouring under civil Diſſentions, we are to follow the Example of the *Roman* Conſuls, and obſerve their Method in compoſing the Diſtractions among the *Ardeates*, which was by cutting off the chief Actors, and confiſcating their Eſtates. And to compoſe the Diſtractions of a City, there are Three ways; either by cutting off the chief Actors (as the *Romans* did;) by baniſhing them the City, or by forcing them to an Accommodation upon ſuch Penalties as they ſhall be afraid to incur: Of theſe Three ways the laſt is moſt dangerous, uncertain, and unprofitable, becauſe it is impoſſible

where

where much Blood has been ſhed, or much Injury done, that that Peace ſhould laſt long, which was made by Compulſion; for ſeeing, and hearing, and converſing with one another daily, their Animoſities muſt of Neceſſity revive, and provoke them to new Outrage, by preſenting them with new Occaſions of Indignation and Revenge: And of this we cannot have an apter Example than in the City of *Piſtoia*, which Fifteen Years ſince (as it is now) was divided into the *Panciatichi*, and *Cancellieri* (only then they were at open Defiance, which now they are not.) After many Conteſts and Diſputes among themſelves, they proceeded to Blood, to the plundering and demoliſhing one anothers Houſes, and committing all other Hoſtilities imaginable: The *Florentines*, whoſe Buſineſs it was to unite them, uſed this Third way, which rather increaſed, than mitigated their Tumults; ſo that weary of that way, and growing wiſer by Experience, they made Uſe of the Second; baniſhed ſome of the Ringleaders, and impriſoned the reſt, whereby they not only quieted their Differences then, but have kept them ſo ever ſince. But doubtleſs the ſafeſt way had been to cut them off at firſt; and if thoſe Executions were forborn then by us, or have been ſince by any other Commonwealth, it is for no other Cauſe, but that they require a certain Generoſity and Greatneſs of Spirit, that in weak Commonwealths is hardly to be found. And theſe are the Errors, which as I ſaid in the Beginning, are committed by the Princes of our Times, when they are to determine in ſuch great Controverſies; for they ſhould inform themſelves how others have comported in the ſame Caſes before them; but they are ſo weak by reaſon of the Slightneſs of our preſent Education, and their Unexperience in Hiſtory, that they look upon the Examples of the Ancients as inhuman, or impoſſible: So that our modern Opinions are as remote from the Truth, as that Saying of our wiſe Men was upon a Time, *Che biſognava tener Piſtoia con le parti, & Piſa con le fortezze: That* Piſtoia *was to be kept under by Factions, and* Piſa *by a Citadel*; but they were miſtaken in both. What my Judgment is about Citadels, and ſuch kind of Fortreſſes, I have delivered elſewhere; ſo as in this Place, I ſhall only demonſtrate how unpracticable it is to keep Towns in Subjection, by fomenting their Differences and Factions. And firſt, it is impoſſible to keep both Parties true to you (be you Prince, or Commonwealth, or whatever) for Men are naturally ſo inconſtant, it cannot be that thoſe Parties which favour you to Day, ſhould be affected to you always; for they will ſtill look out for ſome new Patron, and Protector: So that by Degrees one of the Parties taking ſome Diſguſt againſt you, the next War that happens, you run a great Hazard of loſing your Town. If it be under the Government of a State, the City is in more Danger than in the other Caſe, becauſe each Party looks out for Friends among the great Ones, and will ſpare no Pains nor Money to corrupt them. From whence Two great Inconveniencies do ariſe: One is, you can never make them love you, becauſe by reaſon of the frequent Alteration of Governors, and putting in ſometimes a Perſon of one Humour, and ſometimes another of another, they can never be well govern'd. And then the other is, by this fomenting of Factions, your State muſt be neceſſarily divided. *Blondus*, ſpeaking of the Paſſages betwixt the *Florentines* and *Piſtoians*, confirms what we have ſaid in theſe Words, *Mentre che i Florentini diſegnavano de riunir Piſtoia, diviſona ſe Medeſimi. Whilſt the* Florentines *thought to have united the* Piſtoians, *they divided themſelves.* In the Year 1501. *Arezzo* revolted from the *Florentines*, and the Valleys *di Tenere*, and *Chiana*, were entirely over-run by the *Vitelli*, and Duke *Valentine*. Whereupon *Monſieur de Lant* was ſent from the King of *France* to ſee all that they had loſt, reſtored to the *Florentines*. Where-ever *Monſieur de Lant* came, obſerving the Perſons that came to viſit him, did ſtill profeſs themſelves of the Party of *Morzocco*, he was much diſſatisfied with their Factions, and more that they ſhould declare themſelves ſo freely; for (ſaid he) if in *France* any Man ſhould pronounce himſelf of the King's Party, he would be ſure to be puniſhed, becauſe it would imply that there was a Party againſt the King, and it was his Maſter's Deſire, that his Kingdom and Cities ſhould be all of a Mind: If therefore a Prince believes there is no way for him to keep his Towns in Obedience, but by keeping up Factions, it is a certain Argument of his Weakneſs; for being unable by Force and Courage to keep them under, he betakes himſelf to theſe pernicious Arts, which in peaceable Times may palliate a little, but when Troubles and Adverſity come, will aſſuredly deceive him.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVIII.

A strict Eye is to be kept upon the Citizens; for many times under Pretence of Officiousness and Piety, there is hid a Principle of Tyranny.

THE City of *Rome* being distressed for want of Provisions, and the publick Stores being unable to supply it, it came into the Thoughts of *Spurius Melius* (a rich Citizen of those Times) to furnish the common People *gratis* out of his own private Stock, whereby he wrought himself so far into the Favour of the People, that the Senate suspecting the ill Consequences of his Bounty, began to conspire his Destruction before his Interest became too great; to which Purpose they created a Dictator, who put him to Death: From whence it may be observed, that many times those Actions which seem charitable and pious at first Sight, and are not reasonable to be condemned, are notwithstanding cruel and dangerous for a State, if not corrected in Time. To make this more clear, I say a Commonwealth cannot be well governed, nor indeed subsist without the Assistance and Ministry of powerful and great Men: And yet on the other Side, that Power and Reputation of particular Citizens is the Occasion of Tyranny. To regulate this Inconvenience, it is necessary, that seeing there must be great Men, Things should be so ordered, that they may have Praise and Reputation by such Things as are rather useful than prejudicial to the State. Wherefore it is carefully to be observed what Ways they take to acquire their Reputation; and they are usually Two, either publick or private. The publick Way is when they arrive at their Reputation by some good Counsel, or some great Exploit which they have atchieved for the Benefit of the Publick: And this Way of Reputation is not only not to be precluded to the Citizens, but to be opened by such Promises of Reward for their good Counsels or Actions as may both dignify and enrich them; and when a Reputation is gained by these plain and sincere Ways, it is never to be feared. But when their Courses are private, (which is the other of the Two Ways) they are dangerous, nay totally pernicious. Those private Ways are by obliging particular Persons, by lending them Money, by marrying their Relations, by defending them against the Magistrates, and doing several other particular Favours which may encourage their Clients to violate the Laws, and vitiate the Commonwealth; for which Cause it ought to be so well fortified with good Laws, that the Endeavours of such ambitious Men may be either discouraged or defeated; and on the other Side Rewards proposed to such as arrive at their Greatness by any extraordinary Exploit. In *Rome* the highest Reward of those Persons who behaved themselves gloriously for the Good of their Country was a Triumph, besides which they had other inferior Honours for more inferior Services, and to restrain or punish the Ambition of those who went about by private and clandestine Ways to disturb the Peace of their Country, their greatest Remedy was to accuse them to the People, and when those Accusations were insufficient, (the People being blinded by some specious Pretence of Benefit and Advantage) they created a Dictator, who with a Kind of regal Authority was to reduce the Delinquent from his Aberrations, or punish him as he did *Spurius Melius*; and the leaving of one such Fault unpunished, is enough to ruin a Commonwealth; for a single Example afterwards will hardly be effectual.

CHAP. XXIX.

That the Transgressions of the People do spring commonly from the Prince.

PRinces cannot reasonably complain of the Transgressions of their Subjects, because it is necessarily their Negligence or ill Example that debauches them. And if the People of our Times are infamous for Thefts, and Robberies, and Plundering, and such Kind of Enormities, it proceeds from the Exorbitance and Rapacity of their Governors. *Romandiola* (before Pope *Alexander* VI. exterminated those Lords who had the Command in those Parts) was a Place of all kind of Dissolureness and Iniquity every Day, and every Trivial Occasion producing notorious Murders and Rapines; which was not so much from any Depravity in the Nature of the People, (as some Persons would have it) as from the Corruption of their Princes; for being poor of themselves, and yet ambitious to live in Splendor and Magnificence, they were forced upon ill Courses, and fastened and infused none that could supply them.

To paſs by ſeveral others, one of their deteſtable Ways was to make Laws againſt ſuch and ſuch Things, which after they were publiſhed, they themſelves would be the firſt that ſhould break, to encourage others to do the ſame; nor was any Man ever puniſhed for his Inobſervance, till they ſaw enough involved in the ſame *premunire*; then (forſooth) the Laws were executed moſt ſtrictly, not out of any true Zeal to Juſtice, but out of a Deſire to be fing'ring the Fines; from whence it followed, that by grievous Mulcts and Expilations the People being impoveriſhed, were conſtrained to uſe the ſame Violences upon thoſe who were leſs potent than they; by which means Men were not ſo much corrected, as inſtructed to do ill; and all theſe Miſchiefs proceeded from the Iniquity of their Princes. *Livy* has a Story to this Purpoſe, where he tells us, that the *Roman* Ambaſſadors (paſſing with a great Preſent to *Apollo*, which was taken out of the Spoils of the *Venetians*) were taken by the *Corſairs* of *Lipari* in *Sicily*, and carried with it into that Iſland. *Timaſitheus*, Prince of that Town, underſtanding what the Preſent was, whither it was going, and from whom it was ſent, (though born at *Lipari*) behaved himſelf in that like a *Roman*, and remonſtrated to the People the Impiety of the Fact, which he preſs'd upon them ſo Home, that by common Conſent the Preſent was reſtored, and the Ambaſſadors diſmiſſed; the Words of the Hiſtorian are theſe, *Timaſitheus multitudinem religione implevit, quæ ſemper regenti eſt ſimilis*: Which agrees with that Saying of *Lorenzo de i Medici*,

Et quel che fa li Signor ſanno poi molti,
Che nel Signor ſon tutti gl' occhi volti.

A Prince does nought (or regular, or rude,)
But followed ſtrait by th' gaping Multitude.

CHAP. XXX.

A Citizen who would do any great Matter by his own Authority, muſt firſt extinguiſh all Envy. In what Manner Things are to be ordered upon the Approach of an Enemy, and how a City is to be defended.

THE Senate of *Rome* having Intelligence that the *Tuſcans* had made new Levies of Men to make a new inroad into their Country; and that the *Latini* and *Hernici* (formerly in Amity with the *Romans*) had confederated with the *Volſci*, (implacable Enemies to the very Name of a *Roman*) they concluded that War would be dangerous. *Camillus* being Tribune at that Time, and inveſted with Conſular Authority, they thought he would be able to defend them, (with creating a Dictator) if the reſt of his Colleagues would intruſt him with the chief Command; to which they readily condeſcended, *Nec quicquam* (ſays *Livy*) *de majeſtate ſuâ detractum credebant, quod majeſtati ejus conceſſiſſent*: *Nor did they think any Thing ſubſtracted from their Authority that was added to his.* Upon which *Camillus* (taking their Paroles for their Obedience) cauſed Three Armies to be raiſed. The firſt he deſigned againſt the *Tuſcans*, and commanded it himſelf. The ſecond was to continue about *Rome*, to attend the Motions of the *Latini* and *Hernici*, and was commanded by *Quintius Servilius*. The third was left in the City, as Guards for the Security of the Gates and the Court, and to be ready upon any Accident that ſhould ariſe; and the Command of this Army was committed to *Lucius Quintius*. The Care of his Magazines was referr'd to *Horatius*, one of his Colleagues, who was to ſee them furniſhed with ſuch Arms and Proviſions, and other Things as were neceſſary in Times of War. He cauſed another Tribune of his Colleagues (called *Cornelius*) to preſide in the Senate and publick Council, that he might be preſent in all their Debates, and ready to adviſe in all their daily Tranſactions. So excellent were the Tribunes in thoſe Times, that when the Safety of their Country was at Stake, they were equally diſpoſed either to command or obey. And here may be obſerved the great Ability which a wiſe and good Man has to do good, by the Suppreſſion of Envy, which is many Times a great Impediment to the Good which ſome Perſons would do, could they but get up into ſuch Authority as is requiſite in Affairs of Importance. This Envy is extinguiſhed Two Ways; either by ſome great and difficult Accident, in which, every Man foreſeeing his own Ruin, lays his Ambition aſide, and ſubmits himſelf voluntarily to the Obedience of ſome Perſon from whoſe Virtue he may hope to be delivered: Such a Perſon was this *Camillus*, who having been Three Times Dictator, and acted in all his Adminiſtrations more for the good of the Publick, than any Benefit of his own, and given

many

many excellent Testimonies of his Integrity and Conduct besides, his Colleagues were not scrupulous to transfer their Authority, nor the People at all apprehensive of his Greatness, nor any (how great soever) ashamed to be inferior to him.

Wherefore it was not without Reason that *Livy* used that Expression, *Nec quicquam, &c.* The other Way of extinguishing Envy, is, when either by Violence or the Course of Nature your Competitors die; that is, such Persons as envying your Reputation and Grandeur, and disdaining that you should be above them, cannot contain themselves and be quiet, but rather than not satisfy the Perversity of their Minds, will be contented their Country should be ruined, especially if they have been brought up in a corrupt State, and not been meliorated by their Education.

Against this Sort of Envy there is no Remedy but in the Death of the Subject. And when an excellent Person is so happy, as to have these Impediments removed by the Course of Nature, without any Machination or Concurrence of his, he becomes great and honourable without Obstacle, and may exercise his Virtues without any Offence. But when he has not this good Fortune, and Nature is so unkind as to suffer them to live, it is necessary he remove them some extraordinary Way, and make it his whole Business to find one; yet with that Caution and Deliberation, that he be sure his Way be practicable before he ventures upon it. He who reads the Bible soberly and considerately, will find *Moses* (for the Promotion and Establishment of his Laws) was forced to put several to death, for no other Reason but because out of Envy they opposed his Designs: And this Necessity of removing Competitors was not unknown to *Girolamo Savoralona* the Friar, and *Pietro Soderini Gonfaloniere* of *Florence*. The Friar could not master it for want of Authority; and those of his Followers who could have done it, had no true Knowledge of his Mind; yet that was not his Fault, for his Sermons were full of Declamations against the Wisdom of this World, and Invectives against the wise Men, by whom he intended such envious Persons as opposed his Doctrines and Institutions. *Soderini* was in Hopes by the Goodness of his Conversation, and his Beneficence to all People, that he should have been so fortunate as to have out-lived and worn out the Envy of his Adversaries, seeing he was but young, and found new Clients coming in daily to his Party, whom his excellent Deportment had drawn over. So that he abstain'd from all Kind of Severity and Violence, not considering that Time is not to be lost; that Goodness is ineffectual; that Fortune is changeable; and that envious Persons are not to be obliged by all the Presents and good Offices in the World. So that both these Persons were ruined at last, one of them because he had not Authority enough to master the Envy of his Adversaries; the other, because he did not do it (though he had Authority) in Time. The other Thing remarkable in that Story, was, The Order taken by *Camillus* for the Safety of *Rome*, both Abroad and at Home. And certainly it is not without Reason that good Historians (as ours is) set down certain distinct and particular Cases, that Posterity may learn upon such Accidents in what Manner to defend themselves. It is to be observed likewise, that the most dangerous and unprofitable Defence is that which is made by Tumult and Disorder; and this is apparent by that Third Army which *Camillus* left as a Guard to the City, which many would have thought unnecessary, because the Citizens were generally arm'd and martial; so that there needed no more than to have arm'd the rest upon Occasion, without troubling them with an Army. But *Camillus* (and any other wise Man would have done the same) was of another Opinion; for a Multitude is not to be trusted with Arms, but in an orderly and regular Way. For which Reason, and according to which Example, he who has the Government of a Town, is above all Things to avoid arming the People in a confused and tumultuous Way; but is rather to cull and select such as he dare trust with Arms, and such as he is satisfied will obey him, let him send or command them wheresoever he pleases. The rest are to be required to keep at Home, and every Man look to the Defence of his own House. He who is besieged, and observes this Course, may defend himself well enough; he that does otherwise, does not follow the Example of *Camillus*, and will hardly defend himself.

CHAP. XXXI.

Powerful States, and excellent Persons, retain the same Mind and Dignity in all Kind of Conditions.

AMong the rest of the great Actions and Words which our Author commemorates, and mentions as certain Arguments of the great Virtue and Excellence of *Camillus*, in a Speech of his to his Soldiers, he brings him in with this Expression; *Nec mihi Dictatura animos fecit, nec Exilium ademit. I was neither elated with my Dictatorship, nor dejected with my Banishment.* From whence we may observe that great Men are never discomposed; let Fortune vary as she pleases, let her advance them sometimes, and depress them at others, they are in the same Settlement and Tranquility, so quiet and firm in their Minds, that every Man may see it's not in the Power of Fortune to disorder them; whereas pusillanimous and mean-spirited Persons, inebriated with their good Fortune, and attributing all to their own Virtue and good Conduct, make themselves odious and insupportable to all that are about them; and that Arrogance exposes them to many Revolutions, which coming upon them on a sudden, do so terrify and dismay them, that they run into the other Extreme, and become as abject and vile. Hence it is, that in Time of Adversity such Princes think more of their Escape than Defence, having made themselves uncapable of that by their ill Management before. And as this Diversity of Temper is many Times to be found in particular Persons and Princes, so it is incident to Commonwealths, as may be seen by the Example of the *Romans* and *Venetians*. The first were never dejected by any ill Fortune, nor transported by any Good; as appears by their Defeat at the Battel of *Cannas*, and their Victory against *Antiochus*: Their Defeat at *Cannas* was the Third which they had received, and for that Reason was very considerable; yet they were not so terrified or cowed, as to commit any Thing contrary to the old Dignity of the *Romans*; for they resolved to continue the War; they raised more Forces; they refused to redeem their Prisoners upon any new Terms; and could not be brought to make any Overtures of Peace, either to *Hanibal*, or the Senate at *Carthage*; but for want of others, they arm'd their old Men and their Servants, and resolved wholly upon War; for which Obstinacy and Refractorineſs, when *Hanno* was told, he made a Speech to the Senate, and remonstrated how little they were to presume upon their Victory at *Cannas*: We see then the *Romans* were not to be terrified or discouraged by any Adversity of Fortune; we shall shew now how far they were on the other Side from insulting in their Good. *Antiochus*, before he came to a Battel, sent Ambassadors to *Scipio* to desire a Treaty: *Scipio* sent him these Conditions, that he should return with his Army into *Syria*, and leave the rest to the *Romans*. *Antiochus* thought that unreasonable, fought him, was beaten, and afterwards sent Ambassadors again to *Scipio*, with Instructions to accept of whatever Terms the Conqueror should give. *Scipio* never thought of altering his first Propositions, though made before the Battel was won; but told them, *Quod Romani si vincuntur, non minuuntur animis, nec si vincunt insolescere solent: That the* Romans *were never dejected by ill Fortune, nor elated by good.* The *Venetians* acted quite the other Way, who having got a little good Fortune, (ascribing it to a wrong Cause, as if it had proceeded from their own Power and Virtue) had the Insolence to call the King of *France* Son of St. *Mark*, and taking a Fancy that they should bring their Commonwealth to as great a Condition of Grandeur and Power as the *Romans*, they despis'd the Church, and all the Princes of *Italy* besides. Afterwards, when their Fortune began to change, and they received a small Defeat at *Vaila* by the *French*; they lost their whole Empire in a Day; part revolted, and part they gave up themselves to the Pope and King of *Spain*; and so much had they abandoned themselves to Fear and Consternation, that they sent Ambassadors to the Emperor to make themselves his Tributaries, and writ poor and mean Letters to the Pope to move him to Compassion; and to this Extremity of Dejection they were brought in Four Days Time, by the Loss but of one Half of their Army; for the other of their *Proveditory* retreated, and came off safe to *Verona* with more than 25000 Horse and Foot; so that had there been any Courage either in the Citizens or Senate, they might quickly have recruited, and shewn their Force again; and if they could not have conquered, they might at least have lost all with more Reputation, or possibly have brought the Enemy to some honourable Accord: But the Poorness of their Spirit, and the Illness of their military Discipline took from them at one Time both their Courage and State: And so it will be with whosoever follows the Example of the *Venetians*: For this Insolence in good Fortune and Dejection in bad, proceeds from their manner of Education; which if vain and idle, will make you so too; whereas if it be otherwise, it will give you a better Notion of the World, and teach you in both Fortunes to behave your self with more Moderation: And as this is true in single Persons, so it is

in Commonwealths, which are good or bad according to their manner of Living. We have often ſaid it before, and think it not amiſs to repeat it again, that the Foundation of all Governments conſiſts in their Military Diſcipline; and that where that is defective, neither their Laws, nor any Thing elſe can be good; for through the whole Tract of this Hiſtory it appears, that there is a Neceſſity your Militia ſhould be good, and that cannot be good, but by continual Exerciſe, which you cannot be ſure of, unleſs it conſiſts of your own Subjects. And becauſe you are not always in War, and it is impoſſible you ſhall be, therefore it is neceſſary that they be exerciſed in Times of Peace, which is not to be done by any but your own Subjects, in reſpect of the Charge.

Camillus (as is ſaid before) marched out with his Army againſt the *Tuſcans*, but his Soldiers having had a Sight of the Enemy, found their Army ſo great, that they were diſcouraged and diſmay'd, and thought themſelves ſo much inferior, that they were not able to fight them. *Camillus* underſtanding this Terror in his Camp, went up and down among the Soldiers, and having reprehended their Fear, and ſaid many Things to encourage them, and drive that Fancy out of their Heads, at laſt without further Directions, Come, (ſaid he) Courage! *Quod quiſque didicit aut conſuevit, faciat. Do what you have been taught and accuſtomed, I deſire no more.* From whence it may be collected that he would not have uſed thoſe Words, had not his Army been exerciſed before, and that in Times of Peace as well as War: For no Good is to be expected, nor no General to truſt himſelf to an unexperienced or undiſciplined Army, which will certainly be his Ruin, though he were as good a Commander as *Hanibal* himſelf. And the Reaſon is, becauſe when an Army is engaged, the General cannot be preſent in all Places, to ſupply all Defects, and remedy all Errors; ſo that he muſt neceſſarily miſcarry, unleſs he has ſuch Perſons diſpoſed up and down in the Army, as are capable of underſtanding his Mind, and executing his Orders. Which being ſo, the *Roman* Diſcipline is to be followed, and the Citizens of every City are to be inured to their Arms in Times of Peace as well as War, that when they are brought to fight they may not be at a Loſs, or meet with any Thing new or unaccuſtomed to them; by which Means it will come to paſs, that they will not be ſurprized or terrified in any Condition, but retain ſtill the ſame Courage and Senſe of their Dignity: But where the Citizens are undiſciplin'd, and rely more upon their Fortune than Experience, their Hearts will change with their Fortune, and they will give the ſame Teſtimony of themſelves, as the *Venetians* have done.

CHAP. XXXII.

The Ways which ſome People have taken to prevent a Peace.

THE *Circei* and the *Velitræ*, Two of the *Roman* Colonies, revolted, in hopes the *Latins* would have been able to defend them. The *Latins* being defeated, and they fruſtrated of their Hopes, it was the Advice of ſeveral Citizens, that they ſhould ſend Ambaſſadors to *Rome* to reconcile themſelves to the Senate: But thoſe who had been Ringleaders in the Defection, apprehending the Puniſhment would fall heavy upon their Heads, perverted that Deſign; and to run Things beyond all Poſſibility of Terms, they incited the People to arm, and invade the Frontiers of the *Romans*. And doubtleſs when Prince or Commonwealth are deſirous to prevent an Agreement, there is no ſafer nor ſurer Way, than by running the People into ſome unpardonable Offence, that the Fear of being puniſh'd may keep them averſe from all Overtures of Peace. After the firſt War betwixt the *Carthaginians* and *Romans*, thoſe Soldiers which had been employed by the *Carthaginians* in *Sicily* and *Sardignia*, as ſoon as the Peace was concluded, went over into *Africa*, where being denied or delayed in the Demands of their Pay, they took Arms, and putting themſelves under the Command of Two of their Officers, *Matho* and *Spendio*, they plundered ſeveral of the *Carthaginian* Towns, and poſſeſſed themſelves of others. The *Carthaginians* (to try all Ways, before they came to Extremity) ſent *Aſdrubal* (one of their Principal Citizens) Ambaſſador to them; who having been formerly their General, it was probable, might have ſome Authority among them. *Aſdrubal* being arrived, and *Matho* and *Spendio* deſirous to put the Soldiers beyond all Poſſibility of Pardon, perſuaded them that the beſt and moſt ſecure Way would be, for them to kill all the *Carthaginians* that were Priſoners with them, and *Aſdrubal* among the reſt. Whereupon they killed them all, with a Thouſand Circumſtances of Cruelty and Torture; to which Piece of Wickedneſs they added another by publiſhing an Edict, importing, That all the *Carthaginians* which

ſhould

should be taken for the future, should be treated the same Way. And thus they prevented all Propositions of Peace, and rendred their Soldiers obstinate and implacable to the *Carthaginians.*

CHAP. XXXIII.

To the obtaining a Victory, it is necessary your Army has a Confidence not only in one another, but in their General.

TO win a Battel, and overcome an Enemy, it is necessary to give your Army such a Confidence, as may make them believe that nothing is able to withstand them; and the way of infusing this Confidence is, by Arming, and Exercising them well, and giving them a Knowledge and Acquaintance one with the other; which Confidence and Acquaintance is not to be expected, but where your Soldiers are your own Subjects, and have been brought up together. The General is to be so qualified, that the Soldiers may have Confidence in his Wisdom and Conduct; and they will always have such a Confidence if they see him careful, and regular, and couragious, and one who preserves the Majesty of his Command with Discretion and Reputation; which he will do, if he punishes strictly, and puts his Soldiers upon no over-hard and impertinent Duty; keeps his Promises; represent Victory easy, either by concealing or extenuating the Dangers, or by encouraging them bravely against them; and these Things rightly observed, are of great Consequence both to the Authority of the General, and the obtaining the Victory. The way which the *Romans* took to give this Assurance to their Armies, was, by pretence of Religion; for which Cause before the Creation of their Consuls, the raising, or marching, or engaging of their Armies, their *Augures* and *Auspices* were consulted: And without some of these, no wise General would undertake any great Enterprize, believing they should certainly miscarry, unless the Soldiers were thoroughly convinced that the Gods were on their Side. And when any of their Consuls, or other Commanders, fought in Defiance of these *Auspices*, he was punished, as *Claudius Pulcher* for despising the Omen of the Chickens. And although this is obvious in every Part of the *Roman* History, yet it is better prov'd by the Complaint of *Appius Claudius* to the People, against the Insolence of their Tribunes; where he tells them that by their Means, the *Auspices*, and other Religious Customs were neglected or corrupted; his Words are these, *Eludant nunc licet Religionem; quid enim interest si pulli non pascentur, si ex cavea tardius exierint, succinuerit avis? Parva sunt hæc, sed parva ista non contemnendo, Majores nostri maximam hanc Rempublicam fecerunt. Let them laugh at Religion as they please, and cry, what are we concerned if the Pullets won't eat, if they come lazily out of their Pens; or if a Bird be disposed to Sing? 'Tis true they are but Trifles, yet by not despising those Trifles, our Ancestors brought this Commonwealth to the Grandeur it is at.* And it was true; for those little Things were sufficient to keep the Soldiers confident and united; which are Two Things go very far in a Victory; though without Virtue and Valour, they are not always successful. The *Prenestini* being in the Field with their Army against the *Romans*, they went and lodged themselves upon the River *Allia* (in a Place where the *Romans* had been beaten by the *French*) that the Consideration of the Place might be an Encouragement to their own Men, and a Terror to the *Romans*. And though this Design was not improbable for the Reason aboveSaid, yet it appeared by the Success, that true Courage is not disturbed by every little Accident; as was well expressed by the Dictator to his Master of the Horse, *Vides tu, fortuna illos fretos, ad Alliam consedisse, at tu fretus armis, animisque invade mediam aciem. You see, by their posting themselves upon the* Allia, *they rely wholly upon Fortune; do you trust to your Arms, and your Courage, and attack their main Battel.* And he was in the right; for true Courage, good Discipline, and a Confidence arising from so many Victories, cannot be discomposed by such frivolous Stratagems; light Things will not dismay them, nor every Disorder distract them. For even in the Absence of their Officers, Soldiers that are expert, and accustomed to Arms, are not easily beaten. As appeared by the Two *Manlii* (both Consuls, and making War upon the *Volsci*) who having indiscreetly sent part of their Army to Forage, it fell out, that both the commanded Party, and those which were left behind, were encompassed by the Enemy, and as it were besieged both at a Time; out of which Danger the Soldiers were delivered, more by their own Courage, than any Conduct in the Consuls; whereupon *Livy* tells us, *Militum, etiam sine Rectore stabilis virtus tutata est. The stedfast Courage of the Soldiers defended them, without any Help from their General.* *Fabius* had likewise an excellent

excellent way to confirm his Soldiers, and poſſeſs them with a Confidence which I cannot omit: Having invaded *Tuſcany* with a new Army; ſuppoſing the Novelty of the Country, and their inexperience of that Enemy, might have ſome Influence among them, to give them a Confidence, he called them together before the Battel, and having in a grave Oration given ſeveral Reaſons why they might hope for the Victory, he told them, That he had another Reaſon behind, more certain than all of them, but in that he muſt be private; for to diſcover it, would be to defeat it: A wiſe way, and deſerves well to be imitated.

CHAP. XXXIV.

What Vogue, Fame or Opinion diſpoſes the People firſt to favour ſome particular Citizen; and whether they, or a Prince, diſtributes their Offices with moſt Prudence and Judgment.

WE have ſhown before, how *Titus Manlius* (called afterwards *Torquatus*) preſerved his Father *L. Manlius* from an Accuſation which *Pomponius* the Tribune had exhibited againſt him to the People. And although the way which he took to preſerve him was violent and irregular; yet his filial Affection to his Father was ſo grateful to the People, that they not only not reprehended him for what he had done, but advanced him to Honour; for being not long after to chuſe Tribunes for their Legions, *T. Manlius* was the Second that was made. And here I think it not amiſs to conſider the way which the People of *Rome* took in the Diſtribution of their Honours, and Election of Magiſtrates; and to enquire into the Truth of what I aſſerted before, that the Diſtributions of the People are better, and more exact, than the Diſtributions of a Prince; for the People follow the common and publick Character of every Man, unleſs by ſome particular Notion of his Actions, they preſume, or believe otherwiſe. There are Three ways by which a Man may gain Eſteem and Reputation with the People. The firſt is by Extraction, when the Parents having been great Men, and ſerviceable to the Commonwealth, the People take a Fancy that their Children muſt of Neceſſity be the ſame, until by ſome ill Act they convince them of the contrary. The Second way is to aſſociate with grave Perſons, of good Eſteem, and ſuch as are reputed diſcreet and ſober by every body; and becauſe nothing indicates and diſcovers a Man ſo much as the Company which he keeps, he who keeps good Company, may be concluded to be good; for of neceſſity Perſons ſo converſant together, muſt have ſomething of Similitude. But there is another way of gaining the Favour of the People, which exceeds them both; and that is by performing ſome extraordinary Action, whether publick or private, it matters not, ſo you come honourably off. And the Judgments which are made in this Caſe, are much better than the other: For the Arguments taken from the Virtue of the Parents, are doubtful and fallacious; nor can any Man conclude any Thing, till Experience reſolves him. The Preſumptions in the Second from their Converſations and Company, are much better than the Firſt; but not comparable to the Third; For Reputation from Anceſtors or Company, depends barely upon Opinion and Hopes, till ſome great Action be performed that teſtifies your Virtue, and determines the Doubt; and then if this Action be performed when you are Young, it makes the Impreſſion much deeper, and ſo fixes your Reputation, that you muſt commit many ill Actions before you can expunge it: Thoſe therefore who would advance themſelves in a Commonwealth, are to take this Courſe, and endeavour to do ſome remarkable Thing at firſt; which was done at *Rome* very frequently by ſeveral young Perſons, either by the Promulgation of ſome Law for the Benefit of the Publick; or by the Accuſation of ſome great Perſon for tranſgreſſing the Law; or doing ſome other great or new Thing that may make you be talk'd of. Nor are theſe Things neceſſary only to recommend you at firſt; but they are neceſſary likewiſe to maintain and augment your Reputation; ſo that they are to be renewed and repeated often as long as you live; as *Manlius* did: For after he had defended his Father ſo honourably, and by that noble Action laid the Foundation of his Eſteem, many Years were not paſt before he fought ſingly with a *Frenchman*, and having ſlain him very bravely, he took a Gold Chain from his Neck, which gave him the Name of *Torquatus*; and having given theſe Teſtimonies of his Courage in his Youth, when he came to riper Years, he made himſelf as famous for Diſcipline and Juſtice by the Example upon his Son, whom he cauſed to be put to Death for fighting contrary to Orders, though he defeated the Enemy; which Three great Inſtances of his Courage and Virtue,

made

made his Name so honourable both then and ever since, that no Victory, no Triumph, could have done more. And good Reason, for in Victories many equalled, and some exceeded him; but in these Three very few came near, but no body exceeded him.

Scipio the elder was not so glorious by all his Triumphs, as for having in his Youth so manfully defended his Father at the Battel upon the *Tesin*; and after the Battel of *Cannæ*, forced certain young *Romans* with his Sword drawn, to take an Oath not to desert their Country, as they had resolved to do before; which Two Actions were the Foundations of his following Reputation, and served as Steps to his Triumphs both over *Spain* and *Africa*; which Favour and good Opinion of him was highly increased, by his returning a Daughter and a Wife (both of them great Beauties, and both of them his Prisoners) immaculate and untouched, one to her Father, and the other to her Husband, in his Wars in *Spain*. And this way of Proceeding is not only necessary for such as would gain Honour and Promotion in a Commonwealth; but for Princes likewise and Kings who are desirous to retain their Reputation with their Subjects. For nothing recommends a Prince more efficaciously to the People, than in his Youth to give them some Taste or Specimen of his Virtue, by some remarkable Act, or Proposal for the Benefit of the Publick; especially if it has any Tendency to Justice, Magnanimity, Liberality, or the like; for Things of that Nature that are extraordinary, whether acted, or spoken, are transmitted to Posterity with so much Reverence, that they even come to be Proverbs among the People. But to return; I say then, when the People designs to confer Honour upon a Citizen, upon one of these Three Accounts, they go upon very good Grounds, but especially upon the last, when several and reiterated Examples make him more known; for then 'tis not possible they should be deceived, and in young Persons they are certain Presages of their Deportment for the future. I speak only of those Degrees which are given at first, before any firm Experience has made them better known, or that they pass from one Action to a contrary; in which, both as to Mistakes and Corruption, the People do not err so often as Princes. And because it may happen that the People may be deceived by Report or Opinion, or perhaps the Actions of a Man, as believing them more considerable and estimable than they are (which cannot easily happen to a Prince, by reason of his Council which are by, and always ready to inform him) that the People may not want such Monitors; those who have laid right Foundations for a Commonwealth, have provided that when the great and supream Offices of a City are to be supplied, where it would be dangerous to entertain any incapable Persons, if they find the People disposed to the Creation of any Man who is known to be improper, it may be lawful for any Citizen, nay, an Honour to any one that shall publickly discover his Defects, that thereby the People understanding him better, may be better able to chuse. That this was the Practice in *Rome*, appears by the Oration of *Fabius Maximus*, which he made publickly to the People in the Second *Punick* War, when at the Creation of the Consuls, the People were inclined to create *T. Otracilius*, whom *Fabius* conceiving an unfit Man for those Times, remonstrated his Thoughts so effectually to them, that he put him by that Degree, and prevailed with the People to give it another Person that deserv'd it much better. Which being so, the People in the Election of their Magistrates, do judge according to the best and truest Tokens that they can observe; and could they be as well Counselled in these Affairs as Princes, they would commit fewer Errors than they do. So that that Citizen who would work himself into the Favour of the People, must do some great Matter, or express some great Instance of his Virtue or Parts, that he may seem to imitate *Manlius*, and get as much Honour as he.

CHAP. XXXV.

What Dangers they incur, who make themselves Authors of any Enterprize, and the more extraordinary the Design, the greater the Danger.

IT would be too long and difficult a Task, to discourse at large of the Danger there is in being the Head in any new Enterprize; what Hazards there are in the Conduct, and how impossible to maintain it. Reserving that therefore for a more convenient Place, I shall speak here only of the Dangers to which such Citizens, or other Persons are subject, who advise a Prince to make himself Head of any important Design; and do it with that Eagerness and Impetuosity, that the whole Enterprize may be imputed to him. The first Thing I would recommend to their Observation is, that Counsels are commonly judged by their Success; if their Success be unfortunate, the whole Scandal of the Miscarriage falls

upon the Author. If it proſpers, and the Event be good, he is commended, but at a Diſtance, and his Reward is not commenſurate with the Danger. The preſent Emperor of the *Turks*, *Sultan Selimus*, (as it is reported by ſome that came late out of that Country) having made great Preparations for an Expedition into *Syria* and *Egypt*, changed his Deſign upon the Perſuaſion of one of his *Baſſa*'s, and with a vaſt Army march'd againſt the *Sophy* of *Perſia*. Arriving in an open and large Country, but for the moſt part Deſart, and dry, and no Rivers to ſupply them, many Diſeaſes were contracted in his Army, inſomuch as with Hunger and Sickneſs it dwindled away (as many of the *Romans* had done in that Country before) till at laſt (though he had the better of the War) he had loſt moſt of his Men; upon which the Emperor being highly enraged, cauſed the *Baſſa* who had counſelled him thither to be ſlain. We read likewiſe of ſeveral Citizens adviſing an Enterprize, upon the Miſcarriage of which they were all of them baniſhed. At *Rome*, certain Citizens propoſed and promoted very earneſtly the making one of the Conſuls out of the People; and having prevailed, the firſt of them which went out with their Army being beaten and overthrown, the Authors would doubtleſs have found the Inconvenience of their Counſel, had not the People (in whoſe Favour it was given) appeared in their Protection. So that this is moſt certain, all Counſellors of this Kind (whether to Princes or Commonwealths) are betwixt thoſe Two Rocks; if they do not adviſe what in their Judgments they think profitable for their Maſters, and that frankly, and without Reſpect, they fail in their Duties, and are defective that way; again, if they do counſel freely, they bring their Lives and Fortunes in Danger, becauſe ſuch is the natural Blindneſs of Mankind, they cannot judge of the Goodneſs or Badneſs of any Thing, but by the Succeſs; and conſidering with my ſelf what way was moſt likely to avoid this Infamy or Danger, I can find no better than to take all Things moderately, to aſſume and impropriate no Enterprize; to deliver your Opinion frankly, but without Paſſion, and to defend it ſo modeſtly, that if it be followed by your Prince or Commonwealth, it may appear to be their voluntary Act, and not done upon your Importunity; in that Caſe it will not be reaſonable to complain of your Counſel, when executed by the Concurrence of the reſt; for if there be any Danger, it is where Things are done in Contradiction of the reſt of the Council, who upon any Miſcarriage will be ſure to combine againſt you, and procure your Deſtruction: And though perhaps in this Caſe there may want ſomething of that Glory which accrues to a ſingle Perſon, who carries a Deſign againſt the Oppoſition of the reſt, eſpecially if it ſucceeds; yet there are Two Advantages on your Side; for firſt, you will not run ſo great a Hazard in the Miſcarriage; and then if you adviſe a Thing modeſtly, which by the Obſtinacy and Contradiction of the reſt is carried againſt you, the Miſcarriage of their Counſel will make much more to your Reputation. And although a good Citizen is not to deſire to raiſe his Credit upon the Misfortunes of his Country, nor indeed to rejoice in what happens of it ſelf; yet when a Thing is done, it is more Satisfaction to have your Counſel applauded, than to be in danger of being puniſhed. Wherefore I am of Opinion, in theſe doubtful and difficult Caſes, there can be no better way for the Counſel either of a Prince or State, than to deliver themſelves modeſtly and freely; for to be ſullen, and ſay nothing, would not only betray your Country, but expoſe your ſelf, becauſe in Time you would become ſuſpected; and perhaps it might befal them, as it did to one of the Council of *Perſeus*, King of *Macedon*, who being defeated by *Emilius Paulius*, and eſcaping with ſome few of his Friends, one of them (in Diſcourſe of his Maſter's Misfortune) began to find Fault, and blame ſeveral Paſſages in his Conduct, which as he pretended might have been managed much better. At which the King being enraged, turn'd to him, told him, *And do you (like a Traytor as you are) tell me of it now, when 'tis paſt Remedy?* And killed him with his own Hands; ſo that he paid dear for being ſilent, when it was his Duty to have ſpoke, and for ſpeaking when it was Diſcretion to have been ſilent; nor did his forbearing to give his Advice ſecure him from Danger; ſo that I am confirmed in my Opinion, that the beſt way is to obſerve the Directions aboveſaid.

CHAP. XXXIV.

The Reason why at the first Charge the French *have been, and still are, accounted more than Men, but afterwards less than Women.*

THE Arrogance of that *Frenchman* who challenged the ſtouteſt of the *Romans* to fight with him upon the Bridge of the *Arrien*, and was afterwards killed by *T. Manlius Torquatus*, puts me in mind of what *Livy* ſays in many Places of the *French*, that in their firſt Attack they are more fierce and daring than Men, but afterwards more fearful and puſillanimous than Women. And many People enquiring into the Cauſe, do attribute it to the Peculiarity of their Temperature and Nature: I am of Opinion that there is much of that in it; yet I cannot think but that Nature which makes them ſo furious at firſt, may be ſo invigorated and improved by Art, as to continue their Courage to the laſt. To prove my Opinion, I do affirm there are Three Sorts of Armies. In the firſt there is Courage and Fury, join'd with Order and Diſcipline; and indeed their Courage and Fury proceeds from their Diſcipline. And of this Sort were the Armies of the *Romans*; for all Hiſtories do agree that there was always good Order, by reaſon of their long Diſcipline and Experience. Nothing was done in their Armies, but with great Regularity, and expreſs Order from their General. They neither Eat, nor Slept, nor Bought, nor Sold, nor did any other Action, either Military or Civil, but by Permiſſion of the Conſul; and therefore theſe *Roman* Armies, who by their Diſcipline and Courage ſubdued the whole World, are the beſt Example we can follow; they who do otherwiſe, do ill; and though perhaps they may do ſomething extraordinary ſometimes, yet 'tis more by Accident than Judgment. But where well ordered Courage meets with good Diſcipline, and is accommodated to the Circumſtances of Manner, and Time, nothing diſmays them, nothing withſtands them; for the Goodneſs of their Order giving new Life and Courage to their Men, makes them confident of Victory, and that Confidence never ſuffers them to give Ground, till their whole Order be broken. There is another Sort of Armies, which are acted more by Fury than Diſcipline (as in the Armies of the *French*) and there it is quite otherwiſe, becauſe not ſucceeding in their firſt Charge, and not being ſuſtained by a well ordered Courage, that Fury upon which they wholly rely'd, growing cold and remiſs, they are quickly overthrown. Whereas the *Romans* fearing nothing of Danger, by reaſon of their good Order and Diſcipline, without the leaſt Diffidence or Queſtion of the Victory, fought on ſtill obſtinately, being animated with the ſame Courage, and agitated by the ſame Ardor at laſt as at firſt, and the more they were preſs'd, the better they reſiſted. The Third Sort of Armies, is where there is neither natural Courage, nor Diſcipline and Order, as in our *Italian* Armies now-a-days, which are ſo uſeleſs and unſerviceable, that unleſs they light upon an Enemy who runs by ſome Accident, they are never like to have a Victory; and this is ſo obvious every Day, it needs no Example to prove it. But becauſe by the Teſtimony of *Livy*, every one may know what is the right Diſcipline, and what is the Wrong, I will give you the Words of *Papirius Curſor*, in his Reprimand to *Fabius*, the Maſter of his Horſe. His Words are theſe, *Nemo hominum, nemo Deorum verecundiam habeat. Non edicta Imperatorum, non auſpicia obſerventur: Sine Commeatu, vagi milites in pacato, in hoſtico errent; immemores Sacramenti, ſe ubi velint exauctorentur; infrequentia deſerantur ſigna; neque conveniatur ad edictum: Nec diſcernatur interdiu, noctu; æquo, iniquo loco, juſſu, injuſſu Imperatoris pugnetur: Non ſigna, non ordines ſerventur: Latrocinii modo, cæca & fortuita, pro ſolenni & ſacrata Militia, ſit. Let them bear no Reſpect or Reverence either to God or Man: Let neither the Orders of the General, nor the Directions of the* Auſpices *be obſerved: Let the looſe and vagabond Soldier infeſt his own Country as much as the Enemies: Let them forget their Oaths, and disband as they pleaſe: Let them run from their Colours as they think good, and not come back when they are required: Let them fight Hand over Head, without Conſideration of Time, or Place, or Order of their Officers: Let their Ranks be confuſed, and their Colours deſerted: In a word, Let their whole Conduct be blind and fortuitous like Thieves, rather than the ſolemn and ſacred Militia of the* Romans. By this we may eaſily ſee, whether the Militia of our Times be Blind and Fortuitous, or whether it be Solemn and Sacred; how far it is ſhort of the old Diſcipline of the *Romans*, which conſiſting in exact Order, produced Courage and Conſtancy in the Soldiers; and how far behind the *French*, among whom though there is not that juſt Order and Conſtancy, yet there is Courage enough.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXVII.

Whether fighting in small Parties, or pickeering before a Battel, be necessary; and how the Temper of a new Enemy is to be found without them.

IN human Affairs (as we have said before) there is not only a perpetual and unavoidable Difficulty in carrying them to their Perfection, but there is always some concomitant Mischief so inseparable from it, that it is impossible to arrive at the one without the other. This is visible in all the Actions of Mankind; so that that Perfection is acquir'd with much Difficulty, unless you be so favoured by Fortune, that by her Force she overcomes that common and natural Inconvenience: And of this, the Duel betwixt *Manlius Torquatus* and the *Frenchman*, put me in Mind, where, as *Livy* tells us, *Tanti ea dimicatio ad universi belli eventum momenti fuit, ut Gallorum exercitus, relictis trepide Castris, in Tiburtem agrum, mox in Campaniam transierit: The Success of that Duel was of so much Importance to the Success of the War, that thereupon the* French *Army drew off in a great Fear into the* Tiburtine *Country, and afterwards march'd away into* Campania. From whence I infer on the one Side, that a good General is to avoid any Thing that (carrying but small Advantage with it) may have an ill Influence upon his Army; to fight therefore in Parties, and venture your whole Fortune upon less than your whole Army, is rash and imprudent, (as I have said before, where I dissuaded the keeping of Passes.) On the other Side, I observe, when an experienced General comes against a new Enemy that has the Reputation of being stout, before he brings him to a Battel, he is obliged to try him by slight Skirmishes, and Pickeering, that by so doing he may bring his Soldiers acquainted with their Discipline, and way of Fighting, and remove that Terror, which the Fame and Reputation of their Courage had given them. And this in a General is of very great Importance, and so absolutely necessary, that he who engages an unknown Enemy with his whole Army, before he has made an Essay of his Courage, runs himself and his Army into manifest Danger. *Valerius Corvinus* was sent by the *Romans* with an Army against the *Samnites*, a new Enemy, with whom they had never had any Conflict before; and *Livy* tells us he sent small Parties Abroad, and caused them to entertain light Skirmishes with the Enemy; *Ne eos novum bellum, ne novus hostis terreret; Lest his Soldisrs should be terrified with a new War, and a new Enemy.* But then the Danger is, that your Men being overcome, their Terror should be increased; and that which you intended to animate, should discourage and dismay them: And this is one of those good Things which have so near a Conjunction with Evil, that 'tis no hard Matter to take one for the other. My Advice therefore is, that a wise General abstains from any Thing that may strike a Terror into his Army; for then the Soldiers begin to apprehend, when they see their Comrades kill'd before their Face. For which Reason those Pickeerings and slight Skirmishes are to be avoided by all Means, unless upon great Advantage, or some more than ordinary hopes of Success. Again, it is not his Interest certainly to defend any Pass, where he cannot upon Occasion bring his whole Army to engage: Neither are any Towns to be made good, but such as are of Importance to the Subsistance of his Army, and without which both that and himself must be ruined; and no such Towns are to be fortified, but where not only a good Garison may be disposed and supplied, but where in case of a Siege, your whole Army may be brought to relieve it: Other Towns are rather to be quitted than kept; for to abandon a Town, whilst your Army is in the Field, is no Disrepute to you, nor Discouragement to your Soldiers: But when you lose a Place that you undertook, and every body expected you would defend, that abates much of your Credit, and is a great Prejudice to you; so that it will be with you as it was then with the *French*, a trifling Loss will endanger the whole War.

Philip of *Macedon* (the Father of *Perseus*) a martial Prince, and of great Reputation in his Time, being invaded by the *Romans*, quitted and destroyed a great Part of his Country, which he supposed he should be unable to defend; as judging it better, and more consistent with his Honour to suffer it to be possessed by the Enemy as waste and neglected, than to undertake, and not be able to defend it. The Affairs of the *Romans* being in a very ill Condition after the Battel at *Cannas*, they refused their Assistance to several of their Friends and Allies, giving them leave to defend themselves if they could: Which Resolutions are much better than to attempt to defend that which is not in our Power; for in the first Case we lose only our Friends; but in the last, both our Friends and our selves. To return therefore to our Skirmishes, I say, that whenever for the Discovery of the Enemy, or acquainting his Soldiers with the way of their Fighting, a General is constrained to make Use of them, he is to do it with that Art and Advantage, that he may run no Hazard of being worsted: Or else to follow the Example of *Marius*, (which is the better way of the Two)

who marching againſt the *Cimbri*, a fierce and numerous People which had invaded *Italy* for Prey, and beaten one *Roman* Army already; obſerving his Army to be afraid, he thought it would be neceſſary before he came to a general Engagement, to contrive ſome Way or other to diſpoſſeſs them of their Fear; whereupon, as a wiſe Officer, he diſpoſed his Army (more than once or twice) in ſome ſecure Place upon the Road, by which the *Cimbrian* Army was to paſs, from whence his Men might have a View of their March, and accuſtom themſelves to the Sight of them; to the End, that ſeeing them to be nothing but a confuſed and diſorderly Multitude, incommoded with Baggage, and either very ill accoutred, or utterly unarm'd, they might recover their Spirits, and grow impatient to be at them: And this prudent Invention of *Marius* ought to be diligently imitated by other People, leſt they fall into the Dangers aforeſaid, and come off like the *French*, *Qui ob rem parvi ponderis in Tiburtem agrum, & in Campaniam tranſierunt: Who upon a trifling Accident, deſponded, and retired:* And becauſe I have mentioned *Valerius Corvinus* in this Chapter, I ſhall make uſe of his Words in the next, to ſhew how a General ſhould be qualified.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

How a General is to be qualified, that his Army may rely upon him.

AS we have ſaid before, *Valerius Corvinus* was gone with his Army againſt the *Samnites*, a new Enemy, with whom the *Romans* had had no Conteſt before. To encourage his Soldiers, and acquaint them with the Diſcipline of the *Samnites*, he inured his Men to them, by ſeveral ſmall Skirmiſhes; but leſt that ſhould not do, he made a Speech to them before the Battel, remonſtrating with all poſſible Efficacy of Words, how little they were to value the Enemy; and how much they might expect from their own Valour, and his Conduct: *Livy* brings him in with theſe Words in his Mouth, which gives us an exact Character of a General, in whom his Army may confide. *Tum etiam intueri cujus ductu auſpicioque ineunda pugna ſit; utrum qui audiendus, duntaxat magnificus adhortator ſit, verbis tantum ferox, operum militarium expers; aut qui & ipſe tela tractare, procedere ante ſigna, verſari media in mole pugnæ ſciat. Facta mea, non dicta vos milites ſequi volo, nec diſciplinam modo, ſed exemplum etiam à me petere, qui hac dextra mihi tres Conſulatus, ſummamque laudem peperi. Then you may ſee under whoſe Conduct you fight; whether he that ſpeaks to you be only a magnificent Boaſter, valiant in Words, but ignorant in whatever belongs to a Soldier; or whether he be one that knows how to manage his Arms, lead up his Men, charge in the Head of them, and behave himſelf manfully in the very Heat of the Battel; I would not (Fellow Soldiers) that you ſhould follow my Words more than my Deeds; or take only my Precepts, and not my Example, who with this Hand have gained Three Conſulſhips, and immortal Reputation.* Which Words, if well conſidered, are ſufficient to inſtruct any Man what Courſe he is to take to make himſelf reputed a great General; he who acts otherwiſe will find in Time, that that Command (however he came by it, whether by Ambition or Fortune) will rather abſtract than add to his Honour; for it is not Titles that make Men honourable, but Men their Titles: And it is to be obſerved likewiſe, that if great Captains have been forced to ſuch unuſual Language to confirm the Hearts of an old Veteran Army, when it is to fight with a new Enemy; how much more Care and Art is to be uſed in a new inexperienced Army, that never ſaw an Enemy before. For if a ſtrange Enemy be terrible to an old Army, well may he be ſo to an Army that is new raiſed, and was never engaged. Nevertheleſs, all theſe Difficulties have been overcome by the Prudence of ſeveral Captains, as by *Gracchus* the *Roman*, and *Epaminondas* the *Theban*, who with new raiſed Men defeated old Veteran Troops, that had been long experienced in Matters of War; and their Way was to prepare them for ſome Months by continual Exerciſe and counterfeit Battels; by uſing them to their Ranks, and holding them to ſtrict Diſcipline and Obedience; after which, they advanced againſt the Enemy, engaged with great Confidence, and performed very well. Let no Man therefore (that is any Thing of a Soldier) deſpair of making his Army good, if he has but Men enough; for that Prince who abounds with Men, and wants Soldiers, is rather to complain of his own Lazineſs and Imprudence, than of their Incapacity and Dulneſs.

CHAP. XXXIX.

A General ought to know the Country, and how to take his Advantage in the Ground.

AMong the many Things that are neceſſary in a General of an Army, the Knowledge of Coaſts and Countries is one, and that not only in a general, but in an exquiſite and more particular Way, without which he ſhall not be able to do any great Thing: And becauſe all Knowledge requires Uſe and Exerciſe to bring it to Perfection, ſo is it in this Knowledge of Places. And if it be enquired what Uſe and what Exerciſe is required in this Caſe, I anſwer, Hunting and Hawking, and ſuch like Recreations; and therefore it is that the Heroes, which anciently govern'd the World, were ſaid to be brought up in Woods and Foreſts, and accuſtomed to thoſe Kind of Exerciſes; for Hunting (beſides the Acquaintance which it gives you of the Country) inſtructs you in many Things that are neceſſary in War: *Xenophon* in the Life of *Cyrus* tells us, that when *Cyrus* went to invade the King of *Armenia*, aſſigning ſeveral Offices and Places to the ſeveral Parts of his Army, he told them, that, *Queſta, non era altro ch'una di quelle caccie le quali molte volte havenano fatte ſeco*; *That this Expedition was no more than one of thoſe Chaces which they had taken frequently with him.* Thoſe whom he placed as Scouts upon the Mountains, he reſembled to them who ſet their Nets upon the Hills; and thoſe who were to make Excurſions upon the Plain, were like them who were employed to rouze the Deer, and force them into the Toils. And this is ſaid by *Xenophon*, to ſhew the Reſemblance and Similitude betwixt Hunting and War: For which Cauſe thoſe Kind of Exerciſes are not only honourable but neceſſary for great Perſons; and the rather, becauſe nothing gives a Man ſo true a Knowledge of the Country, or imprints it more deeply and particularly in the Memory: And when a Man has acquainted himſelf thoroughly with one Country, he may arrive more eaſily at the Knowledge of other, becauſe all Countries and Coaſts have ſome Kind of Proportion and Conformity betwixt them; ſo that the Knowledge of the one contributes much to the Underſtanding of the other. But if before you have acquainted your ſelf with your own, you ſeek out new Regions, you will hardly, without great Labour and long Time, come to the Knowledge of either. Whereas he that is well vers'd and practiſed in one, ſhall at the firſt Caſt of his Eye give you an Account how that Plain lies; how that Mountain riſes; and how far that Valley extends; and all by his former Knowledge in that Kind. To confirm all this, *Titus Livius* gives us an Example in *Publius Decius*, who being a military Tribune in the Army which the Conſul *Cornelius* commanded againſt the *Samnites*, and finding the ſaid Conſul and Army fallen by Accident into a Vale, where they might have been encompaſſed by the Enemy and cut off, *Vides tu, Aule Corneli*, (ſaid *Decius* to the Conſul) *cacumen illud ſupra hoſtem? Arx illa eſt ſpei ſalutiſq; noſtræ; ſi eam (quoniam cæci reliquere Samnites) impigre capimus: Do you ſee, Sir, that Hill which hangs over the Enemies Camp? there lies our Hope; the blind* Samnites *have neglected it, and our Safety depends upon the ſeizing of it quickly.* For, ſaid *Livy* before, *Publius Decius Tribunus militum, unum editum in ſaltu Collem, imminentem hoſtium Caſtris, aditu arduum impedito agmini, expeditis haud difficilem:* Publius Decius, *the military Tribune, obſerved a Hill over the Enemies Camp, not eaſily to be aſcended by thoſe who were compleatly arm'd, but to thoſe who were lightly arm'd acceſſible enough.* Whereupon, being commanded to poſſeſs it by the Conſul with 3000 Men, he obeyed his Orders, ſecur'd the *Roman* Army, and deſigning to march away in the Night, and ſave both himſelf and his Party, *Livy* brings him in ſpeaking theſe Words to ſome of his Comrades, *Ite mecum, ut dum lucis aliquid ſupereſt, quibus locis hoſtes præſidia ponant, qua pateat hinc exitus exploremus. Hæc omnia ſagulo militari amictus, ne Ducem circuire hoſtes notarent, perluſtravit: Come along with me, that whilſt we have yet Light, we may explore where the Enemy keeps his Guards, and which Way we may make our Retreat: And this he did in the Habit of a private Soldier, that the Enemy might not ſuſpect him for an Officer.* He then who conſiders what has been ſaid, will find how uſeful and neceſſary it is for a General to be acquainted with the Nature of the Country; for had not *Decius* underſtood thoſe Things very well, he could not ſo ſuddenly have diſcerned the Advantage of that Hill, and of what Importance it would be to the Preſervation of the *Roman* Army; neither could he have judged at that Diſtance whether it was acceſſible or not; and when he had poſſeſſed himſelf of it, and was to draw off afterwards, and follow the Conſul, (being ſo environed by the *Samnites*) he could never have found out the beſt Way for his Retreat, nor have gueſſed ſo well where the Enemy kept his Guards. So that it muſt neceſ-

ſarily be that *Decius* had a perfect Knowledge of the Country, which Knowledge made him ſecure that Hill, and the ſecuring of that Hill was the Security of the Army. After which, by the ſame Knowledge (though he was as it were beſieged by the Enemy) he found a Way to make his own Retreat, and bring off his whole Party.

CHAP. XL.

How Fraud in the Management of War is honourable and glorious.

THough Fraud in all other Actions is abominable, yet in Matters of War it is laudable and glorious; and he who overcomes his Enemies by Stratagem, is as much to be praiſed, as he who overcomes him by Force. This is to be ſeen by the Judgment of thoſe who write the Lives of great Perſons, eſpecially of great Commanders; for they commend and applaud *Hanibal*, and the reſt, in all their Inventions of that Nature. There are many Examples in them to this Purpoſe, which I ſhall not repeat here; only this I muſt advertize, that I do not intend that Fraud which conſiſts in betraying a Truſt, or breaking an Agreement, to be honourable; for though by them you may acquire Power, and 'tis poſſible a Kingdom, (yet, as I ſaid before) it cannot be with Honour. But by Fraud, I mean that Artifice which is ſhewn in Stratagems and Circumventions, againſt an Enemy that is not only in Hoſtility, but a State of Defiance, (for where he repoſes any Confidence in you, it alters the Caſe;) and ſuch as I mean, was the Artifice of *Hanibal* when he pretended to fly, only to poſſeſs himſelf of ſome Paſſes, and ſo block up the Conſul and his Army; as alſo when to clear himſelf of *Fabius Maximus*, he found out the Invention of binding Firebrands and other combuſtible Matter about the Horns of the Cattel, and turning them out upon the Enemy. And much of this Nature was that of *Pontius*, General for the *Samnites*; which he uſed to circumvent the *Roman* Army *ad Tureas Caudinas*. *Pontius* having diſpoſed his Army privately upon the Mountains; ſent ſeveral of his Soldiers, habited like Shepherds, with ſeveral Herds of Cattle thorough the Plain: Being all taken and examined by the *Romans*, where the Army of the *Samnites* was, they unanimouſly concurred in the Story which *Pontius* had put into their Mouths, that it was gone to beſiege *Nocera*; which being credited by the Conſul, he brake up from his Poſt, and marching thorough the Plain for the Relief of *Nocera*, he ran himſelf into the Trap, and was no ſooner entred, but he was block'd up by the Enemy. This Exploit was fraudulently performed, yet it would have been very honourable to *Pontius*, had he followed his Father's Advice, who would have had him either diſmiſſed the *Romans* frankly, that they might have been obliged by their Uſage, or elſe have put them all to the Sword, that they might have taken no Revenge; but he took the middle Way, *Quæ neque amicos parat, neque inimicos tollit. Which neither multiply'd his Friends, nor leſſened the Number of his Foes.* Which Way has always been pernicious in Matters of State, as has been ſhewn elſewhere.

CHAP. XLI.

That ones Country is to be defended by all means; and whether honourable or diſhonourable it imports not, 'tis well defended.

THE *Roman* Army and their Conſul (as is ſaid before) were block'd up by the *Samnites*, who having propoſed Terms to them which were very diſhonourable, as that they ſhould be diſmiſſed *ſub jugum*, and diſarm'd (in token of Bondage,) and then ſent back again to *Rome*: The Conſuls were amazed at the Motion, and the whole Army was in Deſpair; when *Lentulus*, the *Roman* Legate, ſtood up and told them, that in his Judgment no Conditions were to be ſcrupled at that Time when their Country was at Stake: For the Safety of *Rome* conſiſting in the Safety of that Army, the Army was to be preſerved; and that Country which is defended, is well defended, let the Way be as it will, honourable or not honourable, it matters not: For if that Army was preſerved, in Time *Rome* might work off that Diſgrace; but if it were loſt, (though it periſhed never ſo bravely) Country and Liberty, and all would be loſt with it: And ſo his Counſel was followed. And this ought to be conſidered and obſerved by every Man whoſe Office it is to adviſe for the good of his Country; for where the Safety of that is in Queſtion, no other Conſideration ought

to be coincident, as whether the Way be just or unjust, merciful or cruel, honourable or dishonourable; but postponing all other Respects, you are to do that which shall procure the Safety of your Country, and Preservation of its Liberty. And this is effectually imitated by the *French*, both in their Words and Deeds, whenever the Majesty of their Prince, or the Interest of their Country is at Stake. For there is nothing they bear with less Patience, than to hear a Man say such a Thing is dishonourable for their King; for they believe their King uncapable of Dishonour, be his Counsels, or his Fortune what they will; because whether he wins or loses, or whatever is done, all makes for the King.

CHAP. XLII.

That forc'd Promises are not binding.

THE Consuls being returning to *Rome*, with their Army disarmed, and a Scandal upon them for the dishonourable Conditions to which they had submitted; the first who spake against the keeping them, was *S. Posthumius* the Consul, who persuaded the Senate that only himself, and those who accepted them, were obliged thereby; and that they did not extend to the People of *Rome*; wherefore if the People of *Rome* would be never so exact, the most that could be expected from them, would be but to deliver up him, and all those who had engaged themselves into the Hands of the *Samnites*; and this he maintained with so much Obstinacy and Zeal, that the Senate was convinced, and sent him and the rest back Prisoners to the *Samnites*, with a Protestation against the Peace, as not extending to them; and Fortune was so favourable to *Posthumius* in the Business, that the *Samnites* not retaining him, he return'd to *Rome*, and was in greater Reputation there after his Loss, than *Pontius* was among the *Samnites* after his Victory. And here there are Two Things more particularly remarkable: One is, That there is no Action but is capable of producing Honour and Renown; in Victory there is nothing more frequent: In Loss, it is possible, by making it appear that it came not by your Fault; or else by doing some Action presently after, that may recompense and repair it. The other is, That it is not scandalous to break such Promises as are extorted by Force. For in Promises relating to the Publick, if they be obtained by Force, when the Force ceases, the Promise ceaseth with it, and may be neglected without any Disgrace. Of this all History is full of Examples, and there is not a Day but presents us with new: For as we see Princes make no Conscience of performing any Thing they are obliged to by Force, especially if the Force be removed; so they are as little tender of their Promises in other Things, when the Cause which press'd them to promise is taken away: Which whether commendable or not in a Prince, or binding or not binding, I shall not determine in this Place, having spoken of it so largely in my Treatise called, *The Prince*.

CHAP. XLIII.

Those who were born in the same Countrey, retain almost the same Nature thorough all the Variety of Times.

WIse Men were wont to say, (and perhaps not unworthily,) That he who would know what will be, must consider what has been already; because there is nothing in the World now, nor will be hereafter, but what has, and will have Conformity with the Productions of former Times: And the reason is, because proceeding from Men who have, and have had always the same Passions, they must necessarily have the same Effects. 'Tis true indeed their Actions are sometimes better and more virtuous in this Province, than in that, and in that more than in another, according to the Difference of their Education, for from the manner of their Breeding People take the first Rudiments of their Conversation; and it makes it more easy to conjecture future Events by what is passed, when we see some Nations retaining their Humours and Peculiarities a long Time. So one Nation has been always covetous, another fraudulent; and so on the other Side, one has been constantly famous for one Virtue, and another for another. He who peruses the Passages of old in our very City of *Florence*, and compares them with our modern, will find that it has been all along exposed to the Avarice, Pride, Cruelty, and Falshood of the *Germans* and *French*:

French. Every one knows how unfaithfully we have been dealt withal: How often *Charles* VIII. of *France* received our Money, and promiſed to reſtore the Citadels at *Piſa*; but never perform'd; which was a great Inſtance of his Infidelity and Avarice. But to waive ſuch recent Examples, every one knows what happened in the War betwixt the *Florentines*, and the *Viſconti* Dukes of *Milan*. The *Florentines* being deſtitute of other Expedients, reſolved to bring the Emperor into *Italy*, to fall upon *Lombardy* with all his Power and Reputation. The Emperor engaged to bring a great Army into *Italy*, to make War upon the *Viſconti*, and to defend *Florence* againſt them, upon Condition the *Florentines* pay'd him 100000 Ducats by Way of Advance, and as much more when they came into *Italy*. The *Florentines* agreed, paid their firſt Money down, and the reſt when they enter'd *Italy*; yet when he had marched as far as *Verona*, he turned back without doing any Thing, complaining of the *Florentines* for want of Performance: So that had not *Florence* been under ſome extraordinary Neceſſity or Paſſion, or had they ever read and conſidered the ancient Cuſtoms of thoſe Nations, they would never have been ſo often over-reached, ſeeing they have been always alike, and uſed the ſame Practices in all Places, with all People. Thus they ſerved the *Tuſcans* of old, who having been many times over-power'd and routed, and diſperſed by the *Romans*, and finding their own Force unable to defend them, they articulated with the *French* on this Side of the *Alps*, to give them a Sum of Money, for which the *French* were to join their Forces with the *Tuſcans*, and march with them againſt the *Romans*: But when the *French* had got their Money, they refuſed to perform the Conditions on their Part, alledging, That they received it not to make War upon the *Romans*, but to forbear infeſting them themſelves: By which Infidelity and Avarice in the *French*, the poor *Tuſcans* were at once defeated both of their Money and Aſſiſtance. From whence we may conclude, that the *Tuſcans* were formerly of the ſame Nature as now, and eſpecially the *Florentines*; and the *French*, and other foreign Nations, had always the ſame Inclination to deceive them.

CHAP. XLIV.

Confidence and Boldneſs does many times obtain that which would never be compaſſed by ordinary Means.

THE *Samnites* were invaded by the *Romans*, and their Army ſo weak, it durſt not meet them in the Field: Whereupon it was reſolved, That all their Gariſons ſhould be reinforced, and with the reſt of their Troops they ſhould paſs into *Tuſcany* (which was then at Peace with the *Romans*) and try if they could tempt them to take up Arms, and break their Peace; and in the *Harangue* which was made by the *Samnites* to the *Tuſcans* to remonſtrate upon what Occaſion they had taken up Arms themſelves, they had this Expreſſion, *Rebellaſſe quod pax ſervientibus gravior, quam liberis bellum.* They had *rebelled, becauſe Peace was more inſupportable in Servitude, than War to Men that are free.* And ſo partly by Perſuaſions, and partly by the Preſence of their Army, they prevailed with them to take Arms againſt the *Romans*, which they had refuſed to their Ambaſſadors before. From whence it is to be obſerved, that when a Prince deſires to obtain any Thing of another, (if Occaſion permits) he ought not to give him Time to conſider, but is to act ſo as he may ſee a Neceſſity upon him of reſolving immediately; and this is done, when the Perſon to whom the Demand is made, ſees that in either denying it abſolutely, or delaying his Anſwer, he runs a manifeſt Danger. This Way was uſed very handſomely in our Days by Pope *Julius* with the *French*; and Monſieur *de Foix* (the King of *France*'s General) againſt the Marquis of *Mantoua*. Pope *Julius* reſolving to drive the Family of the *Bentivogli* out of *Bolonia*; and judging that to do it, he ſhould have need of the Aſſiſtance of the *French*, and that it would be convenient the *Venetians* ſhould ſtand Neuter: To this Purpoſe, he ſent Ambaſſadors to them both, but could get nothing but uncertain and ambiguous Anſwers; wherefore to ſurprize them, and bring them that Way to his Lure whether they would or no, he got what Forces he could together, and marched directly to *Bolonia*, ſent to the *Venetians*, to let them know he expected they ſhould ſtand Neuter; and to the *French*, to ſend him Supplies: Both of them finding themſelves under a Neceſſity of anſwering immediately, and that there was no Time allowed to conſider, fearing the Diſpleaſure and Indignation of his Holineſs, they both of them complied; the *Venetian* did not meddle, and the *French* ſent him Aſſiſtance. Monſieur *de Foix* being another Time with his Army in *Bolonia*, and underſtanding the Defection of *Breſcia*, he reſolved to go immediately and endea-

endeavour to reduce it. There were but Two Ways that he could poſſibly paſs; one was thorough the Dominions of his Maſter, but that was tedious and about; the other was a ſhorter Cut, thorough the Territories of the Marquis of *Mantoua*; but then he was not only to force his Way thorough that Country, but he was to paſs certain Sluces betwixt Fens and Lakes (with which that Country abounds) and that was not to be done without great Difficulty, in reſpect of ſeveral Forts which were upon them, and all well guarded by the Marquis: However, *de Foiz* reſolved upon the ſhorteſt, in Spite of the Difficulty; and that the Marquis might have no Time to deliberate, he marched with his Army, and at the ſame Moment ſent a Meſſenger to the Marquis for the Keys of ſuch Caſtles as ſtood in his Paſſage; and the Marquis ſurprized with the Suddenneſs and Confidence of the Demand, ſent them immediately, which he would never have done had they been more modeſtly deſired; the Marquis being in League with the *Venetian* and *Pope*, in whoſe Hands he had likewiſe a Son at that Time; all which, had he had Time to have conſidered, would have been very laudable Reaſons to have denied it: But being preſs'd of a ſudden, he ſent them (as is ſaid before:) Juſt ſo it was betwixt the *Tuſcans*, and the *Samnites*; the Preſence of the *Samnian* Army having forced them to take Arms, which they had refuſed before, and had ſcarcely done then, had they had Liberty to have advis'd.

CHAP. XLV.

Whether in a Battel it is beſt to give or receive the Charge.

Decius and *Fabius*, Two *Roman* Conſuls, were in the Field with Two Armies againſt the *Samnites* and *Tuſcans*; and being come to a Battel, it is obſervable that they took Two ſeveral Ways in the manner of their Fighting, and it is worth our Enquiry which of them was the beſt. *Decius* charged the Enemy with all imaginable Fury, and engaged his whole Army at once: *Fabius* received the Charge, and (judging that Way the moſt ſafe) reſerved his Effort till the laſt, when (as we ſay) the Enemy had ſpent their Fire, and the Heat of their Fury was over. By the Succeſs of the Battel it appeared, that the Deſign of *Fabius* was better than that of *Decius*, who tired with the Vehemence of his firſt Charge, and ſeeing his Men engaged farther among the Enemy, than otherwiſe they would have been, to gain that Honour by his Death, which he could not hope for by the Victory, in Imitation of his Father, he ſacrificed himſelf for the *Roman* Legions. Which when *Fabius* underſtood, that he might not gain leſs Honour by Living, than his Colleague ſhould do by his Death, he advanced with his Reſerves, and charg'd the Enemy ſo briskly, that he overthrew them, and gained a happy and moſt memorable Victory. By which it appears, that the Way of *Fabius* was more imitable and ſecure.

CHAP. XLVI.

How it comes to paſs, that in a City the ſame Family retains the ſame Manners and Cuſtoms a long Time.

IT appears that not only one City has its Manners and Inſtitutions different; and produces Men more auſtere or effeminate than the reſt; but in the ſame City Families are frequently found to have the ſame Difference. Of this there are Multitude of Examples, and particularly in *Rome*. The *Manlii* were always rigid and ſevere: The *Publicoli* benign, and Lovers of the People: The *Appii* ambitious and Enemies to the People, and ſo in ſeveral other Families they had their peculiar Qualities that diſcriminated them from the reſt; which cannot proceed barely from their Extraction and Blood (for that muſt of Neceſſity have been altered by the Variety of their Marriages) but rather from the Diverſity of their Education, in the ſeveral Families; for it is a great Matter when a Man is acculſtomed to hear well or ill of any Thing from his Infancy; and makes ſuch an Impreſſion in him, that from thence he many Times regulates his Converſation as long as he lives; and if this were not ſo, it would have been impoſſible that all the *Appii* ſhould have been agitated by the ſame Paſſion and Ambition, as *Livy* obſerved in moſt of them; and particularly in one of the laſt, who being made *Cenſor*, and to depoſite his Office at the Expiration of 18 Months according to Law, refuſed it abſolutely (though his Colleague reſigned) inſiſting upon an

old Law made by the *Censors* to continue their Magistracy for Five Years: And though there were many Meetings, and great Contention and Tumult about this; yet in Spite both of Senate and People he could not be brought to deposite. And he who reads the Oration which he made against *P. Sempronius* the Tribune of the People, will discern the Insolence of that Family, and the Bounty and Humanity of several other Citizens expressed by their Obedience to the Laws, and their Affection to their Country.

CHAP. XLVII.

A good Citizen is to forget all private Injury, when in Competition with his Love to his Country.

Manlius the Consul being employed in the Wars against the *Samnites*, received a Wound that disabled him for executing his Charge; upon which the Senate thought fit to send *Papirius Cursor* the Dictator to supply his Place, and the Dictator being by the Laws to be nominated by *Fabius*, who was then with his Army in *Tuscany*, they were fearful (in respect of an old Quarrel betwixt them) that *Fabius* would not name him. Whereupon the Senate dispatched Two Ambassadors toward him, to intreat that (laying aside all private Animosity) he would name *Cursor* for Dictator, which *Fabius* did out of Love to his Country; though by his Sullenness and Silence, and several other Signs he signified his Reluctancy, and that that Election went against the Hair: From hence therefore all good Citizens are to take Example, and learn to prefer the publick Good, before any private Quarrel of their own.

CHAP. XLVIII.

When an Enemy commits any grand Fault, 'tis to be suspected for a Fraud.

Fulvius being left Lieutenant of the *Roman* Army in *Tuscany*, upon the Consuls going to *Rome* to be present at some Ceremony, the *Tuscans* to draw him into a Trap, laid an Ambuscade for him not far from his Camp; and having disguised some of their Soldiers in the Habit of Shepherds, they caused them to drive certain Cattel within Sight of the *Romans*; and the Shepherds were so exact in their Obedience, that they come up to their very Stoccadoes: The Lieutenant wondered at their Confidence; and the Unreasonableness of the Thing gave him Occasion to suspect; whereupon he found out a Way to discover the Fraud, and frustrate the whole Plot. From whence we may observe, that a General is not to presume upon any gross Error that his Enemy commits; because it is not rational to believe he would be so sottish and inconsiderate, were there not some Stratagem at the Bottom; yet many Times Men are so blinded with Desire of Victory, that they see nothing but what makes for themselves. The *French* having overthrown the *Romans* not far from the *Allia*, and pursuing them to *Rome*, found the Gates open, and without any Guards to defend them: They apprehended it a Design, and stood drawn up all that Day, and the next Night, without daring to enter, not imagining the *Romans* could have been so abject and imprudent as to have abandoned their Country. In the Year 1508. when the *Florentines* besieged *Pisa*, *Alfonso del Mutolo*, a considerable Citizen of that Town, being Prisoner in the Camp, promised that if they would give him his Liberty, he would deliver one of the Gates into their Hands; the *Florentines* believed and discharged him; but coming afterwards to negotiate more particularly with certain Commissioners deputed to that Purpose, he was so far from coming privately, that he was always accompanied with several of the *Pisans*, only when they came to treat, he desired them to withdraw. Forasmuch therefore as he came publickly, and attended by several *Pisans*, the *Florentines* had good Reason to suspect the Performance of his Promise: But the *Florentines* were so blinded with a Desire to have the City, that following the Direction of *Alfonso*, they came up to the Gate towards *Lucca*, expecting to be let in; but all Things being prepared for them, they received a great Loss, and left many of their best Officers and Soldiers behind them.

CHAP. XLIX.

A Commonwealth which deſires to preſerve it ſelf free, has need of new Proviſions every Day; and upon what Score Fabius *was called* Maximus.

IT falls out of Neceſſity (as has been ſaid before) that in a great City there is not a Day but ſome Accidents occur that have need to be remedied; and as they are of more or leſs Importance, ſo their Phyſician ought to be more or leſs expert. And if ſtrange and unexpected Accidents ever happened in any City, it was in *Rome:* One of which Sort, was the general Conſpiracy of the *Roman* Women againſt their Huſbands: Some had poiſoned their Huſbands already, and all the reſt had their Materials ready to do as much by theirs. Of the ſame Sort was the Conſpiracy of the *Bacchanals*, diſcovered during the Time of the *Macedonian* War, in which many Thouſands of Men and Women were engaged; which would have been very dangerous for that City, had it not been diſcovered; for the *Romans* had not a Cuſtom of puniſhing whole Multitudes when they offended. And here we cannot but admire the Fortitude, the Severity, the Magnanimity of the *Romans* in puniſhing Offenders; which (if there were nothing elſe to evince it) would be a great Teſtimony of their Virtue and Power. For ſo great was their Juſtice, they made no Scruple to execute a whole Legion, or City, at a Time: Sometimes they baniſhed Eight or Ten Thouſand Men together, with ſuch Conditions as would have been inſupportable to a ſingle Man: So it happened to thoſe who eſcaped from the Battel at *Cannas*, they baniſhed them all into *Sicily*, forbidding them to Quarter in any Town, or to commit any Diſorder. But the moſt terrible of all their Executions was the Decimation of their Armies, in which every Tenth Man was put to Death by Lot quite thorough their Army; nor for the Puniſhment of a Multitude, can any way be found more formidable; for where a Multitude tranſgreſſes, and no certain Author is known, to puniſh the whole with Death would be too ſevere; and to puniſh one Part, and excuſe another, would be unjuſt to thoſe who were puniſh'd, and encourage the other to commit the ſame Offence again. But where all are alike Guilty, to execute every Tenth Man by Lots, gives him who is to be puniſhed, occaſion to complain only of his Fortune; and makes him who eſcapes, afraid againſt the next Time. The good Women then who would have poiſon'd their Huſbands, and the Prieſts of *Bacchus*, were puniſhed as they deſerv'd; and though theſe Maladies in a Commonwealth have many times very ill Symptoms, yet they are not Mortal, becauſe there is ſtill Time enough for the Cure. But where the State is concern'd, it is otherwiſe, and Time may be wanting; and therefore if they be not ſeaſonably and prudently redreſſed, the whole Government may miſcarry. And this may be clear'd to us, by what happened in *Rome*. The *Romans* having been very free in beſtowing the Freedom and Privileges of their City upon Strangers, the Strangers grew ſo numerous by Degrees, and to have ſo great a Vote in the Councils, that the whole Government began to totter, and decline from its old to its new Inhabitants; which being obſerved by *Quintus Fabius* the *Cenſor*, he applied a Remedy in Time, by reducing all the new Citizens into Four *Tribes*; that being contracted into ſo narrow a Space, they might not have ſo malignant an Influence upon the City; and this ſo timely and ſo uſeful Expedient, was taken ſo thankfully from him by the People, that they gave him the Addition of *Maximus*, and he was called *Fabius Maximus* ever after.

THE ART OF WAR.

In Seven BOOKS.

By *NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL.*

Newly Tranſlated into *ENGLISH*; and for the Benefit of the Reader divided into

CHAPTERS.

LONDON:
Printed in the Year MDCCXX.

Printed in the Year MDCCXX.

LONDON:

CHAPTERS

Newly Translated into ENGLISH; and for

the Benefit of the Reader divided into

IN SEVEN BOOKS.

By ARCHOLAUS MACHINNET.

IN SEVEN BOOKS.

WAR.

OF

ART

THE

THE TRANSLATOR TO THE READER.

Kind READER,

IT may ſeem ſtrange to you at firſt, that I have divided the Books of Machiavel, *and diſpoſed them into Chapters, contrary to the Order of his Dialogues; but I am aſſured when you conſider my Intention, you will rather applaud than condemn me. I was always ſenſible that no Man could blame me, if I kept exactly to my Author; nevertheleſs, I thought this way more Beneficial, the length of a Diſcourſe being commonly tireſome to any Man who affects Brevity; beſides that, in all Sorts of Books, theſe kind of Breaches and Sections are very helpful to the Memory. For this Reaſon the Works of* Ariſtotle, Vitruvius *and* Pliny, *which were originally in another Method, have been reduc'd ſince into this manner of Diviſion. I have preſum'd to do the ſame in this my Tranſlation, having had more Regard to the Eaſe and Advantage of the Reader, than to the exact Order of the Author, whom I have not followed* Verbatim, *by reaſon of the Diverſity of the Languages; yet his Senſe I have obſerved as ſtrictly as would conſiſt with the Propriety of our own Language; aſſuring my ſelf that your Bounty will diſpenſe with ſome Faults, ſeeing nothing can be done ſo accurately, but will be ſubject to many.*

THE

THE PREFACE OF NICOLO MACHIAVELLI, TO Lorenzo, the Son of Philippo Strozzi, Gentleman of FLORENCE.

MANY have been, and are still of opinion, that in the whole world no two things are more incongruous and dissimilar than a Civil and a Military life; insomuch that many times when a man designs himself for a Soldier, he not only takes upon him a new Habit, but he changes his Customs, his Company, his manner of Discourse, and leaves off all ways of civil conversation; for he who would be light and nimble, and ready for the execution of all sort of violence, looks upon a civil habit as improper and cumbersome; civil customs are unsuitable to him who thinks them soft and effeminate, and inconsistent with the life he proposes; and indeed it would be undecent if a man whose business it is to look big, and hector, and fright the whole World with his Oaths and his Blasphemies, should carry himself demurely, and behave himself with the usual gentleness and complaisancy of other men; and this is it which in our days makes this opinion true: But if we consider the condition and method of old times, we shall find no two things more united, more conformable, nor more necessarily amicable than they. For all the Arts which are contrived in a City for the common good; all the courses invented to keep men in fear of God and the Laws would be useless and vain, were not force provided for their defence; which force (if well ordered) will be able to make them good, though perhaps the Laws are not so exact in themselves; for this is most certain, good Orders without Military Coertion will quickly moulder to nothing, and run to decay, like a Noble and Princely Palace that is uncovered at the top, and has nothing but the splendour and richness of its furniture to defend it from the weather. And if anciently Kingdoms and States imploy'd great industry to keep people in peace, and in the faith and fear of God; certainly in the regulation of their Military Discipline they employ'd much more; for where can ones

Country repoſe greater confidence, than in him who has promiſed to die for it? Where can there be greater inclination to Peace, than in him who is not capable of moleſtation or injury, but by War? Where can there be more fear of God, than in him, who being obnoxious to hourly dangers, has more need of his divine aſſtance? This neceſſity being well conſidered by thoſe who gave Laws to Kingdoms, and thoſe who had the Command of their Armies, was the cauſe that the life of a Soldier was in great reputation with all people, and much imitated and follow'd. But Military Diſcipline being now totally deprav'd, and degenerated from the practice of the ancients; that depravity hath been the occaſion of ſeveral ill opinions, which have brought that Diſcipline into contempt, and made all people hate and avoid the converſation of a Soldier. But conſidering with my ſelf, both from what I have ſeen and read, that it is not impoſſible to revive the diſcipline of our Anceſtors, and reduce it to its primitive excellence, I reſolved (to keep my ſelf from idleneſs) to write what I thought might be to the ſatisfaction of ſuch perſons as were ſtudious of the art of War, and lovers of Antiquity. 'Tis true, 'tis more than ordinary boldneſs to treat of this Subject, where others have been ſo ſcrupulous and wary; yet I cannot think it an error to write of what others have profeſſed and exerciſed with much more audacity and preſumption; for my faults in writing may be corrected without prejudice to any body; but thoſe faults which they commit in the execution, cannot be repair'd, but by the deſtruction and ruin of ſeveral people. Conſider then (Sir) the quality of my labours, and according to your judgment let them be approved or rejected, as you think they deſerve: I ſend them to you as a teſtimony of my gratitude, though my abilities are not in the leaſt commenſurate with the greatneſs of your favours: Beſides, it being the cuſtom to addreſs things of this nature to perſons that are Illuſtrious for their Birth, Wealth, Parts, or Generoſity; I knew you had not many equals in your Nobility and Fortune, fewer in your Parts; but in Generoſity and Liberality, none at all.

THE

THE ART OF WAR, IN Seven BOOKS.

LIBER I.

CHAP. I.

How the Seigneur Fabritio Colonna, being refreshing himself one evening with some other Gentlemen in a beautiful Garden, took occasion to enter upon this discourse of War.

Seeing I am of opinion, that after a man is dead, it is lawful for any body to commend him without danger of reproof, (because there can be no occasion nor suspicion of flattery) I shall make no difficulty to speak something in praise of our renowned and true friend *Cosimo Rucellia*, whose name I cannot remember without tears in my eyes, having known in him all the good qualities, which one good Friend or good Citizen would desire in another; for I know not any thing so dear to him, that he would not have sacrific'd for his friend; nor any thing so dreadful, that he would not have undertaken for his Country: and I confess freely among all with whom I have had any acquaintance and conversation, I do not know any man whose heart was more disposed to great and magnificent things. At his death nothing troubled him so much, (as he complained often to his friends) as that he should die young, and in his own house, without honour, or the satisfaction of having been serviceable to any man as he desir'd, for he was sensible that no more could be said of him than that he died a good friend. However it follows not but we, who were acquainted with him, may bear testimony of his virtues and good qualities, seeing there is nothing left of his works or actions to recommend him to the World: and yet fortune was not so much his enemy but she suffered him to leave a short monument of the dexterity of his wit, which appears in certain Sonnets, and amorous Verses of his composition; in which way (though he was not amorous) he entertained himself at idle times in his youth, till his Stars had conducted him to higher thoughts; by which Verses it may easily be discerned with what comelineſs and felicity he could have expressed his conceptions, and how honourable he would have made himself by his Poetry, had he made it his business. But fortune having depriv'd us of such a friend, it seems to me that no better remedy can be apply'd, than for us (as far as is possible) to make as much of his memory as we can, and recollect such of his sayings, or arguments, as were either witty or solid. And because there is nothing of him more fresh than the discourse which he had lately with *Fabritio Colonna* in his Garden, (where the said *Fabritio* gave a large account of all the mysteries of War on the one side, and *Cosimo* proposed, and objected, and argued with as much gravity on the other) being then present by accident with other of our friends, I have thought fit to put in writing, that by reading it, such of *Cosimo*'s friends as were there, may renew the memory

of his Virtues; ſuch as were not there, may be troubled for their abſence, and learn ſeveral things profitable, not only for military, but civil converſation.

I ſay then, *Fabritio Colonna* returning from *Lombardy*, where for a long time he had done very honourable ſervice for the King of *Spain*, paſſing by *Florence* to repoſe himſelf ſome time in that City, viſit the Duke, and enjoy the company of certain Gentlemen with whom he had had a former acquaintance, *Coſimo* held himſelf obliged to invite him to his Gardens, not ſo much to ſhew his own liberality and magnificence, as to have further opportunity of diſcourſing with him, and informing himſelf of ſuch things as might be expected from a perſon of his experience, and ſpending a whole day in diſcourſing of what might be to the ſatisfaction of his mind. *Fabritio* accepted his invitation, came to his houſe, and was entertained very nobly by *Coſimo*, with ſeveral other of his more particular friends, as *Zanobi Buondelmonti*, *Battiſta dalla Palla*, *Luigi Alamanni* and others, all of them young Gentlemen, his intimate friends, and ardently ſtudious of the ſame things: of whoſe qualifications I ſay nothing in this place, becauſe being ſtill living, their own actions do recommend them every hour of the day.

Fabritio was regaled with as much pomp and magnificence, as were conſiſtent with the time and the place: but dinner being ended, the tables taken away, and all the formalities of the Feaſt over, which among perſons of great minds, whoſe thoughts are employ'd upon more honourable things, are not ſo tedious as with other people, the day being long, and heat exceſſive, *Coſimo* thought it convenient for the better ſatisfaction of his deſigns, under pretence of avoiding the heat, to carry *Fabritio* into a cloſe and ſhady Arbour in the Garden, where they might diſcourſe with more leiſure and privacy; and having brought him and the reſt of the Company to the place, ſome of them diſpoſed themſelves upon the graſs, (which was very pleaſant and green) and others upon ſeats under the ſhadow of thoſe lofty trees; *Fabritio* began to applaud the delightſomeneſs of the place, and then looking particularly upon the trees, and not knowing of ſome of them, he ſtood ſtill, as it were in ſuſpence; which being obſerved by *Coſimo*, he told him, 'tis poſſible, Sir, you may not be acquainted with thoſe trees, but 'tis no wonder, for ſome of them were in more requeſt with our Fore-fathers than they are with us, and having told him their names, and what delight *Signor Bernardo* his Grand-father took in planting, *Fabritio* replied, I thought they were as you ſay; but the pleaſantneſs of this place, and the innocence of that employment puts me in mind of ſome Princes in the Kingdom of *Naples*, who delighted themſelves exceedingly in thoſe kind of diverſions, and would plant and make delicate Arbours to keep themſelves from the heat: and thereupon breaking off ſhort in his diſcourſe, he ſtood ſtill for a while, as in ſome ſerious ſuſpence, but preſently he told them, if I thought I ſhould not misbehave my ſelf, (which among my friends I ſuppoſe is not eaſy) I would give you my opinion of it, not to traduce or calumnate them, but for diſcourſe ſake, and to paſs away the time; for doubtleſs thoſe princes (under correction) had done much better to have imitated their Anceſtors in great and heroick, rather than in ſoft and effeminate things; to have followed their examples in the heat of the Sun, rather than to have retir'd and withdrawn themſelves into the coolneſs of a ſhade; and rather to have perſonated their Fore-fathers in what was ſolid and perfect, than in what was delicate and corrupt: for ſince theſe kind of entertainments have been pleaſing to our Countrymen, our Country has gone to ruin, and all things declined.

Coſimo. You have opened a way to a diſcourſe which I deſire exceedingly, and therefore I beg of you that you would ſpeak of it frankly, without reſpect to any body, ſeeing I intend to interrogate you with the ſame freedom; and if in my demands and replies I excuſe or accuſe any man, it will not be barely to excuſe or accuſe him, but to underſtand the truth

Fabritio. I ſhall be well pleaſed to inform you of any thing I know, and ſhall leave it to your diſcretion to judge whether what I ſay be true or falſe, expecting to learn as much from your demands, as you will do from my anſwers; for a wiſe queſtion makes a man conſider many things which perhaps he regarded not before; and underſtand others, which without interrogation he had never underſtood.

Coſimo. I will return to what you firſt ſaid, that my Grand-father and your Fore-fathers would have done more prudently to have imitated their Anceſtors in difficult and generous things, rather than in what was delicate and ſoft; and in this I would excuſe my part, and leave the other to be defended by you. I am of opinion that there was not a man in his time who deteſted all kind of effeminacy more than he, and who was a greater lover of that kind of activity and vigour which you ſo much commend; nevertheleſs he found that he could not make uſe of it either in his own perſon, or in the perſons of his Children, being born in ſo corrupt an age, that a man who ſhould have deviated from the

common

common practice of those times, would have made himself contemptible to every body. For if a man in the heat of Summer should have lain basking upon the sands, or in the midst of Winter should have taken up his quarters in the snow, (as *Diogenes* did) he would have been thought a fool, or a madman: should a man have followed the *Spartan* way, brought up his children in some cottage, taught them to sleep in the fields, to run about bare-foot and bare-headed, wash in cold water to inure them to hardship, and by making them less fond of life, to make them less sensible of death, he would have been despised for his pains, and have been thought rather a brute than a man. Again should a man have been observed to starve his own carcass, and to live only upon beans and pease, and such kind of pulse, and have made as small account of mony as *Fabritius* did of what was offered him by the *Samnites*, 'tis possible he might have been commended by some few, but he should have been followed by no body: being discouraged therefore by the practice of the present age, he follow'd not the example of his Ancestors exactly, but followed them as much as he could, with as little notice and admiration to the World.

Fabritio. You have excused your Grandfather very handsomely on that particular, and what you have said is doubtesly true; but I did not speak so much of that hard and rustick way of living, as of other ways that are more soft and effeminate, have greater conformity and correspondence with our present times, and are (in my judgment) easily to be introduced by any man who has the government of affairs: and in my discourse of this matter I shall not need to straggle into other Countries for examples, for the *Romans* (my own Countrymen) will furnish me abundantly; whose Practices, and order of Government, if well considered, will not be found so impossible to be introduced in any other City where there is but the least spark of virtue and goodness.

Cosimo. What are those things that you would introduce according to the example of our Ancestors?

Fabritio. To honour and reward virtue; not to despise poverty; to value order, and discipline of war; to constrain Citizens to love one another; to live without factions; to postpone all private interest to the publick; and several other things that may easily accommodate with our times; and these things are not difficult to be introduced, provided it be done deliberately and by right means, because in them the truth is so manifest and apparent, that the commonest capacity may apprehend it. He therefore who orders his affairs in this manner, plants himself trees which will afford him a happier and more pleasant shelter and protection than these.

Cosimo. I will not reply to what you have said, but referring it to the discretion of the company, (who can easily judge of it) I shall address my discourse to you, who seem to find fault with all those who in their great and weighty affairs do not follow the examples of our Ancestors, supposing thereby I may be more easily satisfy'd in my intention. I would know therefore how it comes to pass, that on one side you condemn all those who do not imitate the practice of our Ancestors; and yet on the other, in your wars (which is your profession and excellence) it does not appear that you have made use of any thing of the ancient method and discipline, or done any thing that resembled it.

Fabritio. You are now come to the point where I expected you, and indeed my discourse deserved, and I my self desired no other demand. And though I might save my self the labour, with a very plausible excuse, yet I will satisfy both your desire and my own, and that the more largely, because both time and place concurs to our convenience. Men who are desirous to do any great action, are first to prepare themselves with all diligence and industry, that when occasion is offered, they may be ready to execute and compleat it. And because where those preparations are made cautiously, they are not to be discovered; no man is to be accused of negligence, unless occasion discovers him first, to which if he be remiss, and makes not use of his time to execute his design, it gives us to understand, that either he is not prepar'd as he ought to have been, or that he had not thought of it at all: and therefore no occasion having presented it self to me to discover the preparations which I had made to reduce our Militia into the form of the ancients; if I have not yet reduced it, I conceive I cannot justly be condemned, either by you or any body else: and this I think is a sufficient answer to your accusation.

Cosimo. It would be sufficient indeed, could I be assured that you never had any occasion.

Fabritio. But because I find you may doubt whether ever such occasion were offered or not, I am content to discourse more largely (upon condition you will have the patience to hear me) what preparations are necessary to be made; what occasion is necessary to be had; what difficulties obstruct our preparatives, and hinder our occasion; and how this is easy and hard to fall out at the same time, which seems a contradiction.

Cosimo.

Cosmo. You cannot do me and the whole company a greater favour, and if it will be no trouble to you to enlarge it will be none to us to attend. But because the discourse is like to be long, I desire I may have the assistance of my friends, yet with your licence and permission; wherefore they and I do make it our request, that you would not take it amiss if we interrupt you sometimes with some importune demand.

Fabritio. I am very well contented, that you *Cosmo* and these young Gentlemen your friends, ask any thing of me, because I believe the heat of your youth makes you inclinable to arms, and by consequence more apt to give credit to what I shall say: and these other Gentlemen shall have the same liberty, because their grey heads and their cold bloods, makes them commonly enemies to warfare, and incorrigible, as people possessed with an opinion that all is out of time, now the ill customs, which constrain men to live at that rate. Question me then freely, as you please; 'tis the thing I desire, because I shall hereby have some respite and repose; and withal, the satisfaction of clearing your doubts, and leaving nothing unanswered in your minds.

CHAP. II.

A person of honour and condition is not to make War his profession.

Fabritio. I Will begin my discourse with what you said, that in matter of War (which is my profession) I never made use of any thing of the ancients. To which I answer, that War being a profession by which men cannot live honourable at all times, it is not to be taken up as a trade, unless it be by a Common-wealth, or a Kingdom; and if they be well constituted, they will neither of them suffer any of their Citizens or Subjects, or any other good man to make it his business; for he will never be thought a good man who takes upon him an employment, by which if he would reap any profit at any time, he is obliged to be false, and rapacious, and cruel, and to entertain several other qualities that are not consistent in a good man; nor can any man (great or small) who makes war his profession, be otherwise than vicious; because that trade being not to be followed in time of peace, they are necessitated either to prevent or obstruct peace; or in time of war to provide for themselves, that they may subsist in time of peace; and neither of those two ways are practicable to an honest man; for from the desire of providing for themselves against the evil day, when the wars should be ended, proceed the robberies, and thefts, and murders, which are committed daily by such kind of people, and that upon their friends as well as enemies. And from the desire of obstructing the peace, proceed all the frauds and jugling which the Officers use with those who pay them, and all to continue the War; but if by accident peace be concluded contrary to their endeavours and design, it is to be fear'd that the officers finding them destitute of pay, and their old liberty and licentiousness, will get together such Soldiers of fortune as have nothing to subsist upon, and falling into some Province, plunder and rifle it without any compassion. Do you not remember that here in *Italy* we had several of these disbanded Soldiers, which got together when the wars were done, called themselves the *Companies*, and went up and down ransacking Towns, and pillaging the Country, and all without remedy? Have you not read how after the first *Carthaginian* War, disbanded Soldiers united under the command of *Matho* and *Spendius*, (two of their Officers) and in a tumultuous manner made a more dangerous War upon the *Carthaginians*, than that which they had had with the *Romans*: In the days of our Predecessors, *Francis Sforza* not only betray'd the *Milanois* who had made him their General, but usurped upon their liberty, and made himself their Prince; and for what, but that he might live in the same splendor when the Peace was concluded. And all the rest of the great Officers in *Italy* were like him, (especially if War was their profession); and though *de facto* they did not all make themselves Dukes of *Milan* by their treachery, they were the more to be blamed, because without the temptation of so great advantage their lives and exorbitances were as bad. The Father of *Francis Sforza* being in the Service of Queen *Jane*, constrained her to cast her self into the protection of the King of *Arragon*, having deserted her on a sudden, and left her disarm'd in the midst of her enemies, and all to satiate his ambition, to satisfy his revenge, or to have got her Kingdom for himself. *Braccio* with the same industry endeavour'd to possess himself of the Kingdom of *Naples*, and had he not been defeated and slain at *Aquila*, he had certainly effected it; and these confusions proceeded from nothing else but from the employing of such men as were mercenary,

sary, and had nothing to subsist upon but their pay? Have you not a Proverb which confirms what I say, and tells us, that *Want makes Thieves, and Peace brings them to the Gallows*; the reason is, for that those persons who have no other way of livelihood, nor so much temper and ingenuity as to take to any other course that may honestly sustain them, are forced by necessity to rob upon the high-ways, and then justice is forced to dispatch them.

Cosmo. You have represented this trade and profession of a Soldier so vile and contemptible, that to me it seems now to be worse than none at all, whereas before I thought it one of the most noble and excellent things in the World: so that unless you satisfy me better, I shall never be contented; for if it be so as you say, I cannot imagine how it should come to pass, that *Cæsar*, and *Pompey*, and *Scipio*, and *Marcellus*, and so many other great Captains of the *Romans* should become so famous as to be worshipped like Gods.

Fabritio. I have not yet thoroughly examined those two things which I proposed in the beginning; one is, that a good man cannot take up that calling as his profession: the other is, that no well constituted Government (whether Common-wealth or Kingdom) will suffer its Subjects or Citizens to make War their whole business. To the first I have spoke what I thought fit; it remains now that I speak to the second, in which I shall have occasion to reply to your last demand.

A

CHAP. III.

How a Common-wealth ought not (in prudence) to permit any of its Citizens to make War their profession.

Fabritio. TOuching the *Romans* which you mentioned, it is true *Pompey* and *Cæsar*, and most of the great Captains who were at *Rome* after the last *Carthaginian* War, arriv'd at great reputation, but it was rather as brave and generous, than good and virtuous men; whereas those who were before them, were famous as much for their virtue as conduct, and the reason was, because these made not War their profession, and the others did.

Whilst the *Roman* Common-wealth was incorrupt and immaculate, there never was any Citizen who presumed by means of this profession to make his own fortune or party in time of Peace; by breaking the Laws, exacting upon the Provinces, usurping and tyrannizing over his Country, and using all means to make himself rich. No man of inferior condition ever thought of violating his Oaths; maintaining of Parties; disrespecting the Senate; or promoting of tumults, or any tyrannical sedition, with design of making himself a fortune by the profession of Arms. But those who had the command of their Armies, contented with their triumphs, returned joyfully to their private Affairs; and the Officers who were under them laid down their Arms with more alacrity than they had taken them up; every man returning to his former course of life, without any hopes of advancing himself by plunder and rapine. And of this we have strong and evident cause of conjecture from the example of *Regulus Atilius*, who being General of the *Roman* Armies in *Africa*, and having in a manner conquered the *Carthaginians*, desired leave of the Senate to return, that he might look to a Farm of his in the Country which his servants had neglected. From whence it is as clear as the day, that had he made War his profession, or designed to have rais'd his own fortune out of the ruins of other people, having so many provinces at his mercy, he would never have been so careful of the improvement of a Cottage, when every day would have brought him in more than his whole Patrimony was worth. But because good men, and such as are not desirous to make a trade of War, are unwilling to reap any other fruit therefrom but labour, and danger, and glory; when they are arrived at a sufficient proportion of the latter, 'tis their ambition to return quietly to their houses, and live upon their old professions in Peace. As to the common and private Soldiers, it's clear they were of the same humour, and declin'd any such profession; for though when they were at home, they desired many of them to be in the wars, yet when they were in the wars, they were as willing to be dismissed. This is manifest by several arguments, but especially by the privilege which the *Romans* granted to their Citizens, that none of them should be constrained to the wars against his own inclination. So that *Rome* whilst it was well governed (which was till the time of the *Gracchi*) had never any Soldier who made it his profession to be so, by which means few of them were dissolute, and those who were, were punished severely. A City then well constituted

and

and governed, is to take care that this Art of War be used in time of Peace only as an exercise, and in time of War only for necessity, and the acquisition of glory; leaving the constant practice and profession of it to the State, as the *Romans* did anciently to the Common-wealth of *Rome*. That Citizen who has any other design in the profession of Arms, let him be what he will, is no honest man; and that City which is governed any other way, is as much in the wrong.

Cosmo. I am very well satisfied with what you have said hitherto, and do acquiesce in your conclusion as far as it relates to a Common-wealth; but as to Kings I am apt to dissent, because I am apt to think it convenient a King should have those about him who make Arms their profession.

CHAP. IV.

That a King ought not to permit his Subjects to make Arms their profession, for the mischiefs which do frequently ensue.

Fabritio. A Kingdom well governed ought the more carefully avoid people of that condition, because it is they who debauch their King by being the only Ministers of his Tyranny. And do not object to me any of our present Kingdoms; for I shall deny absolutely that they are as well governed as formerly, when Kings had no Soveraignty, nor absolute Power, but in the Armies, because there (and no where else) there is a necessity of speedy resolutions, and that such a power should be reposed in a single person; in other cases they ought to do nothing without their Counsel, and it is to be the particular care of all who are of Counsel to a Prince, to keep off such persons from about him as promote War in time of Peace, because they cannot frame themselves to any other way of subsistance. But I will discourse something more largely of this matter, not standing so much upon a Kingdom that is perfectly good according to the model of the Ancients, but supposing such a one as is like the Kingdoms of our days; in which likewise a King ought to be fearful of such as live wholly by War, because the nerves and strength of all Armies lies certainly in the Infantry.

Wherefore if a King orders his matters so ill, that his foot be not content to return to their several callings in time of Peace, and live as formerly by their labour, he must necessarily be ruined; for of all the Soldiers in the world none are so dangerous as those who make War their profession; and the reason is, because you must be always at War, or keep them always in pay; otherwise you will run a great hazard of being turn'd out of your Kingdom; and because it is impossible either to maintain War perpetually, or keep them in continual pay, you will be in great danger of being driven out of your Kingdom. My Countrymen the *Romans* (as I said before) whilst they were wise, and honest, never suffered their Citizens to make that exercise their calling, though in respect of their perpetual Wars, they were able to have paid them perpetually: But to avoid the inconveniencies which might follow thereupon, seeing the condition of their times did not alter, they alter'd their Men, ordering their affairs in such a manner, that every fifteen years their Legions were renewed, and filled up again with young men in the flower of their age; that is to say, betwixt eighteen and thirty five years of age; during which time their legs, their hands, and their eyes do correspond one with the other, and are in the same disposition; for they did not keep them till their strength and vigour decay'd, and their forwardness and insolence increased, as they did afterwards when the times were more corrupt.

For *Octavian* first, and afterwards *Tiberius* (preferring their private power before the profit of the publick) began to disarm the people, (that thereby they might have them more easily at command) and to keep standing Armies upon the Frontiers of their Empire. But because they thought them insufficient to curb the people, and awe the Senate of *Rome*, they established another Army (which they called the *Pretorian*) which was quartered always about the City, and intended as a guard. But when afterwards the Emperors permitted them who were listed in those Bands, to lay aside all other professions, and devote themselves to War, they grew insolent immediately, and became not only terrible to the Senate, but pernicious to the Emperor; insomuch that many of them were put to death by the fury and insolence of those Soldiers, who created and disposed their Emperors as they pleased; and sometimes it fell out that at the same time several Emperors were created by the several Armies, which occasion'd the division first, and by degrees the destruction of the Empire. Those Kings therefore who are desirous to live in safety

and

and peace, ought to have their Armies compoſed of ſuch perſons, as when there is a neceſſity of War, will take up Arms freely for the defence of their Country; and when Peace is concluded, will as readily acquieſce, and return to their old habitations and callings; which may eaſily be done, if they make their Levies of ſuch men as have profeſſions before. A King is likewiſe (upon the publication of Peace) to command his Generals and great Officers to their reſpective charges and governments elſewhere; the Reformades and Gentlemen to their own Houſes and Eſtates; and the common Soldiers to their Original Trades and Occupations. And by the election of ſuch men, they ſhall ſtudy hourly to procure Peace, but never diſturb Peace to create a War.

Coſimo. I muſt confeſs your Diſcourſe to me ſeems very conſiderable; yet being ſo contrary to what I fancy'd before, my mind is not ſo well ſatisfy'd but there remains ſome doubt behind, which is ſtill to be clear'd: for I obſerve ſeveral Lords and Gentlemen, who in time of Peace, maintain themſelves wholly by the profeſſion of Arms; as ſeveral great Commanders of your acquaintance and quality, who are in pay under ſeveral Princes and States; beſides, moſt of the men at Arms are continued in pay for the guard and ſecurity of ſuch Cities and Caſtles as are requiſite to be kept; ſo that in my judgment, there is employment enough for them all in time of Peace.

Fabritio. I do not believe that you can think that in time of Peace there is entertainment for them all, for if no other reaſon was to be alledg'd, the meaneſs of the numbers requir'd to the furniſhing the Garriſons, would be ſufficient to refute it. What proportion is there betwixt the Bodies of Foot which are to be raiſed for carrying on a War, and thoſe which are requir'd for ſupplying the Garriſons in time of Peace? for thoſe Cities and Caſtles which in time of Peace are kept with a few men, are reinforc'd with great numbers in time of War; beſides which, great Levies are made for the Field Armies, which upon the concluſion of Peace are conſtantly diſbanded. And as to ſuch as are retain'd in the nature of Guards to the State, Pope *Julius* and you have demonſtrated how much more are to be apprehended, who will not entertain any other vocation but War, having turned them out of your Guards for their Inſolence, and entertained Natives in their places, as people born and brought up under Laws, and choſen by the Community by a more regular election; ſo that tell me no more there is employment for them all in times of Peace. As to the men at Arms, and their being continued in pay in times of peace, the anſwer I confeſs is more difficult; yet upon cloſer examination it will not be found impoſſible, becauſe this cuſtom of keeping men at Arms in pay is corrupt, and inconvenient; the reaſon is, for that they are people who having no other Vocations, are occaſions of daily diſorders in the State, eſpecially where their numbers are great; but where they are not ſo numerous as to make an Army of themſelves, the danger of them is ſo much the leſs. Yet many times they have done miſchief enough, as I have ſaid before in the caſes of *Francis Sforza*, his Father and *Braccio da Perugia*. So that I cannot approve this cuſtom of keeping men at Arms in conſtant pay, having ſeen ſo much experience of their corruptions, and the inconvenience which has follow'd thereupon.

Coſimo. Would you have no ſuch Forces in pay at all? or if you would have them, how would you have them entertained?

Fabritio. Not as the men at Arms in *France*, for they are as dangerous and inſolent as ours; but rather according to the method of the ancients, who raiſed their Cavalry out of their own Subjects, whom they ſent home again to their houſes when Peace was concluded, to follow their old Callings, as ſhall be ſhewn more largely before we end our diſcourſe; ſo that if theſe kind of Soldiers do now (even in times of Peace) receive pay, and live under that profeſſion, it proceeds from corruption in their cuſtoms. And as to the Penſions which I and my fellow Officers receive, I ſay that that alſo is a corrupt cuſtom; for a wiſe and well-order'd Government ought not to entertain any ſuch Penſioners, but is rather to employ their own Citizens for Generals in time of War, and when that is done, diſmiſs them to their own private Affairs. And with a wiſe King it is the ſame; he is either to give no ſuch Penſions at all, or if he does, it ought to be in recompence of ſome ſignal exploit, or to oblige ſome excellent perſon in time of Peace as well as War. And becauſe you have inſtanced in me, I am content to ſtand for an example; and therefore I ſay I never made War my profeſſion. My buſineſs is to govern my ſubjects, to defend them, to prefer Peace, but yet to know how to manage my ſelf in War; and if I have received honour or reward from the King, it is not for my underſtanding or experience in War, ſo much as for my integrity and counſel in times of Peace. A wiſe prince ought not therefore to have any about him, but ſuch as are ſo conſtituted; for if they be too zealous either for Peace or for War, they will draw him into inconvenience. This (according to my propoſition at firſt) I could not but ſay as to the firſt point; if it be inſufficient, you muſt apply your ſelf elſewhere for farther

satisfaction. But by what is said, you may perceive the difficulty of reviving the customs of the Ancients in our present Wars: What preparations are requisite to be made by any man that is wise, and what opportunities are to be expected to bring them to perfection; but you will understand them better if your patience will give me leave to discourse them from point to point, and compare all the customs of the ancients, with the particular practices of our times.

Cosimo. If we desired at first to hear you discourse of these things, certainly what you have discoursed already, has much encreased our desire; wherefore as we give you thanks for what you have done, so we do earnestly beg of you that you would proceed to the remainder.

CHAP. V.

In what Countries the best Soldiers are to be rais'd.

Fabritio. SEEing you are hitherto so well pleased, I will deduce my discourse of this matter from the fountain, that thereby you may comprehend it the better, and I be enabled to demonstrate it more copiously. When War is resolved, every man's chief business is to put himself into a condition of giving the Enemy Battle, and fighting him fairly in the field. To enable himself for this, it is necessary to raise an Army; to raise an Army, there is a necessity of men, of arming them, disciplining them, exercising them, (and that in great as well as small bodies) of teaching them to encamp, and acquainting them with the Enemy by degrees, either by frequent facing or confronting him, or by encamping somewhere near his march, where they may have the prospect of his Army as he passes by. In this the whole address and industry of a Campania or field War consists, which doubtless is more necessary and honourable than any other; and he who understands well how to draw up an Army, and present his Enemy Battle, may be excused for all his other errors in the management of the War; but if he be ignorant or defective in that, tho' in other things he be sufficient enough, yet he shall never bring his War to any honourable conclusion. For win a Battle, and you cancel all your former miscarriages; lose one, and all that ever you did well before evaporates, and comes to nothing.

It being so necessary then to find men, the first thing to be done, is to know how to make our choice, (which the ancients called *Delectus*, and we *Levies*,) of which I shall give you some light.

They who have given us rules of the management of War, have recommended to us to make our Levies in temperate regions, that our Soldiers may be both valiant and cunning: For hot Countries are observed to produce wise and subtle people, but not couragious; cold Countries on the other side do afford stout men, and hardy, but then they are seldom discreet. This rule was proper enough for a Prince that was Monarch of the whole world, and might make his Levies where he pleas'd. But to give a rule that all may follow, I must needs say that all Common-wealths, or Kingdoms, are to make their Levies in their own Countries, whether hot or cold, or temperate, it's the same thing; because by ancient experience we find that in any Country, Exercise and Discipline makes good Soldiers; for where Nature is defective, industry will supply; and in this case it's the better of the two. And indeed to raise men in other Countries cannot be call'd properly a *delectus*, for *delectum habere* is to pick and cull the best men in a Province, and to have power to choose those who are unwilling as well as those who are willing to the War; which kind of *delectus* cannot be made exactly but in your own dominion; for in countries belonging to another Prince, you must be contented with such as are willing, it being not to be expected that you should have liberty to choose as you please.

Cosimo. Yet among those who are willing, you may pick and choose, take and leave, what you think good, and therefore it is not so improper to call that a *delectus*.

Fabritio. You are in the right as to one way; but if you consider the secret defects of such an Election, you will find that in strictness it is not an Election; and that for these following reasons. First, those who are not your Subjects, but are willing to the Wars, are none of the best, but generally the lewdest and most dissolute persons in the Province; for if any be scandalous, idle, incorrigible, irreligious, disobedient to their Parents, Blasphemers, Cheats, and altogether ill-bred, they are those who are most likely to list themselves for the War, and there is nothing so contrary to good and true discipline, as such kind of humours: When of such kind of Cattle you have more offer themselves, than the number you design to entertain, you may take your choice indeed, but the whole mass being

ing

ing bad, your choice can never be good. But many times it falls out, that there being not so many of them as you have occasion to employ, you are glad to take all, and in that case you cannot be said *habere delectum* so properly, as *milites conscribere*: And of such kind of disorderly people, the Armies of *Italy* and most other places do consist at this day; only in *Germany* it is otherwise, because there no man is press'd or listed barely upon the Emperor's command, but as he stands willing and disposed to the Wars himself; you may judge then what part of the ancient discipline of the *Romans* can be introduced into an Army made up of such a medly of wickedness.

Cosimo. What way is to be taken?

Fabritio. That which I recommended before, which is to choose out of your own Subjects, and to exercise your authority in your choice.

Cosimo. If your election be made in that manner, can any ancient form be introduced?

Fabritio. You know it may, if it be in a Kingdom, and he who command be their Prince, or lawful Soveraign; and if in a Common-wealth it is the same, so he be a great Citizen, and made General for that time, otherwise it is no easy matter to do any thing that shall succeed.

Cosimo. Why Sir?

Fabritio. I shall tell you that hereafter; at present this may suffice, that no good is to be done any other way.

Cosimo. Well then, these Levies being to be made in your own Territory, is it best to make them in the Cities or Country?

CHAP. VI.

Whether it be best to choose you Men out of the Cities or Country.

Fabritio. THose Authors who have writ any thing of this Nature, do agree unanimously, that the best choice is in the Country, where they are inur'd to difficulty and labour; acquainted more with the Sun than the Shade, accustomed to the Spade and the Plough, and to carry burdens, without any shifting or mutiny. But because our Armies do consist of Horse as well as Foot, my advice is, that the Horse be raised in the Cities, and the Foot in the Country.

Cosimo. Of what age would you choose them?

Fabritio. Were I to raise a new Army, I would choose them betwixt seventeen and forty; were I only to recruit an old one, I would have them always of seventeen.

Cosimo. I do not well understand your distinction.

Fabritio. I will tell you, were I to raise an Army, or settle a Militia where there was none before, it would be necessary to make choice of the most apt and experienced that I could find (provided their age was suitable to the War) to instruct them as I shall direct. But if I were to raise men to recruit and reinforce an Army that was grown weak, I would take none above seventeen, because those who are there already will be able to teach them.

Cosimo. You would order your Militia then, as our's is order'd with us.

Fabritio. You say well; but I would Arm, and Officer, and Exercise, and Order them in a way I know not whether you be acquainted with in your Country.

Cosimo. Then you are for Train'd Soldiers.

Fabritio. Why would you have me blame them?

Cosimo. Because several wise men have always condemn'd them.

Fabritio. I think you are in a mistake to say a wise man can be against training of Soldiers: a man may be thought wise, ('tis possible) and be no such thing.

Cosimo. The ill success which those Trained-bands have always had, is a great argument of the truth of that opinion.

Fabritio. Have a care the fault was not more in you, than in them; of which perhaps you may be convinced before I have done my discourse.

Cosimo. You will do us a very great favour. But I will tell you first, in what it is this Militia is condemn'd, that you may afterwards justify it the better.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Inconvenience and Convenience of Train'd-Bands, or a Settled Militia.

Cosimo. IT is objected, that either they are inexperienced and useless, and then to rely upon them is to ruin the State. Or else they are ready and skilful, and strong, and then, he who has the command of them may do what he pleases. They instance in the *Romans*, who lost their liberty by these kind of men. They instance likewise in the *Venetian*, and the King of *France*; the first of which makes use only of foreign Arms, lest some time or other, they should fall under the subjection of some of their Citizens; and the latter has disarmed his Subjects, with the more ease to keep them under command. But those who are against these Train'd Bands, are more fearful when they are raw and inexperienced, than otherwise; and to this purpose they give two considerable reasons. One is, because they are unskilful, and the other is, because they are unwilling; and they say, that people any thing in years never learn any thing well, and a man never does good when he is forced to the Wars.

Fabritio. The reasons which you have alledged, are produced only by persons who understand things at a distance, as I shall demonstrate plainly. And first as to their unserviceableness, I say, there are no Soldiers more useful than ones own Subjects, and no Subjects can be order'd a better way. And this being clear and indisputable, I will not spend time in proving it farther, because I have the concurrence of all ancient History to confirm it. As to the inexperience and force wherewith they are charged, I say (and it is true) that inexperience makes a man cowardly, and force makes a man mutinous; but courage and experience both are infused into them by arming, and exercising, and accommodating them well, as shall be shewn in my following discourse. But as to the point of force, you must know that such persons as are raised by the command of a Prince, are neither to be altogether press'd, nor altogether Voluntiers; because to have them altogether Voluntiers, would be to incur the inconveniences which I have mentioned before; it would not be a fair election, and there would be very few go along with you; and wholly to force them, would be as dangerous on the other side: therefore a middle way is to be taken, neither too forcible on the one side, nor too frank on the other, but such a one as may tempt them to the War out of their respect to their Prince, whose displeasure they fear above all other punishments; such a course as this, tempered so cunningly betwixt fair means and foul, cannot be dangerous, nor produce that discontent and mutiny which occasions so much mischief. I do not say, that an army so chosen and exercised, is absolutely invincible, for the *Roman* Armies were many times overcome, and *Hannibal*'s Army was defeated; wherefore an Army cannot be so order'd and disciplin'd, that one may promise himself it shall never be broken. The wise men therefore, of whom you speak, are not to calculate the uselessness of an Army, from the loss of one Battle, but are rather to believe that having miscarried once, they will be more cautious afterwards, and do something (as occasion offers) to expiate their disgrace: and if the business should be thorowly examined, it would not be found to be the defect of the form so much, as want of perfection in their Order. And this (as I said before) is to be provided against, not by blaming or exploding the way of train'd men, but by improving and correcting it where it shall be found amiss; and how that is done, I will shew you particularly. As to your doubt that such an order of Soldiers, meeting with an Officer equally disposed, may usurp upon you, and turn you out of your Government; I answer, that Arms put orderly and legally into the hands of Citizens or Subjects never did, or will do any harm. And Cities are kept longer innocent and incorrupt with those, than any other forces; nay, than they are commonly without them. *Rome* had its Citizens in Arms four hundred years together, and yet kept its liberty intire; *Sparta* preserved its liberty 800 years in the same posture; several Cities have been disarmed, and kept their liberties: but how long? Not forty years any of them, and the reason is, because great Cities have occasion for Soldiers, and when they have none of their own, they are forced to entertain Strangers, which commonly do much more mischief than their own, for they are more easily debauched, and a popular Citizen may more easily corrupt and employ them as Instruments of Usurpation and Tyranny, when they have nothing but naked and unarmed people to destroy. Besides, a City ought in reason to be more fearful of two Enemies than one. For in entertaining of Strangers, a City is to have an eye over her Mercenaries and her Natives; and to prove that this jealousy is natural and reasonable, remember what I said before of *Francis Sforsa*; whereas a City which employs only her own inhabitants, fears no body else. But to use one

reason

reaſon for all, let me tell you, no man ever eſtabliſhed a Common-wealth, or Kingdom, who did not believe that the inhabitants (if arm'd) would be willing to defend it.

And had the *Venetians* been as wiſe in this, as other Counſels, they would have ſet up a new Monarchy in the World; and they are the more inexcuſable they have not, becauſe their firſt Legiſlators put arms into their hands, and gave them ability to defend themſelves. But their territory being little at land, they employ'd their arms only at Sea, where they performed many great things, to the enlargement of their Country. But in proceſs of time, being forced to take arms by land for the relief of *Vicenza*, they entertained the Marquiſs of *Mantoua* into their ſervice, and made him their General; whereas they ſhould rather have committed that charge to one of their own Citizens, and ſent him to have engaged the enemy at land. This unhappy reſolution was that which clip'd the wings of their ſucceſs, and kept them from extending their Empire; if they did it out of an opinion that their experience was not ſo great in Land as in Sea Affairs, their diffidence was imprudent; for a Sea-Captain accuſtomed to the conflicts of the Winds, and the Water, and the Elements, and the Enemy, ſhall ſooner make a good Land-Officer, where he has nothing to fight with but men; than a Land-Officer ſhall make a good Captain at Sea. My Countrymen the *Romans*, who were ſo knowing at Land, being at wars with the *Carthagenian* that was ſo potent at Sea, never troubled themſelves to entertain either *Grecian* or *Spaniard* into their ſervice, though they were both ſo good Soldiers at Sea, but they committed that charge to their Land-Officers, who fought the *Carthagenians* and beat them. If the *Venetians* did it to prevent the uſurpation of any of their fellow Citizens, I think it was an unneceſſary fear; for (beſides the reaſons aforeſaid) if a Citizen with his Sea-forces never made himſelf Maſter of any Sea-Town, he could have done it much leſs with any Land-force. So that hence it may be ſeen that it is not putting the Citizens in arms, that is the cauſe of tyranny; but ill order, and ill management in the Government; for whilſt good order is preſerved, there is no danger of their being arm'd, wherefore their reſolution in that point being imprudent, has robb'd them of much reputation and happineſs. As to the King of *France*'s error in not keeping his ſubjects in diſcipline, and prepared for the Wars, which is by you urged for an example, there is no body (laying aſide his private paſſion) but muſt conclude that ſingle neglect to be a great weakneſs to his Kingdom.

But my digreſſion has been too great, and perhaps beyond my deſign; yet I have done it the more willingly, to demonſtrate to you that foreign force is not to be relied upon ſo much as ones own Subjects; nor can ones own ſubjects be prepared and adapted for the Wars any way ſo well, as by training and exerciſe. Nor can there be any better way of forming an army, or eſtabliſhing a Militia in any place, than that which I have preſcribed. If you have read the orders of the firſt *Roman* Kings, eſpecially of *Servius Tullius*, you will find his orders like ours, and driving at nothing more than putting the Citizens into ſuch a poſture, that upon any emergence they might be brought ſuddenly together, and formed into an army for the defence of the City.

CHAP. VIII.

Of what Sort of People an Army is to be compoſed.

Fabritio. BUT to return to our Levies; I ſay again, that being to recruit an old Army, I would chooſe my men of about ſeventeen; but to raiſe a new one that might be made fit for ſervice in a ſhort time, I would take in any betwixt ſeventeen and forty.

Coſimo. Would you in your election make any difference of their trades?

Fabritio. Many Authors which have written on that ſubject, have made a difference of their trades, and will not allow of Falconers, Fowlers, Fiſhers, Ruffians, of any perſons who make ſports their profeſſion, or are in any manner ſubſervient to pleaſure: thoſe who they recommend to be choſen, are Labourers, Husbandmen, Smiths, Farriers, Carpenters, Butchers, Huntſmen, and the like. But for my own part, I ſhould not ſo much conſider the quality of the profeſſion, as the goodneſs of the man, and which way he may be employed with moſt advantage. For this reaſon I think your Ploughmen, and Day-labourers in the Country, are more uſeful generally than any other; for they take more pains,

pains, and do more ſervice in an Army, than all the reſt. After them are your Smiths, Farriers, Carpenters, Joyners, and ſuch people to be choſen; of which ſort it is convenient to have good ſtore, becauſe their arts are uſeful in an Army upon ſeveral occaſions: and 'tis a good thing to have Soldiers who have two ſtrings to their bow, and yield you double Advantage.

Coſimo. How are thoſe who are fit, or unfit for the Wars, to be diſtinguiſhed and known?

Fabritio. I ſhall ſpeak of the manner of chooſing a Militia to form it afterwards into an Army, becauſe we ſhall have occaſion again of ſpeaking of the election to be made upon the recruiting of an old Army. I ſay therefore that the fitneſs of a perſon to be choſen for the Wars, is to be known by experience, (in ſome great atchievement) or by conjecture.

This proof and tryal of their courage is not to be found among new raiſed men; it is neceſſary therefore, where this experience is not to be had, to have recourſe to conjecture, which is to be deduced from their age, arts, and ſtature. Of the two firſt we have ſpoken before; it remains that we ſpeak now of the third, and tell you, that ſome perſons (as *Pyrrhus*) have been altogether for large and tall men. Others (as *Ceſar*) would have them ſtrong, well knit, and vigorous, which is to be judged by the compoſition of their members, and the quickneſs of their aſpect. Wherefore thoſe who treat of that ſubject, have recommended a lively and quick eye, a nervous neck, a large breaſt, a muſculous arm, a long finger, a ſmall belly, round and firm thighs, and thin feet; this kind of contexture does always import activity and ſtrength, which in a Soldier are two things principally to be deſired. But above all, reſpect is to be had to their manners, and that they be indued with honeſty, and modeſty, otherwiſe you chooſe an inſtrument of ſcandal, and a beginning of corruption; for no body can expect, that with brutiſhneſs and diſhoneſty, any laudable virtue ſhould conſiſt. Upon this occaſion it ſeems to me not impertinent (for your better underſtanding the importance of this way of election) to let you know the manner in which the *Roman* Conſuls in the beginning of their Magiſtracy made their elections for the *Roman* Legions. In which levies (by reaſon of their continual Wars) being mix'd of new and veteran Soldiers, they could proceed in the Veterans by experience, and by conjecture in the new. You muſt know then, theſe levies were made either for preſent ſervice, or to exerciſe them firſt, and employ them afterwards as occaſion was offered. And although I have ſpoken already of what is to be obſerved in the election of ſuch as are to be diſciplin'd and employ'd afterwards, yet my intention being to ſhew how an Army may be ordered in a Country where there is no military diſcipline, and where men are not to be raiſed for immediate ſervice, I ſhall ſpeak of it further. But in thoſe Countries where it is the cuſtom to raiſe Forces by the Prince's command, there they may have them always ready for preſent ſervice, as it was anciently in *Rome*, and is among the *Swizzars* at this day. For if in theſe kind of levies there be new Soldiers, there are many which are old and experienc'd, which mingled with the new, will make a good Army. Notwithſtanding this, the Emperors (after they began to keep ſtanding Forces and Garriſons upon the Frontiers) appointed Maſters for the training and inſtructing their new men whom they call'd *Tyrones*, as may be ſeen in the life of *Maximus* the Emperor. Which cuſtom was not practiſed in the Armies whilſt *Rome* enjoy'd her liberty, but only in the city, in which thoſe military exerciſes being much uſed by the youth, it came to paſs, that being drawn out for the Wars, they were ſo well verſed and experienced in that counterfeit diſcipline, that when afterwards they came to it in earneſt, they behaved themſelves very well. But when by degrees the Emperors diſuſed or aboliſhed that cuſtom of training, they were conſtrained to theſe ways which I have ſhewn you before.

CHAP. IX.

How the Romans *rais'd their Legions.*

TO proceed therefore to the manner of the election of the *Roman* Legions, I ſay, that after the *Roman* Conſuls (in whoſe hands the adminiſtration of the War was wholly depoſited) had taken upon them the Magiſtracy, being to raiſe an Army according to cuſtom, which gave to each Conſul two Legions of the beſt men, (who were eſteemed the ſtrength and flower of their Army) they created four and twenty military Tribunes, (ſix for each Legion) and inveſted them with the ſame authority as we do our Captains. After this, they aſſembled all the *Romans* who were able

able to bear arms, and placed the Tribunes of each Legion a part; after which they drew lots in which Tribe they should begin their election, and where the lot fell, out of that Tribe they chose four of the best, and out of them four, one was chosen by the Tribunes of the first Legion; and out of the other three, one was chosen by the second Legion; and out of the remaining two, another was chosen by the third Legion; and the fourth person belonged to the fourth Legion: These four being disposed in this manner, they proceeded to the election of four more, the first of which was chosen by the Tribunes of the second Legion, the second by the Tribunes of the third, the third by the fourth, and the fourth by the first Legion. After which they had a third election; the first chose the third, the second the fourth, the third the first, and the fourth the second: and in this manner they varied their elections, till at length all the Legions became perfect and equal, and were then united. As we said before, the *Romans* had the convenience of making this election for present service, because a good part of such as were chosen, were old Soldiers, well experienc'd in their trade, and all of them well disciplin'd and train'd, so that their elections were made by experience, and conjecture both: But where an Army is to be new rais'd, and chosen, not so much for present as future service, the election in that case is to be made by conjecture only, and that from the age and person of the man.

Cosmo. I believe what you have said to be true; but before you pass to another discourse, I would be satisfied in a thing of which you put me in mind, by saying that levies to be made of such persons as have not been trained up in the wars, are to be made by conjecture; and of this I am the more curious, because I have observed in many places our Militias to be condemned, and especially as to our numbers; for many are of opinion a less number were better, in respect that the fewer there were, the better they would be taught, and by consequence the elections would be better, the confusion less, and they would be more capable of reward, (which is that which keeps them content) and to be sure be under better command. I would know therefore your opinion, whether you are for a great number or a small, and what measures you would take in your elections both of the one and the other.

CHAP. X.

Whether it is best for a Militia to consist of a great Number or a small.

Fabr. SEEing it is your desire to be satisfied, which is best, a great number or a small; without doubt a great number is best, and not only more necessary, but (to speak frankly) a compleat and perfect Militia is not to be had in any place where there is not great plenty of men; and as to your observation in other places, it is easily refuted. For first, the smallness of your number does not better your soldiers, (where plenty is to be had, as in *Tuscany*) nor mend your election; because men being to judge by experience, in that country few people would be found whose experience would recommend them; forasmuch as few of them have been actually in the wars; and of those few, fewer have given such testimony of themselves as to deserve to be chosen before the rest; so that he who makes his election in such places, is to lay aside his experience, and to choose by way of conjecture. Other people therefore being in this perplexity, I would know, if twenty young persons of good aspects were brought before me, by what rules or method I was to choose or reject. I do not doubt but every man would confess the best way to take, and arm, and exercise them all, (it being impossible to judge till then which will be the best) and to reserve your election, till having all had the same exercise and instruction, it be easy to discern which is most vigorous, and likely to do service: so that upon the whole, to desire but few in this case, that your election may be better, is without question an error. As to the objection of being less inconvenience to the Country, and to the People, I answer, that a Militia (be it as little or imperfect as it may) is no prejudice to either. Because it takes away no man from his employments; obliges no man from his business; for to appear only on idle days to exercise, is rather a recreation to the People, and advantage to the Country, than otherwise. Whereas if they had no such divertisement, young men would be apt on those days to run out into some debauchery or extravagance, which would be much worse than those innocent recreations, which being a handsome spectacle, gives great entertainments to young people.

Whereas

Whereas it is alledged that a less number is easier paid, and by consequence kept in better order and obedience; I answer, that no Levies can be made of so few, as that they will be paid always to their satisfaction. For example, a Militia is to be establish'd of five thousand foot: To pay them to their content would require at least 1000 Ducats a month. First, 5000 Foot is not a competent Army, and 1000 Ducats a month would be insupportable to a State, and yet insufficient to satisfy them, or to oblige them to any extraordinary enterprise. So that in so doing, your expence would be great, your force but small, and unable to defend you, much less to make any vigorous attack. If you encrease their pay, or their number, it would be the more impossible to pay them: if you gave them less, or lifted less, they would be so much the more dissatisfied and unserviceable.

They therefore who talk of raising Soldiers, and paying them whilst they are not in service, talk ridiculously, end of things either impossible or useless. 'Tis true, when they are to be raised for immediate Service, they are always to be paid; yet if in times of Peace, they be the occasion of any disorder or inconvenience, (which I cannot believe) the advantages of a well-disciplin'd and ready Militia does abundantly recompence it, for where there is no such force, there is nothing secure.

I conclude then, That he who would have a small number to pay, shou'd the better, or for any other of your reasons, is mightily ignorant. For though it agrees with my opinion, that let your number be what it will, it will be still upon your hands, (by the many accidents that are not possible to be avoided) yet a small number would quickly dwindle to nothing. Besides, a great number is of more real service and reputation. To this it may be added, That if in order to the exercising, you select a few persons in Countries where you intend to be Lords, they are so remote, and at such distance from one another, that you cannot bring them to a Rendezvous without great inconvenience, and without exercising, Militias are useless, as shall be shewn in due place.

Cosmo. You have satisfy'd me as to my former demand, but I desire you would resolve me another doubt; and that is, whether such great numbers do not produce more confusion and disorder in the Country?

Fabritio. That opinion is as idle as the other, and for the reasons I shall give.

CHAP. XI.

How the Inconveniencies which follow great Armies may be prevented.

Fabritio. Those who are designed for the Wars, may occasion disorder two ways, either among themselves, or with other people; but the remedy is easy, though their discipline should not prevent it. (for as to quarrels and mutinies among themselves, discipline will obviate them) If the Country where your Levies are to be made, be so weak, that they have no Arms among them, or so unanimously united among themselves, that they have no head, this Order and Militia will make them more fierce and courageous against Strangers, without any impediment to their unity. For men who are well disciplin'd, are as tender of breaking the Laws when they are armed, as much as when they are disarmed; nor can they be any ways altered, unless the Officers which you set over them debauch them, and which way that is to be done, I shall shew you presently. But if the Country where your Levies are to be made, are in Arms, and disunited, this way will be sufficient to unite them; for though they had Arms and Officers of their own before, yet they were such Arms as were useless in War, and such Officers as rather bred and provoked mutinies, than prevented or suppress'd them. And the reason is, because in those Countries as soon as a man is offended, he repairs immediately to the head of his party, who to maintain his own reputation, encourages him to revenge; whereas a publick General proceeds quite contrary. So then by this way Seditions are prevented, Unity established, Provinces united (but weak) continue their union, and are freed of their weakness: Provinces disunited and mutinous are reconciled and composed, and their ferocity which was employ'd formerly in disorders, is employ'd now to the Advantage of the publick. As to the provision that is to be made that they injure not other people, it is to be considered that that is not to be done, but by the fault of their Officers; and to prevent the Officers from occasioning such disorders, it is necessary that care be taken that they do not usurp too great an authority over their Soldiers, which authority is to be gained too ways, either by nature or accident; the way by nature, is to be prevented by providing that he who

who is born in a place, be never put to command the Forces raiſed in the ſame place, but be put at the head of ſuch Troops as are raiſed in other Countries, with whom he has no natural converſe. As to the accidental way, things are to be ſo ordered, that the Commanders in chief be changed every year; for the continuation of a command over the ſame men, contracts ſuch a friendſhip and intimacy betwixt them, as is many times perverted to the prejudice of the Prince. Which changes, how uſeful they have been to thoſe who have uſed them, and how much the omiſſion of them have been prejudicial to other people, may be obſerved by the example of the Kingdom of *Aſſyria*, and the Empire of the *Romans*; for that Kingdom continued a thouſand years without Tumult or Civil War, which proceeded from the annual changing of the Officers of the Army. And in the *Roman* Empire, after *Julius Cæſar* was killed, all the Civil Wars and Conſpiracies which happened betwixt the Officers and the Emperors, proceeded from nothing but holding the Officers continually in command. And if any of the firſt Emperors, or thoſe who rul'd afterwards with any reputation, (as *Adrianus*, *Marcus*, *Severus* and the like) had had the providence to have introduced that cuſtom into their Armies, without doubt their Empire would have been more quiet and durable; for their Generals would not have had ſo much opportunity to rebel, the Emperors would not have had ſo much occaſion to fear, and the Senate (in default of ſucceſſion) having more authority in the Election of a new Emperor, would undoubtedly have choſen better. But ill cuſtoms (either thorough the ignorance or inadvertency of mankind) are not to be eradicated by examples either good or bad.

Coſimo. I fear my demands have drawn you from your intended diſcourſe, for from ſpeaking of Levies and Militias, and ſuch things, we are got clear upon another Subject; ſo that had I not excuſed my ſelf before, I ſhould think I deſerved reprehenſion.

Fabritio. Let not that trouble you, all that we have ſaid is pertinent enough; for being to treat in the way of Militias (which is condemned by many people) and I to defend it, 'twas convenient that we ſhould begin with the way of Election; and firſt as to the Cavalry.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Cavalry.

Fab. THE Cavalry anciently was raiſed out of the richeſt and moſt conſiderable of the City, but with reſpect to the age, and quality of the perſon. Of theſe there were only three hundred to a Legion; ſo that in each Conſular Army, the *Romans* had never above ſix hundred Horſe.

Coſimo. Would you have a ſtanding Militia of Horſe to exerciſe them at Home, and employ them afterwards in the War?

Fab. To do well, you cannot do otherwiſe, if you would have Soldiers of your own, and not rely wholly upon ſuch as make War their profeſſion.

Coſimo. How would you chooſe them?

Fab. I would imitate the *Romans*, chooſe them out of the wealthieſt, give Officers as they do at this day, and ſee them well armed, and well exerciſed.

Coſimo. Would it be well to allow them any pay?

Fab. Yes truly it would, yet it ſhou'd be no more than wou'd keep their Horſe; for otherwiſe lying continually upon them, they would become grievous to the Subject, and give them occaſion to complain of you.

Coſimo. What numbers would you have, and how would you arm them?

Fab. You are too quick, and paſs from one thing to another; I'll anſwer you to that in another place, when I have told you how the Foot are to be armed, and prepared for a Field Battle.

THE Second BOOK.

CHAP. I.

What Arms were moſt uſed by the Ancients in their Wars.

Fab. WHEN you have raiſed your men, the next thing is to furniſh them with Arms; and before you do that, I think it not amiſs to examine what Arms were moſt uſed by the Ancients, and chooſe the beſt. The *Romans* divided their Infantry into thoſe who were compleatly, and thoſe who were ſlightly armed. Thoſe who were lightly armed, were called *Velites*, under which name all were comprehended who carried Bows, and Slings, and Darts; the greateſt part of them had Caſques upon their Heads for their defence, and a kind of Buckler upon their arm. They fought in no order, and at diſtance from thoſe who were arm'd compleatly; their Arms conſiſted of a Head piece or Morrion, which came down to the Shoulders, a Brigandine down to their knees, their legs and arms were covered with Greaves and Gauntlets, a Buckler cover'd with Iron, about two yards long, and one broad, an iron ring about it without to keep off the blows, and another within to keep it from the dirt when it was laid upon the ground. Their offenſive Weapons were a Sword at their left thigh, about a yard and half long, with a Dagger on their right ſide. They carried a Dart in their hand which they call'd *Pilum*, which upon a charge they darted at the Enemy.

Theſe were the Arms with which the *Romans* conquer'd the whole World. And though ſome of their ancient Writers do give them a Spear in form of a Spit; I do not ſee how ſuch a Weapon cou'd be handled by one that carried ſuch a Buckler, for it was too heavy to be managed with one hand; beſides (unleſs it were in the Front where they had room to make uſe of them) it was impoſſible to uſe them in their ranks; for the nature of Battles is ſuch, (as I ſhall ſhew hereafter) that they do always contract and keep cloſe, as being in much leſs danger, than when they are drawn up looſer and at a diſtance: So that in that cloſe order, all Arms that are above two yards long, are not to be uſed; for having a Spear that is to be managed with both hands, if your Buckler were no hinderance, it could not hurt your Enemy when he was near. If you take it in one hand, and manage your Buckler with the other, you muſt take it in the middle, and then there will be ſo much of it behind, that they who come after you will hinder you from handling it: So that it is true, either the *Romans* had no ſuch *Haſtæ*, or if they had, they made but little uſe of them. For if you read the Hiſtory of *Titus Livius*, in the deſcription of all his Battles, you will ſcarce ever find he mentions thoſe *Haſtæ*, but tells you all along that having darted their *Pila*, they fell to the Sword. My opinion therefore is, that this *Haſta* be laid aſide, and that in imitation of the *Romans*, we make uſe of their Sword and Buckler, and other Arms, without troubling our ſelves with that.

The *Grecians* for their defence did not arm ſo heavily as the *Romans*, but for offence, they relied more upon the Spear than the Sword, eſpecially the *Macedonian Phalanx*, who carried of thoſe Javelins which they call'd *Sariſſæ*, with which they brake the Enemies Battles, and kept their own firm and entire. And tho' ſome Writers ſay that they alſo had their Bucklers, yet I know not (for the reaſons aboveſaid) how they could conſiſt. Beſides, in the Battle betwixt *Paulus Emilius* and *Perſeus* King of *Macedon*, I do not remember that mention was made of any Bucklers, but only of their *Sariſſæ*, and yet the *Romans* had much ado to overcome them. So that my opinion is, the *Macedonian* Phalanx was juſt ſuch a Body as the *Swizzers* Battalion, whoſe whole force lies in their Pike. The *Romans* were likewiſe accuſtomed to adorn their Soldiers with Plumes of Feathers in their Caps, which renders an Army beautiful to their Friends, and terrible to their Enemies.

Enemies. In the first beginning of the *Roman* Wars, their Horse used a round Shield, a Helmet upon their Heads, and all the rest of their body naked; their offensive Arms were a Sword and Javelin with a long thin spike at the end of it; and so being incumbered with Shield and Javelin, they could use neither of them well, and being unarmed, they were more exposed to the Enemy.

Afterwards they came to arm themselves like their Foot, only their Shield was a little shorter and squarer, their Launce or Javelin thicker with pikes at each end, that if by accident one of them should miscarry, the other might be serviceable. With these Arms both for Horse and Foot, my Countrymen the *Romans* went thorough the whole world, and by the greatness of their successes, 'tis likely, they were as well accounted as any Army ever was. And *Titus Livius* in many places of his History makes it credible, where comparing the Armies of the Enemies, he says, But the *Romans* for courage, fashion of their Arms, and discipline were before them all. And for that reason I have chosen to speak particularly rather of the Conquerors Arms, than the Arms of the Conquered. It follows now that I say something of the way of Arming at present.

CHAP. II.

Of the Arms which are used at present, and of the invention of the Pike.

Fabritio. THE Soldiers of our times do wear for defensive Arms, Back and Breast, and for offensive a Launce nine yards long, which they call a *Pike*, with a Sword by their side rather round than sharp. These are generally the Arms which they wear at this day; few wear Greaves and Gauntlets, and none at all Head-pieces. Those few who have no Pikes, do carry Halberts, the staff three yards long, and the head like an Axe. They have among them Musqueriers, who with their Fire Arms do the same Service which was done formerly by the Bows and Slings. This manner of arming with Pikes, was found out by the *Germans*, and particularly by the *Swizzers*, who being poor, and desirous to preserve their liberty, were and are still necessitated to contend against the ambition of the Princes of *Germany*, who are rich, and and able to entertain Horse, which the *Swizzers* are not able to do. So that their Force consisting principally in Foot, being to defend themselves against the Enemy's Horse, they were obliged to revive the old way of drawing up, and find out Arms that might defend them against them. This necessity put them upon continuing or reviving the old Orders, without which (as every wise man knows) the Foot would be useless; for which cause they make use of Pikes, not only to resist and keep off, but to attack and sometimes to disorder the Horse. And by vertue of these Arms, and these Orders, the *Germans* have assumed the confidence with 15 or 20000 of their Foot to attack a vast Body of Horse, of which 'tis not above 25 years since we had a most signal experiment; and so many great examples there are of their courage, (founded upon their Arms, and their Order,) that after *Charles* VIII's Expedition into *Italy*, all Nations made use of them, insomuch as thereby the *Spaniards* grew into great reputation.

Cosimo. Which manner of arming do you prefer, the *German*, or the ancient *Roman*?

Fabritio. The *Roman* without doubt, and I will tell you the usefulness and inconvenience of them both.

CHAP. III.

Whether the ancient or modern is the best way of Arming.

THE *German* Foot are able not only to sustain, but to beat the Cavalry; they are better for expedition, and can draw themselves up better, because not over pestered with Arms. On the other side, Foot are more exposed to wounds both at hand and at a distance. They are not so useful likewise in Storming of Towns, and are in great danger where there is vigorous resistance. But the *Romans* were so well armed, they could encounter and baffle the Horse as well as the *Germans*, and were secure against their blows by vertue of their Arms, could manage themselves better in an engagement with their Swords, than the *Germans* with their Pikes, and assault a Town

better under the ſhelter of their Targets. So that the only inconvenience was the weight of their Arms, and the trouble of carrying them along, which they eaſily ſurmounted by accuſtoming themſelves to all kind of difficulties and hardſhips; and you know cuſtom is a ſecond Nature. You muſt know likewiſe that Foot are many times to engage both againſt Horſe and Foot together, and conſider alſo that theſe kind of Soldiers would be altogether unſerviceable, and could never ſtand againſt Horſe; or if they could bear up againſt them, yet they would ſtill be afraid of the Foot, leſt they ſhould be better armed, and better ordered than they. Now if you conſider the *Romans* and *Germans* together, you will queſtionleſs diſcover that the *Germans* had much the advantage in charging and breaking a Body of Horſe, (as we ſaid before) but to engage a Body of Foot armed, and ordered like the *Romans*, they have much the diſadvantage. So that by this you ſee what advantage and diſadvantage the one has of the other; the *Romans* were able to fight Foot and Horſe both, and the *Germans* are able to deal only with Horſe.

Coſimo. I would deſire you to give us an example, that we may underſtand it the better.

Fabritio. I ſay you will find in many places of our Hiſtory, the *Roman* Foot have overcome great Bodies of Horſe, and you ſhall never find that they were overcome by Foot, by reaſon of any defect in their Arms, or any advantage which the Enemy had in theirs. For had their way of arming been found inconvenient, one of theſe two things would have followed, they would not have advanced with their Conqueſts ſo far (their Enemy being better arm'd,) or elſe they would have arm'd as the Enemy did, and left their own way; and becauſe neither the one nor the other was done, it follows probably that their way of arming was the beſt. With the *Germans* it was otherwiſe, as appears by the ill ſucceſs which they have had whenever they have been engag'd with Foot that were well ordered, and as valiant as they; which proceeded from the advantage the Enemy had of them in their Arms. *Philippo Viſconte*, Duke of *Milan*, being aſſaulted by 18000 *Swizzers*, ſent againſt them the Count *Carmignuola*, who was his General at that time. *Carmignuola* with 6000 Horſe and a few Foot, went to encounter them, and coming to an engagement, was beaten for his pains. *Carmignuola* being a wiſe man, quickly diſcover'd the advantage which the Enemy had in their Foot over his Horſe; having rallied and recruited his Army, he advanced againſt the *Swizzers* again, and when he came near them, he cauſed his Horſe to diſmount, and engaging them ſmartly in that poſture, he put them all to the Rout, and moſt of them to the Sword, only 3000 were left, who finding themſelves paſt remedy, threw down their Arms.

Coſimo. How comes that great diſadvantage?

Fabritio. I told you before, but ſince you did not regard it, I will repeat it again. The *German* Infantry have little or no defenſive Arms, and for offenſive they have the Pike and the Sword, and with theſe weapons, and in that order, they attack the Enemy. But if the Enemy be well provided for his defence (as the Cavalry were which *Carmignuola* cauſed to diſmount) and receives them in any good order, they may deal well enough with the *Swizzers* if they can but come to the Sword; for when they once get within them, the length of their Pikes make them uſeleſs, and falling then to their Sword, they have the diſadvantage of wanting defenſive Arms, with which the Enemy is provided. So that conſidering the advantage and diſadvantage on both ſides, it will appear that they who have no defenſive Arms are without remedy, if the Enemy charges but home, and paſſes their Pikes; for Battles do always advance, (as I ſhall ſhew, when I have told you the manner of drawing them up) and preſſing on perpetually, they muſt of neceſſity come ſo near as to reach one another with their Swords; and though ſome few perhaps may be killed or tumbled down with their Pikes, yet thoſe that are behind preſſing ſtill on, are ſufficient to carry the Victory; and this was the reaſon why *Carmignuola* overcame with ſo great ſlaughter of the *Swiſſes*, and ſo little of his own Army.

Coſimo. Conſidering that *Carmignuola*'s Forces were men at Arms, and (though on foot) yet armed compleatly, in my judgment it would be convenient upon any great enterprize, to arm your Foot in that manner.

Fabritio. Had you remembred what I told you before about the way of the *Romans* arming themſelves, you would not have been of that opinion: For a Foot-Soldier with a Head-piece, Breaſt-plate, Shield, his arms and his legs cover'd with Iron, is better able to defend himſelf againſt the Pikes, and break into them, than one of the men at Arms diſmounted.

I will give you a modern example. Certain Companies of *Spaniſh* Foot were tranſported out of *Sicily*, and landed in the Kingdom of *Naples*, being to ſupply *Gonſalvo*,

who

who was beſieged in *Barbaſtro* by the *French*. *Monſieur d'Aubigny* had notice of their march, and went to meet them with his men at arms, and ſome 4000 *German* foot, who preſſed upon them with their pikes, and opened the *Spaniſh* body; but by the help of their bucklers, and the agility of their bodies, having got under their pikes, and ſo near as they could come at them with their ſwords, the *Spaniards* had the day, with the ſlaughter of moſt of the *Swiſſes*. Every one knows how many of the *Swiſſes* foot were cut off at the battle of *Ravenna*, and all upon the ſame account, the *Spaniſh* foot having got to them with their ſwords, and had cut them certainly in pieces, had they not been reſcued by the *French* horſe: and yet the *Spaniards*, drawing themſelves into a cloſe Order, ſecured themſelves. I conclude therefore, a good Infantry ought to be able not only to ſuſtain the horſe, but to encounter the foot, which (as I have ſaid many times before) is to be done by being well arm'd and well order'd.

Coſimo. Tell me therefore, I beſeech you, how they would have them arm'd.

CHAP. IV.

How Foot ſhould be arm'd, and of the Force and Convenience of Men at Arms.

Fabritio. I Would take both of the *Roman* and *German* arms, and half my men ſhould be arm'd with the one, and half with the other; for if in 6000 foot (as I ſhall explain to you hereafter) I ſhould have 3000 with bucklers like the *Romans*, 2000 pikes, and 1000 muſquets like the *Swiſs*; I think I ſhould do well enough; for I would place my pikes either in my front, or wherever I ſuſpected the Enemy's Horſe might make any impreſſion; my bucklers and ſwords ſhould ſecond my pikes, and be very conducing to the Victory, as I ſhall demonſtrate. So that I think an Infantry thus ordered would be too hard for any other.

Coſimo. What you have ſaid about the Foot, is ſufficient. I pray let us now hear what you judge of the Horſe, and which way of equipping them is the beſt, the ancient or modern.

Fabritio. I think the preſent way is the beſt, in reſpect of the great ſaddles and ſtirrups, (which were not in uſe among the ancients) and make men ſit ſtronger and firmer upon their Horſe. I think our way of arming now is more ſecure, and a body of our horſe will make a greater impreſſion than a body of the old. Yet I am of opinion that Cavalry are not to be more eſteemed now than of old, becauſe (as I have ſaid) they have in our days been oft worſted by the foot, and ſo they always will be, if the foot be arm'd and order'd as above-ſaid. *Tigranes*, King of *Armenia*, came into the field againſt the *Roman* Army, under the command of *Lucullus*, with 150000 horſe, many of them arm'd like our men at arms, (which they called *Cataphracti*,) the *Romans* conſiſting only of 6000 horſe, and 15000 foot. Whereupon, in contempt of their number, when *Tigranes* ſaw them, he ſaid, *That they were liker the Train of an Embaſſador than an Army.* Nevertheleſs when they came to fight, he was beaten; and he who writes the ſtory, blames the *Cataphracti*, and declares them unſerviceable; for (ſays he) having Beavers over their faces, they cannot ſo well ſee how to offend the Enemy, and being laden with arms, if by accident their horſe be killed, or throws them upon the ground, they cannot get up again, nor help themſelves in any manner. I ſay then, that Nation or kingdom which prefers their horſe to their foot, ſhall always be weak, and in danger of ruin, as *Italy* has experimented in our time, having been expoſed to ruin and depredation by ſtrangers, for want of foot, which has been very much neglected, and all the Soldiers ſet on horſe-back. Not but it is good to have horſe too, yet not to make them the ſtrength of their Army, but ſufficient to ſecond the foot; for they are of great uſe for ſcouting, making inroads into the Enemy's Country, raiſing Contributions, infeſting the Enemy, and cutting off Convoys and Supplies of Proviſions; nevertheleſs when they come to a Field-Fight, which is the main importance of a War, and the very end for which Armies are raiſed, they are not ſo ſerviceable as foot, though indeed in a rout they are better to purſue.

Coſimo. I cannot concur with you in this, for two reaſons, one is, the *Parthians* uſed nothing but horſe, and yet they had their ſhare of the World as well as the *Romans*; and the other is, becauſe I cannot ſee which way the Cavalry can be ſuſtained by the Foot, and from whence proceeds the ſtrength of the one, and the weakneſs of the other.

Fabritio. I think I have told you, or elſe I will tell you now, that my diſcourſe of military Affairs ſhall extend no farther than *Europe*. Being intended no farther, I do

not

not think my self obliged to give a reason for their customs in *Asia*, yet this I may say, that the *Parthian* discipline was quite contrary to the *Roman*; for the *Parthians* fought always on horseback in confusion and disorder, which is a way of fighting very uncertain. The *Romans* fought generally on foot, in close and firm order, and they overcame one another variously, as the place where they fought was open, or streight: in streight places the *Romans* had the better; in champain, the *Parthians*, who were able to do great things in respect of the Country which they were to defend, it being very large, a thousand miles from the Sea, not a River sometimes within two or three days march, and Towns and Inhabitants very thin. So that an Army like the *Roman*, pester'd and incumber'd with their arms, and their order, could not pass thorough the Country without great loss, by reason the strength of the Enemy consisted in horse which were nimble, here to day, and to morrow fifty miles off. And this may be a reason why the *Parthians* prevailed with their horse, ruin'd the Army of *Crassus*, and put *Marc Anthony* into so much danger. But as I said before, my intention is not to speak any thing of the Armies out of *Europe*, and therefore I shall insist only upon the *Romans*, the *Grecians*, and the *Germans*.

CHAP. V.

The difference betwixt Men at Arms and Foot, and upon which we are most to rely.

Fabritio. WE come now to your other demand, in which you desire to understand to what order, or what natural virtue it is that makes the foot better than the horse.

I say in the first place, horse cannot march in all Countries as foot can; they are not so ready to obey orders when there is any sudden occasion to change them: for when they are upon their march, if there be occasion to wheel, or face about, to advance, or stop, or retreat, they cannot do it with that dexterity as the foot. Upon any rout or disorder, horse cannot rally so well, (though perhaps they are not pursu'd) which is not so with the foot.

Again, it is frequently seen, a brave and a daring man may be upon a bad horse, and a coward upon a good; and that inequality is the occasion of many disorders. Nor let any one think strange that a body of foot can sustain the fury of the horse, because an horse is a sensible creature, and being apprehensive of danger, is not easily brought into it. And if it be considered what forces them on, and what forces them off, it will be found that that which keeps them off, is greater than that which pricks them on; for that which puts them forward is but a spur, whilst that which keeps them off, is a pike or a sword. So that it has been many times seen both by ancient and modern expetience, that a body of foot are secure, and insuperable by horse. If you object, that coming on galloping to the charge, makes the horse rush furiously upon the Enemy, and to be less careful of the pike than the spur. I answer, that though a horse be in his career, when he sees the pikes, he will stop of himself; and when he feels them prick, he will stop short; and when you press him on, will turn either on the one side or the other: and if you have a mind to make the experiment, try if you can to run a horse against a wall, and you shall find very few that will do it. *Cæsar*, when he was in *France*, being to fight a battle with the *Swizzers*, caused all his horse to dismount, and send their horses away, as being fitter to fly than to fight upon. But though horse are naturally subject to these impediments, he who commands the foot is to march such ways as are likely to be most difficult for horse, and he shall scarce come into a Country but such ways are to be found. If you march over mountainous and hilly places, the very situation will secure you against the fury of the horse; if your march be in a plain, you will seldom march any where but you will have plow'd fields, or hedges, or woods to secure you: for every ditch, every bank, how inconsiderable soever, takes off from the fury of the horse, and every plow'd field or vineyard retards them. And if you come to a battle, it will be the same as in a march; for every small accident that happens to a horse, dismays him, and takes off his courage. However, I will not omit to tell you one thing, that the *Romans* trusted so much to their orders and arms, that had it been in their power to have chosen a place that had been steep, and convenient to secure them against horse, (though they had not been able to draw themselves up) or an open place (more obnoxious to the horse) where they might put themselves handsomely in Battalia, they chose always the last, and rejected the first.

But

But it being time to come now to their manner of exercise, having arm'd our foot according to the ancient and modern way, let us see what exercise the *Romans* gave them before they brought them to a Battle.

CHAP. VI.

How the Soldiers were exercis'd.

THough they be never so well chosen, and never so well arm'd, Soldiers are carefully to be exercis'd, for without exercise they are good for nothing. And this exercise ought to be three-fold; one is to inure them to labour and hardship, and make them dexterous and nimble; another to teach them how to handle their arms; and the third to teach them to keep their ranks and orders in their marches, battles and encampments: which are three great things in an Army. For if an Army marches, is drawn up well, and encamps regularly and skilfully, the General shall gain reputation, let the success be as it will. Wherefore all ancient Common-wealths provided particularly for these exercises by their Customs and Laws, so that nothing of that nature was omitted. They exercised their youth to learn them to be nimble in running, active to leap, strong to throw the bar, and to wrestle, which are all necessary qualities in a Soldier, for running and nimbleness fits them for possessing a place before the enemy, to fall upon them on a sudden in their quarters, and pursue with more execution in a rout: activity makes them with more ease avoid their blows, leap a ditch, or climb a bank; and strength makes them carry their arms better, strike better, and endure the shock better: and above all to inure them to labour, they accustom'd their Soldiers to carry great weights, which custom is very necessary; for in great expeditions it happens many times that Soldiers are forced to carry (besides their arms) several days provisions, which without being accustomed to labour, would be more tedious to them; and by this, great dangers are many times avoided, and great victories many times obtained. As to their way of accustoming them to their arms, they did it in this manner. They made their young men wear head-pieces twice as heavy as those which they were to wear in the field, and instead of Swords, they gave Cudgels with lead run into them, much heavier than their Swords. They caused each of them to fix a pale into the ground three yards high, and fasten it so strong that no blows might be able to batter or shake it: against which pale or stake the youth were accustomed to exercise themselves with their cudgel or buckler, as it had been an Enemy; striking it sometimes as it were on the head, sometimes on the face, then on the sides, legs, before and behind; sometimes retreating, and then advancing again: and by this way of exercise they made themselves dexterous and skilful how to defend themselves, and offend an enemy. And for the heavinesss of their counterfeit arms, they did it to make the true ones appear more light. The *Romans* taught their Soldiers rather to thrust than to cut with their swords, because thrusts are more mortal, more hard to be defended; and he that makes it is not so easily discovered, and is readier to double his thrust than his blow. Do not admire that the ancients concerned themselves in such little things, for when people come to handy strokes, every small advantage is of great importance; and this is not my own opinion only, but is taught by many Authors. The ancients thought nothing more beneficial in a Common-wealth, than to have store of men well exercis'd in arms; for 'tis not the Splendor of their gemms, nor their gold, that makes the enemy run, but the fear of their arms.

The faults which one commits in other things may be repaired, but those which are committed in war are never to be redressed; besides, experience in this kind makes men more audacious and bold, for no man fears to do that which he thinks he understands: the ancients therefore would have their Citizens exercise themselves in all military actions, and made them cast darts (much heavier than the true ones) against their pales: which besides that it taught them dexterity, it was a great strengthener of their arm. They brought up their youth likewise to the bow and the sling, in all which exercises they were profess'd Masters; so that when afterwards they were drawn out to the wars, they were perfect Soldiers both in courage and discipline; nor were they defective in any thing but keeping their ranks in their marches, and receiving orders in their fights; which was quickly learn'd by mixing them with such as had serv'd a long time.

Cosimo. What exercises would you recommend at present?

Fabritio.

Fabritio. Several of thoſe which I have mention'd, as running, leaping, throwing the bar, accuſtoming them to heavy arms; teaching them to ſhoot in the croſs, and long bow, and muſquet, which is a new engine, (as you know) but very good. And to theſe exerciſes I would accuſtom all the youth in my Country, but with more induſtry and ſolicitude thoſe exerciſes which are uſeful in war, and all their muſters ſhould be in idle days. I would have them learn to ſwim likewiſe, which is a very uſeful thing, for they are not ſure of bridges where-ever they come, and boats are not always to be had. So that your Army not knowing how to ſwim, is deprived of ſeveral conveniencies, and loſe many fair opportunities of action. The reaſon why the *Romans* exerciſed their youth in the *Campus Martius*, was, becauſe of its nearneſs to the *Tyber*, where after they had tired themſelves at land, they might refreſh and learn to ſwim in the water.

I would have alſo the Cavalry exerciſed as of old, which is moſt neceſſary, for beſides teaching them to ride, it teaches them to ſit faſt when they come to a charge. To this end they had horſes of wood upon which they exerciſed, vaulting upon them ſometimes with their arms, and ſometimes without, very neatly and exactly, without any aſſiſtance; ſo that upon a ſignal from their Captain they were immediately on horſeback, and upon another ſignal as ſoon upon the ground. And as thoſe exerciſes both for horſe and foot were eaſy in thoſe times, they would be the ſame now to any Prince or Common-wealth that would employ their youth that way, as it is to be ſeen in ſeveral Cities in the Weſt, where they are continued. They divide their Inhabitants into ſeveral parties, and every party is denominated by the arms which they wear; and becauſe they uſe pikes, halberts, bows, and harquebuſſes, they are called *Pike-men*, *Halberdiers*, *Bow-men*, and *Harquebuſſiers*: every inhabitant is to declare in what Company he will be liſted; and becauſe ſome for their age and other impediments are not apt for the wars, there is a choice made out of every order, of ſuch perſons as are called the *Giurati*, being ſworn to ſee the reſt exerciſed in their ſeveral arms, according to their reſpective denominations, and every one of them has a certain place appointed where their exerciſes are to be made; and all that belong to that Order (beſides the *Giurati*) repair thither with ſuch monies as are neceſſary for their expence. What therefore is done actually by them, we may do as well, but our imprudence will not ſuffer us to imitate any thing that is good. By theſe exerciſes the ancient's Infantry were very good, and at this day the weſtern foot are better than our's, becauſe the ancients exerciſed them at home, (as in the Common-wealths) or in the field (as by the Emperors) for the reaſons aforeſaid. But we will not exerciſe them at home, and in the field we cannot, they not being our ſubjects, are not to be compelled but to what exerciſes they pleaſe: and this want of authority to exerciſe them has cauſed our Armies to be firſt negligent and remiſs, and afterwards our diſcipline; and has been the cauſe that ſo many Kingdoms and Common wealths (eſpecially in *Italy*) are ſo weak and inconſiderable.

But to return to our order, and the buſineſs of exerciſing, I ſay, that it is not ſufficient to make an abſolute Soldier, to inure a man to labour, to make him ſtrong, ſwift and dexterous, but he muſt learn likewiſe to keep his ranks well, to obey orders, and the directions of the trumpet and drum; to know how to do right, ſtanding ſtill, retiring, advancing, fighting, and marching; for without this diſcipline be obſerved with all accurate diligence, your Army will never be good. And without doubt men who are furious and diſorderly, are much more unſerviceable than cowards; for order drives away fear, and diſorder leſſens a man's courage.

CHAP. VII.

Of what number of men, and of what arms a battalian is to conſiſt; and of exerciſing in Companies to make them ready either to give a charge, or receive it.

AND that you may the better underſtand what is ſaid before, you muſt know that there is no Nation, which, to put in order its men of war, has not conſtituted a principal member; which member, or body, though they have alter'd it as to their name, yet it is not much alter'd as to the number of their men; for in all places they conſiſt of betwixt ſix and eight thouſand. This body among the *Romans* was called a *Legion*, among the *Grecians* a *Phalanx*, among the *French Caterve*; the ſame thing by the *Swizzers* (who are the only people which retain any thing of the diſcipline of the ancients) is called that in their

their language, which in ours is called Battalion. True it is, that afterwards every one divided it into Companies, and ordered them as they pleased. My advice is, that we found our discourse upon the name which is most known, and range it as well as we may, according to the order, both of the ancients and moderns. And because the Romans divided their Legions, which consisted of betwixt 5 and 6000 men, into ten Cohorts, I think fit that we divide our Battalions into ten Companies, and the whole consisting of 6000 Men, allot to every Company 450, of which 400 may be compleatly armed, and the remaining fifty lightly. The compleatly armed, may be 300 with Swords and bucklers called *Scutati*, and an hundred with Pikes called Pikemen. Those which are lightly armed may be fifty foot, carrying Harquebusses, Cross bows, Partizans and Halbards, which according to the old name may be called *Velites*; so that all the ten Companies make 3000 bucklers, 1000 ordinary Pikes, and 500 ordinary *Velites*, which in all will amount to 4500 foot. But because we say that our Battalion is to contain 6000 Men, 1500 more are to be added, of which 1000 are Pikes, which we will call Pikes in extraordinary, and the other 500 are to be lightly armed, and called *Velites* in extraordinary. So that my foot (as is said before) will be compoled half of Bucklers, and the other half of Pikes, and other Arms. I would have every Battalion have a Commander in chief, four Centurions, and forty *Caporali* or Corporals; and over and above, a Commander in chief of the *Velites*, in ordinary, with five File-leaders. I would assign to the *Velites* in extraordinary two Officers in chief, five Centurions, and fifty Corporals; then make a General of the whole Battalion. I would have every Constable to have his Colours and Drums, by which means the Battalion would consist of ten Companies, 300 Bucklers, 1000 Pikes in ordinary, 1000 extraordinary, 500 *Velites* in ordinary, and 500 extrordinary; so as they would amount in all to 6000 foot, among which there would be 600 Corporals, 15 Constables, 15 Drums, 15 Colours, 55 Centurions, 10 Commanders of the *Velites* in ordinary, and one General of the whole Battalion, with his Standard and Drum.

I have repeated this order the oftner, that afterward when I shew you the way of ordering a Battle or Army, you may not find your self confounded. I say therefore, that a King or Commonwealth is to order his subjects, which he designs for the Wars, with these arms, and into these divisions, and raise as many Battalions as his Country will afford. And when he has disposed them so, being to exercise them in order, he is to exercise them in their several divisions. And although the number of each of them cannot beas the form of a just Army, yet thereby every man may learn what belongs to his own Duty, because in Armies there are two orders observed; one what men are to do in every battle, or division distinctly; and the other what they are to do when united with the rest; and those men who know the first well, will easily learn the other; but without knowledge of the first, they will never arrive at the discipline of the second.

Every one (then) of these Companies may learn by it self to keep the order of their ranks in all motions and places, to open and close, and understand the direction of their Drums, by which all things are commanded in a battle; for by beating of that (as by the whittle in the Gallies) every man knows what he is to do, whether to stand firm to his ground, to advance, or fall back, and which way they are to turn their faces and arms. So that understanding the order of their files in that exactness, that no motion nor no place can disorder them; understanding the commands of their Officer, derived to them by his Drum, and how to advance, and fall back into their places, these Companies (as I have said before) as soon as joined, may easily be taught what an united Body of all the Battalions is obliged to do when they are drawn together into an Army. And because this universal practice is of no slight importance, in time of Peace it would be convenient once or twice in a year to bring them to a general *Rendez-vous*, and give them the form of an Army, exercising them for some Days as if they were to fight a battle with an enemy, drawing them up, and disposing them into front, flank, and reserve. And because a General orders his Army for a battle, either upon the sight or apprehension of an enemy, he is to exercise his Army accordingly, and teach them how to behave themselves upon a march, and how in a battle, and how upon a charge either upon one side or other. When they are exercised as if an enemy was before them, they are to be taught how they are to begin the fight, how they are to retreat upon a repulse, who are to succeed in their places; what Colours, what Drums, what Words of commands they are to obey, and so to train them up, and accustom them to these false alarms, and counterfeit battels, that at length they become impatient to be at it in earnest. For an Army is not made valiant and courageous for having brave and valiant men in it, but for the good order which is observed; for if I be in the forlorn, and know, being beaten, whither I am to retire, and who are to succeed in my place, I shall fight boldly because my relief is at hand. If I be of the second body that is to

engage, the diſtreſs, or repulſe of the firſt will not fright me, becauſe I conſidered it might happen before, and perhaps deſired it, that I might have the honour of the Victory, and not they. Where an Army is new, this way of exerciſing is abſolutely neceſſary, and where it is old, it is convenient; for we ſee the *Roman* Captains before they brought them to fight, continually exerciſed their men after this manner, though they had been brought up to their Arms. *Joſephus* tells us in his Hiſtory, that this continual exerciſing in the *Roman* Army was the cauſe that all the multitude of idle People which followed the Camp either for Traffick or Gain, were made uſeful and ſerviceable, becauſe they underſtood their orders and ranks, and how to preſerve them in time of Battle. But if you had raiſed an Army of young men never in the Wars before, whether you intend them for preſent ſervice, or to eſtabliſh them as Militia, and engage them afterwards, without this way of exerciſing by ſingle Companies, and ſometimes a conjunction of them all, you do nothing. For order being perfectly neceſſary, it is convenient with double induſtry and labour to teach ſuch as are not skilful already, and practiſe ſuch as are: as we have ſeen ſeveral excellent Commanders, to practiſe and inſtruct their Soldiers, take extraordinary pains without any reſpect to their dignities.

Cosmo. It ſeems to me that this diſcourſe has a little tranſported you, for before you have told us the way of exerciſing by Companies, you have treated of entire Armies and the managing of a Battle.

Fabritio. You ſay right, and the true reaſon is the affection I bear to thoſe orders, and the trouble I am under that they are no more uſed; yet do not think but I will recollect my ſelf and return. As I told you before, in the exerciſing of a Company, the firſt thing of importance is to know how to keep your ranks; to do this, it is neceſſary to exerciſe them in that order which they call *Checcolo*, or the Snail order. And becauſe I have ſaid that one of theſe *Battalia* or Companies is to conſiſt of four hundred Foot compleatly armed, I will keep to that number.

Theſe four hundred men (then) are to be reduced into 80 files, five in a file, after which they are to be carried forward upon a quick march, or a ſlow, wheeling, and doubling, charging or retreating, which indeed is more demonſtrable to the eye, than the underſtanding. But this *Snail* way of exerciſing a Company is not ſo neceſſary, becauſe every one that knows any thing of an Army, knows how 'tis to be done; and indeed it is not conſiderable in any reſpect, but to teach Soldiers how to move their files; but let us now draw up one of theſe Companies, and diſpoſe them into their ranks.

CHAP. VIII.

Of three principal ways of drawing up a Company, and putting them into a poſture to fight.

I Say that there are three principal forms of drawing up men; the firſt and moſt uſeful is to draw them up cloſe, in the figure of two Squares. The ſecond is to draw them up in a ſquare with two Wings. The third is to draw them up with a vacuity in the middle, which they call *Piazza*. To draw them up in the firſt figure, there are two ways. One is to double their files, that is, the ſecond file entring into the firſt, the fourth into the third, the ſixth into the fifth, and ſo ſucceſſively; ſo that whereas they were 80 files of five in a file, they may become forty files of 10 in a file. After this you are to double them again in the ſame manner, thruſting one file into another, and then they will be 20 files, and twenty men in a file. This makes two ſquares, or very near; ſo though there be as many men on one ſide as the other, yet towards the head they join together, ſo as one flank may touch the other; but on the other ſide, their diſtance is at leaſt two yards one from the other; ſo that the ſquare is longer from the Rear to the Front, than from one flank to another. And becauſe we are to ſpeak often of the fore part, and hinder part, and the ſides, of this *Battalia* or Company, and of the whole Army when joined; you muſt know that when I ſay the head or the front, I mean the fore part of the Battle; when I ſay the ſhoulders, I mean the hinder part; and when I ſay the flanks, I mean the ſides. The fifty *Velites* in ordinary do not mingle withe reſt of the files, but when the *Battalia* is formed, they are diſpoſed by its flanks. The other way of drawing up a Company is this, (and becauſe it is better than the firſt, I reſolve to deſcribe it ſo plain, that you ſhall underſtand it as well as if it were before your eyes) I ſuppoſe you remember of what number of men, of what Officers it

is compoſed, and what Arms it is to carry. The form therefore of this *Battalia* is of twenty Files, twenty men in a File, five Files of Pikes in the front, and fifteen Files of Bucklers in the rear. Two Centurions in the front, and two in the rear, which the ancients called *Tergiductores*. The Conſtable or Captain with his Colours and Drum is to ſtand in the ſpace betwixt the five Files of Pikes, and the fifteen Files of Bucklers; Corporals, upon the flank of every File one; ſo that each of them may have his men by his ſide; thoſe who are on the right hand, will have them on their left, thoſe on the left on their right; the fifty *Velites* are to be drawn up on the flanks and rear. Now that your Soldiers may put themſelves into this poſture in their ordinary march, it is to be done in this manner. You are firſt to reduce your Battalia into 80 Files, five men in a File, leaving your *Velites* either in the front or the rear, but they muſt be ſure to be placed without this order. Every Centurion is to be at the head of twenty Files, five of Pikes are to be immediately behind him, and the reſt Bucklers.

The Conſtable or Captain is to ſtand with his Drum, and Colours in the ſpace betwixt the Pikes and the reſt of the Bucklers belonging to the ſecond Centurion, and may take up the place of three of the Bucklers. Of the *Capidieci* or Corporals, twenty are to ſtand in the flank of the Files of the firſt Centurion, upon the left hand, and twenty upon the flank of the laſt Centurion upon the right hand. And it is to be obſerved that every Corporal who leads the Pikes, is to have a Pike in his hand: and they who lead the *Scudi* are to have Bucklers in theirs.

Having put your Files into this order, and being deſirous upon their march to reduce them into a *Battalia* to make head againſt an Enemy, you muſt cauſe the firſt Centurion with his firſt twenty Files to make a halt, and the ſecond Centurion to continue his march to the right all along by the ſides of thoſe twenty Files which ſtand firm, till he comes cheek by jole with the firſt Centurion, where he alſo makes his ſtand, and then the third marching on likewiſe on the right hand by the flank of the ſaid Files, advances till he be even with the other two Centurions, and then he making his ſtop, and ſo the the reſt; which being done, two of the Centurions only are to depart from the front into the rear of the *Battalia*, which by this means is in the ſame order as I ſaid before. The *Velites* are to be drawn up by the ſide, as they are diſpoſed in the firſt way, which is called *redoubling by a right line*, for the ſecond way redoubles them in the flanks. The firſt way is more eaſy, this is more orderly and uſeful, and may be better corrected and reformed to your mind; for in the firſt you are obliged to conform to your number, for five double, make ten, ten twenty, twenty forty; ſo that if you would double your Files in a right line, you cannot make a front of fifteen, five and twenty, thirty, nor thirty five, but you muſt go where the number will carry you. And therefore it happens every Day upon particular recounters, that it is neceſſary to make head with 7 or 800 foot, and in ſo doing to double in a right line would undo you. For theſe reaſons this way pleaſes me beſt, and the difficulties therein are eaſily removed by exerciſe and practice. I ſay then that nothing is of greater importance than to have Soldiers which can put themſelves inſtantly into their ranks, and to learn that it is neceſſary to exerciſe them in theſe Companies at home, to teach them the quick and the ſlow march, to advance or to retreat, and to paſs thorough ſtreights, and difficult places, without diſturbing their order: For Soldiers that can do that well, are good Soldiers, and may be called old Soldiers, though they never looked an Enemy in the face; whereas on the contrary, if a man has been in a thouſand Battels, and underſtands not that, he is but a Novice, and a freſh-water Soldier. This is only as to cloſing their ranks upon a march when they are in ſmall Files; but having cloſed their Files, and being afterwards broken by ſome accident (either from the place or the Enemy) to rally, and recollect themſelves then, there lies the difficulty and importance, which requires great exerciſe and practice, and by the ancients was endeavoured with much induſtry. In this caſe it is neceſſary therefore to do two things.

CHAP IX.

The manner of rallying Soldiers after a rout, and to make them face about a whole Company at a time.

Fabr. WHen a Squadron is broken, to rally and bring them again ſuddenly into order, two things are convenient; firſt, that ſeveral Colours or Countermarks be aſſigned to every *Battalia*; and ſecondly, to obſerve this rule, that the ſame Foot ſtand ſtill in the ſame Files. For example, if a Soldier's Place was formerly in the ſe-

cond File, let him continue in that File, and not only in that File, but in the ſame place; and in order to that, as I ſaid before, ſeveral Countermarks are neceſſary. And firſt, it is convenient that the Enſigns and Colours of each Company be ſo handſomely diſtinguiſhed, that being joined with other Squadrons, they may know one another. Next, that the Captains and Centurions have Plumes of Feathers or Scarfs, or ſomething that may make them conſpicuous and remarkable; and laſt of all (as being of more importance) the *Capidieci* or Corporals are to be ſo accoutred, that they may be known; and of this the ancients were ſo extraordinarily curious, that their numbers were written upon their Helmets in great Characters, calling them the firſt, ſecond, third, and fourth, *&c.* And not content with this, every Soldier had the number of his File, and the number of his place in that File engraven upon his Buckler. Your Companies being in this manner made diſtinguiſhable by their Colours, and accuſtomed to their Ranks and Files by practice and experience, it is no hard matter, though they be diſordered, to rally, and reduce them ſuddenly again; for as ſoon as the Colours are ſtuck down in the ground they are immediately viſible, and the Captains and Officers knowing which are their own, repair themſelves, and diſpoſe their Soldiers immediately to their places, and when thoſe on the left have placed themſelves on the left hand, and thoſe which belong to the right hand on the right; the Soldiers directed by their rules, and the difference of their Colours, fall immediately into their Ranks, as eaſily as we put together the Staves of a Barrel when we have mark'd them before. Theſe things if learned with diligence and exerciſe at firſt, are quickly attained, and hardly forgot; for your raw men are directed by the old, and in time a Province by theſe exerciſes might be made very fit for the War. It is neceſſary therefore to teach them how to turn all together, when to face about in the Rear, or the Flanks, and make Rear and Flank of the firſt Ranks when occaſion is offered.

And this is no hard matter to do, ſeeing it is ſufficient, that every man faces to that ſide he is commanded, and where they turn their faces, that is the Front. True it is when they face to the Flank, their Ranks do not hold their proportion, becauſe the diſtance betwixt the Front and the Rear is thereby much leſſened, and the diſtance betwixt the extremity of the Flanks is much encreaſed, which is quite contrary to the genuine order of a *Battalia*, for which cauſe great practice and diſcretion is required to rectify it, and yet this may be remedied by themſelves. But that which is of greater conſequence, and which requires more practice, is when an Officer would turn his whole Company together, as if it were a ſingle man, or a ſolid and maſſy body of itſelf. And this requires longer experience than the other. For if you would have it turn to the left, the left corner muſt ſtand ſtill, and they who are next them, march ſo leiſurely, that they in the right may not be put to run; if they be, it will breed confuſion.

But becauſe it always happens that when an Army marches from place to place, that the Companies which are not in the Front, are forced to fight in the Flanks, or Rear, ſo that one and the ſame Company is many times compelled to face about to the Flanks and Rear at one and the ſame time, that theſe Companies therefore may in this exigence hold their old proportion, according to what is ſaid before, it is neceſſary that they have Pikes in that Flank which is moſt likely to be attack'd, and *Capidieci* Captains, and other Officers in their proper places.

CHAP. X.

To range a Company in ſuch order that it may be ready to face the Enemy, on which ſide ſoever he comes.

Fabr. When you have marſhalled your foreſcore Files, five in a File; you are to put all your Pikes into the firſt twenty Files, and place five of your Corporals in the head of them, and five in the Rear. The other 60 Files which follow, are Bucklers all, and conſiſt of 300 men. So then the firſt and laſt File of every Company, are to be Corporals; The Captain with his Enſign and Drum, is to ſtand in the midſt of the firſt hundred of Bucklers, and every Centurion at the head of his Diviſion. When they are in this order, if you deſire to have your Pikes on the left hand, you are to double them Company by Company from the right Flank; if you would have them on the right, you are to double from the left; and this is the way by which a Company turns with the Pikes upon one Flank, with their Officers at the Head and the Rear of them, and their Captain in the midſt, and it is the form which is obſerved in a march. But upon the approach of an Enemy, when

when they would make a Front of a Flank, they have no more to do but to command that all of them face about to that Flank where the Pikes are, and in so doing the whole Battalia turns with its Files and Officers at the same time, in the manner aforesaid; for (unless it be the Centurions) they are all in their old places, and the Centurions can quickly be there. But when a Battalia marches in the Front, and is in danger to be engaged in the Rear, the Files are to be so ordered, that the Pikes may be readily behind; and to do this there needs no more, but whereas usually in every Battalia, every Century has five Files of Pikes in the Front, those five Files may be placed in the Rear, and in all other places the same order to be observed as before.

Cosimo. If my memory fails not, you said that this way of exercise is in order to the uniting these Battalias into an Army, and that this practice is sufficient to direct them in that. But if it should happen this Squadron of 450 Foot should be to fight singly and by it self, how would you order it then?

Fabritio. He who commands them is to judge where his Pikes are to be disposed, and place them as he thinks fit, which is not at all consistent with what I have prescribed before; for though that be a way to be observed in Battle upon an union or conjunction of several Squadrons, yet it may serve as a rule in whatever condition you fall into. But in shewing you the two other ways which I recommended for the ordering of a Battalia, I will satisfie you farther.

CHAP. XI.

To draw up a Company with two horns, or another with a Piazza, or vacuity in the middle.

TO come to the way of drawing up a Battalia or Squadron with two horns or points, I say you must order your 80 Files, five in a File, after this manner.

In the midst you must place a Centurion with 25 Files, two of Pikes to the left, and three of Bucklers to the right: When those five are disposed, bring up the other twenty, with twenty Files and File-leaders, all of them to be placed betwixt the Pikes and the Bucklers; only those who carry Pikes are to stand with the Pikes. After these twenty five Files are so placed, draw up another Centurion with fifteen Files of Bucklers; after which the Constable or Captain is to draw into the middle with his Drum and his Colours, with other fifteen Files of Bucklers. This being performed, the next to march up is the third Centurion, who is to be at the head of 25 Files, of 5 in a File, three Bucklers to the left, and two Pikes to the right; and after the 5 first Files, let there be twenty File leaders placed betwixt the Pikes and the Bucklers, and after these the fourth Centurion. Having drawn your Men into this order; to make a Battalia consisting of two horns, the first Centurion is to make a stand with his 25 Files at his heels; then is the second Centurion to advance with his 15 Files of Bucklers, and place himself on the right hand of the first Centurion, and marching along by the side of the 25 Files, he is to advance 'till he comes to the 15 Files, and there he is to stop. The next that marches is the Captain, with his Division of 15 Files of Bucklers behind him, and advancing on the right hand by the flank of the other 15 Files, he is to march up to their Front. After him the third Centurion is to move with his 25 Files, and the fourth Centurion after him, and passing along by the right flank of the last 15 Files of Bucklers, they are not to stop at the Front of the said Files, but to advance 'till the last of the 25 Files be parallel with the Files which are behind them. As soon as this is done, the Centurion at the head of the first 15 Files of Bucklers, is to remove into the left Angle in the Rear, and by this means you shall form a Battalia of five and twenty firm Files of twenty men in a File with two horns, on each side of the Front one, each of them consisting of ten Files of 5 in a File, with a space betwixt the two horns, sufficient to receive ten men a breast. Betwixt the two horns the Captain is to be placed, and a Centurion at each point or angle; there are likewise to be two Files of Pikes, and twenty Corporals on each Flank. These horns or wings are useful to receive and secure Carriages or Artillery, when they have any with them; the *Velites* are to be drawn up along the flanks under the shelter of the Pikes. But to reduce this horn'd Squadron into another Figure with a space in the middle, no more is to be done, than out of the 15 Files of twenty in a File, to take eight, and place them upon the point of the two horns, which will make a good Rear, and turn it into a Battalia *della Piazza*, or a Battalia with a space in the midst; in this Space or Area, the Carriages are disposed, and the Captain and his Colours, but not

the

the Artillery, for they are placed either in the Front, or along the Flanks. Theſe are the Forms to be obſerved in a Battalia or Squadron, when it marches alone through dangerous places. But the ſingle Battalia without horns or vacuity is better, though to ſecure ſuch as are diſarmed, the horned Figure is convenient. The *Swiſſes* have ſeveral forms of drawing up their Battalias, one is the faſhion of a Croſs, placing their Harquebuſſiers betwixt the Arms of the ſaid Croſs to ſecure them from the Enemy. But becauſe thoſe Figures are proper only when Squadrons fight ſingly and by themſelves, and my Intention being to ſhow they may fight united and in conjunction, I ſhall not trouble my ſelf with them.

Coſimo. I fancy I do ſufficiently comprehend the way that is to be obſerved to exerciſe men in theſe Battalias; but (if I miſtake not) you told us that to the ten Battalias, (which united, make a Battallion) you would add a Thouſand extraordinary Pikes, Four hundred of the extraordinary *Velites*. And theſe would you not adviſe ſhould be exerciſed?

Fabritio. I would, and with very great diligence, exerciſing the Pikes with the ſame care as the reſt, becauſe I would make more uſe of them than the reſt upon all private occaſions, as in conducting convoys of proviſions, depredations, and ſuch like. But my *Velites* I would exerciſe at home without bringing them together; for it being their office to fight looſe and confuſed, it is not neceſſary that they ſhould be always exerciſed as the reſt; for it is enough if they underſtand their own buſineſs well. They ought then (at I ſaid before, and I am not troubled to repeat it again) ſo to exerciſe their men in theſe Battalias, that they may know to keep their ranks, underſtand their places, wheel readily, and ſhift handſomly, either upon ſight of an Enemy, or inconvenience of the Place. For when they can do this well, they will eaſily learn which are their Places, and what are their duties in a Battle. And if a Prince or Commonwealth grudges not to take pains, and employ themſelves in ſeeing their Subjects thus exerciſed, they would have always good Soldiers, be always too hard for their Neighbours, and would be in a condition rather to give, than receive Laws from other people. But (as I have ſaid before) the diſorder in which we live, is the cauſe that we do not only neglect, but deſpiſe thoſe things, and that is the true reaſon our Soldiers are no better; and though there may be Officers and Soldiers too, that perhaps are both valiant and skilful, yet they have no occaſion or encouragement to ſhew themſelves.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Baggage and Train belonging to a Company; How neceſſary it is that they have ſeveral Officers, and of the uſefulneſs of Drums.

Coſimo. I Would ask you now, what Carriages you would allot to each of theſe Battalias?

Fabritio. In the firſt place, I would not allow that either Centurion or Corporal ſhould march on Horſeback, and if the Captain muſt ride, I would allow him only a Mule. I would allow him two Carriages, one to every Centurion, and two betwixt every three Corporals, becauſe we quarter them together in our Camp, as ſhall be ſhewn in its due place; ſo that to every Battalia there ſhould be 36 Carriages, which I would have carry the Tents, and Utenſils for their Cookery; their Hatchets, and other Inſtruments to ſet up their Huts, Tents and Pavilions; and if there be afterwards any place left, let them carry what they pleaſe.

Coſimo. I am of opinion that the Officers which you have appointed in every of theſe Battalias are neceſſary, yet I ſhould be afraid ſo many Commanders ſhould confound them.

Fabritio. What you ſay would be true, were they not ſubordinate to one; but depending ſtill upon one perſon, they proceed very regularly, nay without them, they could not poſſibly be governed. For a wall that is tottering in all places, requires that its Buttreſſes and Supporters be rather many than ſtrong, becauſe the ſtrength and goodneſs of one, will not hinder the ruin which will follow. And therefore in all Armies, and among every ten men, it is convenient to have one of more life, more courage, and more authority than the reſt, who with his alacrity, and language, and example, may encourage the reſt, and diſpoſe them to fight. And to prove the neceſſity of theſe things in an Army, (*viz.* Enſigns, Officers and Drums) it appears by our Armies, where there are of them all,

but

but none of them do their office, according to the intent of their establishment. First your *Conductor of File-leaders*, if they answer the end for which they were established, are to have their men a-part, lodge with them, charge with them, and be always in the same file with them; for being kept to their due places, the *File-leaders* are a rule and compass to the rest, keeping them firm and strait in their files, so as it is impossible almost that they be disordered, and if they be, they are quickly reduced. But in our days we make no otherwise of them but to give them greater pay, and enable them to make particular factions. 'Tis the same with our Ensigns, for they are used more for pomp and parade, than any military service; whereas formerly the Captains employed them as guides, and directions in case of disorder; for every man as soon as the Ensign was fixed, knew his place immediately, and immediately returned to it: they knew likewise thereby how they were to move, or to halt: it is necessary therefore in an Army that there be several of these small Bodies, that every Body has its Colours, and Ensign and Guide; for where there are many Bodies there ought to be many Arms and many Officers. The Soldiers (then) are to follow the motion of their Colours, and the Colours the direction of their Drum, which (being well order'd) commands the Army, and advertises how they are to march with a motion suitable to the time which it beats, which is a great preservation to their order. For this cause the ancients had their flutes and pipes which made an excellent harmony; and as he that dances, keeps himself exactly to the time of the musick, and whilst he does so, is not capable of erring; so an Army that in its motions observes the beating and direction of its Drums, cannot be easily disordered. For this reason they varied their sounds when they would excite, or asswage, or continue the courage of their men. And as their ways of beating were various, so they gave them several names. The *Dorick* way provoked to constancy and firmness; the *Phrygian* inflam'd the Soldiers into a martial fury and violence. It is reported that *Alexander* being one day at dinner, and hearing a Drum beating suddenly the *Phrygian* way, was transported with so great a vehemence and commotion, that he clap'd his hand upon his Sword and drew it, as if he had been going to fight. So that in my judgment it would be very convenient to revive the ancient Dialects of the Drum, and practices of our Ancestors; and if that should prove too difficult, yet those persons should not be despis'd and laid aside, who would teach and instruct the Soldier how to obey them; yet those ways may be changed and varied as every man pleases, provided he inures his Soldiers Ears to understand the variety: but now a-days the greatest use of the Drum, is to make a great noise.

Cosmo. I would fain know of you (if you have ever considered it with your self) how it comes to pass that such military exercises are in our times grown so low and contemptible.

Fabritio. I shall tell you freely what I think may be the cause.

CHAP. XIII.

A discourse of the Author about military Virtue; and how it is become so despicable in our days.

Fab. YOU know *Europe* (according to the testimony of several Authors) has afforded many excellent Captains; *Africk* has had some, and *Asia* fewer; and the reason (as I conceive) is, because those two quarters of the World have had but one or two Monarchies among them, and very few Common-wealths; but *Europe* has had several Kingdoms, and more Common-wealths; and men are industrious, and by consequence excellent, as they are employ'd and prefer'd by their Prince or their State. Where therefore there are many Princes, there are many brave men; where there are but few of the first, there are fewer of the other. We find in *Asia* there was *Ninus*, *Cyrus*, *Artaxerxes*, *Mithridates*, and some few others of that rank. In *Africa* (besides the *Egyptian* antiquity) there were *Massinissa*, *Jugurtha*, and those great Captains which were trained up in the *Carthaginian* Wars, which notwithstanding in respect of the numbers which have been produced in *Europe*, were very few; for in *Europe* their brave Generals are innumerable in History, or at least they would have been, had the Historians (with those they have already recorded) made mention of such as are now forgotten by the malignity of time. For there people are more vitious, where there have been frequent revolutions of State, and where the Governments have favoured virtue either out of necessity, or compassion.

As for *Asia*, it has not produced many extraordinary men, because that Province was wholly under a Monarchy, which (by reason of its greatness, the greatest part of it being always at peace) could not produce such excellent men, as where there was action and war.

In *Africa* it was the same, yet there they were more numerous, by reason of the *Carthaginian* Republick: for Common-wealths do furnish the World with more brave men than Kingdoms; because in States, virtue is many times honoured and advanced; in Monarchies and Kingdoms it is suspected; from whence it proceeds that in the one it is encouraged, in the other exploded. He then who shall consider *Europe*, shall find it full of Common wealths, and Principalities, which in respect of the jealousies and animosities betwixt them, were constrained to keep up the old military discipline, and advance those who in it were any ways eminent; for in *Greece*, besides the *Macedonian*, there were many republicks, and in each of them several excellent men.

The *Romans*, the *Samnites*, the *Tuscans*, *Cisalpine Gauls*, *France* and *Germany* were full of Republicks and Principalities, and *Spain* was the same. And though in respect of the *Romans*, the numbers which are mention'd of them in History, are but small; that proceeds from the emulation and partiality of the Historians, who following fortune, content themselves with commending the Conquerour; but it is unreasonable to imagine that among the *Samnites* and *Tuscans* (who waged war with the *Romans* 150 years together before they were totally subdued) there were not many brave men; and so in *France* and *Spain*; but the virtue which Authors do not celebrate in particular men, they impute generally to the whole people, whom they exalt to the skies for their constancy, and adherence to their liberty.

It being true then, that where there are most Principalities and Governments there are more excellent men; it follows, that when those Governments and Principalities extinguish, their brave men and virtue extinguish with them, there being less occasion to exert it. After the *Roman* Empire had dilated it self so strangely, and subverted all the Common-wealths and Principalities in *Europe*, and *Africa*, and the greatest part of those in *Asia*; virtue declined in all Places but in *Rome*. Whereupon virtuous men began to grow thinner in *Europe* and *Asia*, and by degrees came afterwards to a total declination; for the virtue of the whole World being as it were inclosed in the walls of *Rome*, when it grew depraved and corrupted there, the whole World became corrupt, and the *Scythians* were encouraged to make their inroads and depredations upon the Empire, which had been able to consume and extinguish the virtue of all other places, but was not able to preserve it at home. And though afterwards by the inundation of those Barbarians it was divided into several Cantons; yet for two reasons their virtue was never restored: one was, because when Laws and Orders are once neglected and disused, it is with no little pain that they are reassumed: the other, our way of living in these times (in respect of the Christian Religion) imposes not that necessity of defending our selves, as anciently it did: for then those who were overcome in war, either killed themselves, or remained in perpetual slavery, in which they lived afterwards in continual misery. The Towns that were taken, were either totally demolished, or the Inhabitants banished, their Goods plundered, their Estates sequestered, and themselves dispersed all over the World; so that he who was overcome, suffered such miseries as are not to be express'd. People being terrified by these insupportable cruelties, kept up the reputation of military discipline, and advanced all those who were excellent therein.

But at present we are under no such apprehensions: no man kills himself for being conquered; no man is kept long a prisoner, because it is more easy to set him at liberty. If a City rebels twenty times, it is not immediately razed and demolished; the Citizens are continued in their Estates, and the greatest punishment they fear, is a mulct or a tax: so that men will not now submit to military orders, nor apply themselves to those labours to avoid a peril which they do not apprehend. Besides, the Provinces of *Europe* are under few heads, in comparison of what they were anciently: for all *France* is under one King; all *Spain* under another: *Italy* is divided into four parties, so that the weaker Cities that are unable to maintain war of themselves, defend themselves by alliances with the Conqueror; and those who are strong (for the reasons aforesaid) are in no fear of ruin.

Cosimo. And yet within these five and twenty years several Cities have been sack'd, and several Kingdoms subverted; which example should teach others to reassume, and live according to the custom of our ancestors.

Fabritio. 'Tis true as you say, yet if you observe what those Towns were which have suffered in that nature, you will find that they were no capital Cities, but subordinate, and depending

ding: ſo we ſee though *Tortona* was demoliſhed, *Milan* was not; though *Capua* was roy'd, *Naples* was not: *Breſcia* was ſack'd, but *Venice* was not: *Ravenna* was pilla-, but *Rome* was not. Theſe examples do not make him who governs recede from deſigns, but makes him rather more refractory and obſtinate, and purſue them more vehemence, to recompence himſelf with taxes and new impoſitions. it is that makes men unwilling to expoſe themſelves to the trouble of milita- exerciſes, looking upon it partly as unnecellary, and partly as a thing which they do not derſtand. Thoſe who are ſubjects, and ought to be affrighted with ſuch examples of titude, have not power to help themſelves; and thoſe who are Princes, having loſt ir dominion, are unable, as having neither time nor convenience: Whilſt thoſe who able, either cannot, or will not; chooſing rather to run along with fortune, with- any diſquiet, than to trouble themſelves to be virtuous; for believing that all things govern'd by fortune, they had rather follow her ſwing, than contend with her for llery. And that you may believe what I have ſaid to be really true, conſider the untry of *Germany*, where, by reaſon of their ſeveral Principalities and States, their ipline is good, and depends upon the example of thoſe people, who being jealous their States and Seigneuries, maintain themſelves in honour and grandeur, as fear- to fall into a ſervitude, out of which they could not ſo eaſily emerge.

This I ſuppoſe is ſufficient to ſhew the reaſon of the vileneſs and depravity of our ent diſcipline; I know not whether you may be of the ſame opinion, or whether diſcourſe may not have raiſed ſome ſcruple in your mind.

Cſimo. Not at all, I am rather perfectly ſatisfy'd; only I deſire (returning to our firſt) to know of you how you would order your horſe with theſe Battalias, in numbers you would have them, how you would have them arm'd, and how offi-

CHAP. IV.

What number of Horſe are to be put into a Battalion, and what proportion is to be obſerved for their baggage.

YOU may think perhaps I forgot it, but do not wonder, for I ſhall ſpeak of it but little for two reaſons. One is, becauſe the nerves and ſtrength of an Army is the Infantry; the other is, becauſe the horſe are not ſo much debauched and degenerated as the foot; for the Cavalry is equal, if not better at this day than in an- ent times. Yet I have ſaid ſomething before of the way how they are to be exercis'd; and as to the manner of arming them, I would arm them according to our preſent fa- ion, both light-horſe and men at arms. But the light-horſe (if I might preſcribe) ould carry croſs bows, with ſome few harquebuſſes among them, which (though in o- ther affairs of war they are but of little uſe) are here very neceſſary to frighten the Country people, and force them from their paſſes, which perhaps they have undertak- to defend: for one harquebuſs will ſcare them more than an hundred other arms. But to come to their number, having undertaken to imitate the *Roman* Militia, I ould take but 300 good horſe for every Battalion, of which 150 ſhould be men at arms, and 150 light-horſe; and I would appoint a Captain to each of theſe ſquadrons, 15 Corporals to each, and a Trumpet and Enſign. I would allow every ten men at arms ree Carriages, and every ten light-horſe, two; which Carriages (as with the foot) ould carry the Tents, Utenſils, Hatchets, and other Inſtruments and Harneſs. Think not that what I ſay would be any diſorder, ſeeing their men at arms had each of them four horſes in their equipage, which is a thing much corrupted; for now in Germany you ſhall ſee men at arms with but one horſe, and themſelves, and twenty of them are allowed but one Waggon to carry their neceſſaries. The *Roman* horſe were likewiſe alone, but the *Triarii* were lodg'd always by them, who were obliged to aſſiſt them in the looking to their horſes, which may be eaſily imitated by us, as ſhall be ſhown in the diſtribution of our lodgments: what there the *Romans* did of old, and and what the *Germans* do at this day, we may do likewiſe, and we do very ill if we do not.

Theſe horſe being liſted and called over, may be muſtered ſometimes with the Bat- talion, at a general Muſter of all the Companies, and, be appointed to make charges, and counterfeit skirmiſhes with them, rather to bring them acquainted, than for any thing elſe. What we have ſaid already is ſufficient for this part: let us now come to marſhal our Army, and draw it up in a poſture to fight, and with hopes of ſucceſs, which is the great end of all kind of military diſcipline, in which men employ ſo much ſtudy and diligence.

THE Third BOOK.

CHAP. I.

The Order observed by the Roman *Legions when a Battle was preſented.*

Coſimo. SEEing we change our ſubject, I ſhall yield my place of expoſtulating to another man; for preſumption being a thing which I condemn in other people, I would not be too much guilty of it my ſelf, therefore I diſmiſs my ſelf of that office, and will tranſfer it to which of our friends will vouchſafe to accept it.

Zanobi. It would have been very grateful to us all, had you pleaſed to have continued; but ſeeing 'tis not your pleaſure, tell us at leaſt which of us it is you will depute to ſucceed you.

Coſimo. I ſhall leave that to the election of Signor *Fabritio.*

Fabritio. I am content to undertake it, and do deſire that we may follow the *Venetian* cuſtom, by which the youngeſt of the company has the liberty to ſpeak firſt, and in this caſe not without reaſon; for this being the proper exerciſe of young men, I perſwade my ſelf young Gentlemen are the fitteſt to diſcourſe of it, as being moſt ready to follow it.

Coſimo. 'Tis then your province, *Luigi*, and as I do much pleaſe my ſelf in my ſucceſſor, ſo you may be as well ſatisfy'd with his interrogation. But that we loſe no time let us return to our buſineſs.

Fabritio. I am certain, that to demonſtrate how well an Army is to be marſhal'd and prepar'd for a Battle, it would be neceſſary to declare how the *Greeks* and *Romans* ordered the Troops in their Armies: but becauſe theſe things are ſufficiently obvious in Hiſtory, I ſhall paſs by ſeveral particulars, and addreſs my ſelf only to ſuch as I think moſt uſeful for our imitation, and fitteſt to give perfection to the diſcipline of our times, which will be the occaſion that at once I give you a proſpect how an Army is to be ranged in order to a Battle; how they are to confront and charge one another in a real engagement; and how they may be exercis'd in a counterfeit. The greateſt diſorders committed in the drawing up an Army for a Battle, is to give it only a front, becauſe they leave them and their fortune to the ſucceſs of one charge: and this error proceeds from nothing but from having loſt the old way of cloſing their their ranks, and thruſting one into another. Without that way there is no relieving of the front, no defending them, nor no ſupplying their places in the heat of their Engagement, which among the *Romans* was moſt accurately obſerv'd. To the end therefore you may comprehend this way, I ſay, that the *Romans* divided each Legion into three Bodies.

The firſt were *Haſtati*, the ſecond *Principes*, the third *Triarii*. The *Haſtati* were in the front of the Army, in thick and firm ranks. The *Principes* behind them, but their ranks not altogether ſo cloſe: and after them the *Triarii* in ſo cloſe an order, that they could receive both *Principes* and *Haſtati* into their Body upon any diſtreſs. Beſides theſe they had their *Slingers*, their *Bow-men*, and their *Velites*; not drawn up in this order, but placed at the Head of the Army, betwixt the Cavalry and the Foot.

Theſe light arm'd Soldiers began the Fight, and if they prevailed, (which was very ſeldom) they follow'd the Victory; if they were repulſed, they fell back by the flanks of the Army, or thorough certain ſpaces appointed on purpoſe, and retir'd among thoſe who had no arms. When they were retir'd, the *Haſtati* advanced againſt the enemy, and finding themſelves overpower'd, they retired ſoftly to the *Principes*, and fell into their ranks, and together with them renew'd the Fight; but if they alſo were too weak to ſuſtain the fury

of

of the Battle, they retreated all into the ſpaces of the *Triarii*, and all together being conſolidated into a firm maſs, they made another effort more impetuous than before; if this miſcarried, all was loſt, for there was no farther reſerves. The Horſe were plac'd at the corners of the Army, like two wings to a Body, and fought ſometimes on Horſeback, and ſometimes on Foot, as occaſion was offered. This way of reinforcing three times, is almoſt impoſſible to be maſter'd, becauſe fortune muſt fail you three times before you can be beaten, and the Enemy muſt be ſo valiant as to conquer you as often.

CHAP. II.

The form obſerved in their Battels by the Macedonian *Phalanx.*

THE *Grecians* ordered not their Phalanx, as the *Romans* did their Legions, and though they had many Officers among them, and ſeveral ranks, yet they made but one body, or rather one front. The way which they obſerved to relieve one another, was not to retire one rank into another, like the *Romans*, but to put one man into the place of another; which was done in this manner. Their Phalanx being reduced into Files (and let us ſuppoſe each File to conſiſt of fifty men) being afterwards with the front towards the Enemy, of all the Files only the ſix firſt could charge, becauſe their Launces (which they called *Sariſſæ*) were ſo long, that the ſixth rank charged with the point of his Launce thorough the firſt rank: In the Fight therefore, if any of the firſt rank was either killed or diſabled, he who was behind in the ſecond rank ſupplied his place; and the vacuity in the ſecond rank was filled up out of the third, and ſo ſucceſſively, and on a ſudden the ranks behind ſupplied what was defective before; ſo as their ranks remained always entire, and no place left void but the laſt rank, which was not reinforced, becauſe there was no body behind to ſupply them: So that the loſs in the firſt rank exhauſted the latter, and yet it ſelf was continued entire. So that theſe *Phalanxes* were ſooner conſumed and annihilated than broken, becauſe the cloſeneſs and groſſneſs of the body made them impenetrable. The *Romans* at firſt uſed theſe Phalanxes, and inſtructed their Legions in that way: Afterwards they grew weary of that order, and parted their Legions into ſeveral diviſions, *viz.* into *Cohorts* and *Manipuli*, judging (as I ſaid before) that body to be moſt vigorous and fulleſt of life, that conſiſted of moſt members, ſo conſtituted as that they could ſubſiſt and govern themſelves.

CHAP. III.

How the Swiſſes *ordered their Battalions.*

Fab. THE *Swiſſes* at preſent do uſe the ſame method with their Battalions, as the *Macedonians* did anciently with their Phalanxes, both enranging them entire and in groſs, and in relieving one another. When they came to a Battle, they diſpoſed their Squadrons one in the flank of another, and not behind. They have not the way of receiving the firſt into the ſecond upon a repulſe, but to relieve one another, they obſerve this order; they put their Battalions one in the Flank of another, but ſomewhat behind it, towards the right hand; ſo that if the firſt be in any diſtreſs, the ſecond advances to relieve it. The third Battalion they place behind the other two, but at the diſtance of the ſhot of a Harquebuſs, that if the two Battalions ſhould be worſted, the third might advance in their reſcue, and that which advances, and the other which retire may have ſpace to paſs by one another without any claſhing or colliſion; for groſs bodies cannot be received ſo commodiouſly as little; and therefore ſmall bodies, diſpoſed at a diſtance (as they were in the *Roman* Legions) might better receive and relieve one another upon occaſion. And that this order of the *Swiſſes* is not ſo good as the ancient order of the *Romans*, is demonſtrated by many examples of their Legions when they were engaged with the *Macedonian* Phalanxes; for theſe were ſtill worſted by the other: The faſhion of their Arms, and their way of Reſerves being more effectual, than the cloſeneſs and ſolidity of a Phalanx.

CHAP. IV.

How the Author would make use of both Greek and Roman Arms for his Battalion, and what was the ordinary Army of the Romans.

BEing therefore according to these Models to range and marshal an Army, I think it best to retain something of the Arms and Orders both of the Phalanx and Legion. For this reason I have said, in a Battalion I would have 2000 Pikes (which were the Arms of the *Macedonian* Phalanx) and 3000 *Scudi*, or Shields and Swords, which are the Arms of the *Romans*. I have divided a Battalion into ten Battalias or Companies, as the *Romans* divided their Legions into ten *Coharts*. I have ordered the *Velites* or light-arm'd to begin the Fight, as they did formerly. And because as the Arms are mix'd, they participate of the one Nation and the other; that they may participate likewise in their orders, I have appointed that every Company may have five Files of Pikes in the front, and the rest of Bucklers, that the front may be enabled to keep out the Horse, and break more easily into the Foot, having Pikes in the first charge as well as the Enemy, by which they may be fortified to sustain it bravely, 'till the Bucklers come up, and perfect the Victory. And if you consider the strength and vertue of this Order, you will find how all these Arms perform their office exactly. For Pikes are very useful against Horse, and against Foot too, before the Battles be joyned; but after they are joyned, they are utterly useless. For this reason, behind every third rank of Pikes, the *Swissers* put a rank of Halbards, which was to make room for their Pikes, though indeed it was not enough. Placing therefore our Pikes before, and our Bucklers behind them, they are enabled to sustain the Horse, and when they come to charge, they do open and press hard upon the Foot; but when the Fight is begun, and the Battles are joyned, the Bucklers succeed with their Swords, as being manageable more easily in the crowd.

Luigi. We desire now to understand, how with these Arms and Orders you would manage your Army to give the Enemy Battle.

Fabritio. I shall shew you nothing at present but this: You must know that in an ordinary Army of the *Romans* (which they called a Consular Army) there were no more but two Legions of Citizens, consisting in all of 600 Horse, and about 11000 Foot. They had besides these as many more Horse and Foot sent them in by their Friends and Confederates: These Auxiliaries were divided into two parts, the right wing and the left; for they would never suffer them to exceed the number of the Foot of their Legions, though their Horse indeed they permitted to be more. With this Army, consisting of 22000 Foot, and about 2000 Horse, a *Roman* Consul did all his business, and attempted any thing. Yet when they were to oppose a greater power, they joyned two Consuls together, and their two Armies. You must know likewise that in the three great Actions of an Army (their march, their encampment, and engagement) they placed the Legions in the middle, because the force in which they reposed their greatest confidence, they thought fit should be more united and compact, as I shall shew you more at large when I come to treat of those things.

These Auxiliary Foot, by vertue of their conversation with the Legionary Foot, grew to be as serviceable as they, because they were train'd and disciplin'd with them, and upon occasion of Battle, drawn up in the same Figure and Order. He therefore who knows how the *Romans* marshalled one single Legion in the day of Battle, knows how they disposed of them all: When I have told you therefore how they divided a Legion into three Squadrons, and how one Squadron received another; I shall have told you how a whole and entire Army is to be ordered, when it is to be drawn up for Battle.

CHAP. V.

The way of drawing up a Battalion, according to the Intention of the Author.

BEing to prepare for a Battle according to the method of the *Romans*, as they had two Legions, ſo I would take two Battalions, and by the ordering of them, you may gueſs how to order a compleat Army: For to add more men, is only to multiply their ranks. I think it unneceſſary to repeat what foot there are in a Legion, what Companies, what Officers, what Arms, what *Velites* in ordinary, what in extraordinary, what Pikes and what other things. For it is not long ſince I told you diſtinctly, and preſs'd it upon your memories as a thing very neceſſary for the underſtanding all other Orders; wherefore I ſhall paſs on without farther reflection.

It ſeems to me beſt that one of the ten Battalions, or Companies of a Battalion be placed in the left flank, and the other ten of the other Battalion on the right. Thoſe on the left are to be ordered in this manner: Put five Battalias (one on the ſide of the other) in the front, ſo as there may remain a ſpace of four yards betwixt each; draw them up ſo as they may poſſeſs in breadth 140 yards of ground, and in depth forty: behind theſe five Battalias, I would place three others, diſtant in a right line from the firſt about forty yards; of theſe three, I would have two follow directly the Companies which are upon the two extremities or corners of the five firſt, and the third ſhould be diſpoſed in the midſt; by which means theſe three Companies ſhould take up as much ground, both in breadth and depth, as the other five, which have only five yards diſtance betwixt the one and the other, whereas the three laſt ſhould have thirty three. This being done, I would cauſe the two Companies remaining to advance, and place themſelves behind the three former in a right line, and at the diſtance of forty yards; but it ſhould be in ſuch a ſort, that each of theſe two Companies ſhould be ranged directly behind the extremity of the three precedent Companies, and the ſpace left betwixt them ſhould be 91 yards: By theſe means all the Companies, thus diſpoſed, ſhould extend themſelves in front 161 yards, and in depth 80. After this I would extend the Pikes extraordinary along the flanks of all the Companies on the left hand, at about twenty yards diſtance; and I would make of them 140 ranks of ſeven in a rank, ſo that they ſhould ſecure all the left flank (in depth) of the ten Battalias, drawn up as I ſaid before; and I would reſerve forty Files of them to guard the Baggage, and the unarmed people in the rear, diſtributing their Corporals and other Officers in their reſpective places. The three Conſtables or Captains, I would place one at the head of them, another in the midſt, and a third in the rear; who ſhould execute the Office of a *Tergiductor*, who was always placed in the rear of the Army. But to return to the front of the Army; I ſay that after the Pikes extraordinary, I would place the *Velites* extraordinary, (which are 500) and allow them a ſpace of forty yards. By the ſide of theſe, on the left hand, I would place my men at Arms, with a ſpace of 150 yards; after them I would advance my light Horſe, at the ſame diſtance as I allow'd to my men at Arms. As to the *Velites* in ordinary, I would leave them about their Battalias, which ſhould take up the ſpace which I left betwixt each Company, unleſs I found it more expedient to put them under the *Pikes extraordinary*; which I would do or not do, as I found it more or leſs for my advantage. The Captain General of the Battalion ſhould be placed in the ſpace betwixt the firſt and ſecond orders of Battalias, or elſe at the head of them, or elſe in the ſpace betwixt the laſt of the firſt five Battalias and the *Pikes extraordinary*, as I found it moſt convenient: he ſhould have about him 30 or 40 ſelect men, all brave and experienc'd, and ſuch as underſtood how to execute their Commiſſion with prudence, and how to receive and repel a charge; and I would have the Captain General in the midſt of the Drums and the Colours.

This is the order in which I would diſpoſe my Battalion on the left wing, which ſhould contain half the Army, and take up in breadth 511 yards, and in depth as much as I have ſaid before (without reckoning the ſpace that was poſſeſſed by the Pikes extraordinary, which ſhould be as a Shield to the people without Arms, and take up a ſpace of about a hundred yards;) The other Battalion I would diſpoſe on the right ſide, leaving betwixt the two Battalions a diſtance of about 30 yards, having order'd it as the other: At the head of that ſpace I would place ſome pieces of Artillery, behind which ſhould ſtand the Captain General of the whole Army, with the Drums, the Standard or chief Enſign, and two hundred choice men about him, (moſt of them on foot) and amongſt them

them ten or more, fit to execute any command. The General himſelf ſhould be ſo mounted, and ſo arm'd, that he might be on Horſeback, and on foot, as neceſſity required. As to the Artillery, ten pieces of Cannon would be enough for the taking of a Town. In the Field I would uſe them more for defence of my Camp, than for any Service in Battle. My ſmaller pieces ſhould be of 10 or 15 pound carriage, and I would place them in the front of the whole Army, unleſs the Country was ſuch that I could diſpoſe them ſecurely in the flank, where the Enemy could not come at them.

This form and manner of ranging an Army, and putting it in order, may do the ſame things in a Battle as was done either in the *Macedonian* Phalanx, or the Legion of the *Romans*; for the Pikes are in the front, and all the foot placed in their ranks; ſo that upon any charge or engagement with the Enemy, they are able not only to bear and ſuſtain them, but (according to the cuſtom of the Phalanx) to recruit and reinforce their firſt rank, out of thoſe which are behind.

On the other ſide, if they be over-power'd, and attack'd with ſuch violence that they are forced to give ground, they may fall back into the intervals of the ſecond Battalia behind them, and uniting with them, make up their body, and charge them briskly again: And if the ſecond Battalia is not ſtrong enough to relieve them, they may retire to the third, and fight all together in conjunction; ſo that by this order (as to the buſineſs of a Battle) we may ſupply and preſerve our ſelves according to the *Grecian* and the *Roman* way both.

As to the ſtrength of an Army, it cannot be ordered more ſtrong, becauſe the two wings are exactly well fortified with Officers and Arms; nor is there any thing weak but the rear, where the people which follow the Camp without Arms are diſpoſed, and they are guarded with the *Pikes extraordinary*; ſo that the Enemy cannot aſſault them any where, but he will find them in very good order; neither is the rear in any great danger, becauſe an Enemy can be hardly ſo ſtrong as to aſſault you equally on all ſides; if you found he was ſo ſtrong, you would never take the Field againſt him. But if he was three times as many, and as well ordered as you, if he divides, and weakens himſelf to attack you in ſeveral places, beat him in one, and his whole enterprize is loſt. As to the Enemies Cavalry, though they out-number you, you are ſafe enough; for the Pikes which encompaſs you, will defend you from any impreſſion from them, though your own Horſe be repulſed. The chief Officers are moreover plac'd in the flank, ſo as they may commodiouſly command, and as readily obey; and the ſpaces which are left betwixt one Battalia and the other, and betwixt one rank and another, ſerve not only to receive thoſe who are diſtreſſed, but give room for ſuch perſons as are ſent forward and backward with orders from the Captain: And as I told you at firſt, as the *Romans* had in their Army about 24000 men, I would have our Army conſiſt of the ſame number; and as the Auxiliaries took their method of Fighting, and their manner of drawing up, from the Legions; ſo thoſe Soldiers which you would joyn to your two Battalions, ſhould take their form and diſcipline from them. Theſe things would be very eaſie to imitate, ſhould you have but one example, for by joyning either two other Battalions to your Army, or adding as many Auxiliaries, you are in no confuſion, you have no more to do but to double your ranks, and whereas before you put ten Battalias in the left wing, put twenty now; or elſe you may contract, or extend them as your place and Enemy will give leave.

Luigi. In earneſt, Sir, I am ſo well poſſeſs'd of your Army, that I fancy I ſee it drawn up before my eyes, which gives me an ardent deſire to ſee it engaged: I would not for any thing in the world that you ſhould prove a *Fabius Maximus*, and endeavour no more than to avoid Fighting, and keep the Enemy in ſuſpence; for I ſhould blame you more than the *Romans* did him.

CHAP. VI.

The Deſcription of a Battle.

Fabr. DO not queſtion it: Hark, do not you hear the Artillery? Ours have fired already, but done little execution upon the Enemy; the *Velites* extraordinary, together with the light Horſe, advance to the charge in Troops, with the greateſt ſhout and fury imaginable. The Enemies Artillery has fired once, and the ſhot paſſed over the head of our Foot, without any prejudice at all. That it might not have time for a ſecond Volley, our *Velites* and our Cavalry have marched up in great haſte to poſſeſs it, and the Enemy

Enemy advancing in its defence, they are come ſo cloſe, that neither the Artillery of one ſide or the other can do any miſchief. See with what courage and bravery our Soldiers charge; with what diſcipline and dexterity they demean themſelves, thanks to the exerciſe to which they have been uſed, and the confidence that they have in our Army: See our Battalions marching up, with their Drums beating, Colours flying, and men at Arms in their wings in great order to the charge: Obſerve our Artillery, which (to give place, and make room for our men) is drawn off by that ground which was left by the *Velites*: See how the General encourages his men, and aſſures them of Victory: See how our *Velites* and light Horſe are extended and returned to the flanks of our Army, to ſee if there they can find any advantage to make an impreſſion upon the Enemy. Now, now they are met. See with what firmneſs our Battalions have received the charge, without the leaſt noiſe or confuſion: Obſerve the General how he commands his men at Arms to make good their ground; not to advance upon the Enemy, nor deſert the Foot upon any occaſion whatever. See our light Horſe marching to charge a Body of the Enemies Harquebuſiers that was firing upon our flank; and how the Enemies Horſe come in to their reſcue; ſo that being encloſed betwixt the Cavalry of one ſide and the other, they cannot fire, but are forced to retreat behind their Battalias: See with what fury our Pikes addreſs themſelves to the Fight, and our Foot advanced already ſo near, that the Pikes are become unſerviceable; ſo that according to our Diſcipline, the Pikes retire by little and little among the Shields: See in the mean time how a Body of the Enemies men at Arms has diſordered our men at Arms in the left wing; and how according to our Diſcipline, retiring under the Protection of our *Pikes extraordinary*, by their aſſiſtance they have repulſed the purſuers, and killed moſt of them upon the place. See the Pikes in ordinary of the firſt Battalias, how they have ſheltred themſelves under the *Scudari*, and left them to make good the fight: See with what courage, with what ſecurity, with what leiſure, they put the Enemy to the Sword. Behold how they cloſe their ranks in the Fight, and are come up ſo near they have ſcarce room left to manage their Swords. See with what fury the Enemy flies, becauſe being armed only with Pike and with Sword, both of them are become unſerviceable; one becauſe of its length, the other becauſe the Enemy is too well armed. See how they throw down their Arms, how they are wounded, killed or diſperſed. See how they run in the right wing; ſee how they fly in the left. So now we are ſafe, and the Victory our own.

CHAP. VII.

The Authors reaſons for the occurrences in the Battle.

Fabr. WHat do you think now, have we not got the Victory very fortunately; but we would have had it with more advantage, had I been permitted to have put all things in execution. You ſee there is no neceſſity of making uſe either of the ſecond or third order; becauſe our Van was ſufficient to overcome the Enemy; ſo that I am inclined to ſpeak no farther upon this Subject, unleſs it be to reſolve any doubt that may ariſe in your mind.

Luigi. You have gained this Victory with ſo much courage and gallantry, that I fear my tranſport will not give me leave to explain my ſelf, whether I have any ſcruple or not. Nevertheleſs preſuming upon your quickneſs, I ſhall take the boldneſs to tell you what I think. Firſt, therefore let me deſire you to inform me, why you made uſe of your Artillery but once? why you cauſed them to be drawn off into your Army, and made no mention of them afterward? It ſeems to me that you placed the Enemies too high, and ordered them as you fancied; which might poſſibly be true; but if their Cannon ſhould be ſo placed (as I do not queſtion but many times they are) as that they ſhould play among your Troops, I would fain underſtand what remedy you would preſcribe; and ſince I have begun to ſpeak of the Artillery, I ſhall propoſe all my ſcruples in this place, that I may have no occaſion to mention them hereafter. I have heard many perſons find fault with the Arms and orders of the ancients, as things of little or no uſe in our days, in reſpect of the fury of our Cannon; becauſe they break all ranks and pierce all Arms at ſuch a rate, that it ſeems to them no leſs than madneſs to oppoſe any ranks or orders of men againſt them, and to tire your Soldiers with the carriage of Arms that will not be able to defend them.

Fabritio.

Fabritio. Your demand conſiſting of many heads, requires a large anſwer. 'Tis true I cauſed my Artillery to play but once, and I was in doubt whether they ſhould do that; and the reaſon is, becauſe it concerns a man more to keep himſelf from being hurt, than to miſchief his Enemy. You muſt underſtand, that to provide againſt the fury of great Guns, it is neceſſary to keep where they cannot reach you, or to place your ſelf behind ſome wall or bank that may ſhelter you, for there is nothing elſe that can ſecure you; and then you muſt be ſure that either the one or the other are able to protect you. Thoſe Generals who put themſelves in a Poſture to give battle, cannot place their Armies behind a wall or a bank, or at a diſtance where the Enemies Cannon cannot reach them; and therefore ſeeing they have no way to defend themſelves abſolutely, the beſt courſe is to ſecure themſelves as well as they can, and that is by poſſeſſing their Cannon with as much ſpeed as is poſſible.

The way to poſſeſs themſelves of it, is to march up to it ſuddenly, and in as wide an order as is convenient; ſuddenly, that they may fire but once; and wide, that the execution may be the leſs. This is not to be done by a band of Soldiers in order; for if they march any thing wide, they diſorder themſelves; and if they run on in a huddle, it will be no hard matter for the Enemy to break them. And therefore I ordered my Battle ſo, that it might do both the one and the other; for having placed 1000 of the *Velites* in the wings, I commanded that as ſoon as our Artillery had fired, they ſhould advance with the light Horſe, to ſeize upon their Cannon; for which reaſon our Artillery was ſhot off but once, and that the Enemy might not have time to charge the ſecond time, and fire upon us again; for we could not take ſo much time our ſelves, but they would have had as much to do the ſame; wherefore the reaſon why I fired not my Cannon the ſecond time, was, that if the Enemy fired once, they might not have leiſure to fire any more. To render therefore the Enemies Artillery unſerviceable, the beſt remedy is to attack it with all poſſible ſpeed; for if the Enemy deſerts it, 'tis your own; if he undertakes to defend it, he muſt advance before it, and then being betwixt it and us, they cannot fire but upon their own men. I ſhould think theſe reaſons ſufficient without farther examples; yet having plenty of them from the ancients, I will afford you ſome of them. *Ventidius* being to fight the *Parthians* (whoſe ſtrength conſiſted principally in their bows and arrows) was ſo ſubtil as to let them come up cloſe to his Camp before he would draw out his Army; which he did, that he might charge them on a ſudden, before they had leiſure to ſhoot their arrows. *Cæſar* tells us, that when he was in *France*, being to engage with the enemy, he was charged ſo briskly, and ſo ſuddenly by them, that his men had not time to deliver their darts according to the cuſtom of the *Romans*. You ſee therefore that to fruſtrate a thing in the field which is to be diſcharged at a diſtance, and to prevent its doing you any hurt, there is no better way than to march up to it with all ſpeed, and poſſeſs it if you can. Another reaſon moved me likewiſe to fire my Artillery no more, which may ſeem trivial to you; yet to me it is not ſo contemptible. There is nothing obſtructs an Army, and puts it into greater confuſion, than to take away or hinder their ſight; for ſeveral great Armies have been broken and defeated, by having their ſight obſtructed either with the duſt or the Sun: now there is nothing that cauſes greater obſcurity, or is a greater impediment to the ſight, than the ſmoke of Artillery; and therefore I think it more wiſdom to let the Enemy be blind by himſelf, than for you to be blind too, and endeavour to find him. Theſe things conſidered, I would either not fire my artillery at all, or elſe (becauſe that perhaps would not be approved, in reſpect of the reputation which thoſe great Guns have obtained in the World) I would place them in the wings of my Army, that when they fire, the ſmoke might not fly in the faces of my front, which is the flower and hopes of my Army. And to prove that to trouble the ſight of an Enemy, is a thing of more than ordinary advantage; I need bring no more than the example of *Epaminondas*, who to blind the eyes of his Enemy, before he advanced to charge them, cauſed his light horſe to gallop up and down before their front to raiſe the duſt, and hinder their ſight; which was done ſo effectually, that he got the Victory thereby. As to your opinion that I placed the Enemies Cannon, and directed their bullets as I pleaſed, cauſing them to paſs over the heads of my Foot, I anſwer, that great Guns do without compariſon oftner miſs the Infantry, than hit them, becauſe the Foot are ſo low, and the Artillery ſo hard to be pointed, that if they be placed never ſo little too high, they ſhoot over; and never ſo little too low, they graze and never come near them. The inequality of the ground does likewiſe preſerve the Foot very much; for every little hill or bank betwixt the Artillery and them, ſhelters them exceedingly. As to the Horſe, eſpecially the Men at arms, becauſe their order is cloſer than the order of the light horſe, and they are to keep firmer in a body, they are more obnoxious to the Cannon, and are therefore to be kept in the rear of the Army, till the Enemy has fir'd

his

his Cannon. This is moſt certain, your ſmall Field-pieces, and your ſmall ſhot does more execution than your great pieces, againſt which, the beſt remedy is to come to handy-blows as ſoon as you can; and though in the firſt ſome men fell, (as be ſure there always will;) yet a good General and a good Army are not to conſider a particular loſs, ſo much as a general; but rather are to imitate the *Swiſſers*, who never refuſed a Battle for fear of great Guns, but puniſhed them with capital puniſhment, who for fear of them forſook their ranks, or gave any other ſign or expreſſion of fear. I cauſed my artillery to be drawn off as ſoon as I had fired them, that they might leave the Field clear for my Battalians to advance; and I made no mention of them afterwards, as being quite uſeleſs when the Armies were joined. You have ſaid likewiſe, that in reſpect of the violence and impetuoſity of thoſe Guns, many do judge the arms and the orders of the ancients to be altogether uſeleſs; and it ſeems by that, that the people of late have found out arms and orders which are ſufficient to ſecure them: if you know any ſuch thing, you will oblige me to impart it; for as yet I know none, nor can I believe that there's any to be found: So that I would know of them why the Infantry of our times do carry Corſlets of Iron upon their breaſts, and the horſe are arm'd *Cap a pied*; for ſeeing they condemn the ancient way of arming as uſeleſs in reſpect of the Artillery, they may as well condemn what is practis'd now-a-days. I would underſtand likewiſe why the *Swiſſers*, according to the cuſtom of the ancients, make their Battalions to conſiſt of ſix or eight thouſand foot; and why other Nations have imitated them, ſeeing that order is expos'd to the ſame danger (upon account of the Artillery) as others are. I think it cannot eaſily be anſwered, yet if you ſhould propoſe it to Soldiers of any judgment and experience, they would tell you firſt, that they go ſo arm'd, becauſe though their arms will not defend them againſt great Guns, yet they will ſecure them againſt ſmall Shot, and Pikes, and Swords, and Stones, and all ſuch Things. They would tell you likewiſe, that they keep that cloſe order like the *Swiſſers*, that they may more eaſily engage the Enemy's Foot, that they may better ſuſtain their Horſe, and put fairer to break them.

So that we ſee Soldiers are afraid of many things beſides Artillery, againſt which they are to provide by their arms and their orders: from whence it follows, that the better an Army is armed, and the cloſer and ſtronger it is drawn up, the ſafer it is. So that whoever is of that opinion, is indiſcreet or inconſiderate: for if we ſee that a ſmall part of the Arms of the ancients which is uſed at this day, (as the pike,) and a ſmall part of their order (which are the Battalions of the *Swiſſers*) have been ſo ſerviceable, and contributed ſuch ſtrength to our Armies, why may we not believe that the other Arms and orders which are laid aſide, might have been as beneficial and uſeful? Again, had we no regard to the Artillery in placing our ſelves in that ſtrait cloſe order like the *Swiſſers*, what other orders could make us more fearful? No order certainly can make us more fearful of the Artillery, than that which keeps men firm and cloſe together. Beſides, if I be not frighted by the Artillery of the enemy when I encamp before a Town, where they can fire upon me with more ſecurity, becauſe I cannot come at them by reaſon of the wall, nor hinder them but by my own Cannon, which will be a buſineſs of time; if I be not afraid, (I ſay) where they can multiply their Shot upon me as they pleaſe, why ſhould I fear them in the Field where I can run upon them, and poſſeſs them immediately? So that I conclude, Artillery in my opinion, is no ſufficient impediment why we ſhould not uſe the methods of our anceſtors, and practiſe their virtue and courage. And had I not diſcourſed formerly with you about this ſubject, I ſhould have enlarged more; but I ſhall refer my ſelf to what I ſaid then.

Luigi. We have heard (or at leaſt it is our own faults if we have not) what you have diſcourſed about the Artillery; and that the beſt courſe that can be taken againſt it, is to make our ſelves maſters of it with as much expedition as we can, if our Army be in the Field, and drawing up ready to engage. Upon which I have one ſcruple, becauſe to me it ſeems poſſible that the Enemy may place his Artillery in the flanks of his Army, ſo as that it might offend you more, and yet be more capable of being defended. You have made (if you remember) in the ranging of your Army for a Battle, a ſpace of four yards from Company to Company, and another ſpace of twenty yards from the Battalias to the Pikes extraordinary: if the Enemy ſhould draw up his Army in your own way, and place his Cannon in thoſe intervals, I believe from thoſe places they might gaul you exceedingly, and with great difficulty, becauſe you could not enter into the Enemies Body to poſſeſs them.

Fab. Your ſcruple is rational, and I will endeavour to diſcuſs it, or apply a remedy. I have told you that thoſe Battalias are in continual motion, either for a battle or a march, and do naturally ſo ſtraighten and cloſe themſelves, that if you make your intervals narrower where you place your Artillery, they will be cloſed up in a ſhort time, ſo as they will

not be able to do any execution. If you make your diſtances large, to avoid one danger, you incur a greater, by giving the Enemy opportunity not only to poſſeſs himſelf of your Cannon, but to rout your whole Army. But you muſt underſtand it is impoſſible to keep your Artillery among your Squadrons, eſpecially thoſe which are upon Carriages, becauſe being drawn one way, and their mouths lying the other, it is neceſſary to turn them before you can fire upon the Enemy; and to turn them takes up ſo much ſpace, that fifty of thoſe Carriages are enough to diſorder a whole Army. So that it is neceſſary the Artillery be placed without their Squadrons; and being ſo, they may be attack'd, as is ſaid before. But let us ſuppoſe it might be placed within the ſquadrons, and that a way might be found out of retaining it in the middle, and that it ſhould not hinder the cloſing of their bodies, nor leave a way open to the Enemy. I ſay, that even in that caſe the remedy is eaſy, and that is by making ſpaces and intervals in your Army for the bullets to paſs; by which means the fury of their Artillery will become vain: and it will be no hard matter to do this, becauſe the Enemy being deſirous that it may be ſecure, will place it behind in the fartheſt part of the intervals, ſo that to prevent their ſhot from doing miſchief among their own men, it is neceſſary that it paſs always in a right line, ſo that by giving place on your ſide, it is eaſily avoided. For this is a general rule, we muſt give place to any thing that we are not able to reſiſt, as the Ancients did to the Elephants and forked Chariots. I believe, and am aſſured that you think I have ranged the Armies, and won the day; yet let me tell you, (if what I have told you already be inſufficient) it would be impoſſible for an Army ſo armed and ordered, not to beat in the very firſt encounter any other Army that ſhould be arm'd and order'd according to the method of our times; which many times affords but one front, without any bucklers, and ſo ill arm'd, that they are not able to defend themſelves againſt any Enemy that is near them.

And for their way of drawing up, they do it in ſuch manner, that if they place their Battalias in the flank one of another, they make their Army too thin; if they place them behind one another, not having the way of receiving them into one another, they are all in confuſion, and their ranks eaſily broken. And though they give three names to their Armies, and divide them into three Bodies, the Van-guard, Battaile, and Rear-guard, yet they ſerve only upon a march, and for diſtinction of quarters; but in a Fight they are all at the mercy of fortune, and one ſmall charge defeats the whole Army.

Luigi. I have obſerved by the deſcription of the Battle, that your Horſe were repulſed by the Enemy's Horſe, and retired to your Pikes extraordinary, by whoſe aſſiſtance they not only ſuſtained the enemy, but beat him back again. I believe as you ſay, the Pikes may keep off the Horſe in a cloſe and groſs body like that of the *Swizzers*; but in your Army you have but five ranks of Pikes in the front, and ſeven in the flank, ſo that I cannot ſee how your Foot ſhould be able to ſuſtain them.

Fab. Though I told you formerly that in the *Macedonian Phalanx* ſix ranks of Pikes could charge at one time, yet you muſt underſtand, that if a Battalion of *Swizzers* ſhould conſiſt of a thouſand ranks, there could charge at once not above four or five at the moſt; becauſe their Pikes being nine yards long, and a yard and half is taken up betwixt their hands; ſo that in the firſt ranks they have free ſeven yards and a half. In the ſecond rank (beſides what is taken up betwixt their hands) a yard and a half is conſumed betwixt one rank and the other, ſo as there remains but ſix yards that can be uſed. In the third rank for the ſame reaſons there remains but four yards and a half; in the fourth, three yards; and in the fifth but one and a half. The other ranks therefore are not able to reach the Enemy, yet they ſerve to recruit the firſt ranks, as we have ſaid before, and are as a rampart and bulwark to the other five. If then five of their ranks are ſufficient to ſuſtain the Enemy's horſe, why may not five of our's do as much, having other ranks behind to reinforce them, and give them the ſame ſupport, though their Pikes be not ſo long? And if the ranks of extraordinary Pikes which are placed in the flanks ſhould be thought too thin, they may be put into a ſquare, and diſpoſed in the flank by the two Battalias which I place in the laſt ſquadron of the Army, from whence they may with eaſe relieve both the front or the rear, and give Aſſiſtance to the horſe as occaſion requires.

Luigi. Would you always uſe this order when-ever you were to give the Enemy Battle?

Fab. No, by no means; for the form of your Army is to be changed, according to the ſituation of the place, and the ſtrength or number of the Enemy, as I ſhall ſhew by example before I finiſh my diſcourſe. But this form or model is recommended to you not as the beſt, (though in effect it is ſo) but as a rule from whence you may take your other orders, and by which you may underſtand the other ways of drawing up an Army; for every Science has its Generalities upon which it is moſt commonly founded. Only one thing I would

would preſs upon you to remember, and that is, That you never draw your Army up ſo, as that your front cannot be relieved by your rear; for whoever is guilty of that error, renders the greateſt part of his Army unſerviceable, and can never overcome, if he meets with the leaſt oppoſition and courage.

Luigi. I have a new ſcruple that is riſen in my mind. I have obſerved that in the diſpoſing of your Battalias, you make your front of five Battalias drawn up by the ſides one of another; your middle of three, and your rear of two; and I ſhould think it would have been better to have done quite contrary; becauſe in my opinion an Army is broken with more difficulty, when the Enemy which charges it finds more Firmneſs and Reſiſtance the further he enters it; whereas it ſeems to me, that according to your order, the farther he enters it, the weaker he finds it.

Fabr. If you remembred how the *Triarii* (which were the third order of the *Roman* Legions) conſiſted only of 600 men, you would be better ſatisfied, when you underſtood they were placed always in the rear: for you would ſee that I, according to that example, have placed two Battalias in the rear, which conſiſt of 900 men; ſo that I chooſe rather in my imitation of the *Romans*, to err in taking more men than fewer. And though this Example might be ſufficient to content you, yet I ſhall give you the reaſon, and it is this: The front of the Army is made thick and ſolid, becauſe it is that which is to endure the firſt ſhock and inſult of the Enemy; and being not to receive any recruits from elſewhere, it is convenient that it be well manned, for a few would leave it too weak, and the ranks too thin. But the ſecond Squadron, being to receive its friends into it, before it is to engage with the Enemy, it is neceſſary that it has two great intervals, and by conſequence muſt conſiſt of a leſs number than the firſt. For ſhould it conſiſt of a greater number, or be but equal to the firſt, either there muſt be no ſpaces or intervals at all, which would occaſion diſorder; or by leaving of ſpaces, they would exceed the proportion of the firſt Squadron, which would make your Army look very imperfect. As to what you ſay touching the impreſſion of the Enemy, that the farther he enters your Army, the weaker he finds it, it is clearly a miſtake; for the Enemy cannot engage the ſecond body, before the firſt is fallen into it; ſo that he finds the middle Battalion rather ſtronger than weaker, being to fight both with the firſt and ſecond together. And it is the ſame thing when the Enemy advances to the laſt Squadron; for there he has to encounter not only two freſh Battalias, but with all the Battalions united and entire: And becauſe this laſt Battalion is to receive more men, it is neceſſary the diſtances be greater, and by conſequence that their number be leſs.

Luigi. I am very well ſatisfied with what you have ſaid, but pray anſwer me this; If the five firſt Battalias retire into the three Battalias which are in the middle, and then thoſe eight into the two Battalias in the rear, I cannot conceive it poſſible that the eight Battalias firſt, and afterwards the ten, can be comprehended (when eight or ten) in the ſame ſpace as when they were but five.

Fabr. The firſt thing I anſwer is this, That the ſpace is not the ſame; for the five Battalias in the front were drawn up with four ſpaces in the middle, which were cloſed up when they fell in with the three Battalias in the midſt, or the two in the rear. Beſides there remains the ſpace betwixt the Battalions, and that alſo which is betwixt the Battalias and the Pikes extraordinary; which ſpaces altogether, do give them room enough.

To this it may be added, That the Battalias take up another place when they are drawn up in order before their retreat, than they do after they are preſſed; for in their retreat, they either contract or extend their Orders. They open their Orders, when they fly: they contract them when they retreat; ſo that in this caſe it would be beſt to contract. Beſides the five ranks of Pikes in the Van, having received the firſt charge, are to fall back thorough the Battalias into the rear of the Army, and give way to the *Scudati* or Shields to advance; and thoſe Pikes falling into the rear of the Army, may be ready for any Service in which their Captain ſhall think fit to employ them; whereas, did they not retire after the Battle was joyned, they would be altogether uſeleſs. And by this means the ſpaces which were left to that purpoſe, are made big enough to receive all forces that are remaining. And yet if thoſe ſpaces were not ſufficient, the flanks on both ſides are men and not walls, which opening and enlarging their ranks, can make ſuch diſtances as will be able to receive them.

Luigi. The ranks of Pikes extraordinary which you place in the flank of your Army, when the Battalias in the front fall back into the Battalias in the middle, would your have them ſtand firm, and continue, as two wings to the Army, or would you have them retire with the Battalias? If you were willing they ſhould, I do not ſee how it is poſſible, having no Battalias (with intervals) behind them to give them reception.

Fabr. If when the Enemy forces the Battalias to retire, he does not preſs them too hard, they may ſtand firm in their order, and flank the Enemy when the Battalias in the front are retired. But if they be charged (as may be reaſonably expected) and the Enemy be ſo ſtrong as to force the other, they may retire with them, and that without difficulty, though there be no Battalias behind with ſpaces to receive them; for the Body in the midſt may double to the right, and thruſt one File into another, as we ſhall ſhew more at large when we ſpeak of the manner of doubling of Files. 'Tis true, to double in a retreat you muſt take another way than what I have deſcribed, for I told you the ſecond rank was to enter into the firſt, the fourth into the third, and ſo on: But here in this caſe we muſt not begin in the Front, but in the Rear, to the end that by doubling our ranks we may retreat, and not advance.

CHAP. VIII.

The Exerciſes of an Army in general.

Fabr. TO anſwer now to whatever may be objected againſt my Battle, as I have drawn it up before you, I muſt tell you again that I have ordered and engaged it in that manner for two reaſons; one to ſhew you how it is to be drawn up, the other to ſhew you how it is to be exerciſed. As to the drawing up of an Army, I doubt not but you underſtand it very well, and as to the exerciſing, I muſt tell you, it ought to be done as often as poſſible, that the Captains may learn to keep their Companies in theſe orders; for it belongs to every particular Soldier to keep the orders exact in every Battalia; and to every Captain to keep his Company exact with the order of the whole Army, and know how to obey the Command of the General. It is convenient likewiſe that they underſtand how to joyn one Battalia with another, how to take their place in a moment; and therefore it is convenient that the Colours of each Company may have its number of Soldiers deſcribed in it, for the greater commodity of commanding them, and that the Captain and Soldiers may underſtand one another with the more eaſe; and as in the Battalias, ſo it is convenient likewiſe in the Battalions, that their numbers ſhould be known, and deſcribed in the Colonel's Enſign: That you ſhould know the number of the Battalion in the left or right wing; as alſo of the Battalias in the front, or the middle, and ſo conſequently of the reſt. It is convenient likewiſe that there be degrees of Offices and Commands, to raiſe men as it were by ſteps, to the great honours of an Army. For example, The firſt degree ſhould be File-leaders, or Corporals; The ſecond ſhould have the command of fifty ordinary *Velites*; The third of a hundred, with the title of *Centurion*; The fourth ſhould command the firſt Battalia; the fifth, the ſecond; the ſixth, the third; and ſo on to the tenth *Battalia*, whoſe place ſhould be next in honour to the Captain General of the *Battalion*, to which command no perſon ſhould be advanced, but he who has paſſed all thoſe degrees. And becauſe beſides theſe Officers, there are three *Conſtables* or Commanders of the Pikes extraordinary, and two of the *Velites* extraordinay, I did not much care if they were placed in the ſame quality with the Captain of the firſt *Battalia*, nor would it trouble me if ſix men more were preferred to the ſame degree, that each of them might put himſelf forward, and do ſome extraordinary thing to be preferred to the ſecond *Battalia*. If then each of theſe Captains underſtands in what place his *Battalia* is to be ranged, it muſt neceſſarily follow, that at the firſt ſound of the Trumpet (the Standard being erected) the whole Army will fall into its place. And this is the firſt exerciſe to which an Army is to be accuſtomed, that is to ſay, to cloſe and fall in one with another; to do which, it is convenient to train them often, and uſe them to it every day.

Luigi. What mark and difference would you appoint for the Standard of the whole Army, beſides the number deſcribed as aforeſaid?

Fabritio. The Lieutenant General's Enſign ſhould have the Arms of his General or Prince, and all the reſt ſhould have the ſame Arms with ſome variation in the Field or Colours, as the Prince ſhall think beſt; for it imports not much what their Colours are, ſo they diſtinguiſh one Company from another. But let us paſs to the other exerciſe, in which an Army is to be train'd; that is, in its motions, to be taught how to march, advance, or fall back with exact diſtance and time, and to be ſure that in their marches a juſt order be obſerved. The third exerciſe is, Teaching them to manage their Arms, and charge in ſuch a manner, as that afterwards they may do both dexterouſly when they come to fight; teaching them how to play their Artillery, and how to draw

them

them off, when there is occaſion; Teaching the *Velites* extraordinary to advance out of their places, and after a counterfeit charge, to retreat to them again: Teaching the firſt *Battalias* (as if they were over-powered) to fall back into the intervals of the ſecond; and all of them afterwards into the third; and having done ſo, to divide again, and return to their old poſts; in ſhort, they are ſo to be accuſtomed in this exerciſe, that every thing may be known, and familiar to every Soldier; which, with continual practice, is eaſily obtained. The fourth exerciſe inſtructs your Soldiers in the uſefulneſs of the Drums, and Trumpets, and Colours, informing them of the Commands of their Captain, by the beating of the one, the ſounding of the other, and the diſplaying and flouriſhing of the third: for being well uſed to them, they will underſtand what they are to do by them, as well as if they were directed by word of mouth. And becauſe the effects of theſe Commands depend altogether upon theſe kind of ſounds, I ſhall tell you what kind of Inſtruments the Ancients made uſe of in their Wars. The *Lacedamonians* (if we may believe *Thucidides*) in their Armies made uſe of the Flute, conceiving that Harmony more apt to infuſe gravity than fury into their Soldiers. Induced by the ſame reaſon, the *Carthaginians* ſounded their charges upon the Harp; with which Inſtrument they began the Fight. *Aliate* King of *Lidia*, in his Wars made uſe of them both: But *Alexander* the Great, and the *Romans*, uſed Horns and Trumpets, ſuppoſing the clangor and noiſe of thoſe Inſtruments would enflame the courage of their men, and make them more valiant in Fight. But as in the arming of our Army, we have followed the way both of the *Greek* and the *Roman*; ſo in the choice of our Inſtruments of Intelligence, I would follow the Cuſtoms both of the one Nation and the other. I would have therefore the Trumpets placed by the Lieutenant General, as Inſtruments not only proper to excite and enflame your Army, but fitter to be heard, and by conſequence apter to derive your Commands than any of the other. The reſt of thoſe kind of Inſtruments I would have placed about the Captains and Colonels of the Battalions: I would have alſo a ſmaller ſort of Drums and Flutes, which ſhould be beaten and played upon not as we do now in our Fights, but as our Tabors and Flagelets do in our Feaſts: The General with his Trumpets ſhould ſignifie when his Army is to make a ſtand, when to advance, when to wheel, when to retire, when to make uſe of the Artillery, when the *Velites* extraordinary are to move, and by the variation of the ſounds, to direct his Army in all the Marches and Counter-marches that are generally uſed; and I would have the Trumpets followed afterwards by the Drums. And becauſe this exerciſe is of great conſequence in an Army, it imports very much that it be frequently taught. As to the Horſe, they ſhould have Trumpets too, but of a leſſer and different ſound from thoſe about the Lieutenant-General. And this is all that has occurred to my memory in the ordering and exerciſing of an Army.

Luigi. I beſeech you, Sir, let me not trouble you too much, if I deſire to be ſatisfied in one thing more; and that is, for what reaſon you cauſed your light Horſe and *Velites* extraordinary to advance againſt the Enemy with great ſhouts and clamours, and cries; and when afterwards the Body and remainder of the Army came to charge, they did it with extraordinary ſilence? I confeſs I cannot comprehend the reaſon, and therefore I beg your explanation.

Fabr. The opinions of the Ancient Generals have been different in that point, whether an Enemy was to be charged ſilently and without noiſe, or with all the clamour could be made: The ſilent way is beſt to keep your men firm in their orders, and to ſignify the Commands of the General: but the obſtreperous way is beſt to excite the courage of your Soldiers, and diſmay the Enemy: and becauſe I thought in both caſes there was ſomething of advantage, I made uſe of them both, and cauſed thoſe to advance with clamour, and theſe with ſilence; for I cannot think that an univerſal and perpetual noiſe can be any advantage, becauſe it hinders orders from being derived, which is a moſt pernicious thing: nor is it likely that the *Romans* uſed thoſe ſhouts after the firſt ſhock, for Hiſtory tells us, that many times, by the exhortation and encouragement of their Officers, the Soldiers which were flying, were ſtopped, and rallyed, and diſpoſed immediately into new Orders, which could not be, where the Officers could not have been heard.

THE

THE Fourth BOOK.

CHAP. I.

The conſiderations and ſubtleties to be uſed in the drawing up an Army to fight.

Luigi. SEEing the Victory has been ſo honourably obtained under my Conduct, I think it diſcretion to tempt fortune no farther, knowing how much ſhe is variable, and inconſtant. Wherefore my deſire is to reſign my Authority, and that *Zanobi* may take it upon him according to the Order propoſed of transferring it to the youngeſt: and I know he will not refuſe that honour, (or rather trouble) both in complacency to me, and as being naturally the more couragious of the two; for he fears not to engage in theſe kind of conflicts, though there be as much likelihood of his miſcarriage as conqueſt.

Zanobi. I ſhall refuſe no Office into which you ſhall put me, though I muſt needs ſay, I could more willingly have been an auditor; for your ſcruples and demands have hitherto given me more ſatisfaction, than any thing I could have objected my ſelf. But I think, *Seignor Fabritio*, it would be better if you proceed (provided your patience will ſerve, and that we do not tire you with our Ceremonies)

Fabritio. You rather oblige me, Sir, for this variety of Interrogators gives me to underſtand the variety of your judgments and appetites. But is there any thing behind that you would have added to what has been ſpoken before?

Zanobi. There are two things of which I would willingly be ſatisfied before we paſs any farther. One is, whether you have any other way of drawing up an Army: The other is, what reflections or conſiderations a General is to have, before he comes to a Battle; and when any accident intervenes, how it is to be avoided.

Fabr. I ſhall endeavour to ſatisfie you, but not by anſwering diſtinctly to your demands; for whilſt I anſwer to one, it happens many times that I ſeem to anſwer to the other; I have told you how I would have my Army drawn up, that according to that model any other Figure may be taken, as the number of the Enemy, and the nature of your ground does require; for in that caſe, one is to act according to the condition both of the one and the other.

But take notice of this, That there is no way more dangerous, than to extend the front of your Army too much, unleſs it be very numerous and ſtrong: Otherwiſe you are to draw it up cloſe and thick, rather than wide and thin. For when your Forces are few in reſpect of the Enemy, you muſt look out for other remedies: as by drawing your Army up, ſo as it may be fortified by ſome River, or Fen, that may ſecure you behind; or fortified in the flanks by ſome Ditch or Entrenchment, as *Cæſar*'s was in *France*; and this ought to be a general rule to you, that you extend or contract your front according both to your own number, and the number of your Enemy. If the Enemy be not ſo numerous, and your men as well diſciplin'd as they, you are to make choice of an open place, where you may not only encompaſs the Enemy, but diſtend your own ranks: For in ſtreight and narrow places, not being able to make uſe of your orders, you cannot make uſe of your advantage. For this reaſon the *Romans* did moſt commonly make choice of open and clear places, and avoided ſuch as were difficult and cloſe. But if your Army be ſmall, or your men inexperienced, you muſt do quite contrary (as I ſaid before) and muſt find out ſome place where your few men may defend themſelves, or where their inexperience may do you no hurt: In that caſe you are to chooſe ſome hill or eminence, from whence you may come down upon the Enemy with more force; yet muſt you have this caution not to draw up your Army upon any Strand or Sea-coaſt, nor under the command of any Hill

of

of which the Enemy may poſſeſs himſelf, becauſe you will be expoſed thereby to the Enemies Cannon without remedy, and be unable to do them miſchief with any convenience. In the drawing up an Army for Battle, great regard is likewiſe to be had to the Sun and the Wind, that neither the one nor the other be in your face, for they are great impediments to your ſight, one with its beams, and the other by raiſing the duſt, and carrying the powder into your eyes; beſides, the Wind being contrary, is a great diſadvantage in rendring the blows which they give the Enemy more languid and weak; and as to the Sun, you muſt not only take care that it be not in your face, nor does you no prejudice in the beginning of the Fight, but that it does you no injury when it gets up: wherefore the beſt way is when you draw up your men, to have it if poſſible on their backs, that many hours may paſs before it can come about into their faces.

Hanibal knew this advantage very well, and made uſe of it in the Battle of *Cannæ*, and *Marius* did the ſame againſt the *Cimbrians*. If you be weaker in Horſe, it is your beſt way to draw up among the Vines or the Woods, and ſuch other impediments, as in our times the *Spaniards* did when they beat the *French* in the Kingdom of *Naples*, near *Carignuola*. And it has been many times ſeen that the ſame Soldiers which have been worſted and baffled before, by only changing their order, and ſhifting their ground, have recovered the Victory: Thus it was with the *Carthagenians*, who having been many times worſted by *Marcus Regulus*, were afterwards Victorious by the Conduct of *Kantippus* the *Lacedamonian*, who cauſed them to come down into the plain, where they might have room for their Horſe, and their Elephants, and by ſo doing they were too hard for the *Romans*.

According to the practice of the Ancients, I have obſerved, That all great Generals when they have known which quarter of the Enemy was the ſtrongeſt, and where they have fortify'd moſt, they have not oppoſed the ſtrongeſt part of their Army againſt it; but have choſe rather to confront it with the weakeſt of their diviſions, and with their ſtrongeſt attack the weakeſt of their Enemy's. When afterwards they came to engage, they commanded the ſtrongeſt of their Squadrons that they ſhould not only ſtand firm, and receive the charge without making any advance, whilſt the weaker parts had orders to ſuffer themſelves to be overcome, and by giving ground gradually, to fall behind the rear of the Army. The Artifice procures two great diſorders to the Enemy: The firſt is, that the ſtrongeſt part of his Army is environ'd inſenſibly; the other is, that imagining their Victory certain by the retreat of their Enemy, they fall frequently into diſorder, which many times robs them of that Victory of which they thought themſelves ſo certain. *Cornelius Scipio* being in *Spain* againſt the *Carthagenians*, under the command of *Aſdrubal*, and knowing that *Aſdrubal* underſtood very well that in the drawing up his Army, he put the *Roman* Legions (which were the ſtrength and flower of his Army) in the midſt, and that *Aſdrubal* in probability would do the like; when they come afterwards to fight, he changed his order, put his Legions in the Wings, and his light-arm'd men in the Body: When the Battle was joined, he commanded his Body to ſlacken their march on a ſudden, and the Wings to double their pace; ſo that only the Wings on both ſides engaged, and the Bodies on both ſides being at a diſtance one from the other, came not up to one another, and the ſtrongeſt part of *Scipio*'s Army fighting better than the weakeſt of *Aſdrubal*'s, he overcame them. In thoſe days that ſtratagem was well enough; but in our days by reaſon of our Artillery, it is impracticable; for the ſpace which would be left betwixt the two Bodies, would give opportunity to the Artillery to play, which as we ſaid before would be very dangerous: So then that way is to be laid aſide; and the way which I recommended before is to be uſed, which is to charge with your whole Army, and let your weakeſt Squadrons retire. When a General finds his Army ſtronger than his Enemy's, if he would encompaſs it inſenſibly, and that the Enemy may not prevent him, let him draw up his Army to an equal front with the Adverſary: afterwards in the heat of the Fight let him order by little and little to retire in the front, and let the Wings advance as gradually, and it will always happen that the Enemy ſhall be encompaſs'd before he is aware.

When a General would fight, and be ſure not to be routed, let him draw up his Army near ſome place of retreat or ſecurity, as either Fens, Mountains, or ſome ſtrong inexpugnable Town; for in that caſe he may purſue the Enemy, but the Enemy cannot purſue him. *Hanibal* made uſe of this cunning when his fortune began to decline, and he began to apprehend the conduct of *Marcellus*. Some Generals, to diſturb the orders of the Enemy, have commanded their light-armed men to begin the Battle, and when it is once joined, to retire among the ranks. When afterwards it grows hotter, and both ſides are thoroughly engaged, they have had orders to draw forth out of the flanks of the Army, and having flanked the Enemy unexpectedly, they have diſorder'd

der'd and broke him. If any one finds himſelf weaker in Horſe, beſides the ways propoſed before, he may place a Battalia of Pikes behind them, and draw them up in ſuch manner, that in the heat of the Battle they may open, and give way for the Pikes to paſs thorough them, and by ſo doing, he ſhall be ſure to prevail. Several have accuſtomed their light-armed men to fight among their Horſe, and they have been found to give the Horſe very good aſſiſtance.

Of all thoſe who are famous for drawing up Battles, *Hanibal* and *Scipio* are the moſt renowned, for the great skill that both of them expreſſed in their conflict in *Africa*; but becauſe *Hanibal*'s Army was compoſed of *Carthagenians*, and Auxiliaries of ſeveral Nations, he placed 80 Elephants in his front; behind them he placed his Auxiliaries, next them his *Carthagenians*, and laſt of all his *Italians*, in whom he could not ſafely confide: and the reaſon why he ordered them ſo, was becauſe the Auxiliaries having the Enemy in their faces, and finding themſelves cloſed up with *Carthagenians* at their backs, ſhould not think of flying; but being under a neceſſity to fight, he did hope they might either overcome, or ſo harraſs the Enemy, that when he came up with his freſh men, he might the more eaſily overthrow them. Againſt this order *Scipio* placed his *Haſtati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*, in his accuſtomed manner, ſo as upon occaſion they might be received one into the other.

The front of his Army he made up with great ſpaces; but that it might appear cloſe and united to the Enemy, he filled them up with his *Velites*, with order that as ſoon as the Elephants come upon them, they ſhould retire, and entring among the Legions by the ordinary ſpaces, leave a way open for the Elephants to paſs; by which means the fury and execution of the Elephants being evaded, they came preſently to handy-blows, and the *Carthagenians* were overcome.

Zanobi. In your deſcription of the Fight, you have cauſed me to remember how *Scipio* in the Engagement cauſed not his *Haſtati* to retire into the ranks of the *Principes*, but divided them, and cauſed them to retire into the Wings of the Army, to give place to the *Principes* when they were to advance againſt the Enemy: I would know therefore for what reaſon he differed from the ordinary cuſtom.

Fabritio. I will tell you: *Hanibal* had placed the ſtrength of his Army in the ſecond diviſion; ſo that *Scipio*, to oppoſe them with equal courage, united the *Principes* and the *Triarii* together, inſomuch as the intervals of the *Principes* being filled up by the *Triarii*, there was no ſpaces left for the reception of the *Haſtati*; wherefore he cauſed the *Haſtati* to open to the right and left, and fall in with the Wings of the Army. But you muſt obſerve that this way of dividing the firſt Squadron, is not to be uſed but when the other is Superior; for then you may do it conveniently, as *Scipio* did; but being Inferior or under any Repulſe, it is not to be done without manifeſt danger, and therefore it is neceſſary that you have ſpaces behind in your other Squadrons that may be ready to receive you.

But to return to our diſcourſe. The ancient *Aſians*, among other contrivances to miſchief their Enemy, made uſe of certain Chariots with Sythes faſtened to the Sides of them, which ſerved not only to open the Squadrons of the Enemy with their force, but to cut and kill them with their Sythes. Againſt theſe Chariots, they had three ways to defend themſelves; either by the cloſeneſs of their ranks, or by receiving them into their ranks (as they did the Elephants) or by ſome other vigorous reſiſtance, as *Silla* the *Roman* did againſt *Archelaus*, who had ſtore of thoſe Chariots; to repel them *Silla* cauſed ſeveral ſtakes to be pitched into the ground before his firſt Squadron, which putting a ſtop to the carrier of the ſaid Chariots, prevented the execution which they would otherwiſe have done. And it is obſervable the new method that *Silla* uſed in ranging his Army; for placing his *Velites* and Light-horſe behind, and all his compleat arm'd Soldiers before, he left intervals ſufficient to receive them, which were behind when they had occaſion to march up; ſo that the Fight being begun, by the aſſiſtance of the Horſe (who had room to paſs thorough the firſt Squadron to the charge) he obtained the Victory.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

The Arts which are to be used during the Fight.

Fabr. TO disturb the Army of the enemy when the Battle is joined, it is necessary to invent some way or other to affright them, either by spreading a report of supplies that are hard by, or counterfeiting some representation of them that may dismay the enemy, and facilitate their defeat.

Minutius Ruffus and *Acilius Glabrio*, two of the Roman Consuls, were skilful in this art. *Caius Sulpitius* caused all the boys and refuse of his Army to mount upon mules and other beasts that were unserviceable in fight, and placed them at a distance upon a hill, and drawn up in such order that they appeared like a compleat Body of horse, when he was engaged with the *French*, and the enemies apprehension of that body got *Sulpitius* the Victory. *Marius* made use of the same stratagem when he fought against the *Germans*. If then these false alarms and representations are of such use and advantage in time of Battle, true ones must needs be more efficacious, especially if they fall upon the enemies flank or rear whilst the battle is joined: which indeed is not easy to be done, unless the nature of the Country contributes; for if it be open and plain, you cannot conceal any part of your Forces, as is necessary to be done in those cases; but in woody or mountainous Countries you may conceal some of your Troops in such manner, as they may fall suddenly and unexpectedly upon the enemy, which will give you a certain Victory. It is many times of great importance to spread a rumour abroad during the Fight, that the enemies General is slain, or that he is beaten in another part of the Army, which (as the other) has many times been the cause of a Victory. The enemies horse are often disordered by the representation of strange figures, or the making of some unusual noise, as *Crœsus* did, who opposed camels against horse; and *Pyrrhus*, when he confronted their Calvalry with his Elephants; the strangeness of which fight affrighted them so, that nothing was strong enough to keep them from disorder. In our days the *Turk* defeated the *Sophi* of *Persia*, and the *Soldan* of *Syria* only with the noise of his Guns, which being unusual to their horse, disordered them in such manner, that the *Turk* got the Victory without any great trouble. The *Spaniards*, to distract the Army of *Amilcar*, placed in the front of their Army certain Chariots filled with flax, and drawn by oxen, to which flax (when the enemy came up to charge) they put fire, and the oxen running from the fire, rush'd furiously into the Army of *Amilcar*, and put it to the rout. It is an unusual practice (as we have said before) to surprize and disturb the enemy with ambuscades where the Country is convenient; but where it is open and large, many have made great holes in the ground, and covered them with straw and earth lightly, leaving certain places solid and firm for their own retreat; over which having retired cunningly in the heat of the fight, the enemy pursuing, has fallen in, and been ruined. If during the Fight any ill accident happens that may discourage your Soldiers, 'tis prudence to dissemble it, and turn it to advantage, as *Tullus Hostilius* did, and *Lucius Sylla*, who observing in the heat of the Battle a party of his Troops go over to the enemy, to the great disheartning of the rest, caused it to be published quite thorough his Army that it was done by his order, which not only dispelled the apprehension that was among them, but encouraged them in such manner that got him the Victory. *Sylla* having commanded out a party upon some enterprize, and all of them being killed in sight of his Army, that the rest might not be terrify'd, told them he sent them on purpose, because he had found them unfaithful. *Sertorius* fighting a battle in *Spain*, slew one of his own men, who brought him news that one of his great Officers was killed, and the reason was, lest telling it to the rest, it might possibly have discouraged them. It is no easy matter to detain an Army, (if it be once tottering and inclining to run) and to bring it to fight again: but you must consider it with this distinction, either it is wholly disordered, and then it is impossible to recover it; or else it is disordered but in part, and there is some remedy. Many of the *Roman* Generals have stop'd the flight of their Armies, by putting themselves at the head of them, and as it were upbraiding them by their cowardice. *Lucius Sylla* seeing part of his Troops routed, and pursued by the forces of *Mithridates*, rode up to the head of them with his sword in his hand, and cried out to them, *If any body ask you where you have left your General, tell him you left him fighting in* Boetia. *Atilius* the Consul opposed those who fought bravely against those who ran away; telling them that if they did not face about, they should be killed by their friends as well as their enemies. *Philip* King of *Macedon* understanding that his Soldiers were afraid of the

Scythians, placed behind his Army certain of the faithfulleſt of his horſe, with commiſſion to kill any man that fled; ſo that his men chooſing to die rather fighting than flying, overcame their adverſaries. Several of the *Roman* Generals have wreſted an Enſign out of the hands of their Soldiers, and throwing it among the enemy, promiſed a reward to him who ſhould recover it; and this they did not ſo much to hinder the flight of their own men, as to give them occaſion of doing ſome greater exploit upon the enemy.

CHAP. III.

Stratagems after the Fight.

Fabr. I Do not think it impertinent to add to this diſcourſe ſuch things as happen after the Fight, eſpecially ſeeing they are but ſhort, and not to be omitted becauſe they are conformable to the matter which we have in hand. But ſince one of theſe two things muſt happen, either that we gain the Victory, or looſe it; I ſay, that when we gain it, we are to purſue it with the greateſt diligence we can, and rather imitate *Cæſar* in this caſe than *Hanibal*, who for not following his Victory, and puſhing it on after he had defeated the *Romans* at *Cannæ*, loſt the whole Empire of the *Romans*, which fortune had almoſt thruſt into his hands. *Cæſar* on the other ſide never reſted after a Victory, but followed the enemy with greater fury than he attack'd them at firſt. But when the day is loſt, a wiſe General is to conſider the beſt that he can make of it, eſpecially if there be any thing of his Army remaining.

The advantage that may ariſe is from the inadvertency of the enemy, who many times tranſported with his ſucceſs, grows negligent and remiſs, and gives opportunity to the enemy to revenge himſelf, as *Martius* the *Roman* did upon the *Carthaginian* Army, who having ſlain the two *Scipios*, and routed their forces, not valuing thoſe which remained, were ſuddenly aſſaulted and broken; for it is frequently ſeen, nothing is perpetrable ſo eaſily, as what the enemy fancies you can never attempt; for commonly men ſuffer moſt, where they are moſt ſecure. A General therefore, when he cannot carry the Victory, is to endeavour with all poſſible induſtry that his loſs may be as little as may be; and to do this, it is neceſſary to order things ſo, that the enemy may not eaſily purſue, or be in a capacity to retard you.

As to the way of hindering the purſuit of the Conqueror; ſeveral Generals, as ſoon as they found their condition, and that it was not poſſible to continue the Fight, have ordered their inferior Commanders to ſeperate, and fly in ſeveral parties, and meet again at a place which he aſſigned; and the enemy not daring to divide his Army for fear of a deſign, has let all or the greateſt part of the conquered eſcape. Others have thrown the beſt of their goods in the way, that the enemy following might be delayed by the prize, and ſuffer them to get off. *Titus Dimius* uſed no ſmall art to conceal the loſs which he had ſuſtained in the fight; for having endured the brunt of the Battle from morning till night with the loſs of many of his men; when night came, he cauſed moſt of them to be buried privately: the next morning the enemy finding ſo many of their own men dead and ſo few of the *Romans*, concluded themſelves beaten, and fled. And now I ſuppoſe (though confuſedly) I have in ſome meaſure ſatisfy'd your demands.

CHAP. IV.

Two other ways of ranging an Army to fight.

Fabr. 'TIs true, as to the form and model of drawing up an Army to fight, it remains that I let you know, that ſometimes ſome Generals have drawn them up in the figure of a wedge pointing in the front, ſuppoſing it the propereſt way to pierce and make an impreſſion upon the enemy. In oppoſition to this, the way was for the adverſary to draw up in the figure of a pair of ſhears, which being opened, were to receive the point of the wedge, encloſe it, and charge it on all ſides. And about this, let me recommend to you this general rule, that the beſt remedy to be uſed againſt the deſign of an enemy, is to do that bravely of your ſelf, to which you perceive he would endeavour to force you, for doing it voluntarily you do it orderly, and to your own profit and

advantage; whereas if you do it by conſtraint, you do it to your ruin. I will not repeat any thing that I have ſaid before, to confirm my diſcourſe. But this is moſt certain, if your adverſary thinks to open, and as it were cleave your Army with his wedge, if you keep your Army open in the figure of the ſhears, and receive them in the middle, you cut them to pieces, and they can do you no hurt.

Hanibal placed his Elephants in the front of his Army, thinking thereby to have pierced the Army of *Scipio* with more eaſe; but *Scipio* ranging his men in the form of a pair of ſhears, and receiving him in an open poſture, gained the Victory, and *Hanibal* was loſt.

Aſdrubal placed the beſt and ſtrongeſt of his men in the front of his Army, to make the better charge upon the Enemy; *Scipio* commanding his middle men in the front to retreat inſenſibly, and give place, was ſo cunningly obeyed, that the Enemy was drawn in, and defeated: ſo that you ſee thoſe deſigns are many times the occaſion of his Victory againſt whom they are deſigned.

CHAP V.

Of the conſtraint and advantage a man may have to Fight.

Fabr. IF my memory does not fail, it remains yet that I ſay ſomething touching the things which a wiſe General is to conſider before he comes to an engagement. And the firſt thing I ſhall ſay upon this ſubject is, that a General is never to come to a Field-fight unleſs he be conſtrained, or has ſome more than ordinary advantage. His advantage may lie in the nature of the Place, in the diſcipline of his Army, or the number or excellence of his Men. And his neceſſity conſiſts in finding his condition ſuch, that without fighting he muſt be certainly deſtroyed: as where money is wanting, where victuals are defective, and where the Enemy is in expectation of ſupplies: in theſe caſes a General is always to venture, tho' he fights upon diſadvantage; for 'tis better fighting where fortune may favour you, than not to try her at all, and be certainly ruined; and in this caſe it would be as great a fault in a General not to fight, as it would be if he had an opportunity of defeating his adverſary, and was either too ignorant to know it, or too cowardly or dilatary to make uſe of it. The advantages which occur in the conduct of war, do many times proceed from the Enemy, and ſometimes from your prudence. Many have been ſurprized and routed in their paſſage over Rivers, by the dexterity of the Enemy, who having forborn them till half of them were over, have fallen ſuddenly upon them, and put them to the rout, as *Cæſar* ſerved the *Swizzers* when he cut off a fourth part of their Army, by reaſon that they were ſeparated by a River. Sometimes it happens that your Enemy is tired, and weary, having followed you with too much haſte and inconſideration; and in that Caſe, finding your own Army vigorous and ſtrong, you are not to loſe your opportunity. Beſides, if your Enemy preſents you Battle in the morning betimes, you are not immediately to draw out your Army and fight him, but are rather to protract and ſpin out the time for ſome hours, (ſtill offering and pretending to come forth) that their impatience of delay, or ſtanding ſo long to their Arms, may rebate the fury with which they came; and as ſoon as you find them cool, and off of their firſt ardor, then you may come forth, and charge them as ſmartly as you can. *Scipio* and *Metellus* made uſe of this way in *Spain*, the one againſt *Aſdrubal*, the other againſt *Sertorius*. If the Enemy has leſſened his power by dividing his Army, (as *Scipio* did in *Spain*) or by any other occaſion, then alſo a good General may try his fortune with credit.

The greateſt part of the graveſt Generals have choſen rather to receive than give the charge, becauſe the fury of an Enemy is eaſily ſuſtained by thoſe who ſtand firm and cloſe in their ſtation; and being once check'd, it turns into cowardize. *Fabius* being ſent againſt the *Samnites* and the *Gauls*, received their fury with that compoſedneſs and tranquility, that he conquered them both, but *Decius* his Colleague not following his example, miſcarried, and was ſlain. Some who have been poſſeſſed too much of the courage of their Enemy, have choſe to begin the Fight in the Evening towards night, that their Army being worſted, might get off, or defend themſelves by the benefit of the darkneſs. Others underſtanding the ſuperſtition of the Enemy, and that on certain days they devote themſelves wholly to Religion, and will not endeavour to fight, have choſen that time to attack them, and have carried the Victory. *Cæſar* made uſe of this way againſt *Arioviſtus* in *France*, and *Veſpaſian* did the ſame in *Syria* againſt the *Jews*, who upon their Sabbath would not ſo much as defend themſelves againſt the *Romans*.

CHAP. VI.

Directions for a General.

Fabr. THere is nothing of more importance to the General of an Army, than to have about him persons that are faithful, experienced in war, and prudent in Counsel, with whom he may constantly advise, and confer both about his own Men, and the Enemy; as which is the most numerous, which the best arm'd, which the best mounted, which the best exercised, which the most patient of labour and distress, and whether the Horse or the Foot are to be relied upon most.

The next thing to be considered is the place where he is, whether it be more advantageous for the Enemy than for him; which is most easily supply'd with provisions; whether it be best to fight presently, or protract; and what he may gain or suffer thereby: for many times the Soldiers disgusted at the tediousness of the war, grow lazy and remiss, and coming at length to be weary, they either grow mutinous, or run away. But above all things, I would advise a General to inform himself of the nature and qualification of his adversary the Enemies General, whether he be rash, or wary, and what counsel he has about him. The next thing he is to consider, is, whether he can confide in his Auxiliaries or not: and be sure never to bring his Army to a Battle, if he finds them under any apprehension, or with the least distrust of the Victory; for the greatest sign of miscarriage, is despair, and when they think it impossible to prevail. In this case therefore you are to avoid fighting, either by following the example of *Fabius Maximus*, (who encamped his Army in places of such advantage, that *Hanibal* durst not attack him) or else if you suspect the Enemy will venture upon you in your entrenchments, and that you shall not be able to defend them, your best way will be to remove, divide your Army, and dispose them in parties into several Towns, that the tediousness of a siege, and length of time, which will be required, may discourage the Enemy.

Zambi. Is there no other way of avoiding a Battle, but to divide your Troops, and to dispose them into several Towns?

CHAP. VII.

Which way a Battle is to be avoided, though pressed never so earnestly by the Enemy.

Fabr. IF I be not mistaken I have discoursed to some of you before, how he that is in the field cannot avoid fighting when pressed by an Enemy who will fight upon any terms; and that the best way he can take, is to keep himself at fifty miles distance, that he may have time to remove when he hears of his advance. *Fabius Maximus* did not refuse fighting with *Hanibal*, but would fight at his own time, and advantage; and *Hanibal* was too wise to attack him, where he was sure he could do no good: for had he believed he could have conquered him, *Fabius* would have been constrained to have fought him, or fled. *Philip* King of *Macedon*, Father of *Perseus*, being at war with the *Romans*, posted his Army upon an high Mountain, that he might not be compelled to fight; but the *Romans* assaulted, and defeated him. *Cingentorix* General of the *Gauls* to avoid fighting with *Cæsar* who had passed a river contrary to his expectation, quitted the Country, and march'd away with his Army. The *Venetians* in our times, if they had had no mind to have fought the *French* King, they should not have staid till his Army had passed the *Adda*, but have removed farther off, as *Cingentorix* did before them; but they staid so long that they had time neither to draw up handsomely to fight, nor to make their retreat; for the *French* were so near before the *Venetians* dislodged, that the *French* fell upon them, and put them to the rout. So then by what I have said, it is manifest that a Battle cannot be avoided, when the Enemy presses it upon any disadvantage; and let not any body tell me of *Fabius*, for *Hanibal* refused to fight in that case as much as he.

CHAP. VIII.

How Soldiers are to be encouraged to fight; and how they are to be cooled and assuaged when their courage is too high.

Fabr. IT many times happens that your Soldiers are impatient to be fighting, but if you do not find it convenient in respect of the number of your Army, the disadvantage of the place, or some other consideration, you would do well to turn them from that inclination. It happens again that necessity or occasion constrains you to fight when your Soldiers are diffident or adverse: in one case it is necessary that you affright them, in the other that you excite them. In the first case, when remonstrances and exhortations will do no good, the best way is to suffer some of them to be cut off by the enemy, that those who have fought, and those who have not, may believe you another time. What *Fabius Maximus* did by accident, may be done on purpose, and by art. You know the Army of *Fabius* was very fierce to be fighting with *Hanibal*, and his Master of the Horse was of the same mind with the Army: *Fabius* was of another opinion, and thought it better to protract; and this diversity of opinions occasioned the dividing of the Army: *Fabius* kept his division in his trenches, the Master of the Horse went out, fought, was worsted, and had certainly been cut off, had not *Fabius* relieved him; by which example the Master of the Horse, and the whole Army were convinced that their wisest way was to have obeyed the orders of *Fabius*. As to the other point of animating your Soldiers, and raising their courages to a pitch, it is good to incense them by possessing them of the contumacy and insolence of the enemy: by pretending intelligence among them, and that you have corrupted a considerable party; by posting your Army so near them, that they may see one another, and skirmish with them slightly every day, (for things which are done daily, we easily despise) by counterfeiting your self angry, and in a solemn and grave oration reprehending and upbraiding their backwardness, and telling them, that if they leave you, you will charge the enemy alone. But to make your Soldiers bold and couragious, you are by no means to permit any of them to send any thing to their own houses (or to deposit it any where else) till the war be done, that they may know that though in running home they may save their lives, yet it must be with the loss of their Prize; the love of which renders people commonly as valiant as the love of their lives.

Zanobi. You say that Soldiers may be encouraged, and disposed to fight, by a speech or oration: do you intend it should be delivered to the whole Army, or only to the Officers?

CHAP. IX.

A General ought to be skilful and eloquent to persuade or dissuade as he sees occasion.

Fabr. IT is an easy matter to persuade or dissuade any thing with a small number of persons, because if words will not do, you have force and authority to back them: but the difficulty is to remove an opinion out of the heads of the Multitude, when it is contrary to your own judgment, or the interest of the publick; for there you can use nothing but words, which must be heard and understood by every body, if you would have every body convinced. For this reason it is requisite an excellent General should be a good Orator, to inflame or assuage the Courage of his Soldirs as he has occasion; for unless they can tell how to speak to a whole Army, there is little good to be expected; and yet in our times this way of haranguing them is quite laid aside. Look over the Life of *Alexander* the Great, and see how often he was put to speak in publick to his Army; and had he not done it, he would never have been able to have conducted it (when laden with so much riches and prey) thorow the deserts of *Arabia*, and in *India*, where it endured so much misery and distress; for there is scarce a day but something or other happens that causes confusion and ruine to an Army where the General is either ignorant or careless of speaking to them. The way of making speeches to them takes away their fear, quickens their courage, augments their confidence, discovers their cheats, secures their rewards, remonstrates their dangers, and the ways to avoid them. In short, by those kind of Orations a General reprehends, entreats, threatens, en-

encourages, commends, reproaches, and does every thing that may either enhance, or depreſs the paſſions of his men; wherefore that Prince or that Commonwealth that ſhould deſign to eſtabliſh a new Militia, and give it a reputation, is to accuſtom his Soldiers to the harangues of their chief Officers, and to chuſe ſuch Officers as know how to accoſt them.

CHAP. X.

Certain conſiderations which encourage Soldiers, and make them as virtuous as valiant.

Fabr. THe worſhip which the ancients paid to their Gods, (though they were falſe) Religion, and the Oath which was taken before they were liſted in the Army, was in thoſe days ſufficient to keep their Soldiers to their duty; for upon every miſdemeanor they were threatned not only with ſuch puniſhments as they were to expect from their Officers, but ſuch as could be inflicted (as they thought) by nothing but their Gods; which opinion being tempered with other religious ceremonies and ſuperſtitions, made all enterpriſes eaſy to the Generals of thoſe times, and would do ſo ſtill, were we as careful and obſervant of our Religion as they were of theirs. *Sertorius* knew how to make his advantage that way, pretending conference with a white Hart, which (as he gave out among his Soldiers) came from Heaven to aſſure him of Victory. *Sylla* to make his deſigns the more credible, pretended to diſcourſe with an Image that he had taken out of the Temple of *Apollo*, which directed him how he was to ſteer. Others have pretended dreams and viſions that have commanded them to fight: in the days of our Fathers, *Charles* the Seventh of *France*, during his wars with the *Engliſh*, pretended to be adviſed by a maid that was ſent from Heaven to give him inſtructions, which maid was called the *Pucelle d' Orleans*, and gained him many a Victory. There are other ways of making an Enemy contemptible; *Ageſilaus* the *Spartan* having taken ſeveral *Perſians*, ſtrip'd them naked, and ſhew'd them to his men, to the end that ſeeing the delicacy and tenderneſs of their contexture, they might have leſs occaſion to fear them. Some have by deſign brought their men into extremity, that they might be neceſſitated to fight, as having taken from them all hopes of preſervation, but in Victory; which indeed is the ſureſt and beſt way to make your Soldiers fight, and to infuſe courage into them, and then this courage and obſtinacy is highly encreaſed by their confidence in their General, and their love to their Country. Their love to their Country is natural; their confidence in their Captain is more from his experience and conduct, than from any thing elſe. There may be many other obligations, but none ſo ſtrong as that which binds you either to conquer, or die.

THE

THE Fifth BOOK.

CHAP. I.

How the Romans *marched in an Enemies Country, and in what manner they are to be imitated.*

Fabr. I Have shewn you how an Army is drawn up and marshalled in order to a Battle; I have told you how an Enemy is overcome, and several circumstances which occur therein. So that it is time now to inform you how an Army is to be ordered, which has not an Enemy in view, but is in continual probability of an assault: This may happen when an Army marches in an enemies Country, or at least a Country that is suspected. And first you must understand the *Roman* Armies had always some Troops of Horse which were scouting abroad, in order to the discovery of the Roads. After which followed the right Wing, and after them the Carriages which belonged to that Squadron; Then followed a Legion, and after them their Carriages. Then another Legion and their Carriages; and after them, the left Wing, and the remainder of the Cavalry after them. This in short was the manner in which the *Romans* marched most commonly; and if it happened in their march that their Army was assaulted either in the front or the rear, they caused all their Carriages to withdraw to the right wing or the left, as they found it convenient, and most agreeable with the nature of the place: and then when they were cleared of their Baggage, and disincumbered, all of them unanimously made head again the Enemy. If they were assaulted in the flank, they drew their Carriages on that side where they were like to be most safe, and then addres'd themselves against the Enemy.

This way being good and well govern'd, ought in my Judgment to be imitated, by sending your light Horse to scout about the Country; and having four Battalions of Foot, they are to follow one the other successively, each of them with its Carriages in the rear: And because Carriages are of two sorts, one belonging to particular Persons, and others for the common use of the Camp, I would divide the publick Carriages into four parts, and assign one to every Battalion; I would likewise divide the Artilery, and the followers of the Camp into four parts, that each Battalion should have equal share in their Impediments and Carriages. But because it happens many times that you march through a Country not only suspected, but so openly your Enemy, that you expect every hour to be assaulted; it will be necessary, that to secure your self, you change the form of your march, and put your self into such a posture, as that neither the Peasants, nor the Enemies Army may be able to offend you, tho' they come upon you never so suddenly. In these cases your Generals of old were wont to march in a square order, which they called a square; not that it was exactly of that figure, but because it was ordered so, as it was able to fight in four places at once, and by that means they were always ready either to march or to fight. I shall follow this model for ordering my two Battalions, which I have chosen to that purpose instead of a compleat Army,

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

How an Army is to be Marſhalled to march in an Enemies Country.

Fabr. TO march (therefore) ſecurely in an Enemies Country, and to be able to make good every part when ſurprized, and aſſaulted by the Enemy, I am to reduce my Army into a ſquare, according to the model of the ancients. I would have a ſquare whoſe area, or vacuity within, ſhould conſiſt of 212 yards, in this manner; I would firſt place my flanks diſtant one from the other 212 yards; I would have five Battalia's in each flank marching length ways in files, and at three yards diſtance the one Battalia from the other; ſo that each Company taking up forty yards, all of them together (with the ſpaces betwixt them) ſhall take up 212 yards. Between the front and the rear of theſe two flanks, I would diſpoſe the other ten Companies, in each of them five; ordering them ſo, that four of them ſhould be placed in the front of the right flank, and four in the rear of the left flank, leaving a ſpace of four yards betwixt each Company; and of the two Companies that are left, I would have one placed at the head of the left flank, and the other in the rear of the right. And becauſe the ſpace betwixt one flank and the other conſiſts of 212 yards, and theſe Battalia's drawn ſideways in breadth rather than length, will take up (intervals and all) 134 yards, there will remain a ſpace of 78 yards betwixt the four Companies in the front of the right flank, and the ſame ſpace will be poſſeſſed by the four Companies in the rear; nor will there be any difference but that one ſpace will be behind towards the right wing, and the other before towards the left. In the ſpace of 78 yards before, I would put my ordinary *Velites*; in the ſpace behind, my *Velites* extraordinary, which would not amount to a thouſand for each ſpace. But to contrive it ſo, that the great ſpace within ſhould conſiſt of 212 yards ſquare, it would be convenient that the five Companies which are placed in the front, and the five Companies in the rear, ſhould take up none of that ſpace which belongs to the flanks; wherefore it is neceſſary that the five Companies behind ſhould with their front touch the rear of the flanks, and thoſe five Companies in the Van with their rear ſhould touch the front of the flanks; ſo that there ſhould remain on each ſide of the Army, a diſtance ſufficient to receive another Company. And becauſe there are four ſpaces, I would take four Enſigns of the Pikes extraordinary, and place one in each of them, and the two Enſigns which would remain, I would place in the midſt of the ſpace of my whole Army in a ſquare Battalion; at the head of which, the General of the Army ſhould ſtand with his Officers about him. But becauſe theſe Battalia's thus ordered, do march all of them one way at once, but do not ſo when they fight; when they are drawn up, thoſe ſides are to be put into a fighting poſture, which are not guarded by other Battalia's: And therefore it is to be conſidered that the five Battalions in the front are defended on all ſides, but juſt in the front; ſo that they are to be drawn up in great order with the Pikes before them; the five Companies behind are guarded on all ſides but behind, ſo as they are likewiſe to be ordered with Pikes in their rear, as we ſhall ſhew in its place.

The five Companies in the right flank are guarded on every ſide but only on the right flank. The five in the left flank are the ſame, only on the left flank they are open; and therefore in the managing your Army, you muſt obſerve to place your Pikes ſo as they may turn about to that flank which is naked and expoſed; and your Corporals are to be in the front, and in the rear, that (being to fight) the whole Army, and every Member of it may be in their proper places; and the manner of doing it, we have declared before, when we diſcourſed of putting the Companies in order. I would divide my Artillery, and place part of it without my right flank, and the other without my left. My light Horſe I would ſend before to ſcour the Country; my men at Arms I would diſpoſe part behind my right wing, and part behind my left, at about forty yards diſtance from the Battalia's. And this general rule you are to obſerve by all means in the drawing up your Army, that your Horſe are to be placed either in the rear, or upon the flanks; for to place them before at the head of the Army, would occaſion one of theſe two things, either they muſt be placed at ſuch diſtance, that upon a repulſe they may have ſpace and time enough to wheel off without falling foul upon the foot, or elſe draw up the foot with ſuch intervals, that the Horſe may paſs thorough without putting them into diſorder. Certainly no body ought to look upon this as a thing of ſmall importance; for many have been ruined and routed by their own men, for want of timely conſideration.

But to return to our business; the Carriages and the people unarmed are placed in the void place of the Army, and so disposed, that there is passage left for any to pass from one part of the Army to another. These Companies (without the Horse and Artillery) do take up a space of 282 yards: And because this square consists of two Battalions, it is convenient to let you know what part of them makes one Battalion, and what the other. Now because Battalions are denominated from the number, and each of them (as you know) consists of ten Battalias (or Companies) and a Colonel, I would have the first Battalion place the five first Companies in the front, the other five in the left flank, and the Colonel in the left angle of the front. The second Battalion should place its five first Battalias upon the right flank, and the other five in the rear, with the Colonel in the right corner to secure the rear, and perform the office of him whom the *Romans* called by the name of *Tergiductor*.

CHAP. III.

How to put an Army presently into order, and draw it up, so as if upon a march it should be attack'd, it may defend it self on all sides.

Fabr. HAving put your Army into this posture, you are to cause it to march, and in its march observe the same order; for without doubt it is safe enough against the tumults and incursions of the Peasants, against which, it is sufficient if the Colonel commands out parties of Horse, or certain Companies of his *Velites* to repel them. Nor is there any danger that those kind of people will ever come to handy strokes with you; for men without order are always fearful of men in order, and 'tis the practice of such people to alarm you with great shouts and crys, but never to come near; like little Curs that bark at a Mastiff, but keep far enough off. When *Hanibal* invaded *Italy* with so much detriment to the *Romans*, he passed thorough *France*; was frequently infested by the Boors, but he valued them not. But it is not sufficient to have your Army in this order, but if you intend to march, you must have Pioneers, and such kind of people to plain the ways, make your intrenchments, *&c.* and these Pioneers are to be secured by the Horse which you send up and down the Country. In this order an Army may march ten miles a day, and be time enough at their journeys end to sup, and take up their Quarters by day-light; for many times an Army will march in one day twenty miles. But if it happens to be attacked by a formed Army, it cannot be so sudden, but you will have time to put your self into a posture of defence, because an orderly Army marches slowly, and you will have leisure to draw your self up in Battalia, and put your Army either into the same Figures I have prescribed, or into such another. If you be assaulted in the Van, you have no more to do but to bring your Artillery thither out of the flanks, and bringing your Horse out of the rear into the Van, to put them into the same place and distance as I have directed. The 1000 *Velites* which are before, may advance, divide themselves into two parties of five hundred a piece, and enter into their own place betwixt the Horse and the wings of the Army; and then into their place are to succeed the two Companies of Pikes extraordinary, which I placed before in the great vacuity of the Army. The 1000 *Velites* in the rear are to remove from their post, and dividing themselves, repair to the two flanks and fortify them; and by the space and chasm which they leave at their departure, the Carriages may march out, and all those who are unarmed, and put themselves behind in the rear: The space in the middle being now void, and every man in his place, the five Battalias which I ordered behind the Army may advance, by the void space betwixt the two flanks, and march towards those in the Van. Three of them may march up within 40 yards (with equal intervals betwixt the one and the other) and the other two may remain behind at the same distance of forty yards. This is a form that may be ordered on a sudden, and has some resemblance with the first model of an Army which we recommended before; for though it be streighter in the front, it is firmer in the flanks, and by consequence stronger. But because the five Battalias in the rear have Pikes with them for the reasons abovesaid, it is necessary to cause them to advance to fortify the front of the Army, and therefore either you must cause your Companies to turn Company by Company as they were solid Bodies; or else pass them into the front, thorough the Files of the Bucklers; which way is a better way, and less disorderly, than to cause them to wheel in whole Companies like a solid body: and the same thing is to be done

with thoſe in the rear upon any aſſault, as I have ſhewn before. If the Enemy preſents himſelf in the rear, you have no more to do but to face about with your whole Army, and immediately the Figure is altered, the rear becomes the front, and the front the rear; after which you are to obſerve all the ways of fortifying your front, as I have directed before. If the Enemy appears upon your flank, your Army is to face about to that ſide, and do the ſame things to ſtrengthen your front; ſo that your Horſe, your *Velites*, your Artillery may be in ſuch places as are convenient for the making up that front; and if there be any difference in this variation of fronts, it is only this, that ſome of thoſe who are to remove, have farther to advance than others. Nevertheleſs, in making a front of your right flank, your *Velites* are to enter into the intervals, betwixt the wings of the Army; and the Horſe ſhould approach to the left flank, into whoſe place the two Companies of Pikes extraordinary (which were placed in the middle) ſhould ſucceed: But the carriages ſhould remove, and the unarm'd people, (by the great ſpace and overture that is made) and retire behind the left flank, which is now become the rear of the whole Army: And the other *Velites* who were placed in the rear at firſt, are not to budge in this caſe, becauſe that place ſhould not remain open, being of the rear become the flanks. All other things are to be done as in my firſt directions for the making of a front.

What is ſaid before of making a front of the right flank, will ſerve for making a front of the left flank, for the ſame order is to be uſed: If the Enemy comes upon you ſo ſtrong that he is able to attack you on both ſides; you muſt fortify the places where you ſuſpect he will charge, by doubling your ranks from the place where he does not appear to fall on; by dividing your Artillery, your *Velites*, and your Horſe, and diſtributing them equally in both Places. If he aſſaults you in three or four ſides at once, you or he muſt be very imprudent; for had you been wiſe, you would never have put your ſelf into a place where an Enemy could have come at you on ſo many ſides; eſpecially with a form'd and well ordered Army. For to ruin you ſecurely, it is neceſſary the Enemy be ſtrong enough to attack you on all ſides, and with as many Men in every place almoſt, as in your whole Army: And if you be ſo indiſcreet to march into his Country, or put your ſelf into the Power of an enemy, whoſe men are three times as many, and as well experienced as yours; if you miſcarry, you can blame no body but your ſelf: But if misfortune happens not by your fault, but by accident of war, no body will condemn you, and it will fare with you as it did with *Scipio* in *Spain*, and *Aſdrubal* in *Italy*. But if the Enemy be not much ſtronger than you, and yet ventures to aſſault you in ſeveral places, the raſhneſs will be on his ſide, and the ſucceſs in all probability on yours; for of neceſſity he muſt ſo weaken himſelf, that you may receive him in one place, and charge him briskly in another, and then you will eaſily ruin him. This way of ordering an Army againſt an enemy that is not in ſight, but is hourly expected, is very neceſſary; And it is very uſeful to accuſtom your Soldiers to cloſe, and change, and march in this order, and in their March to ſhew them how to fight according to my firſt front, and then falling into their march again, upon a new alarm in the rear, to turn that into a front; and then each of the flanks, and ſo in their firſt poſture again; And theſe exerciſes are very neceſſary, if you would have your Army ready and well diſciplin'd. For which cauſe I would recommend it to all Princes and great Captains to reſtore theſe practices of the ancients; for what is military diſcipline, but to know how to command and execute theſe things well? What is a well diſciplin'd Army, but an Army train'd up well in theſe kind of exerciſes? And he who in our times would but frame his diſcipline to this, I am confident could never be worſted. But to continue our diſcourſe; if this ſquare Figure be difficult, it is not to be laid aſide for that, for that difficulty is neceſſary: Nevertheleſs, exerciſe will make it eaſy; for having learn'd how to draw your ſelf up, and preſerve your Figure, you will eaſily underſtand afterwards how to maintain other Figures in which there is not ſo much difficulty.

Zanobi. I am of your mind, that thoſe orders are neceſſary, and cannot tell (as to my ſelf) what can be added or ſubſtracted. Yet I would willingly be ſatisfied in two things. One is, when you would make a front of your rear, or one of your flanks, and would have your men face about, how you do ſignify your commands, whether by word of mouth, or ſound of trompet: The other is, whether thoſe you ſend before to plain the ways, and make them paſſable for your Army, are to be Soldiers drawn out of your Battalias, or other Country people deſigned on purpoſe for that work.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Of Commands derived by word of mouth, by Drums, and Trumpets, and of the nature of Pioneers.

Fab. YOUR firſt demand is of very great importance, for many Armies have been ruined when the Captain's orders have been miſtaken, or not heard: for which reaſon, the words of Command in ſuch dangers ought to be clear and intelligible: and if you would ſignify your Commands by the ſound of your Trumpets or Drums, great care is to be taken, that the ſounds be ſo different and diſtinguiſhable one from the other, that they cannot be miſtaken. If your commands are by word of mouth, you muſt uſe particular, and be ſure to avoid general Terms; and in your particular words you muſt be cautious to uſe none that may be liable to an ill interpretation. Many times the crying *back, back,* has been the loſs of an Army: wherefore that word is to be avoided, and inſtead of it you are to ſay *retreat.* If you would change your front, and make it either in the flank or the rear, you muſt not ſay *turn, but face about to the right or the left, to the front or the rear:* and in like manner all the words of command are to be plain and intelligible, as *march on, ſtand firm, advance, retreat:* and whatever may be done by word of mouth clearly and diſtinctly, is to be ſignify'd that way: what cannot be done that way, is to be done by the Trumpet and Drum. As to the Pioneers which is your ſecond demand, I would have that office performed by my own Soldiers, as well becauſe it was the practice of ancient times, as becauſe thereby I ſhould have fewer idle Perſons in my Army, and by conſequence fewer impediments. I would command out of every Battalia what number I thought neceſſary; I would furniſh them with Pickaxes, and Spades, and cauſe them to leave their arms with their next ranks, who ſhould carry them for them; ſo that when the enemy appeared, they ſhould have no more to do but to fall back to their ranks, and take them again.

Zanobi. But who ſhould carry their Pickaxes and Spades?

Fab. There ſhould be Waggons on purpoſe.

Zanobi. I fear you would never prevail with your Soldiers to work.

Fab. We will talk of that in its proper place: at preſent I ſhall lay it aſide, and diſcourſe of the way how they are to be ſupply'd with proviſions; for having tired them thus long, 'tis but reaſonable to refreſh them with victuals.

CHAP. V.

Of the Proviſions that are neceſſary for an Army.

Fab. YOU muſt know, a Prince is to keep his Army as free, and as fit for expedition as poſſible, and to rid it of all Encumbrances that may make his enterprizes difficult. The firſt difficulty to be remov'd, is want of proviſions, and therefore he is to take particular care that they be furniſhed with bread and wine. The ancients did not think of providing of wine, for when they wanted wine, they made uſe of water with a little vinegar to give it a taſte; ſo that among the proviſions for the Army, vinegar was provided, but not wine. Their Bread was not baked ready to their hands, as in the Towns, but every Soldier had his proportion of meal, which he order'd as he pleaſed, with a certain quantity of Bacon, and Seam, which gave their bread a guſt, and render'd them ſtrong. So that the proviſion for the Soldiers was meal, vinegar, bacon, and ſuet or ſeam, and barley for the horſes. They had commonly herds of Cattle great and ſmall, which follow'd the Armies, which being driven and not carry'd, were no great encumbrance. By reaſon of this order, of old, an Army marched many days journey thorough difficult and ſolitary places without want of proviſions, becauſe they lived upon ſuch things as might eaſily be carry'd with them. But in our Armies now a-days we find it quite contrary; for the Soldiers cannot ſubſiſt without wine and biſket, as when they are at home, of which, proviſion cannot be made for any conſiderable time, inſomuch as they are many times famiſhed; or if proviſion be made, it is with much trouble, and vaſt expence. I would endeavour therefore that my Army might not be ſupply'd at that rate; nor would I have them have any bread but what they make themſelves. As to wine, I would not hinder their drinking it, nor prohibit that any ſhould come into the Army; but I would take no

pains, nor uſe no induſtry to ſupply them: and for other proviſions, I would follow exactly the model of the ancients: which way, if rightly conſidered, will ſhew what difficulties are removed, what wants and diſtreſſes are prevented to an Army and General, and what convenience is added to any enterprize that ſhall be undertaken.

Zanobi. Since we have routed the enemy, and marched afterwards into his Country, 'tis but reaſonable to believe that we have made our depredations, tax'd his Towns, taken ſeveral Priſoners: I would know therefore how the ancients proceeded in theſe caſes.

CHAP. VI.

How the ancients divided the ſpoil, and of the pay which they gave to their Soldiers.

Fab. I Will ſatisfy you as to that: I do not queſtion but you have conſider'd (becauſe I have diſcourſed it formerly with ſome of you) how our preſent wars do impoveriſh not only thoſe Princes which are overcome, but thoſe too that are Conquerors; for as one looſes his Country, ſo the other looſes his Money: which was otherwiſe in ancient times, becauſe the Conqueror enrich'd himſelf by the war. The reaſon of this difference is, becauſe in our times no publick account is taken of the prizes, (as formerly) but all is left to the diſcretion of the Soldier, which occaſions two very great diſorders; the firſt is, as before; the other, it renders the Soldier more deſirous of plunder, and leſs obſervant of order and military diſcipline. And we have heard of many inſtances, where their impatience to be pillaging has wreſted the Victory out of their hands who had almoſt perfectly obtained it. Whilſt the *Romans* had the command of their own Armies, they provided very well againſt both theſe inconveniencies, appointing all the prizes to be deliver'd in, and appropriated to the publick, and that afterwards the publick ſhould diſtribute as it pleaſed. To this purpoſe they had their *Queſtores*, (which were like our Chamberlains) in whoſe hands all their prizes and taxes were depoſited, of which the Conſul or General of their Army diſpoſed as he thought good, for the payment of his Soldiers, the curing of the wounded or ſick, and diſcharging the other neceſſities of the Army.

'Tis true, the Conſul had power to give the plunder of a Town to his Soldiers, and he frequently did it, but that liberty never bred any diſorder; for when a Town was taken, or an Army defeated, all the prize was brought into a publick place, and diſtributed man by man, according to every one's merit.

This cuſtom made the Soldiers more intent upon victory than plunder: the practice of the *Roman* Legions was to break and diſorder an enemy, but not to purſue; for they never went out of their ranks upon any occaſion whatever. Only the horſe, the light-arm'd men, and what other Soldiers were not of the Legions, follow'd the chaſe: whereas if the plunder of the field had belong'd to any man that cou'd catch it, it would have been neither reaſonable, nor poſſible, to have kept the Legions to their ranks, or to have expoſed them to ſo many dangers. Hence it was, that upon a Victory the publick was always enriched; for when a Conſul entred in triumph, he brought with him great riches into the Treaſury of *Rome*, and they conſiſted of Taxes, Contributions, Ranſoms, and Plunder. The ancients had likewſe another cuſtom that was very well contriv'd, and that was, out of every Soldier's pay, to cauſe a third part to be depoſited with the Enſign of their reſpective Companies, who never reſtor'd it before the War was ended. This they did for two reaſons; firſt, that every Soldier might have a ſtock of his own; for moſt of them being young and profuſe, the more they had, the more they would have ſquandred. The other reaſon was, that knowing their ſtocks were in their Enſign's hands, they ſhould have the more care of him, and defend him with the more courage; and this cuſtom contributed much to their valour, and is neceſſary to be obſerved by any man who would reduce his Soldiers to the diſcipline of the *Romans*.

Zanobi. I believe it impoſſible for an Army not to meet with ſeveral ill accidents whilſt it marches from one place to another; and that it requires great induſtry in the General, and great courage in the Soldiers to prevent or avert them: you would oblige me much if you will tell me what has occur'd to your knowledge in the caſe.

CHAP.

CHAP VII.

To know the ſurprizes which are contriving againſt you upon your march.

Fab. I Shall ſatisfy you willingly, as being particularly neceſſary to any man who is deſirous to give a perfect ſcheme of this diſcipline.

Whilſt an Army is marching, the Generals are above all things to be vigilant that they fall not into any ambuſhments, which may be done two ways; one, when you fall into it bluntly of your ſelf: the other, when you are drill'd and wheedl'd into it by the enemy before you perceive it. To prevent the firſt way, it is convenient to ſend out ſtrong parties to diſcover the Country, who are to be the more diligent, by how much the Country is more apt and proper for ſuch things, as where it is woody or mountainous; for ambuſcades are commonly laid behind ſome hill, or under the ſhelter of ſome wood; and, as if you do not diſcover them in time, they are very pernicious; ſo, if your care be ſufficient, they are as eaſily prevented. The birds and the duſt have many times diſcover'd the enemy; for whenever the enemy approaches in any great number, he will be ſure to raiſe the duſt, which will give you the alarm. Several Generals obſerving the Pidgeons to riſe in ſome place where they were to paſs, (or other birds that fly together in flocks) and to hover over their Heads without falling again, have thereby diſcovered the ambuſhments of the enemy, and either prevented or defeated them.

As to the ſecond way of being drawn in by the artifices of the enemy, you muſt be cautious of believing any thing eaſily, that is not reaſonable to be ſuppoſed: as it would be, if an enemy ſhould leave ſomething for you to pillage on purpoſe, you muſt ſuſpect there is ſome deſign at the bottom, and be careful it does not ſucceed. If a great number of the enemy be beaten, and purſu'd by a few of your men, if a few of the enemy attacks a greater party of your's, if the enemy runs unexpectedly and without any viſible occaſion; in thoſe caſes you muſt always ſuſpect, and never fancy your enemy ſo weak as not to underſtand his own buſineſs: on the contrary, if you would be leſs expoſed to his ſtratagems, and run your ſelf leſs into danger, the weaker and more careleſs you obſerve him to be, the more you are to apprehend him. In this caſe you are to comport your ſelf in two different manners; you are to fear him in your own thoughts, and order your affairs accordingly; but in your words and outward behaviour you are to ſeem to deſpiſe him; this laſt way makes your Soldiers more confident of Victory, the other makes you more cautious, and leſs apt to be circumvented. And you muſt know, that to march thorough an Enemy's Country is more dangerous than to fight a Field-Battle.

CHAP. VIII.

One is to know the Country perfectly well thorough which he is to paſs, and keep his enterprizes ſecret.

Fab. THE marching thorough an Enemy's Country being ſo extraordinarily dangerous, it is neceſſary that a General doubles his diligence; and the firſt thing he is to do, he is to have a Chart made of all the Country by which he is to paſs, that he may know the Towns, their number, and diſtance, the roads, and mountains, the rivers, the fens, and the nature and qualities of them all: and to better his knowledge, it is convenient that he diſcourſes and interrogates ſome body who underſtands the places, objecting, and asking them ſeveral queſtions, and obſerving their anſwers. He is likewiſe to ſend ſome parties of his light-horſe before, under the command of prudent Officers, not ſo much to face the enemy, as to ſpeculate the Country, and ſee whether it agrees with his Map, and the deſcription which he has received. He is alſo to ſend out ſpies and guides with good guards, promiſing them rewards if they tell true, and threatning them with puniſhment, if falſe. But above all, he is to have a care that his Army knows nothing of his deſign; for in the whole Art of War there is nothing ſo uſeful, as to conceal the enterprizes that you are about.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Of certain things which are requiſite upon a march.

Fab. THAT no ſudden attack may be able to diſorder your Soldiers, you muſt command them to ſtand ready with their arms, for things that are foreſeen and expected, are leſs terrible and hurtful. Many perſons to avoid confuſion, in their march, have diſpoſed their Carriages and unarm'd people near the Colours, with command to follow them cloſe, that upon a halt, or retreat, (if there ſhould be occaſion) they might do it more eaſily; which is a good way, and I like it well. A General is likewiſe to have a great care that his men do not ſtraggle in their march, or march unequally, ſome too faſt, others too ſlow, which would weaken his Army, and expoſe it to great diſorder. It is convenient therefore to place their Officers in the flanks, that they keep them uniform in their motion, reſtraining thoſe who are too haſty, and ſoliciting thoſe who are too ſlow, and that cannot be done better than by the Trumpets and Drums. The ways are likewiſe to be enlarged and repair'd, ſo as one Company at leaſt may always march in order. Beſides this, the cuſtom, quality and humour of your enemy is to be conſider'd, whether he be like to aſſault you in the morning, at noon, or at night. Whether he be ſtrongeſt in horſe or in foot, and as you are inform'd of that, you order your men, and provide every thing neceſſary. But to come to ſome particular accident.

CHAP. X.

How to avoid fighting near a River, though preſſed by the enemy; and in what manner you may paſs it.

Fab. IT falls out ſometimes that you are forced to decline the enemy, as thinking your ſelf too weak, and are therefore unwilling to engage him: the enemy follows you what he can to ſtop you, or cut you off in your paſſage over the river, to which you are marching to that purpoſe; and your paſſage will take up ſo much time, that in probability the enemy will reach you. Some who have been in that dangerous condition, have drawn a trench round the rear of their Army, fill'd it with faggots and other combuſtibles, and ſet them on fire, whilſt in the mean time their Army paſſed over without any impediment from the enemy, by reaſon the fire that was betwixt them hinder'd their deſigns.

Zanobi. I cannot eaſily believe that ſuch a fire as that could hinder them; becauſe I remember I have heard how *Hanno* the *Carthagenian*, being beſieged by an enemy, on that ſide where he deſigned to eſcape, cauſed ſtore of wood and faggots to be laid, and then ſet them on fire: ſo that the enemy not obſerving him ſo ſtrictly on that ſide, he paſſed his Troops thorough the flames, only by ordering them to hold their Targets before their faces.

Fabr. You ſay well, but conſider a little what I told you, and what *Hanno* did; I told you that the Generals I mention'd caus'd a trench to be digg'd, and fill'd with combuſtible matter; ſo that when the enemy was to paſs, he was to encounter with two great difficulties, the trench and the fire. *Hanno* made his fires without any ditch, and becauſe he deſigned to paſs over them, he commanded that they ſhould not be made too violent; for without a trench, that would have ſtop'd him. Do you not know the ſtory of *Nabis* the *Spartan*, who being beſieged in *Sparta* by the *Romans*, he ſet part of the Town on fire, to hinder the advance of the *Romans*, who had already enter'd in ſome places; and by that fire he not only hinder'd their advance, but repulſed them.

But to return to our Buſineſs. *Quintus Lutatius* the *Roman*, having the *Cimbri* upon his heels, and being arriv'd at a river; that the enemy might give him time to paſs, he pretended a reſolution to fight them, pitch'd his Camp, entrench'd himſelf, ſet up his Standard, and ſet out parties of horſe to provide forrage. The *Cimbrians* conceiving he would encamp there, came and encamped by him, and divided themſelves into ſeveral parties to ſupply them with proviſions; of which *Lutatius* having notice, ſlip'd over the river before they could have time to diſturb him. Some have turned the courſe of a river, and by a cut carrying the water on the back ſide of the Army, have made the river fordable

dable, and paſſed it with eaſe. When the waters are rapid and the ſtream ſtrong, to facilitate the paſſage of the Foot, they put the ſtrongeſt of their Horſe betwixt the ſtream and the Foot, to keep off the torrent; and another party below to bear up the Foot, if the water ſhould be too ſtrong for any of them. Rivers that are unfordable, are likewiſe to be paſſed with Bridges and Boats; ſo that it is good to carry in your Army materials for all theſe things. It happens ſometimes that when you would paſs a River, the Enemy is got on the other ſide, and oppoſes. To remove this difficulty, I know nothing you can do better, than to follow the example of *Cæſar*, who having brought his Army to the ſide of a River in *France*, with deſign to have paſſed it, but finding *Vercingetrix* with his Army on the other ſide ready to obſtruct him, he marched down the River ſeveral days journey on one ſide, whilſt *Vercingetrix* did the like on the other.

But *Cæſar* having made a place in a Wood convenient for the concealing of ſome of his men, drew out three Companies out of each Legion, cauſed them to ſtay behind there, and when he was gone, commanded that they ſhould ſet up a Bridge over the River, and fortify it; and in the mean time he follow'd his march. *Vercingetrix* obſerving the ſame number of Legions, not ſuſpecting that any part of them were left behind, follow'd him on the other ſide; but *Cæſar* when he judged the Bridge finiſhed, faced about on a ſudden, and finding every thing as he expected, he paſſed the River without any difficulty.

Zanobi. Have you any rules whereby you may diſcover a ford?

Fab. Yes, we have: where-ever in a River you ſee the water tremble, and carry certain ſtreaks betwixt the place where it ſtagnates and the current, you may be ſure the bottom is good, and the place fordable, becauſe the gravel and ſand which the River does commonly carry along with it, is more fixed there, as has been often ſeen by experience.

Zanobi. Suppoſe the flood ſhould have looſened the earth at the bottom of the ford, ſo as the horſe ſhould ſink in; what remedy then?

Fab. You muſt make grills or lattices of wood, ſink them into the River, and let them paſs over them. But to follow our diſcourſe.

CHAP. XI.

How to make your paſſage thorough a ſtreight, though you be preſſed by an Enemy.

Fab. IF a General by accident be conducted with his Army betwixt two Mountains, and that he has but two paſſages, one before, and the other behind, and the Enemy has got poſſeſſion of both, he can have no better remedy than to do as has been done before; that is, to dig a deep *Trench* behind him, and make it as unpaſſable as he can, that the Enemy may believe he intended to ſtop him there in the rear, that with his whole force he might make his way thorough the paſſage in the Van: Which being obſerved by the Enemy, he concluded according to appearance, ſent what ſtrength he could make to the other end of the paſs, and abandon'd the Trench; whereupon the other clap'd a wooden bridge over the Trench immediately (which he had prepar'd on purpoſe) and paſſed back again without any obſtruction. *Lucius Minutius* a *Roman* Conſul was in *Liguria* with an Army, and was ſhut up by the Enemy betwixt the Mountains, ſo as he could not diſengage himſelf: being ſenſible of his condition, he ſent certain *Numidians* which he had in his Army upon ſmall ſcrannel Horſes towards the places where the Enemy had their Guards. At firſt ſight the Enemy put themſelves into a poſture to defend the paſſes, but when they obſerved the *Numidians* in ill order, and ill mounted in reſpect of themſelves, they began to deſpiſe them, and to be more remiſs in their Guards; which was no ſooner perceiv'd by the *Numidians*, but they clap'd Spurs to their Horſes, and charging ſuddenly upon them, they paſſed on in ſpight of all their oppoſition; and being paſſed, the miſchief and devaſtation that they made in the Country, conſtrained the Enemy to give free paſſage to the whole Army. A certain General being infeſted by a numerous Enemy, drew up his Army ſo cloſe, that the Enemy was able to encompaſs him round, and afterwards he fell ſo ſmartly upon that Quarter where the Enemy was weakeſt, that he not only worſted them, but diſentangl'd himſelf. *Marcus Antonius* in the retreat from the *Parthians*, obſerved that every morning by break of day they were upon his back as ſoon as he moved,

ved, and continued skirmishing and molesting him quite thorough his march; whereupon he resolved not to remove before noon. The *Parthians* observing, concluded he would not stir that day, and returned to their Posts, insomuch that *Marcus Antonius* had opportunity to march all the rest of that day without interruption. The same person, to avoid the Darts of the *Parthians*, commanded his Men, that when the *Parthians* came near them, the first rank should fall down upon their knees, and the second rank clap their Bucklers over the heads of the first rank, the third over the second, the fourth over the third, and so on; so as the whole Army lay as it were under a Shield, and was defended from their Arrows: And this is all I can remember about the accidents to which an Army is subject upon a march. I shall pass now to another thing, unless you have something else to demand.

THE Sixth BOOK.

CHAP. I.

What kind of places the Greeks *and the* Romans *chose out for their Camps, with a short recapitulation of what has been said before.*

Zanobi. I Think it very convenient that *Battista* takes upon him the Office of demanding, and that I lay it down; by doing so we shall seem to imitate the good Generals of old, who (as I have been taught by Seignor *Fabritio*) did usually place the valiantest of their Soldiers in the front, and in the rear of the Army; conceiving it necessary to have those in the Van who would begin the fight bravely, and such in the rear as would bravely maintain it. And as *Cosimo* began this discourse with a great deal of prudence, so *Battista* may finish it with the same; *Luigi* and I having born the brunt in the middle as well as we could; and seeing hitherto every man has taken his part willingly, I do not think *Battista* will refuse.

Battista. Hitherto I have suffered my self to be governed, and am resolved to do so for the future; let me desire you therefore Seignor *Fabritio* to pursue your discourse, and hold us excused if we interrupt you with these kind of demands.

Fabritio. As I told you before, you do me a very great kindness; for this interruption, and changing of persons, rather refreshes than troubles my fancy: But to follow our business; I say, that it is now high time that we dispose our Army into its quarters, for you know every thing desires rest, and security; for to repose without security, is not properly to repose. I do fancy you would rather have had me lodged my Army first, and march'd and fought them afterwards, but we have done quite contrary, and indeed not without necessity; for being to shew how an Army in a march was to quit that form, and put it self into a posture to fight, it was necessary first to shew how they were to be drawn up for a Battle. But to return; I say, that if you would have your Camp safe, you must have it strong and well ordered: The discretion of the General puts it in good order, but it is art or situation that makes it defensible and strong. The *Grecians* were so curious in this point, that they would never encamp but where there was some River, or Wood, or Bank, or other Natural Rampart to defend them: But the *Romans* stood not so much upon the strength of the situation, as their own ways of fortification; nor would they ever encamp, but where according to their own Discipline they could draw up their Army. For this reason the *Romans* observed one constant form in their encampments; for they would rather make the situation of the place comply with their methods, than permit their customs to comply

comply with the ſituation; but with the *Grecians* it was otherwiſe, becauſe following the condition and form of the place, it was neceſſary that they varied the manner of their encampment, and the form of their Camp. The *Romans* therefore where the ſituation was weak, ſupplyed it by art and induſtry: And becauſe in this diſcourſe I have propoſed the *Romans* for a Precedent, I ſhall not leave them in my manner of encampment; nevertheleſs I ſhall not follow their practice in every thing, but picking and ſelecting ſuch parts as I think moſt agreeable with our times. I have told you often how the *Romans* in their Conſular Armies had two Legions of *Romans*, conſiſting of about 11000 Foot, and 600 Horſe; they had moreover about 11000 more Foot, ſent in by their Friends and Allies to their aſſiſtance: but this was a Rule, their Auxiliaries never exceeded the number of the Legions, unleſs it were in Horſe, and in them they were not ſo curious. I have told you likewiſe how in all their battles their Legions were placed in the middle, and their Auxiliaries in the flanks, and it was the ſame in their encampments; as you may read in ſuch Authors as make any mention of their Hiſtory. I will not therefore be ſo exact in my relation; I ſhall content my ſelf only to tell you in what order I would lodge my Army at preſent, and you will underſtand by that what I have borrowed from the *Romans*. You know that in imitation of their Legions I have taken two Battalions conſiſting of 6000 Foot, and 300 Horſe of ſervice for the Battalion: you know into what Companies, into what Arms, and into what Names I divided them. You know how in ordering my Army to march and to fight, I have ſaid nothing of more men; only what was to be done, was to be done by doubling their ranks, not by any reinforcement of men. But being now to ſhew you the manner of encamping, I think it not convenient to ſtick to my two Battalions, but to unite our whole Army, compoſed acccording to the model of the *Romans* of two Battalions, and as many Auxiliaries; which I do the rather, that the form of our Camp may be the more compleat, by the reception of a compleat Army; which in my other demonſtrations I have not thought altogether ſo neceſſary. Being therefore to lodge a compleat Army of 24000 Foot, and two thouſand Horſes of ſervice, to be divided into four Battalions, (two of Natives, and two of Strangers) I would take this way.

CHAP. II.

The form of a Camp.

Fabr. HAving found a place convenient for my Camp, I would ſet up my Standard in the midſt of a ſquare of fifty yards deep. The four ſides of that ſquare ſhould reſpect the four quarters of the World, and look Eaſt, Weſt, North, and South. In this ſquare I would ſet up the General's Pavilion: and becauſe I think it diſcreet, and in part the practice of the Ancients, I would divide my men which carry arms, from them who have none; and thoſe who are free, from thoſe who are incumbred. All or the greateſt part of my arm'd men I would lodge towards the Eaſt; my men that were diſarm'd and incumbred, I would lodge towards the Weſt, making my front towards the Eaſt, and my rear towards the Weſt; and the North and the South ſhould be my flanks. To diſtinguiſh the quarters of thoſe which bore arms, I would take this courſe; I would draw a line from the Standard towards the Eaſt of 680 yards long; then I would draw two other lines, (with the firſt in the middle) of the ſame length, but each of them at a diſtance of fifteen yards from the firſt; at the end of theſe lines I would have my Eaſtern Port; and the ſpace betwixt the two outward lines would make a Street which ſhould go from that Gate to the General's quarters, and take up a ſpace of thirty yards in breadth, and 630 in length, (for the General's quarter would take up fifty) and this ſhould be called the General's ſtreet. Then I would cauſe another ſtreet to be drawn out from North to South, and it ſhould paſs by the end of the General's ſtreet, not far from the General's quarter towards the Eaſt, which ſhould contain in length 1250 yards (for it ſhould take up all the breadth of the Camp) and be called the Croſs-ſtreet. Having deſigned the General's quarters, and theſe two Streets, I would mark out quarters for the two Battalions that were my own Subjects, and one of them I would diſpoſe on the right hand of the General's ſtreet, and the other on the left. And then paſſing over the Croſs-ſtreet, I would aſſign 32 lodgments on the left hand of the General's ſtreet, and as many on the right, leaving betwixt the ſixteenth and ſeventeenth lodgment a ſpace of thirty yards wide, as a traverſe way to paſs thorough all the lodgments of the Battalions. I would lodge the Captains of the men at Arms at the front of thoſe two orders of lodgments which joyn to the Croſs ſtreet, and their men at Arms in the fifteen lodg-

ments that are next them; ſo as every lodgment ſhould contain ten men at Arms, the whole number that I have allotted to each Battalion being an hundred and fifty. The Captains lodgments ſhould be forty yards wide, and ten in length; and you muſt take notice that when I ſay *wide*, I mean from North to South; and when *long*, from Eaſt to Weſt. The lodgment for the private men at arms ſhould be fifteen yards long, and thirty wide. In the other fifteen lodgments which follow on both ſides of the ſtreet, (which begin at the traverſe way, and ſhould have the ſame allowance of ground as I have given to the other) I would diſpoſe my light horſe. And becauſe there are likewiſe of them belonging to each Battalion 150, I would put ten of them into each of the fifteen lodgments, and the ſixteenth I would reſerve for the Captain with the ſame ſpace of ground as is allowed to the Captain of the men at arms; and ſo the lodgments of the horſe of the two Battalions ſhould come down to the middle of the General's Street, and be a direction to the quartering of the Foot, as I ſhall ſhew. You have ſeen how I have lodged the 300 horſe of both Battalions, with their Officers, in 32 lodgments ſet up near the General's Street, and beginning at the Croſs-ſtreet; and how betwixt the ſixteenth and the ſeventeenth there was reſerved a ſpace of thirty yards to make a croſs way. Being therefore to lodge the twenty Battalia's or Companies in the two ordinary Battalions, I would appoint lodgments for every two Battalia's behind the lodgments of the horſe, and they ſhould each of them contain in length 15 yards, and in breadth thirty, according to the dimenſions of the horſe-lodgment, and they ſhould be ſo cloſe that they ſhould touch one another.

In the firſt lodgment on each ſide butting upon the Croſs-ſtreet, I would lodge the Captain of each Company over againſt the lodgment of the Captain of the men at Arms: and this lodgment alone ſhould be twenty yards wide, and ten long. In the other fifteen lodgments which ſucceed on both ſides as far as the traverſe way, I would quarter a Company of foot, which being 450, ſhould be diſpoſed 30 to a lodgment. The other 15 lodgments ſhould be ſet up on each ſide by the lodgments of the light horſe, with the ſame dimenſions of ground; and on each ſide I would place a Battalia of foot.

In the laſt lodgment on each ſide I would place the Captain of the Company (right over againſt the Captain of the light horſe) with a ſpace of ten yards in length, and twenty in breadth: and ſo theſe two firſt ranks of lodgments would be half horſe, and half foot: But becauſe (as I ſaid before) theſe horſes are all horſes of ſervice, which have no proper perſons either to dreſs or to feed them, I would have the foot which are quartered behind, obliged to look to them, and for ſo doing they ſhould be exempt from other duties in the Camp; and this was the method of the *Romans*. After this I would leave a ſpace of thirty yards on each ſide, which ſhould make ſtreets, and be called, one of them, the firſt Street on the left hand, and the other the firſt Street on the right. I would then on each ſide ſet up another row of 32 lodgments, with their backs one to the other, with the ſame ſpaces as I aſſigned to the other; and having ſeparated ſixteen of them, (as with the reſt) to make a traverſe way, I would diſpoſe in each ſide four Companies with their Captains at the head of them, and other Officers in the rear. After I had left on both ſides a diſtance of thirty yards for a way, which on one ſide ſhould be called the ſecond Street on the right hand, and on the other ſide the ſecond Street on the left hand; I would ſet up another rank of 32 lodgments with the ſame diſtances and ſeparations, where I would lodge on each ſide four Companies with their Officers: and by doing this, all the Cavalry, and the Companies of both the Battalions would be lodged in three rows of lodgments, and the General's quarter in the middle. The two Battalions of Auxiliaries (having made them to conſiſt of the ſame number of men) I would quarter on both ſides of the two ordinary Battalions, with the ſame number of rows, and in the ſame order as them, placing firſt one order of lodgments conſiſting half of horſe, and half of foot, diſtant from the next order thirty foot; which diſtance ſhould make a Street, and be called on one ſide, the third Street on the right hand; and on the other ſide, the third Street on the left hand. And then I would make on each ſide two more rows of lodgments with the ſame diſtances and diſtinctions as in the lodgments of the other Battalions, which ſhould make two other Streets, and be called according to their number, and the hand on which they are placed; ſo that this whole Army will be lodged in twelve double rows of lodgments, and there will be thirteen Streets, reckoning the General's Street, and the Croſs-ſtreet: When I have deſigned my circumference, and appointed my lodgments for my four Battalions, I would leave a ſpace betwixt the lodgments and the trenches of an hundred yards broad, which ſhould go round my Camp: and if you compute all the ſpaces, you will find that from the middle of the General's lodgment to the Eaſt Gate, are 680 yards. There are two other ſpaces, one from the General's quarter to the South Gate, and the

other

other from the ſame place to the North Gate, each of them 635 yards, commencing at the Center. Subſtracting afterwards from each of theſe ſpaces fifty yards for the General's quarter, and five and forty more on each ſide for a *Piazza*, and thirty yards for a Street that divides each of the ſaid ſpaces in the middle, and an hundred yards round betwixt the lodgments and trenches; there remains on all ſides for lodgments, a ſpace of four hundred yards wide, and an hundred long, meaſuring the length with the ſpace which is taken up by the General's quarter; then dividing the ſaid length in the middle, there will be on each ſide of the General forty lodgments, in length fifty yards, and twenty wide, which in all will be eighty; in which the General Officers of the Battalions ſhould be quartered, the Treaſurers, the *Maſtres de Campe*, and all ſuch as have any Office in the Army; leaving ſome ſpaces empty for ſtrangers, or ſuch Voluntiers as follow the Wars meerly out of affection to the General: On the back ſide of the General's quarters I would make a Street from South to North, thirty yards broad; and it ſhould be called Front-ſtreet, and run all along the eighty lodgments aboveſaid. From this Front ſtreet, by the General's quarter, I wou'd have another Street that ſhould go from thence to the Weſt Gate, thirty yards wide, anſwering both for ſituation and length to the General's Street, and it ſhould be called the *Piazza*-ſtreet. Having ſettled theſe two Streets, I would order a *Piazza* or Market-place, and it ſhould be at the end of the *Piazza* ſtreet, over againſt the General's lodging, and not far from the Front-ſtreet. I would have it ſquare, and every ſquare to contain 121 yards. On the right and left hand of this Market-place I would have two rows of lodgments, each of them double, and conſiſting of eight lodgments, in length twelve yards, and in breadth thirty: So that on each ſide of the *Piazza* I would have ſixteen lodgments, with that in the middle, ſo that in all they would be 32; in which I would place thoſe horſe which remain undiſpoſed of, that belong to the Auxiliary ſquadrons. If theſe would not be ſufficient to receive them, I would conſign them ſome of the lodgments about the General's quarters, eſpecially thoſe which look towards the trenches. It remains now that we lodge the Pikes, and the *Velites* extraordinary which I have aſſigned to each Battalion, which as you know conſiſted (beſides the ten Companies) of a thouſand Pikes extraordinary, and five hundred *Velites*. So that the two Battalions had 2000 Pikes extraordinary, and 1000 *Velites* extraordinary, and the Auxiliaries had the ſame; ſo that we have ſtill 6000 foot to lodge, which I would diſpoſe in that part toward the Weſt, and along the ditch. From the end of the Front-ſtreet towards the North, leaving a ſpace of 100 yards betwixt that and the ditch, I would have a row of five double lodgments, which ſhould contain in length all of them 75 yards, and 60 in breadth: So as when the breadth is divided, there ſhall belong to each lodgment 15 yards in length, and 30 in breadth; and becauſe there will be but ten lodgments in this rank, there ſhall be lodged 300 foot, 30 in a lodgment. After that, leaving a ſpace of 31 yards, I would ſet up in the ſame manner, and with the ſame diſtances, another row of five double lodgments, and after that another, 'till they came to be five rows of five double lodgments, in all fifty, placed in a right line from the North, all of them ten yards from the foſs, and ſhould entertain 1500 foot. Turning them towards the Weſt Gate, in all that ſpace from them to the ſaid Gate, I would have five other double orders, in the ſame manner, and with the ſame ſpaces, (but with a diſtance of but 15 yards from one row to another) where I would lodge 1500 foot more. And ſo all the *Velites*, and Pikes extraordinary, of both the proper Battalions, ſhould be lodged from the North Gate to the Weſt Gate, according to the turning of the trenches, and ſhould be diſtributed into 100 lodgments in ten rows, ten lodgments in a row. The Pikes and the *Velites* extraordinary, of the two Auxiliary Battalions, ſhould be lodged in the ſame manner betwixt the Weſt Gate and the South, as the trenches incline in ten rows, ten lodgments in a row, as I ſaid of the other: The Captains or their Lieutenants may take ſuch quarters as they think moſt convenient, on that ſide towards the trenches. The Artillery I would diſpoſe every where upon the banks of the trenches; and in all the other ſpace which remains towards the Weſt, I would beſtow all the baggage, and ſervants, and impediments of the Army. By impediments you muſt underſtand (and you know it very well) the ancients intended all their train, and whatever elſe was neceſſary for an Army, beſides the Soldiers; as Carpenters, Smiths, Shooe-makers, Engineers, and Cannoneers, (though theſe indeed might be numbred among the Soldiers) Butchers with their Beefs and their Muttons, Cooks, Paſtry-men, and all that prepared meat for the Army; and in ſhort, all other profeſſions which followed the Camp for ſubſiſtence: They reckoned likewiſe among them all the carriages for publick proviſions and arms. I would not make any particular diſtinction of lodgments, only I would order the Streets ſo as that they might not be taken up by them. As to the other ſpaces betwixt the Streets, which would be four in all, I would conſign them in general to all the ſaid

impediments, that is, one to the Butchers, another to the Artificers and Maſters of ſeveral Profeſſions; a third to the carriages for Proviſions; a fourth for the carriages for Arms. The Streets that I would have left free, ſhould be the Street to the *Piazza*; the Front-Street, and another Street called the middle Street, which ſhould begin in the North, and paſs thorough the middle of the Market-ſtreet (or Street to the *Piazza*) towards the South, which on the Weſt ſide ſhould do the ſame ſervice as the Traverſe-ſtreet does on the Eaſt. And beſides this, I would have another back-ſtreet along by the lodgments of the Pikes and the *Velites* extraordinary; and I would have all theſe Streets thirty ſpaces wide. The Artillery I would place afterwards upon the trenches on the hinder part of the Camp.

Battiſta. I do acknowledge my ignorance, nor do I think it reproachful where it is not my profeſſion to be otherwiſe: nevertheleſs I am very well pleaſed with your order, only I would deſire you to reſolve me two doubts; one is, why you make the Streets and the ſpaces about the lodgments ſo large; the other (which troubles me moſt) is, how you would employ the ſpaces which you deſign for the lodgments.

Fabr. You muſt underſtand I aſſign 30 yards to the breadth of the Streets, that a Battalia of foot may march together a breaſt; for (if you remember) I told you often that each Company took up in breadth betwixt 25 and 30 yards. That the ſpace betwixt the trench and the lodgments ſhould be 100 yards broad, is very neceſſary for drawing up the Battalia's, managing the Artillery, conveying and diſpoſing of the booty, beſides the convenience of retiring upon occaſion, and making new Ramparts, and new Intrenchments within. Moreover, the lodgments are better at that diſtance from the trenches, as being farther from fire-works and other things which an enemy might caſt in among them: As to your ſecond demand, I do not intend that every ſpace that I have deſigned for a lodgment ſhould be covered with one Tent, or one Pavilion only, but that it ſhould be employed as is moſt commodious for thoſe who are to lodge there with more or fewer Tents as they pleaſe, provided they do not exceed their allowance of ground.

To make a juſt diſtribution of theſe lodgments, you muſt have perſons that are well vers'd and experienced in that affair, and good Architects, who as ſoon as the General has made choice of his place, can immediately put it into form, diſtribute the lodgments by dividing the Streets, and diſtinguiſhing the places for the ſeveral lodgments with a cord and pikes thruſt into the ground, with ſo much dexterity, that all things ſhall be preſently in order. And if you would prevent confuſion, you muſt turn your Camp always one way, that every man may know in what Street, and in what quarter he may find his Tent. This muſt be obſervable in all times and places, and in ſuch manner that it may ſeem a moving City, which where-ever it moves, carries with it the ſame Gates, the ſame Streets, the ſame Houſes, and the ſame Figure; which is a thing that cannot be practiſed by thoſe who make choice of places of natural ſtrength, for they muſt frame their Camp according to the variety of the ſituation. But the *Romans* fortified their Camps with Trenches, and Ramparts, and Mounts; for they left a good ſpace round about their Camp, and before it they made a ditch commonly ſix yards wide, and three yards deep. They made theſe ſpaces greater or leſs, according to the time they deſign'd to ſtay there, or according to their apprehenſion of the Enemy: for my own part, I would not encloſe my Camp with Stoccado's, unleſs I intend to Winter in it. I would have my Trench and my Parapet not leſs than theirs, but bigger upon occaſion. Upon every corner and ſide of the Camp I would raiſe a kind of half-moon, from whence my Artillery might play, and flank an Enemy that ſhould attempt the ditch. In this exerciſe, to underſtand how to mark out a Camp, your men are to be trained frequently, and your other Officers are by practice to be made ready in deſigning, and your Soldiers as dexterous in knowing their own quarters; nor is there any great difficulty in it, as I ſhall ſhew elſe-where, for at preſent I ſhall paſs to the Guards of the Camp, becauſe without them all the other pains and punctilio's would be vain.

Battiſta. Before you proceed to the Guards, I would be informed when you would pitch your Camp near your Enemy, what method you would uſe; for I cannot imagine that you ſhould have time enough to do it without manifeſt danger.

Fabr. You muſt know no man incamps near an Enemy, but he who is deſirous to fight whenever the Enemy will give him an opportunity; and when the Enemy is diſpoſed to it as well as he, the danger is no more than ordinary; for two parts of the Army are drawn out to fight, and the third orders the Camp. In this caſe the *Romans* committed the fortification and ordering their Camp to the *Triarii*; whilſt the *Principes* and *Haſtati* ſtood to their Arms. And this they did, becauſe the *Triarii* being to fight laſt, had time (if the Enemy advanced) to leave their work, ſtand to their Arms, and fall every man into his place.

You,

You, if you would imitate the *Romans*, muſt cauſe your Camp to be made by the Battalia's in your Rear, which are inſtead of the *Triarii*; but now to the Guards of the Camp.

CHAP. III.

Of the ſeveral Watches and Guards about the Camp.

Fabr. I Do not remember in Hiſtory to have found that the Ancients, for the ſecurity of the Camp in the night, did ever make uſe of Out-Guards or Sentinels without the Ditches, as we do now. The reaſon, as I take it, was becauſe they thought the Army thereby might be eaſily ſurprized; by the difficulty of diſcerning their Sentinels and Scouts; beſides their Sentinels might be over-powered or corrupted by the Enemy, ſo that to rely upon them either in part or in whole, they concluded would be dangerous: wherefore all their Guards were within their Trenches, placed with ſuch diligence and exactneſs, that it was no leſs than death for any man to deſert his poſt. How theſe Guards were diſpoſed by them, I think it unneceſſary to relate, becauſe if you have not ſeen it already, you may do it when you pleaſe; only this I ſhall tell you in ſhort what I would do in the Caſe. I would have every night one third part of the Army in Arms, and of them a fourth part upon the Guard, diſtributed all along the works, and in all convenient places quite thorough the Camp; with a main Guard in each of the four quarters of your Camp, of which a party ſhould remain conſtantly upon the Guard, and another party ſhould patrole from one quarter to the other. And this order I would uſe likewiſe in the day time, if my Enemy was near. As for giving the word, and changing it every night, and other things which are obſervable in the like caſes, I ſhall paſs them by as notorious and known. One thing only I ſhall mention, as being of importance, and that which brings much advantage to any man that uſes it, and as much diſadvantage where it is neglected.

CHAP. IV.

To obſerve who goes and comes to the Camp.

Fabr. HE who would be ſecure in his Camp, is to require notice with great exactneſs of all ſtrangers that lodge in his Camp, and ſo have a ſtrict account of all goers and comers; and this is no hard matter to do, if the Tents be but viewed all along as they ſtand in their orders; becauſe every lodgment has its preciſe and definitive number, and when you find them more or leſs than their proportion, let them be examined and puniſhed. He who obſerves this courſe exactly, ſhall keep the Enemy from practiſing your Officers (at leaſt without great difficulty) or from having knowledge of your affairs. Had not the *Romans* been very exact obſervers of this courſe, *Claudius Nero* (when *Hanibal* lay ſo near him) could never have ſtole ſo privately from his Camp in *Lucania*, and have marched into *la Marca*, and back again, before *Hanibal* had miſſed him.

CHAP. V.

Of Military Juſtice, and the methods uſed by the Ancients in the puniſhment of Offenders.

Fabr. BUt it is not enough to contrive good orders, unleſs they be ſtrictly obſerved; for ſeverity is no where ſo requiſite as in an Army: wherefore to keep your Soldiers to their duty, ſtrict and ſevere Laws are to be made, and they are to be executed as ſtrictly. The *Romans* puniſhed it with death to be abſent from the Guard, when it was a man's duty to be there. It was no leſs capital to abandon the place aſſigned him in Battle. To carry any thing privately out of his Quarters. To boaſt and appropriate to himſelf ſome great exploit, which he never did. To fight without the General's order. To throw away one's Arms in fear. If at any time it happened

a whole Troop or Company had offended in that nature, they were all put to death; but an imbursation was made of their names, and drawing them out by lots, every tenth man was executed. And this way of Decimation was used, that though all were not actually sensible, yet all might be affrighted. But because where the punishments are great, the rewards ought to be proportionable, that men may be as well encouraged as deterred, they ordain'd recompences for every remarkable exploit. As to him who in the fight, saved the life of a Citizen. He who first scal'd the Walls of an Enemies Town. He who first entred into the Enemies Camp. He who wounded or killed the Enemies General, or dismounted him from his Horse. By this means no signal act was performed, but it was recompensed by the Consul, and applauded publickly by the rest: and those who received any of these prizes for any generous act, (besides the glory and fame which they acquired among their fellow Soldiers) when they returned home into their Country, they exhibited them to the view of their Relations and Friends, and were received with great acclamation. It is not then to be admired if that people extended their Empire so far, being so fair in their discipline, and in the observation of their punishments and rewards, towards such as by the generosity of their actions had merited the one, or by their offences the other; of which things I am of opinion the greatest part should be observed now. I think it not amiss to mention one of their punishments, and it was this; The Criminal being convict before the Tribune or Consul, was by him struck gently over the shoulders with a rod; after which the Malefactor had liberty to run, but as he had liberty to run, so the rest of the Soldiers had liberty to kill him if they could; so that immediately some threw stones at him, some darts, some struck him with their Swords, some with one thing, some with another; so that his life was but short, for seldom any escaped; and those who did escape could not return to their houses, but with so much ignominy and scandal, that they had much better have died. This sort of punishment is in some measure used still by the *Swissers*, who cause those who are condemned to pass through the Pikes, which is a punishment well contrived, and most commonly well executed; for he who would order things so that a man should not side, or defend a Malefactor, cannot do better than to make him an instrument of his punishment; because with another respect he favours, and with another appetite he desires his punishment when he is Executioner himself, than when the execution is committed to another. To the end then that a Malefactor may not be favoured by the people, nor upheld in his offence, the best remedy is to refer him to their judgment. To confirm this, the example of *Manlius Capitolinus* may be brought, who being accused by the Senate, was defended by the people, till they were made his Judges; but when his case fell once into their Cognizance, and they were made Arbitrators in the business, they condemned him to death. This then is the true way of punishing, to prevent Seditions, and execute Justice. But because neither fear of the Laws, nor reverence to men was sufficient to keep Soldiers to their duties, and to a just observation of their discipline, the Ancients added the fear and authority of God. For this cause they made their Soldiers to swear with great Ceremony and Solemnity to preserve their discipline, that if they trangress'd they might be in danger not only of humane Laws but divine Justice, endeavouring by all industry to possess them with principles of Religion, however false they were.

Battista. I pray satisfy me whether the *Romans* permitted any Women in their Armies, and whether they suffered their Soldiers to game, as we do now adays in ours.

CHAP. VI.

The Ancients had neither Women, nor Gaming in their Armies; and of the manner how they discamp'd.

Fabr. THe *Romans* allowed neither the one nor the other, and indeed it required no great difficulty to prevent them; for to speak truth, the exercises to which they kept the Soldiers constantly, either in parties or together were so many, that they had no time either for dalliance or play, nor for any thing else that could make them mutinous or unserviceable.

Battista. What you say pleases me very well: But pray tell me when your Army discamps, what orders do you observe?

Fabr. The General's Trumpet sounds three times: The first sound they take down the Tents, and the Pavilions, and pack them up: The second sound they load their Sumpters; and the third they march in the same order as I said before, with their Baggage

and Train behind every Battalia, and the Legions in the midſt. Then the Auxiliary Battalion moves, and its Baggage and Train after it, and a fourth part of the common Baggage and Train, which conſiſt of all thoſe who were lodged in either of the quarters, which I have ſhewn before in the deſcription of my Camp. Wherefore it was convenient that each of the ſaid quarters ſhould be aſſigned to a Battalion, that upon the motion of the Army every man might know in what place he was to march. So that every Battalion was to march with its own Baggage and a fourth part of the common Baggage behind it; and this was the manner which the *Roman* Army obſerved in its march, as you may underſtand by what we have ſaid.

Battiſta. Tell us, I beſeech you, in the placing of their Camps, did the *Romans* uſe any other cuſtoms beſides what you have related?

CHAP. VII.

The ſafety and health of a Camp is to be regarded, and it is by no means to be beſieged.

Fabr. I Muſt tell you again, that the *Romans* in their Encampments were ſo conſtant to their old method, that to retain that, they applyed themſelves with incredible diligence, not regarding what pains, or what trouble it required: But two things they obſerved with a curioſity more than ordinary; one was, to place their Camp in an Air that was healthful and freſh: And the other was, not to place it where the Enemy might not eaſily beſiege them, or cut off their Proviſions. To avoid the unhealthfulneſs of the place, they avoided all fenny and boggiſh places, or where the wind was cold and unwholſome, which unwholſomneſs they did not ſo much compute from the ſituation of the place, as from the complexion of the Inhabitants, and when they found them ſwarthy or blowſy, they never encamped there. As to the other thing, never to be beſieged or ſtreightened by an Enemy: you muſt conſider the nature of the place both where your Friends are placed, and where your Enemies; and then to make your conjecture whether you can be beſieged or no. It is neceſſary therefore a General be very skilful in the ſituation of the Country, and that he have thoſe about him who underſtand it as well as he. Beſides this, there is another way of preventing diſeaſes, and that is, by providing that no diſorder be uſed in your Army: for to keep it ſound and in health, the way is that your Army ſleep in Tents; that they be lodged as often as may be under Trees that are ſhady; (where they may have firing to dreſs their meat) that they may not be obliged to march in the heat. So that in the Summer time you muſt diſlodge them before day, and have a care in the Winter that they march not in the ſnow, nor upon the ice, without the convenience of fires; that they want not neceſſary cloaths, nor to be conſtrained to drink ill water; you muſt command the Phyſitians of the Army to have a particular care of thoſe who are ſick, for a General will find himſelf overlaid, when he is at once to contend with an Enemy and a Diſeaſe. But of all remedies, nothing is ſo powerful as exerciſe, and therefore it was a cuſtom among the Ancients to exerciſe them continually. Think then of what importance exerciſe is, when in the Camp it keeps you ſound, and in the Field it makes you victorious.

CHAP. VIII.

Directions as to Proviſions.

Fabr. AS to Famine, you muſt not only have a care that the Enemy cannot cut off your Proviſions; but you muſt conſider from what place you may be ſupplyed, and ſee that what you have already be not imbezzled. It is convenient therefore that you have with you always a months Proviſion before hand, and then you are to oblige your neighbours and friends to furniſh you daily with more. You muſt likewiſe have a good Magazine for Ammunition, in a ſtrong place, which is to be diſtributed with great care, giving every man a reaſonable proportion every day, and keep ſuch an eye over it, that want of it may occaſion no diſorder: for in matters of War every thing elſe may be repaired in time, but hunger the longer it laſts, will the more certainly deſtroy you. Not will any Enemy that

that can maſter you with Famine, ever ſeek to attack you with his Arms; becauſe though the Victory be not ſo honourable, it is more eaſie and ſecure.

That Army therefore in which Juſtice is not obſerved; that Army which ſquanders and conſumes laviſhly as it pleaſes, cannot ſo well barricado or fortifie its Camp, but that Famine will find the way in; for where Juſtice is neglected, Victuals is not conſtantly ſupplyed; and where Soldiers are laviſh and profuſe, though they have plenty, it is quickly conſumed: For this cauſe among the Ancients it was commanded that the Soldiers ſhould eat what was given them, and at a prefixed time, for no Soldier durſt eat but when the General went to dinner; but every body knows how little this is obſerved in our days; and if then the Soldiers might be juſtly termed ſober and orderly, they may now with as much juſtice be ſaid to be licentious and debauched.

Battiſta. When you began firſt to order your Camp, you told us you would not confine your ſelf to your two Battalions, but take four, that you might ſhew us how a juſt and compleat Army was to be lodg'd: I deſire therefore that you would ſatisfie me in two things: One is, when I have either more or leſs than four Battalions, how I am to diſpoſe of them The other is, what number of Soldiers would ſuffice you, to expect and engage any Enemy whatever.

CHAP. IX.

How to lodge more or leſs than four Battalions, and what number of men is ſufficient to make head againſt an Enemy, be he as numerous as he may.

Fabr. TO your firſt demand I anſwer, That be your Army compoſed of more or leſs than four or ſix thouſand men, you may increaſe or leſſen their lodgments as you pleaſe, and in the ſame manner you may proceed to leſs or more, *in infinitum*; Nevertheleſs, when the *Romans* joyn'd two Conſular Armies together, they made two Camps, and turned the place of the unarmed men one againſt the other.

To your ſecond demand I reply, That the ordinary *Roman* Army conſiſted of about 24000 men; but when by accident they were over-preſſed with numbers, they never exceeded 50000; with this number they oppoſed 200000 *Gauls*, which aſſaulted them after their firſt War with the *Carthaginians*; with this number they oppoſed themſelves againſt *Hanibal*: and you muſt obſerve that the *Romans* and the *Greeks* always carried on their War with a few men, fortifying themſelves with their good order, and the excellence of their diſcipline; whereas the Eaſtern and Weſtern Nations did all by their multitudes, but the Weſtern people performed all by their natural fury, and the Eaſtern by their ſubmiſſion and obedience to their King. In *Greece* and in *Italy*, where their natural fury and natural reverence to their King was not ſo great, it was neceſſary to apply themſelves to diſcipline, which was of ſuch efficacy, that it has made a ſmall Army prevail againſt the fury and natural obſtinacy of a greater. I ſay therefore that if you would imitate the *Romans* and the *Greeks*, you are not to exceed the number of 50000 men, but rather to be fewer, becauſe more do but breed confuſion, and hinder the order and diſcipline that you have learn'd. *Pyrrhus* uſed ordinarily to ſay, that with 15000 men he would go thorough the world.

But let us paſs now to another part of our diſcipline.

CHAP. X.

Certain Artifices, and Advertiſements of War.

Fabr. WE have gained a Battle with our Army, and ſhewn moſt of the accidents which may happen in it: We have cauſed it to march, and diſcourſed with what impediments it might be incumbered in its march; and at length we have brought it into its Camp, where it is to take not only a little repoſe after its travel and fatigues, but conſider and deliberate how it is to finiſh the War. For in the Camp many things are tranſacted, eſpecially there being an Enemy in the Field, and Towns to be ſuſpected, of which it is good to ſecure your ſelf, and to reduce ſuch as are in hoſtility. It is neceſſary therefore

therefore to come to ſome demonſtrations, and paſs theſe difficulties with the ſame glory and honour with which we have proceeded thus far. To deſcend therefore to particulars, I ſay, that if many people or perſons have any thing in controverſie betwixt them to your advantage, and their own detriment, (as if they ſhould beat down the walls of their City, or ſend ſeveral of their Citizens into baniſhment) you muſt cajole them in ſuch manner that none of them may think it has any relation to them, to the end that neither of them relieving one another, they may all of them be oppreſſed without remedy; or elſe you muſt command all of them what they are to do the ſame day, that each of them believing himſelf particularly commanded, may think rather of obeying than looking out for a remedy; and by that means your command be executed without ſedition or diſorder. If you ſuſpect the fidelity of a people, and would aſſure your ſelf of them; and ſurprize them unawares, you cannot do better than to communicate ſome deſign with them, deſire their aſſiſtance, and pretend to ſome farther enterprize, without the leaſt umbrage or ſuſpition of them: and by doing ſo, (not imagining you have any jealouſie of him) he will neglect his own defence, and give you opportunity of effecting your deſigns.

If you ſuſpect there is any body in your Army that gives advice of your deſigns to the Enemy; the beſt way to make your advantage of his treachery, is to impart ſome things to him which you never intend to do; and to conceal what you intend; to pretend doubts where you are perfectly reſolved; and to conceal other things that you have abſolutely determined: by this means you will put the Enemy upon ſome enterprize (upon preſumption that he knows your deſigns) in which you may eaſily circumvent and defeat him.

If you reſolve (as *Claudius Nero* did) to leſſen your Army, and ſend relief to your friend ſo privately that the Enemy ſhould not perceive it; you muſt not take down your Tents, nor diminiſh the number of your Hutts; but keep up your Enſigns and preſerve your ranks intire, with the ſame fires and guards as before. If any ſupplies come up ſuddenly to your Army, and you would not have your Enemy perceive you are reinforced, you muſt not augment the number of your Tents; for nothing is more uſeful than to keep ſuch accidents ſecret. *Metellus* being in *Spain* with his Army, one took the confidence to demand of him what he intended to do the next day: He replyed, *That if he thought his ſhirt knew, he would burn it. Marcus Cræſus* being asked by one when he would decamp, anſwered him, *Are you the only man think you that will not hear the Trumpet?*

If you deſign to underſtand the ſecrets of your Enemy, and to know his order and condition; you muſt do as others have done, ſend Embaſſadors to him, with wiſe and experienced Soldiers in the Train, who may take their opportunity to view his Army, and conſider his ſtrength and weakneſs ſo, as may give occaſion to overcome him. Some have pretended to baniſh ſome of their Confidents, and by that means had information of his Enemies deſigns. They are diſcovered likewiſe ſometimes by the taking of priſoners: *Marius* whilſt he was at War with the *Cimbrians*, to feel the fidelity of the *Gauls*, (who at that time inhabited *Lombardy*, and were in League with the *Romans*) ſent to them two ſorts of Letters, one open, and the other ſealed. In the Letters that were open, he writ that they ſhould not open thoſe which were ſealed till ſuch a time as he directed, before which time he ſent for them again, and finding them open, he found he was to repoſe no confidence there.

CHAP. XI.

How to rid one's ſelf of an Army that is preſſing upon one's heels.

Fabr. SEveral Generals having been invaded, and not marched their Army immediately againſt the Enemy, but made an inroad into his Country, and conſtrained him to return to defend it; and this way has many times ſucceeded, beccauſe yours are fluſh'd with victory, and loaden with plunder, whilſt the Enemy is terrified, and inſtead of a hopeful victory, like to go by the loſs: ſo that they who have uſed this kind of diverſion, have many times proſpered. But this is practicable only to thoſe whoſe Country is ſtronger than the Enemies Country; for if it be otherwiſe, that diverſion is pernicious. If a General be block'd up in his Camp by the Enemy, he cannot do better than to propoſe an accord, or at leaſt a truce with him for ſome days, for that makes your Enemy the more negligent in every thing; of which negligence you may take your advantage, and give him the ſlip. By this way *Silla* diſintangled himſelf twice, and cleared himſelf of his Enemies: by the

ſame Artifice *Aſdrubal* extricated himſelf in *Spain* from the forces of *Claudius Nero*, who had block'd him up; it would likewiſe contribute much to the freeing a man from the power of the Enemy, to do ſomething (beſides what has been ſaid already) that may keep him in ſuſpence. And this is to be done two ways; by aſſaulting him with part of your forces, that whilſt he is imploy'd upon them, the reſt may have time to preſerve themſelves. There is another way likewiſe, and that is by contriving ſome new thing or other that may amuſe or aſtoniſh the Enemy, and render him uncertain which way he is to ſteer: ſo *Hanibal* ſerved *Fabius Maximus* when he had ſhut him up on the mountains; for cauſing little wiſps of bruſh-wood to be tied to the horns of ſeveral Oxen, he ſet them on fire; and *Fabius* not underſtanding the depth of the ſtratagem, ſuppoſing it worſe than it was, kept upon his guard within his Camp, and ſuffered him to paſs.

CHAP. XII.

How a man may make a Prince's Favourite ſuſpected, and divide his Forces.

A General above all things is to endeavour to divide the Enemies Forces, either by rendering his Confidents ſuſpicious; or by giving him occaſion to ſeparate his Troops, and by conſequence weaken himſelf. The firſt is be done by preſerving the Eſtates or Goods of thoſe he has about him; as in time of War, to ſpare their Houſes, or Poſſeſſions; and returning their Children or Relations ſafe, and without ranſom. You know when *Hanibal* burned all about *Rome*, he exempted what belonged to *Fabius Maximus*. You know how *Coriolanus* coming with a ſtrong Army to beſiege *Rome*, preſerved the Poſſeſſions of the Nobility. *Metellus* being at the head of an Army againſt *Jugurtha*, moved it to the Embaſſadors which the Enemy ſent to him, to deliver up *Jugurtha* Priſoner, and writing Letters to them afterwards to the ſame purpoſe, he continued his Correſpondence till *Jugurtha* got the alarm, ſuſpected his whole Counſel, and made them away after ſeveral manners.

When *Hanibal* was fled to *Antiochus*, the *Roman* Embaſſadors practiſed ſo cunningly, that *Antiochus* grew jealous, and truſted him no farther.

As to the way of dividing the Enemy, there is not any more certain than to cauſe an incurſion to be made upon his Country, that he may be conſtrained to leave the War, and go back to defend himſelf. This was the way which *Fabius* uſed when he had an Army againſt him of *French* and *Tuſcans*, *Umbrians* and *Samnites*. *Titus Didius* having a ſmall Army in reſpect of the Enemy, expecting another Legion from *Rome*, which the Enemy was deſirous to intercept, he gave out in his Army that the next day he would give the Enemy Battle, and ordered it ſo, that certain Priſoners which he had in his Camp at that time, took their opportunity to eſcape, and gave intelligence to the Enemy that the Conſul had given orders to fight; upon which news, that they might not leſſen their Forces, they did not march againſt the other Legion, and by that means it was preſerved; ſome there have been who, to divide or weaken the force of their Enemy, have ſuffered him to enter into their Country, and poſſeſs himſelf of ſeveral Towns, that by putting Garriſons into them, he may leſſen his Army, and give them occaſion to attack and defeat him. Others deſigning againſt one Province, have pretended to invade another, and uſed ſuch induſtry in the buſineſs, that being entred unexpectedly into that Country, they have conquered it before the Enemy had time to relieve it: for the Enemy being uncertain whether you will return back and invade the Country which you threatned before, is conſtrained to keep his Poſt, and not to leave one place to ſecure another, and it falls out many times that he is unable to defend either the one or the other.

CHAP. XIII.

In what manner seditions and mutinies in an Army are to be appeased.

Fabr. BEsides what has been said already, it is of great use and reputation to a General, if he knows how to compose mutinies and dissentions in his Army. The best way is by punishing the Ringleaders; but then it is to be done so neatly, that they may have their reward before they have news that it is intended. The way to do that is, if they be at any distance, to summon both nocent and innocent together, that they thinking themselves safe, and not in danger of any punishment, may not be refractory, and stand upon their guard, but put themselves quietly into your hands to be punished. If they be present, and at hand, the General is to make himself as strong as he can with those who are innocent, and others in whom he can confide, and then punish as he thinks fit. When the quarrel is private, and among themselves, the best way is to expose them to danger, and let them fight if they think good; for the fear of that does many times reconcile them. But above all things, there is nothing that keeps an Army so unanimous as the reputation of the General, which proceeds principally from his courage; for it is neither birth nor authority can do it without that.

The chief thing incumbent upon a General is to pay well, and punish well; for whenever the Soldiers want pay, 'tis but reasonable that they should want punishment; for you cannot in justice chastise any exorbitance in a Soldier, when you disappoint him of his pay; nor can he forbear stealing, unless he be willing to starve: but if you pay, and do not punish them, they are insolent again; and you will become despicable in holding a Command that you are not able to manage; and by not maintaining your dignity and authority, of necessity tumults and disorders must follow, which will be the utter ruin of your Army.

CHAP. XIV.

How the Ancients relied much upon their auguries, and other accidents.

Fabr. THE Generals of old were subject to one molestation, from which in our days we are exempt: and that is, how to pervert an ill augury, and interpret it to their advantage: for if an Arrow fell down in an Army: if the Sun or the Moon was eclipsed: if there happened an Earthquake, or it was the General's fortune to fall down, either as he got up on horse-back, or dismounted, it was look'd upon by the Soldiers as an ill omen, and was the occasion of such fear in them, that coming afterwards to a Battle, they were easily beaten: and therefore the Generals in times past, when such an accident happened, immediately gave some reason for it, and referred it to some natural cause, or else wrested and perverted it to their own profit and advantage.

Cæsar passing over into *Africa*, tumbling down upon the ground as he came out of the Ship, grasping the grass in his hands, he cryed out, *Teneo te O Africa*; Africa *you are mine, for I have you in my hands.* And several others have given reasons (according to their own interest) for the Earthquakes and Eclipses of the Moon: but in our days these artifices cannot pass, because our men are not now so superstitious, and our Religion explodes such opinions as heathenish and vain: but whenever we should be so blind as to reassume those superstitions, we must revive the custom of the Ancients.

CHAP. XV.

That we are not to fight with an Enemy reduced to despair; and several arts that may be used to surprize them.

Fabr. WHen famine, natural necessity, or humane passion has brought your Enemy to such despair, that impelled by that he marches furiously to fight with you, you must keep within your Camp, and decline fighting as much as possibly you can. The *Lacedemonians* acted in that manner against the *Messeni*; *Cæsar* did the same against *Afranius* and *Petreius*. When *Fulvius* was Consul against the *Cimbrians*, he caused his horse to attack the Enemy for several days together; and observing in what numbers they came forth to engage them, he placed an ambush one day behind their Camp, caused them again to be assaulted; and the *Cimbrians* issuing forth in their old numbers to encounter them, *Fulvius* fell in the mean time upon their Camp, entred it, and sack'd it. Some Generals have made great advantage (when they lie near the Enemies Army) to send out parties with the Enemies Colours to plunder their own Country; for the Enemy supposing them supplies sent to relieve them, have issued forth to meet them, and assist them to plunder; whereby they have been put to disorder, and given opportunity to the adversary to overthrow them. *Alexander* of *Epirus* did the same against the *Sclavonians*, and *Leptene* the *Syracusan* against the *Carthaginians*, and both with success: many have been too hard for their Enemies, by giving them opportunity of eating and drinking too much, making a shew of being afraid, and leaving their Camp full of wine and provisions; with which the Enemy having gorg'd himself without measure, the others have fallen upon them with advantage, and put them to the sword. *Tomyris* provided such an entertainment for *Cyrus*; and *Tiberius Gracchus* regal'd the *Spaniards* in the same manner: others have poysoned their meat and their drink, to ruin the Enemy that way the more easily. I said before, that I did not find it in any History that the *Romans* did ever in the night place any Centinels without their Camp, supposing they omitted it to prevent the mischiefs that might ensue; for it has been often seen that the Centinels which are placed abroad in the day time to hear and descry the Enemy, have been the destruction of those who have sent them; for being often times surprized by the Enemy, they have been forced to give the signal with which they were to call their own men, and they coming immediately according to the sign, have been all killed, or taken prisoners.

To over-reach and circumvent an Enemy, it is good sometimes to vary your custom, that the Enemy depending upon it, may be disappointed and ruined. Thus it happened with a General, who being accustomed to give the signal of the approach of the Enemy in the night by fire, and in the day time by smoke, commanded that they should make smoke and fire together without intermission, and that when the Enemy came they should put them both out; the Enemy supposing he was not perceived, (because he saw no signal given) marched on in disorder, and gave his Adversary the victory.

Memnon the *Rhodian*, desiring to draw his Enemy out of his strong hold, sent one by the way of a fugitive into their Army, with news that *Memnon*'s Army was in a mutiny, and that the greatest part of them were gone from him; and to confirm it the more, he caused disorders and tumults to be pretended in his Camp; whereupon the Enemy taking encouragement, advanced out of his hold to attack *Memnon*, but was cut off himself.

Besides the things above-mentioned, great care is to be had never to bring your Enemy to despair. *Cæsar* was very cautious of this in his War with the *Germans*, and opened a way for them, when he saw that not being able to fly, they must of necessity fight, and that more couragiously than otherwise; wherefore he chose rather the trouble of pursuing them when they fled, than the danger of fighting them when they were forced to defend themselves. *Lucullus* observing a party of his horse going over to the Enemy, caused a Charge to be sounded immediately, and commanded other parties to follow them; whereupon the Enemy believing *Lucullus* intended to fight, sent out a party to charge those *Macedonians* who were running away; and they did it so effectually, that the *Macedonians* were glad to stand upon their guard; by which means, of fugitives intended, they became good Subjects in spight of their teeths.

CHAP. XVI.

How a ſuſpected Town or Country is to be ſecured, and how the Peoples hearts are to be gained.

Fabr. IT is a great thing in a General to know how to ſecure a Town that you ſuſpect, either after a Victory or before; as ſeveral ancient examples do demonſtrate. *Pompey*, being jealous of the *Catinenſes*, beg'd of them that they would give entertainment to ſome of his ſick men, and under the diſguiſe of ſick, ſending ſtout and valiant men, they ſurprized the Town, and kept it for *Pompey*. *Publius Valerius* was diffident of the *Epidauni*, and cauſed a general indulgence to be given in one of the Churches without the Town; the people thronging thither for pardon, he ſhut the Gates upon them, and received none back again but ſuch as he could truſt. *Alexander* the Great being to march into *Aſia*, and by the way ſecure himſelf of *Thrace*, carried along with him all the principal perſons of that Province, giving them commands in his Army, and leaving the people to be governed by thoſe of their own condition; by which means he ſatisfy'd all parties; the Nobility by paying them, and the Populace, by leaving no Governor that would oppreſs them. But among all the ways wherewith the the people are to be cajoled, nothing goes ſo far as examples of chaſtity and juſtice, as that of *Scipio* in *Spain*, when he returned a beautiful young Lady to her Parents and Husband untouched; a paſſage that contributed more than his Arms to the ſubduing of that Country. *Cæſar* only for paying for the wood which he cauſed to be cut down to make Stoccadoes about his Camp in *France*, got ſuch a name for his juſtice, that it facilitated the Conqueſt of that Province. I know not now that there remains any thing to ſay further about theſe accidents; or that there is any thing which we have not already examined. If there be, it is the way of taking and defending of Towns, which I am willing to ſhew, were I ſure I ſhould not be tedious.

Batiſta. Your civility is ſo great, that it makes us purſue our deſires without the leaſt fear of preſumption; for you have offered us that frankly, which we ſhould have been aſhamed to have requeſted. We do aſſure you therefore, you cannot do us a greater favour than to finiſh this Diſcourſe; but before you proceed, let me intreat you to reſolve me, whether it be better to continue a War all Winter long (as they do now adays) or carry it on only in the Summer, and in the Winter go to their Quarters.

CHAP. XVII.

War is not to be continued in the Winter.

Fabr. OBſerve, Gentlemen, had it not been for the prudence of *Batiſta*, a very conſiderable part of our Diſcourſe had been omitted: I tell you again that the Ancients did every thing with more prudence and diſcretion than we, who, if we be defective in any thing, are much more in matters of War.

Nothing is more imprudent and dangerous for a General, than to begin a War in the Winter; and he who is the aggreſſor is more liable to miſcarry, than he that is invaded. The reaſon is this, all the induſtry employed in Military Diſcipline, conſiſts in preparing your men, and putting them into order for Battle. That is it at which a General is principally to aim, becauſe a Battle does commonly decide the buſineſs, whether it be loſt or won. He therefore who knows beſt how to put his Army in order, and he who knows beſt how to prepare and equip them, has doubtleſs the advantage, and is in moſt hopes to overcome. On the other ſide, nothing is more inconſiſtent with good order than ſteep places, or cold rainy weather; for ſteep places will not ſuffer you to open or extend your ranks according to diſcipline; cold and wet weather will not permit you to keep your men together, nor preſent them in cloſe order before the Enemy; but conſtrains you of neceſſity to lodge them up and down aſunder, without order, at the mercy of all the Caſtles, and Towns, and Villages that receive you; ſo that all the pains you have taken to diſcipline your Army, is (for that time) utterly uſeleſs.

Do not admire, if now adays we make War in the Winter, for our Armies being without diſcipline, it is not to be imagined what inconveniences they ſuffer by not being quar-

tered

tered together; for it troubles them not, that they cannot keep thoſe orders, and obſerve that diſcipline which they never had. Yet it ought ſeriouſly to be conſidered what prejudice has followed upon encampments in the Winter: and it ought likewiſe to be remembred that the *French* in the year 1503. were broken and ruined near *Garigliano*, rather by the extremity of the weather, than the magnanimity of the *Spaniards*. For as I told you before, the Invader is under greateſt incommodity, as being more expoſed to the weather in an Enemies Country, than at home: for to keep his men together, he is neceſſitated to endure the cold and the rain; or to avoid it, to divide his men, which is mightily to expoſe them. But he who is upon the defenſive part can chooſe his place and his way, attended with freſh men, which he can join in a moment, and fall upon ſome party of the Enemies with ſuch fury, as they will not be able to endure the ſhock. It was the weather therefore which diſordered the *French*, and 'tis the weather that will always ruin any man that begins War in Winter, if his adverſary have any ſhare of diſcretion. He therefore who would have his force, his order, his diſcipline, and his courage of no uſe or advantage to him, let him keep the Field, and carry on his War in the Winter: For the *Romans* (who deſired all thoſe things in which they imployed their induſtry and diligence ſhould be uſeful to them) avoided the incommodities of Winter, as much as the aſperities of the *Alps*, the difficulty of places, and whatever elſe might hinder them from ſhewing their dexterity and courage. And thus much as to your demand; we will diſcourſe now of taking and defending of Towns, and of their Natural and Artificial ſtrength.

THE Seventh BOOK.

CHAP. I.

How Towns or Caſtles are to be fortified.

Fabr. YOU muſt underſtand that Towns and Caſtles are ſtrong two ways, by Nature or by Art. They are ſtrong by Nature, which are encompaſſed by Rivers or Fens, (as *Mantua* and *Ferrara*,) or ſeated upon ſome Rock, or craggy Mountain (as *Monaco*, and *Saulco*); for other places ſeated upon Mountains, if not difficult of acceſs, are in our days rather weaker than otherwiſe, in reſpect of our Artillery and Mines; and therefore at preſent being to build a City, or erect a Fort that may be ſtrong, we chooſe to do it in a Plain, and fortify it artificially with Ramparts and Baſtions; and our firſt care is to make the Walls crooked and retort, with ſeveral Vaults and places of receipt, that if the Enemy attempts to approach, he may be oppoſed and repulſed as well in the flank as the front: If your Walls be made too high, they are too obnoxious to the Cannon; if they be too low, they are eaſily ſcaled; if you make a Ditch before the Wall, to make the *Scalado* more difficult, the Enemy fills it up (which with a great Army is no hard matter) and makes himſelf Maſter immediately. My opinion therefore is this, (but with ſubmiſſion to better judgments) that to provide againſt both inconveniences, the beſt way will be to make your Wall high, and a Ditch on the inſide rather than without; and this is the ſtrongeſt way that you can build, becauſe it keeps you both from their Artillery and aſſaults, and gives the Enemy no capacity of filling up the Ditch. Your Wall then is to be of the beſt height you can contrive; three yards thick at the leaſt to reſiſt their Batteries; it is to have Towers and Bulwarks at the diſtance of every 200 yards. The Ditch within is to be thirty yards broad at leaſt, and twelve in depth; and all the earth which is taken out of the Ditch is to be thrown towards the Town,

Town, againſt a Wall which is to be brought for that purpoſe from the bottom of the Ditch, and carried up a man's height above the ground, which will make the Ditch more deep and ſecure. Towards the bottom of the Ditch every two hundred yards, I would have a Caſement from whence the Artillery may ſcour, and play upon any Body that ſhall deſcend. The great Guns which are uſed for the defence of a Town, are to be planted behind the Wall on the inſide of the Ditch; for to defend the firſt wall, Falcons and ſuch ſmall Pieces are eaſier managed, and do as good Execution. If the Enemy comes to ſcale you, the height of the firſt Wall defends you eaſily: If he comes with his Artillery, he muſt batter down the firſt Wall, and when he has done that, it being natural in all Batteries for the Wall and Rubbiſh to fall outward, there being no Ditch without to ſwallow and receive it, the ruins of the Wall will encreaſe the Depth of the Ditch, in ſuch manner as that you cannot get forward, being obſtructed by the Ruins, hindred by the Ditch, and interrupted by the Enemies great Guns within the Walls that do great ſlaughter upon you. The only remedy in this caſe is to fill up the Ditch, which is very hard in reſpect of its dimenſions, and the danger in coming to it, the Wall being crooked, and vaulted, and full of Angles, among which there is no coming without manifeſt hazard, for the reaſons aboveſaid; and to think to march with Faggots over the ruins, and to fill it up that way is a chimerical thing; ſo that I conclude a City ſo fortify'd is not to be taken.

Battiſta. If one ſhould make a Ditch without, beſide that within the Wall, would not your Town be the ſtronger?

Fabr. Yes, without doubt; but my meaning is, if one Ditch only be to be made, it is better within than without.

Battiſta. Would you have Water in your Ditch, or would you rather have it dry?

Fabr. Opinions are divided in that point; for Ditches with water are more ſecure againſt Mines, and Ditches without are harder to be filled up: But upon conſideration of the whole, I would have them without water, becauſe they are more ſecure; for it has been ſeen, that the freezing of the Ditch in the Winter has been the taking of many a Town, as it happened at *Mirandola* when Pope *Julius* beſieged it: And to prevent Mines, I would carry my Ditch ſo low, that whoever would think to work under it, ſhould come to the Water. Caſtles I would build (as to my Ditches and Walls) in the ſame manner, that they might have as much trouble who ſtormed them. But let me give one caution to any man who defends a City, and it is this, that he makes no redoubts without, at any diſtance from the Wall, and another to him that builds and fortifies a Caſtle, and that is, that he makes no works within for retreats in caſe the firſt Wall be taken.

The reaſon that makes me give this Counſel is, becauſe no man ought to do that which may leſſen his reputation at firſt; for the dimunition of that makes all his other orders contemptible, and diſcourages thoſe who have undertaken his defence. And this that I ſay will always happen when you make Baſtions without, and oblige your ſelf to defend them, they will certainly be loſt, for ſuch ſmall things being now adays to contend with the fury of Artillery, 'tis impoſſible they ſhould hold out, and the loſs of them being a leſſening to your reputation, the leſſening of your reputation will be the loſs of the place. When *Genoa* rebelled againſt *Lewis* King of *France*, he cauſed certain Baſtions to be erected upon the Hills which were about the Walls, which Baſtions were no ſooner loſt (and they were loſt preſently) but the City was taken.

As to my ſecond advice, I do affirm that there is nothing ſo pernicious to a Caſtle as to have thoſe works of retreat; for the hopes that men have of preſerving themſelves by deſerting their Poſts, makes them abandon them often, and the loſs of their Poſts, is afterwards the loſs of the Fort. We have a freſh example of this in the taking of the Caſtle at *Furli*, when the Counteſs *Catharine* defended it againſt *Ceſar Borgia*, the Son of *Alexander* VI. who had brought the *French* Army before it. This Caſtle was full of thoſe retreats; for firſt there was a Citadel, then a Fortreſs, and betwixt both a good Ditch with a Draw-bridge. The Caſtle within was divided into three parts, and each part ſtrongly ſeparated from the other with Ditches and Water, and Draw-bridges by which they communicated. As ſoon as the Duke had made his approaches, he with his great Guns battered one part of the Caſtle, and laid open a good part of the Wall; whereupon *Giovanni da Caſale* who had the command of that quarter, never ſtood to make good the breach, but left it to retire into another part, ſo that the Enemy having entred the firſt quarter with little Difficulty, it was not long before they made themſelves Maſters of all, by ſecuring the Draw-bridges (in the hurry) which conveyed them one to another: This Caſtle therefore which was thought inexpugnable was loſt by two faults; one was for having ſo many Redoubts, the other was becauſe none of them commanded the Bridges; the ill contrivance therefore of the Fortreſs, and the imprudence of him

that

that defended it, was a ſhame and diſappointment of the magnanimous enterprize of the Counteſs, who had the courage to expect an Army which neither the King of *Naples*, nor the Duke of *Milan* had the confidence to attend. Yet though ſhe miſcarried in her deſigns, ſhe reaped the honour which her magnanimity deſerved, as appeared by many Epigrams compoſed in thoſe times in her praiſe. If then I were to erect a Fort, I would do it with as ſtrong Walls, and with as good Ditches as I have preſcribed; and within it, I would build only houſes for habitation, and thoſe low and weak, and ſuch as ſhould not hinder the proſpect of all the Walls, from thoſe who were in the *Piazza*; that the Commander might have the advantage to diſcern with his eye from the main guard, whither he was to direct his ſupplies, and that every man might underſtand when the Wall and the Ditch was loſt, the Caſtle was not to be kept. And when I made any redoubts and retrenchments within, I would do it in ſuch manner that they ſhould each of them command the Bridges which ſhould be rais'd upon Pillars in the middle of the Ditch.

Battiſta. You have ſaid that ſmall places are not to be defended in our days, and I ſuppoſe I have heard quite contrary; that is to ſay the leſſer a place is, the better it is defenſible.

Fabritio. You were then miſinformed, for no place can be now a days ſtrong, where the defenders have not room for new Ramparts and Retrenchments to retire to; for ſuch is the fury of the Artillery, that he who preſumes upon the protection of one Wall or one Rampart, will find himſelf deceived. And becauſe Baſtions or Forts (provided they do not exceed their juſt meaſure, for in that caſe they will be rather Caſtles and Towns) are not made in ſuch manner that there is ſpace to retreat, they muſt preſently be loſt. It is wiſdom therefore to place theſe Baſtions without, and to fortify within, eſpecially the entries into the Towns, and to ſecure the Gates with Ravelins, ſo as that no body may come in or go out in a direct line, and that from the Ravelin to the Gate there may be a Ditch with a Draw-bridge. The Gates are to be fortified with Portculliſſes, to receive their men back again into the Town when they have gone out to engage the Enemy, and when it happens that they are repulſed, and the Enemy purſues, that they may diſtinguiſh betwixt their own men and the Enemy, and prevent their entring Pell-mell amongſt them. To this purpoſe Portculliſſes (which the Ancients called *Cateratte* or Pigeon-holes) were invented, which being let down excluded the Enemy, and preſerved their Friends; whereas without them, neither Bridges nor Gates would be of any uſe, being poſſeſſed by the multitude.

Battiſta. I have ſeen theſe Portculliſſes of which you ſpeak in *Germany*; and they were made of bars of wood, in the faſhion of Iron Gates, whereas ours are made of maſſy Rafters or Girders all of a piece: Now I would willingly be informed from whence this difference proceeded, and which is moſt effectual.

Fabr. I tell you again, that the ways, and cuſtoms, and orders of War are laid aſide all the world over, in reſpect of what was uſed amongſt the Ancients, but in *Italy* they are utterly forgot, and if their be any thing better than other, we have it from the *Ultramontani*, or Northern Nations. You may have heard, and perhaps ſome of theſe Gentlemen may remember how weakly we fortified before the coming of *Charles* 8. into *Italy*, in the year 1494. The battlements of our Walls were made but half a yard thick; the Port-holes for our great Guns, and Muſquets or ſmall Shot were made narrow without, wide within, with many other defects which I ſhall forbear to mention, leſt I ſhould become tedious; for thoſe thin battlements were quickly beaten down, and our Guns were as eaſily diſmounted.

But now a days we have learn'd of the *French* to make our Battlements large and thick, and our Port-holes large within, cloſe again in the middle, and wide again without; by which means our Artillery are not ſo eaſily diſmounted, nor our Soldiers beaten from their Works. Beſides theſe the *French* have ſeveral other good ways, which our Soldiers have not ſeen, and ſo have not ſo much as conſidered; and among the reſt thoſe open Portculliſſes, like grates, is in one, and they are much better than ours, for if to defend and fortify your Gate, you have a cloſe Portcullis, when you let it down to keep out the Enemy, you ſhut up your ſelves, and cannot afterwards do him any hurt, ſo that with Pick-axes, Hatchets, Petards or Fire, he may do what he pleaſe without any interruption. But if your Portcullis be made Lettice-wiſe and tranſparent, when it is let down thorough the holes and intervals, you may defend it with your Pikes, ſmall Shot, or any other kind of Arms.

Battiſta. I have obſerved in *Italy* another Northern invention, and that is to make the wheels of your Carriages, for your great Guns, with ſpokes crooked or bending towards the Axel-tree. Now I would gladly know the reaſon of that way, becauſe to me the ſtraight ſpokes ſeem ſtronger.

Fabr.

Fabr. Do not imagine that things which deviate from common uſe, are done by accident; or if you fancy they were made in that faſhion for beauty, you are miſtaken; for where force and ſtrength is required, they never ſtand upon beauty; but the reaſon why they were changed, was becauſe theſe kind of ſpokes are much more ſecure and ſtrong; and the reaſon they are ſtronger is this; when a Carriage is loaden, it is either equally poiz'd, or hang'd too much on one ſide. When it is equally poiz'd, the wheels bear equally, and the weight being equally diſtributed, does not burthen them much: But when it inclines to one ſide, the weight lies all upon one of the wheels. If the ſpokes be made ſtraight, they are eaſily broken, for when ever the wheel bends, the ſpokes bend with it, as being unable to keep up the weight; ſo that when the weight is well poized, or is otherwiſe but moderate, your ſtraight ſpokes are ſtrong enough, but when your Carriage goes awry, and enclines to one ſide, they are too weak to ſupport it. On the contrary, the ſpokes of your *French* Carriages that are made bending, are made ſo with great reaſon, for when a Carriage enclines to one ſide, the ſpokes on that ſide being made bending, will come to be ſtraight, and will be able to ſuſtain the whole weight better, than when it hangs equal, and (being crooked) bears but half. But to return to our Towns and our Caſtles. The *French*, beſides what we have mentioned, have another way of ſecuring their Gates, and for the ſallying and retiring of their Soldiers during a Siege, than I have yet ſeen practiſed in *Italy*: and it is this, On the outward point of the Draw-bridge they ſet up two Pillars, and upon each of them they faſten a beam, in ſuch manner that one half of it hangs over the Bridge, and the other half without. Then that part which is without the Bridge, they joyn together with croſs bars like a grate, and to the end of each of the beams that hang over the Bridge, they faſten a chain: when therefore they would ſhut up the Bridge ſo as no body ſhould come in from without, they looſen the chains, and let down that part of it that is made with croſs bars, which ſhuts up the Bridge; when they would open the Bridge, they draw the chains, and that part comes up again, and it is to be raiſed gradually, ſo as to receive a man on Foot, and no Horſe, or a Horſeman as they pleaſe, and it is raiſed or let down with unimaginable dexeterity. This way is better than your Portculliſſes, becauſe they can hardly be hindred by the Enemy from being let down, not falling in a direct line as your Perculliſſes do, which are eaſily ſtop'd by putting any thing under them. They then who would make a Town ſtrong, are to do it in the ſame manner as I have preſcribed.

Moreover they are to prohibit Cultivation or building within a Mile round; all ſhould be a plain without any Hills, Houſes, Banks or Trees to hinder the proſpect of the beſieged, or give any ſhelter to the Enemy in his approaches. And you muſt know that where the Ditch is without the Walls, and there are eminencies above the level of of the Country, that Town is but weak; for thoſe eminencies are blinds to the Enemy in their approaches, and when they are poſſeſs'd, they are convenient for their Batteries: But let us paſs on, and come into the Town.

CHAP. II.

What order is to be obſerved by him who ſhuts himſelf up in a Town, with reſolution to defend it.

Fabr. I Will not loſe ſo much time as to ſhew you how convenient it is (beſides what has been ſaid before) to have your Stores of Ammunition and Victuals, becauſe they are things that every body knows cannot be wanted, and without them all other Proviſions are vain. Two things then, are generally to be obſerved, you are to ſecure what you can poſſibly to your ſelf, and to prevent the Enemy of any Commodity, eſpecially in your own Precincts. Wherefore if there be any Straw, or Corn, or Cattle that you cannot carry off into the Town, you muſt be ſure to deſtroy it. He who undertakes the defence of a Town is likewiſe to obſerve this order, not to ſuffer any thing to be done tumultuouſly and diſorderly, and to provide that upon every accident, every man may know what he is to do; and the way is, by cauſing the Women, Children, old, lame and infirm to keep within their Houſes, and leave the Town to be defended by thoſe who are vigorous and ſtrong, who being armed as is requiſite, are to be diſtributed into all places, ſome upon the Walls, ſome at the Gates, ſome in the principal places of the City, to relieve their Companions upon any diſtreſs; another party there ſhould be likewiſe not obliged to any particular place, but always ready to ſuccour where neceſſity is required; and things being thus

ordered, ſcarce any Sedition can happen to diſorder you. Again, there is one thing I will recommend to your memories, both in the beſieging and defending of a Town: And that is, that there is nothing animates an Enemy ſo much, or gives him ſuch hopes of carrying a Town, as when he knows his adverſary has not been uſed to the ſight of an Enemy; for many times fear only, without any experiment of their ſtrength, has cauſed a Town to be ſurrendered: He therefore who comes before a City ſo qualified is to make all the ſhows and oſtentations of terror that he can; and on the other ſide, he who is aſſaulted, is to oppoſe men of reſolution and courage, and ſuch as are not to be terrified with ſhows, nor any thing but force and violence of Arms; for if the firſt brunt be ſuſtained, the beſieged are encouraged, and the beſiegers will have no hopes left but in their reputation and valour.

The Ancients had ſeveral inſtruments of War with which they defended their Towns, as Rams, Scorpions, Bows, Slings, Clubs, *&c.* Again, they had ſeveral Engines which they uſed in their Leaguers, as Rams, Towers of wood, *Vineæ*; They had alſo their *Flax*, their *Pluteus*, *Teſtudo*, and others; inſtead of which, we now make uſe of Artillery, which is uſeful both for him that is beſieged, as well as him that beſieges. But to return.

CHAP. III.

Advertiſements for ſuch as are diſtreſſed for Proviſions within a Town, and for ſuch as beſiege them, and would reduce them to that neceſſity.

Fabr. HE who takes upon him the defence of a Town, is to ſee ſuch proviſion made both of Victuals and Ammunition, that he may be in no danger of loſing it, either by Starving or Storm. As to Starving (as is ſaid before) it is neceſſary before the ſiege be laid, that you furniſh your ſelf well with Victuals; but becauſe ſuch proviſion cannot be made, but a long ſiege may exhauſt it, you muſt betake to extraordinary ways, and look out for friends that may relieve you, eſpecially if you have a River running thorough the Town. Thus the *Romans* did when their friends were beſieged by *Hanibal* in the Caſtle of *Catalino*, for not being able to relieve them otherwiſe, they flung great quantities of Nuts into the River, which were carried down by the ſtream in deſpight of the Enemy, and gave the Gartiſon very good relief Some who have been beſieged, to make their Enemy believe that they had plenty of Corn, and render them deſperate of carrying them by ſtarving, have thrown bread over their Walls; or elſe given Corn to ſome of their Cows, and ſuffered her afterwards to be taken by the Enemy, that when they kill'd her, they might find Corn in the paunch, and conclude that Corn was as plentiful in the Town as in the Camp. On the other ſide, wiſe Generals have uſed as much Art and Stratagem for the reduction of Towns: *Fabius* permitted the *Campani* to ſow their ground, that preſuming upon it, they might make no other proviſion, and he came afterwards and utterly deſtroyed it.

Dionyſius having beſieged *Rhegium*, pretended a Treaty, and whilſt things were in tranſaction, he provided himſelf with Victuals with all poſſible diligence; but when he had effectually ſupply'd himſelf, he brake off the Treaty, block'd them up again, and conſtrained them to ſurrender.

Alexander the Great being deſirous to reduce *Lucadia*, he took, plundered, and deſtroyed all the Caſtles about it, but gave the Garriſons ſafe Conduct to *Lucadia*; by which Policy he ſo throng'd them with men, that their numbers quickly diſtreſs'd them, and they were forced to ſurrender.

CHAP. IV.

Other Advertiſements both for the Beſiegers and the Beſieged.

Fabr. IN matters of aſſault, I ſay, the firſt things to be provided againſt, is the Enemies firſt Effort; for by that way the *Romans* gain'd many a Town, aſſaulting it ſuddenly, and in all places at once; and in this they called *Aggredi urbem Corona*, or to make a general aſſault, as *Scipio* did when he took new *Carthage* in *Spain*. But if the Beſieged can ſtand the firſt ſhock, it gives him ſuch courage, he will hardly be taken afterwards,

And if things ſhould go ſo far, that a breach ſhould be made, and the Enemy enter; yet the Citizens have their remedy if they will ſtand one to another: for many Armies have been repelled and defeated after they have entered a Town. The remedy is this, that the Inhabitants make good the higheſt places of the City, and fire upon them from the windows and tops of their houſes. But againſt this the Aſſailers have made uſe of two inventions; one was, to open the Gates of the City, and give the Inhabitants opportunity to eſcape; the other is, to make proclamation, that whoever throws down his Arms ſhall have quarter, and none put to the Sword but ſuch as are taken in Arms; and this artifice has been the taking of many a Town. Moreover, a Town is taken with more eaſe, when it is ſo ſuddenly attacked, as when an Army keeps at ſuch a diſtance, as that the Town believes either you will not at all, or cannot attempt it, before they ſhall have the alarm of your motion; becauſe it is at preſent ſo far off. Wherefore if you can come upon them ſuddenly and ſecretly, not once in twenty times but you will ſucceed in your deſign.

I ſpeak very unwillingly of the occurrences of our times, becauſe it muſt be done with reflection upon me and my friends; and if I ſhould diſcourſe of other people, I ſhould not know what to ſay. Nevertheleſs, I cannot paſs by the example of *Cæſar Borgia* (called Duke *Valantino*) who being with his Army at *Nocera*, under pretence of making an inroad into the Dutchy of *Camerin*, turned ſuddenly upon the State of *Urbin*, and maſter'd it without any trouble in one day, which another man would not have been able to have effected in a much longer time.

CHAP. V.

A man is not to depend upon the Countenance of the Enemy, but is rather to ſuſpect what even he ſees with his eyes.

Fabr. THoſe who are beſieged, are to be very careful of the tricks and ſurprizes of the Enemy, and therefore they are not to rely upon the countenance that he carries, but are rather to ſuſpect there is ſome fraud or deceit that will fall heavily upon them, if they ſuffer themſelves to be deluded.

Domitius Calvinus beſieging a Town, made it his cuſtom every day to march round about the Walls with a good part of his Army; the Garriſon fancying by degrees that it was only for his recreation, began to ſlacken their Guards, of which *Domitius* having notice, fell ſuddenly upon them, and carried the Town.

Other Generals have had intelligence of relief that was expected in the Town, and having habited a certain number of their Soldiers, and diſpoſed them under counterfeit Enſigns, like thoſe which the beſieged expected, they were received into the Gates, and poſſeſſed themſelves of the Town. *Cimon* an *Athenian* General having a deſign to ſurprize a Town, in the night ſet fire on a Temple that was without it, and the Inhabitants flocking out to extinguiſh the fire, they fell into an Ambuſcado, and loſt their Town. Others having taken ſome of the Servants, and ſuch people as came forth for forrage, put them to the Sword, and diſguiſing their own Soldiers in their Cloths, have entred the Gates, and made themſelves Maſters of the Town.

CHAP. VI.

How to diſfurniſh a Garriſon of its men, and to bring a terror upon a Town.

Fabr. THe Ancients have (beſides theſe) made uſe of ſeveral Stratagems and Artifices to unfurniſh the Enemies Garriſons of their men: When *Scipio* was in *Africa*, being deſirous to poſſeſs himſelf of ſome of the Garriſons, which the *Carthaginians* had in their cuſtody, he made many offers to beſiege them; but pretending fear, he not only drew off on a ſudden, but marched away with his Army to a great diſtance. *Hanibal* ſuppoſing his apprehenſion real, to follow him with a greater force, drew out his Garriſons, which *Scipio* underſtanding ſent *Maſſiniſſa* to ſurprize them, and he did it with ſucceſs. *Pyrrhus* making War in *Sclavonia*, advanced againſt the chief Town in that Province; in the defence of which Town, ſeveral people having got together, he pretended

to deſpair of carrying it by force, and turning his Arms againſt other Towns which were not viſibly ſo ſtrong, he proſpered ſo well in his deſign, that the ſaid Town drawing out a good part of its Garriſon in relief to their Neighbours, left it ſelf ſo weak, as it became a prey to his Enemy. Many have corrupted and defiled the waters, and turned Rivers out of their Channels, to make themſelves Maſters of a Town, and have miſcarried when they have done. It is a way likewiſe contributes much to the taking of a Town, to affright them with reports, as of ſome great Victory that you have obtained, ſome great ſupplies that you have received, and an obſtinate reſolution if they do not ſurrender quickly to put them all to the Sword.

CHAP. VII.

To corrupt a Garriſon, and take it by Treachery.

Fabr. SOme Generals of old have endeavoured to take Towns by treachery, by corrupting ſome of the Garriſon, and they have done it ſeveral ways. Some have ſent of their own men as fugitives into the Town, thereby to put them into credit and authority with the Enemy, and give them opportunity to betray them. Some by this means have diſcovered the ſtrength of the Garriſon, and by that diſcovery have taken the Town. Some under feigned pretences have ſtopped up the Gates of a Town from ſhutting, with a Cart, or beam, or ſuch kind of thing, and given their party the convenience of entring. *Hanibal* beſieging the Town of *Tarentum* in *Calabria*, which was defended by the *Romans* under the Conduct of *Levius*, corrupted a perſon in the Garriſon called *Eoneus*, and ordered him that he ſhould go out a hunting in the night, and pretend he durſt not do it in the day for fear of the Enemy. *Eoneus* obſerved his direction, went out and in ſeveral nights together, and the Guards had not the leaſt ſuſpicion; at length *Hanibal* diſguizing ſome of his men in the habit of Huntſmen, ſent them in after him, who killed the Guards, poſſeſſed themſelves of the Gates, and let *Hanibal* into the Town. A Garriſon is likewiſe to be cheated by drilling them a good diſtance out of Town, and pretending to fly when they come to charge you. Many (and *Hanibal* among the reſt) have ſuffered their Camps to be poſſeſſed by the Enemy, that they might have opportunity to clap between with their Army, and get into the Town. Again, they are ſometimes deluded by pretending to raiſe the Siege, as *Formio* the *Athenian* did, who having plundered and harraſſed the Country of *Calcidon*, received their Embaſſadors afterwards with propoſitions of Peace: He gave them very good words, and ſent them back full of ſecurity and fair promiſes, upon which the poor people preſuming too much, *Formio* fell ſuddenly upon them, and overcame them. Thoſe who are ſhut up in a Town, are to keep a ſtrict eye upon ſuch as they have reaſon to ſuſpect; but they are ſometimes to be ſecured and obliged to you by preferment as well as by puniſhment. *Marcellus* knew that *Lucius Baucius* the *Nolan* was a great favourer of *Hanibal*, yet he carried himſelf to him with ſo much kindneſs and generoſity, that of an Enemy, he made him his intimate Friend.

CHAP. VIII.

Good Guard is to be kept in all places and times.

Fabr. THoſe who are in any fear of being beſieged, are to keep diligent guard as well when the Enemy is at a diſtance, as at hand: and they are to have moſt care of thoſe places where they think themſelves moſt ſecure; for many Towns have been loſt by being aſſaulted on that ſide where they thought themſelves impregnable; and this miſcarriage ariſes from two cauſes; either becauſe the place is really ſtrong and believed inacceſſible, or elſe becauſe of the policy of the Enemy, who with great clamour and noiſe pretend to ſtorm it on one ſide, whilſt on the other he does it as vigorouſly, but with all the ſilence imaginable. And therefore it concerns the beſieged to be very careful, and keep good Guards upon the Walls, eſpecially in the night, and as well with Dogs as with Men, for if they be fierce and watchful, they will give an alarm (if the Enemy approaches) as ſoon as any thing: And not only Dogs, but Birds have been known to have preſerved a Town, as it happen'd to the *Romans*, when the *French* beſieged the Capitol.

When

When the *Spartans* lay before *Athens*, *Alcibiades* to discover how his watches were kept, commanded that in the night when ever he held up a light, each of the Guards should hold up another, and great punishment was to be inflicted upon any that neglected it. *Isocrates* killed a Centinel that he found a-sleep, with this expression, *I leave him as I found him.*

CHAP. IX.

Ways to write privately to ones Friends.

Fabr. THose who have been besieged have contrived several ways of conveying intelligence to their friends; not daring to trust their affairs to the tongue of a messenger, they write in cyphers many times, and conceal them several ways. The cyphers are made according to every man's fancy, and the ways of concealing them are divers: some have writ on the inside of a scabbard of a Sword; others have put their Letters up in Paste, baked it, and then given it for sustenance to the messenger that is to carry it: some have hid them in their privities; some in the collar of the messenger's dog.

There is another very useful and ingenious way, and that is, by writing an ordinary Letter about your private affairs, and afterwards betwixt every two lines to write your intrigues with a certain kind of water that will never be discovered but by dipping it into other water, or by holding it to the fire; and by so doing the Letters will be visible. And this trick has been very subtilly practised in our times, in which a certain person having a desire to signifie a secret to some of his friends, and not daring to trust it to a messenger, he sent out Letters of Excommunication written very formally, but interlined as abovesaid, and caused them to be fixed to the doors of the Churches, which being known to his friends by some private marks, they understood the whole business: and this is a very good way, for he who carries it may be deceived, and he that writes it is in no great danger.

There are a thousand other ways invented according to every man's fancy and wit. But it is much easier to write to those who are block'd up in a Town, than for those who are besieged to write to their friends abroad, because these Letters cannot be conveyed but by somebody who must pretend to run away out of the Town, which is a hard and a dangerous thing, if the Enemy be any thing careful; but 'tis otherwise with Letters to be sent into the Town, for a man has a thousand occasions to come into a Leaguer, where he may watch his opportunity, and slip into the Town.

CHAP. X.

How to repair a breach, and the way to defend it.

Fabr. BUT let us come now to the present way of beleaguering of Towns: I say, that if you be assaulted in a Town that is not fortified with ditches on the inside, (as I have mentioned before) that your Enemy may not enter at the breaches which the Artillery make, (for against other breaches there is no remedy) it is necessary whilst the Artillery is playing, to cut a new ditch behind the breach of at least thirty yards wide, and to throw all the earth that comes out of it towards the Town, that it may make a good Rampart, and add to the depth of the ditch; and this work is to be carried on with such diligence, that when the wall falls, the ditch may be at least five or six yards deep; and whilst they are at work to make this ditch, it is necessary that they be secured with two Casemats, that may flank the Enemy in case he should endeavour to disturb them: and if the wall be so strong as to give you time to make your ditch and your Casemats, that part which is battered will be the strongest part about the Town; for that Rampart will be of the same form and model which we proposed for the ditch within. But where the wall is so weak as to allow you no time, then you must shew your courage, and present your self bravely at the breach, your Soldiers well armed, and with as much chearfulness as is possible. This way of throwing up new works was observed by the *Pisans* when you besieged it, and they might do it well enough; for their walls were strong, which gave them time, and the earth good and proper for Ramparts; whereas had they wanted either of those conveniences, they must of necessity have been lost. It is wisdom therefore to make these ditches round about the Town before there be any necessity, as we said before; for in that case you may expect the Enemy without fear.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Of Mines.

Fabr. THE ancients took ſeveral Towns by mining under ground, and that two ways, either by carrying their mines under ground into the Town, and entring thereby, (as the *Romans* did when they took the City of *Vejentum*) or by undermining only the walls, and ſo tumbling them down. At preſent this latter way is more uſed than the other, and renders thoſe Towns which ſtand high weaker than the reſt, becauſe more ſubject to be min'd; and then adding but a good quantity of powder, which takes fire in an inſtant, you do not only ruin the wall, but you open the very mountain, and cleave the works into pieces. The way to prevent this, is to fortify in a flat Country, and make the ditch which encompaſſes your Town ſo deep, that the enemy may not dig under it without coming to the water, which is the beſt defence againſt mines. But if you be to defend a Town upon an eminence, your beſt way will be to make ſeveral deep holes in the wall, that may give vent to the powder when the enemy ſets it on fire.

There is another way likewiſe to prevent them, and that is, by countermining, if you find where the enemy mines; but 'tis a hard matter to diſcover them, eſpecially if you be beſieged by a cautious enemy.

CHAP. XII.

Good Guards are always to be kept, and your Soldiers not to be divided.

Fabr. HE who is beſieged is to take extraordinary care that he be not ſurpriz'd in time of repoſe; as after a ſtorm, after the Guards are ſet, (which is either at break of day, or at the ſhutting in of the evening) or eſpecially whilſt you are at dinner, in which time many Towns have been taken, and many ſallies have been made to the deſtruction of the beſiegers. Wherefore it is neceſſary to be upon the Guard in all quarters, and your men generally arm'd: and here I cannot omit to tell you, that nothing makes a Town or Camp harder to be defended, than the dividing of your forces; for the enemy being able to attack you when he pleaſes with all his Power at once, you muſt be ready on all ſides; and having parted your Forces, you will be forced to defend your ſelf with a part, and to keep the ſame guards with the remainder whenever the enemy aſſails you, as your ſtrength have done when your whole Garriſon was together; which is a great diſadvantage, for he can attack you with his whole power, when you have but a part of yours to defend yourſelf.

CHAP. XIII.

That when ones ſees himſelf block'd up on every ſide, it is good to expoſe ones ſelf now and then, and of the advantages which have enſued.

Fabr. IF he who is beſieged be beaten conſiderately, he is certainly loſt; but the Beſieger can only be repulſed: for which reaſon many who have been beſieged (either in Camp or Town,) though they have been inferior in number, have nevertheleſs ſallied with their whole force at a time, and been too hard for the enemy. Thus *Marcellus* did at *Nola*; thus *Cæſar* did in *France*, when his Camp was encompaſſed with a vaſt number of *Gauls*, for finding he was not able to defend it, becauſe he muſt divide his men into parties, and diſtribute them round, and finding alſo that ſtanding within his ſtoccadoes he could not do ſo much execution upon the enemy as he deſired, he opened his Camp on one ſide, and iſſuing out of it with his whole force, charged the enemy with ſuch fury and courage, that he put them to the rout. Beſides, the obſtinacy and reſolution of the beſieged does many times aſtoniſh and terrify the enemy. *Pompey* being encamped againſt *Cæſar*, and *Cæſar*'s Army in great diſtreſs for proviſions,

Pom-

Pompey had preſented him a piece of *Caſar*'s bread which was made of herbs, and look'd upon as a very ſtrange thing; *Pompey* having viewed it, commanded that it ſhould not be ſhewn in his Army, leſt it ſhould diſcourage them to conſider the obſtinacy of their Enemy. Nothing was more honourable to the *Romans* in their War with *Hanibal* than their conſtancy, becauſe in the greateſt of their diſtreſs, and in the worſt of their fortune, they never demanded peace, nor diſcover'd any token of fear: on the contrary, when *Hanibal* was under their Walls, they ſold the ground in which he was encamped, at an higher rate than it would have been ſold at another time: and they were ſo true and firm in their enterprizes, that they would not draw off from *Capua* to defend their own City, though they had an Army before that, when *Hanibal* appeared before *Rome*.

I am ſenſible I have told you ſeveral things that you underſtood, and perhaps conſidered already; yet I have done it (as I ſaid before) by that means to give you a better comprehenſion of the quality of this Army; and to ſatisfy ſuch (if there be any ſuch here) as have not had the opportunity to underſtand it ſo well as you. I ſuppoſe now there remains nothing but that I give you ſome general rules which are very obvious and common.

CHAP. XV.

General Rules to be obſerved in Military Diſcipline.

Fabr. THat which is beneficial to you, is prejudicial to your Enemy; and that which is beneficial to him, is prejudicial to you.

He who in War is moſt vigilant to obſerve the deſigns and enterprizes of the Enemy, and takes moſt pains in exerciſing and diſciplining his Army, ſhall expoſe himſelf to leſs danger, and have greater probability of victory.

Never bring your men to fight till you have ſome juſt confidence in their courage, till you have ſeen them well arm'd, and well ordered; and never let them engage but when you find them chearful, and hopeful of ſucceſs.

It is better to conquer an Enemy by hunger than fighting, in which laſt victory, fortune has more ſhare than vertue or courage.

No reſolution is ſo likely to ſucceed, as that which is concealed from the Enemy till it comes to be executed.

Nothing is of more importance in the whole Art of War, than to know how to take advantage when it is offered.

Nature produces few perſons ſtrong; but induſtry and exerciſe makes many.

Order and diſcipline is more available in War, than valour or force.

When any come over to your ſervice from the Enemy, they are of great advantage to you, provided they be faithful; for it is more diminution to the Enemies ſtrength to have Soldiers revolt, than to have ſo many ſlain, though the name of a fugitive is ſuſpicious to new friends, and abominable to old.

It is better in the drawing up your Battalions for a Battle, to draw them up with reſerves, and place ſuch behind the front as may ſupply it upon occaſion, than to enlarge your front, and make as it were but one rank of your whole Army.

He who underſtands his own Forces and the Enemies too, can hardly miſcarry.

The courage of Soldiers is better than their number.

The ſituation of the place is ſometimes more effectual than the courage of your men.

New and unexpected things are an aſtoniſhment to ſome Armies.

Your Soldiers deſpiſe things that are common, and are weary of any thing that is tedious; I would adviſe therefore that by pickeering and little skirmiſhes you acquaint your men with your Enemy before you bring them to Battle,

He who purſues an Enemy that is diſordered, in diſorder himſelf, ſhall loſe the victory he had gained, and perhaps give it to the Enemy.

He who makes not proviſion of Victuals, will be beaten without a blow.

He who relies more upon his Horſe than his Foot, or his Foot than his Horſe, muſt accommodate himſelf to the place.

If you would know at any time whether you have any ſpies in your Army, you have no more to do but to command every man to his Tent.

If

If you find the Enemy has any knowledge of your deſigns, you muſt change them.

What you are to do, you may adviſe with many; what you are reſolved to do, communicate with few.

When Soldiers are in their quarters, they are to be kept in order by fear and by puniſhment; when in the field, with hopes and reward.

A good General never comes to a Battle but when neceſſity requires, or ſome great advantage invites him.

You muſt endeavour that your Enemy may not know how you intend to draw up your Army when you come to fight; and let your figure be what it will, be ſure your firſt Companies be ſo ordered as that they may fall back into the ſecond, and both into the third.

When you are engaged, never employ any of your Battalias about any thing but that to which you deputed them at firſt; if you would avoid putting things into diſorder.

Sudden accidents are not eaſily prevented; but thoſe which are foreſeen, are prevented without difficulty.

Men, Arms, Money and Proviſions are the nerves of War; but the firſt two are moſt neceſſary, becauſe Men and Arms will find Money and Victuals; but Money and Victuals can never find Men.

The rich Man unarm'd, is but a prey to the Soldier.

Uſe your Soldiers to abominate luxury either in diet or cloths.

This is as much as I can think fit to ſpeak of in general, though I am ſenſible other things would have fallen in well enough with my Diſcourſe. As how and in what manner the ancients ordered their Squadrons; how they were habited, and how they exerciſed them in ſeveral other things; and I could have added ſeveral particulars, which I have not thought neceſſary at this time, becauſe you may know it your ſelf, and likewiſe becauſe it was not my intention at firſt to ſhew you exactly how the ancient Militia was conſtituted, but how it was to be done in our times.

For this reaſon I have thought it unneceſſary to ſpeak any farther of thoſe kind of antiquities, than what might be ſerviceable to this introduction. I know likewiſe I might have inlarg'd myſelf more about the exerciſing of Horſe; and come afterwards to diſcourſe of Sea-fights, for to diſtinguiſh Militia's, their Armies at Sea, and Armies at Land; Armies of Foot, and Armies of Horſe; but of Sea diſcipline I ſhall not preſume to ſay any thing, becauſe I know nothing of it: I ſhall leave that to be treated of by *Genoueſes* or *Venetians*, who by their experience in that kind, have done very great things formerly. Nor ſhall I ſpeak any farther of Horſe than what I have ſaid before, becauſe they are not ſo corrupt and diſorderly. For if your Foot (which is the ſtrength of an Army) are well diſciplin'd, and in good order, your Cavalry muſt be good of neceſſity.

CHAP. XVI.

The way to have many Horſe in your Country.

Fabr. I Would however remember him who is deſirous to ſettle and eſtabliſh a good Militia in his Country, that to furniſh it handſomely with Horſe, he ſhould do two things; one is, that he ſhould diſtribute a certain number of good Stallions up and down, that the Countrymen may breed, and drive a Trade with Foles and Colts, as you do in this Country with Calves and young Mules. The other is, that there might not want Chapmen for the Colts, I would oblige every man that keeps a Mule, to keep an Horſe; and he that would keep but one thing for his Saddle, ſhould be enjoyned to have it an Horſe; beſides, I would conſtrain every man that wore Cloth-cloths, to keep a Horſe in his Stable.

This order was taken not long ſince by a Prince of our times, and ſucceeded ſo well, that in a ſhort time he had a moſt excellent Cavalry. As to other things relating to Horſes, I refer you to what has been ſaid this day, and what has been practiſed of old.

CHAP. XVI.

A General is to invent of himself, and not follow altogether the Practices of his Predecessors.

Fabr. BUT perhaps you would desire to know what part and qualifications there ought to be in a General; and I will satisfy you in short, for I cannot make choice of a properer man, than he who understands all those things which I have recommended this day; and yet that would not be sufficient, unless he had abilities to invent something of his own; for never any man was Master of a Trade, who had no invention of his own; and if invention be honourable in any thing, it is most certainly in this: This is manifest in all Authors, who have constantly applauded all sorts of inventions, how slight and inconsiderable soever, as appears by the great Character they bestowed on *Alexander* the Great, for his wisdom in appointing a Cap to be put upon the top of a Launce as a signal for the dislodging of his Army, rather than to do it by sound of Trumpet as formerly, because it imported him much that they should remove privately. He was commended likewise for ordering his Soldiers upon a charge to fall down upon their left knee, as an expedient that would make them receive the charge with the more strength and firmness; which invention got him the victory, and occasioned him so much honour, that all Statues erected afterwards in his honour, were erected in that posture. But because it is time to conclude our discourse, I will leave where I began, to avoid the reproach which is incident to such persons as when once straggled know not how to return.

CHAP. XVII.

The Author returns, and with a short Discourse concludes his Book.

Fabr. IF you remember (*Cosimo*) you told me, that you could not imagine the reason why in one place I should commend Antiquity, and blame those which would not imitate it in great things; and yet I have not imitated it my self in my martial Affairs, in which I have taken much pains, and spent a great deal of my time.

To which I answer, That men who are to execute any thing, are first to learn which way it is to be done, that they may be afterwards the more able, when it comes to operation. Now whether or no I understand how to establish a Militia according to the method of the Ancients, I leave you to judge, who have heard me discourse of it so long; from whence you may imagine how much time has been spent in those thoughts by me, what great desire I have had to bring them to effect, and whether I have already, or ever may have occasion to do it. But to satisfy you farther, and justify myself, I will give you the reasons, and thereby observe my promise in some measure, by shewing you the conveniencies and inconveniencies in such imitations. I say then, that no action this day among men is more easily executed according to the method of the Ancients, than military discipline; but it must be among such Princes as are able to bring together 15 or 20000 of their own Subjects, against an Enemy. On the other side, there is nothing more difficult, to such Princes as have not that convenience: And that you may comprehend it the better, you must understand, that Generals are commended upon two several accounts; some are famous for that with an Army ordered and prepared by their own natural discipline, they have performed great things; so it was with most of the *Roman* Citizens, and others who had the command of Armies; whose only task was to keep their Soldiers good, and conduct them securely. Others have been not only to contend with and conquer the Enemy, but they were first to instruct and exercise their Army; and these doubtless were worthy of more praise than they who with their old and well experienced Soldiers performed such Exploits: Of this sort was *Pelopidas*, *Epaminondas*, *Tullus*, *Hostilius*, *Philip* of *Macedon*, *Cyrus* King of *Persia*, and *Gracchus* the *Roman*: All those were forc'd to model and discipline their Armies before they ventured them to fight; and all these were able to do it in respect of their own experience, and that they had other Persons which were able to exercise their Soldiers as they desired. Nor would it ever have been possible that any of those Generals, how good and excellent soever, could ever have done any great thing in another Province full of corrupt men, unless it had been accustomed to some honest Obedience. It

is not ſufficient then in *Italy* to underſtand how to manage a Veteran Army; but you muſt firſt know how to make and prepare it, and then how to govern and conduct it. Again, thoſe who do this, muſt be ſuch Princes as have great revenues, and many Subjects, in which number I am not to be reckoned, as one who never commanded, nor never can, unleſs it be foreign Forces under ſome other Prince; into which foreigners, whether it be poſſible or not to infuſe any of theſe things of which I have diſcourſed, I leave to you to judge. How could I perſwade a Soldier of our days to carry more Arms than he was accuſtomed, and beſides his Arms, two or three days Proviſion at his back, and a Spade or Pickaxe at his girdle? How could I prevail with him to work or dig all day, to ſtand all day to his Arms in counterfeit exerciſes, that I might rely the more confidently upon him when he came to it in good earneſt? How could I work upon him to abſtain from play, laſciviouſneſs, blaſphemy, and inſolence, which is their practice every day? How long would it be before I could reduce them into ſuch order, ſuch diſcipline, and awe, that if an Apple-tree was never ſo full, and ſtood in the middle of their Camp, none of them ſhould venture to touch it? As is many times read of the *Roman* Armies. What is it that I can promiſe them, that may make them either fear me, or love me, when the War being ended, I ſhall have no farther to do with them? How can I make them ſenſible of ſhame, who have been born and bred without any? How ſhould they pay me a reſpect whom they do not know? By what God, by what Saint ſhall I conjure them? By the Gods which they adore, or by the Gods which they blaſpheme? Which it is they adore I cannot tell, but am ſure they blaſpheme them all. How can I expect they ſhould keep their promiſe, which they do hourly deſpiſe? How can they who pay no honour to God, expreſs any to men? What good diſcipline then are we like to imprint upon ſo depraved a Maſs? If you object that the *Swizzers* and *Spaniards* are good Soldiers, I confeſs them much better than the *Italians*; but if you conſider what I have ſaid, and the manner of proceeding of both thoſe Nations, you will find them come ſhort in many things of the perfection of the Ancients. The *Swizzers* are become good Soldiers by natural practice of thoſe things which I have recommended; and the *Spaniards* by neceſſity; for their Wars lying in Foreign Provinces, where they are conſtrained to overcome or die, (becauſe they can never hope to get off by flying) are grown good, and yet their goodneſs is in many things defective; for their excellence is only to ſtand and receive the Enemy at puſh of Pike, and the Swords point; beſides, there is not any man among them fit to inſtruct another in what is neceſſary, much leſs if he be not of their own Country. But to return to our *Italians*, who having wanted wiſe Princes, have not been capable of good orders; and having wanted that neceſſity which was incumbent upon the *Spaniards*, they have not taken it up of themſelves, ſo that now they are the ſcorn and contempt of the world, not for any fault in the people, but in their Princes, who thereby have been chaſtiſed for their ignorance, and juſtly puniſhed for loſing their Territories ſo ignominiouſly, without any conſiderable reſiſtance. Will you ſee that what I ſay is true? Conſider what Wars we have had in *Italy* ſince the Expedition of *Charles* 8th, to this day: and although other Wars rendered Soldiers formidable and martial; theſe Wars, by how much they were more great, and more furious, by ſo much both Officers and Soldiers became more diſſolute and cowardly: And this muſt neceſſarily proceed from ill orders, which are not much better at this day; and the miſery is, there was nor is none able to reform them: Do not think that there is any way to recover reputation to the Arms of the *Italians*, but by this way that I have propoſed, and by means of ſuch Princes as have great Territories there; for this form may be imprinted in men that are ſimple, and plain, and one's own Subjects, much ſooner, than in ſuch as are lewd, and diſorderly, and ſtrangers. A good Sculptor never expects to make a good Statue out of a piece of Marble that is mangled, and has been ill handled; but he will do well enough if it has never been touched. Our Princes in *Italy*, before they were ſenſible of their Wars with the Northern Nations, believed it was enough for a Prince to know how to write a civil anſwer; how to direct a Letter with all its Punctilio's; how to ſhew himſelf witty and quick in his *repartees*; how to juggle, and diſſemble; how to dreſs himſelf handſomly, and diſpoſe of his Jewels to the beſt advantage; how to eat, and ſleep in more ſtate and magnificence than other people; to have a thouſand dalliances and pleaſures about him; to behave himſelf haughtily, and extort from his Subjects; to live in idleneſs and eaſe; to diſpoſe of Military commands to their Paraſites; to deſpiſe thoſe who propoſed any thing of Virtue; to require that their word ſhould be like Oracles, and of as much authority, as if ſpoken by God himſelf; to employ ſuch as had no knowledge in affairs; to commit great things to thoſe who durſt attempt nothing; to believe every thing immediately, without pondering and debating either their words or arguments that ſpoke them; and ſeveral other imperfections which hindered them from ſeeing that at laſt they

they muſt become a prey to any that would attack them. Theſe things in the year 1494. were the occaſion of thoſe flights, and fears, and depredations, by which three of the moſt potent States in *Italy* were frequently deſtroyed. But the worſt is, they which remain, continue in the ſame errors, and live in the ſame diſorder, without any conſideration that thoſe who formerly deſired to preſerve their Dominions, did all that I have preſcribed this day; and that their whole ſtudy was to accuſtom themſelves both minds and bodies to labour, to trouble, and deſpiſing of danger. And this was the cauſe that *Cæſar*, and *Alexander*, and all the valiant and brave Princes were always at the head of their Armies, compleatly armed and on foot, and rather than loſe their ſtates they would loſe their lives; ſo as they lived and dyed with a great deal of honour: And though perhaps ſome of them might be condemned for their ambition, and exorbitant deſire to reign; yet they could never be accuſed of effeminacy, or doing any thing that might render them delicate and unmanly. Which paſſages if they were read and believed by the Princes of our times, it would be impoſſible but they muſt alter their courſe of life, and their Provinces their fortune. But becauſe in the beginning of our diſcourſe you complained of your Militia, I tell you, that if you have ordered it according to my aboveſaid direction, and it has not anſwered your expectation, you have reaſon to complain; but if be not ordered and exerciſed according to my rules, the complaint lyes more properly againſt you, who has made it rather an abortion, than a perfect production. The *Venetians*, and the Duke of *Ferrara* began very well, but they did not perſevere, and it was imputable rather to themſelves, than their Soldiers. And let me affirm this to you for a truth, and among all the preſent Princes of *Italy*, he who takes his way firſt, and obſerves theſe rules and theſe orders, ſhall make himſelf greater than any Prince in that Country; and it ſhall happen to his Subjects as to the Kingdom of *Macedon*, which falling under the Dominion of King *Philip*, was improved to that height by this order and exerciſe (whilſt the reſt of *Greece* were idle, and if employed at all, it was in following Plays and Balls, and ſuch effeminate entertainments) that in a few years time he was able to conquer the whole Country, and leave a foundation to his Son to make himſelf Monarch of the whole world. He then who deſpiſes this Doctrine, if he be a Prince deſpiſes his own Principality; and if a Citizen, his own City. And in this I cannot but complain of Nature, who ſhould either have not ſuffered me to have known theſe things; or have given me power to have executed them, which is a thing I can never hope for now, as growing old, and towards the end of my days. For this reaſon I have diſcourſed the more frankly with you who are young, and ſo qualified that you may be able (if you be ſatisfied with what is ſaid) to give the ſame Counſil to your own Princes when occaſion ſhall be offered, and I hope with ſucceſs; and of this I beg you would not diſpond; for this Province ſeems to have a peculiar faculty of reviving things that are dead, as it has done Poetry, and Painting, and Sculpture; though for my own part I cannot expect to ſee it, as having one foot already in the grave. Certainly had fortune indulged me in my young days, ſo far as to have afforded ſo much Territory as ſuch an enterprize required, I believe in a ſhort time I would have demonſtrated to the world the power and efficacy of the orders of the Ancients, by means of which I ſhould have enlarged my Dominions with honour, or loſt them without ſhame,

THE MARRIAGE OF BELPHEGOR BY Nicholas Machiavel.

IT is recorded in the ancient Chronicles of *Florence*, that a certain holy Perſon, whoſe life was the admiration of that age, falling one day into a Trance, had a very ſtrange apparition: it ſeemed to him, that the ſouls of married men, that came trooping in great numbers to Hell, cried out all of them as they paſſed, that their Marriage was the cauſe of their miſery, and their Wives the occaſion of their coming thither: *Minos*, *Radamanth*, and the whole infernal Privy-Council were amazed at the clamour; at firſt they could not believe there was any thing in the buſineſs; but at laſt obſerving the ſame complaints continually multiplyed, they thought it fit to make *Pluto* acquainted: *Pluto* underſtanding the report, without imparting any thing to his wife, (who had taken Phyſick that week, and kept her Chamber) reſolved the matter ſhould be accurately examined, and ſuch courſe be taken, as was likelieſt to make the ſpeedieſt diſcovery of the truth: he iſſued out his Writs immediately, and aſſembled his Courts; his Princes, Dukes, Counts and Barons were all preſent; never was Senate ſo full, nor never was affair of that importance before it: the holy Father that beheld all, affirms poſitively, that *Pluto* delivered himſelf in this manner,

Right Truſty and well-Beloved,

Though our Kingdom was aſſigned us from Heaven, and the fatal decree has anciently determined our Dominion: though that ſentence be irrevocable, and above the cognizance of any humane Power; yet ſeeing his prudence is moſt ſafe, that is dictated by Laws; and his judgment moſt ſolid, that is fortified with others; we are reſolved to take your counſels along with us, which way we are to ſteer in an affair, that otherwiſe may prove (in time) of great diſhonour to our Government. The ſouls of married men, that are continually flocking into our Dominions, do unanimouſly exclaim againſt their Wives, as the only Perſons that ſend them tumbling hither; to us it ſeems impoſſible: yet foraſmuch as a peremptory and determinate Sentence upon their bare allegations, would not ſuit with our Satanical mercy; ſo a careleſs pretermiſſion on the other ſide could not be without reflexion on our Juſtice: That matters of ſuch importance therefore may have their due diſquiſition, and our adminiſtration be defended from obloquy or ſcandal; that no inconveniency may follow for want of delibration, and that ſome better expedient may be found out, than our ſelves have happily thought on, we have thought good to call you together, being confident, and aſſured by the aſſiſtance of your counſels, the honour and reputation of our Empire will be continued as unqueſtionable for the future, as it has been preſerved hitherto, by our own proper care and ſolicitude.

There was not one preſent but acknowledged it a buſineſs of importance, and well worthy an exact conſideration: it was the opinion of the whole Board, that all imaginable means was to be uſed to find out the truth; but what means that was, could not be agreed on; ſome were of opinion, a ſingle perſon was to be diſpatch'd into this World, and no more; others judged it better to ſend ſeveral, and that the diſcovery would be more certain from the experience of many, than of one; and a third ſort, more brisk and ſevere in their counſels, thought that clutter unneceſſary, and that clapping good ſtore of them together upon the rack, would be enough doubtleſs to extort a confeſſion. However it was at laſt carried by the plurality of voices, that a ſingle perſon only ſhould be ſent, and in this

this reſolution the whole company acquieſced; nevertheleſs there being no body found that would voluntarily undertake the employment, it was concluded the election ſhould be by lot; and at the ſame time, having made their billets, and ſhuffled them, the lot fell upon *Belphegor*.

One may ſay, and ſay true, that fortune never decided any thing ſo juſtly; for *Belphegor* was no ordinary Devil; and *Pluto* having made him formerly Generaliſſimo of his Armies, 'tis to be preſumed he was no novice; for all this he had a months mind to be quit of his embaſſy; but the order being unalterable, he was forced to ſubmit, and accept theſe conditions that were ſolemnly decreed, *That an hundred thouſand Ducats ſhould be paid him immediately, to defray the expences of his journey; that he ſhould aſſume the ſhape of a man; that he ſhould take a Woman to his wedded Wife, and live with her (if poſſible) ten years; that at the end of the term, (pretending to die) he ſhould give her the ſlip, repair immediately to his old quarters, and make affidavit upon his own experience of all the pleaſures and calamities of Matrimony.* It was declared to him alſo, that during this metamorphoſis, he was to be ſubject to the pains and misfortunes of humanity, as ſickneſs, impriſonment, and poverty: but that if by his cunning and dexterity he could diſintangle himſelf, it ſhould be allowed him, and not imputed as any ſcandal or reproach. *Belphegor* accepts the conditions, receives his Ducats, and having drawn a ſpruce party of horſe out of his Guards, and furniſhed himſelf with Pages and Footmen good ſtore, he ſet out immediately for this World, and arrived at *Florence* in a very fair equipage: he choſe that place above all other, for the conveniency of improving his mony, and putting it to intereſt with greater advantage. He called himſelf *Don Roderick* of *Caſtile*; he took a very noble Houſe in the Fauxburg of *All-Saints*; and that his quality might be undiſcovered, he gave out that he was a *Spaniard*, that being young he took a Voyage into *Syria*, that he had dwelt ſome time in *Aleppo*, where he had got moſt part of his Eſtate: but being weary there he was come into *Italy*, as a Country more agreeable with his humour, with intention (if any fair opportunity was offered) to marry: *Don Roderick* ſeemed to be a very handſome man, about thirty years of age; and in ſhort time after his arrival, he made it evident enough that he was rich, and by his liberality, that he knew how to make the beſt uſe of them; inſomuch that ſeveral Gentlemen of *Florence*, that had more Daughters than money, took all poſſible pains to inſinuate how welcome he ſhould be into their alliance. *Don Roderick*, that had choice of Miſtreſſes, preferr'd one that was tranſcendently handſome before them all; the ſtory ſays, ſhe was called *Honeſta*, and was the Daughter of *Americ Donati*, who had three more alſo to marry, and three Sons between twenty or twenty five years of age: but though *Seigneur Americ* was of one of the nobleſt Families of *Florence*, yet he was look'd upon as down the wind, and one that was overlaid with too many children, and the unavoidable charges of his Nobility: but *Don Roderick* took an order for that, defraying the whole expence of his Wedding out of his own purſe, managing all things with that ſplendor and magnificence, that there was nothing omitted that was deſirable upon ſuch an occaſion. It was mentioned before, as one of the conditions propoſed to *Belphegor*, that as ſoon as he was out of the Infernal dominions, he ſhould be ſubject to all the paſſions of mankind; and accordingly he began immediately to take delight in the honours and gallantry of the World; and as cunning a Devil as he was, to be wheedled with the flatteries and applauſes of men: but that which delighted him ſo much, coſt him dear; beſides that he had not been long with *Honeſta*, but he fell ſtark mad in love with her, and finding ſomething or other extraordinary in her, that I cannot think of, he was ſo far inamoured, he never thought himſelf happy before; inſomuch as when ſhe was melancholy, or out of humour, he would curſe his Commiſſion, and take his corporal Oath his very life was tedious. On the other ſide it was not to be forgot, that *Honeſta* marrying *Roderick*, and bringing him Beauty and Nobility inſtead of a Portion, ſhe thought it not fit to leave her pride and untractableneſs behind her; theſe two good qualities were ſo eminently in her, that *Roderick*, who had been uſed to *Lutifer's*, and had more than once experienced it, ſwore point-blank his Wife's inſolence was beyond it: for when ſhe once found the fondneſs and paſſion her Husband had for her, believing ſhe could manage him with a ſwitch, and order him as ſhe pleaſed, ſhe carried herſelf like his Soveraign, and handled him without pity or reſpect; and if it happened he denied her any thing, ſhe gave him immediately to underſtand, that ſhe was alſo as eloquent in ſcoulding, as others of her quality. By this you may judge what a cooler this was to *Don Roderick*: nevertheleſs the conſideration of his Father-in-Law, his Wife's Brothers, the Kindred he had by that bleſſed Marriage, but above all the paſſion and tenderneſs he had for her, made him endure all patiently. I ſhall not mention the expence of her clothes, which though never ſo rich, he was forced to change every week, according to the ordinary vanity of the Ladies in *Florence*. Beſides theſe, there

were

were other things were of no leſs inconvenience; he was forced (to preſerve the peace) to aſſiſt his Father-in-Law in the Marriage of his other Daughters, which coſt him a good round ſum: moreover, that all things might go well, and his correſpondency continue with his Conſort, he was glad to ſend one of her Brothers into the *Levant* with woollen Stuffs, another into *France* and *Spain* with Silks, and to furniſh the third with wherewithal to ſet up a Goldſmith's-ſhop in *Florence*: all which afflictions together were ſufficient to diſcompoſe any Devil of a thouſand, yet he had other thrown into the bargain: there is not any Town in all *Italy* more extravagant in their expences, in their Carnivals and Feaſts of St. *John*, than *Florence*; and *Honeſta* upon that occaſion muſt needs have her *Roderick* outdo all people of his Rank, in the ſumptuouſneſs of his Entertainments, in the magnificence of his Balls, and other diverriſements that are uſual at thoſe times: he ſuffered all theſe calamities for the ſame reaſons he endured the reſt; and though perhaps theſe difficulties were very hard and unpleaſant, he would have thought them ſupportable, could he have been ſatisfied his patience would have procured any quietneſs in his Family, and that he might have peaceably attended the hour of his deſtruction. But *Don Roderick* found the clear contrary; beſides the expence you have heard ſhe occaſioned, her inſolence was accompanied with a thouſand other inconveniences, inſomuch as he could keep neither officer nor ſervant in his houſe above three days together. This was ſevere trouble to him to find it was impoſſible for him to keep any body about him, though never ſo well experienced or affected to his affairs; nor indeed could any body blame them for taking their leaves, when the Devils themſelves that he brought along with him, did choſe rather to return, and toaſt the bottoms of their feet againſt the fire of Hell, than live in this World under the dominion of ſo ſuper-deviliſh a woman. *Roderick*'s life being thus miſerably uncomfortable, and the ſtock that he had reſerved, exhauſted by her extravagant expences, he was reduced to that paſs, he ſubſiſted only upon the hopes of the advantage he ſhould make by the return of ſome Veſſels he had ſent into the Eaſt and Weſt. And whereas before he had very good credit in that Town, to continue it, and keep up his Port, he borrowed money of ſuch as are uſed in that place to put it out; but thoſe kind of people being ſuch, as are not uſually ſleepy or negligent in their affairs, they took notice immediately he was not over-punctual to his day: his purſe being already empty, and he reduced to the higheſt extremity, at one daſh he receives news of two as diſaſterous accidents as could poſſibly befall him. The firſt was, that one of *Honeſta*'s Brothers had loſt at Hazzard all that *Roderick* had intruſted in his hands; and the other was no more welcome, which was, that his other Brother-in-Law returning into *Italy*, was himſelf caſtaway, and all his goods. The buſineſs was no ſooner known in *Florence*, but his Creditors had a meeting, where giving him over for one that was irrecoverably loſt, and not daring to diſcover themſelves, becauſe the time of payment was not yet come, they concluded he was to be watch'd very cloſe, leaſt he ſhould chouſe them, and ſhew them a light pair of heels. *Don Roderick* of *Caſtile* on the other ſide, conſidering with himſelf his affairs were paſt remedy, and alſo the term he was obliged to by the infernal Law, reſolves to take horſe and be gone without any more ado, which he performed without much difficulty, living conveniently for that by the Port *del Prato*; yet he was no ſooner march'd off, but the alarm was taken by his Creditors: they repair immediately to the Magiſtrates, and purſue him not only with Poſt and Officers, but leſt a certain number of Ducats ſhould dedauch that kind of Cattle, who are no better in *Italy* than other places, and prevail with them for an abatement of their ſpeed, they follow him themſelves in a full body, with impatience of hearing ſome tidings of him. *Roderick* in the mean time was no fool, but conſidered very well what he had to do; as ſoon as he was gallop'd about half a league from the Town, he leaves the high-way, and his horſe with it, (the Country being incloſed, and full of ditches on both ſides) and was forced to make the reſt of his journey on foot, which he did very ſucceſsfully; for wandring up and down under the ſhelter of the Vines and Reeds that abound much in thoſe parts, he arrived at laſt at *Peretola*, at the houſe of *Jean Matteo del Bricca*, Baily to *Jean del Bene*.

By very good fortune he meets *Matteo* carrying fodder to his Cattle; he accoſts him immediately, and promiſes him as he was a Gentleman, that if he would deliver him from the Catchpoles that were in purſuit of him, with deſign to clap him up, and ſtarve him in Priſon, he had an invention in his pate would make him rich out of hand, and of this he would give ſuch evidence before he departed, as ſhould aſſure him of his truth and fidelity; and if I do not, ſays he, with a damn'd imprecation, I will be content to be delivered up into their clutches that perſecute me. Now you muſt underſtand, that though *Matteo* was an Hinde and a Peaſant, yet the fellow had cunning enough, and knew on which ſide his bread was buttered; he conſidered, if he undertook him, and miſcarried, he had nothing

to

to loſe; and that if he ſucceeded, he ſhould be made for ever: without any more ado therefore he promiſes him protection, and clapping him cloſe upon a dunghill that was before the gate, he covered himſelf over with bruſh faggots and reeds, and ſuch other fewel as lay there in readineſs for the fire: and indeed he was no ſooner in his retirement, but in came the Creditors with full cry; they ſwaggered and laid about them like Lords, but all to no purpoſe, *Matteo* could not be perſuaded to confeſs ſo much as he ſaw him; inſomuch as marching on ſtill in the purſuit, but with as little ſucceſs as they came thither, they gave *Roderick* and their Money over for loſt, and returned to *Florence* every jot as wiſe as they were before. The Coaſt being clear in this manner, and the alarm over, *Matteo* ſteals to the cloſet where he had left *Roderick*, gives him a little freſh air, and conjures him to be as good as his word. *Roderick* was very honeſt in that point, and I dare ſay never any Devil, as to matters of gratitude, had more of a Gentleman; he gave him thanks for the great obligation he had received: he ſwore over and over again, he would do whatever lay in his power, to diſcharge himſelf of his promiſe, and in the heat and height of his compliments, to convince him he meant as he ſaid, he gives him the whole ſtory as you have had it, and at laſt told him the very way he had pitch'd upon to make him a Prince: know then, ſays he, that whenever you hear of any Lady that is poſſeſs'd, 'tis no other Devil but I that have poſſeſs'd her; and be ſure I will never leave her, till you come your ſelf and force me from my quarters, after which you have wit enough to make your own terms for your payment. They had very few words more, he only gave him the Sumerſet once or twice, and ſhewed him two or three jugling tricks, and vaniſh'd.

A while after there was a great noiſe about the Town, that *Meſ. Ambroſio Amidei's* Daughter, that was married to *Bonaculo Thebalducci's* Son, was poſſeſs'd; her Father and Mother did not fail to uſe all the remedies are uſual in ſo deplorable a caſe; they brought before her *St. Zanobe's* Head, and *St. J. Galbert's* Cloak, which was nuts to *Belphegor*, and made him nothing but laugh: There was no body in her but *Don Roderick de Caſtile*, who was as ingenious a Gentleman devil as one would wiſh; and that the world might take notice that this was no fantaſtick imagination, nor fit of the Night-mare, nor any ſuch trifle, but that ſhe was really poſſeſſed, ſhe ſpake Latin better than *Tully* ever writ, diſputed in Philoſophy, and diſcovered the ſecrets and ſins of ſeveral people that were there, who were very much ſurprized to find the Devil concern himſelf with thoſe kind of affairs.

Amongſt the reſt, was one holy Father he did great diſcourteſie to, in blurting out before the whole company, as if he had kept a young Laſs four years together in his Cell, in the habit of a young Monk; and after all this, let any body judge whether the poſſeſſion was not like to be true. *Ambroſio* in the mean time was in great affliction for his Daughter; he had tryed all the ways that Phyſick or Religion could propoſe, but to no purpoſe; ſo as he was brought to the higheſt point of deſpair, when *Matteo* came to him, and undertook the cure of his Daughter, if he would give him five hundred *Florins*, which he deſigned to lay out in Land at *Pereiola*. In ſhort, *Matteo* was an honeſt fellow, and would have done the miracle *gratis*, and like a Gentleman, but his pockets were hollow, and he had great occaſion for Money at that time; Seignior *Ambroſio* accepts the conditions, and *Matteo* falls to work; he began very civilly with certain Maſſes and other Ceremonies, that he might appear the more formal in the buſineſs, at length he ſtole to the Ladies ear, calls *Roderick*, and tells him he was come thither to him, and did require him to be as good as his word. Content, ſays *Roderick*, and that you may ſee I ſhall deal with you like a perſon of quality, take notice, that becauſe this expedition is not enough to inrich you, and do your buſineſs, I will befriend you more than once; for which reaſon as ſoon as I am departed from hence, away I'll march into the Daughter of *Charles* King of *Naples*, and don't fear but I'll ſtick to her, till you come to exorciſe me, ſo as there you may make up your markets at a blow, and become conſiderable for ever, but be ſure after that I be troubled with you no more; and as ſoon as he had ſaid ſo, whip ſays he out of the Lady, and was gone to the great joy and aſtoniſhment of the whole Town.

Belphegor in the mean time was as good as his word, as he promiſed *Matteo*; away he goes, and in two or three days time it was all over *Italy*, that the Daughter of *Charles* King of *Naples*, was in the ſame condition; which was good news for *Matteo*, who was at this bout to gain the Philoſophers-ſtone: In ſhort, he tryed all means poſſible; the Monks went to work with their prayers, and their croſſes, but to no purpoſe; The Devil would not budge till *Matteo* came himſelf, who had formerly obliged him. The King had news of what had happened at *Florence*, and ſends away immediately for *Matteo* to his Court, who came accordingly, and after ſome few ceremonious formalities, counterfeited for concealment of the myſtery, he cures his Daughter. However *Roderick* before his departure, as is reported in the Chronicle, accoſted him in this manner: You ſee, *Matteo*

I have been as good as my word; you see you are become rich in a trice, and may take your ease for the future; so as if I be not mistaken, I have discharged my self as to you very honestly: hereafter have a care how you come near me; for as hitherto I have done you knight-service, henceforward I will do you as much mischief as I can. *Matteo* being returned to *Florence* very wealthy, (for the King of *Naples* had given him above five thousand Ducats) he thought of nothing now but enjoying that peaceably he had got, never imagining *Roderick* would do him any harm; but his designs were much frustrated by a report out of *France*, that *Lewis* the seventh's Daughter was possess'd as the former: *Matteo* was in great trouble; on the one side he was not ignorant of the power of that Prince, on the other he remembred *Roderick*'s last words; the King used all means possible, but without any success; he was told what feats *Matteo* had done, and dispatched a Post to him immediately, to desire his company at *Paris*; but *Matteo* pretending I know not what indispositions, that rendered him incapable of serving his Majesty, the King was forced to write to the Magistrates, who sent away *Matteo* immediately.

Being arrived at *Paris*, he was in great affliction, because he knew not which way for his life to perform what was expected from him. At last he goes to the King, and tells him, that true it was indeed, he had formerly wrought some cures in that kind, but that it was not in reason to be expected he could dispossess all people he met with, seeing there were some Devils so refractory and cross-grain'd, neither threats nor enchantments, nor devotion it self, would do any good on: That he said not this out of any repugnancy or unwillingness to do as he was desired, but that in case his endeavours were ineffectual, he might have his Majesty's pardon. The King was stark mad at the story, and told him in plain terms, if he did not rout the Devil out of his Daughter, as he had done out of others, he would hang him forthwith; for he saw no reason why Miracles were not as feasible at *Paris*, as at *Florence* and *Naples*. These words toucht *Matteo* to the quick, he thought there was no pleasure to be taken in being hang'd in that manner, and that what the King had said, was without any equivocation: However he recollected himself a little, or at least pretended so, and calling for the Princess that was possess'd, he makes his approaches, and whispering her in the ear, told *Roderick* he was his very humble servant, and put him in mind of the good office he had done him, when he delivered him out of the talons of the Law; adding withal, that if he left him in the lurch, in the extremity of danger he was then in, the whole World would cry out on his ingratitude. *Roderick* heard him with no more patience than needs must, he swaggers, swears, storms, and lays about him like a Devil in good earnest, gives him a thousand and a thousand ill words, but they could distinguish only these few at the last: How now, you Rascally Traitor, have you the impudence to come near me again? have you forgot it was I that made you your fortune? but I'll make all the World see, and you too with a pox to you, that I can take away as well as give; besides which, you shall not fail to be hang'd before you get away from *Paris*. Poor *Matteo*, seeing no other remedy for his misfortunes, he fell a thinking some other way, and having sent back the Lady to her Chamber, he made this speech to the King: Sir, I have told you before, that there are certain ill-natur'd capricious Spirits, one knows not which way to deal withal, and of this sort is that which possesses your Daughter; if what we shall administer might be sufficient, your Majesty should be happy in your desire, and mine also; but if things prove otherwise, and your Majesty be not satisfied with my endeavours, I shall submit, and your Majesty may deal with me as I deserve; in the mean time, I desire your Majesty would give order a Theatre be erected in the Church-yard of *Nostre Dame*, big enough to receive all the Nobility and Clergy in the Town: Let this Theatre, if your Majesty think good, be hung with Cloath of Gold, and other rich Stuffs, and an Altar set up in the middle on *Sunday* next; I would desire your Majesty to be there, with all the Princes and Nobility in *Paris*, and after a grand Mass is sung, let the Princess be brought also: Besides this, it is necessary there should be twenty persons at least, with Trumpets, Horns, Drums, Hoboys and Symbals, ready in some by-place, when I throw up my Cap into the air, to advance towards the Theatre with all the noise they can make; which Musick, with some other ingredients that I have, will send the Devil packing from the Princess. The King gave order all things should be done as *Matteo* requested, and *Sunday* being come, and the Theatre throng'd with a multitude of persons of quality, and the Church-yard of *Nostre Dame* full of people, the Princess was led in by two Bishops, and followed by several Lords of the Court; *Roderick* was in a terrible amaze, to behold so magnificent a preparation, and pondering with himself, was over-heard to pronounce these words: I would fain know what this rascally Peasant means to do; I have seen many places, I have more than once seen the whole

pomp

pomp of Heaven, nor am I ignorant of what is moſt formidable in Hell, yet can I not tell what to make of this; but I'll handle him like a Rogue, as he is, and if I fail, *Pluto* requite me. *Matteo* came up cloſe to him, and deſired him very civilly to depart; but *Roderick* cryed out, Oh the wonderous cunning that is in you! do you think by this whimſey to ſave your ſelf from my power, and the indignation of the King? but think what you will, you ſcoundrel, I am reſolved you ſhall hang for't, or elſe let me paſs for the moſt miſerable poor-ſpirited Devil in the World; *Matteo* perſiſted in his requeſt, but *Belphegor* gave him worſe Language than before; but all that frighted not *Matteo*, for without loſing more time, he threw his hat up in the air, and at an inſtant the Trumpets, Horns, and all the reſt of the Muſick ſtruck up, and advanced towards the Theatre; *Roderick* was ſtartled at the noiſe, and made it manifeſt that there are ſome Devils as fearful as men; and not able to imagine the reaſon, he called out to *Matteo*, and asked what was the matter? *Matteo* being a cunning Rogue every inch of him, as if he had been terribly frighted, informs him thus: Alas! poor *Roderick*, ſays he, 'tis your Wife *Honeſta* is come to ſeek you at *Paris*; he ſaid no more, but it is not to be imagined what diſorder theſe four or five words put the Devil into; they took away his wit and judgment, ſo as without any conſideration, whether the news was poſſible or not, without ſpeaking one word, away he ſtole from the Princeſs, chooſing rather to go back into Hell, and give up his accounts there, than to return again into the thraldom of Matrimony, that had already coſt him ſo many ſorrows and dangers. As ſoon as he arrived he demanded audience, and in the preſence of *Pluto*, *Æacus*, *Minos*, and *Radamanthus*, all of them Counſellors of State, he declared that the Souls of Men were in the right on't, and that 'twas their Wives that ſent them to Hell. *Matteo* that had been too crafty for the Devil, returns to *Florence* in great triumph; the Chronicle mentions not any great matter the King gave him, but it ſays, that having gained ſufficiently by the two former, he eſteemed himſelf very happy that he had eſcaped hanging at *Paris*.

THE PUBLISHER TO THE READER,

Concerning the following LETTER.

Courteous Reader,

IT hath been usual with most of those who have Translated this Author into any Language, to spend much of their time and paper in taxing his impieties, and confuting his errors and false principles, as they are pleased to call them; if upon perusal of his Writings I had found him guilty of any thing that could deceive the simple, or prejudice the rest of Mankind, I should not have put thee to the hazard of reading him in thy own Language, but rather have suffered him still to sleep in the obscurity of his own, than endanger the world; but being very well assured of the contrary, and that the Age will rather receive advantage than damage by this Publication, I did yet think that it was fit to say something in a Preface, to vindicate our Author from those Slanders, which Priests, and other byas'd Pens have laid upon him; but still I thought, that it might prove a bold and presumptuous undertaking, and might excite laughter, for a person of my small parts and abilities, to apologize for one of the greatest Wits, and profoundest Judgments, that ever lived amongst the Moderns: In this perplexity, I had the good fortune to meet with this Letter of his own writing; which hath delivered me from those scruples, and furnished me with an opportunity of justifying this great person by his own Pen. Receive then this choice Piece with benignity, it hath never before been published in any Language, but lurk'd above eighty Years in the private Cabinets of his own Kindred, and the Descendents of his own admirers in Florence, *'till in the beginning of the* Pontificat *of* Urbane *the* 8th, *it was procured by the Jesuits, and other busie-bodies, and brought to* Rome, *with an intention to divert that wise* Pope *from his design of making one of* Nicholas Machiavel's *Name and Family* Cardinal, *as (notwithstanding all their opposition) he did, not long after. When it was gotten into that*

that City, it nlunted not those who had the judgment and curiosity to copy it, and so at length came to enjoy that privilege, which all rare Pieces (even the sharpest Libels and Pasquils) challenge in that Court, which is to be sold to Strangers; one of which being a Gentleman of this Country, brought it over with him at his return from thence in the Year 1645, and having translated it into English, *did communicate it to divers of his friends, and by means of some of them, it hath been my good fortune to be capable of making thee a present of it, and let it serve as an Apology for our Author and his Writings, if thou thinkest he need any. I must confess, I believe his Works require little, but rather praise and admiration; yet I wish I could as well justifie one undertaking of his, not long after the writing of this Letter; for we find in the Story of those times, that in the Month of* August *following, in the same Year* 1537, *this* Nicolo Machiavelli, *(except there were another of that name) was committed Prisoner to the* Bargello, *amongst those who were taken in Arms against* Cosimo, *at the Castle of* Montemurli, *notwithstanding all his Compliments in this Letter to that Prince, and profess'd Obligations to him; if this be so, we must impute it to his too great Zeal, to concur with the desires of the universality at that time, in restoring the Liberty of their Country, which hath so far dazzel'd the judgments even of great and wise men, that thou seest many grave Authors among the Ancients, have even commended and deified the Ingratitude and Treachery of* Brutus *and* Cassius. *But certainly this crime of his would have been much more pardonable, if he had lived to see his own Propheſie fulfilled in the Persons and Descendents of this great* Cosimo, *for there was never any succession of Princes since the world began, in which all the Royal vertues and other qualities, necessary to those who rule over men, were more eminently perspicuous, than in every individual of this line; so that those people have as little cause as ever any had, to lament the change of their Government; their great* Dukes *having been truly Fathers of their Country, and treated their Subjects like Children, though their power be above all limitation, above all fundamental Laws; but they having no Law, are a Law to themselves. I cannot chuse but instance in some few of their benefits to their people, first the making the River* Arno *Navigable from* Pisa *to* Florence, *in a year of Dearth, that so the Poor might be set on work, and have Bread, and the Traffick of both Cities infinitely facilitated; their making at their own charge a* Canal *from* Livorne *to* Pisa, *their erecting at* Pisa *a famous University, paying the Professors, who are eminent for Learning, and discharging all other incidencies out of their own Revenue, besides the raising stately Buildings for Schools and Libraries, their founding a renowned Order of* Knighthood, *and keeping the Chapter in the same City, and ordering a considerable number of Knights constantly to reside there, both which were intended and performed by them, to encrease the concourse, and restore the wealth to the once opulent Inhabitants of that place. Their new building, fortifying and enfranchizing* Livorne, *that even by the abolishing their own Customs they might enrich their Subjects, and make that Port (as it now is) the Magazine of all the* Levant *Trade; and lastly, their not having in* 140 *years ever levyed any new Tax upon their people, excepting in the year* 1642, *to defend the Liberties of* Italy *against the* Barbarini. *These things would merit a Panegyrick, if either my Parts, or this short Advertisement would admit it. I shall conclude then, after I have born a just and dutiful testimony to the merits of the Prince, who now governs that State, in whom (if all the Princely vertues and endowments should be lost) they might be found and restored again to the World: as some ingenious Artists in the last Age, retrieved the Art of Sculpture by certain* bas relievos *remaining on some Pillars and Walls at* Rome; *The Prudence, Magnanimity, Charity, Liberality, and above all, the Humanity, Courtesie, and Affability of this Prince, though they exceed my expressions, yet they are sufficiently known, not only to his own Subjects, (the constant objects of his care and goodness) but even to all Strangers, more particularly to our Nation; he having undertaken a troublesome Journey to visit this Kingdom, and to make it witness and partaker of his transcendent generosity*

and bounty, which hath continued ever since, as can be testified by all who have had the honour to wait upon him in his own Country, or the good fortune but to see him in ours. I my self, who have been so happy to be admitted into his presence, and have been honoured since in having his Highness my customer for many choice Books to encrease (not his Knowledge, for that is beyond receiving any addition by Books) but his curiosity, and his Library, do think my self bound in Duty to take this poor opportunity of testifying my gratitude and devotion, to this excellent Prince. As to this Letter, I have nothing more to say, but that thou mayest see how right this Author was ser in Principles of Religion, before he could have the information which we have had since from the Pens of most learned and rational Controvertists in those points, and therefore thou mayst admire the sagacity of his Judgment. Read him then, and serve God, thy King, and thy Country, with the knowledge he will teach thee. Farewel.

NICHO-

NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL's LETTER TO *ZANOBIUS BUONDELMONTIUS*, IN Vindication of himself and his Writings.

THE Discourse we had lately (dear *Zenobio*) in the delightful Gardens of our old deceased Friend *Cosimo Rucellai*, and the pressing importunity of *Guilio Salviati*, that I would use some means to wipe off the Many aspersions cast upon my Writings, gives you the present trouble of reading this Letter, and me the pleasure of writing it; which last would be infinitely greater, if I were not at this day too old, and too inconsiderable, and by the change of our Government wholly uncapable of performing, either with my brain or my hand, any further service to my Country; for it hath ever been my opinion, that whosoever goes about to make men publickly acquainted with his actions, or apologize to the world for imputations laid upon him, cannot be excused from vanity and impertinence, except his parts and opportunities be such, as may enable him to be instrumental for the good of others, and that he cannot atchieve that excellent end, without justifying himself from having any indirect and base ones, and procuring trust from men, by clearing the repute of his justice and integrity to them. But although this be far from my case; yet I have yielded (you see) to the entreaty of *Guilio* and the rest of the Company, not only because I am sufficiently (both by the restraint of our Press, and the discretion of the person I write to) assured that this Letter will never be made publick; but that I esteem it a Duty to clear that excellent Society, from the Scandal of having so dangerous and pernicious a person to be a member of their Conversation; for by reason of my Age, and since the loss of our Liberty, and my sufferings under that Monster of lust and cruelty *Alexander de Medeci*, set over us by the Divine vengeance for our sins, I can be capable of no other design or enjoyment, than to delight and be delighted in the company of so many choice and virtuous persons, who now assemble themselves with all security, under the happy and hopeful Reign of our new Prince, *Cosmo*: and we may say, that though our Common-wealth be not restored, our slavery is at an end, and that coming in by our own choice, may prove (if I have as good Skill in Prophesying as I have had formerly) Ancestor to many renowned Princes, who will govern this State in great quietness, and with great clemency; so that our Posterity is like to enjoy ease and security, though not that greatness, wealth, and glory, by which our City hath for some years past (even in the most factious and tumultuous times of our Democracy) given Law to *Italy*, and bridled the ambition of foreign Princes. But, that I may avoid the Loquacity incident to old men, I will come to the business. If I remember well, the exceptions that are taken to these poor things I have published, are reduceable to three.

First, *That in all my Writings, I insinuate my great affection to the Democratical Government, even so much as to undervalue that of Monarchy in respect of it; which last I do, not obscurely, in many passages teach, and as it were perswade, the People to throw off.*

Next, *That in some places I vent very great impieties, slighting and villifying the Church, as Author of all the misgovernment in the World, and by such contempt make way for Atheism and Prophaness.*

And Lastly, *That in my Book of the Prince I teach Monarchs all the execrable Villanies that can be invented, and instruct them how to break faith, and to oppress and enslave their Subjects:*

I

Machiavel died before Alexander de Medicis was at the head of the State Ann 1530 See the Prince by Clement 7th for printing his works 1531

I ſhall anſwer ſomething to every one of theſe; and that I may obſerve a right method, will begin with the firſt.

Having lived in an Age when our poor Country and Government have ſuffered more changes and revolutions, than ever did perhaps befall any people in ſo ſhort a time, and having had, till the taking of *Florence*, my ſhare in the managing of affairs, during almoſt all theſe alterations, ſometimes in the quality of *Secretary* of our *City*, and ſometimes employed in Embaſſages abroad, I ſet my ſelf to read the Hiſtories of Ancient and Modern times, that I might by that means find out whether there had not been in all Ages the like viciſſitudes and accidents in State affairs, to ſearch out the cauſes of them; and having in ſome ſort ſatisfyed my ſelf therein, I could not abſtain from ſcribling ſomething of the two chief kinds of Government, *Monarchy* and *Democracy*, of which all other forms are but mixtures; and ſince neither my Parts nor Learning could arrive to follow the ſteps of the *Ancients*, by writing according to Method and Art, as *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, and many others have done upon this Subject, I did content my ſelf to make ſlight obſervations upon both; by giving a bare Character of a *Prince*, as to the *Monarchical* frame; and as to the popular, chuſing the perfecteſt and moſt ſucceſsful of all Governments of that kind upon earth; and in my Diſcourſes upon it, following the order of my Author, without ever taking upon me to argue problematically, much leſs to decide which of theſe two Governments is the beſt; if from my way of handling matters in my diſcourſes upon *Livy*, and from thoſe incomparable virtues, and great Actions we read of in that *Hiſtory*, and from the obſervations I make, men will conclude (which is, I muſt confeſs, my opinion) that the excellency of thoſe Counſels and Atchievements, and the improvement which Mankind, and as I may ſo ſay, humane nature it ſelf obtained amongſt the *Romans*, did proceed naturally from their Government, and was but a plain effect and conſequence of the perfection of their Common-wealth; I ſay, if Readers will thus judge, how can I in reaſon be accuſed for that; it would become thoſe who lay this blame upon me, to undeceive them whom my Papers have miſled, and to ſhew the world to what other cauſes we may impute thoſe admirable effects, thoſe Heroick qualities and performances, that integrity and purity of manners, that ſcorning of riches and life it ſelf, when the publick was concerned: If they pleaſe to do this, they will oblige my Readers, who will owe to ſuch the rectifying their Judgments, and not at all offend me, who have reaſoned this matter impartially and without paſſion, nor have poſitively affirmed any thing. But what if this part of my accuſation had been true? Why ſhould I be condemned of Hereſie or indiſcretion, for preferring a *Common-wealth* before a *Monarchy*? Was I not born, bred, and employed in a City, which being at the time I writ under that form of Government, did owe all wealth and greatneſs, and all proſperity to it? If I had not very deſignedly avoided all dogmaticalneſs in my obſervations, (being not willing to imitate young Scholars in their Declamations) I might eaſily have concluded from the premiſes I lay down, that a *Democracy* founded upon good orders is the beſt and moſt excellent Government, and this without the leaſt fear of confutation; for I firmly believe, that there are none but Flatterers and Sophiſters would oppoſe me, ſuch as will wreſt *Ariſtotle*, and even *Plato* himſelf, to make them write for *Monarchy*, by miſapplying ſome looſe paſſages in thoſe great Authors; nay, they will tell their Reader, that what is moſt like the Government of the world by God is the beſt, which wholly depends upon his abſolute power; to make this compariſon run with four feet, theſe Sycophants muſt give the poor Prince they intend to deifie, a better and ſuperior Nature to humanity, muſt create a neceſſary dependance of all Creatures upon him, muſt endow him with infinite wiſdom and goodneſs, and even with omnipotency it ſelf. It will be hard for any man to be miſled in this Argument by proofs wreſted from *Theology*, ſince whoſoever reads attentively the Hiſtorical part of the *Old Teſtament*, ſhall find that God himſelf never made but one Government for men, that this Government was a *Common-wealth*, (wherein the *Sanhedrim* or *Senate*, and the Congregation or *popular Aſſembly* had their ſhare) and that he manifeſted his high diſpleaſure when the rebellious would turn it into a *Monarchy*. But that I may not ſtrike upon the rock I profeſs to ſhun, I ſhall paſs to that which is indeed fit to be wip'd off, and which if it were true, would not only expoſe me to the hatred and vengeance of God, and all good men, but even deſtroy the deſign and purpoſe of my Writings, which is to treat in ſome ſort (as well as one of my ſmall parts can hope to do) of the *Politicks*; and how can any man pretend to write concerning Policy, who deſtroys the moſt eſſential part of it, which is obedience to all Governments. It will be very eaſie then for *Gurlio Salviati*, or any other member of our Society, to believe the Proteſtation I make, that the animating of private men either

either directly or indirectly to disobey, much less to shake off, any Government how despotical soever, was never in my Thoughts or Writings; those who are unwilling to give credit to this, may take the pains to assign in any of my Books, the passages they imagine to tend that way, (for I think of none my self) that so I may give such persons more particular satisfaction. I must confess I have a discourse in one of my Books, to encourage the *Italian* Nation, to assume their ancient valour, and to expel the *Barbarians*, meaning (as the ancient *Romans* used the word) all Strangers from amongst us; but that was before the *Kings of Spain* had quiet possession of the Kingdom of *Naples*, or the *Emperor* of the *Dutchy* of *Milan*; so that I could not be interpreted to mean, that the people of those two Dominions should be stir'd up to shake off their Princes, because they were Foreigners, since at that time *Lodovic Sforza* was in the possession of the one, and King *Frederick* restored to the other, both *Natives* of *Italy*; but my design was, to exhort our Country-men not to suffer this *Province* to be the Scene of the Arms and ambition of *Charles* the 8th, or King *Lewis* his Successor, who when they had a mind to renew the old Title of the House of *Anjou* to the Kingdom of *Naples*, came with such force into *Italy*, that not only our Goods were plundered, and our Lands wasted, but even the liberty of our Cities and Government endangered; but to unite and oppose them, and to keep this *Province* in the hands of *Princes* of our own Nation; this my intention is so visible in the Chapter it self, that I need but refer you to it. Yet that I may not answer this imputation barely by denying, I shall assert in this place what my principles are, in that which the world calls *Rebellion*, which I believe to be not only rising in Arms against any Government we live under, but to acknowledge that word to extend to all clandestine Conspiracies too, by which the peace and quiet of any Country may be interrupted, and by consequence the Lives and Estates of innocent persons endangered. *Rebellion* then so described, I hold to be the greatest crime that can be committed amongst men, both against Policy, Morality, and *in foro Conscientiæ*; but notwithstanding all this, it is an offence which will be committed while the world lasts, as often as Princes tyrannize, and by enslaving and oppressing their Subjects make Magistracy, which was intended for the benefit of Mankind, prove a Plague and Destruction to it; for let the terrour and guilt be never so great, it is impossible that humane Nature, which consists of passion as well as vertue, can support with patience and submission the greatest cruelty and injustice, whenever either the weakness of their Princes, the unanimity of the people, or any other favourable accident, shall give them reasonable hopes to mend their condition, and provide better for their own interest by insurrection. So that Princes and States ought in the Conduct of their affairs, not only to consider what their people are bound to submit to, if they were inspired from Heaven, or were all Moral Philosophers, but to weigh likewise what is probable *de facto* to fall out, in this corrupt age of the world; and to reflect upon those dangerous Tumults, which have happened frequently, not only upon oppression, but even by reason of Malversation, and how some *Monarchies* have been wholly subverted and changed into *Democracies* by the Tyranny of their Princes; as we see (to say nothing of *Rome*) the powerful *Cantons* of *Switzerland* brought by that means a little before the last age, to a considerable *Common-wealth*, courted and sought to by all the *Potentates* in *Christendom*. If *Princes* will seriously consider this matter, I make no question but they will Rule with Clemency and Moderation, and return to that excellent Maxim of the Ancients (almost exploded in this Age) that the interest of *Kings*, and their people, are the same; which truth it hath been the whole design of my Writings to convince them of.

Now having gone thus far in the Description of Rebellion; I think my self obliged to tell you what I conceive not to be Rebellion. Whosoever then takes up Arms to maintain the Politick Constitution, or Government of his Country, in the condition it then is, I mean, to defend it from being changed, or invaded, by the Craft or Force of any Man, (altho' it be the Prince, or Chief Magistrate himself) provided, that such taking up of Arms be Commanded or Authorised by those who are, by the Orders of that Government, legally intrusted with the Custody of the Liberty of the People, and Foundation of the Government: This I hold to be so far from Rebellion, that I believe it laudable, nay, the Duty of every Member of such Common-wealth; for that he who fights to Support and Defend the Government he was born and lives under, cannot deserve the odious name of Rebel, but he who endeavours to destroy it. If this be not granted, it will be in vain to frame any mix'd Monarchies in the World; yet such is at this day the happy Form under which almost all *Europe* lives, as the People of *France*, *Spain*, *Germany*, *Poland*, *Swethland*, *Denmark*, &c. wherein the Prince hath his share, and the People theirs; which last, if they had no means of recovering their Rights, if taken from them, or defending them if invaded, would be in the same E-

ſtate as if they had no Title to them, but liv'd under the Empire of *Turks* or of *Muſcovy*. And ſince they have no other Remedy but by Arms, and that it would be of ill Conſequence to make every private man judge when the Rights of the People (to which they have as lawful a Claim as the Prince to his) are invaded, which would be apt to produce frequent, and ſometimes cauſeleſs Tumults; therefore it hath been the great Wiſdom of the Founders of ſuch Monarchies, to appoint Guardians to their Liberty; which if it be not otherwiſe expreſt, is, and ought to be underſtood to reſide in the Eſtates of the Country; which for that reaſon (as alſo to exerciſe their ſhare in the Sovereignty, as making Laws, Levying Money, &c.) are frequently to be aſſembled in all thoſe Regions in *Europe*, before mentioned. Theſe are to aſſert and maintain the Orders of the Government, and the Laws eſtabliſhed; and (if it cannot be done otherwiſe) to arm the People to defend them, and repel the Force that is upon them. Nay, the Government of *Arragon* goes further; and becauſe in the Intervals of the Eſtates or Courts many Accidents may intervene, to the prejudice of their Rights or *Fueros*, as they call them; they have, during the intermiſſion, appointed a Magiſtrate, called *El Juſticia*, who is, by the Law and Conſtitution of that Kingdom, to aſſemble the whole People to his Banner, whenever ſuch Rights are incroacht upon; who are not only juſtified by the Laws for ſuch coming together, but are ſeverely puniſhable in caſe of refuſal. So that there is no queſtion, but that if the Kings of *Arragon*, at this day very powerful, by the addition of the Kingdoms of *Naples*, and of *Sicily*, and the Union with *Caſtile*, ſhould in time to come invade their Kingdom of *Arragon* with the Forces of their New Dominions, and endeavour to take from them the Rights and Pleaſures they enjoy lawfully by their Conſtitution; there is no queſtion, I ſay, but they may (tho' their King be there in perſon againſt them) aſſemble under their *Juſticia*, and defend their Liberties, with as much Juſtice, as if they were invaded by the *French*, or by the *Turk*. For it were abſurd to think, ſince the People may be legally aſſembled to apprehend Banditti Robbers, nay, to deliver a Poſſeſſion forcibly detain'd againſt the Sentence of ſome inferior Court, that they may, and ought not to beſtir themſelves to keep in being, and preſerve that Government which maintains them in poſſeſſion of their Liberty and Property, and defends their Lives too from being arbitrarily taken away. But I know this clear Truth receives oppoſition in this unreaſonable and corrupt Age; when Men are more prone to flatter the Luſts of Princes than formerly, and the Favourites are more impatient to bear the Impartiality of Laws, than the Sons of *Brutus* were; who complain'd, *Leges eſſe Surdas*; that is, tho' they were Gentlemen, in favour with the Ladies, and Miniſters of the King's Pleaſures, yet they could not Oppreſs, Drink, Whore, nor Kill the *Shiri*, Officers of Juſtice, in the Streets, returning from their Night-Revels, but the Execution of the Laws would reach them, as well as others; who, in the times of *Tarquin*, it ſeems, found the Prince more exorable. Nay, the very Divines themſelves help with their Fallacies, to oppugn this Doctrine; by making us believe, as I ſaid before, it is God's Will all Princes ſhould be abſolute; and are ſo far in a Conſpiracy againſt Mankind, that they aſſert, that in the Text (*This ſhall the manner of your King be*) God was giving that People the *Jus Divinum* of Government, when in truth he was threatning them with the Plagues of Monarchy. But I ſpare the Divines here, ſince I ſhall have occaſion, in diſcourſing of my next Accuſation, to ſhew how that ſort of People have dealt with God's Truth, and with the Intereſts of Men; and to be as good as my word, I ſhall preſently fall upon that Point, having been ſo tedious already in the former.

I am charged then, in the ſecond place, with *impiety, in villifying the Church, and ſo to make way for Atheiſm*. I do not deny but that I have very frequently in my Writings laid the blame upon the *Church* of *Rome*, not only for all the miſgovernment of *Chriſtendom*, but even for the depravation and almoſt total deſtruction of Chriſtian Religion it ſelf in this Province; but that this Diſcourſe of mine doth, or can tend to teach men impiety, or to make way for Atheiſm, I peremptorily deny: and although for proof of my innocence herein, I need but refer you and all others to my Papers themſelves, as they are now publiſhed, (where you will find all my reaſons drawn from experience, and frequent examples cited, which is ever my way of arguing) yet ſince I am put upon it, I ſhall in a few lines make that matter poſſibly a little clearer: and ſhall firſt make proteſtation, that as I do undoubtedly hope, by the merits of Chriſt, and by faith in him, to attain Eternal Salvation; ſo I do firmly believe the Chriſtian profeſſion to be the only true Religion now in the world: Next, I am fully perſuaded, that all Divine verities, which God then deſigned to teach the world, are contained in the Books of Holy Scripture, as they are now extant and received amongſt us. From them I underſtand, that God created man in purity and innocence,

and that the first of that Species, by their frailty, lost at once their integrity and their Paradise, and intail'd sin and misery upon their posterity; that Almighty God, to repair this loss, did, out of his infinite mercy, and with unparallel'd grace and goodness, send his only begotten Son into the world, to teach us new truths, to be a perfect example of virtue, goodness and obedience, to restore true Religion, degenerated amongst the *Jews* into Superstition, Formality, and Hypocrisie, to die for the salvation of Mankind, and in fine, to give to us the Holy Spirit, to regenerate our Hearts, support our Faith, and lead us into all Truth. Now if it shall appear, that as the lusts of our first Parents did at that time disappoint the good intention of God in making a pure world, and brought in by their disobedience the corruptions that are now in it; so since that likewise the *Bishops* of *Rome*, by their insatiable ambition and avarice, have designedly, as much as in them lies, frustrated the merciful purpose he had, in the happy restauration he intended the world by his Son, and in the renewing and reforming of humane Nature, and have wholly defaced and spoil'd Christian Religion, and made it a worldly and a Heathenish thing, and altogether uncapable, as it is practised amongst them, either of directing the ways of its Professors to virtue and good life, or of saving their Souls hereafter: If, I say, this do appear, I know no reason why I, for detecting thus much, and for giving warning to the world to take heed of their ways, should be accused of Impiety or Atheism, or why his Holiness should be so inraged against the poor Inhabitants of the Valleys in *Savoy* and against the *Albigenses* for calling him Antichrist. But to find that this is an undoubted truth, I mean that the *Popes* have corrupted Christian Religion, we need but read the New Testament (acknowledged by themselves to be of infallible truth) and there we shall see, that the Faith and Religion preach'd by Christ, and settled afterwards by his Apostles, and cultivated by their Sacred Epistles, is so different a thing from the Christianity that is now profess'd and taught at *Rome*, that we should be convinc'd, that if those Holy men should be sent by God again into the world, they would take more pains to confute this *Gallimaufry*, than ever they did to preach down the Tradition of the *Pharisees*, or the Fables and Idolatry of the *Gentiles*, and would in probability suffer a new Martyrdom in that City under the Vicar of Christ, for the same Doctrine which once animated the Heathen Tyrants against them. Nay, we have something more to say against these Sacrilegious pretenders to God's power; for whereas all other false worships have been set up by some politick Legislators, for the support and preservation of Government, this false, this spurious Religion, brought in upon the ruines of Christianity by the *Popes*, hath deformed the face of Government in *Europe*, destroying all the good principles and Morality left us by the Heathen themselves, and introduced, instead thereof, forbid, cowardly, and impolitick Notions; whereby they have subjected Mankind, and even great *Princes* and *States*, to their own *Empire*, and never suffered any Orders or Maxims to take place, where they have power, that might make a Nation Wise, Honest, Great or Wealthy; this I have set down so plainly in those passages of my Book which are complained of, that I shall say nothing at all for the proof of it in this place, but refer you thither, and come to speak a little more particularly of my first assertion, that the *Pope* and his Clergy have depraved Christian Religion. Upon this subject I could infinitely wish, now Letters begin to revive again, that some Learned Pen would employ it self, and that some person vers'd in the Chronology of the Church (as they call it) would deduce out of the Ecclesiastical Writers, the time and manner how these abuses crept in, and by what arts and steps this *Babel*, that reaches at Heaven, was built by these sons of the Earth; but this matter, as unsuitable to the brevity of a Letter, and indeed more to my small parts and learning, I shall not pretend to, being one who never hitherto studied or writ of Theology, further than it did naturally concern the *Politicks*; therefore I shall only deal by the New Testament as I have done formerly by *Titus Livius*, that is, make observations or reflections upon it, and leave you and Mr. *Guilio*, and the rest of our Society, to make the judgment, not citing like Preachers the Chapter or Verse; because the reading of Holy Scripture is little us'd, and indeed hardly permitted amongst us. To begin at the top, I would have any reasonable man tell me, whence this unmeasurable power, long claim'd, and now possess'd by the *Bishop of Rome*, is derived, first of being Christ's Vicar, and by that (as I may so say) pretending to a Monopoly of the Holy Spirit, which was promised and given to the whole Church, that is, to the elect or Saints, as is plain by a Clause in St. *Peter*'s Sermon, made the same time that the miraculous gifts of the Spirit of God were first given to the Apostles, who says to the *Jews* and *Gentiles*, *Repent and be Baptized every one of you in the Name of Jesus Christ for the remission of Sins, and you shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost; for this promise is to you and to your Children, and to all that are afar off, even as many as the Lord our God shall call.* Next, to judge infallibly of Divine Truth, and to forgive

Sins as Christ did. Then to be the Head of all Ecclesiastical persons and causes in the world; to be so far above *Kings* and *Princes*, as to judge, depose, and deprive them, and to have an absolute jurisdiction over all the Affairs in Christendom, *in Ordine Spiritualia*; yet all this the Canonists allow him, and he makes no scruple to assume, whilst it is plain in the whole New Testament there is no description made of such an Officer to be at any time in the Church, except it be in the Prophecy of the *Apocalyps*, or in one of St. *Paul's* Epistles, where he says, who it is that shall sit in the Temple of God, shewing himself that he is God. Christ tells us, his Kingdom is not of this world, and if any will be the greatest amongst his Disciples, that he must be servant to the rest; which shews that his followers were to be great in sanctity and humility, and not in worldly power.

The Apostle *Paul* writing to the Christians of those times, almost in every Epistle commands them to be obedient to the higher Powers, or Magistrates set over them, and St. *Peter* himself (from whom this extravagant Empire is pretended to be derived) in his first Epistle, bids us submit our selves to every ordinance of man for the Lords sake, whether it be to the King, or, *&c.* and this is enjoyn'd although it is plain, that they who govern'd the world in those days, were both Heathen, Tyrants, and Usurpers, and in this submission there is no exception or proviso for Ecclesiastical immunity. The practice as well as Precepts of these Holy men shews plainly, that they had no intention to leave Successors, who should deprive Hereditary Princes from their right of Reigning for differing in Religion, who without all doubt are by the appointment of the Apostle, and by the principles of Christianity, to be obeyed and submitted to (in things wherein the fundamental Laws of the Government give them power) though they were *Jews* or *Gentiles*. If I should tell you by what Texts in Scripture the *Popes* claim the Powers before mentioned, it would stir up your laughter, and prove too light for so serious a matter; yet because possibly you may never have heard so much of this Subject before, I shall instance in a few: They tell you therefore that the Jurisdiction they pretend over the Church, and the power of pardoning Sins, comes from Christ to St. *Peter*, and from him to them: *Thou art Peter, and upon this Rock I will build my Church. I will give thee the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven; whatsoever thou shalt bind on Earth shall be bound in Heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on Earth, &c.* From these two Texts ridiculously applyed, comes this great Tree, which hath with its Branches over-spread the whole Earth, and kill'd all the good and wholsome Plants growing upon it: The first Text will never by any man of sence be understood to say more, than that the Preaching, Suffering, and Ministry, of *Peter*, was like to be a great foundation and Pillar of the Doctrine of Christ; the other Text, as also another spoken by our Saviour to all his Apostles, *whose sins ye remit they are remited, and whose sins ye retain they are retained*) are by all the Primitive fathers interpreted in this manner, whersoever you effectually Preach the Gospel, you shall carry with you Grace, and Remission of Sins to them which shall follow your instructions; but the people who shall not have these joyful Tidings communicated by you to them, shall remain in darkness, and in their Sins. But if any will contest, that by some of these last Texts, that Evangelical Excommunication, which was afterwards brought into the Church by the Apostles, was here præsignified by our great Master, how unlike were those censures to those now thundered out (as he calls it) by the *Pope?* these were for edification, and not destruction, to afflict the flesh for the salvation of the Soul; that Apostolical ordinance was pronounced for some notorious Scandal or Apostacy from the Faith, and first decreed by the Church, that is, the whole Congregation present, and then denounced by the Pastor, and reached only to debar such persons from partaking of the Communion or fellowship of that Church, till repentance should re-admit him, but was followed by no other prosecution or chastisement, as is now practised. But suppose all these Texts had been as they would have them, how does this make for the Successors of St. *Peter* or the rest? Or how can this prove the *Bishops of Rome* to have right to such succession? But I make haste from this subject, and shall urge but one Text more; which is, *The spiritual man judgeth all men, but is himself judged of none*; from whence is inferred by the Canonists, that first, the *Pope* is the Spiritual man; and then, that he is to be Judge of all the world, and last, that he is never to be liable to any judgment himself; whereas it is obvious to the meanest understanding, St. *Paul* in this Text means to distinguish between a person inspired with the Spirit of God, and one remaining in the state of Nature, which latter he says cannot judge of those Heavenly gifts and graces, as he explains himself when he says, *The Natural man cannot discern the things of the Spirit, because they are foolishness unto him.* To take my leave of this matter wholly out of the way of my Studies, I shall beg of you *Zanobio*, of *Guilio*, and the rest of our Society, to read over carefully the New Testament, and then to see what ground there is for Purgatory (by which

all

all the wealth and greatneſs hath accru'd to theſe men) what colour for the Idolatrous worſhip of Saints, and their Images, and particularly for ſpeaking in their hymns and prayers to a piece of wood (the Croſs I mean) *Salve Lignum* &c. and then *fac nos dignos beneficiorum Chriſti*, as you may read in that Office; what colour, or rather what excuſe for that horrid, unchriſtian, and barbarous Engine called the *inquiſition*, brought in by the command and authority of the *Pope*, the Inventer of which, *Peter* a Dominican Fryer, having been ſlain amongſt the *Albigeſi*, as he well deſerved, is now Canoniz'd for a Saint, and ſtil'd *San Pietro Martine*: In the dreadful Priſons of this Inquiſition, many faithful and pious Chriſtians (to ſay nothing of honeſt Moral *Moors* or *Mahometans*) are tormented and famiſh'd, or, if they out-live their ſufferings, burnt publickly to death, and that only for differing in Religion from the *Pope*, without having any crime, or the leaſt miſdemeanor proved or alledged againſt them; and this is inflicted upon theſe poor Creatures, by thoſe who profeſs to believe the Scripture, which tells us, that *faith is the gift of God*, without whoſe ſpecial illumination no man can obtain it, and therefore is not in reaſon or humanity to be puniſhed for wanting it: And Chriſt himſelf hath ſo clearly decided that point, in bidding us let the tares and the wheat grow together till the Harveſt, that I ſhall never make any difficulty to call him Antichriſt, who ſhall uſe the leaſt perſecution whatſoever againſt any differing in matters of faith from himſelf, whether the perſon ſo diſſenting be *Heretick*, *Jew*, *Gentile*, or *Mahometan*. Next, I beſeech you to obſerve in reading that Holy Book (though Chriſtian faſts are doubtleſs of Divine right) what ground there is for enjoyning fiſh to be eaten (at leaſt fleſh to be abſtained from) for one third part of the year, by which they put the poor to great hardſhip, who not having purſes to buy wholſome fiſh, are ſubjected to all the miſeries and diſeaſes incident to a bad and unhealthful dyet, whilſt the rich, and chiefly themſelves and their *Cardinals*, exceed *Lucullus* in their Luxury, of *Oyſters*, *Turbats*, *tender Crabs*, and *Carpioni* brought ſome hundreds of miles to feed their gluttony, upon theſe penitential days of abſtinence from *Beef* and *Pork*. It may be it will lye in the way of thoſe who obſerve this, to enquire what St. *Paul* means when he ſays, *That in the latter days ſome ſhall depart from the faith, forbidding to marry, and commanding to abſtain from meats which God hath created to be received with thankſgiving*; but all theſe things, and many other abuſes brought in by theſe Perverters of Chriſtianity, will I hope e're long be enquired into by ſome of the Diſciples of that bold Fryer, who the very ſame year in which I prophecyed that the ſcourge of the Church was not far off, began to thunder againſt their Indulgencies, and ſince hath queſtioned many tenets long received and impoſed upon the world. I ſhall conclude this diſcourſe after I have laid a word of the moſt Helliſh of all the innovations brought in by the *Popes*, which is the *Clergy*; theſe are a ſort of men, under pretence of miniſtring to the people in holy things, ſet apart and ſeperated from the reſt of mankind (from whom they have a very diſtinct, and a very oppoſite intereſt) by a humane Ceremony called by a divine name, *viz.* Ordination, theſe wherever they are found (with the whole body of the Monks and Fryers, who are called the regular Clergy) make a Band which may be called the *Janizaries of the Papacy*; theſe have been the cauſes of all the Soleciſms and immoralities in Government, and all the impieties and abominations in Religion, and by conſequence of all the diſorder, villany, and corruption we ſuffer under in this deteſtable Age; theſe men, by the Biſhop of *Rome*'s help, have crept into all the Governments in *Chriſtendom*, where there is any mixture of *Monarchy*, and made themſelves a third eſtate, that is, have by their temporalities (which are almoſt a third part of all the Lands in *Europe*, given them by the blind zeal, or rather folly of the *Northern* people, who over-ran this part of the world) ſlept into the throne, and what they cannot perform by theſe ſecular helps, and by the dependency their vaſſals have upon them, they fail not to claim and to uſurp, by the power they pretend to have from God and his Vice-gerent at *Rome*. They exempt themſelves, their Lands and Goods from all ſecular Juriſdiction; that is, from all Courts of Juſtice and Magiſtracy, and will be Judges in their own Cauſes, as in matters of tithe, *&c.* and not content with this, will appoint Courts of their own to decide Soveraignly in teſtamentary matters, and many other cauſes, and take upon them to be the ſole Puniſhers of many great Crimes, as Witchcraft, Sorcery, Adultry, and all uncleanneſs; to ſay nothing of the afore-mentioned judicatory of the Inquiſition: in theſe laſt caſes they turn the offenders over to be puniſh'd (when they have given Sentence) by the ſecular arm, ſo they call the Magiſtrate, who is blindly to execute their decrees under pain of Hell-fire; as if Chriſtian Princes and Governours were appointed only by God to be their Bravo's or Hangmen. They give Protection and Sanctuary to all execrable offenders, even to Murderers themſelves, (whom God commanded to be indiſpenſably puniſh'd with death) if they come within their Churches, Cloyſters, or any other place, which they

will

will pleaſe to call Holy ground; and if the ordinary juſtice, nay, the Soveraign power, do proceed againſt ſuch offender, they thunder out their Excommunication; that is, cut off from the body of Chriſt, not the Prince only, but the whole Nation and People, ſhutting the Church doors, and commanding divine Offices to ceaſe, and ſometimes even authorizing the people to riſe up in Arms, and conſtrain their Governours to a ſubmiſſion; as happened to this poor City in the time of our Anceſtors, when for but forbidding the ſervant of a poor Carmelite Fryer (who had vowed poverty, and ſhould have kept none) to go arm'd, and puniſhing his diſobedience with impriſonment, our whole Senate with their *Gonfalonier* were conſtrained to go to *Avignon* for abſolution, and in caſe of refuſal, had been maſſacred by the people. It would almoſt aſtoniſh a wiſe man to imagine how theſe folks ſhould acquire an Empire ſo deſtructive to Chriſtian Religion, and ſo pernicious to the intereſts of men; but it will not ſeem ſo miraculous to them who ſhall ſeriouſly conſider, that the Clergy hath been for more than this thouſand years upon the catch, and a form'd united corporation againſt the purity of Religion, and the intereſt of mankind, and have not only wreſted the Holy Scriptures to their own advantage (which they have kept from the laity in unknown languages, and by prohibiting the reading thereof) but made uſe likewiſe firſt of the blind devotion and ignorance of the *Goths*, *Vandals*, *Huns*, &c. and ſince of the ambition and avarice of Chriſtian Princes, ſtirring them up one againſt another, and ſending them upon fooliſh errands to the Holy Land, to loſe their lives, and to leave their Dominions, in the mean time, expoſed to themſelves and their Complices. They have beſides kept Learning and Knowledge amongſt themſelves, ſtifling the light of the Goſpel, crying down Moral virtues as ſplendid ſins, defacing humane policy, deſtroying the purity of the Chriſtian faith and profeſſion, and all that was vertuous, prudent, regular and orderly upon earth; ſo that whoever would do good, and good men ſervice, get himſelf immortal honour in this life, and eternal glory in the next, would reſtore the good policy (I had almoſt ſaid with my Author *Livy* the ſanctity too) of the *Heathens*, with all their valour, and other glorious endowments; I ſay, whoever would do this, muſt make himſelf powerful enough to extirpate this curſed and apoſtate race out of the world. And that you may ſee this is lawful as well as neceſſary, I ſhall ſay but one word of their calling and original, and then leave this ſubject. The word *Clergy* is a term, wholly unknown to the Scriptures, otherwiſe than in this ſence; a peculiar People or Gods lot, uſed often for the whole Jewiſh Nation, who are likewiſe called a Kingdom of Prieſts in ſome places. In the New Teſtament the word *Cleros* is taken for the true Believers, who are alſo called the Elect, and often the Church, which is the Aſſembly of the faithful met together, as is eaſily ſeen by reading the beginning of moſt of St. *Paul*'s Epiſtles, where writing to the Church, or Churches, he uſually explains himſelf, *To all the Saints in Chriſt*; ſometimes, *To all who have obtained like faith with us*; ſometimes, *To all who in all places call upon the Name of the Lord Jeſus*, &c. by which it appears, that neither the word Church nor Clergy was in thoſe days ever appropriated to the Paſtors or Elders of the flock; but did ſignifie indifferently all the people aſſembled together; which is likewiſe the literal conſtruction of the word *Eccleſia*, which is an aſſembly or meeting; in theſe Congregations or Churches was performed their Ordination, which properly ſignifies no more than a decree of ſuch Aſſembly, but is particularly uſed for an Election of any into the Miniſtery. The manner was this, ſometimes the Apoſtles themſelves in their Perigrinations, and ſometimes any other eminent Member of the Church, did propoſe to the Society (upon vacancy, or other neceſſity of a Paſtor, Elder, or Deacon) ſome good Holy man to be elected; which perſon if he had parts or gifts, ſuch as the Church could edifie by, was choſen by the lifting up of hands, that is by ſuffrage, and oftentimes hands were laid upon him, and Prayer made for him. Theſe men ſo ſet apart did not pretend to any conſecration, or ſacredneſs more than they had before, much leſs to become a diſtinct thing from the reſt of mankind, as if they had been metamorphos'd, but did attend to perform the ſeveral functions of their calling, as prophecying, that is, Preaching the Goſpel, viſiting the ſick, *&c.* and never intermitted the ordinary buſineſs of their Trade or Profeſſion, unleſs their Church or Congregation was very numerous, in which caſe they were maintained by alms or contribution, which was laid aſide by every member, and collected the firſt day of the week by the Deacons; this was ſaid to be given to the Church, and was imployed by ſuffrage of the whole Collective Body to the poor, and to other incidencies, ſo far was it from Sacrilege in thoſe days to employ Church goods to Lay uſes. From theſe words, *Church*, *Clergy*, *Ordination*, *Paſtor*, (which laſt hath been tranſlated of late years *Biſhop*) you ſee what concluſions theſe men have deduced, and how immenſe a ſtructure they have raiſed upon ſo little a foundation, and how eaſily it will fall to the ground, when God ſhall inſpire Chriſtian Princes and States to redeem his truths, and his poor enſlaved Members

How

bers out of their Clutches, to bring back again into the world the true original Christian faith, with the Apostolical Churches, Pastors, and Ordination, so consistent with moral virtue and integrity, so helpful and conducing to the best and most prudent Policy, so fitted for obedience to Magistracy and Government; all which the world hath for many years been deprived of, by the execrable and innate ill quality, which is inseperable from Priest-craft, and the conjuration or spell of their new invented ordination; by which they cry with the Poet,

Jam furor humanum nostro de pectore sensum
Expulit & totum spirant præcordia Phœbum.

which makes them so Sacred, and Holy, that they have nothing of integrity, or indeed of humanity left in them. I hope I shall not be thought impious any longer, upon this point, I mean for vindicating Christian Religion from the assaults of these men, who having the confidence to believe, or at least profess themselves the only instruments which God hath chosen or can choose to teach and reform the world, (though they have neither Moral virtues, nor Natural parts equal to other men for the most part) have by this pretence prevail'd so far upon the common sort of people, and upon some too of a better quality, that they are perswaded their salvation or eternal damnation depends upon believing or not believing of what they say. I would not be understood, to dissuade any from honouring the true Apostolical Teachers, when they shall be re-established amongst us, or from allowing them (even of right, and not of alms or courtesie) such emoluments as may enable them cheerfully to perform the duties of their charge, to provide for their Children, and even to use hospitality as they are commanded by St. *Paul*. But this I will prophesie before I conclude, that if Princes shall perform this business by halves, and leave any root of this Clergy or Priest-craft, as it now is, in the ground, or if that famous reformer, fled some years since out of *Picardy* to *Geneva*, who is of so great renown for learning and parts, and who promises us so perfect a reformation, shall not in his model wholly extirpate this sort of men; then I say I must foretel, that as well the Magistrate as this Workman will find themselves deceived in their expectation, and that the least *fibra* of this plant will over-run again the whole Vineyard of the Lord, and turn to a diffusive Papacy in every Diocess, perhaps in every Parish. So that God in his mercy inspire them to cut out the core of the ulcer, and the bag of this imposture, that it may never rankle or fester any more, nor break out hereafter, to diffuse new corruption and putrifaction through the body of Christ, which is his Holy Church, not to vitiate and infect the good order and true policy of Government.

I come now to the last branch of my charge, which is, that I teach Princes villany, and how to enslave and oppress their Subjects; in which acculation I am dealt with as poor *Agnolo Canini* was, who, as they report, being a very learned Practiser of the Laws, and left the only man of this profession (one Autumn) in our City, the rest of the Advocates being fled into the Country for fear of a contagious Disease which then reigned, was commanded by our Judges to assist with his Counsel both parties, and to draw Pleas as well for the defendant as the Plaintiff, else the Courts of Justice must have been shut up. In the same manner my accusers handle me, and make me first exhort and teach Subjects to throw off their Princes, and then to instruct Monarchs how to enslave and oppress them; but I did not expect such ingratitude from mine own Citizens, or to be served as *Moses* was, when he was upbraided for killing the *Egyptian*, by one of his own people for whose sake he had done it, whereas he believed they would have understood by that action, that he was the person whom God intended to make use of in delivering them from the horrid slavery they were then under. If any man will read over my Book of *the Prince* with impartiality and ordinary charity, he will easily perceive, that it is not my intention to recommend that Government, or those men there described, to the world; much less to teach them to trample upon good men, and all that is sacred and venerable upon earth, Laws, Religion, Honesty, and what not; if I have been a little too punctual in designing these Monsters, and drawn them to the life in all their lineaments and colours, I hope mankind will know them the better to avoid them, my Treatise being both a Satyr against them, and a true Character of them. I speak nothing of great and honourable Princes, as the Kings of *France*, *England*, and others, who have the States and Orders of their Kingdoms with excellent Laws and Constitution to found and maintain their Government, and who reign over the hearts as well as the persons of their subjects; I treat only of those vermin bred out of the corruption of our own small Common-wealths and Cities, or engender'd by the ill blasts that come from *Rome*, *Olivaretto da Fermo*, *Borgia*,

* Chief Magistrates.

Borgia, the *Baglioni*, the *Bentivoglii*, and an hundred others; who having had neither right nor honourable means to bring them to their power, uſe it with more violence, rapine, and cruelty upon the poor people, than thoſe other renowned Princes ſhew to the Boars, the Wolves, the Foxes, and other ſavage beaſts, which are the objects of their chaſe and hunting: whoſoever in his Empire over men is ty'd to no other rules than thoſe of his own will and luſt, muſt either be a Saint to moderate his paſſions, or elſe a very Devil incarnate; or if he be neither of theſe, both his life and reign are like to be very ſhort; for whoſoever takes upon him ſo execrable an employment as to rule men againſt the Laws of nature and of reaſon, muſt turn all topſie turvy, and never ſtick at any thing, for if once he halt, he will fall and never riſe again: I hope after this I need ſay little to juſtifie my ſelf from the calumny of adviſing theſe Monſters to break their faith, ſince to keep it is to loſe their Empire, faithfulneſs and ſincerity being their mortal enemies: An *Ugucceone della Faggivola*, to one who upbraided him, that he never employed honeſt men, anſwered, *Honeſt men will cut my Throat, let the King uſe honeſt men*, meaning the King of *Naples*, who was eſtabliſhed in his Throne, and had a right to it. But that I may have occaſion to juſtifie my ſelf againſt a little more than I am accuſed of, I will confeſs, that in a work where I deſired to be a little more ſerious, than I was in this Book of *the Prince*, I did affirm, that in what way ſoever men defended their Country, whether by breaking or keeping their faith, it was ever well defended, not meaning in a ſtrict moral ſence, or point of honour, but explaining my ſelf that *de facto* the infamy of the breach of word would quickly be forgotten and pardoned by the world, which is very true: Nay, what if I had ſaid that good ſucceſs in any enterprize (a far leſs conſideration than Piety to our Country) would have cancell'd the blame of ſuch perfidy as *Ceſar* (whom I compare to *Cataline*) us'd toward his fellow-Citizen, not only not deteſted by poſterity, but even crown'd with renown and immortal fame; inſomuch as Princes to this day (as I have obſerved elſewhere) think it an honour to be compared to him, and the higheſt pitch of veneration their flatterers can arrive at, is to call them by the name of one who violated his faith, and enſlav'd his Country. I hope that in ſhewing as well theſe Tyrants, as the poor people who are forced to live under them, their danger, that is, by laying before the former the helliſh and precipitous courſes they muſt uſe to maintain their power, by repreſenting to the latter what they muſt ſuffer, I may be inſtrumental, firſt, to deter private Citizens from attempting upon the liberties of their Country, or if they have done it, to make them lay down their ill gotten authority; and then to warn the reſt of the Nobility and people, from theſe factions and malignancies in their ſeveral common-wealths and Governments, which might give hope and opportunity to thoſe who are ambitious amongſt them, to aſpire to an Empire over them. However it prove, I hope I am no more to be blamed for my attempt, than that excellent Phyſician of our Nation is, who hath lately taken ſo much pains to compoſe an excellent Treatiſe of that foul Diſeaſe, which was not long ſince brought from the new world into theſe parts; wherein though he be forced to uſe ſuch expreſſions as are almoſt able to nauſeate his Readers, and talk of ſuch Ulcers, Boyls, Nodes, Botches, Cankers, *&c.* that are ſcarce fit to be repeated, eſpecially when he handles the cauſes of thoſe effects, yet he did not intend to teach or exhort men to get this Diſeaſe; much leſs did he bring this lamentable infirmity into the world; but deſcribes it faithfully as it is, to the end men may be bettered, and avoid the being infected with it, and may diſcern and cure it, whenever their incontinence and folly ſhall procure it them. I ſhall ſay no more in this matter; but to conclude all, make a proteſtation, that as well in this Book, as in all my other Writings, my only ſcope and deſign is to promote the intereſt and welfare of mankind, and the peace and quiet of the world; both which I am ſo vain as to believe, would be better obtained and provided for, if the principles I lay down were followed and obſerved by Princes and People, than they are like to be by thoſe Maxims which are in this Age moſt in vogue. For my ſelf I ſhall only ſay, (and call you all to witneſs for the truth of it) that as by my Birth I am a Gentleman, and of a Family which hath had many * *Gonfaloniers* of juſtice in it; ſo I have been uſed in many employments of great truſt, both in our City and abroad, and at this hour I am not in my Eſtate one penny the better for them all, nor ſhould I have been although I had never ſuffered any loſſes by the ſeiſure of my Eſtate in the year 1531. For my carriage, it hath ever been void of faction and contention; I never had any prejudice againſt the Houſe of *Medici*, but honoured the perſons of all thoſe of that Family whom I knew, and the memory of ſuch of them as lived before me, whom I acknowledge to have been excellent Patriots and Pillars of our City and Common-wealth. During the turbulent times of *Piero*, and after his expulſion out of *Florence*, though my employments were but Miniſterial, my advice was asked in many grave matters, which I ever delivered with im-

* *Chief Magiſtrates.*

partiality

partiality and indifference, not eſpouſing the heady opinons of any, much leſs their paſſions and animoſities; I never ſided with any Party further than the Duty of my charge obliged me to ſerve the prevailing Party, when poſſeſs'd of the Government of our City; this I ſpeak for thoſe changes which happened between the flight of the ſaid *Piero de Medici*, and the horrid Parricide committed by *Clement* the 7th. upon his indulgent Mother, joyning with his greateſt Enemies, and uniting himſelf with thoſe who had uſed the moſt tranſendent inſolence to his own perſon, and the higheſt violence and fury the Sun ever ſaw to his poor Courtiers and Subjects, that ſo accompanied he might ſheath his Sword in the bowels of his own deſolate Country. At that time, and during that whole Siege, I muſt confeſs I did break the confines of my Neutrality, and not only acted as I was commanded barely, but rouz'd my ſelf, and ſtir'd up others, haranguing (in the Streets and places of the City) the People to defend with the laſt drop of their blood, the Walls of their Country, and the Liberty of their Government; taking very hazardous Journeys to *Ferruccio*, and then into the *Mugello* and other parts, to bring in Succours and Proviſions to our languiſhing City; and acting as a Soldier (which was a new profeſſion to me) at the age of above ſixty, when others are diſpenſed from it. For all which, I had ſo entire a ſatisfaction in my mind and conſcience, that I am perſwaded this cordial made me able to ſupport the ſufferings which befel me after our Cataſtrophe, and to rejoyce in them ſo far, that all the malice and cruelty of our Enemies could never draw one word from me unſuitable to the honour I thought I merited, and did in ſome ſort enjoy, for being inſtrumental to defend (as long as it was poſſible) our Altars and our Hearths. But all that I have undergone hath been abundantly recompenced to me by the favour and courteſie of the moſt excellent Signiot *Coſimo*, who hath been pleaſed to offer me all the preferments the greateſt ambition could aſpire to, which I did not refuſe out of my ſcruple to ſerve ſo incomparable a Prince, whoſe early years manifeſt ſo much Courage, Humanity, and Prudence, and ſo fatherly a care of the publick good, but becauſe I was very deſirous not to accept of a charge which I was not able to perform, my years and infirmities having now brought me to a condition in which I am fitter to live in a Cloyſter than a Palace, and made me good for nothing but to talk of paſt times, the common vice of old Age: So that I did not think it juſt or grateful to reward this excellent perſon ſo ill for his kindneſs, as to give him an uſeleſs Servant, and to fill up the place of a far better. This is all I think fit to ſay of this matter; I chuſe to addreſs it to you *Zenobio*, for the conſtant friendſhip I have ever entertained with you, and formerly with your deceaſed Father, the companion of my Studies, and ornament of our City. And ſo I bid you farewel.

The firſt of April,
1537.

F I N I S.

MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM